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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

October 8, 2015 

v No. 318854 

St. Clair Circuit Court 

JUSTIN TIMOTHY COMER, LC No. 11-001804-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

GLEICHER, P.J. (concurring). 

 I concur with the result reached in the majority opinion only because I am compelled to 

do so by People v Harris, 224 Mich App 597; 569 NW2d 525 (1997). In my view, Harris was 

wrongly decided and should be overruled by our Supreme Court. Further, I believe that the 

Supreme Court has signaled, albeit in obiter dictum, that the analysis set forth in Harris is deeply 

flawed. Were it not for Harris, I would vacate the electronic monitoring provision from 

defendant’s sentence. 

 Resolution of this case hinges on an interpretation of two closely related court rules. The 

first, MCR 6.429 sets forth two relevant subrules. Subrule (A) establishes that a trial court 

possesses the authority to correct an invalid sentence. Subrule (B), titled “Time for Filing 

Motion,” sets forth various time limits for filing a motion to correct an invalid sentence. 

Subsection (B)(1) provides that “[a] motion to correct an invalid sentence may be filed before the 

filing of a timely claim of appeal.” If a claim of appeal has already been filed, a motion to 

correct an invalid sentence may be filed only in accordance with the procedure set forth in MCR 

7.208(B), or the remand procedure set forth in MCR 7.211(C)(1).1

 MCR 6.429(B)(2). If the 

matter involves adefendant who may only appeal by leave (as here), a motion to correct an 

invalid sentence must be filed “within 6 months of entry of the judgment of conviction and 

sentence.” MCR 6.429(B)(3). When a defendant is no longer entitled to appeal by leave, 

 

1

 MCR 7.208(B) provides that “[n]o later than 56 days after the commencement of the time for 

filing the defendant-appellant’s brief” in the Court of Appeals, the defendant may file in the trial 

court a motion to correct an invalid sentence. MCR 7.211(C)(1) addresses motions to remand 

filed in the Court of Appeals “[w]ithin the time provided for filing the appellant’s brief.” Neither 

rule applies here. 
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“defendant may seek relief pursuant to the procedure set forth in subchapter 6.500.” MCR 

6.429(B)(4). 

 These procedures clearly contemplate that a court may correct an invalid sentence only 

after a party has filed a motion seeking that relief. Although MCR 6.429(A) imbues a court with 

the authority to correct an invalid sentence, MCR 6.429(B) describes in considerable detail the 

process for correcting an invalid sentence. That process commences with the filing of a motion. 

Justice STEPHEN MARKMAN reached the same conclusion when dissenting from an order denying 

leave to appeal in People v Peck, 481 Mich 863 (2008). Joined by Justice CAVANAGH, Justice 

MARKMAN wrote that MCR 6.429 “requires that a ‘motion’ be ‘filed’ by a ‘party’ before a trial 

court may correct a sentence.” Id. at 867 n 1. No motion was filed in the case at bar. 

 Furthermore, I believe that the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v Holder, 483 Mich 

168; 767 NW2d 423 (2009), comes close to implicitly overruling Harris. The defendant in 

Holder committed several crimes after receiving a parole discharge from prison. Id. at 169. The 

trial court sentenced him for those crimes. Subsequently, the Department of Corrections notified 

the defendant and the trial court that it had “cancelled” the defendant’s parole discharge. The 

DOC asked the judge “to amend the defendant’s judgment of sentence to reflect that the sentence 

imposed was to be served consecutively to the sentence for which defendant was on parole.” Id. 

at 170. The judge complied with this request. Id. The Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause the 

original judgment of sentence was valid when imposed, the sentencing judge had no authority to 

modify it pursuant to MCR 6.429(A),” and vacated the amended sentence. Id. The Supreme 

Court emphasized that notices sent by the DOC to trial courts “are merely advisory and 

informational in nature,” and do not excuse compliance with “the relevant statutes and court 

rules.” Id. 

Holder is distinguishable from this case, as the sentence in Holder was valid when 

imposed while defendant’s sentence was not. However, in obiter dictum the Holder Court 

observed: 

 While the DOC certainly has an obligation to ensure that any sentence 

executed is free from errors, the department is not a party to the underlying 

criminal proceedings under either MCR 6.429 or MCR 6.435. As a result, we 

wish to reiterate that any notices sent from the DOC to the courts and parties 

regarding sentencing errors are merely informational, and any requests contained 

therein merely advisory. Any judge receiving such a notice must ascertain the 

nature of the claimed error, determine whether the error implicates a defendant’s 

sentence, and consider the curative action recommended by the DOC. It is 

imperative, however, that any corrections or modifications to a judgment of 

sentence must comply with the relevant statutes and court rules. Significantly, if 

the claimed error is substantive, the court may modify the sentence only “[a]fter 

giving the parties an opportunity to be heard” and if “it has not yet entered 

judgment in the case. . . .” MCR 6.435(B). Similarly, if the original judgment of 

sentence was valid when entered, MCR 6.429(A) controls and mandates that the 

court “may not modify a valid sentence after it has been imposed except as 

provided by law.” [Id. at 176-177 (emphasis added, alterations in original).] 
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 Here, as in Holder, a letter from the DOC triggered the trial court’s correction of 

defendant’s sentence. Here, as in Holder, the error was substantive rather than clerical. I 

conclude, as the Supreme Court indicated in Holder, that the procedure for correcting a 

substantive error is governed by MCR 6.435(B). 

 MCR 6.435 empowers courts to correct “mistakes.” This court rule distinguishes 

between two types of mistakes—“clerical” and “substantive”—as follows: 

 (A) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other 

parts of the record and errors arising from oversight or omission may be corrected 

by the court at any time on its own initiative or on motion of a party, and after 

notice if the court orders it. 

 (B) Substantive Mistakes. After giving the parties an opportunity to be 

heard, and provided it has not yet entered judgment in the case, the court may 

reconsider and modify, correct, or rescind any order it concludes was erroneous. 

[Emphasis added.] 

Because the omission of lifetime electronic monitoring from both judgments of sentence 

constituted a substantive rather than a clerical mistake, were it not for Harris, I would hold that 

the trial court lacked the authority to correct this mistake. 

 According to the 1989 Staff Comment to MCR 6.435, subrule (A) permits a court to 

correct “an inadvertent error or omission in the record, or in an order or judgment.” The purpose 

of subrule (A) “is to make the lower court record and judgment accurately reflect what was done 

and decided at the trial level.” Central Cartage Co v Fewless, 232 Mich App 517, 536; 591 

NW2d 422 (1998) (discussing MCR 2.612[A], which is identical to MCR 6.435[A]). 

 The staff comment explains that subrule (B), addressing “substantive mistakes,” “pertains 

to mistakes relating not to the accuracy of the record, but rather, to the correctness of the 

conclusions and decisions reflected in the record.” The comment continues, “[s]ubstantive 

mistake refers to a conclusion or decision that is erroneous because it was based on a mistaken 

belief in the facts or the applicable law.” MCR 6.435, 1989 Staff Comment. The comment 

provides the following examples intended to “illustrate the distinction” between clerical and 

substantive mistakes: 

A prison sentence entered on a judgment that is erroneous because the judge 

misspoke or the clerk made a typing error is correctable under subrule (A). A 

prison sentence entered on a judgment that is erroneous because the judge relied 

on mistaken facts (for example, confused codefendants) or made a mistake of law 

(for example, unintentionally imposed a sentence in violation of the Tanner rule2

) 

 

2

 The “Tanner rule” refers to the pre-legislative sentencing guideline rule that a defendant’s 

minimum sentence could be no more than 2/3 his maximum sentence. See People v Tanner, 387 

Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972). 
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is a substantive mistake and is correctable by the judge under subrule (B) until the 

judge signs the judgment, but not afterwards. [Id.] 

 During defendant’s first two sentencing hearings, neither Judge Adair nor the prosecuting 

attorney mentioned lifetime electronic monitoring. Most likely, this was because it remained 

unclear whether lifetime electronic monitoring was required when a defendant’s CSC-I offense 

did not involve a child under the age of 13. Brantley and King illustrate the disagreement 

involving this legal question. In my view, Judge Adair (and the prosecutor) neglected to raise 

the issue of lifetime monitoring because both were “laboring under a misconception of the law.” 

See People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 170; 312 NW2d 638 (1981). Their misconception gave 

rise to a substantive mistake requiring correction. Under MCR 6.435(B), that correction could 

only occur before the court entered a judgment of sentence. 

 Notably, in Harris, this Court failed to address MCR 6.435. I believe that properly 

construed, MCR 6.435 governs the procedure for correcting mistakes that render a sentence 

invalid. Although MCR 6.429 empowers a trial court to make corrections, MCR 6.435 imposes 

limits on that authority. Because the correction of substantive mistakes must occur before entry 

of the judgment of sentence, I believe that Judge West was foreclosed from adding lifetime 

electronic monitoring as a term of defendant’s sentence. 

 Finally, I believe that Judge West erred by attempting to circumvent MCR 6.435 by 

withdrawing defendant’s guilty plea and forcing him to enter a renewed plea of guilty. A 

defendant may move to withdraw his guilty plea within six months after sentence, and thereafter 

only in accordance with the procedure set forth in MCR 6.500 et seq. MCR 6.310(C). 

Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea within six months, and never invoked the 

procedures set forth in MCR 6.500 et seq. MCR 6.310(C) further provides: 

 If the trial court determines that there was an error in the plea proceeding that 

would entitle the defendant to have the plea set aside, the court must give the 

advice or make the inquiries necessary to rectify the error and then give the 

defendant the opportunity to elect to allow the plea and sentence to stand or to 

withdraw the plea.” 

In context, this provision of MCR 6.310(C) relates to the trial court’s determination of a motion

brought by a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. MCR 6.310(E) allows a court to vacate a plea 

on a prosecutor’s motion “if the defendant has failed to comply with the terms of a plea 

agreement.” I have located no authority empowering a trial court to independently decide, years 

after sentencing, that a defect in the plea proceeding required setting aside a guilty plea. 

Moreover, in People v Strong, 213 Mich App 107, 112; 539 NW2d 736 (1995), this Court 

emphasized that a “trial court may exercise its discretion to vacate an accepted plea only under 

the parameters of the court rule.” Thus, in my view the trial court abused its discretion by 

withdrawing defendant’s guilty plea and requiring him to re-plead, and did not restart the clock 

under MCR 6.435(B). 
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Harris permits a trial court to substantively modify a defendant’s sentence without a 

motion, and at any time. I believe that MCR 6.435 was intended to rein in a court’s authority to 

alter even an invalid sentence, and urge the Supreme Court to consider this question. 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher