United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 2, 2022*

Decided September 7, 2022 

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 21-3413 

BOBBY LEE DICKERSON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GOOGLE, INC., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:21-cv-03103-SLD-TSH

Sara Darrow, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R

Bobby Lee Dickerson appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit, in which he alleged a 

far-reaching plot to deprive him of the use of an account and email address with 

Google.com. Because Dickerson fails to develop any argument that the decision was 

flawed, we dismiss the appeal. 

* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this 

appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is 

frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-3413 Page 2 

After losing access to his Gmail account by unexplained means, Dickerson sued 

Google, Facebook, Android, YouTube, the Federal Communications Commission, all 

state and federal judges, and numerous other parties for violating his constitutional 

rights “by not trying to give [him his] old account back.” He believes that the account 

was taken from him and not returned because he is a Black man. Dickerson further 

alleged that the defendants used illegal wiretaps and caused his networks to crash. He

referred to other misdeeds, including prosecutorial and judicial misconduct and 

violations of the Second and Fourth Amendments, state disability laws, and the Hobbs 

Act, but he did not expand his factual allegations.

When Dickerson moved to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court granted 

that motion and dismissed the complaint upon screening. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

First, the court reasoned that Dickerson failed to state a claim because the allegations 

were conclusory and lacked factual support. The court further explained that amending 

the complaint would be futile because Dickerson’s “irrational, incredible allegations” 

were frivolous.

After Dickerson appealed, this court requested jurisdictional briefing because the 

notice of appeal appeared to be late. The district court then realized that the judgment 

order did not accurately reflect the parties because it omitted certain defendants from 

the caption. (And here, the defendants’ identities triggered different deadlines for a 

notice of appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A)–(B).) The district court thus entered an 

“amended” judgment solely to include all defendants. Although a notice of appeal 

typically strips a district court of jurisdiction, we understand the court to have simply 

corrected the miscaptioned judgment order nunc pro tunc, which is permitted with leave 

of this court while an appeal is pending. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a); Local 1545, United Mine 

Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) (construing a 

request for jurisdictional briefing as leave to correct a judgment). 

Though we have jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal because Dickerson fails to 

provide any basis for finding error in the district court’s decision, as required by 

Rule 28(a)(8) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Anderson v. Hardman, 

241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001). We construe pro se arguments liberally but cannot 

glean any ground for reversal from Dickerson’s two sentences generally asserting that

his rights are being “shre[]dded.” Failing to develop any argument is a waiver. Shipley 

v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2020). 

DISMISSED