[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2019-Ohio-2018.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 18AP-7 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CR-2375) 

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Guy Taylor, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 23, 2019 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, for appellant. Argued: Steven L. Taylor. 

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Ian J. 

Jones, for appellee. Argued: Ian J. Jones. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

BROWN, J. 

{¶1} The State of Ohio, plaintiff-appellant, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, in which the court granted the motion to 

suppress evidence filed by Guy Taylor, defendant-appellee. 

{¶2} A confidential informant ("informant") contacted the Whitehall Police 

Department ("WPD" or "police") and told them appellee was selling heroin. Using the 

informant, police conducted a controlled buy of heroin from appellee. On November 20, 

2016, and within 72 hours of the controlled buy, police obtained a search warrant for 

appellee's residence. On November 22, 2016, police executed the search warrant using 

their "swoop" policy. Pursuant to the swoop policy, police waited for appellee to exit his 
No. 18AP-7 2

residence, get into his vehicle, and travel about two blocks away from his residence. Police 

then initiated a traffic stop of appellee's vehicle. Police informed appellee they had a 

search warrant for his residence. Appellee told police that, although he had no drugs at his 

residence, he did have heroin on his person. Police searched appellee and confiscated a 

bag of heroin. 

{¶3} Appellee was indicted on one count of trafficking in heroin and one count of 

possession of heroin, both fourth-degree felonies. On October 20, 2017, appellee filed a 

motion to suppress evidence with regard to the heroin police confiscated from his person 

during the traffic stop. Appellee argued the search warrant for his residence did not 

authorize police to initiate a traffic stop. 

{¶4} On December 15, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on appellee's motion to 

suppress. At the hearing, WPD Sergeant Jonathan Earl testified on behalf of the state 

regarding the circumstances surrounding the informant, search warrant, and traffic stop. 

Appellee did not cross-examine Sergeant Earl, call any witnesses, or present any evidence. 

{¶5} On December 28, 2017, the trial court issued a decision in which it granted 

appellee's motion to suppress. The court first found that, pursuant to Bailey v. United 

States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), appellee could not be detained pursuant to the search 

warrant because such detainments must be made within the immediate vicinity of the 

premises. The court then found police could not stop appellee's vehicle because they did 

not have reasonable suspicion pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and they did 

not have probable cause to arrest appellee. The court also found the swoop policy was 

unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, and exclusion of the evidence was the 

only meaningful remedy to correct this violation. 

{¶6} The state appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following 

three assignments of error: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS BASED ON THE FAILURE TO OBTAIN AN 

ARREST WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT'S PUBLIC ARREST. 

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABSUSED ITS 

DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT REASONABLE 

SUSPICION WAS LACKING TO ENGAGE IN A TERRY 

STOP. 
No. 18AP-7 3 

[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT EXCLUDED THE EVIDENCE IN 

THE ABSENCE OF A CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE 

FOURTH AMENDMENT. 

{¶7} The state argues in its first assignment of error the trial court erred when it 

granted the motion to suppress based on the failure to obtain an arrest warrant for 

appellee's public arrest. An appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence 

presents mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332 (4th 

Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of 

fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness 

credibility. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992); State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 

521, 548 (2d Dist.1996). As a result, an appellate court must accept a trial court's factual 

findings if they are supported by competent and credible evidence. State v. Guysinger, 86 

Ohio App.3d 592, 594 (4th Dist.1993). The reviewing court must then review the trial 

court's application of the law de novo. State v. Russell, 127 Ohio App.3d 414, 416 (9th 

Dist.1998). 

{¶8} In the present case, the state argues there existed probable cause for the 

police to arrest appellee. Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se, subject only to a 

few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 

204, 207 (1978). A warrantless arrest that is based on probable cause and occurs in a 

public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 

2007-Ohio-4837, ¶ 66, citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). R.C. 2935.04 

provides that "[w]hen a felony has been committed, or there is reasonable ground to 

believe that a felony has been committed, any person without a warrant may arrest 

another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of the offense, and detain him 

until a warrant can be obtained." Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists "if all the 

facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge were sufficient to cause a prudent 

person to believe that the individual has committed or was committing an offense." State 

v. Dingess, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1232, 2002-Ohio-2775, ¶ 9, citing Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). "A warrantless arrest does not require the officer's 

absolute knowledge that a crime has been committed; it requires only a reasonable belief 

based on the totality of the circumstances." State v. Grayson, 8th Dist. No. 102057, 2015-
No. 18AP-7 4 

Ohio-3229, ¶ 19. Furthermore, probable cause is not subjective. State v. Abrams, 12th 

Dist. No. CA2007-03-040, 2008-Ohio-94, ¶ 12. "The subjective intentions of the officers 

are irrelevant in a probable cause determination." State v. Cabell, 6th Dist. No. L-06-

1026, 2006-Ohio-4914, ¶ 27. Rather, probable cause is viewed under an objective 

standard. Abrams at ¶ 12. 

{¶9} Here, the trial court found police did not have probable cause to arrest 

appellee on the date in question. The court held that exigent circumstances did not exist 

to justify a warrantless arrest and search of appellee in that the state did not meet the 

heavy burden to demonstrate an urgent need to arrest appellee without a warrant. The 

court concluded that police had ample opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant for 

appellee based on Sergeant Earl's knowledge of the controlled sale to the informant but 

strategically decided not to request an arrest warrant in order to utilize their swoop policy. 

{¶10} In its assignment of error, the state asserts police had probable cause to 

make a warrantless public arrest of appellee based on their knowledge of the previous 

controlled buy. The state points out that police monitored the controlled hand-to-hand 

drug transaction involving the informant, police confirmed the drug as heroin, police had 

appellee's photograph from his driver's license, and the informant had identified 

appellee's photograph. The state argues that, despite the court's finding that police lacked 

probable cause to arrest appellee on the date of the search because there were no 

attendant exigent circumstances at the time, probable cause still existed at the time of the 

stop based on the controlled sale five days prior, and both the Supreme Court of Ohio and 

the United States Supreme Court have rejected the need for any exigency requirement for 

an arrest warrant for a public arrest based on probable cause. 

{¶11} After reviewing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and 

reviewing pertinent case law, we agree with the state and find the trial court erred when it 

found there existed no probable cause here and that exigent circumstances were required 

for a warrantless arrest. The facts, as testified to at the hearing, clearly detail the 

controlled buy by the informant five days before appellee's arrest. Sergeant Earl testified 

that he was informed by the informant that appellee was selling heroin in Whitehall. 

Sergeant Earl identified appellee using several law enforcement databases and was able to 

identify where appellee was living. Police set up a controlled buy with the informant and 
No. 18AP-7 5

observed appellee selling heroin to the informant. The informant was someone who had 

been reliable multiple times previously. Sergeant Earl testified that, after obtaining a 

search warrant for appellee's residence, police allowed appellee to leave his residence in 

his vehicle and then a uniformed officer took him "into custody." After appellee told 

Sergeant Earl he had heroin on his person, Sergeant Earl "[c]onducted a search incident 

to arrest." He testified that, when appellee left his residence, he believed appellee was 

involved or may have been involved in criminal activity based on the controlled narcotics 

buy.

{¶12} There can be no serious dispute that the controlled buy provided probable 

cause to arrest appellee. The offenses for which appellee was indicted, possession of 

heroin and trafficking in heroin, are felony offenses, pursuant to R.C. 2925.11 and 

2925.03, respectively. Thus, appellee's offenses clearly fall under the authorization for 

warrantless arrests for felony offenses outlined in R.C. 2935.04, as quoted above. 

Furthermore, this court, as well as others, has found probable cause under similar 

circumstances, even when the controlled buy was remote in time to the arrest. See, e.g., 

State v. Hovatter, 5th Dist. No. 17-CA-37, 2018-Ohio-2254 (there was sufficient probable 

cause to arrest the defendant based on the three prior controlled drug transactions 

occurring five to six months prior to the arrest); State v. Phillips, 10th Dist. No. 15AP1038, 2016-Ohio-5944 (defendant's warrantless arrest was justified as officers had 

probable cause to arrest him based on two controlled drug buys from a confidential 

informant occurring within 72 hours and 7 days prior to the arrest). Thus, we find 

probable cause existed based on the controlled drug buy by the informant. 

{¶13} However, in granting the motion to suppress, the trial court found that, in 

addition to probable cause, there must exist exigent circumstances that prevented police 

from obtaining an arrest warrant, and police had ample opportunity to obtain an arrest 

warrant for appellee based on Sergeant Earl's knowledge of the controlled sale to the 

informant five days prior. In support of such proposition, the trial court relied on State v. 

VanNoy, 188 Ohio App.3d 89, 2010-Ohio-2845 (2d Dist.), and State v. Heston, 29 Ohio 

St.2d 152 (1972). In VanNoy, the Second District Court of Appeals held that a warrantless 

arrest "must not only be supported by probable cause, but it must also be shown that 

obtaining an arrest warrant beforehand was impracticable under the circumstances, i.e., 
No. 18AP-7 6

that exigent circumstances exist." Id. at ¶ 23, citing Heston. In Heston, the Supreme Court 

found that a warrantless arrest may be made when a police officer has probable cause to 

believe that a felony has taken place and the circumstances must be such as to make it 

impracticable to secure a warrant. Id. at 155. 

{¶14} However, this court has never followed VanNoy for the proposition relied 

on by appellee and the trial court and has, instead, followed the Supreme Court's decision 

in Brown. Similarly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals noted in Hovatter that the Second 

District's approach in VanNoy is a minority position and is not the state of the law in 

Ohio's Fifth Appellate District, which uniformly follows the Supreme Court's Brown

decision. Hovatter at ¶ 15-16. There is also dissent within the Second District Court of 

Appeals as to whether exigent circumstances are required for warrantless arrests made 

with probable cause. See State v. Armstead, 2d Dist. No. 26640, 2015-Ohio-5010 

(Welbaum, J., dissenting) (Heston has been discredited by Watson and Brown, and 

exigent circumstances or an undue delay requirement cannot be imposed on warrantless 

arrests made with probable cause). Indeed, in Watson, the United States Supreme Court 

specifically refused to find an exigency requirement for warrantless arrests made with 

probable cause, finding: 

Congress has plainly decided against conditioning warrantless 

arrest power on proof of exigent circumstances. Law 

enforcement officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants 

where practicable to do so, and their judgments about 

probable cause may be more readily accepted where backed 

by a warrant issued by a magistrate. But we decline to 

transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule 

when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long 

been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause 

rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless 

litigation with respect to the existence of exigent 

circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, 

whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like. 

(Citations omitted.) Watson at 423-24. We echoed this finding in Watson in State v. 

Salvito, 10th Dist. No. 81AP-152 (Nov. 3, 1981), stating " 'The necessary inquiry, therefore, 

was not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get [a warrant], but 

whether there was probable cause for the arrest.' " Id., quoting Watson at 417. Therefore, 

we continue to adhere to the holdings in Brown and Watson that a warrantless arrest that 
No. 18AP-7 7

is based on probable cause and occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. 

{¶15} This court addressed similar circumstances in Phillips and found probable 

cause existed without any analysis of exigent circumstances. In Phillips, the WPD 

obtained a search warrant for the defendant's home based on two prior controlled drug 

buys—one within the prior 7 days and one within the prior 72 hours—using a confidential 

informant. Following the issuance of the search warrant, police stopped the defendant in 

his vehicle after he left the residence identified in the search warrant. At the suppression 

hearing, the officer testified that, at the time the defendant was stopped, he still had 

probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a drug trafficking offense. He said 

that, after stopping the defendant, they arrested him, seized his keys, and used the keys to 

open the door of the residence named in the search warrant. The trial court denied the 

motion to suppress. On appeal, we considered whether the defendant's warrantless arrest 

prior to the execution of the search warrant was proper. We concluded that detention of 

the defendant's vehicle and subsequent arrest were justified because the officers had 

probable cause to arrest him based on the two prior drug transactions. We found that, 

based on the facts and circumstances that were known at the time of the defendant's 

detention, a reasonably prudent person would believe the defendant had committed an 

offense. Therefore, we held in Phillips, under the totality of the circumstances, probable 

cause existed to arrest the defendant without a warrant. 

{¶16} Likewise, in the present case, police had probable cause to stop appellee's 

vehicle and initiate an arrest based on the prior controlled drug buy. The prior controlled 

drug transaction with the informant was known to police officers at the time they pulled 

over appellee's vehicle. Similar to the testifying detective in Phillips, Sergeant Earl 

testified here that, when appellee left his residence, he still believed appellee was involved 

in criminal activity based on the earlier controlled narcotics purchase. Thus, here, we find 

that based on the prior controlled drug buy known to police, a reasonably prudent person 

would believe appellee had committed an offense. 

{¶17} Appellee contends police had no actual intent to arrest him but, instead, 

only intended to detain him away from the scene of the search warrant while the warrant 

was executed. We disagree. There was sufficient evidence provided by the state at the 
No. 18AP-7 8

hearing to conclude police intended to arrest appellee. Sergeant Earl testified a uniformed 

officer took appellee "into custody" and "[c]onducted a search incident to arrest." 

Sergeant Earl stated the method they used to apprehend appellee in his vehicle away from 

the search warrant site was "a quiet way of arresting a subject." The trial court specifically 

found Sergeant Earl's testimony credible, consistent, and uncontroverted, without any 

suggestion of bias or motive to lie. The trial court also apparently agreed appellee was 

arrested, as it made several references to the fact that appellee was arrested after police 

pulled over his vehicle. The state bears the burden of proof on whether a warrantless 

arrest was based on probable cause, State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 559 (1996), and, 

here, at the suppression hearing, the state presented the credible testimony of Sergeant 

Earl to support a finding that police intended to arrest appellee based on the prior 

controlled buy. 

{¶18} We note appellee claims that other circumstances also demonstrate there 

was no intent to arrest him after he was pulled over. Appellee contends he was never 

charged with anything out of the controlled sale, police did not conform with the 

requirements of an arrest under R.C. 2935.07, and a warrant was never obtained 

following the arrest as required by Crim.R. 4(E)(2) and (F) and R.C. 2935.03. However, 

there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing with regard to these claims. 

Our review on appeal of a motion to suppress is limited to evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing. State v. Monford, 190 Ohio App.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4732, ¶ 45-46 

(10th Dist.) (holding that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an 

appellate court may only consider evidence that was presented during the suppression 

hearing). Although the state bore the burden of proving probable cause, in response, 

appellee failed to present any evidence or witnesses at the suppression hearing to 

contradict Sergeant Earl's testimony and did not cross-examine Sergeant Earl. Therefore, 

we find appellee's unsupported arguments without merit. 

{¶19} Based on all the foregoing, we find the evidence at the suppression hearing 

established that police had knowledge of the prior controlled drug buy, police intended to 

arrest appellee, and a reasonably prudent person would have believed appellee committed 

an offense. Therefore, police had probable cause here, and the trial court erred when it 
No. 18AP-7 9

granted appellee's motion to suppress. The state's first assignment of error is sustained. 

Given this determination, the state's second and third assignments of error are moot. 

{¶20} Accordingly, the state's first assignment of error is sustained, the second 

and third assignments of error are rendered moot, the judgment of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded to that court for further 

proceedings in accordance with law, consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

DORRIAN and NELSON, JJ., concur. 

____________________