United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1677

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

GUILLERMO GONZÁLEZ-SANTILLAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Rikelman, Hamilton, and Thompson,

Circuit Judges.

Raúl S. Mariani Franco, for appellant.

Ricardo A. Imbert-Fernández, Assistant United States 

Attorney, with whom Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and W. Stephen 

Muldrow, United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee. 

July 11, 2024

 Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. A person absconds when he 

"depart[s] secretly and hide[s] [himself]." Merriam Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/absconds (last visited 

June 10, 2024) [https://perma.cc/4C43-7TLW]. That's precisely 

what Appellant Guillermo González-Santillan ("González-Santillan

") did. In 2009, González-Santillan fled Puerto Rico to evade his 

sentencing hearing for conspiracy to commit money laundering after 

entering into -- and pleading guilty pursuant to -- a plea 

agreement with the government. After being on the run for thirteen 

years, González-Santillan was eventually caught in the Dominican 

Republic and returned to the United States, where he awaited 

sentencing. However, now González-Santillan faced a recommended 

two-point obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement for his 

abscondment. 

The upshot. Currently, González-Santillan is serving a 

seventy-month term of imprisonment. In this appeal, he asks us to 

vacate his sentence and judgment and to remand because, in his 

telling, the district court erred in imposing the enhancement. On 

review, we aren't persuaded and therefore decline the invitation

to let González-Santillan escape his sentence. 
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HOW GONZÁLEZ-SANTILLAN GOT HERE1

Beginning in 2007, González-Santillan conspired with his 

co-defendants to launder drug money. As a part of their scheme, 

they moved drug money belonging to Colombian traffickers into 

various United States bank accounts. Collectively their 

conspiracy delivered deposits of over $2,000,000, and 

González-Santillan himself was involved in the delivery of over 

$1,500,000 for depositing. This all came to a head in 2008 when 

González-Santillan was indicted by a grand jury in the District of 

Puerto Rico on one count of conspiring to commit money laundering 

and five counts of aiding and abetting money laundering. In due 

course, González-Santillan and the government struck a plea deal 

in which González-Santillan agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy 

to commit money laundering (count one) in exchange for the 

government's dismissal of his other counts at sentencing (counts 

two through six).2

1 We glean the relevant facts from the plea agreement, 

presentence investigation report, and transcript of the sentencing 

hearing. See United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 280 

n.2 (1st Cir. 2017); see, e.g., United States v. Lasalle González, 

857 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2017).

2 González-Santillan pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 

commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which in 

relevant part provides that "[a]ny person who conspires to commit 

any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be 

subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense 

the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy."
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Per the plea agreement, González-Santillan landed an 

adjusted offense level of twenty-five giving him an advisory 

guideline range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months' 

imprisonment. As relevant to this appeal, the plea agreement 

provided that "[t]he parties agree[d] that no other adjustments or 

departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by 

the parties" and that the government reserved its right "to dispute 

sentencing factors or facts material to sentencing." The United 

States Pretrial and Probation Office ("USPO") prepared a 

presentence report that noted the parties' agreement. 

González-Santillan entered his guilty plea on March 3, 2009 and 

the court scheduled a sentencing hearing. And here's where things 

began to go off the rails. 

Prior to his sentencing, González-Santillan failed to 

appear for a scheduled meeting with his probation officer on June 

8th. And then, the next day, he failed to appear for his sentencing 

hearing. In response, the court revoked the terms of 

González-Santillan's bail (which included electronic monitoring 

and home detention) and issued an arrest warrant. 

González-Santillan's whereabouts were unknown until thirteen years 

later when he was arrested on March 9, 2022 in the Dominican 

Republic. In due course, he was extradited to the United States 

and held in custody. In anticipation of González-Santillan's (at 

long last) sentencing, and given the time that had elapsed, the 
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court ordered the USPO to issue an updated presentence report (the 

"Amended Presentence Report"), which it did on June 17th. 

In relevant part, the Amended Presentence Report 

mimicked the parties' original plea agreement. The government 

objected on the basis that the "report fail[ed] to include that by 

absconding the jurisdiction of the Court for thirteen years, 

defendant obstructed justice." Accordingly, the government sought 

a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which increases 

a defendant's adjusted offense level by two for obstructing justice 

(we'll explain this Guideline in more detail shortly). 

The USPO adopted that recommendation and amended the 

report (the "Second Amended Presentence Report") to include a 

two-point obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement, placing 

González-Santillan at a total adjusted offense level of 

twenty-seven with a corresponding guideline range of seventy to 

eighty-seven months' imprisonment. In making that adjustment, the 

USPO explained that the enhancement was applicable for the reasons 

outlined in the government's objection. In response, 

González-Santillan submitted his sentencing memorandum, which 

opposed the USPO's findings on the bases that: (1) the parties' 

original plea agreement barred the government from seeking an 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement because "[t]he parties agree[d] 

that no other adjustments or departures [were] applicable in this 

case nor [would] be sought by the parties"; and (2) the government 
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had failed to prove that the enhancement was applicable because it 

had not presented any evidence that he willfully failed to appear 

at his sentencing hearing. 

At González-Santillan's sentencing hearing, he argued 

his total offense level wasn't twenty-seven; rather, he calculated 

a total offense level of twenty-one in the event the court added

two points for obstructing justice, and requested a sentence of 

thirty-seven months.3 The government argued that 

González-Santillan's total offense level was indeed twenty-seven 

and initially sought a sentence of eighty-seven months, at the top 

of the guideline range, but later recanted and requested seventy 

months, at the lower end of González-Santillan's guideline range, 

in accordance with the plea agreement's original pledge that "[t]he 

United States [would] recommend a sentence at the lower end of the 

applicable guideline range."4 González-Santillan voiced his 

objection to the government's recommendation for a sentence at the 

higher end of the applicable guideline range, explaining that its 

recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement. The court 

3 Although González-Santillan had previously agreed to a total 

offense level of twenty-five, he argued at sentencing that his 

total offense level was then twenty-one because of the efforts he 

took to rehabilitate himself during the thirteen years of his 

abscondment. 

4 True to its word, the government dismissed the five counts 

of aiding and abetting money laundering against González-Santillan 

at sentencing. 
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agreed, noting that the government was bound by its pledge to seek 

a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range. However, with 

respect to the obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement, it 

explained that the government could seek the enhancement because 

González-Santillan had engaged in conduct, his thirteen-year

disappearance, that occurred after the plea agreement had been 

signed by the parties and therefore the government was not in 

breach of the agreement in making its request. 

After hearing from the parties and in accordance with 

the Second Amended Presentence Report, the court pegged

González-Santillan's total offense level at twenty-seven with a 

corresponding guideline range of seventy to eighty-seven months' 

imprisonment. In doing so, it applied the obstruction-of-justice 

sentencing enhancement, explaining that "Mr. Gonzalez willfully 

obstructed or impeded or attempted to obstruct or impede the 

administration of justice with respect to his sentencing for this 

offense by absconding from pretrial supervision and remaining a 

fugitive for 13 years." The court then meted out a seventy-month 

term of imprisonment. Before the hearing's conclusion, 

González-Santillan's attorney lodged an objection to the sentence, 

again incorporating his objections outlined in his sentencing 

memorandum5 and labeling the sentence as both procedurally 

5 In relevant part, González-Santillan's arguments in his 

sentencing memorandum included his belief that: the government 
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unreasonable due to the absence (he says) of evidence of 

willfulness and substantively unreasonable as excessively long. 

This timely appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

González-Santillan takes exception to the district 

court's imposition of the two-level obstruction-of-justice 

sentencing enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (the "enhancement" or 

"sentencing enhancement") provides:

If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or 

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, 

the administration of justice with respect to 

the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing 

of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) 

the obstructive conduct related to (A) the 

defendant's offense of conviction and any 

relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related 

offense, increase the offense level by 2 

levels. 

Application note 4(E) is illustrative of the statute's covered 

conduct, explaining that "escaping or attempting to escape from 

custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear, 

as ordered, for a judicial proceeding" are examples of obstructive 

or impeder conduct for which the enhancement applies. U.S.S.G. 

§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (emphases added). 

improperly sought and obtained the obstruction-of-justice 

sentencing enhancement; the government failed to provide any 

evidence to support the sentencing enhancement; he was being 

sentenced harsher than his co-conspirators who received sentences 

of thirty, twenty-four, and about eleven months, respectively; he 

was largely rehabilitated; and a lighter sentence was warranted as 

a first-time offender. 
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Against the application of the enhancement 

González-Santillan launches two arguments, and we'll take each in 

turn. 

A. The Court's Application of the Obstruction-of-Justice 

Enhancement

First up is González-Santillan's primary argument that 

the district court erred when it applied the sentencing enhancement 

because the government failed to properly establish that he 

"willfully" failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. Rather 

than produce evidence of willfulness, González-Santillan says, the 

government did nothing more than summarily note that he left his 

electronic monitoring device at his residence when he fled the 

jurisdiction. That alone is insufficient proof, he concludes, and 

accordingly the enhancement should not have applied as a matter of 

law.

Unsurprisingly, the government disagrees.6 It argues 

that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is applicable here because 

6 The government first maintains that González-Santillan has 

waived his challenge to the court's application of the sentencing 

enhancement because "he asked for [it] when recommending his 

desired sentence" and never argued against its application. We 

disagree. The sentencing hearing transcript (and his sentencing 

memorandum) indicates that initially, González-Santillan requested 

a sentence akin to that of his co-defendant. However, 

alternatively he stated that "[i]f the Court understands that an 

additional punishment should be imposed by his failure to appear, 

disrespect to the courts, leaving the jurisdiction, I understand 

that. But that shouldn't double that 30-month sentence [the 

sentence he sought] to 60 and even less to 70 -- or more than 70 

months." The "if" conditional language indicates to us that 
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González-Santillan's abscondment is clearly covered conduct. 

Furthermore, the government notes, the Second Amended Presentence 

Report succinctly and pellucidly spelled out the factual findings 

of González-Santillan's flight to the Dominican Republic for 

thirteen years, and he did not object to those findings below.

Continuing, the government emphasizes that three things -- the 

record, § 3C1.1.'s application notes, and the case law -- all make 

clear that González-Santillan's abscondment was willful and 

therefore the government met its burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that González-Santillan willfully 

failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. 

We review preserved claims of procedural sentencing 

errors for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Coplin-Benjamin, 79 F.4th 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2023). "Within this

framework, we review a district court's factual findings for clear 

error, and its interpretation and application of the Guidelines de 

novo." United States v. Velez-Soto, 804 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 

2015); see also United States v. Nygren, 933 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 

2019). When a defendant challenges the factual basis for the 

district court's application of a sentencing enhancement, as 

González-Santillan does here, "we ask only whether the court 

González-Santillan simply argued an alternative basis to his 

original plea to be sentenced as his co-defendant who the record 

reflects was not given the two-point obstruction-of-justice 

sentencing enhancement. 
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clearly erred in finding that the government proved the disputed 

fact by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. 

Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In 

our review of the evidence we've noted that "[e]ither direct or 

circumstantial evidence will do, with the sentencing court free to 

draw commonsense inferences from the evidence." United States v. 

Matthews, 749 F.3d 99, 105 (1st Cir. 2014).

Turning now to consider González-Santillan's specific 

contentions on this issue, § 3C1.1 application note 4(E), as we 

previously noted, explains that "escaping or attempting to escape 

from custody before trial or sentencing[,] or willfully failing to 

appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding" is the type of 

conduct to which the sentencing enhancement applies. United States

v. Rivera-Nazario, 68 F.4th 653 (1st Cir. 2023), is instructive as 

we consider González-Santillan's contentions. There, we 

confronted an appellant's analogous claim that the government had 

failed to show that he had acted "willfully" in failing to appear. 

Id. at 661. Upon review, we held that everything about the 

appellant's conduct -- namely his violation of "dozens of release 

conditions"; "fail[ure] to appear at his sentencing hearing"; 

departure from "his third-party custodian's home without the 

permission of pretrial services"; and outstanding fugitive status 

"for over ten months" -- suggested willfulness. Id. We concluded 

that "[a] criminal defendant who evades authorities and fails to 
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appear for a sentencing hearing has obstructed justice; and '[t]o 

hold otherwise would condone direct disobedience of a court's 

conditional release order.'" Id. (second alteration in original) 

(quoting Fuller v. United States, 398 F.3d 644, 652 (7th Cir. 

2005)).

As with Rivera-Nazario, we similarly conclude that the 

circumstances of González-Santillan's abscondment suggest 

willfulness. As a reminder, the record evinces

González-Santillan's: failure to attend his scheduled appointment 

with his probation officer; failure to appear at his sentencing 

hearing; abscondment for thirteen years to a different country; 

and of particular import, his acknowledgment of his abscondment at 

his sentencing hearing.7 And to reiterate, "[a] criminal defendant 

who evades authorities and fails to appear for a sentencing hearing 

has obstructed justice." Id. Moreover, despite 

González-Santillan's insistence that "no factual conclusion or 

finding was included" in the Second Amended Presentence Report, in 

its Addendum to the Report the USPO explained that the enhancement 

was appropriate because (and to repeat) he "absconded from his 

pretrial release just prior to his Sentence Hearing" and "was a 

fugitive from justice for 13 years." 

7 Before the court announced its sentence, González-Santillan 

remarked to the court that: "I'd like to apologize to you for my 

mistake . . . . I know that I made a mistake by not having appeared 

in court on that date. . . . I went to the Dominican Republic." 
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Plucking another arrow from his quiver, 

González-Santillan argues that our decision in United States v. 

Marshall, 753 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2014), "requires the government 

to prove that [he] acted with knowledge that his conduct would 

certainly obstruct the proceedings." However, in Rivera-Nazario, 

we declined an appellant's invitation to address a similar 

question: "whether district courts must make a particularized 

finding that a defendant had a specific intent to obstruct justice 

to impose a § 3C1.1 enhancement." 68 F.4th at 661–62. We declined 

to do so because, as the record elucidated, the appellant's conduct 

indisputably supported the enhancement. See id.; see also United 

States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining to 

address whether particularized findings of specific intent to 

obstruct justice are required under § 3C1.1 where "evidence clearly 

supports the district court's ultimate" obstruction-of-justice

finding). And while González-Santillan is correct that the 

government bears the burden of proving sentencing enhancements, 

see Matthews, 749 F.3d at 105, and by a preponderance of the 

evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 715 

(1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Cannon, 589 F.3d 514, 517 (1st 

Cir. 2009), here, as in Rivera-Nazario, we conclude that the 

government has easily met its burden because the facts of this 

case -- as adequately set forth in the Second Amended Presentence 

Report and by González-Santillan's own in-court admission --
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clearly support the conclusion that he willfully failed to appear 

for his sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we espy no error from 

the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement.8

8 Before turning the page on González-Santillan's primary 

argument, we quickly dispatch a secondary aspect of that claim. 

In his brief, González-Santillan summarily states that he "was not 

'under custody' at any time prior to him absconding nor he

'escaped' [sic] from any prison." This is important, 

González-Santillan explains, because U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1's 

application notes distinguish between "escaping or attempting to 

escape from custody before trial or sentencing" from failure to 

appear for a judicial proceeding. And for the latter, unlike the 

former, a showing of willfulness is required, which the government 

failed to produce. However, a thorough review of the record 

reveals that González-Santillan did not make this argument below 

in either his sentencing memoranda or at his sentencing hearing. 

Accordingly, "[t]here is a procedural obstacle to this claim of 

error: it is raised for the first time in this court." United 

States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2015). And 

therefore, we review, at best, for plain error. See id.; see also

United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 218, 220 (1st Cir. 2005) 

(en banc); United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999) 

(applying plain error review when a defendant's objections were 

raised for the first time on appeal). Yet, González-Santillan has 

not even attempted to address the applicable standard of review,

and therefore we deem his claim waived. See United States v. 

Vázquez-Rosario, 45 F.4th 565, 571 (1st Cir. 2022) (deeming an 

appellant's claim waived when he did not address the applicable 

standard of review); see also United States v. Bulger, 816 F.3d 

137, 157 (1st Cir. 2016) ("Whether you characterize Bulger's Brady

claim as unpreserved because he did not seek a ruling below, or 

waived for failure to adequately develop it on appeal, his claim 

fails."). Separately, we deem González-Santillan's "under 

custody" argument waived for lack of developed argumentation. His 

barebones assertation that he was not "under custody" without any 

further explanation for why he believes that to be so simply won't 

cut it. As we explained many times, "we see no reason to abandon 

the settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory 

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, 

are deemed waived." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st 

Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 

352 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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B. Breach of the Parties' Plea Agreement

Alternatively, González-Santillan argues that the clear 

terms of the plea agreement barred the government from seeking the 

sentencing enhancement because they specified that "no other 

adjustment or departures [were] applicable in this case nor shall 

be sought by the parties," and therefore the government breached 

the plea agreement by doing so. Furthermore, González-Santillan 

claims that because the plea agreement did not contain a breach 

clause,9 the government "had no power to withdraw from its 

obligations [under] the plea agreement," including its vow not to 

seek any upward adjustment or enhancement. Continuing on, 

González-Santillan explains that this was not a situation where 

the government was under an "unflagging duty" to provide accurate 

information to the court, but instead was a situation where the 

government, without any prompting from the court, sought a clearly

9 Simply put, a breach clause, or breach provision as it is 

sometimes referred to, is a clause sometimes found in a defendant's 

plea agreement that allows the government to withdraw from the 

plea agreement if the defendant violates a term or condition of 

the agreement. For example, in United States v. Gardner, 5 F.4th 

110, 113 (1st Cir. 2021), a case that both parties here cite to, 

we considered Gardner's claim that he was not bound by his guilty 

plea under the plea agreement after he breached the agreement and 

the government withdrew from it. In relevant part, Gardner's 

breach clause stated that if "before sentencing," he "violat[ed] 

any term or condition of [his] Plea Agreement, engage[ed] in any 

criminal activity, or fail[ed] to appear for sentencing," the 

government "may consider such conduct to be a breach of the Plea 

Agreement and may withdraw therefrom." 
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barred sentencing enhancement. (Quoting United States v. 

Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84, 89 (1st Cir. 2014)).

The government argues that it did not breach the plea 

agreement because the agreement only barred it from seeking 

additional adjustments based on conduct that took place before the 

parties signed it, not conduct that occurred after its execution.10

And utilizing "traditional principles of contract law," it 

launches an interpretive argument based on the clause's temporal 

language to establish that the "are applicable" language of the 

plea agreement could only include those adjustments and departures 

that were then available at the time the agreement was signed. 

Moving along, the government contends that González-Santillan 

himself breached the plea agreement by absconding because "[a]n 

implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that the 

defendant show up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction." 

10 The government insists that González-Santillan has waived 

his breach argument because he requested the sentencing 

enhancement at his sentencing hearing and he has failed in his 

opening brief to challenge the district court's rationale for 

finding that no breach of the plea agreement had occurred. Upon 

review, we are not persuaded for two reasons. First, as explained 

above, González-Santillan initially objected to a sentencing 

enhancement. And second, our review of his brief reveals that 

González-Santillan does indeed attack the district court's 

rationale for finding that no breach of the plea agreement 

occurred. For example, González-Santillan argues that the 

district court incorrectly assumed that his failure to appear for 

his sentencing hearing constituted breach, cites to our decision 

in Gardner, 5 F.4th at 110, for the proposition that the absence 

of a breach clause supports his position, and launches additional 

arguments against the district court's reasoning. 
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United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Therefore, the government continues, González-Santillan materially 

breached the plea agreement when he fled the jurisdiction and that 

abscondment subsequently released it from the specific performance 

of its remaining obligations under the agreement. And, seeking to 

highlight González-Santillan's apparent hypocrisy, the government 

points out that González-Santillan, himself, disregarded the 

agreement at sentencing when he advocated for a sentence at the 

lower end of his requested offense level of twenty-one, which is 

not the twenty-five offense level the plea agreement had originally 

contemplated. 

At his sentencing hearing, González-Santillan objected 

on the basis that the government violated the plea agreement, so 

we review his claim de novo. See United States v. Brown, 31 F.4th 

39, 50 (1st Cir. 2022). We've held that traditional principles of 

contract law guide our interpretation of and performance of a plea 

agreement. See United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 

1995). And because a defendant who enters into a plea agreement 

waives his fundamental constitutional rights, "we hold prosecutors 

to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and 

performance.'" United States v. Marín-Echeverri, 846 F.3d 473, 

478 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 89). 

Accordingly, the government's burden is not satisfied by mere "lip 

service." See id. (citation omitted). And "[i]n addition to 
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entitlement to the government's technical compliance with the 

agreement, appellant is entitled to the 'benefit of the bargain' 

and the 'good faith' of the prosecutor." Brown, 31 F.4th at 50 

(quoting Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d at 283). Therefore, we consider 

"the totality of the circumstances" in considering whether the 

government failed to uphold its end of the bargain. Id.

In support of its argument that González-Santillan 

breached the plea agreement when he fled the jurisdiction, thereby 

relieving the government of any further obligations thereunder,

the government points to our sister circuit's opinion in Hallahan,

which considered a similar assertion.

In that case, the defendants entered into plea 

agreements in exchange for the government's promise, amongst 

others, to recommend sentences at the low end of the applicable 

guideline ranges. Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 967. However, before 

their sentencing hearings got underway, defendants fled the 

jurisdiction for twelve years. See id. After their capture and 

return, their sentencing hearings eventually commenced and the 

government sought not the low-end sentences originally bargained 

for, but rather the "longest of sentences" at the highest end of 

the applicable guideline advisory ranges, arguing that it was 

relieved of its original obligation to seek sentences at the low 

end of the guideline ranges because the defendants had breached 

the plea agreement by absconding. See id. at 967-68, 972. The 
- 19 -

district court agreed and imposed the government's requested 

sentences at the higher end of the guideline ranges. See id. at 

967-68. 

Upon review and as relevant here, the Seventh Circuit 

sided with the government, finding that the government's pledge 

"was excused by the defendants' breach of their obligation to show 

up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction." Id. at 972. 

More specifically, the court explained that:

An implied but obvious term of any plea 

agreement is that the defendant show up for 

sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction. The 

defendants breached this obligation when they 

fled the district and avoided the punishment 

for their crimes for twelve years. The 

defendants' flight constituted a material 

breach, depriving them of the ability to hold 

the government to its promise to recommend the 

low end of the applicable guideline range. 

Id. (citation omitted).11

We find Hallahan persuasive and in full accord with our 

circuit's plea-bargaining jurisprudence. See United States v. 

11 See also United States v. Munoz, 718 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[n]o defendant could reasonably 

expect that he could abscond for five years and still hold the 

government to its promises under the plea agreement" and that 

"[w]hen [defendant] fled the country and spent nearly five years 

as a fugitive in Mexico, he breached what we believe was an implied 

but obvious term of the plea agreement that he remain in the 

country and show up for sentencing"); United States v. Delacruz, 

144 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Since defendant failed to 

appear for sentencing and continued his criminal conduct, the 

government was no longer obligated to recommend a sentence of 24 

months at his sentencing hearing.").
- 20 -

Bermudez, 407 F.3d 536, 540 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[I]f [a] defendant 

fails to fulfill his promises, the government is released from the 

agreement." (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 

572, 578 (1st Cir. 1987))). Like the Hallahan court we conclude

that "[a]n implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that 

the defendant show up for sentencing and not flee the 

jurisdiction." 756 F.3d at 972. Accordingly, we conclude that 

González-Santillan materially breached the plea agreement when he 

hightailed it out of the jurisdiction for thirteen years to avoid 

punishment. See id. And therefore, it follows that 

González-Santillan is now deprived of the opportunity to hold the 

government to its original pledge "that no other adjustments or 

departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by 

the parties." That is so because we have held that "if the 

defendant fails to fulfill his promises, the government is released 

from its agreement." Bermudez, 407 F.3d at 540 (quoting

Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d at 578). Accordingly, we detect no 

breach of the parties' plea agreement stemming from the 

government's request for the obstruction-of-justice sentencing 

enhancement. Nor do we find error in the district court's 

application of it. 

FINAL WORDS

In sum, González-Santillan's sentence is affirmed.