* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50435

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MARIA SERA DE AGUIRRE also known as, Maria M Aguirre also known as,

Magdalena Aguirre

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:06-CR-01992

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Maria Sera De Aguirre pleaded guilty to importing and possessing more

than 50 kilograms of marijuana. At sentencing, she claimed that she was

entitled to a two-level reduction in her offense level because she met the “safety

valve” criterion in USSG § 5C1.2(a). The district denied her the two-level

reduction and sentenced her to 30 months in prison. De Aguirre now appeals,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 31, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-50435

1 United States v. Miller, 179 F.3d 961, 963–64 (5th Cir. 1999).

2 USSG § 5C1.2(a). 

3

Id. § 5C1.2(a)(5).

4

Id. § 5C1.2(a). 

2

contending thatthe district court misapplied the safety-valve standard. Finding

no error, we AFFIRM. 

1. We review the district court’s findings of fact pertaining to a safetyvalve reduction for clear error and the district court’s legal

interpretation of the safety-valve standard de novo.1 Under USSG

§ 2D1.1(b)(11), a defendantis entitled to a two-level reduction in her

offense level if she can meet the safety-valve requirements found in

§ 5C1.2. That provision requires “the [district] court [to] find[] that

the defendant” has met five conditions.2 Only the fifth condition is

relevant here; it provides: 

[N]ot later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the

defendant [must have] truthfully provided to the

Government all information and evidence the defendant

has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of

the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or

plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or

useful other information to provide or that the

Government is already aware of the information shall

not preclude a determination by the court that the

defendant has complied with this requirement.3

The rule, by its plain terms, requires “the [district] court [to]

find[] that the defendant” has “truthfully provided to the

Government” all relevant information about the offense.4In other

words, the district court must find that the defendant has actually

been truthful. 
No. 07-50435

3

2. De Aguirre contends that the court below mistakenly thought

this fifth condition required it to determine only whether the

government believed she was telling itthe truth—not whether

she was in fact telling the truth. De Aguirre reaches this

conclusion by focusing on one statement the district court

made at sentencing: “Motion for continuance is overruled.

It’s plain to me that the Government does not find her credible,

so it’s just a waste of time.” (emphasis added). This

statement, however, must be read in context. Just prior to

this statement, De Aguirre asked the district court for a

continuance so that she could speak to the government and

clear up any confusion it might have about what she said. The

statement, then, was a response to that request. The district

court was overruling the request for continuance because

there was no need to give De Aguirre more time to confer with

the government when the government already did not believe

her. In other words, the request for continuance would be, in

the district court’s words, “just a waste of time.” 

After this exchange,the district court asked De Aguirre

if she had any other objections. She responded that she had

none. She did not complain to the district court that it was

not independently determining whether she had been

truthful. Nor did she ask for an explicit ruling on her request

for an evidentiary hearing. 

Once the district court’s comment about the government

not finding De Aguirre credible is put into context, nothing

else suggests that the district court applied the wrong legal

standard. Instead, it appears that the district court agreed
No. 07-50435

4

with the government’s argument that De Aguirre was not

being honest when she said she had been collecting

information on a drug organization for 30 years. The district

court’s implicitfactualfinding that De Aguirre did not provide

truthful information to the government is not clearly

erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in

denying De Aguirre safety-valve relief.

AFFIRMED.