This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 MESA FINANCE, INC., 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,504 9 JAMES VAUGHN, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY 12 Abigail Aragon, District Judge 13 William J. Cooksey 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellee 16 New Mexico Legal Aid 17 Martin A. Lopez 18 Las Vegas, NM 19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 VIGIL, Judge. 22 Defendant appeals from a district court order denying his motion to reinstate 23 a replevin action. We issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Defendant has 242 responded with a memorandum in opposition. We affirm. 1 Pursuant to Rule 1-041(E)(2), a party is entitled to reinstatement of the 2 complaint if a motion is filed within 30 days of the dismissal order establishing “good 3 cause” to do so. “Good cause” has been defined as demonstrating that a party is 4 “ready, willing, and able to proceed with the prosecution of his claim and that the 5 delay in prosecution is not wholly without justification.” Vigil v. Thriftway Mktg. 6 Corp , 117 N.M. 176, 180, 870 P.2d 138, 142 (Ct. App. 1994). 7 Here, a writ of replevin was issued on November 19, 2009. [RP 12] On 8 November 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed a moti on for order to show cause why Defendant 9 should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. [RP 14] Defendant 10 responded by treating this as a request to make the writ permanent. [RP 17] He also 11 argued that he believed that his disabilityinsurer was required to pay his vehicle 12 payments under its policy. [RP 21-22] On D ecember 17, 2007, the district court issued 13 an order giving Defendant thirty days to resolve the disability issue, with the writ 14 becoming permanent if he failed to do so. [RP 30] Citing to Rule 1-041(E)(2), the 15 district court issued an order of clos ure on December 19, 2009. [RP 41] Defendant 16 filed his motion for reinstatement on January15, 2009, again arguing that his vehicle 17 payments should have been made under his insurance policy. [RP 42] 18 As we observed in our calendar notice, th e tape log of the hearing on the motion 19 to reinstate indicates that the district court denied th e motion because Defendant had 203 never filed a counterclaim in this proceeding. [RP 49] See Rule 1-041(E)(1) NMRA. 1 In other words, Defendant ha d no claim to reinstate. De fendant responds to this point 2 in his memorandum in opposition by stating that there was never a final writ of 3 replevin issued. [MIO 2] However, a writ of replevin had already been issued. [RP 12] 4 The district court December 17, 2007 order essentially gave Defendant a second 5 chance to resolve the dispute he was having. Contrary to Defendant’s claim that we 6 have no final order with respect to the replev in action, the district court order was self7 executing, effectively making the writ perm anent if Defendant did not take certain 8 actions within the thirty day period. [RP 30-31] 9 To the extent that we might construe this as a motion under Rule 1-060(B) 10 NMRA, Defendant has failed to preserve this issue and has not provided any ground 11 for establishing such relief. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra , 92 N.M. 47, 51, 582 12 P.2d 819, 823 (1978) (holding that an appellate court "will not interfere with the 13 action of [a] trial court in vacating a judgment except upon a showing of abuse of 14 discretion"). Defendant’s motion [RP 42] did not even indicate that his disability 15 carrier accepted coverage and offered to make the disputed payments. To the 16 contrary, his motion acknowledge d that the disability insurer was still refusing to pay 17 and it was likely he would sue. [RP 44, ¶ 44] Notwithstanding Defendant’s claim that 18 some papers out of his possession might help clarify this matter, there is no showing 19 that the fundamental reason for the writ—the failure to pay—was ever at issue. 204 Instead, as we observed in our calendar noti ce, this appears to be a dispute between 1 Defendant and his disability insurer. 2 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

_______________________________ 5 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 6 WE CONCUR: 7

________________________________ 8 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 9

________________________________ 10 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 11