Between Russia and Iran: Room to Pursue American 

Interests in Syria

by John W. Parker

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 27

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs, and Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise 

INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting 

research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, 

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The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the 

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NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and 

the broader national security community. 

Cover: In the Gothic Hall of the Presidential Palace in Helsinki, Finland, 

President Donald Trump met with President Vladimir Putin on

July 16, 2018, to start the U.S.-Russia summit.

(President of Russia Web site/Kremlin.ru)
Between Russia and Iran

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Series Editor: Thomas F. Lynch III

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

January 2019

By John W. Parker

Between Russia and Iran:

Room to Pursue American Interests in Syria
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

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Human Subject Protections (HSP) protocols have been used for this study in accordance 

with appropriate statutes and Department of Defense regulations governing HSP. The views of 

the sources rendered anonymous by HSP are solely their own and do not represent any official 

policy or position of the Defense Department or the U.S. Government.

This paper is based on information that was current as of August 1, 2018 

First printing, January 2019
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

“A Very Good Question”.................................................................................... 2

Tainted Success................................................................................................... 4

Friction Among Allies ...................................................................................... 7

Strategic Partners?.............................................................................................. 9

Sanctions Depress Trade..................................................................................11

“Axis of Oil” vis-à-vis “Shiite Axis” ................................................................13

Israeli Security Lobby ......................................................................................17

Russian-American Deconfliction...................................................................22

Addition, Not Subtraction...............................................................................26

Push-Pull with Turkey ....................................................................................28

Sanctions, Strikes, JCPOA Withdrawal.........................................................31

Implications for U.S. Policy.............................................................................36

Notes ..................................................................................................................40

About the Author .............................................................................................82

1

Between Russia and Iran

Executive Summary

President Donald Trump has underscored containing Iran’s sway as a key element in establishing a “strong and lasting footprint” in Syria as the United States moves toward bringing its 

Soldiers home. In pursuing this key American objective, this paper recommends that Washington take advantage of the “daylight” between Russia and Iran, and that it be American policy at 

all levels to work to expand it. This long-existing “daylight” was underscored in 2018 by calls in 

Moscow for Iran to withdraw its forces from some or all of Syria, and by Putin’s positive regard 

at the summit in Helsinki with President Trump for Israel’s security requirements. 

Russian acquiescence to U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian-associated and other forces 

in Syria reinforces the conclusion that backing a dominant Iran is not one of President Vladimir Putin’s priorities. However, while he will not forcefully oppose the United States and Israel 

constraining Tehran, Putin will resist pressure to break totally with Iran and with the proxies 

Iran bankrolls and trains to fight in Syria. In addition, Russia’s leverage on Iranian military and 

political activities in Syria is limited.

Russia’s solution to its own dilemma of restraining Iranian behavior in the region has been 

one of addition and mediation rather than subtraction. Moscow dilutes Iranian influence by 

working with other powers, including those most antithetical to Iran. Russia’s relations with 

Israel are now arguably closer to a “strategic partnership” than those with Iran. Russia’s dealings 

with Saudi Arabia correspond more aptly to an “oil axis” than the “Shiite axis” description used 

by some to characterize the ties between Moscow and Tehran. Russia’s economic ties and diplomacy with Turkey and greenlighting of Turkish military action in Syria against Kurdish forces 

have also diluted Iranian leverage in Syria.

America’s imposing military capabilities and veto-wielding membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council will provide it and its allies with continuing leverage on developments in Syria. Putin ultimately will not be able to count on U.S. acceptance of any deal that 

leaves Bashar al-Asad in place after a transition and new elections. Such an outcome would also 

dash Russian hopes of significant American, European, and regional contributions to the immense costs of reconstruction that lie ahead in Syria. Russia is unlikely to link its actions with 

the United States in Syria to U.S. policy toward Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA) nuclear deal, or to U.S. sanctions on Russia. 

To attain the conditions that will make possible the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, 

the United States needs to maintain a properly resourced military presence on the ground and 

in Syrian airspace. Only if it does so will Russia regard the United States as the most important 
2 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

counterweight to Iran with which Moscow will want and will need to deal. Even after the April 

13–14, 2018, U.S.-UK-French strikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities, President Putin 

remained eager for talks with President Trump and addressed Syria at their summit in Helsinki. 

The Trump administration should therefore continue judiciously to engage Russia as the United 

States works toward the goals of assuring the defeat of the so-called Islamic State (IS), constraining Iran’s malign activities, bolstering Israel’s security, and deterring Syrian government use of 

chemical weapons, without conceding anything in advance on Asad’s future or Iran’s place in 

the region. 

This paper is based on information that was current as of August 1, 2018.1

“A Very Good Question”

Working together, Russia and Iran have succeeded in preserving the regime of President 

Asad in Syria from internal and external opposition since the civil war commenced in 2011. 

This achievement owes much to what is often described as the “Shiite axis” of Iran, the Lebanese 

Hizballah, and various Iranian-supported Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, 

whose ground forces Russian airpower has supported. Russia now is widely recognized as the 

central international player in Syria. This centrality rests in part on Russian coordination of 

military activities with Iran.

What Russia and Iran have accomplished in Syria is important for American national security interests and policy in the region because it frames some of the hard choices Washington 

faces. Discussing U.S. policy in Syria with the press at the Pentagon on November 13, 2017, 

Secretary of Defense James Mattis praised a reporter for asking a “very good question”: is there 

any “daylight” between Russia and Iran in Syria?2

 The answer to this question is strategically 

important to the Trump administration’s new U.S. policy toward Iran’s activities in and around 

Syria. It is also critical for assessing to what extent President Putin can follow through on his 

agreements with President Trump.

On July 7, 2017, on the margins of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, the two presidents 

agreed on a de-escalation zone in southwest Syria, which Moscow and Damascus then destroyed in June–July 2018.3 In Danang, Vietnam, on November 10–11, 2017, on the margins of 

the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, Presidents Trump and Putin “confirmed their 

determination to defeat ISIS in Syria” and “agreed to maintain open military channels of communication between military professionals to help ensure the safety of both U.S. and Russian 

forces and de-confliction of partnered forces engaged in the fight against ISIS . . . until the final 

defeat of ISIS is achieved.” They “confirmed that the ultimate political solution to the conflict 
3

Between Russia and Iran

must be forged through the Geneva process pursuant to UNSCR [UN Security Council Resolution] 2254.”4

In Helsinki on July 16, 2018, the two presidents discussed a variety of issues, including 

the Syrian conflict. In that context, President Trump stated that “creating safety for Israel is 

something that both President Putin and I would like to see very much.” The two leaders agreed 

that representatives of their national security councils would follow up on the issues they had 

discussed.5

 The following day in Washington, President Trump reiterated that “We discussed 

Israel and the security of Israel, and President Putin is very much involved now with us and 

the discussion with Bibi Netanyahu on working something out with surrounding Syria . . . and 

specifically with regard to the security and long-term security of Israel.”6

As set out by President Trump in Washington on April 13, 2018,7 and in Helsinki and 

Washington on July 16–17, and elaborated in various settings by Defense Secretary Mattis,8

UN Ambassador Nikki Haley,9

 White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders,10 and Secretaries 

of State Rex Tillerson11 and Mike Pompeo,12 U.S. goals in Syria include: put an end to Syrian 

government use of prohibited chemical agents; eliminate IS; contain Iranian influence in Syria 

and the region; buttress the security of Israel; encourage U.S. allies to increase their engagement 

in Syria; support pursuit of a UN-led political solution to the Syrian crisis; and bring American 

Soldiers home.

In his exchanges with the Pentagon press pool on November 13, 2017, Secretary Mattis 

twice complimented a reporter for the “very good question” as to whether he was “seeing any 

daylight between” Russia and Iran in Syria.13 Given the importance to the United States of pushing back Iranian influence in the Middle East, this is indeed a critical question. Some expert 

observers of the region have long seen little daylight between Iran and Russia in Syria. Shortly 

after Secretary Mattis’s remarks, for example, James Jeffrey wrote of “Iran’s Russian-enabled 

power projection against Arab states, Israel, Turkey, and U.S. regional interests,”14 and testified 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee of a “detailed plan for the region” being pursued 

by “Iran, enabled by Russia.”15

The present study, however, argues that the complex ties between Iran and Russia create 

sufficient room for the United States to maneuver in the area and, with persistence and patience, 

further American priorities in Syria, though there are limits to what Russia will go along with 

and can actually accomplish. From 2006 to 2015, for example, Russia voted for a series of UNSC 

sanctions resolutions against Iran and then joined the P5+1 (the Permanent Members of the 

UN Security Council and Germany) that worked to halt Iran’s military nuclear enrichment 

program, eventually producing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. At the very 
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

beginning of that process, however, Russia in July 2006 successfully negotiated to rule out the 

threat of military force against Iran under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII, Article 42, to compel 

Tehran to agree.16

Similarly, in December 2015, Russia supported UNSC Resolution 2254’s call for negotiating an inclusive political transition “governance” for Syria that would be followed by adoption 

of a new constitution and the holding of new elections. Earlier, however, in negotiations that 

in June 2012 produced the Geneva Communique, to which Resolution 2254 harks back, Russia 

ensured that any transitional government could not in principle exclude President Asad.17

If the main premise of this paper is off the mark and there is no “daylight” between Russian and Iranian goals in the region, the prospects for success in advancing the American goal 

of constraining Iranian influence in Syria are minimal. The consequence of failure in this regard 

will be a further slippage of U.S. influence throughout the Middle East and beyond. Regional 

powers opposed to the spread of Iranian influence, but demonstratively ready and able to work 

with Russia even while opposing the Asad regime in Damascus, will look all the more attentively to Moscow as the power broker best able to mediate and perhaps even marginally blunt 

the extension of Iranian power. 

Tainted Success

Some analysts posit that Putin “had plans for the Middle East, particularly Syria, from the 

very beginning, and pursued them consistently.”18 Putin, however, owes his present position 

in Syria to aggressively taking tactical advantage of a series of fortuitous opportunities, not to 

disciplined pursuit of some detailed long-term strategic plan for increasing Russia’s stature in 

the region and decreasing U.S. importance.19 Throughout, Putin has benefited from what Moscow has judged as weak American resistance to Russian moves in Syria, and Iran’s welcoming 

of Russian help in saving the Asad regime. After nearly 3 years of direct military involvement 

in Syria, however, the complexities of the military and diplomatic tracks have driven home the 

conclusion that there will be no easy exit option for Russia from Syria, and Moscow has settled 

in for the long haul. 

Putin’s efforts in Syria have been aimed at elevating Russia’s standing among the world’s 

great powers, as well as at solidifying his political standing at home. To this end, Russia has 

focused on preventing externally sponsored “regime change” in Damascus and securing Moscow’s paramount role in deciding Syria’s political future. Russia wants any future leadership in 

Damascus to respect Russian access to its two bases in Syria and its wider interests in Middle 

East politics. Russia cooperates as well as competes with Iran in Syria, and together they have 
5

Between Russia and Iran

succeeded in keeping President Asad in power. But Putin has little interest in backing a dominant Iran in Syria or a resurgent Iran in the region, and he does not want Iran to limit Russia’s 

relations with other powers. 

While working with Moscow, Tehran supports Asad in his resistance to Russian pressure 

that would affect what Tehran evidently sees as Iran’s vital need for a land bridge through Syria 

to the Lebanese Hizballah and for a military footprint in Syria from which to challenge Israel. 

Iran also backs Asad’s opposition to any compromise short of complete recovery of and control 

over all Syrian territory lost to a variety of opponents since 2011. Islamic Revolutionary Guards 

Corps (IRGC) leaders have explicitly stated that their goals are to oust the United States from 

the region and to cement Asad’s hold on power in Damascus. Iran does not like it that Russia 

does nothing to prevent Israeli attacks on Iranian interests in Syria, and that Russia is not interested in helping Hizballah on the Golan Heights. Russia, however, tolerates and even benefits 

from counterbalancing Iranian, Turkish, Saudi, Israeli, and American activity in Syria as long as 

none ultimately are able to nullify Russian gains. 

Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been forging new relations with Russia even as they pursue 

their own particular interests in Syria, bringing little comfort to Tehran. Despite differences 

over Syria driven by competition with Iran for regional supremacy, Saudi Arabia moved closer 

to Moscow as Riyadh perceived an American retreat from the region, was impressed by the 

increasingly central role that Russia was coming to occupy in Syria, and increasingly shared an 

interest with Russia in elevating and stabilizing world oil prices. Ankara, for its part, is focused 

on preventing an autonomous “Rojava” Kurdish region in northern Syria, linking the cantons 

of Jazeera, Kobane, and Afrin across the border from Turkey’s own restless Kurdish region. 

Ankara and Moscow have used each other to undermine the U.S. partnership with Kurdish 

forces in eastern Syria as well as to limit Iranian power in the regions abutting Kurdish cantons. 

Moscow has taken advantage of tensions over the Kurdish issue to try to sap the abilities of Ankara and Washington to manage their ties as longstanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies. 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met repeatedly with Putin since 2015 to lobby 

Israeli security interests in Syria. As a result, Israel has been able repeatedly to hit Iranian and 

Hizballah associated targets in that country while Russia has looked the other way in public 

silence. Russian acquiescence to these strikes permits Israel to degrade security threats emanating from the Golan Heights and to disrupt the air bridge Iran uses to supply Hizballah in Syria 

and Lebanon. 
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Against this background of competing and overlapping aims, Syrian forces backed by Russia air power broke the IS siege of Deir ez-Zour City on the Euphrates River in eastern Syria on 

September 5, 2017.20 It was treated as a banner day, although Damascus still did not control the 

economically vital oil and gas fields and facilities in the surrounding countryside. An attempt to 

recover one site by unorthodox means would bring a dramatic clash with the U.S. military and 

loss of lives for a Russian mercenary force in February 2018. Moreover, having already caused 

nearly half a million dead, over five million refugees, and six million internally displaced, and 

significant destruction to major cities, the war was still far from over.21 American-supported 

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in particular neared total control of the IS stronghold of Raqqa 

and began pivoting toward major objectives in Deir ez-Zour Province.22 Asad, however, calculated that his forces and their allies—while still not totally victorious—had at least prevented his 

enemies from winning and had started to think out loud about the postwar world and Syria’s 

strategic orientation toward the East going forward.23

In a lengthy interview at the end of December 2017, Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, suggested that the top priority of the U.S.-led coalition 

campaign in Syria had never been to vanquish IS but rather to topple Asad.24 However, more objective Russian observers punctured the veneer of triumphalism in Moscow by reminding that 

it was the U.S.-led coalition that had achieved the roll-back of IS first in Iraq and then in Syria.25

(In fact, outside Russia one study has concluded that only around 14 percent of Russian and Syrian strikes from 2015–2018 targeted IS.26) Moreover, it became clearer that any earlier thoughts 

in Moscow of an exit strategy involving political compromise and a military drawdown would 

have to be seriously revised.27

Nevertheless, suggestions began to surface—culminating with Putin’s announcement on 

December 11, 201728—of another partial drawdown of Russian air assets in Syria.29 They could 

always be reinserted as the need arose,30 a point reinforced when Putin signed the law ratifying Russia’s agreement with Syria on usage and enlargement of the port facility at Tartus,31 and 

Defense Minister Shoigu commented on Russia’s “permanent presence” in Syria.32 Putin made 

yet another partial withdrawal announcement at the end of June 2018.33 

Meanwhile, another round of the talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, initiated by Russia and 

cosponsored by Iran and Turkey, came and went on October 30–31, 2017, with few signs of 

progress toward a political solution to the conflict.34 At the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva, the 

Syrian government delegation, led by veteran negotiator Bashar al-Jaafari, walked in and out 

and in of the round held December 1–14, refusing to meet face-to-face with the opposition 

delegation or to discuss political issues of the transition called for by UNSC Resolution 2254. 
7

Between Russia and Iran

UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Staffan de Mistura asserted that “I did not 

see the government really looking to find a way to have a dialogue” but “I did see the opposition 

trying to.”35

Friction Among Allies 

Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus have coordinated their efforts in the Syrian conflict, but 

they have sometimes made surprisingly little effort to conceal differences on key military and 

political issues. There have been several remarkable public spats and repressed tensions between 

them over tactics and strategic goals. Looking back over the course of Russia’s military and 

diplomatic involvement in Syria, the Moscow scholar Leonid Isayev concludes that “Asad and 

Iran are not interested in Russo-American cooperation in Syria.” Asad, according to Isayev, on 

some issues “simply ignores Moscow and hides behind Tehran.”36 As another Moscow expert on 

the region put it in May 2018, Russia and Iran are simply riding in the same train; they are not 

friends or enemies.37

On May 6, 2016, in the battle for Khan Tuman, southwest of Aleppo, Iranian fighters and 

Iranian-supported militias suffered over 80 deaths at the hands of jihadist al Qaeda al-Nusra 

fighters and other opposition forces—at the time among the highest casualty counts in one day. 

The losses provoked bitter hints in Tehran that Moscow should provide air cover to Iran’s proDamascus militias rather than wasting time on ceasefire agreements with Washington.38 Three 

months later, however, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehqan announced that Russia’s brief 

use of Hamadan Airbase in western Iran that August to strike targets in Syria had been suspended. Dehqan’s televised statement betrayed distrust of Russia’s ultimate aims in Syria: “The 

Russians are interested in showing that they are a superpower and guaranteeing their role in 

deciding the political future of Syria. And, of course, there has been a certain showing-off and 

ungentlemanly conduct on their part.”39

In December 2016, Iran, Syria, and their militias blocked and delayed implementation of 

the Russian-Turkish ceasefire-evacuation deal on Aleppo with last minute demands, including 

for assistance to a couple of Shiite areas near Aleppo. In January 2017, already irritated at Russia 

for treating it as a junior partner in organizing the Astana talks with Turkey, Iran was further 

discomfited by Russia’s invitation to the United States to attend despite Iran’s opposition.40 After 

Putin’s summit in Moscow with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on March 28, 2017, veteran 

Tehran watchers in Moscow argued that the summit had not accomplished all that it could. 

They suggested that Putin put his foot on the brake of developing Russian-Iranian relations 

so as not to impede his efforts to repair relations with Washington. Putin was wary about the 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

U.S. reaction to progress in his dealings with Tehran, some explained. The Iranians especially 

seemed to have been disappointed by the results, and overall Russian-Iranian relations were still 

characterized by a profound lack of trust.41

There is also reason to presume discomfort in Damascus and Tehran over the de-escalation zone agreed upon between Russia and the United States in and around Daraa, in southwest 

Syria bordering on Jordan, of special interest also to Israel. The terms of the zone were announced after the Trump-Putin meeting on July 7, 2017, on the margins of the G-20 summit in 

Hamburg.42 Moscow reportedly assured Washington that Asad would stand by the agreement.43

However, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif asserted that “America and Russia cannot make 

a decision for Iran. We are present in Syria based on a request from the Syrian government 

and will act upon that request.”44 Skeptics of the deal could also point to IRGC statements of 

resistance to pulling out of Syria.45 As the Russian pundit Vladimir Frolov put it at the time, 

“Factually, this is a Russian-American deal limiting the influence of Iran and Syria in the interests of Israel and Jordan.”46 Under armed attack by Damascus and Moscow, the understandings 

concerning this zone would collapse in June–July 2018, as will be discussed later in this paper. 

They would be supplanted by new understandings worked out principally between Putin and 

Netanyahu, which would be equally if not more troublesome for Tehran.

Putin’s interactions with Asad in Sochi in late 2017 underscored Russia’s quiet competition 

with Iran in Syria. The “military operation is nearing completion,” Putin told Asad on November 20, and the “main task now is to launch the political process.” Asad accompanied Putin to 

a meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov and 

other military leaders involved in Russia’s Syrian intervention. It was these military leaders who 

had “played the key role in saving Syria,” asserted Putin. Asad expressed his “gratitude for Russia’s efforts to save our country.” “Success” had been achieved, said Asad, “thanks to cooperation 

between the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian Army.” 

Just a year earlier, Asad had given even billing to Iran, the Lebanese Hizballah, and Russia.47 Now, however, according to the transcript made available by the Kremlin, the only reference to Iran’s role in the fighting was Asad’s oblique thanks to the Russian military’s actions and 

“the actions of the Syrian Army and our allies” for making it possible for many Syrians who had 

fled terrorism to return home.48 A month later, Gerasimov would similarly give a lengthy interview in which he completely ignored Iran’s contribution to the military effort in Syria. Only in 

responding to a question as to whether problems had ever arisen in requesting permission for 

Russian bombers to use Iraqi and Iranian airspace on their way to Syria did Gerasimov laconi-
9

Between Russia and Iran

cally state that “We have a well-established collaboration with the military in these countries 

and failures did not occur.”49

Asad, however, would shift with ease his formulations of the relative importance of Russia and Iran to Syria. In June 2018, as Syrian forces backed by Russian airpower began to press 

against opposition hold-outs in Daraa Province and shatter the southwest de-escalation zone 

agreed by Presidents Trump and Putin in Hamburg in July 2017, Asad asserted that Syria would 

not split with Iran to curry favor with Saudi Arabia or Israel. He regarded the relationship 

with Russia as strategic, but suggested that statements out of Moscow were provoking unhelpful “speculations.” He insisted there were no “full formations” or Iranian bases in Syria, while 

conceding that “there are certainly Iranian advisers in Syria, and there are groups of Iranian 

volunteers who came to Syria, and they are led by Iranian officers.” For the future, however, he 

was open to a greater Iranian presence. “If we find . . . that there is a need for Iranian military 

bases, we will not hesitate.”50

Strategic Partners?

Moscow’s default setting for dealing with Tehran over the years has been wary engagement, and vice versa for Tehran’s approach to Moscow. This has been ingrained by centuries of 

wars and mutual grievances. Both sides are used to and adept at mixing cooperation and contention on different issues at the same time, and we can expect this pattern of dealing with each 

other to continue for years to come.51

In the decade preceding the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, Moscow had become 

increasingly concerned about Iran’s expanding influence in the Middle East. Former Russian 

Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov lamented the consequences of the American invasion of Iraq 

in 2003. This destroyed the Iran-Iraq balance of power that had brought a modicum of stability to the region since the end of the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war. The collapse of Iraqi power, the 

revelation of Iran’s nuclear program in 2002–2003, and the success of the Iranian-backed Hizballah forces in stymieing the Israeli army in the 2006 Lebanon War all contributed to concern 

in Moscow over Iran’s seemingly relentless rise in the region.52

In the last decade, however, and especially since the advent of the Arab Spring and the rise 

of forces such as al Qaeda’s new offshoots in Iraq and Syria—the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham and Jabhat al-Nusra, renamed Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016—Moscow has begun to look 

on Iran with new eyes. Despite its earlier misgivings, Russia has gained appreciation for Iran as a 

“natural barrier” to Sunni extremism traveling north into Russia and other former Soviet states. 

At the same time, hoping to project and expand Russian influence south into the Middle East, 
10 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Moscow has not wanted Iran to interpose itself as a barrier to Russia’s dealings with Sunni states 

throughout the region, even Iranian bêtes noire Saudi Arabia and Israel.53

The ties between Russia and Iran are not really an “alliance” and can never be a “strategic 

partnership,” asserts Vladimir Sazhin, a long-time student of Moscow’s relations with Tehran. 

They are instead a “pragmatic partnership.”54 To some, this might seem a distinction without a 

real difference. After all, however one might choose to characterize the relationship they have 

in Syria, it has produced results. In Moscow, nevertheless, the view among expert observers is 

that Iran is envious of Russian influence over Asad. Russia is displacing Iran in Damascus, and 

Tehran does not like this. Russia wants a secular government in Syria, and Iran does not agree 

with this idea. Russia wants any future leadership in Damascus to respect Russian access to its 

two bases in Syria and Russian wider interests in Middle East politics.55

One expert in Moscow who supports closer Russian-Iranian relations has elaborated on 

the many obstacles to pursuing a “strategic” relationship. In Syria, Russia is trying to cooperate 

with Iran but it is not easy, and Russia and Iran have different views on the future. Iran also does 

not like it that Russia does nothing to prevent Israeli attacks on Iranian interests in Syria, and 

that Russia is not interested in helping Hizballah on the Golan Heights. In Iraq, Russia is willing 

to send weapons, but not to engage militarily or to choose sides in the Sunni-Syria confrontation. In Yemen, Russia does not want to engage militarily, but Iran is doing some of that.56

Experts in Tehran who watch Moscow have reciprocal concerns.57 Nevertheless, alongside 

irritations on both sides, Russia and Iran in the past have episodically found common ground 

for cooperation in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, much as they have found more recently in Syria.58 The observer Maxim Suchkov has termed them “strategic singles.” Despite their lack of 

trust in each other, they would rather “have each other as partners . . . than adversaries” in the 

region. As long as Iran’s activities in Syria “don’t target Russian interests, Moscow doesn’t see a 

need to react harshly.”59

Over the years, there have been those in Moscow as well as Tehran who have advocated a 

“strategic partnership” between the two countries. However, Putin’s restraint on the phrase has 

been consistent over the years. While he might hold it up as an aspirational goal, as he did at 

the summit with Rouhani in March 2017,60 Putin is unlikely ever to embrace it. In this, Putin 

seems to have taken the advice of long-time Middle East expert Yevgeny Primakov. As foreign 

minister in December 1996, at an earlier high point in Russian-Iranian official ardor, Primakov 

resisted Iranian hints that Moscow should adopt the term. “I would not use the words strategic 

partnership regarding anyone,” Primakov counseled. “I simply want to stress that our relations 

are good.”61
11

Between Russia and Iran

The sensitivity in Moscow over embracing the term was again on display during Putin’s 

meeting with Rouhani in Tehran on November 1, 2017, on the margins of the trilateral summit with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan. Rouhani described Russia as Iran’s “strategic 

partner,” and his Web site asserted that Putin had also called Iran Russia’s “strategic partner.”62

However, the account of the meeting on the Russian president’s own Web site was unusually 

truncated and made no mention at all of the phrase, attributing it neither to Rouhani nor to 

Putin.63 In stark contrast, Putin 7 months later signed a “Declaration of Strategic Partnership” 

with the United Arab Emirates, the first such Russian agreement with a Gulf state, in this case a 

leading opponent of Iran.64

Sanctions Depress Trade

For many years the impression has persisted that Russia-Iran trade is substantial. In fact, 

it is not impressive, and Chinese trade with Iran outstrips that of Russia by a factor of 25 to 1.65

The Russian government encouraged new business involvement in Iran while the P5+1 nuclear 

negotiations with Iran were ongoing. However, Russian business did not like the risks of running afoul of Western and particularly American sanctions on doing commerce with Iranian 

entities. Even Russian advocates of moving toward a “strategic partnership” with Iran conceded that, while Russia-Iran economic cooperation had serious potential, there were no serious 

achievements because of internal opposition on both sides to moving ahead.66

Nevertheless, likely more for political reasons than for profit, Rosatom committed in November 2014 to building at least two new nuclear power generating units at Bushehr.67 However, nearly 2 years later, experts in Moscow claimed that money had yet to be appropriated for 

Bushehr 2 and 3, even if there had already been a ribbon-cutting ceremony.68 Whatever that 

ceremony amounted to, the official start of construction of Bushehr 2 reportedly was finally 

celebrated on October 31, 2017, clearly to hype Putin’s summit meetings in Tehran the following 

day.69 A month later, however, the general contractor for the project announced that construction would not start until June 2019.70 Given Bushehr 1’s tortured history, implementation of 

the Bushehr 2 contract will likely again be a long-term and painful proposition.71

Russia may have hoped to earn substantial income from trade with Iran in the aftermath 

of the adoption in July 2015 of the Joint Coordinated Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal 

and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and the subsequent beginning of the process of 

lifting financial sanctions and weapons acquisitions prohibitions on Iran. Putin visited Tehran 

on November 23, 2015, his first visit to the Iranian capital since 2007. The occasion was a Gas 

Exporting Countries Forum summit, which the Russian president was able to use for meetings 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Rouhani. The two leaders then met again in 

Moscow, as noted, on March 28, 2017, and then more recently in Tehran on November 1, 2017. 

The economic headline for the last meeting was an agreement announced by Russian Oil 

(Rosneft) chief Igor Sechin and National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) head Ali Kardor on a 

“road map” for joint strategic energy investments in Iran that could total as high as $30 billion 

and yield as many as 51 million tons of oil annually. Neither side, however, released any details 

and no concrete contracts were evidently signed. This suggested that skepticism was in order 

over ultimate implementation of the “road map.”72 When asked about this in May 2018, a Moscow expert on economic relations with Iran laughed and replied that there were no tenders yet 

but at least the “road map” was still in place. Another noted extreme irritation in Moscow at the 

highest levels over working with energy counterparts in Tehran.73 Separate from these summits, 

Iran and Russia signed a $1.6 billion contract in December 2016 to build a gas-powered power 

plant (TES) with 1,400 megawatts capacity at Bandar Abbas.74 However, the same Moscow economic expert commented 18 months later that while the Russian Central Bank claimed to have 

issued a credit for the project, nothing had happened yet.75 Gazprom and Iran signed a separate 

deal around the same time, but the fine print revealed that it was only to cooperate on studies 

for two gas fields.76

The outlook, therefore, for any dramatic rise in the volume of trade is still not promising 

despite the three summits in 2 years. Russian business will continue to be reluctant to cross 

American sanctions on Iran reimposed when President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal 

from the JCPOA in May 2018. It will behave just like European businesses, which are backing 

out of already established ventures, however substantial, note Russian experts, citing the example of French Total.77 In 2015, Russia and Iran were agreed upon a portfolio of potential contracts adding up to $70 billion, but most remain paper aspirations only.78 Economic ties remain 

anemic despite what seem to be continuous consultations on mega-deals. Bilateral trade shrank 

to $1.24 billion in 2015 from $1.68 billion in 2014, then rebounded to around $2.18 billion in 

2016, before falling again to $1.706 billion in 2017. By comparison, Iran-China bilateral trade 

in 2014 stood at $52 billion.79

Nevertheless, as mandated by UNSC Resolution 2231, if Iran does not withdraw from the 

JCPOA, it may start to make significant conventional offensive arms purchases beginning in 

October 2020, 5 years after the JCPOA’s adoption day of October 18, 2015.80 For lack of affordable alternatives, we may see a partial repeat of Iran’s post–Iran-Iraq war rush to Russian manufacturers three decades ago to replenish depleted and outmoded stocks of military hardware. 

In 1989–1991, Moscow and Tehran signed contracts worth potentially $5–6 billion. President 
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Between Russia and Iran

Rouhani, who has a lifetime of experience dealing with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, was a core member of the high-level delegation that traveled to Moscow in 1989 with 

Iran’s initial shopping list for replacement weapons.81 Deals under consideration in recent years 

could be worth as much as $8 billion.82 “There is a lot they would like,” according to Rostec 

chairman Sergei Chemezov. However, “when it comes to weaponry, they buy that with their 

own money, not with ours,” Chemezov has insisted.83 In 2016, Russia sold almost $400 million 

in arms to Iran.84 In May 2018, nevertheless, a Russian arms transfers expert noted that Moscow 

has stopped having any great expectations about the Iranian arms market. Another expert in 

military affairs judged that Russia will not transfer any major defensive systems to Iran for the 

remainder of the current Trump administration.85

However, one deal with a lot of historical baggage has already gone forward. In spring 

2015, as the P5+1 negotiations over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program were approaching the 

endgame, Putin issued a decree permitting resurrection of the contract for the S-300 air defense 

missile system.86 The contract had been a bitter irritant in Russian relations with Iran ever since 

then-President Medvedev annulled it in September 2010.87 After Putin’s green light, a new $1 

billion contract for four S-300 divisions was signed on November 9, 2015, at the Airshow-2015 

in Dubai.88

“Axis of Oil” vis-à-vis “Shiite Axis”

In the meantime, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been negotiating with Russia—albeit 

at radically different speeds—for the more advanced next generation S-400 air defense system. At four divisions each for upward of $2 billion, the Saudi and Turkish deals are playing 

a role in nailing down new relationships between these countries and Russia, including over 

Syria, probably bringing little comfort to Tehran.89 The improvement in Russia’s relations with 

Iran’s regional rival Saudi Arabia has not been a flash in the pan but the result of prolonged, if 

sometimes bumpy, courtship between the two sides. Even before King Salman’s October 4–5, 

2017, visit to Moscow—the first ever by a reigning Saudi monarch—some began to refer to the 

Russian-Saudi connection as an “axis in oil affairs” and even an “axis of love.”90 The day after 

Putin met with Iran’s leaders in Tehran in November 2017, Russian Energy Minister Alexander 

Novak conferred in Riyadh with King Salman.91 With Novak frequently meeting with Saudi 

counterparts, “oil axis” is perhaps a more apt description of the relationship between Moscow 

and Riyadh than the “Shiite axis” label all too often hyperbolically applied to the ties between 

Moscow and Tehran.
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Despite differences over Syria, and in part as an effort to manage the relationship while 

both are deeply involved in Syria, Moscow and Riyadh have maintained contacts at the highest 

levels since King Salman succeeded deceased King Abdullah in January 2015. Putin first extended an invitation to King Salman to visit Moscow in a phone call to the new Saudi ruler on 

April 20, 2015. The Russian leader soon after had a wide-ranging face-to-face first meeting with 

then–Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in St. Petersburg on June 18, 2015, during 

which Putin received a reciprocal invitation from the King to visit Riyadh.92 Four months later, 

Putin met yet again with Prince Mohammed, this time in Sochi on October 11.93

These contacts have developed despite vocal Syrian and, presumably, Iranian objections to 

dealing with Saudi Arabia so intimately, including bringing Riyadh into diplomacy over Syria 

even as Russia ramped up its air operation there. Putin has long pitched a broad international 

anti-IS “coalition” or “alliance,” to include Saudi Arabia, an effort Syrian Foreign Minister Walid 

Moallem ridiculed in June 2015 as a “miracle.”94 Since then, Riyadh has balanced President 

Trump’s May 20–21, 2017, visit to Saudi Arabia with Prince Muhammed’s (also serving as Defense Minister) call on Putin in the Kremlin on May 30.95 Both sides touted the occasion, and it 

followed the first formal meeting between the two countries’ oil industry heavyweights—Rosneft boss Igor Sechin and Aramco chief Amin Nasser—in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.96 King Salman 

promoted his son Prince Muhammed to direct successor 3 weeks later in June. One Russian 

commentary saw his elevation as portending a “deepening of cooperation between Moscow 

and Riyadh” despite differences over Syria.97 Indeed, the soon-to-be full Crown Prince’s meeting with Putin at the end of May 2017 laid the groundwork for King Salman’s visit to Moscow 

4 months later.98

Geopolitically, Riyadh early on was motivated to move closer to Moscow by its perception 

of an American retreat from the region and by its impression of the increasingly central role that 

Russia was coming to occupy in Syria, both on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations in 

Geneva, Astana, and other venues.99 Since then, Russia has avoided being enmeshed in Saudi 

Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) dispute with Qatar over ties with Iran and 

alleged sponsorship of terrorism.100 At the same time, Russia has courted Saudi Arabia’s good 

offices and contacts with the Syrian opposition. 

In the last few years, Moscow has invited and praised Riyadh’s efforts to unify the various 

Syrian opposition representations—the so-called Riyadh, Cairo, and Moscow platforms—and 

getting them to the negotiating table.101 To work toward a better outcome for the eighth round 

of the UN-sponsored Geneva talks, Russia’s special presidential envoy for Syria, Alexander 

Lavrentiev, met on November 19, 2017, with Crown Prince Mohammad and participated on 
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Between Russia and Iran

November 22 in the so-called Riyadh 2 conference hosted by Saudi Arabia and designed to 

unify the Syrian opposition representation at Geneva.102 After the subsequent positions put forward in Geneva by the leaders of the joint delegation disappointed both Moscow and Riyadh, 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov excused Riyadh, stating that the opposition’s “unacceptable 

ultimatums” had been aimed “to discredit our Saudi colleagues” and had “deceived [UN Special 

Envoy for Syria] Staffan de Mistura and, regrettably, also our Saudi partners.”103

Meanwhile, growing common interests in stabilizing world energy markets have drawn 

the two countries even closer together. On December 10, 2016, Russia joined the cap and cut 

production agreement reached by the Saudi-led OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries) 10 days earlier.104 Lifting crude markets at least temporarily, the agreement was extended at the end of May 2017 to March 2018, and then at the end of November 2017 through 

2018.105 Market logic is driving Russian-Saudi cooperation on trying to dampen global oil production in order to raise prices, which by January 2018 had rebounded to over $70 a barrel and 

then in May briefly climbed over $80 a barrel.106 Since February, there have been suggestions 

of an impending deal to partner also in the liquefied natural gas sector, as well as to develop a 

10- to 20-year oil alliance.107 In June, Putin and Crown Prince Mohammad discussed bilateral 

relations and energy cooperation in the Kremlin and then sat side by side at the opening of 

the FIFA World Cup championship in Moscow as Russia defeated the Saudi team 5-0.108 Then, 

Energy Minister Novak and his Saudi counterpart Khalid al-Falih worked out the details of yet 

another understanding on future oil production.109

Over previous years, Moscow had become cynical toward repeated Saudi dangling of prospects for substantial arms sales, which in the end always petered out.110 Meanwhile, Riyadh repeatedly concluded impressive arms contracts with the United States, amounting to some $110 

billion at the conclusion of President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May 2017.111 Given the slump in 

world oil prices in 2014 and its impact on the Russian and Saudi state budgets, however, cooperation between OPEC and Russia has become more important in the long run than the arms 

sales reportedly advanced during King Salman’s October 2017 visit to Moscow. The possibilities 

seem to be improving for steadier and more substantial benefits to Russia from closer relations 

with Saudi Arabia in the energy sector than from weapons sales. 

On the topic of weapons, the two sides agreed on deals totaling upward of $3 billion during 

King Salman’s October 2017 stay in Russia.112 They included agreements in principle on Riyadh’s 

purchase of no fewer than four divisions of the S-400 Triumf air defense missile system, worth 

around $2 billion, and contracts to purchase and manufacture Kalashnikov assault rifles in 

Saudi Arabia and likewise some elements of TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems, Kornet-EM 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

antitank missile systems, and AGS-30 grenade launchers. Arms transfer expert Ruslan Pukhov, 

director of the Moscow-based CAST (Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies) think 

tank, expressed the hope that King Salman’s word meant that after tricking Russia twice, Saudi 

interest in purchasing weapons this time around would be for real.113

On the trade and investment side, understandings on paper at least go beyond what Saudi 

Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir described as the “historic agreement on stabilization of the oil 

markets” reached earlier in the year and the arms agreements just noted. The two sides have 

now established a $10 billion investment fund, with $2.1 billion already invested. These, Jubeir 

said, are “laying a firm foundation for the development of relations.” Russia is “an important 

player” and “could perform a positive role in the Near East,” affirmed Jubeir. “Politically, our 

positions are closer than many think.”114 Putin reciprocated Jubeir’s assessment of the relationship 10 days later. Referring to Saudi Arabia and other states in the region, he told the Valdai 

conference that “I have a very good personal, almost friendly relationship with almost all the 

leaders of these states.”115

Some of the raised hopes in Russia now seem to have been premature. By May 2018, 

palpable disappointment but not surprise over relations with Riyadh had returned in Moscow, 

except in the energy field. An expert on weapons transfers noted that all Russia had from the 

Saudis on the purchase of S-400s was the original declaration of intent; nothing had happened since then. The only thing solid with Riyadh was the Kalashnikov deal. Separately, a 

connoisseur of the Saudi press detected increased “digs” or “jabs” (ukolki) at Russia in Saudi 

commentary since the U.S.-UK-French strikes in Syria in April 2018 and the U.S. withdrawal 

from JCPOA in May. At the same time, he thought these “digs” were somewhat offset by Saudi 

cooling toward the United States, particularly after the announcement that the American Embassy would move to Jerusalem. On balance, he saw Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia at a 

standstill. Yes, the two countries still shared an interest in the arrangement with OPEC, but 

this had no big political content. Russia could easily let the agreement die if it no longer held 

any further advantage for it.116

Another expert wryly observed that the Saudis talk but they don’t deliver. The Crown 

Prince had made all his early moves toward Russia simply to be able to extract more from the 

United States when he went to Washington. The expert saw this as “very Arab behavior.” For 

its part, however, Russia was not all that enthusiastic about selling arms to the Saudis because 

that would bring with it political obligations. Nevertheless, Moscow had certainly enjoyed being 

courted by the Saudis and others in the region. According to him, Moscow was hearing from 

Saudi officials such as Foreign Minister Jubeir that “We want Russia to replace Iran in Syria. We 
17

Between Russia and Iran

do not mind a Russian presence in Syria on any scale, but we do not want the Iranian position 

there to strengthen.” This was, said the Russian expert, essentially also the Israeli position.117

Israeli Security Lobby

On several levels the argument can be made that Israel’s relations with Russia are much 

closer to a “strategic partnership” than those between Russia and Iran. The influence of pro-Israeli views is reportedly strong in Moscow. In contrast, the pro-Iran lobby is small and weak.118

According to Andrey Kortunov, director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, 

“There is mutual respect between [Putin] and Netanyahu, and Russia has a special attitude 

toward Israel’s military activity in Syria and has warned Asad and Hizballah not to retaliate.” 

Sources in Moscow reportedly assert that Putin will propose that no foreign country be allowed 

to use Syria to attack neighboring countries.119

Indeed, Putin reportedly told King Salman’s son in Sochi on October 11, 2015, and Israeli 

Prime Minister Netanyahu several weeks earlier on September 21 in Moscow, that if they lent 

Russia their support in Syria, Russia would help them contain Iran in the region. According to 

this same account, Putin told Netanyahu that an expanded Russian role in Syria could dampen 

Iranian and Iranian-supported Lebanese Hizballah Syrian-based operations against Israel.120

Over the years, Israel has lobbied in Moscow on specific Iranian- and Syrian-connected 

security issues. Israel has built a good relationship with Russia in this regard. Its courtship of 

Moscow has even included not supporting the March 2014 UN General Assembly resolution 

declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea illegal.121 Putin’s September 2015 agreement with Netanyahu about cooperation at the General Staff level to deconflict operations in the airspace 

over Syria no doubt irritated Tehran.122 Since then, Netanyahu has met with Putin eight more 

times to lobby Israeli security interests in Syria, including three times in Moscow during the 

first 7 months of 2018: on January 29, May 9, and July 11.123 Foreign Minister Liberman is said 

to talk weekly in Russian by phone with Defense Minister Shoigu.124

To the extent that Russia has indeed been competing with and displacing Iran in Syria, 

Russia may be able marginally to improve security for Israel by lessening threats to Israel emanating from the Golan Heights and by active-passively disrupting the air bridge Iran uses to 

supply Hizballah in Lebanon. Over the course of Russia’s air operation in Syria, Israel has repeatedly hit Iranian- and Hizballah-associated targets in that country, and Russia has looked the 

other way in public silence.125 In September 2017, while not confirming or denying any of these 

strikes, Major General Yair Golan, former deputy chief of general staff, Israel Defense Forces, 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

affirmed that Russia can be “a constraining influence on Iran’s ambitions.” Israel and Russia, he 

asserted, “have a good operational relationship.”126

This was strikingly on display on February 10, 2018, when Israeli jets struck at what Israel 

said were eight Syrian and four Iranian military sites in Syria—the largest such attack since the 

beginning of the Syrian conflict. The incident began after Syrian antiaircraft fire hit an Israeli 

F-16, which crashed in Israel. The F-16 was one of eight Israeli fighter jets returning home from 

bombing what Israel described as the Iranian command and control center at Syria’s Tiyas Military Airbase (T-4 Airbase) between Homs and Palmyra,127 from which an Iranian drone had 

been launched but subsequently shot down over Israel by an Israeli attack helicopter.128

It is unknown whether Russia was informed in advance by Damascus and Tehran, or knew 

from its own channels, about the drone mission that precipitated the incident. Whichever the 

case, Russia did not protect them when they got in trouble with Israel. Given Russian control 

of Syrian airspace, the pundit Vladimir Frolov has noted that Israel could not have carried out 

the massive counterattack, which he asserted knocked out half of Syria’s air defenses in 2 hours, 

without giving advance warning to Moscow and benefiting from Russia’s non-interference. 

Moscow’s only response was what Frolov described as the Russian Foreign Ministry’s “banal” 

call for respecting Syrian sovereignty and Putin’s agreement, after speaking with Israeli Prime 

Minister Netanyahu on the telephone, to keep the lines of communication open.129 According 

to the official Russian accounts, the Foreign Ministry statement also warned that “the creation 

of any threat to the lives and security of Russian soldiers [in Syria at the invitation of the Syrian 

Arab Republic to fight terrorism] was absolutely unacceptable” and Putin called for avoiding a 

new round of dangerous confrontation.130 Only after a repeat strike on April 9 from Lebanese 

airspace on the Iranian drone facility at T-4 Airbase, killing some 14 personnel, including seven 

or more Iranians, did Moscow criticize Israel in any way.131

That that criticism did not amount to much was underscored by the remarkable sequence 

of events from May 8–10. On May 8, Israel struck Iranian assets at the Syrian army base at AlKiswah. On May 9, Putin discussed with his Security Council the strike, his upcoming meeting 

that same day with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Kremlin, and the U.S. withdrawal 

from JCPOA.132 Netanyahu, who accompanied Putin during the emotional Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, used the Kremlin meeting to liken present day Iran to vanquished Nazi Germany and to underscore “the deep bond that exists between our countries and our people.”133

After the meeting, Netanyahu told the press that he “had no basis to think that Russia would 

limit Israel’s action in Syria.”134
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Between Russia and Iran

A Kremlin source reported that Netanyahu had also used the meeting with Putin to lobby 

once again against any transfer by Russia of the S-300 air defense system to Syrian disposal.135

Moscow had hinted at a high level, including by Foreign Minister Lavrov, that it would finally do 

so after the U.S.-UK-French strikes of April 13–14, discussed in this paper.136 Netanyahu later 

reportedly told his cabinet that he had again persuaded Putin to delay any transfer of the system 

to Syrian hands.137 Indeed, Vladimir Kozin, advisor to Putin on military-technical cooperation 

(that is, arms transfers), around the same time told Izvestia that there were no Russian-Syrian 

talks on transfer of the S-300 to Syria and that Syria had everything it needed.138 Nevertheless, 

an expert observer speculated that Russia in time will supply the S-300 to Syria, especially now 

that Russian forces are switching over to the S-400 for their own use and no longer needed to 

retain the S-300. However, more important than acquiring the S-300, this expert argued, is that 

Damascus use its Buk-2 and Pantzir air defense systems—both excellent, he stressed—more 

effectively and efficiently.139

After Netanyahu returned to Israel from Moscow, the Israeli air force launched a massive 

attack on Iranian facilities across Syria early on May 10, 2018, in response to asserted IRGC 

Quds Force missile attacks on Israeli Golan Heights positions.140 Israel reportedly informed 

Russia before the attack. Russian positions were not threatened so it did not activate its air 

defense systems.141 Moscow’s reaction to the Israeli action amounted to a weak pro-forma admonition to both sides to restrain themselves.142 An expert observer speculated soon after that 

Russia in fact was hoping that the Israelis would hit some Iranian targets. The Iranians were 

getting overconfident, he said, so Israel had taught them a lesson that Moscow did not mind.143

For sure, the views on security issues of Putin and Netanyahu and of top-level officials on 

both sides are often contentious and far from identical. Nevertheless, there is a level of trust in 

the Russian-Israeli relationship that is definitely lacking in that between Moscow and Tehran.144

A veteran foreign policy insider in Moscow is of the opinion that Russia can rely on nobody in 

the region except maybe in a sense on Israel.145 Even on trade, that of Israel with Russia runs 

around $3 billion a year and includes a much larger high technology component than Iran’s 

trade with Russia, which struggles to rise above $2 billion annually despite Iran’s much greater 

population.146

In further developing the reported understandings Israel and Russia reached on May 9 regarding Israel’s freedom to strike Iranian forces and facilities across Syria, Netanyahu’s conversation with Putin in the Kremlin on July 11 in effect framed the context of the public comments 

on Syria by Presidents Putin and Trump in Helsinki on July 16.147 Syrian forces were about to 

raise the national flag over Daraa in southwest Syria on July 12, culminating an offensive that 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

had begun 3 weeks earlier.148 State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert had issued a statement on June 21 warning Moscow and Damascus of “serious repercussions” should Syrian regime violations of the southwest de-escalation zone continue.149 Nevertheless, Hmeimim-based 

Russian airpower joined the campaign late June 24 through early June 25—the first Russian 

strikes in the zone since conclusion of the Trump-Putin de-escalation agreement a year earlier—after the U.S. Embassy in Amman reportedly sent a text cautioning rebel groups in the 

area that they should not count on U.S. military support.150 Secretary of State Pompeo agreed at 

Senate hearings on June 27 that Russia was violating the de-escalation agreement.151 Clearly, by 

openly joining the Syrian campaign against Daraa and surrounding areas, Moscow deliberately 

terminated the concept that President Putin had endorsed with President Trump in Hamburg 

just a year earlier.

Nevertheless, the same day Secretary Pompeo testified before Congress, National Security 

Advisor John Bolton traveled to Moscow and met with Putin, and the next day—June 28—

Washington and Moscow announced that Presidents Trump and Putin would meet in Helsinki 

on July 16.152 With U.S.-Russian summit preparations proceeding even as Syrian forces backed 

by Russian air support regained control of Syrian territory right up to the border with Israel, 

Netanyahu on July 11 reportedly won an agreement in principle from Putin to keep Iranian and 

Iranian-supported forces away from the very same border. In return, Israel would not object to 

Damascus regaining control of the region and Asad remaining in power. 

The understanding on keeping Iranian forces out of this key border area with Israel did 

not meet Israel’s hope that Russia would commit to ousting them from all of Syria. On the other 

hand, Israel apparently would continue to be able to attack Iranian-related targets at will in this 

and other areas without any obstructions from Russia.153 Putin also met with Iranian Supreme 

Leader Khamenei’s advisor Velayati shortly after meeting with Netanyahu, but probably more 

to convey the understandings already reached with Israel than to open the negotiation to further Iranian input.154 Presumably referring to Iranian-affiliated forces, Anatoly Viktorov, Russia’s ambassador to Israel, could subsequently report that Putin and Netanyahu had reached “an 

understanding” on the withdrawal of “certain well-known armed units . . . so many kilometers” 

from Syria’s border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, while Levan Dzhagaryan, Russia’s ambassador in Tehran, without contradiction could reassure Iranians that their military 

presence in Syria was entirely legal and insist that Russia had no intention of pressing Iran to 

withdraw them.155 However, negotiations continued on just how deep this Russian-enforced 

restricted zone should be. Not many months earlier, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu had told 

Israeli Foreign Minister Liberman that Israel’s request for a 40-kilometer buffer zone keeping 
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Between Russia and Iran

Iranian-backed militias away from the Golan Heights went too far.156 Nevertheless, during a 

visit to Jerusalem on July 23, 2018, Foreign Minister Lavrov and General Staff chief Gerasimov 

reportedly conveyed an offer from Moscow to enforce a 100-kilometer strip, but Jerusalem 

upped the ante and insisted on the total removal of Iranian forces, allied militias, and the Lebanese Hizballah from all of Syria.157 On July 30, Ambassador Viktorov pushed back against this 

Israeli demand, stating that while only Syrian forces should be deployed in the southwest along 

the Golan Heights border, Iranian and other “foreign forces” were playing a valuable role in 

fighting “terrorists” elsewhere in Syria. Russia could and would not force them out. At the same 

time, Russia could not prevent Israel from striking Iranian elements and allies across Syria.158

The day before the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki, Netanyahu asserted at a Cabinet 

meeting in Jerusalem, on July 15, that “We will not allow entry into our territory and we will demand that the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement with the Syrian army be strictly upheld.”159

This was a reference to the ceasefire and disengagement agreement brokered by U.S. Secretary 

of State Henry Kissinger that concluded the Yom Kippur War and implemented UNSC Resolution 338 of September 1973.160 The demand was presumably a talking point that Netanyahu 

used with Putin in person on July 11, and probably also conveyed in a phone call to President 

Trump on July 14.161 The Russian president picked up on the concept and ran with it in Helsinki 

on July 16:

Crushing terrorists in the southwest of Syria—the south of Syria—should be 

brought to the full compliance with the Treaty of 1974 about the separation of 

forces—about separation of forces of Israel and Syria. This will bring peace to 

Golan Heights and bring a more peaceful relationship between Syria and Israel, 

and also to provide security of the state of Israel. . . . Thus far, we will make a step 

toward creating a lasting peace in compliance with the respective resolutions of 

Security Council, for instance, the Resolution 338.162

Putin’s press conference remarks in effect implicitly suggested that Russia’s willful collapse of his agreement with President Trump on a de-escalation zone in southwest Syria would 

ultimately contribute toward establishing greater security for Israel along its borders with 

Syria, a goal shared by Moscow, Washington, and Jerusalem. Invoking the 1974 treaty and 

calling for more vigorous and rigorous enforcement of its provisions—as suggested by Netanyahu—provided Putin an elegant way to portray the brutal Daraa campaign as aimed at doing 

just this. The interactions between Putin and Netanyahu in arriving at this common language 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

underscored the strength of the relationship that had developed between Moscow and Jerusalem throughout the course of the Syrian conflict and that now presented Tehran with new and 

growing challenges.163

Russian-American Deconfliction

American dealings with Russia over deconfliction in the skies above Syria go back as far as 

Israel’s and have been just as productive. In fact, U.S. warplanes were striking IS targets in Syria 

long before the Russian air campaign began. Early on, the two countries in October 2015 negotiated a memorandum of understanding on what Defense Secretary Ash Carter insisted on calling deconfliction rather than cooperation. As Carter recounts, American policy was that “our 

fight in Syria was against ISIS” and “had nothing to do with what the Russians were doing.”164 All 

the same, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, observed 

in December 2017 that the memorandum was being “scrupulously observed by both parties.”165

In Helsinki the following July, Presidents Trump and Putin agreed that the militaries of the two 

sides “get along.”166

After Syrian government warplanes attacked Khan Shaykhun with sarin gas on April 4, 

2017, the American cruise missile strike on Shayrat Airbase renewed public attention on the 

issue of U.S.-Russian deconfliction efforts in Syria. The attack took out 20 percent of the Syrian 

government’s air force.167 Although Moscow after the incident said that it would close down the 

hotline between the two countries, it stayed up.168 According to Brett McGurk, the U.S. Special 

Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, U.S.-Russian contacts on deconfliction actually accelerated after the Tomahawk salvo.169 As Dmitry Yefremenko has noted in 

the mainline Russia in Global Affairs journal, the American move on April 7, 2018, sent “a 

strong signal to Russia, whose response to the U.S. attack was quite reserved, which not only 

made it possible for Russia to maintain contact with the U.S. on the crisis settlement process in 

Syria, but also work out initiatives that take into account Trump’s new approaches.”170

Attention was sharpened further by several incidents in June 2017 in eastern and southeastern Syria. Damascus forces and Iran-backed militias were racing with U.S.-backed opposition forces toward the oil- and gas-rich region of Deir ez-Zour while the latter forces’ campaign 

to liberate Raqqa from IS was still in progress.171 Under these competitive circumstances, U.S. 

jets shot down Iranian-made drones on June 8 and June 20 and a Syrian jet on June 18. Russia 

again announced that it would suspend the use of a hotline dedicated to defusing clashes over 

Syria, but, as happened in April after the Tomahawk strike on Shayrat Airbase, the militaries on 

both sides continued to use the hotline without interruption.172
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Between Russia and Iran

Tensions rose again in September 2017. First, the United States charged that Russian 

warplanes had attacked an SDF position where U.S. Soldiers were also present north of Deir 

ez-Zour. Then, several days later, Russia charged that the U.S.-backed SDF had fired twice on 

Syrian government positions, where Russian special operations forces were also present, outside Deir ez-Zour City, and threatened retaliation in the case of further such incidents. Again, 

however, Russian and American battlefield commanders reportedly continued to hold meetings 

focused on ways to lessen the chances of future such incidents.173

The two sides appeared to be refining rules of engagement (ROEs) or, rather, non-engagement, as the forces they each supported battled toward Deir ez-Zour. The main problem from 

the Russian point of view appeared to be potential clashes between Syrian government and 

Iranian-supported militias and U.S. forces, with Russia not wanting to get caught in the middle. 

Russia could countenance with relative equanimity the American cruise missile attack against 

Damascus’s Shayrat Airbase in April. The same could be said of multiple Israeli strikes on Syrian-Hizballah-Iranian targets. But the more recent SDF strikes on Syrian forces accompanied by 

Russian special forces raised more serious concerns in Moscow. 

These concerns contributed to consultations between Russian and American battlefield 

commands that soon resulted in agreement on deconfliction guidelines to govern activities on 

both sides of the Euphrates River Valley by their respective forces in order to ensure their safety. 

At the end of 2017, Secretary Mattis stated that the resulting deconfliction line running down 

the river “has held, pretty much,” and those problems which have arisen have been “resolved.”174

Russian Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov shared this assessment. After agreement on the 

deconfliction measures was reached, he said, “there were no problems.”175

Russia itself, however, has continued to test and cross the limits of the ROEs agreed upon 

with the United States. Since November 2017, Russian jets have crossed into skies east of the 

Euphrates a half dozen times a day, flying dangerously close to American aircraft, which, in at 

least one case on December 13, fired flares to warn them off.176 Even Gerasimov has alluded to 

the “unpleasant incident” that occurred on this day.177 Russia also pushes the envelope in continuing to support Syrian ground forces and then warning that it will strike back at U.S. allied 

opposition forces that hit Russian forces. The upside may be, however, that Russia—if it wants 

to—can move the dial on Syrian and Iranian activity and consequent vulnerability to American 

attack by deciding where and when Russia’s own special forces will operate alongside SyrianIranian forces. After all, it is Russia, not Iran, that is negotiating ROEs with the United States 

in Syria. According to one Israeli account in September 2017, “In a number of cases in recent 

months, Russia refused to help Iranian-backed forces in the Euphrates Valley, eastern Syria, 
24 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

when they clashed with Kurdish fighters supported by the United States and came under fire 

from U.S. aircraft.”178

This option may have been put on open and painful display on February 7, 2018, when 

U.S. forces supporting SDF fighters at a base outside Deir ez-Zour—3 miles east of the Euphrates demarcation line near an oil complex—repulsed and decimated an attack by pro-Damascus 

forces. By some accounts, over 200 (perhaps well over 300) attackers died.179 The United States 

had detected preparations for the assault a week earlier and conveyed this knowledge to Russian 

deconfliction interlocutors, along with the warning that force would be met with force. The two 

sides remained in contact during and after the attack, with the Russian side claiming throughout that there were no Russian military units in the area.180

First reports indicated that the attackers had consisted of various pro-Damascus militia 

groups, according to some accounts under the direction of Iranian IRGC advisors.181 Soon, 

however, it became clear that a substantial number of the advancing force had consisted of Russian mercenaries working for the so-called Wagner Group.182 Not long after, it was reported that 

Wagner’s ultimate main owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, informally known as “Putin’s chef,” had been 

in contact with high Syrian and Russian government officials shortly before the attack about 

a “good surprise” being prepared for Asad. Prigozhin was also a main investor in Evro Polis, 

which had a contract with Damascus to receive 25 percent of the oil and gas profits from any 

fields recaptured from IS.183

Nevertheless, the Russian Defense Ministry initially ascribed the February 7 assault on 

the SDF camp entirely to Syrian militias who, it claimed, suffered only 25 wounded, and asserted that they had not coordinated their plans with Russian forces.184 However, well-informed 

journalists in Moscow soon reported that their sources claimed that around 600 Wagner mercenaries had been involved in the conflict but that the Russian command in Syria had neither 

sanctioned nor supported the operation, deeming it a “dangerous independent initiative.”185 The 

Russian Foreign Ministry also initially stressed that no Russian servicemen had been involved 

in the attack, although it acknowledged that five Russians, presumably, had died in the action. 

It later reiterated that “Russian service members did not take part in any capacity and Russian 

military equipment was not used,” while conceding that assistance was being provided to those 

Russians who had been injured to return home for medical assistance.186

As of this writing we do not know who was in the loop on the Russian side—aside from 

Prigozhin and those he reportedly was in contact with—at each step of the unfolding debacle 

on February 7, 2018. It could have been a straightforward case of his mercenaries attacking 

American forces with the full backing of the Kremlin and the military command, which had 
25

Between Russia and Iran

the option of so-called plausible deniability should the assault not go well. It could have also 

been a case in which Prigozhin and his Wagner agents ignored the advice not to go forward 

from detractors in the professional military and possibly also political rivals. They in turn stood 

by, watched the escapade fail badly, and washed their hands of any responsibility for the entire 

bizarre incident.187 In any event, as had the U.S. cruise missile operation against Shayrat Airbase 

in April 2017, the lack of a Russian effort to respond militarily again suggested a healthy respect 

in Moscow for American warfighting capabilities.188 In addition, some of the early assignments 

of blame for the debacle outside Deir ez-Zour reflected suspicion on the Russian side that Iran 

was involved, or at least the eagerness of some Russians to use Iran as a scapegoat.

Three months later, visiting Moscow in May 2018, this author found the fog of war and 

awkward embarrassment still heavy in conversations about the February incident with half a 

dozen seasoned Russian observers of the conflict in Syria. While clearly seeing it as an example 

of bad coordination, several firmly rejected any possibility of more than 30 to 40 Russian casualties. Others had no problem accepting that there had been six or seven dozen Russian fatalities 

when the Wagner forces encountered more than a Kurdish irregular force and were mowed 

down by a regular American military opponent. In most of the reconstructed speculative narratives this author heard, the Wagner force had not notified the local Russian command. Several 

of these interlocutors, however, assumed that the Russian command nevertheless was indeed 

aware of what the Wagner force intended to do but acted under standing instructions never 

to acknowledge such awareness to its American deconfliction counterparts. At the same time, 

these interlocutors explained to this author, the Russian command in Syria was also operating 

under another standing instruction: not to interfere with the Wagnerites, let things proceed as 

they might, and watch and assess the results of the Wagner force’s testing of the U.S. presence. 

All but one of the author’s interlocutors had no idea whether Iranians had participated in 

the fighting on February 7. The one who was certain that Iranians had been present elaborated 

that there had not been many and that they had been at the battle outside Deir ez-Zour in a 

“watchdog,” and not fighting, capacity. Given the decreasing confidence between Russia and 

Iran and the rising tension between them, he explained, the Iranians wanted to keep track of 

every operation in Syria that Russians were involved in.189

Subsequently, after the Syrian government attack on Douma on April 7, 2018, which killed 

dozens of civilians, U.S.-Russian deconfliction channels served well—by all accounts—in planning and executing the U.S.-UK-French strikes on April 13–14. These successfully launched 

105 weapons against three Syrian chemical weapons facilities: the Barzeh Research and Development Center, in Damascus; the Him Shinshar chemical weapons storage facility, outside 
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Homs; and the Himshar chemical weapons bunker facility, also near Homs.190 In briefing the 

press, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., stated, “We used 

the normal deconfliction channels to deconflict the airspace that we were using. We did not 

coordinate targets or any plans with the Russians.”191 Joint Staff Director Lieutenant General 

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., described the deconfliction channel as “a multilevel, robust system of 

communication that we’ve employed for some time.” It “operated frequently over the past few 

months” and “continued to operate frequently leading up to this strike and a routine basis after 

the strike.” Emphasizing that “The Russians don’t have a veto on anything we do,” General McKenzie reported that “None of our aircraft or missiles involved in this operation were successfully 

engaged by Syrian air defenses, and we have no indication that Russian air-defense systems were 

employed.”192 Soon after, it appeared that Moscow had finally decided—once again—to transfer 

the S-300 system to Syrian disposal, for which there originally had been a contract signed in 

2010. However, as we have seen in an earlier section of this paper, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu once again successfully lobbied against such a move during his May 9, 2018, meeting with 

Putin in the Kremlin. 

Addition, Not Subtraction

Russia’s solution to its own dilemmas with aggressive Iranian behavior has implicitly been 

one of addition and mediation rather than subtraction. Russia’s approach to blunting Iranian 

leverage in Syria without boldly proclaiming this aim has been to dilute Iranian influence by 

dealing with other powers over Syria rather than trying to shun them. Refusing to pick sides 

between Iran and Israel, for example, can mean setbacks, concedes Vitaly Naumkin, dean of 

Russian Middle East experts, but it also puts Moscow in a better position to ease conflicts.193

From Moscow’s perspective, this approach—combined with Russia’s increased involvement in 

Syria—enhanced Russia’s leverage or, at least, aspirations for leverage, on other issues in the 

region: Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Quartet and bilateral; the Qatar versus GCC Gulf crisis; 

Yemen; and Iraq.194

A corollary of this development was the rebalancing of the instrumental value to Russia 

flowing from its dealings with the United States in Syria. This was not Putin’s original intent. 

However, regional powers began to pay greater attention to Russia because it was in Syria, and 

the United States appeared to be playing a secondary role to that of Russia. Polling across the 

region found that respondents in all countries except Iran viewed Russia as playing a negative 

role in Syria but, nevertheless, saw relations with Russia as significantly more important in 2017 

than in 2016.195 America’s instrumental value to Putin in Syria was consequently declining, and 
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Between Russia and Iran

the value to Russia of the regional powers was appreciating. The instrumental value of Russia’s 

military and political intervention in Syria was beginning to rest more on multiple regional and 

other power relationships and less on the appearance of Russia’s engagement as an equal and 

independent power on the world stage with the United States. 196

In 2015, as we have seen, Asad’s Foreign Minister Moallem was discomfited by Putin’s 

efforts to bring powers other than Iran into what the Russian president portrayed as an international coalition against IS. Two years later, nevertheless, Putin told Asad in Sochi in November 2017 that Russia maintained “constant contact” with its “partners” Iraq, the United States, 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Indeed, Putin followed up his talks with Asad with phone calls 

to President Trump, King Salman, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and Prime Minister 

Netanyahu.197 Two days later, in Sochi, Putin also convened a meeting with Turkish President 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and got their assent for holding 

a “Syrian National Dialogue Congress.”198 A month later, in Astana, representatives of the three 

agreed to hold the Congress on January 29–30, 2018, in Sochi.199

As Russia cooperates as well as competes with Iran in Syria, Putin does not want Iran to 

limit Russia’s relations with other powers in the region. Putin has long been personally courting 

the Saudis, other Gulf Sunni Arabs, and Israel, and in this pursuit does not want to get boxed in 

by overly intimate ties with Iran.200 Russia, however, will never part company with Iran in Syria 

and needs Iranian help there. Moscow, therefore, cannot and will not solve all of Washington’s 

issues with Iranian policy in Syria. Nevertheless, Putin does have some interests in common 

with the United States in constraining Iran in Syria and beyond. Russia has little interest in 

backing a dominant Iran in Syria or a resurgent Iran in the region. 

The demonstrations across Iran at the turn of the year (2017 to 2018) may reinforce the 

success of Russia’s “addition not subtraction” handling of Tehran’s aspirations in Syria and the 

wider region. Moscow paid close attention to the weeklong wave of protests that broke out on 

December 28, 2017, in Mashhad.201 There was some trepidation in the Russian capital given 

likely concern over the example that successful Iranian demonstrations could set for a Russia heading toward presidential elections in March 2018.202 There was probably also relief that 

there was no repetition of the “Death to Russia” chants that were heard in the protests that 

followed the fraud-filled reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2009.203 While 

Russia dodged a bullet this time, historical animosities will always provide the kindling for 

potential explosions of anti-Russian sentiment in Iran. However, piggybacking on Iranian official propaganda, recent demonstrations instead gave Moscow another opportunity to play up 

the theme of Russia as defender against externally stoked “color revolutions.” Deputy Foreign 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Minister Sergey Ryabkov put out the official line, portraying Russia as the protector of Iran—

Russia’s “friendly” neighbor—against U.S. interference and once again warning that the JCPOA 

was non-negotiable.204

However, some protestors this time around did pointedly question Iran’s engagement in 

Syria. There were widely reported chants of “Leave Syria alone, think about us!”; “Neither Gaza 

nor Lebanon, I will give my life for Iran”; and “Death to Hizballah.”205 Such sentiments evidently 

reflected deteriorating economic conditions affecting young people, especially in Iran’s provinces. In the sparring between hard-line conservatives and reformers, it had been revealed that 

funding for the IRGC had jumped to around $8 billion in the newly unveiled budget for 2018.206

If opposition to such largesse for the IRGC leads to hesitation in Tehran to stake more 

resources on its operations in Syria, Moscow may judge it a positive development to the extent 

that it tempers any inclination in Tehran to challenge Russia’s ascendancy in Damascus and claw 

back some of Iran’s lost advantages. However, Moscow will not want the fallout from the demonstrations to undercut Iran as a useful counterbalance to American activities and influence 

in Syria. So far this does not appear likely. Expert observers report that “at street level across 

Iran, the Syrian venture—as well as Iran’s other Arab pursuits—are overwhelmingly viewed as 

nothing but a drain.”207 Nevertheless, in reacting to the demonstrations and to then–Secretary 

Tillerson’s speech at Stanford University not long after outlining American policy toward Iran, 

Iranian security institutions such as the IRGC, with significant stakes in Syria, have shown no 

signs of any intention to pull back from a forward-leaning posture. They have instead explicitly 

stated that their goals are to oust the United States from the region and to cement Asad’s hold 

on power in Damascus.208

Push-Pull with Turkey 

Russia’s handling of Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in northern Syria against Afrin in 

Idlib Province reflects another variation in Moscow’s pursuit of a flexible “addition not subtraction” approach to Syria. The evolution of American partnering with the Syrian Kurdish YPG 

(People’s Protection Units) in the fight against IS in Iraq and then in Syria opened up new opportunities, as well as some complications, for Moscow’s ties with Ankara. Ankara has objected 

to U.S. partnering with the YPG in any form since the beginning of the relationship in 2014, 

even when subsumed with Syrian Arab opposition forces within the SDF (Syrian Democratic 

Forces). The YPG is the armed wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (YPD), 

which Turkey considers a terrorist organization along with its Turkish “parent,” the Kurdistan 

Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey’s fear has been that the U.S.-YPG fighting partnership will ad-
29

Between Russia and Iran

vance the Kurdish political project to create an autonomous “Rojava” Kurdish region linking 

the cantons of Jazeera, Kobane, and Afrin across the border from Turkey’s own restless Kurdish 

region. Turkey’s strategic obsession has been on defeating the PKK together with the PYD and 

the YPG, and to control the 800-kilometer border with Syria.209

Even as the United States, in early 2018, wrestled with the dilemmas and consequences 

of continuing to partner with the YPG, Turkish threats against Manbij, further to the east of 

Afrin, raised the possibility of Turkish forces clashing with a fellow NATO member—America’s 

special operations personnel stationed there.210 The gravity of the situation spurred then–Secretary Tillerson’s meetings with President Erdogan and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in 

Ankara on February 15–16, at which the two sides agreed to set up formal talks to sort out their 

differences.211 Despite a first round in Washington on March 8–9, however, the issue of Turkey’s 

objections to U.S. partnership with the YPG and Turkey’s threats to their joint presence in Manbij remained unresolved.212

Prior to that, Russia, on January 20, had withdrawn its personnel from around Afrin and 

did not interfere as some 72 Turkish fighter jets struck over 100 targets.213 The initial Russian 

reaction to the operation was relatively mild. “This information was received with concern in 

Moscow,” stated the Russian Foreign Ministry. “We are closely monitoring the development 

of the situation.”214 Earlier in January, even after reports surfaced that armed drones targeted 

at Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base had been launched from an area in Idlib Province controlled 

by Turkey,215 Putin quickly asserted that “I am sure that neither the Turkish military, nor the 

Turkish authorities, nor the Turkish state has anything to do with this incident.” It was a case of 

“provocateurs” trying to “destroy” Russia’s relations with Iran and Turkey.216

The hard-knuckled but essentially transactional back-and-forth between Ankara and 

Moscow over Afrin was reminiscent of that over Aleppo in 2016, as the two sides worked to 

put behind them the grave crisis that ensued in November 2015 after Turkish F-16 fighter jets 

downed a Russian Su-24M bomber over the Turkish-Syrian border.217 Then, Moscow had not 

impeded Ankara’s Operation Euphrates Shield, also aimed at disrupting a viable Rojava Kurdish 

autonomy in northern Syria, and in return Ankara had helped Russia resolve its challenge in 

Aleppo by withdrawing Turkish support for rebel opposition forces there. Now, Ankara largely 

withheld criticism of Russia’s cooperation with Syrian forces in brutally hammering opposition 

holdouts in the Damascus suburbs in Douma and elsewhere in Eastern Ghouta, in return for 

which Moscow did not impede Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch move into Afrin.218

As Ankara threatened to push east from Afrin toward Manbij, it used Turkey’s warming 

ties to Russia to encourage the United States to break with the YPG, and Turkey’s cooling ties 
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

to the United States within NATO to prod Russia to ease, especially, air defense barriers to attacking the YPG. Turkey also appeared to hope eventually to displace Iranian influence across 

northern and eastern Syria. Without advertising it, Russia appeared not averse to using its cooperation with Turkey to reduce Iranian activity in the area and diplomatic leverage over Syria, 

while also increasing friction between NATO allies Turkey and the United States.219 A long-time 

Russian analyst of the Middle East cautioned not long after these events, however, that Turkey 

would remain in NATO. Erdogan’s goal is not to get close to Russia but to minimize conflict 

with Russia, and use Russia as an argument or card in dealing with Europe and the United 

States. The Turkish president’s moves toward Russia are tactical, this analyst maintained, not 

part of some strategic vision of partnership with Russia.220

In any event, any reduction of U.S. military leverage on the ground east of the Euphrates 

would have the downside for the United States of undermining the U.S.-SDF campaign against 

remaining IS forces in that region. At the same time, there would be an upside for Moscow as 

well as Ankara because their side of the equation would improve in the balance, not only of 

military forces but also diplomatic leverage in the Astana process, as well as eventually in Geneva.221 An experienced observer of military-diplomatic developments in Syria notes that while 

Moscow wants stability more than control in Syria, Russia would certainly gain should the Syrian Kurds abandon their partnership with American forces, as the United States would then find 

that it cannot stay in Syria.222

In the short-term, however, the situation has been a wash for both Turkey and Russia. The 

United States reportedly set up a base in Manbij after Turkey launched its operation against 

Afrin and threatened to extend it to Manbij. But Ankara and Washington continued to discuss 

their differences and, on June 4, agreed to a “road map” under which Turkish troops would 

reportedly displace Kurdish fighters in Manbij; work jointly with the United States to provide 

security and stability in the area; and the current Kurdish-dominated local council will give way 

to local forces, primarily Arab.223 In fact, already on June 5, the Syrian Kurdish YPG announced 

that its military advisors would be leaving Manbij.224 Meanwhile, the U.S.-backed SDF, after 

suspending operations in March against IS in Deir ez-Zour because of the transfer by the YPG 

of its fighters to the Afrin theater, resumed the offensive against IS in Deir ez-Zour by early May 

as Kurdish fighters returned from Afrin.225

The trilateral summit in Ankara on April 4, 2018, and the follow-up meeting by Astana 

foreign ministers in Moscow on April 29, appear to have left these dynamics between Russia, 

Tehran, and Turkey largely intact, with Iran the marginal loser.226 At the same time, Ankara has 

kept its approaches to Moscow and Washington fluid as it continues to explore its options in 
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Between Russia and Iran

the context of the evolution of Trump administration policy toward Russia, Syria, and the Iranian presence in Syria.227 Kurdish explorations of their options in Syria, including dealing with 

Damascus and the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki, have reportedly heightened wariness in 

Ankara over possible Russian-American and Russian-Kurdish understandings in Syria.228

All the regional and external parties involved have underscored their support for maintaining a unified Syria. Turkey, however, has been isolated in resisting a role for Syria’s Kurds in 

the search for a political solution to the conflict, a position which it may find untenable in the 

longer run.229 The outcome of the Astana meetings in April was consistent with the remarks by 

Vitaly Naumkin, the long-time head of the Oriental Institute in Moscow who has been deeply 

involved in the Astana process. He emphasized at a public gathering of the Valdai Discussion 

Club in the Russian capital on May 21 that Astana partners Russia, Iran, and Turkey are not a 

strategic alliance. None of the countries are giving up their own sovereign interests. All are following their own national interests.230

Russia can thus live with and tolerate continuing and counterbalancing Iranian, Turkish, 

Israeli, and American activities in Syria as long as none seeks to challenge and contest Russian 

gains.231 As summer 2018 approached, Turkey moved to solidify its presence in northwestern 

Idlib Province and even encroach on Latakia Province.232 As Ankara’s Operation Olive Branch 

launched toward Afrin early in the year, the Russian Foreign Ministry quickly posted on its 

Facebook page a report on Lavrov’s phone call with Secretary Tillerson. The account ended with 

the statement that the two men had committed to staying in “close contact.”233 Officials in Tehran may well have squirmed as they followed Moscow’s direct interactions with both Ankara 

and Washington over Turkey’s military activity in Syria, bypassing Tehran. 

Sanctions, Strikes, JCPOA Withdrawal

As April 2018 began, Moscow and Damascus appeared closer together than at any time 

since the beginning of the conflict on the way ahead in Syria. Moscow had joined Damascus 

in the brutal assault on the Syrian capital’s Eastern Ghouta suburbs that began on February 4, 

escalated on February 20, and formally concluded on April 12.234 The Russian-Syrian campaign 

continued despite UNSC Resolution 2401’s call on February 24 for a ceasefire.235 It repeated the 

tactics used against Aleppo in 2016 of targeting noncombatant civilians—this time reportedly 

even with chlorine gas—and indiscriminately associating all opposition groups with the proscribed al Qaeda al-Nusra front.236 Unlike Aleppo, however, there was no prolonged arm wrestling between Moscow and Damascus preceding the operation against Eastern Ghouta, which 
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Russian diplomacy and airpower supported from the very beginning and beyond the UNSC’s 

call for a ceasefire.237

With the expulsion of all rebel forces from the suburbs of Damascus complete by May 

21,238 Moscow appeared less inclined than ever to work toward a replacement for Asad. In any 

event, Putin, if necessary, will want to arrange a dignified exit for the Syrian president that does 

not undermine a key argument for Russia’s intervention in Syria: preventing externally sponsored “regime change.” Accomplishing this will be difficult, however, no matter how much Putin 

might want it. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to Russian pressure that would have 

an impact on what Tehran evidently sees as its vital need for a land bridge through Syria to the 

Lebanese Hizballah, and for a military footprint in Syria from which to challenge Israel.239 But 

having itself vetoed nearly a dozen Syria UNSC resolutions, Moscow can have no illusions that 

the United States will approve any Russia-sponsored resolution that legitimizes Asad remaining 

in place in Damascus past a UN-negotiated transition period.

However, after the United States imposed deep sanctions on key Russian oligarchs on April 

6,240 followed by the April 13 U.S.-UK-French strikes in Syria, Putin’s hand in Syria began to 

lose value. Even before these events, Moscow had still faced a hard slog ahead. Convening the 

Congress of Syrian National Dialogue in Sochi at the end of January had required strenuous 

Russian efforts that did not yield much.241 Any challenges to security at Hmeimim Air Base and 

Tartus port more successful than the drone and other attacks at the turn of the year could easily 

throw hopes of creating an aura of success in Syria awry.242 Asad remained a difficult partner. 

Damascus openly questioned the premises of the de-escalation zones Russia had negotiated and 

clearly continued to favor the military rather than the diplomatic option.243

Now, the new sanctions and strikes dented Russia’s military reputation in the region, further restricted Russia’s access to world capital markets, and improved President Trump’s bargaining position in any future meetings with President Putin.244 The strikes had been a “great 

humiliation” for Russia, according to one independent pundit.245 The trenchant Vladimir Frolov 

observed that Russia’s “status as a great power and key military player in the Middle East suffered considerable damage.” The strikes had demonstrated that “the real balance of power in the 

Middle East as before is not in Russia’s favor.” They were a reminder that Russia’s military victories in Syria had been possible mainly because the United States had abstained from opposing 

them. Russia’s relative military weakness was obvious, in Frolov’s view. “Russia cannot pretend 

to play the role of an alternative to the United States of America as a power center and security 

provider in the Middle East.” It was time to review Russia’s potential end goals in the region. 
33

Between Russia and Iran

Frolov agreed with Fedor Lukyanov, head of the Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council, 

that otherwise Russia’s “vulnerability will grow.”246

On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the 

JCPOA, the nuclear deal agreed upon with Iran by the five permanent members of the UN 

Security Council and Germany (the P5+1) in July 2015, and reimpose financial and oil sanctions on Iran.247 Together with the other parties to the accord, Russia lamented the move, and 

Tehran debated what to do next.248 Russia’s advice to Tehran was clearly to stick with the deal, 

the terms of which Russia had helped negotiate.249 Even in advance of President Trump’s decision ultimately not to certify Iranian compliance with the JCPOA on October 13, 2017,250 Putin’s 

advice to Iranian President Rouhani was to fully implement the agreement.251 Russia’s interest is 

to keep the JCPOA’s restraints on the Iranian nuclear program, a priority that the long record of 

Russia’s dealings with Iran over the nuclear issue underscores.252 In Moscow, some also speculate that European opposition to the U.S. decision will weaken American standing not only on 

the world stage but in any summit meeting with Putin.253

Russia is unlikely, however, to link what it does with the United States in Syria to the U.S. 

decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran. Russia has its own objectives in Syria and 

Putin evidently calculates that the United States will not impinge on them despite its JCPOA 

decision. Moscow’s greatest concern regarding the nuclear agreement will be that future potential Russian military deals with Iran might be postponed. Moscow will talk loudly about forging 

ahead with increasing ties with Iran, but the reimposition of American financial sanctions will 

again scare off any Russian investment in Iran that might run afoul of American sanctions. 

Russia will publicly disagree with the United States over any challenges to JCPOA and also 

with American criticism of Iranian policy in Syria. However, while it swallows its own rising 

losses from increasing U.S. sanctions,254 Russia will quietly pocket any potential lessening of Iranian leverage on Damascus resulting from the economic impact of American measures on Iran. 

Adding insult to injury, Damascus may even already have begun to resist Iranian economic expansion into Syria in favor of Russian and Chinese business.255 Iran’s IRGC and its Quds Force, 

however, will probably remain politically strong enough to skim any cream off the top of the 

Iranian economy, but much under increasing stress.256

Meanwhile, as we have seen, the American decision on JCPOA left in place Russian toleration of Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities and interests in Syria, as dramatically demonstrated by 

the Israeli strikes of May 10. Paralleling Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s likening of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Nazi Germany, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman routinely calls Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “the new Hitler,” and Riyadh joined 
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Israel in applauding the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.257 Despite fundamental disagreement 

with Russia over the wisdom of the nuclear deal, Riyadh and Moscow have enormous interests 

in common in increasing and stabilizing world energy prices, and both no doubt welcome the 

return to oil prices above the $70 per barrel level. The reimposition of American sanctions and 

consequent reduction in Iranian oil on world markets will necessitate some renegotiation of the 

Saudi-led OPEC and Russian-led non-OPEC understandings on country output targets and allocations.258 Whether Russia sticks with the agreement, now slated to be operative until the end 

of 2018, will hinge more on cold-blooded market factors and Moscow’s dealings with Riyadh 

than on any sentimental attachment to Russia’s presumed “ally” relationship with Iran. Turkey 

will again lament the hit that its trade with Iran will take, but it will continue to try to use its 

relationships with Russia and the United States to bolster its objectives in Syria, including vis-àvis Iran, Asad, and Kurdish autonomy. 

On May 17, Putin again unexpectedly met with Asad in Sochi.259 On the political track, 

Asad publicly went no further than to commit to sending a list of delegates to the Constitutional Committee to be established to work with UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura 

“to discuss amendments to the current Constitution,” rather than a new Constitution as called 

for in December 2015 by UNSC Resolution 2254. Damascus would in fact submit a delegate 

list, but the 10th round of Astana format talks, held on July 30–31, could only report that negotiations continued on putting together a constitutional commission.260 On the economic track, 

Asad, in Sochi, on May 17, talked up Russian investments in Syria, but in Damascus the next 

day the Syrian president met with the Iranian delegation to the Syrian-Iranian Joint Ministerial Economic Committee to assure them of the importance of Iranian trade and investment 

in Syria.261

At the end of the Kremlin’s transcript of the statements to the press after the Putin-Asad 

meeting in Sochi, Putin ambiguously stated, “We proceed from the assumption that in view of 

the significant victories and success achieved by the Syrian Army in its fight against terrorism, 

and the start of a more active phase of the political process, foreign armed forces will be withdrawing from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.”262 The ambiguity was removed the next 

day when the Russian envoy to the Syrian peace negotiations, Aleksander Lavrentiev, stated 

“This includes the Americans, and the Turks, and “Hizballah,” and of course the Iranians.” Russia, however, would keep its two bases in Syria to help stabilize the situation in that country. In 

general, expanded Foreign Minister Lavrov, Russia would maintain its presence in Syria “as long 

as Syria’s legitimate leadership and friendly population needs it.”263 In Tehran, predictably, the 
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Between Russia and Iran

Foreign Ministry underscored that Iran was in Syria at the invitation of its government and that 

it was the American and Turkish forces that should withdraw from Syria.264

In Moscow, not long afterward, a widely recognized expert on the Middle East assessed 

Putin’s meeting with Asad as a forced and not realistic demonstration of success. Russia is 

trapped, he said, and it is becoming more obvious that it cannot do anything. The only strategy 

is to find a way out through negotiations, but everything Moscow tries repeatedly fails. Putin 

does not want to make any steps that might worsen the situation, which is deadlocked. Putin’s 

dilemma is how to maintain the status quo without sinking deeper into the Syria quagmire. 

Russia continues to lose lives and military equipment. Strategically, it has now achieved the 

maximum possible in recovering territory for the Asad regime. Under Asad, Syria will remain 

divided, with no chance to get the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition to leave. The coalition controls the 

areas rich in oil and gas, depriving the Asad government of significant income. And Russia is 

caught between Israel and Iran, a situation that it cannot improve.265

Separately, Irina Zviagelskaya, another well-known and veteran analyst of Russia’s relations 

with the Middle East, publicly agreed that Russia cannot reconcile Iranian and Israeli interests 

in Syria and that Moscow’s ability to deal with the two countries is very limited. It was sad, she 

mused, but perhaps for the best just to let the two countries shoot at each other from time to 

time. More widely, however, she stressed that all the regional powers share a concern that Iran 

will settle militarily in Syria; this is not just an Israeli worry. In fact, a paper she had co-authored 

and was presenting when she made these comments stated that Russia, “while maintaining a 

trusting working relationship with Israel, cannot ignore its concern over the possible appearance of Iranian bases in Syria, the creation of a corridor from Iraq to Lebanon, or Hezbollah’s 

advance to the border in the Golan Heights.”266 Such comments emanating from Moscow have 

raised grave concerns in Tehran.267

Despite Zviagelskaya’s pessimism about Russia’s ability to reconcile Iranian and Israeli interests, however, the Kremlin continues to work the problem with both, and Iran’s staying power 

in Syria cannot be underestimated.268 In addition, and not for the first time, Putin pushed beyond the analysis of many in the expert community in Moscow with surprising moves in Syria. 

Rather than folding his hand, the Russian president in effect reshuffled the deck, working with 

Damascus to destroy the southwest de-escalation zone he had agreed to a year earlier with 

President Trump. Putin then worked with Netanyahu on new principles governing military 

activities in the area, after which the Russian president attempted to get American agreement at 

the summit in Helsinki on working together to bolster Israeli security and to bring the Syrian 

conflict to an end.
36 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Implications for U.S. Policy

During his joint press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron in Washington on April 24, President Trump stated that with the campaign against IS coming to an end, 

American Soldiers will “be coming home” but “we want to leave a strong and lasting footprint” 

in Syria. A key element in this would be not giving “Iran open season to the Mediterranean.”269

In pursuing this key American objective, this paper recommends that the Trump administration should continue judiciously to engage and work with Russia where possible. Russia is not 

joined at the hip to Iran in Syria, and the presence of friction between Moscow and Tehran over 

Damascus is now clearer than ever. In response to the question posed to Secretary Mattis on 

November 13, 2017, this paper argues that there are several significant areas where “daylight” 

exists between Russia and Iran in Syria, and that the United States should discreetly encourage 

their widening.270 As Secretary Mattis and General Dunford implement U.S. military support 

for the way forward toward constraining Iran’s activities in the region, this paper suggests several implications for U.S. policy. 

The overarching proposition is that President Putin is not inclined to back a dominant Iran 

in Syria or the Middle East. However much Russia may verbally defend Iran, Moscow actually 

shares some of the U.S. concern in constraining Tehran. Nevertheless, Moscow will resist any 

U.S. pressure to break totally with Iran and with the proxy forces Iran bankrolls and trains to 

fight in Syria. Going forward, Russian-Iranian cooperation on almost all issues is sure to fall 

well short of 100 percent, but they will more often than not be able to sustain some lesser degree of coordination, although fraught with tension. Iranian and Iranian-sponsored boots on 

the ground have saved Russia from having to intervene in Syria with sizable ground forces of 

its own and from suffering the associated casualties. However, they have also allowed Moscow 

to argue that Russia’s presence there serves as a counterweight and bulwark against Iranian 

domination.271 Nevertheless, Russia will not solve Washington’s issues with Iran and probably 

calculates that residual Iranian-sponsored and directed militias in Syria will serve as a hedge 

against what Russia would regard as American overreaching. 

Russia will thus not follow Washington’s lead in working against Iran’s military presence 

and political activities in Syria. However, the record so far supports the conclusion that Russia 

will not impede U.S. military actions focused on inhibiting and retaliating against Syrian- and 

Iranian-associated attacks or threats against U.S. and allied forces on the ground or in Syrian airspace, or against sarin and other chemical agent attacks, especially on civilian populations. Russia’s reaction to the American cruise missile attack on the Syrian regime’s Shayrat Airbase in April 
37

Between Russia and Iran

2017, to the U.S. defense of the SDF base outside Deir ez-Zour in February 2018, and to the joint 

U.S.-UK-French strikes against Syrian chemical weapons facilities in April 2018, all bear witness 

to this, as do Russia’s several deconfliction agreements with the U.S. military regulating activities 

in Syria and the Trump-Putin statement at Danang, Vietnam, in November 2017.

272

In Helsinki, Presidents Trump and Putin agreed that their national security officials would 

follow up on the issues they discussed. Now, in fact, is a good time for the United States and 

Russia to explore how they can come to together where their objectives overlap in Syria. Russia 

is facing the prospect of diminishing, degrading returns.273 Its temporary tactical advantages are 

beginning to slip, though this process is still obscured by its, and the Asad regime’s, victories in 

2018 in finally securing the suburbs of Damascus and regaining Daraa in the southwest, where 

the Syrian revolt began in 2011. The Islamic State killed as many as nine Russian “advisors” in 

a firefight on May 23 with Syrian forces in Deir ez-Zour Province, near the town of Mayadeen, 

for example, and more than 200 people in Sweida Province along the Jordanian border on July 

25.274 But to encourage Russia to engage in pursuit of America’s goals, including constraining 

Iran’s leverage in Syria and the wider region and reinforcing Israel’s security, the United States 

needs to maintain a properly resourced military presence in and around Syria. 

As argued at the onset of this paper, failure to maintain such a presence until the IS threat 

is minimized will lead to the further waning of U.S. influence across the Middle East, not just 

in Syria, and to the continued waxing of Iranian expansion in the region. Moreover, as the example of Iraq demonstrates, it is difficult to definitively defeat IS.275 Continuing an American 

presence in and around Syria, however, ensures that Russia will regard the United States as a key 

counterweight to Iran with which Moscow will want and will need to deal. The decline in the 

instrumental value of dealing with the United States on Syria, not only for Russia but also for the 

regional powers, will continue to reverse and start to rise again. Washington, however, should 

have little expectation that Russia will have much interest in sharing its gains in influence in 

Syria at Iran’s expense with the United States to any significant extent. 

Consequently, as the United States continues to address the IS threat in Syria, an active 

American military presence that retains Russian respect will be necessary to resist and degrade 

Iranian influence in Syria, and to support the security interests of America’s allies in the region, including Israel. This means maintaining robust stand-off sea and air assets around Syria 

capable of striking chemical weapons research, development, production, and storage facility 

targets and disabling airbase infrastructures used by the Asad regime to inflict chemical weapon 

attacks. The United States must also maintain ground forces and advisors east of the Euphrates 

for as long as it takes and in sufficient numbers to confront the IS and Iranian challenges. This 
38 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

includes disrupting Iranian land supply routes to Hizballah through Iraq and Syria at key crossing points such as the Al Bukamal and Al-Tanf areas.276 At the same time, the United States 

should continue to engage with Russia on deconfliction in Syria, while not ruling out U.S. and 

allied strikes on Syrian, Iranian, and Iranian-supported forces to prevent their attacks on U.S. 

and allied forces, as well as defend against and repulse any Russian mercenary attacks, as was 

done on February 7, 2018. 

While recognizing that Russia is now an influential player in Syria with substantial military and political assets, the United States should not seek to reverse these Russian accomplishments. Instead, the United States should exercise strategic patience as Russia and Iran’s differences on Syria’s future widen largely on their own. Russia and Iran are historical rivals, and U.S. 

objectives toward Iran are now served by the presence of Russia in Syria. This includes Russia’s 

bases at Hmeimim and Tartus, which Moscow intends to keep under the terms of its long-term 

agreements with Damascus. Although it was not Moscow’s original intent, these bases now help 

anchor Russia’s influence, counterbalancing that of Iran in Syria, diminishing Iran’s sway over 

the Asad regime.277

This recommended U.S. posture will also bolster American leverage at the Geneva negotiating table and increase U.S. ability to stabilize the 30 percent of Syrian territory that lies to the 

east of the Euphrates river, out of the control of Damascus.278 In Helsinki, Putin called on the 

United States to work with Russia to address Syria’s humanitarian and refugee crises.279 Those 

challenges, together with the immense cost of reconstruction—put at over $250 billion by the 

United Nations280—will give the United States and European and Arab supporters of Syria’s 

moderate oppositions and surviving civil society continuing leverage with Russia over how long 

Asad remains in power in Damascus.281 Asad’s tenure will remain an open issue as peace negotiations continue, the search for aid becomes more serious, and increasing stability east of the 

Euphrates sets an example for an alternative to the Asad regime.282 According to polling, the 

majority of respondents across the region, even in Iran, do not believe that there can be a solution in Syria that leaves Asad in power.283 Moscow appears at times to recognize this reality. Although Tehran still insists on keeping Asad, Foreign Minister Lavrov, in April 2018, reportedly 

told a closed-door session of the Russian Council of Foreign and Defense Policy that Moscow 

is pushing for reforms and a change of leaders in Syria, for without it Syrian society cannot be 

reunited.284 So far, however, such suggestions must be regarded with extreme skepticism.

The continuing requirements of deconfliction and the potential of the United States as one 

of several counterweights to Iranian aspirations for dominance in Syria and the region will spur 

Putin to keep the door open to dialogue with the Trump administration. Setting the stage for 
39

Between Russia and Iran

their summit in Helsinki, Putin quickly endorsed President Trump’s March 20 proposal to meet 

and his suggestion that the venue might even be the White House.285 Earlier, at the Valdai Conference in October 2017, Putin was not just jollying President Trump out of principle or good 

manners but pursuing his own objectives when he castigated a questioner for his lack of respect 

for the American president.286 Reacting to the April 13 strikes, Putin called for an emergency 

meeting of the UN Security Council, but still abstained—as usual—from any ad hominem lashing out at President Trump.287 Sources in Moscow asserted that Putin had put out the order to 

tone down the anti–United States rhetoric.288 Some in Moscow reportedly actually saw “new 

opportunities for a détente on Syria” after the strikes.289

The United States is still relevant to Moscow on several levels in Syria, and that is why 

Russia will not abandon its efforts to engage Washington on the conflict and what comes afterward. The Trump administration should therefore work with Russia toward a UN-led political 

solution to Syria, without conceding anything in advance on Asad’s future or Iran’s place in the 

region. 
40 

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Notes 1 The paper also draws on the author’s May 2018 visit to Moscow and previous visits and 

work on this and related topics: John W. Parker, Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran Since the Fall 

of the Shah (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), passim; John W. Parker, Russia and the 

Iranian Nuclear Program: Replay or Breakthrough? Strategic Perspectives 9 (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, March 2012), passim, available at <http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/

inss/Strategic-Perspectives-9.pdf>; John W. Parker, Understanding Putin Through a Middle Eastern 

Looking Glass, Strategic Perspectives 19 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2015), passim, available 

at <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-19.

pdf>; and John W. Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket, 

Strategic Perspectives 25 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2017), passim, available at <http://inss.

ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-25.pdf>. 

2 Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, “Hallway Press Gaggle by Secretary Mattis,” transcript, 

Department of Defense (DOD), November 13, 2017, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1371000/hallway-press-gaggle-by-secretary-mattis/>. 

3 Karen DeYoung, “U.S., Russia Agree to Collaborate on Backing Cease-Fire in Southwest 

Syria,” Washington Post, July 7, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/

us-russia-agree-to-collaborate-backing-cease-fire-in-southwest-syria/2017/07/07/2fcbfb5e-633b-1

1e7-a4f7-af34fc1d9d39_story.html?utm_term=.3d0c32acf371>; and Gardiner Harris, “U.S., Russia and 

Jordan Reach Deal for Cease-Fire in Part of Syria,” New York Times, July 7, 2017, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2017/07/07/us/politics/syria-ceasefire-agreement.html?ref=todayspaper>. 

4 In Danang, Vietnam, the two presidents also reviewed progress on the ceasefire in southwest 

Syria that they had finalized at their July summit in Hamburg, and “welcomed” the Memorandum of 

Principles just concluded on November 8, 2017, in Amman. The memorandum agreed upon between 

Jordan, Russia, and the United States, the two leaders stated, “reinforces the success of the [southwest 

Syria] ceasefire initiative, to include the reduction, and ultimate elimination of foreign forces and 

foreign fighters from the area to ensure a more sustainable peace.” See “Statement by the Presidents of 

the Russian Federation and the United States of America,” President of Russia Web site, November 11, 

2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5252>. 

5 “Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press 

Conference,” The White House, July 16, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-putin-russian-federation-joint-press-conference/>.

6 “Trump Addresses Criticism of Appearance with Putin: Full Transcript,” New York Times, 

July 17, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/us/politics/donald-trump-putin.html>.

7 Announcing the coordinated U.S.-UK-French strikes on April 13, 2018, on Syrian chemical 

weapons facilities, President Trump explained that “The purpose of our actions tonight is to establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread, and use of chemical weapons. Establishing this 

deterrent is a vital national security interest of the United States. The combined American, British, 

and French response to these atrocities will integrate all instruments of our national power: military, 

economic and diplomatic. We are prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian regime stops its use 
41

Between Russia and Iran

of prohibited chemical agents.” He went on to say that “In Syria, the United States, with but a small force 

being used to eliminate what is left of ISIS, is doing what is necessary to protect the American people. 

Over the last year, nearly 100 percent of the territory once controlled by the so-called ISIS caliphate 

in Syria and Iraq has been liberated and eliminated.” President Trump added that “The United States 

has also rebuilt our friendships across the Middle East. . . . Increased engagement from our friends, 

including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and others, can ensure that Iran does 

not profit from the eradication of ISIS. America does not seek an indefinite presence in Syria, under 

no circumstances. As other nations step up their contributions, we look forward to the day when we 

can bring our warriors home.” See “President Trump on Syria Strikes: Full Transcript and Video,” New 

York Times, April 13, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-syriaairstrikes-full-transcript.html>. 

8 Discussing Syria after the Danang summit, Secretary of Defense Mattis on November 13, 

2017, stated that the U.S. “goal right now [is] to continue until ISIS is extinguished and . . . until the 

Geneva process can give us a diplomatic solution and a way ahead.” See Mattis, “Hallway Press Gaggle by Secretary Mattis,” November 13, 2017. For Defense Secretary Mattis’s preview of the role U.S. 

troops remaining on the ground in Syria would play, see Mattis, “Press Gaggle with Secretary Mattis,” 

transcript, DOD, December 29, 2017, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/TranscriptView/Article/1406278/press-gaggle-with-secretary-mattis/>.

9 Expounding on President Trump’s position, United Nations (UN) Ambassador Nikki Haley 

stated on April 15, 2018, that “At some point we want to see our military come home. . . . But there are 

three things that we have to do to get there. First of all, the President made it very clear we cannot have 

chemical weapons usage anywhere and we will continue to combat that in any way we need to protect 

American interests. Secondly, we want to make sure that they understand that ISIS has to be defeated 

completely and wholly in a way that we know that we have stabilized the region. . . . And then thirdly, 

we want to make sure that the influence of Iran doesn’t take over the area. . . . The President has asked 

the allies to step up and do more when it comes to Syria. And so all of these things are being done in the 

name of bringing our military home.” See “UN Ambassador Nikki Haley,” transcript, Face the Nation, 

CBS News, April 15, 2018, available at <www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-u-n-ambassador-nikki-haley-on-face-the-nation-april-15-2018/>; Ambassador Haley repeated these same points the same day on 

Fox News. See “Amb. Nikki Haley on Trump Administration’s Syria Strategy,” Fox News Sunday, April 

15, 2018, available at <www.foxnews.com/transcript/2018/04/15/amb-nikki-haley-on-trump-administrations-syria-strategy.html>.

10 On April 16, 2018, the White House Press Secretary stated that “We don’t have a timeframe” 

on bringing American troops home. “It’s not based on an arbitrary timeline, but on defeating ISIS and 

also getting the Gulf partners in the region to step up and do more both militarily and financially.” See 

“Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders,” The White House, Aboard Air Force One, En Route 

Miami, Florida, April 16, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-gaggleby-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-041618/>. 

11 On January 17, 2018, in remarks delivered at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, 

former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson expanded on “the way forward for the United States in Syria.” 

The United States desired “five key endstates”: the “enduring” defeat of the so-called Islamic State 
42 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

(IS) and al Qaeda; a “stable, unified, independent,” and “functioning” Syrian state under a post-Asad 

leadership attained through pursuit of a UN-led political process as spelled out in UN Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 2254; the diminution of “Iranian influence” in and across Syria and security for 

Syria’s neighbors “from all threats emanating from Syria”; conditions conducive to the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to Syria; and the removal of all weapons of 

mass destruction from Syria. See Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, “Remarks on the Way Forward 

for the United States Regarding Syria,” Hoover Institute at Stanford University, Stanford, CA, January 

17, 2018, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2018/01/277493.htm>. 

12 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” The Heritage 

Foundation, May 21, 2018, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282301.htm>. 

13 Secretary Mattis also twice stated that he was “not prepared to answer” the question. See 

Mattis, “Hallway Press Gaggle by Secretary Mattis,” November 13, 2017.

14 James F. Jeffrey, “U.S. Troop Deployment in Syria: Potential Pitfalls,” Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, December 12, 2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/

view/u.s.-troop-deployment-in-syria-potential-pitfalls>. 

15 Senate Armed Services Committee, testimony by James F. Jeffrey, “U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Middle East,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 14, 2017, available at 

<www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-policy-and-strategy-in-the-middle-east>. 

16 Parker, Persian Dreams, 250, 270; Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program, 44–45, 

passim; and Parker, Understanding Putin, passim. 

17 Parker, Understanding Putin, 14; and Andrew J. Tabler, “Beyond Deconfliction in Syria,” 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 16, 2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.

org/policy-analysis/view/beyond-deconfliction-in-syria>. For the relevant documents leading up to 

and including UNSCR 2254, see UN, “Action Group for Syria,” Final Communique, 30.06.2012 (also, 

“Geneva Communique”), available at <www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf>; UNSCR 2118, September 27, 2013, available at <www.securitycouncilreport.

org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf>; “Statement 

of the International Syria Support Group,” Vienna, Austria, October 30, 2015 (also, “Vienna Statement”), available at <https://documents.aucegypt.edu/SyriaReader/Documents/2-Vienna%2030%20

Oct%202015.pdf>; UN Department of Political Affairs, “Statement of the International Syria Support 

Group,” Vienna, Austria, November 14, 2015, available at <www.un.org/undpa/en/Speeches-statements/14112015/syria>; and UNSCR 2254, December 18, 2015, available at <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf>.

18 Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Goals Go beyond Damascus,” Middle East Quarterly 24 

(Winter 2018), January 1, 2018, available at <www.meforum.org/articles/2017/russias-goals-go-beyonddamascus>. 

19 For a look back at the slowly rising rank of Syria and the Middle East as a priority in Russian foreign policy under Putin, see Parker, Understanding Putin, 7, 14, 21, 39, 62–65, and 68–73; and 

“Putin’s Syrian Gambit,” 32–35. Now, of course, it is at the top, or at least at the top of media attention, 

as acknowledged by Foreign Minister Lavrov. See “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and 

Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference on Russian Diplomacy in 2017,” Russian Foreign 
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Between Russia and Iran

Ministry Web site, January 15, 2018, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3018203>. 

20 Ellen Francis and Laila Bassam, “Syrian Army, Allies Thrust East to Break Siege in Deir 

Al-Zor City,” Reuters, September 4, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisissyria/syrian-army-allies-thrust-east-to-break-siege-in-deir-al-zor-city-idUSKCN1BF1G0?utm_

source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=20170905>; Liz Sly, “A Boost for Assad 

as the Syrian Army Makes Gains Against ISIS in Eastern Syria,” Washington Post, September 6, 2017, 

available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-backed-forces-reach-besiegedallies-outside-islamic-state-held-city/2017/09/05/75ce908e-922b-11e7-8754-d478688d23b4_story.

html?utm_term=.4e7109ded4a1>; and Louisa Loveluck and Zakaria Zakaria, “Syria’s World Cup Soccer Bid Mesmerizes a Divided Nation Badly in Need of Hope,” Washington Post, September 6, 2017, 

available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrias-world-cup-soccer-bid-mesmerizesa-divided-nation-badly-in-need-of-hope/2017/09/05/d5eb422e-91da-11e7-8482-8dc9a7af29f9_story.

html?utm_term=.8fa7aa0f945d>.

21 “Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help,” World Vision, July 13, 2017, available 

at <www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts>.

22 Louisa Loveluck, “U.S.-Backed Forces Announce anti-ISIS Push in Syria’s Oil-Rich 

East,” Washington Post, September 10, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/usbacked-forces-announce-anti-isis-push-in-syrias-oil-rich-east/2017/09/09/f79f5536-94e1-11e7-8482-

8dc9a7af29f9_story.html?utm_term=.c4b56e16a9f1>; and Liz Sly, “The Syrian War Is Far from 

Over. But the Endgame Is Already Playing Out,” Washington Post, September 27, 2017, available at 

<www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-syrian-war-is-far-from-over-but-the-endgameis-already-playing-out/2017/09/24/4361a55e-9d67-11e7-b2a7-bc70b6f98089_story.html?utm_

term=.3a074bec37ef>. 

23 “President al-Assad: Everything Related to the Destiny and Future of Syria Is a 100% Syrian Issue, Unity of Syrian Territory Is Self-Evident and Not up for Debate,” Syrian Arab New Agency 

(SANA), August 20, 2017, available at <http://sana.sy/en/?p=112238>; and “Syrian and Russian 

Businessmen Discuss Enhancing Cooperation,” SANA, August 19, 2017, available at <http://sana.sy/

en/?p=112176>.

24 Victor Baranets, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh sil Rossii general armii Valerij Gerasimov: ‘My perelomili hrebet udarnym silam terrorizma.’ Razgrom vooruzhennyh formirovanij terroristov v Sirii stal odnim iz glavnyh voennyh itogov uhodjashhego goda. I v jetom Rossijskaja armija, 

bezuslovno, sygrala reshajushhuju rol” [The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces 

Army General Valery Gerasimov: “We broke the backbone of the strike forces of terrorism.” The defeat 

of the armed groups of terrorists in Syria became one of the main military highlights of the year. And 

in this the Russian army played a crucial role], Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 26, 2017, available at 

<www.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693/?geo=0>. 

25 Prime Minister Abadi declared victory over IS in Iraq on December 9, 2017; See Tamer 

el-Ghobashi, “Iraq Declares Complete Victory in the War Against Islamic State,” Washington Post, 

December 10, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraq-declares-complete-victory-inthe-war-against-islamic-state/2017/12/09/9a0c5ea6-dce3-11e7-8e5f-ccc94e22b133_story.html?utm_
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term=.680ecab0bcb6>, several days after President Putin declared the defeat of IS on both sides of 

the Euphrates in Syria on December 6; See “President on Situation in Syria,” President of Russia Web 

site, December 6, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56321>. However, the 

pundit Vladimir Frolov wrote that it had been the U.S.-led campaign that had freed up Syrian government and Iranian forces, Iranian-supported militias, and Russian airpower to concentrate their fire on 

the Damascus regime’s non-IS opponents, who as time went on received less and less assistance from 

the outside. See Vladimir Frolov, “Kak rascenivat’ poezdku Putina v Siriju?” [How Should We Assess Putin’s Trip to Syria?] Republic (Moscow), December 12, 2017, available at <https://republic.ru/

posts/88333>. With even more detail, the journalist Maksim Yusin pointed out that Russia did not focus on IS until after the December 2016 victory in Aleppo; that Syrian government forces did not score 

a significant victory over IS until November 2017, when they took Deir ez-Zour; and that by that time 

the Western coalition had already taken Raqqa in October 2017, after Turkish forces had earlier taken 

al Bab in February 2017, and Kurdish forces supported by the United States had captured Manbij in 

August 2016. See Maksim Yusin, “Nepodelennaja pobeda. Maksim Jusin—o tom, kto vnes reshajushhij vklad v razgrom IG” [The Uncut Victory. Maxim Yusin—On Who Made the Decisive Contribution 

to the Defeat of ISIS], Kommersant (Moskow), December 12, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.

ru/doc/3493833?from=doc_vrez>.

26 IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center (JTIC), as cited in Agence France-Presse, 

“Study: Russian Support Gave Assad Half of Syria,” VOA, May 15, 2018, available at <www.voanews.

com/a/russian-support-gave-assad-half-of-syria-study-says/4394613.html>. For an analysis of the Russian air intervention in Syria, see Anton Lavrov, “The Russian Air Campaign in Syria: A Preliminary 

Analysis,” CNA, Arlington, VA, June 22, 2018, available at <www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2018-

U-017903-Final.pdf>. 

27 As Dmitry Yefremenko put it: “Russia’s exit from Syria, whether voluntary or due to some extraordinary circumstances, would create a power vacuum that the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf countries, 

on the one hand, and Iran, on the other hand, would immediately try to fill. Adverse consequences for 

the region would not be far off. In other words, the time when Russia could contemplate an exit strategy 

seems to have passed. It would be virtually impossible now to guarantee a negotiated settlement in Syria 

or at least a lasting truce without Russia’s substantial military presence in that country.” See Dmitry 

Yefremenko, “By the Rivers of Babylon,” Russia in Global Affairs, October 5, 2017, available at <http://

eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/By-the-Rivers-of-Babylon-19037>. On several waves of earlier hopes, see 

Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 20–32.

28 “Vladimir Putin posetil aviabazu Hmejmim v Sirii” [Vladimir Putin Visited Hmeimim 

Air Base in Syria], President of Russia Web site, December 11, 2017, available at <http://kremlin.ru/

events/president/news/56351>. The Russian version makes clear Putin said “significant portion.” On 

March 14, 2016, Putin had used the phrase “main part”; See Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 28–29; 

and on December 9, 2016, had ordered Defense Minister Shoigu to begin the scaling back of Russian 

forces in Syria; See Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 60. 

29 For speculation on what would be withdrawn from Hmeimim, see Ivan Safronov and Aleksandra Dzhordzhevich, “Net povoda ne vyjti. Rossijskie voennye pristupili k zaversheniju operacii v 

Sirii” [There Is No Reason Not to Leave. The Russian Military Has Begun Wrapping Up Operations in 
45

Between Russia and Iran

Syria], Kommersant, December 12, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3494094>. 

30 Ivan Safronov and Alexandra Dzhorzhevich, “Politicheskoe uregulirovanie—ne delo tehniki. 

Rossija mozhet nachat’ sokrashhat’ kolichestvo samoletov i vertoletov v Sirii” [A Political Settlement 

Is Not a Matter of Technique. Russia May Begin Reducing the Number of Aircraft and Helicopters in 

Syria], Kommersant, October 30, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3454164?utm_source=

CGI+Daily+Russia+Brief&utm_campaign=a0322d60fd-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_02&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=0_814a2b3260-a0322d60fd-281718393&mc_cid=a0322d60fd&mc_

eid=3826ac3356>; and comments on November 3 by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, 

as reflected—among several sources—in “Russia Prepares to Withdraw Forces from Syria,” Asharq 

Al-Awsat (London), December 1, 2017, available at <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1100156/

russia-prepares-withdraw-forces-syria>. This revived speculation on the expansion of Russian “private” 

fighter deployments to Syria; See Metin Gurcan, “Private Military Companies: Moscow’s other Army 

in Syria,” Al-Monitor, November 29, 2017; and was accompanied by news of talks between Russia and 

Egypt on an agreement for reciprocal access to airbases and airspace for a period of 5 years; See “Russian Military Working on Deal to Use Egyptian Airbases: Document,” Reuters, November 30, 2017, 

available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-egypt-military-airspace-planes/russian-military-working-on-deal-to-use-egyptian-air-bases-document-idUSKBN1DU11D?utm_campaign=20171130&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. When Putin stopped 

in Cairo on December 11, a $30 billion nuclear power station construction contract was announced 

but nothing further was said about the airbase agreement; See Neil MacFarquhar and Anne Barnard, “A 

Quick 3-Nation Tour for Putin Highlights Moscow’s New Reach in the Middle East,” New York Times, 

December 12, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/world/europe/putin-syria-russia.

html?ref=todayspaper>. 

31 See Russia’s Official Internet Portal for Legal Information, “Federal’nyj zakon ot 29.12.2017 

# 441-FZ ‘O ratifikacii Soglashenija mezhdu Rossijskoj Federaciej i Sirijskoj Arabskoj Respublikoj o 

rasshirenii territorii punkta material’no-tehnicheskogo obespechenija Voenno-Morskogo Flota Rossijskoj Federacii v rajone porta Tartus i zahodah voennyh korablej Rossijskoj Federacii v territorial’noe 

more, vnutrennie vody i porty Sirijskoj Arabskoj Respubliki’” [Federal Law No. 441-FZ, December 29, 

2017, On Ratification of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on Expansion of the Material-Technical Logistics Center of the Navy of the Russian Federation in 

the Area of the Port of Tartus and the Visits of Warships of the Russian Federation in the Territorial 

Sea, Internal Waters and Ports of the Syrian Arab Republic], available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.

ru/Document/View/0001201712290024>. Putin signed a similar document covering Hmeimim Air 

Base over a year earlier, on October 14, 2016, available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/

View/0001201610140012>. 

32 “Russia Establishing Permanent Presence at Bases in Syria,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty (RFE/RL), December 26, 2017, available at <www.rferl.org/a/russia-syria-bases-permanentpresence-shoigu/28939539.html>; and Alexei Nikolsky, “Utverzhdeny shtaty i struktura rossijskih 

voennyh baz v Sirii. Tam ostanetsja okolo 20–30 edinic aviacii i okolo 3000 voennosluzhashhih” [The 

Staffing and Structure of the Russian Military Bases in Syria Are Approved. 20–30 Aircraft and about

3,000 Troops Will Remain There], Vedomosti, December 27, 2017, available at <www.vedomosti.ru/
46 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

finance/articles/2018/07/23/776274-minfin-rasshiryaet?utm_campaign=%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%B

5%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B9%20%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%20%C2%A

B%D0%92%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%-

B9%C2%BB%20%D0%B7%D0%B0%2027%20%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B1%

D1%80%D1%8F&utm_medium=email&utm_source=vedomosti>. 

33 “Putin Says Russia Has Withdrawn 1,140 Military Personnel and 13 Warplanes from 

Syria,” Reuters, June 28, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriarussia/putin-says-russia-has-withdrawn-1140-military-personnel-and-13-warplanes-from-syriaidUSKBN1JO1ED?utm_campaign=20180628&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. 

34 Ellen Francis, “Russia Invites Syrian Kurds to People’s Congress: Kurdish Official,” 

Reuters, October 31, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/

russia-invites-syrian-kurds-to-peoples-congress-kurdish-official-idUSKBN1D016J?utm_

campaign=20171101&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20

Minute>; “Syrian Opposition Rejects Russia-Sponsored Peace Initiative,” Reuters, November 1, 

2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-oppositio/syrian-opposition-rejects-russia-sponsored-peace-initiative-idUSKBN1D13UU?utm_campaign=20171102&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>; and Anton Mardasov, 

“Russian Summit on Syria Raises Controversy, Doubt,” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2017.

35 Stephanie Nebehay and Lisa Barrington, “Syrian Government Negotiator Quits Geneva 

Talks, Says May Not Return,” Reuters, December 1, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/

us-mideast-crisis-syria-talks/syrian-government-negotiator-quits-geneva-talks-says-may-not-returnidUSKBN1DV4U8?utm_campaign=20171204&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Middle%20East%20Minute>; Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Peace Talks for Syria Falter Again,” 

New York Times, December 15, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/world/middleeast/

syria-peace-talks-un.html?ref=todayspaper>; and Michelle Nichols and Tom Miles, “UN to Make 

Proposals to Kickstart Syrian Reform Process,” Reuters, December 19, 2017, available at <www.reuters.

com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/u-n-to-make-proposals-to-kickstart-syrian-reform-processidUSKBN1ED291?utm_campaign=20171220&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. 

36 Oleg Gromov, “Leonid Isaev: ‘Asad i Iran ne zainteresovany v rossijsko-amerikanskoj sotrudnichestve v Sirii’” [Leonid Isayev: “Asad and Iran Are Not Interested in Russo-American Cooperation in 

Syria”], Politcom.ru, June 22, 2017, available at <http://politcom.ru/22535.html>. 

37 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

38 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 36–37. 

39 Ibid., 38–39. 

40 Ibid., 55–56. 

41 Ibid., 57. 

42 DeYoung, “U.S., Russia Agree to Collaborate on Backing Cease-Fire in Southwest Syria.” 

43 Harris, “U.S., Russia and Jordan Reach Agreement to Facilitate a Cease-Fire in Part of Syria.”

44 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran to Keep Its Forces in Syria in Defiance of International Pressure,” 
47

Between Russia and Iran

Middle East Institute, Washington, DC, December 5, 2017, available at <www.mei.edu/content/io/irankeep-its-forces-syria-defiance-international-pressure>. 

45 See, for example, Vladimir Frolov, “Putin and Trump Talked. But Don’t Bet on Real Change,” 

The Moscow Times, July 9, 2017, available at <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/trump-and-russiadont-bet-on-change-58340>; and Michael Weiss in Michael Young, “Will Israel Eventually Accept the 

U.S.-Russian Agreement over Southern Syria?” Carnegie Middle East Center, July 27, 2017, available 

at <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/72660?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWkdJeU1qZzBPVGN4TVdKayIsInQiOiI3VFB2WEorWG9Fdmp4b0x6OHBFempKcHVvVjc1bHpXTG91OUQrVEhlcUNTMlQwRVFvcWY

1V2VzTWZTTFJsQXNic09Dd3lhZXh3ajVXRjZVS1VYN1hkYXpzNDJCdGVwa3dsM1V4K3o5ZmJjSlA5Mmh2ZFhmUFNSanliUFRLQmVaZSJ9>. For discussion of mounting IRGC resistance to leaving Syria, see Alex Vatanka, “Iran and Russia, Growing Apart. Rising Dissent Over the IRGC’s Militias,” 

Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2017, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-11-29/

iran-and-russia-growing-apart?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20171130>; Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran Appears Unwilling to Withdraw Its Forces from Southern Syria,” Middle East Institute, Washington, DC, November 

30, 2017, available at <www.mei.edu/content/io/zarif-russia-and-america-can-t-decide-iran-s-presencesyria?utm_medium=email&utm_source=cc&utm_campaign=io-daily&utm_content=readmore>; and 

Farzin Nadimi, “Iran May Double Down on Foreign Militias after Its ‘Victory’ Against the Islamic State,” 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 6, 2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.

org/policy-analysis/view/iran-may-double-down-on-foreign-militias-after-its-victory-against-the-isla>. 

46 Vladimir Frolov, “Rukopozhatie protivnikov. Itogi pervoj vstechi Putina i Trampa. Svidanie 

dvuh liderov zatjanulos’. No jeto ne priblizilo ih k resheniju samyh ostryh voprosov” [The Handshake 

of Opponents. The Results of the First Meeting of Putin and Trump. The Meeting of Two Leaders Was 

Prolonged. But This Did Not Bring Them Closer to Solving the Most Pressing Issues], Republic, July

8, 2017, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/84723?utm_source=slon.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_

campaign=saturday>. 

47 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 56. 

48 “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Made a Working Visit to Russia,” President of Russia 

Web site, November 21, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56135>. 

49 Baranets, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh sil Rossii general armii Valerij Gerasimov.”

50 “President al-Assad to Iranian Al-ALAM TV: Syrian-Iranian Relation Is Strategic . . . the 

Strongest Response to Israel Is to Strike Its Terrorists in Syria,” SANA, June 13, 2018, available at 

<https://sana.sy/en/?p=140166>. Asad’s thumbnail recounting in this interview of Syria’s earlier major 

battlefield mileposts parallels that suggested by the present author in Understanding Putin Through a 

Middle Eastern Looking Glass and Putin’s Syrian Gambit: Qusayr in 2013, Aleppo in 2016, Deir ezZour in 2017, and the Damascus suburbs in 2018. 

51 For examination of this conclusion from various perspectives over time and for the sources 

consulted, see Parker, Persian Dreams, passim; Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program, passim; Parker, Understanding Putin, passim; and Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, passim. 

52 Parker, Persian Dreams, passim; and Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program, 

passim. 

53 Parker, Understanding Putin, 24–25. 
48 

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54 Igor Subbotin, “Tegeran ishhet ukrytija v al’janse s Moskvoj. Iran nameren sblizit’sja s Rossiej 

na fone konfrontacii s SShA” [Tehran Seeks Shelter in Alliance with Moscow. Iran Intends Rapprochement with Russia Against Background of Confrontation with United States], Nezavisimaya Gazeta

(Moscow), February 21, 2017, available at <www.ng.ru/world/2017-02-21/1_6934_iran.html>.

55 Author conversations in Moscow, April 2017; and ibid.

56 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 57. 

57 Mark N. Katz, “Moscow’s Balancing Act in Syria,” Lobe Log, November 21, 2017, available at 

<http://lobelog.com/moscows-balancing-act-in-syria/>. 

58 Parker, Persian Dreams, 169–206.

59 Maxim A. Suchkov, “Moscow’s Leverage in Syria Is Strong, but Limited,” Al-Monitor, 

December 8, 2017. 

60 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 57. 

61 Parker, Persian Dreams, 210. 

62 “President in a Meeting with His Russian Counterpart,” President of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran official Web site, November 1, 2017, available at <http://president.ir/en/101403>. 

63 “Meeting with President of Iran Hassan Rouhani,” President of Russia Web site, November 

1, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55980>. See also “Statements for the 

Press Following the Trilateral Meeting of Vladimir Putin, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani, and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev,” President of Russia Web site, November 1, 2017, available at <http://

en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/55984>. For an earlier discussion of this subject, see Parker, 

Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 55–57 and 60–62. 

64 “Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the United 

Arab Emirates,” President of Russia Web site, June 1, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5309>; and “Meeting with Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan,” 

President of Russia Web site, June 1, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/

news/57632>. See also Mark N. Katz, “Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Draw Closer to Moscow,” Arab Gulf 

States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), June 20, 2018, available at <www.agsiw.org/riyadh-abudhabi-draw-closer-moscow/>.

65 Vladimir Sazhin, “Iran-Russia Strategic Partnership at the New Stage: What Could We 

Propose to Each Other?” in Russia-Iran Partnership: An Overview and Prospects for the Future, 

Report for the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies, 

Moscow, December 13, 2016, 12, available at <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/russiairan-partnership-an-overview-and-prospects-for-the-fu/>. 

66 Author’s conversations in Moscow, June and September 2014.

67 “Rosatom: Construction of Bushehr II, III N. Power Plants to Start,” Islamic Republic News 

Agency (IRNA), February 20, 2016, available at <www.irna.ir/en/News/81970820/>. 

68 Author’s conversations in Moscow, June 2016. 

69 Anzhelika Basisini, “Trojka v Tegerane: o chem dogovorilis’ lidery Rossii, Irana i Azerbajdzhana” [The Troika in Tehran: What the Leaders of Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan Agreed to], RBK 

Group, November 1, 2017, available at <www.rbc.ru/politics/01/11/2017/59f9bdf19a79470d902e08c6>. 

70 “Iran Welcomes Russian Companies’ Investments in Its Energy and Transport Sectors,” 
49

Between Russia and Iran

TASS, December 4, 2017, available at <http://tass.com/economy/978895>. 

71 Parker, Understanding Putin, 7, 43–44. 

72 Anna Trunina and Lyudmila Podobedova, “«Rosneft’» i Iran dogovorilis’ o proektah s investicijami v $30 mlrd” [“Rosneft” and Iran Agreed on Projects with Investments of $30 Billion], RBK 

Group, November 1, 2017, available at <www.rbc.ru/business/01/11/2017/59f9bf299a79470d7ff28a9d

?from=main>. 

73 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

74 “Iran, Russia Seal Contract to Build 1,400mw Power Plant,” IRNA, December 14, 2016, 

available at <www.irna.ir/en/News/82346030/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_

campaign=20161214>.

75 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

76 “Iran, Russia Sign Major Deal on Development of Oil, Gas Fields,” Tasnim News 

Agency, December 13, 2016, available at <www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/12/13/1266366/

iran-russia-sign-major-deal-on-development-of-oil-gas-fields?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_

medium=manual&utm_campaign=20161213>. 

77 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. See also Thomas Erdbrink, “Europeans in 

Iran Bitterly Denounce the U.S. Over Its New Sanctions,” New York Times, May 27, 2018, available at 

<www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/world/middleeast/europe-iran-american-sanctions.html?action=click

&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlace

ment=9&pgtype=collection>; and Yuriy Barsukov, “Iranskij gaz ostanetsja v zemle. Total predupredila 

ob uhode iz Irana iz-za sankcij SShA,” [Iranian Gas Will Remain in the Ground. Total Warned about 

Leaving Iran Because of U.S. Sanctions], Kommersant, May 17, 2018, available at <www.kommersant.

ru/doc/3630132>. This article includes an extensive table of foreign company expressions of interest and 

actual agreements in working Iranian energy deposits. On Russian Lukoil’s putting on hold its plans for 

Iran, see “Major Russian, Indian Energy Firms Reportedly Moving To Pull Out Of Iran,” RFE/RL, May 

31, 2018, available at <www.rferl.org/a/major-russian-indian-energy-firms-lukoil-reliance-oil-refinerycomplex-reported-moving-pull-out-of-iran/29260706.html?ltflags=mailer>. 

78 Yuriy Barsukov, Ivan Safronov, and Yelena Chernenko, “Forum ideal’nogo gaza. Vladimir Putin vpervye za vosem’ let posetit Iran” [Ideal Gas Forum. Vladimir Putin to Visit Iran for the 

First Time in Eight Years], Kommersant, November 23, 2015, available at <www.kommersant.ru/

doc/2860396>. 

79 Vladimir Sazhin, “Iran-Russia Strategic Partnership at the New Stage,” 12; Nikolay Kozhanov, 

“Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods,” Chatham House, London, February 

2018, appendix table 1, 31, available at <www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/

research/2018-02-21-russian-policy-middle-east-kozhanov.pdf>; and Vasily Kuznetzov, Vitaly Naumkin, and Irina Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in the Middle East: The Harmony of Polyphony,” Valdai Discussion 

Club, Moscow, May 2018, 13 (figure): “Russia’s Trade with the Middle East Countries in 2017,” available 

at <http://valdaiclub.com/files/18375/>. 

80 UNSCR 2231 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, July 20, 2015, 

S/RES/2231, annex B: statement, paragraph 5, 100, available at <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/

cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2231.pdf>. Paragraph 4 of this 
50 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

same statement limits the sale of nuclear weapon delivery systems and their components for 8 years 

after Adoption Day. UNSCR 1929 (2010), adopted June 9, 2010, had embargoed transfers of all these 

systems to Iran. For background on that earlier UNSC action and Moscow’s surprising decision pursuant to UNSCR 1929 to include the S-300 among the systems that Russia would not export to Iran, see 

Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program,” 11–17. 

81 Parker, Persian Dreams, 31–34. 

82 On preliminary negotiations after the beginning of implementation of the JCPOA, see 

Matthew Bodner, “Iran Seeks Russian Fire Power,” The Moscow Times, March 4, 2016, available at 

<www.themoscowtimes.com/article/iran-seeks-russian-fire-power/561322.html>. 

83 Paul Sonne, “WSJ Q&A with Sergei Chemezov,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2016, 

available at <www.wsj.com/articles/wsj-q-a-with-sergei-chemezov-1457657218>. See also Ivan Safronov, “U S-300 zaedaet mehanizm oplaty” [The Payment Mechanism Trips Up the S-300], Kommersant, March 9, 2016, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/2932732>. 

84 Kuznetzov, Naumkin, and Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in the Middle East,” 13 (figure). 

85 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

86 For discussion of the timing of Putin’s decision, see Parker, Understanding Putin, 45–47. 

87 Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program, 16–17. 

88 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russia Says Stalled Arms Deal With Iran Is Signed and Active,” 

New York Times, November 9, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/world/europe/

russia-says-stalled-arms-deal-with-iran-is-signed-and-active.html?emc=eta1>; Yuriy Barsukov et al., 

“Forum ideal’nogo gaza”; and Ivan Safronov, “U S-300 zaedaet mehanizm oplaty.” The systems are 

now reportedly deployed at four sites: two divisions in Tehran region; one at Bushehr airport; and one 

at Isfahan airport. See Yuri Lyamin, “Vot i pozicija chetvertogo diviziona ZRS S-300PMU-2 v Irane 

nashlas’” [The Position of the Fourth Division of the S-300 PMU-2 SAMS in Iran Has Been Found], 

imp_navigator blog, LiveJournal (Russia), March 24, 2018, available at <https://imp-navigator.livejournal.com/715610.html>. 

89 For details on the evolving deal with Saudi Arabia, see below in the main text. With Turkey, financial arrangements for the deal reportedly were completed by the end of December 2017. 

Rostec chairman Chemezov stated that Turkey would pay $2.5 billion for four divisions (battalions) of the S-400 system. See Ivan Safronov, “U menja inogda voznikaet vopros: poshel by ja voobshhe v jetu avantjuru? Glava goskorporacii ‘Rosteh’ Sergej Chemezov dal interv’ju ‘Kommersant’” 

[I Sometimes Ponder the Question: Should I Have Gotten Involved at All in This Adventure? The 

Head of State Corporation “Rostec” Sergey Chemezov Gave an Interview to “Kommersant”], Kommersant, December 27, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3509148>. The delivery date 

was advanced to July 2019 during Putin’s April 3–4, 2018, visit to Ankara; See “Turkey Says Russian 

S-400 Missile Delivery Brought Forward to July 2019,” Reuters, April 4, 2018, available at <www.

reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-missiles/turkey-says-russian-s-400-missile-delivery-broughtforward-to-july-2019-idUSKCN1HB0IU?utm_campaign=20180404&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. On the negotiations with Turkey, see also 

Carlotta Gall and Andrew Higgins, “Turkey Agrees to Buy Russian Missile System, Pivoting from 

NATO,” New York Times, September 13, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/eu-
51

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rope/turkey-russia-missile-deal.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>; and Ivan Safronov, “‘Triumfu’ skazali: 

NATO. Rossija i Turcija podpisali krupnejshij oruzhejnyj kontrakt na S-400” [“Triumph” Was Told: 

NATO. Russia and Turkey Have Signed the Biggest Arms Contract for S-400], Kommersant, September

13, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3409158>. 

90 Dmitry Zhdannikov and Vladimir Soldatkin, “‘Axis of Love’: Saudi-Russia Détente Heralds 

New Oil Order,” Reuters, June 1, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec-russiasaudi-idUSKBN18S3Y3>; “Petro Diplomacy: Navigating the New Oil Era,” conference program, 

AGSIW, Washington, DC, September 25, 2017, see description of the afternoon panel on “Political and 

Economic Flashpoints for Oil Markets,” 23, available at <www.agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/

Petro-Diplomacy-2017-ONLINE.pdf>. See also the excellent scene setter for this conference: Diane 

Munro, “Navigating the New Oil Era,” Issue Paper 10, AGSIW, September 22, 2017, available at 

<www.agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Munro_Petro-Scene-Setter-2017_ONLINE-1.pdf>.

91 Reuters, “Russia Says Global Oil Cut Deal Could Be Extended, No Imminent Decision,” New 

York Times, November 2, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/11/02/business/02reuterssaudi-russia-energy.html?_r=1&utm_source=CGI+Daily+Russia+Brief&utm_campaign=abd9bdffa1-

EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_814a2b3260-abd9bdffa1-

281718393&mc_cid=abd9bdffa1&mc_eid=3826ac3356>. 

92 For a review of Russian-Saudi relations from Putin’s first years as president until June 2015, 

see Parker, Understanding Putin, 21–28 and 54–59.

93 “Joint news conference by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Foreign Minister of Saudi 

Arabia Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, Sochi, October 11, 2015,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, 

October 12, 2015, available at <www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/1838901>; and Igor Delanoë, “Is a Russia-Saudi Deal on the 

Horizon?” The Moscow Times, October 12, 2015, available at <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/is-arussia-saudi-deal-on-the-horizon-50218>. 

94 On June 29, 2015, when Putin suggested Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan as partners in such a coalition, Moallem complained that these countries were all supporters of the “terrorists” 

fighting Syrian government troops. In Moallem’s view, “an alliance with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, 

and the United States would require a very big miracle.” See “Meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister 

Walid al-Mu’allim,” June 29, 2015, President of Russia Web site, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/

events/president/news/49781>; Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia: Officials Meet on Syrian Crisis,” New York 

Times, June 30, 2015; and Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 23–24. 

95 Vladimir Soldatkin, “Russia’s Putin, Saudi Prince Praise Dialogue on Oil, Syria,” Reuters, May 30, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-saudi-meetingidUSKBN18Q0S4?il=0&utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=MEM&utm_campaign=20170530>; 

and “Meeting with Deputy Crown Prince and Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin 

Salman Al Saud,” President of Russia Web site, May 30, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/

events/president/news/54627>. 

96 Dmitry Zhdannikov and Vladimir Soldatkin, “‘Axis of Love.’” 

97 Pavel Koshkin, “‘Mjagkij perevorot’: chto znachit smena naslednika Saudovskoj Aravii” 

[“Soft Coup”: What the Change in Saudi Heir Means], RBK, June 21, 2017, available at <www.rbc.ru/
52 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

politics/21/06/2017/594a4f919a794782ebb15312?from=center_36>. 

98 Vasily Kuznetsov, “How Moscow-Riyadh Rapport Fits into the Mideast Scene,” Al-Monitor, June 11, 2017. 

99 Parker, Understanding Putin, 54–59; and Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 57–59. 

100 Kareem Fahim and Karen DeYoung, “Four Arab Nations Sever Diplomatic Ties with Qatar, 

Exposing Rift in Region,” Washington Post, June 6, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

world/four-arab-nations-sever-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-exposing-rift-in-region/2017/06/05/15ad

2284-49b4-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.66e6628fedc7>; Karen DeYoung, “As 

Persian Gulf Crisis Persists, Alarm in Washington Deepens,” Washington Post, September 18, 2017, 

available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-persian-gulf-crisis-persists-alarmin-washington-deepens/2017/09/17/3353c50a-970b-11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html?utm_term=.

a3ed646b1f02>; Nikolay Kozhanov, “Why Russia Seeks to Stay Neutral in Saudi-Qatar Rift,” AlMonitor, September 1, 2017; “Russian-Qatari Talks. Vladimir Putin Held Talks at the Kremlin with 

Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, Who Arrived in Russia on a Working 

Visit,” President of Russia Web site, March 26, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/

news/57134>; and Kirimli Semenov, “Russia, Qatar Explore Partnership Potential,” Al-Monitor, March 

28, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/03/russia-qatar-new-partnershipputin-tamim.html>. 

101 See, for example, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Opening Remarks and Answers to 

Media Questions at a Joint News Conference with Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh 

Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan on the Results of His Visit to the United Arab Emirates, Abu 

Dhabi, August 29, 2017,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, August 29, 2017, available at <www.mid.

ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2846895>; David Enders and 

Joyce Karam, “Saudi Arabia Sets About Unifying Opposition to Assad,” The National (Abu Dhabi), September 7, 2017, available at <www.thenational.ae/world/mena/saudi-arabia-sets-about-unifying-opposition-to-assad-1.617714?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=20170910>; 

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a Joint News Conference Following Talks with Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Adel Al-Jubeir, Jeddah, 

September 10, 2017,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, September 10, 2017, available at <www.mid.

ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2857224>; and “Telephone 

Conversation with King of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud,” President of Russia Web site, 

November 21, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56144>. 

102 Ali Bakeer, “Can Saudis Tempt Moscow into Pushing Iran from Syria?” Al-Monitor, December 5, 2017. 

103 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with RT, Moscow, December 25, 2017,” 

Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, December 25, 2017, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/

news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3007223>. 

104 Stanley Reed and Clifford Krauss, “OPEC to Limit Production as Iran’s Influence Grows,” 

New York Times, December 1, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/business/international/opec-energy-oil-saudi-iran.html?ref=todayspaper>; and Stanley Reed, “Russia and Others Join 

OPEC in Deal to Cut Oil Output,” New York Times, December 11, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.
53

Between Russia and Iran

com/2016/12/10/business/russia-opec-saudi-arabia-cut-oil-output.html?ref=todayspaper>.

105 Stanley Reed, “Price of Crude Soars as Two Oil Giants Agree to Cut Production,” New York 

Times, May 16, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/business/energy-environment/saudiarabia-russia-opec-oil.html?action=click&contentCollection=Energy%20%26%20Environment%20

&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=Marginalia&pgtype=article>; Stanley Reed, “OPEC, Battling 

Market Forces, Extends Production Cuts Into 2018,” New York Times, May 26, 2017, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2017/05/25/business/energy-environment/oil-opec-shale-renewables.html?action=click

&contentCollection=Europe&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=Marginalia&pgtype=article>; and 

Stanley Reed, “Saudi Arabia Drives OPEC to Extend Production Cuts,” New York Times, December 1, 

2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/business/energy-environment/opec-saudi-arabiaoil-meeting.html?ref=todayspaper>. On speculation that the production cut agreement might be 

extended even further, see Vitaliy Petlevoy, “Soglashenie Rossii s OPEK mogut prodlit’ eshhe na god. 

Aleksandr Novak schitaet, chto sotrudnichestvo s kartelem prodolzhitsja” [The Agreement between 

Russia, OPEC Might Be Renewed for Another Year. Alexander Novak Believes that Cooperation with 

the Cartel Will Continue], Vedomosti, January 21, 2018, available at <www.vedomosti.ru/business/

articles/2018/01/22/748465-soglashenie-rossii-opek?utm_campaign=%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%B5

%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B9%20%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%20%C2%A

B%D0%92%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%-

B9%C2%BB%20%D0%B7%D0%B0%2022%20%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%

D1%8F&utm_medium=email&utm_source=vedomosti>. 

106 Liam Denning, “The Market Math Behind the Saudi-Russia Romance,” Bloomberg 

Gadfly, June 13, 2017, available at <www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-06-13/saudi-arabiarussia-oil-market-math-behind-their-romance?utm_campaign=opinion&utm_medium=bd&utm_

source=applenews>; Andrew E. Kramer, “Oil Prices Buoy Russia, Despite West’s Sanctions,” New York 

Times, January 19, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/world/europe/russia-oil-economy.

html?ref=todayspaper>; and Vitaly Petlevoy and Mikhail Overchenko, “Stoimost’ nefti prevysila $80 za 

barrel’ vpervye c 2014 goda” [The Cost of Oil Exceeded $80 per Barrel for the First Time Since 2014], 

Vedomosti, May 17, 2018, available at <www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/05/17/769824-neftiprevisila-80>. 

107 See Wael Mahdi and Elena Mazneva, “Russians, Saudis May Go Beyond Oil Alliance 

With LNG Project,” Bloomberg, February 14, 2018, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-14/russia-saudis-may-go-beyond-their-oil-alliance-with-lng-deal>; Richard Mably 

and Yara Bayoumy, “Exclusive: OPEC, Russia Consider 10- to 20-Year Oil Alliance—Saudi Crown 

Prince,” Reuters, March 27, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oil-exclusive/

exclusive-opec-russia-consider-10-to-20-year-oil-alliance-saudi-crown-prince-idUSKBN1H31SK>; 

and “Russia: We Have a Common Position with Riyadh on Oil Deal,” Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2018, 

available at <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1279586/russia-we-have-common-positionriyadh-oil-deal>. For a cautionary note, however, see Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia Might Not Be Ready 

for Long-Term OPEC Commitment,” Al-Monitor, April 10, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.

com/pulse/originals/2018/04/russia-opec-mohammad-bin-salman-oil-honeymoon.html?utm_

campaign=20180411&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.
54 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

108 “Meeting with Crown Prince and Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin 

Salman Al Saud,” President of Russia Web site, June 14, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/

events/president/news/57786>; and Steven Goff and Matt Bonesteel, “In World Cup Opener, Russia 

Romps Past Saudi Arabia, Fans Revel and Putin Is Pleased,” Washington Post, June 14, 2018, available 

at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/soccer-insider/wp/2018/06/14/russia-vs-saudi-arabia-2018-worldcup/?utm_term=.076e180e4b01>. 

109 “Russia, Saudi Arabia Agree on Termless Extension of OPEC+ Deal—Energy Minister. 

The Agreement Will Not ‘Specify Particular volumes,’ Alexander Novak said,” TASS, June 16, 2018, 

available at <http://tass.com/economy/1009863>; and Nikolay Kozhanov, “Saudi Crown Prince, Putin 

Boost Energy Cooperation in Moscow Meeting,” Al-Monitor, June 17, 2018, available at <www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/russia-saudi-arabia-putin-mbs-meeting-energy.html?utm_

campaign=20180618&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

This was further refined 10 days later in Vienna. See Stanley Reed, “Saudis Say They Will Increase Oil 

Output,” New York Times, June 24, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/business/opecoil-production.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&con

tentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=

2&pgtype=collection>; and Vitaly Petlevoy, “Rossija i Saudovskaja Aravija pomogli SShA. Glavnym 

beneficiarom sdelki OPEK+ stali amerikanskie kompanii” [Russia and Saudi Arabia Helped the U.S. 

The Main Beneficiary of the OPEC+ Deal Were American Companies], Vedomosti, June 24, 2018, 

available at <www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/06/24/773627-rossiya-saudovskaya?utm_camp

aign=newspaper_25_06_2018&utm_medium=email&utm_source=vedomosti>.

110 Parker, Understanding Putin, 21–28 and 54–59; and Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 57–59. 

111 Steven Mufson, “U.S., Saudi Arabia Reach Tentative Pacts Potentially Worth $110 Billion,” Washington Post, May 21, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/

us-saudi-arabia-reach-tentative-pacts-potentially-worth-110-billion/2017/05/20/2a919826-3d91-11e7

-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.dc3ac4ca6a38>; and Philip Rucker and Karen DeYoung, 

“Trump Signs ‘Tremendous’ Deals with Saudi Arabia on His First Day Overseas,” Washington Post, 

May 21, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-gets-elaborate-welcome-in-saudiarabia-embarking-on-first-foreign-trip/2017/05/20/679f2766-3d1d-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.

html?utm_term=.fa4dc5f9d632>. 

112 Prior to King Salman’s visit, “Rostec” head Sergey Chemezov in July 2017 put the total 

value of deals being discussed at $3.5 billion. See Andrey Vandenko, “Sergej Chemezov: obshhee 

proshloe s prezidentom Putinym ─ ne indul’gencija. General’nyj direktor goskorporacii “Rosteh”—v 

specproekte TASS “Pervye lica” [Sergei Chemezov: A Common Past with President Putin Is Not an Indulgence. The General Director of the State Corporation “Rostec”—in the TASS “First Person” Special 

Project], TASS, July 10, 2017, available at <http://tass.ru/opinions/top-officials/4392342>; and Ivan 

Safronov, “Rossija i Saudovskaja Aravija zarjadili oruzhie razgovorami. Storony obsuzhdajut soglashenija na $3,5 mlrd” [Russia and Saudi Arabia Loaded Weapons with Talks. The Parties Are Discussing an Agreement for $3.5 Billion], Kommersant, July 11, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/

doc/3351312?utm_source=kommersant&utm_medium=mir&utm_campaign=four>. 

113 Ivan Safronov and Aleksandra Dzhodzhevich, “Jer-Rijad poluchit ognja, raket i granat” 
55

Between Russia and Iran

[Riyadh To Get Fire, Missiles, and Grenades], Kommersant, October 6, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3429985>.

114 Interview by Nikolay Surkov, “Adel’ al’-Dzhubejr: ‘Politicheski nashi pozicii blizhe, 

chem mnogie dumajut’” [Adel al-Jubeir: “Politically, Our Positions Are Closer Than Many People

Think”], Izvestiya, October 9, 2017, available at <https://iz.ru/655707/nikolai-surkov/adel-al-dzhubeirpoliticheski-nashi-pozitcii-blizhe-chem-mnogie-dumaiut>. For more detail, see also “Russian-Saudi 

talks. Vladimir Putin held talks with King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, Who Is in 

Russia on a State Visit,” President of Russia Web site, October 5, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.

ru/events/president/news/55775>. 

115 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Vladimir Putin Took Part in the Final 

Plenary Session of the 14th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club Titled ‘The 

World of the Future: Moving Through Conflict to Cooperation,’” President of Russia Web site, October 

19, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882>. Meanwhile, there have been 

suggestions that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are moving closer to Israel, motivated by their common perception of an Iranian threat. See Simon Henderson, “From Bahrain to Jerusalem,” Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/from-bahrain-to-jerusalem>. 

116 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018.

117 Ibid.

118 Author’s conversations in Moscow, April 2017 and May 2018.

119 Anshel Pfeffer, “Mission Impossible? Putin Seeks Syria Deal that Both Iran and Israel 

Can Swallow,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), September 19, 2017, available at <www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/1.812927>.

120 Jay Solomon, “U.S. Eyes Russia-Iran Split in Bid to End Syria Conflict,” Wall Street 

Journal, November 19, 2015, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-eyes-russia-iran-split-in-bidto-end-syria-conflict-1447895357>. See also Igor Delanoë, “Is a Russia-Saudi Deal on the Horizon?” 

The Moscow Times, October 12, 2015, available at <www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/is-arussia-saudi-deal-on-the-horizon/538674.html>; and Saheb Sadeghi, “Why Iran and Russia Aren’t as 

Closely Aligned on Syria as You Might Think,” Al-Monitor, November 10, 2015, available at <www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-russia-syria.html>.

121 Parker, Understanding Putin, 42, 47–48.

122 “Answers to Journalists’ Questions [on September 28, 2015],” President of Russia Web 

site, September 29, 2015, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/press_conferences/50394>; Judah Ari Gross, “Israel’s Air Superiority Clouded by New Russia Missiles in Syria,” 

The Times of Israel, December 1, 2015, available at <www.timesofisrael.com/israels-air-superiority-insyria-clouded-by-russian-s-400/>; and Josh Cohen, “Vladimir Putin Is the Closest Thing to a Friend Israel Has Ever Had in Moscow,” Reuters, January 14, 2016, available at <http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2016/01/14/vladimir-putin-is-the-closest-thing-to-a-friend-israel-has-ever-had-in-moscow/>. 

The two leaders met in Moscow on September 21 (even before the launch of Russia’s air campaign) 

and in Paris on November 30, 2015, on the margins of the UN Climate Change Conference. 

123 The May and July meetings are covered later in the current study. For the earlier meetings, 
56 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

see “Conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,” President of Russia Web site, 

January 29, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56739>; Andrey Ontikov, 

“Netan’jahu v Rossii podnimet iranskij vopros. Tel’-Aviv bespokoit usilenie vlijanija Islamskoj Respubliki v Sirii” [Netanyahu in Russia Will Raise the Iranian Issue. The Growing Influence of the Islamic 

Republic in Syria Concerns Tel Aviv], Izvestiya, August 23, 2017, available at <https://iz.ru/635459/

netaniakhu-edet-k-putinu-obsuzhdat-iran>; Ben Caspit, “Netanyahu Raising Alarm on Iran, Again,” 

Al-Monitor, August 24, 2017; and Marianna Belenkaya, “Israel Takes Stock of Putin’s Pull with Iran,” 

Al-Monitor, August 28, 2017. 

124Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Three-Way Deal on Iran in Syria and Russia in the G-7,” Al-Monitor, 

June 18, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/israel-russia-us-iransyria-avigdor-liberman-vladimir-putin.html?utm_campaign=20180619&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

125 “‘Israeli Jets’ Strike Outside Damascus, No Casualties,” al-Jazeera, November 30, 2016, 

available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/jets-strike-damascus-casualties-161130104548716.

html>; William Booth, “Syria Fires Missiles at Israeli Warplanes on Bombing Run,” Washington Post, 

March 18, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-fires-missiles-at-israeli-warplaneson-bombing-run-in-syria/2017/03/17/5481dbb4-0afb-11e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.html?utm_

term=.5797ced8edce>; Ian Fisher, “After Attack in Damascus, Syria Blames the Israelis,” New York Times, 

April 28, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/middleeast/syria-damascus-airportisrael-hezbollah.html?ref=todayspaper>; David M. Halbfinger and Ben Hubbard, “Airstrikes on Syrian 

Sites Renew Focus on Chemical Arms,” New York Times, September 8, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2017/09/07/world/middleeast/syria-israel-chemical-weapons-bombing.html?ref=todayspaper>; 

Ben Caspit, “Will Russia Tolerate Israeli Actions in Syria?” Al-Monitor, September 11, 2017; Loveday Morris and Louisa Loveluck, “With Sharp Words and Stealth Strikes, Israel Sends a Message to 

Hezbollah and U.S.,” Washington Post, September 24, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

world/middle_east/with-sharp-words-and-stealth-strikes-israel-sends-a-message-to-hezbollah-andus/2017/09/20/168282e4-98e2-11e7-af6a-6555caaeb8dc_story.html?utm_term=.e1c2a7354c97>; 

“Israeli Air Strike Hits Near Syria’s Homs,” Reuters, November 1, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/

article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel/israeli-air-strike-hits-near-syrias-homs-idUSKBN1D15W0?utm_

campaign=20171102&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20

Minute>; Ben Caspit, “Israel, Iran Duel on Syrian soil,” Al-Monitor, December 4, 2017; and “Syrian Army 

Says IAF Fired at Syria with Jets, Missiles,” Ynetnews (Tel Aviv), January 9, 2018, available at <www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5068360,00.html?utm_campaign=20180109&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. 

126 Major General Yair Golan, Israel Defense Forces, “New Thinking about Israeli National 

Security in a Changing Regional Environment,” 2017 Zeev Schiff Memorial Lecture, Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy, September 7, 2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/

Documents/other/GolanTranscript20170907-3.pdf>.

127 For overhead photography of this and three other airbases used by Iran in Syria, as well as 

a map showing the location of other Iranian bases across Syria, see Ben Hubbard, Isabel Kershner, and 

Anne Barnard, “Iran Building Up Militias in Syria To Menace Israel,” New York Times, February 19, 
57

Between Russia and Iran

2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/world/middleeast/iran-syria-israel.html?rref=collecti

on%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®i

on=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection>. 

128 Loveday Morris and Ruth Eglash, “Israel Carries Out ‘Large-Scale Attack’ in Syria after 

Israeli Jet Crashes under Antiaircraft Fire,” Washington Post, February 11, 2018, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/world/israel-carries-out-large-scale-attack-in-syria-after-israeli-jet-crashesunder-anti-aircraft-fire/2018/02/10/89e0ca2c-0e33-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story.html?utm_

term=.1bc997b6ee7d>; and Isabel Kershner, Anne Barnard, and Eric Schmitt, “Israel Loses Jet and Then 

Hits at Iran in Syria,” New York Times, February 11, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/

world/middleeast/israel-iran-syria.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times

&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&

contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection>. 

129 Vladimir Frolov, “Te zhe i Izrail’: novyj vitok jeskalacii v Sirii. Rossija vse sil’nee vtjagivaetsja 

v blizhnevostochnyj konflikt. Ujti iz regiona nikak ne poluchaetsja” [And Now Israel: A New Round 

of Escalation in Syria. Russia Is More Strongly Being Drawn into the Middle East Conflict. Withdrawal from the Region Is Not Working], Republic, February 13, 2018, available at <https://republic.ru/

posts/89484?utm_source=slon.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=morning>. 

130 “Ob izrail’skih udarah po Sirii” [Concerning Israeli Strikes on Syria], Russian Foreign 

Ministry Web site, February 10, 2018, available at <www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3068784>; and “Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister of 

Israel Benjamin Netanyahu,” President of Russia Web site, February 10, 2018, available at <http://

en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56843>. 

131Ruth Eglash, “Despite Blowback over Syrian Strike, Some Israelis Say More Military 

Action Needed,” Washington Post, April 11, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-blowback-over-syrian-raid-some-israelis-say-more-military-action-needed/2018/04/10/3e7e6e5a3cbd-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html?utm_term=.4fa162a455c3>; Farzin Nadimi, “Israel Once 

Again Strikes Iran’s UAV Base in Syria,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 10, 2018, 

available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israel-once-again-strikes-irans-uavbase-in-syria>; and Marianna Belenkaya et al., “U Donal’da Trampa rakety cheshutsja. SShA poobeshhali nakazat’ Siriju, a Izrail’ uzhe otbombilsja,” [Donald Trump Has Itchy Missiles. The U.S. Has 

Promised to Punish Syria, but Israel Has Already Bombed] Kommersant, April 10, 2018, available at 

<www.kommersant.ru/doc/3598879>. 

132 “Meeting with Permanent Members of Security Council,” President of Russia Web site, May 

9, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57439>. 

133 “Talks with Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu,” President of Russia Web site, 

May 9, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57441>. 

134 Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: No Basis to Think Russia Will Limit Israel’s Action in 

Syria,” The Jerusalem Post, May 9, 2018, available at <www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Netanyahu-Nobasis-to-think-Russia-will-limit-Israels-action-in-Syria-556011?utm_campaign=20180510&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_term=middle%20east%20minute>. 

135 Maxim A. Suchkov, “As Tensions Flare with Iran, Israel Embraces Russia,” Al-Mon-
58 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

itor, May 10, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/tensions-flareisrael-iran-russia-netanyahu-putin.html?utm_campaign=20180511&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

136 Russia and Syria concluded a contract for four S-300 divisions in 2010. After the beginning of the civil war in Syria and subsequent lobbying against their transfer by Israel, Putin had 

decided to annul the contract. With some modifications, the systems intended for Syria were the 

ones later reportedly transferred to Iran. See “Russia: U.S. Strikes Remove Moral Hurdles for S-300 

Missiles for Assad—RIA,” Reuters, April 20, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-russia-lavrov/russia-u-s-strikes-remove-moral-hurdles-for-s-300-missiles-for-assad-riaidUSKBN1HR0LY?utm_campaign=20180420&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Middle%20East%20Minute>; Ivan Safronov and Aleksandra Dzhorzhevich, “S-300 nacelilis’ na 

Siriju. Damask mozhet poluchit’ rossijskie ZRK sovsem skoro” [S-300s Are Targeting Syria. Damascus 

Might Receive the Russian Air Defense System Quite Soon], Kommersant, April 23, 2018, available at 

<www.kommersant.ru/doc/3612197?from=other_read>; and Parker, Understanding Putin, 16, 45. 

137 Isabel Kershner and David M. Halbfinger, “Israel Strikes Military Assets of Iran in Syria,” 

New York Times, May 11, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/world/middleeast/israeliran-syria-military.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&

contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlaceme

nt=1&pgtype=collection>. 

138 Yegor Sozaev-Gurev, “Rossija ne postavljaet Sirii S-300. V Kremle rasskazali o voennotehnicheskom sotrudnichestve s arabskoj respublikoj” [Russia Is Not Supplying Syria S-300s. In the 

Kremlin They Spoke about Military-Technical Cooperation with the Arab Republic], Izvestiya, May 11, 

2018, available at <https://iz.ru/741749/egor-sozaev-gurev/rossiia-ne-postavliaet-sirii-s-300>. 

139 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

140 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel Strikes Dozens of Iranian Targets in Syria,” The Jerusalem Post, 

May 10, 2018, available at <www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Israel-strikes-dozens-of-Iranian-targetsin-Syria-556034?utm_campaign=20180510&utm_source=sailthru&utm_term=middle%20east%20

minute>; and Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s Miscalculated Escalation in the Golan,” Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy, May 10, 2018, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iransmiscalculated-escalation-in-the-golan>. 

141 Nikolay Surkov, Alexei Ramm, and Aleksandr Kruglov, “Zasekli na dal’nih podstupah. 

Izrail’skie rakety ne zastali vrasploh sirijskuju PRO” [They Were Detected at a Long Distance. Israeli 

Missiles Did Not Catch Syrian Missile Defenses by Surprise], Izvestiya, May 10, 2018, available at 

<https://iz.ru/741806/nikolai-surkov-aleksei-ramm-aleksandr-kruglov/izrailskii-udar-ne-zastal-damaskvrasplokh>. 

142 Isabel Kershner and David M. Halbfinger, “Israel Strikes Military Assets of Iran in Syria,” 

New York Times, May 11, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/world/middleeast/israeliran-syria-military.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click

&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlace

ment=1&pgtype=collection>; and Loveday Morris, Ruth Eglash, and Louisa Loveluck, “Israel Launches 

Massive Military Strike against Iranian Targets in Syria,” Washington Post, May 11, 2018, available 
59

Between Russia and Iran

at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-says-retaliation-just-thetip-of-the-icebergafter-iran-blamed-for-overnight-strikes/2018/05/10/bd2fde18-53e8-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.

html?utm_term=.fb69fb4b1a1f>. 

143 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

144 Arad Nir, “Is Putin Bibi’s New ‘Bestie’?” Al-Monitor, March 6, 2017; Dmitri Trenin, “How 

Does Russia Position Itself between Iran and Israel in the Middle East?” Carnegie Middle East Center, 

March 14, 2017, available at <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/68257?lang=en&mkt_tok=eyjpijoitlrsa1peqtnargrot1dzesisinqioijkvw1ndktks0w2yny5qvlhc0dothr2z2tcujbwt1vpnxzyovvtrhvutdjzk0lmymjlz

lercctwrvwvenc1uvwvxc83vfljsetpeld5nvi1awpzuu9wt1dxz2didvbyk2hjdys2wfwvogphv0xuofwvwflsxc9ebw13mfvcand5xc9hm2rts3gifq%3d%3d>; and Sergey Strokan, interview with Israeli Defense 

Minister Avigdor Lieberman, “‘Dlja reshenija ljubogo voprosa nado dostich’ soglasija mezhdu SShA i 

Rossiej.’ Ministr oborony Izrailja Avigdor Liberman rasskazal ‘Kommersant’ o putjah uregulirovanija 

na Blizhnem Vostoke” [“To Resolve Any Issue Agreement Needs to Be Reached between America and 

Russia.” Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman told “Kommersant” about the Paths to Settlement 

in the Middle East], Kommersant, July 13, 2017, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3352234?utm_

campaign=relap&utm_medium=all&utm_source=kommersant>.

145 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

146Robert Zapesochny, “An Emerging Alliance: Russia and Israel,” American Spectator, 

December 15, 2016, available at <https://spectator.org/an-emerging-alliance-russia-and-israel/>; and 

Vladimir Sazhin, “Iran-Russia Strategic Partnership at the New Stage,” 12.

147 For a similar conclusion, see Josh Rogin, “Inside the Putin-Netanyahu-Trump Deal on 

Syria,” Washington Post, July 20, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/

wp/2018/07/20/inside-the-putin-netanyahu-trump-deal-on-syria/?utm_term=.fa89afa0cf94>.

148 Louisa Loveluck, “Syrian Army Raises Flag Above City Considered as Birthplace of 

Uprising against Assad,” Washington Post, July 13, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

world/middle_east/syrian-army-raises-flag-above-city-considered-as-birthplace-of-uprising-againstassad/2018/07/12/1720517e-85e8-11e8-9e06-4db52ac42e05_story.html?utm_term=.ee613adca73b>. 

On July 26, the Syrian flag would be raised in Quneitra, the main border crossing into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, 4 years after Damascus lost control of the area. See “Syrian Regime Raises Flag 

on Frontier with Israel-Occupied Golan, Monitor Reports,” The New Arab (London), July 26, 2018, 

available at <www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/7/26/syria-regime-raises-flag-on-frontier-withisrael-occupied-golan?utm_campaign=20180727&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Middle%20East%20Minute>.

149 Tom Perry, “Assad Presses Assault in Southwest Syria, Civilians Flee,” Reuters, June 21, 

2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-southwest/civilians-flee-fightingin-syrian-southwest-monitor-idUSKBN1JH0YE>.

150 On the timing of the beginning of the Russian air strikes, see “First Russia Air Strikes Hit 

South Syria as Assault Looms,” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Coventry, UK, June 24, 

2018, available at <www.syriahr.com/en/?p=96220>. On evidence—from a reportedly informed but 

deliberately anonymous U.S. official and from the Agence France-Presse, who reportedly was provided 

with a copy of the Arabic-language text—of the existence of the message from the U.S. Embassy in 
60 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Amman, see Agence France-Presse, “U.S. Tells Rebels in South Syria Not to Expect Help against 

Regime Assault,” The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), June 24, 2018, available at <www.timesofisrael.

com/us-tells-rebels-in-south-syria-not-to-expect-help-against-regime-assault/>; and Associated Press, 

“U.S. Seen Backing Away from Syria De-Escalation Enforcement,” An-Nahar (Beirut), June 26, 

2018, available at <https://en.annahar.com/article/823219-us-seen-backing-away-from-syria-deescalation-enforcement>. For other reporting on this key moment of transition in the Syrian conflict, see 

“Regime Advances Deeper into Deraa,” The Daily Star (Beirut), June 25, 2018, available at <www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2018/Jun-25/454238-regime-advances-deeper-into-deraa.ashx?utm_

campaign=20180625&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20

Minute>; and “Syrian Military Extends Southwest Assault, Thousands Displaced,” Reuters, June 25, 

2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria/syrian-military-extends-southwestassault-thousands-displaced-idUSKBN1JL1BI?utm_source=applenews>. 

151 Karen DeYoung, Liz Sly, and Zakaria Zakaria, “Cease-Fire in Southwestern Syria Nears 

Collapse as U.S. and Russia Trade Blame,” Washington Post, June 29, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/airstrike-in-southern-syria-kills-families-hiding-in-shelter-from-offensive/2018/06/28/ced4d68a-7a5a-11e8-ac4e-421ef7165923_story.html?utm_term=.654a96906b22>. 

Pompeo was responding to a question from Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) at hearings held by the Senate 

Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations & Related Programs. See CSPAN broadcast, “Secretary of State Pompeo on 2019 Budget,” CSPAN, video, June 27, 2018, at 10:55 minutes, 

available at <https://archive.org/details/CSPAN_20180628_020300_Secretary_of_State_Pompeo_

on_2019_Budget>.

152 Anton Troianovski and Philip Rucker, “Trump and Putin Agree to a Summit in Hopes 

of Soothing U.S.-Russia Tensions,” Washington Post, June 28, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-and-putin-agree-to-a-summit-in-hopes-of-soothing-us-russia-tensions/

2018/06/27/75f257c0-7a20-11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html?utm_term=.33a4670fddd4>; and 

John Wagner, Anton Troianovski, and Philip Rucker, “Trump and Putin Will Meet July 16 in Helsinki, Washington and Moscow Announce,” Washington Post, June 29, 2018, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-and-putin-will-meet-july-16-in-helsinki-washington-and-moscow-announce/2018/06/28/93043146-7ac3-11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html?utm_term=.ad8dce020b27>.

153 David M. Halbfinger and Ben Hubbard, “Israeli Leader Says Russia Agreed to Restrain 

Iran in Syria,” New York Times, July 13, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/world/middleeast/syria-israel-putin-netanyahu.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-tim

es&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highligh

ts&contentPlacement=5&pgtype=collection>; and Marianna Belenkaya, “Netanyahu, Putin Talk Iran 

before Helsinki Summit,” Al-Monitor, July 12, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/putin-netanyahu-syria-iran.html?utm_campaign=20180713&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

154 See “Meeting with Iran Supreme Leader’s Senior Adviser for International Affairs Ali 

Akbar Velayati,” President of Russia Web site, July 12, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/

president/news/57984>.
61

Between Russia and Iran

155 Karen DeYoung, “Russia Continues to Shape Narrative of Helsinki Summit,” Washington 

Post, July 21, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-continuesto-shape-narrative-of-helsinki-summit/2018/07/20/3ea54a98-8c40-11e8-a345-a1bf7847b375_story.

html?utm_term=.7b96689a8ee7>.

156 Anna Ahronheim, “Russia Agrees to Keep Iran, Hezbollah Forces away from Israeli Border,” The Jerusalem Post, October 18, 2017, available at <www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Russia-agreesto-move-Iran-Hezbollah-forces-away-from-Israeli-border-507727>. 

157 Agence France-Presse, “Russia Offers to Keep Iran Forces in Syria Far from Golan: 

Israel,” Al-Monitor, July 24, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/afp/2018/07/israel-russia-syria-iran-diplomacy-conflict.html?utm_campaign=20180724&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>; Loveday Morris, “Israeli Military Says 

Syrian Plane Shot Down after Crossing Golan Heights Line,” Washington Post, July 25, 2018, 

available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-military-says-syrian-plane-shotdown-after-crossing-golan-heights-line/2018/07/24/45e759a6-8f36-11e8-8322-b5482bf5e0f5_story.

html?utm_term=.66462fbdf084>; and Ben Caspit, “Israel Detects Russian Shift on Iran’s Presence 

in Syria,” Al-Monitor, July 25, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/

israel-iran-syria-rouhani-trump-putin-netanyahu-strategy.html?utm_campaign=20180726&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

158 “We Can’t Force Iran Out of Syria, Russia Tells Israelis,” Reuters, July 30, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel-russia/we-cant-force-iran-out-ofsyria-russia-tells-israelis-idUSKBN1KK29O?utm_campaign=20180731&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. 

159 For the quote and a discussion of the 1974 agreement, see David Makovsky, “Putin’s Golan 

Comments: Implications for Israeli Security,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2018, 

available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/putins-golan-comments-implicationsfor-israeli-security>. 

160 “Separation of Forces between Israel and Syria, May 31, 1974,” Israel Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, available at <www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-syria%20separation%20of%20forces%20agreement%20-%201974.aspx>; and UNSC, “Resolution 338 (1973) of 22 

October 1973,” available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/338>.

161 Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu Talks to Trump before Trump-Putin Summit,” The Jerusalem 

Post, July 15, 2018, available at <www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/PM-talks-toTrump-before-Trump-Putin-summit-562545>. 

162 “Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press 

Conference,” The White House, July 16, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-putin-russian-federation-joint-press-conference/>. 

163 Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran Maneuvers to Protect Its Interests in Syria,” Al-Monitor, July 

26, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/iran-russia-syria-helsinkisummit-partnership-putin-trump.html?utm_campaign=20180727&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

164 Ash Carter, “A Lasting Defeat: The Campaign to Destroy ISIS,” Report, Belfer Center for 
62 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2017, available at <www.belfercenter.org/LastingDefeat>. See also Lisa Ferdinando, “U.S., Russia Sign Memorandum on Air Safety in 

Syria,” DOD News, October 20, 2015, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/624964/usrussia-sign-memorandum-on-air-safety-in-syria/>; Neil MacFarquhar, “U.S. Agrees with Russia on Rules 

in Syrian Sky,” New York Times, October 21, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/world/

middleeast/us-and-russia-agree-to-regulate-all-flights-over-syria.html?_r=0>; and “Russian and U.S. 

Defence Ministries Signed Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in 

the Course of Operations in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Russian Ministry of Defense, October 20, 2015, 

available at <http://syria.mil.ru/en/index/syria/news/more.htm?id=12061345@egNews>. 

165 Baranets, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh sil Rossii general armii Valerij Gerasimov.”

166 “Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press 

Conference,” The White House, July 16, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-putin-russian-federation-joint-press-conference/>.

167 Tillerson, “Remarks on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding Syria”; and “President Trump on Syria Strikes.” 

168 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit,” 49–53.

169 “Assessing the Trump Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy,” panel discussion, Middle 

East Institute, podcast, July 27, 2017, available at <www.mei.edu/events/assessing-trump-administrations-counterterrorism-policy>. 

170 Yefremenko, “By the Rivers of Babylon.” See also Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 49–53. 

While Syrian government forces’ use of the sarin nerve agent appeared to cease, use of the choking 

agent chlorine continued and raised international concern. See Louisa Loveluck and Carol Morello, 

“New Chemical Attacks Reported in Syria, and Trump Administration Blames Russia,” Washington Post, 

January 24, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-chemical-attacks-reported-insyria-and-trump-administration-blames-russia/2018/01/23/52167730-005b-11e8-86b9-8908743c79dd_

story.html?utm_term=.a0ef349312f9>; and Adam Taylor, “In Syria and North Korea, Trump Administration ‘Red Lines’ Are Out of Focus,” Washington Post, January 25, 2018, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/25/in-syria-and-north-korea-trump-administrationred-lines-are-out-of-focus/?utm_term=.dc76ba7d6e4f>. 

171 Louisa Loveluck and Loveday Morris, “As ISIS Retreats in Syria, U.S. and Iran Scramble 

for Control,” Washington Post, June 8, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_

east/as-isis-retreats-in-syria-the-us-and-iran-scramble-for-control/2017/06/06/2f86615c-4581-11e7-

8de1-cec59a9bf4b1_story.html?utm_term=.d1fce486b518>; Anne Barnard, “After Raqqa, Fates of 

ISIS and Syria Rest on a Bigger Battle,” New York Times, June 11, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2017/06/10/world/middleeast/syria-raqqa-islamic-state-isis-deir-al-zour-iran-russia-united-states.

html?ref=todayspaper>; Louisa Loveluck, “U.S.-Backed Forces Announce Anti-ISIS Push in Syria’s 

Oil-Rich East,” Washington Post, September 10, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

world/us-backed-forces-announce-anti-isis-push-in-syrias-oil-rich-east/2017/09/09/f79f5536-94e1-

11e7-8482-8dc9a7af29f9_story.html?utm_term=.c4b56e16a9f1>; and Michael Young, interview with 

Hassan Hassan, “What’s Next in Deir Ezzor?” Carnegie Middle East Center, September 22, 2017, 
63

Between Russia and Iran

available at <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/73153?lang=en>. 

172 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Fighter Downs Drone Over Syria,” New York Times, June 21, 

2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/middleeast/american-warplane-shoots-downiranian-made-drone-over-syria.html?ref=todayspaper>; and Louisa Loveluck and David Filipov, “U.S. 

Risks Further Battles as It Steps Deeper into Syrian Quagmire,” Washington Post, June 20, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-threatens-to-treat-us-coalition-aircraft-as-targets-oversyria/2017/06/19/95e87428-54ca-11e7-9e18-968f6ad1e1d3_story.html?utm_term=.c2ae078a0340>. 

173 David Filipov and Liz Sly, “Russia Threatens Retaliatory Strikes against U.S. Troops and 

Their Allies in Syria,” Washington Post, September 22, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/

world/russia-warns-of-retaliation-if-facing-fire-from-us-led-coalitionin-syria/2017/09/21/00e3b81c9eba-11e7-8ed4-a750b67c552b_story.html?utm_term=.3ae086677040>. 

174 Mattis, “Press Gaggle with Secretary Mattis,” December 29, 2017. 

175 Baranets, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh sil Rossii general armii Valerij Gerasimov.” 

176 Eric Schmitt, “Over Syria, Close Calls With Russian Warplanes,” New York Times, December 10, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-russia-us-air-war.

html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>; and “U.S. Jets Fire Flares to Warn Russian Jets in Syria,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-jets/u-s-jets-fire-flares-towarn-russian-jets-in-syria-idUSKBN1E82V3?utm_campaign=20171215&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. 

177 Baranets, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh sil Rossii general armii Valerij Gerasimov.”

178 Anshel Pfeffer, “Mission Impossible?” 

179 From Yekaterinburg, the journalist Maxim Borodin reported casualty figures ranging from 

217 to 334 and still counting. See Maxim Borodin, “‘Verbujut eshhe na bazah podgotovki opolchencev. 

Potom prjamym bortom v Siriju’” [“They [Wagner representatives] Recruit Them at Militia Training Bases [Near the Border in Russia for Fighting in Eastern Ukraine]. Then They Fly Them Directly 

to Syria”], RIA New Day, February 16, 2018, available at <https://newdaynews.ru/ekb/628346.html>. 

Borodin would die from a fall from his balcony under unexplained circumstances several months later. 

See Matthew Luxmoore, “Russian Journalist Who Reported on Secretive Paramilitary Dies,” New York 

Times, April 16, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/world/europe/maksim-borodin-journalist-dead-russia.html>. For a secondhand account of the February 7 slaughter, based on conversations 

with Wagner personnel by a Molkino resident who is retired from the regular Russian military, see Igor 

Pushkarev, “‘Vrut vse, synok, oni neft’ deljat! Na krovi rebjat zarabatyvajut’ Kak vygljadit lager’ ChVK 

Vagnera pod Krasnodarom” [“They Are All Lying, Son, They Are Sharing the Oil! They Are Earning 

Money from Our Guys’ Blood.” What the Wagner Private Military Company’s Camp Near Krasnodar 

Looks Like], Znak.com, March 5, 2018, available at <www.znak.com/2018-03-05/kak_vyglyadit_lager_chvk_vagnera_v_krasnodare>. On the high casualty rates, including at least 217 dead from the 

Wagner 5th Company, see Igor Pushkarev, “Pervogo iz sverdlovchan, voevavshego v ChVK Vagnera i 

pogibshego v Sirii, pohoronjat 14 marta” [The First of Sverdlovsk Locals Who Fought in PMC (Private 

Military Company) Wagner and Died in Syria Is Buried on 14 March], Znak.com, March 12, 2018, 

available at <www.znak.com/2018-03-12/pervogo_iz_sverdlovchan_voevavshego_v_chvk_vagnera_i_

pogibshego_v_sirii_pohoronyat_14_marta>. See also “Zakharova Downplays Armed Clash with 
64 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Americans in Syria, Kremlin-Linked Audio Recordings Contradict Her Story,” Poligraph.info, February 

16, 2018, available at <www.polygraph.info/a/us-wagner-russia-syria-scores-killed/29044339.html>; 

“The Business of War: Russian Mercenaries in Syria,” France 24, February 23, 2018, available at <www.

france24.com/en/20180223-russia-fighters-syria-exclusive-interview-mercenary-wagner?ref=fb>; 

Richard Engel and Kennett Werner, “U.S. troops Who Repelled Russian Mercenaries Prepare for More 

Attacks,” NBC News, March 15, 2018, available at <www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-troops-whorepelled-russian-mercenaries-prepare-more-attacks-n855271>; and Rebecca Kheel, “Pompeo Confirms 

‘A Couple Hundred’ Russians Killed in Syria,” The Hill, April 12, 2018, available at <http://thehill.com/

policy/defense/382864-pompeo-defending-trumps-russia-policy-confirms-a-couple-hundred-russians>. 

180 James Mattis, “Media Availability with Secretary Mattis,” transcript, DOD, February 8, 

2018, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1436590/media-availability-with-secretary-mattis/>; Liz Sly, “U.S. Troops May Be at Risk of ‘Mission Creep’ after a Deadly Battle in the Syrian Desert,” Washington Post, February 8, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.

com/world/middle_east/syria-accuses-us-of-aggression-after-its-warplanes-strike-pro-governmentforces/2018/02/08/bab1502a-0cb4-11e8-8890-372e2047c935_story.html?utm_term=.9a645260c760>; 

and Maksim Yusin, Marianna Belenkaya, and Ivan Safronov, “Sirijskie otrjady popali pod nedruzhestvennyj ogon’. SShA zajavili ob unichtozhenii bolee sta bojcov sil, lojal’nyh Basharu Asadu” [Syrian 

Troops Came under Hostile Fire. The United States Announced the Destruction of More Than a Hundred Fighters of Forces Loyal to Bashar al-Assad], Kommersant, February 9, 2018, available at <www.

kommersant.ru/doc/3542559>.

181 On the possible Iranian connection, see Yusin, Belenkaya, and Safronov, “Sirijskie otrjady 

popali pod nedruzhestvennyj ogon’. SShA zajavili ob unichtozhenii bolee sta bojcov sil, lojal’nyh Basharu Asadu”; and Tom Cooper, “The U.S. Military Bushwacked Iranian Forces in Syria,” War Is Boring, 

February 12, 2018, available at <http://warisboring.com/the-u-s-military-bushwacked-iranian-troops-insyria/>. 

182 Wagner mercenaries had earlier fought in eastern Ukraine. Their training facility for operations in Syria was located next to the official Main Intelligence Directorate training camp for Russian 

special forces at Molkino in Krasnodar territory in southern Russia. Their deployment in Syria had 

enabled Putin to claim “no boots on the ground” and keep the official tally of Russian casualties low; 

See Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit,” 19. For more on the history of private military contractors and 

Wagner specifically, see also “Private Military Companies in Russia: Carrying Out Criminal Orders of 

the Kremlin,” Inform Napalm, n.d., available at <http://informnapalm.rocks/private-military-companiesin-russia-carrying-out-criminal-orders-of-the-kremlin>; and Ilya Rozhdestvenskiy, “‘O rospuske rech’ ne 

idet.’ Kak sejchas funkcioniruet i vo skol’ko obhoditsja ‘gruppa Vagnera’” [“There Is No talk of Disbanding It.” How the ‘Wagner Group’ Functions Now and How Much It Costs], Republic, February 21, 

2018, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/89612?utm_source=slon.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_

campaign=morning>. For reporting on a visit to Molkino in March 2018, replete with photographs, 

see Igor Pushkarev, “‘Vrut vse, synok, oni neft’ deljat! Na krovi rebjat zarabatyvajut’ Kak vygljadit lager’ 

ChVK Vagnera pod Krasnodarom.” Wagner contractors fresh from Syria were still using the Molkino 

facility as recently as April 2018. See Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev, “Exclusive: Russian Civilians 

Helping Assad Use Military Base Back Home—Witnesses,” Reuters, April 25, 2018, available at <www.
65

Between Russia and Iran

reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-military/exclusive-russian-civilians-helping-assaduse-military-base-back-home-witnesses-idUSKBN1HW0LX?utm_source=applenews>.

183 Ellen Nakashima, Karen DeYoung, and Liz Sly, “Putin Ally Said to Be in Touch with 

Kremlin, Assad before His Mercenaries Attacked U.S. Troops,” Washington Post, February 23, 2018, 

available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/putin-ally-said-to-be-in-touch-withkremlin-assad-before-his-mercenaries-attacked-us-troops/2018/02/22/f4ef050c-1781-11e8-8b08-

027a6ccb38eb_story.html?utm_term=.f7c476412d6c>. Prigozhin’s connections to Evro Polis and the 

latter’s business ties with the Syrian government began to develop in December 2016 under the auspices 

of Russia’s Energy Ministry. They first came to light in June 2017 in the St. Petersburg online publication Fontanka. They were exposed by online journalist Denis Korotkov, who had earlier done the first 

reporting on the Wagner Group (see Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 71). See Denis Korotkov, “Nemnogo biznesa v sirijskoj vojne” [A Little Business in the Syrian War], Fontanka (St. Petersburg), June 

26, 2017, available at <www.fontanka.ru/2017/06/26/084//>; and Andrew Kramer, “Russia Deploys a 

Potent Weapon in Syria: The Profit Motive,” New York Times, July 6, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2017/07/05/world/middleeast/russia-syria-oil-isis.html?ref=todayspaper>. 

184 “Minoborony prokommentirovalo udary koalicii po sirijskim opolchencam” [The Defense 

Ministry Commented on the Coalition Strikes on Syrian Militias], RIA Novosti, February 8, 2018, 

available at <https://ria.ru/syria/20180208/1514234194.html>. 

185 Maxim Solopov et al., “Chastniki boevyh dejstvij. Diplomaty utochnjajut, kto pogib ot 

amerikanskogo udara” [Military Privateers. Diplomats Clarify Who Was Killed by the American Attack], Kommersant, available at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3548170?from=doc_vrez>. 

186 “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, February 15, 

2018,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, February 15, 2018, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3077521>; and “Comment by the 

Information and Press Department Regarding Medical Assistance for Russians Wounded in Syria,” 

Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, February 20, 2018, available at <www.mid.ru/en/maps/sy/-/asset_publisher/9fcjSOwMERcf/content/id/3086874>.

187 Putin distanced himself from Prigozhin in early March, claiming Prigozhin was not a friend 

and anything he did in Syria was on his own, Prigozhin’s, initiative. See “Interview to American TV 

Channel NBC. Vladimir Putin Answered Questions from NBC Anchor Megyn Kelly. The Interview 

Was Recorded in the Kremlin on March 1, 2018, and in Kaliningrad on March 2, 2018,” President of 

Russia Web site, March 10, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57027>. 

For speculation on how high-level politics in Moscow connected with what happened outside Deir 

ez-Zour on February 7, much of it purportedly driven by detractors of Defense Minister Shoigu, see 

Tatyana Stanovaya, “Gibel’ rossijan v Sirii: politizacija sirijskoj kampanii” [The Death of Russians in 

Syria: The Politicization of the Syrian campaign], Politkom.ru, February 19, 2018, available at <http://

politcom.ru/22911.html>. 

188 On this point, see Alex Lockie, “Why Russia, Assad, and Iran Combined Don’t Stand 

a Chance Against Just 2,000 U.S. Troops in Syria,” Business Insider, March 19, 2018, available at 

<www.businessinsider.com/russia-syria-iran-us-troops-chance-2018-3>. 

189 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

190 For a good graphic, see Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Strikes Unlikely to Halt Syria’s Chemical Plans, Pentagon Report Warns,” New York Times, April 20, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2018/04/19/world/middleeast/syria-strikes.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodaysnew-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&versi

on=highlights&contentPlacement=6&pgtype=collection>. 

191 Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Joseph F. Dunford; Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White; “Briefing by Secretary Mattis on U.S. Strikes in 

Syria,” transcript, DOD, April 14, 2018, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/TranscriptView/Article/1493658/briefing-by-secretary-mattis-on-us-strikes-in-syria/>. For more details on American-Russian military interactions in Syria, including at the Dunford-Gerasimov level in person and by 

phone, see Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “U.S.-Russian Relations in Syria Are Less Rosy 

Than Leaders Implied,” New York Times, July 18, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/

world/middleeast/american-russian-military-syria.html>.

192 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White 

and Joint Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” transcript, DOD, April 14, 2018, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1493749/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/>. 

193 Interview with Vitaly Naumkin, Scientific Director, Institute of Oriental Studies, by Marianna Belenkaya, “U Rossii ogromnyj opyt raboty s konfliktujushhimi storonami” [Russia Has Vast 

Experience Working with Conflicting Parties], Kommersant, February 16, 2018, available at <www.

kommersant.ru/doc/3549309?query=%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F>. 

194 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a Joint 

News Conference Following Talks with Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Adel AlJubeir, Jeddah, September 10, 2017,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, September 10, 2017, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2857224>. 

See also “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Meeting with the 

Students and Faculty of MGIMO University and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, Moscow, September 1, 2017,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, September 1, 2017, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2851134>; 

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Opening Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a Joint News 

Conference with Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan 

Al Nahyan on the Results of His Visit to the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, August 29, 2017,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, August 29, 2017, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/

asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2846895>; and “Meeting of the Valdai International 

Discussion Club.” 

195 Zogby Research Services, “Public Opinion 2017,” November 2017, available at 

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/5a1b10689140b7c306258b

2e/1511723112971/SBY2017+Final.pdf>, 4, 7. For the video of James Zogby’s presentation of the 

survey findings and the discussion by a panel of experts, see “Public Opinion in a Conflicted Middle 

East,” Middle East Institute, November 30, 2017, available at <www.mei.edu/events/public-opinionconflicted-middle-east>.
67

Between Russia and Iran

196 On the earlier evolution of the instrumental factor in Russian assessments of Moscow’s 

engagement in Syria, see Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 32–33. 

197 See the events listed for November 21, 2017, at President of Russia Web site, available at 

<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/by-date/21.11.2017>. 

198 “Press Statements Following Meeting with President of Iran Hassan Rouhani and President 

of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” President of Russia Web site, November 22, 2017, available at 

<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56153>. 

199 “Joint Statement by Iran, Russia, and Turkey on the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, 21–22 December 2017,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, December 22, 2017, available at <www.

mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/

content/id/3001212>. 

200 For more on this theme, see Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 57–59. This is also a key theme in 

Yefremenko, “By the Rivers of Babylon.” 

201 Thomas Erdbrink, “As Protests Spread Across Iran, Furor Largely Skips the Capital,” New 

York Times, January 4, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/world/middleeast/iran-protests.html?ref=todayspaper>. 

202 Maxim A. Suchkov, “Russia Sizes up Iranian Protests,” Al-Monitor, January 4, 2018. 

203 Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program, 5–7. 

204 “Rjabkov: RF predosteregaet SShA ot popytok vmeshivat’sja vo vnutrennie dela Irana” 

[Ryabkov: The RF Warns the USA Against Efforts to Interfere in the Internal Affairs of Iran], TASS, 

January 4, 2018, available at <http://tass.ru/politika/4857003>. 

205 Erin Cunningham, “Death Toll Rises as Iran Protests Rattle the Government,” Washington 

Post, January 2, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-says-10-people-have-beenkilled-in-nationwide-protests/2018/01/01/384f61be-ee7b-11e7-95e3-eff284e71c8d_story.html?utm_

term=.b355fcb4b166>; Thomas Erdbrink, “Rolling Protests in Iran Lay Bare Power Struggle,” 

New York Times, January 3, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/world/middleeast/

iran-protests-khamenei.html?ref=todayspaper>; Liz Sly, “Protests Threaten Iran’s Ascendant Role in 

the Middle East,” Washington Post, January 6, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/

protests-threaten-irans-ascendant-role-in-the-middle-east/2018/01/04/86246e7e-994f-457b-a85bf1eb76b71998_story.html?utm_term=.33ea778d158e>. 

206 Erdbrink, “Rolling Protests in Iran Lay Bare Power Struggle”; and Sly, “Protests Threaten 

Iran’s Ascendant Role in the Middle East.” 

207 Alex Vatanka, “Iran’s Syria Policy: The View from the Street,” Middle East Institute, April 

4, 2018, available at <www.mei.edu/content/article/irans-syria-policy-view-street>. 

208 Ahmad Majidyar, “IRGC Commander: We’re Chasing U.S. to Eastern Mediterranean and 

Red Sea,” Middle East Institute, January 19, 2018, available at <www.mei.edu/content/io/irgc-commander-we-re-chasing-us-eastern-mediterranean-and-red-sea>; and Ahmad Majidyar, “U.S. LongTerm Military Presence in Syria Worries Tehran,” Middle East Institute, January 19, 2018, available at 

<www.mei.edu/content/io/us-long-term-military-presence-syria-worries-tehran>. For subsequent interesting speculation and analysis in Israel of the state of play of opinion in Tehran on further supporting 

the conflict in Syria, see Ben Caspit, “Israel Detects Russian Shift on Iran’s Presence in Syria,” Al-
68 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

Monitor, July 25, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/israel-iran-syriarouhani-trump-putin-netanyahu-strategy.html?utm_campaign=20180726&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

209 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 8–9, 41–48. 

210 Louisa Loveluck, “Turkish President Threatens to ‘Drown’ U.S.-Backed Force in Syria,” 

Washington Post, January 16, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkish-presidentthreatens-todrown-us-backed-force-in-syria/2018/01/15/e7789850-f9e7-11e7-b832-8c26844b74fb_

story.html?utm_term=.b226ea49a4c9>; Anne Barnard, “Jitters over New Border Force in Syria,” 

New York Times, January 17, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/world/middleeast/

syria-kurds-force.html?ref=todayspaper>; Mark Landler, Carlotta Gall, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Tries to 

Mend Fences as Turkey Attacks Syrian Kurds,” New York Times, January 24, 2018, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2018/01/23/world/middleeast/us-nato-turkey-afrin-manbij.html?ref=todayspaper>; 

Gardiner Harris, “In Phone Call, Trump Warns Turkey about Its Military Strikes in Syria,” New York 

Times, January 25, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/world/middleeast/trump-turkeystrikes-syria.html?ref=todayspaper&referer=http://www.nytimes.com/pages/todayspaper/index.

html?nytmobile=0&nytmobile=0>; Bulent Aliriza and Zeynep Yekeler, “Understanding Turkey’s Afrin 

Operation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 25, 2018, available at <www.

csis.org/analysis/understanding-turkeys-afrin-operation>; and Louisa Loveluck, Liz Sly, and Kareem 

Fahim, “New American Strategy for Syria Could Be Doomed as Allies of U.S. Fight Each Other,” 

Washington Post, January 28, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-us-strategy-forsyria-could-be-doomed-as-american-allies-fight-each-other/2018/01/26/dc3c007c-005d-11e8-86b9-

8908743c79dd_story.html?utm_term=.4666a068d993>. 

211 Carol Morello and Erin Cunningham, “Turkey and the U.S. Agree to Move Forward, Not 

Dwell on Past Differences,” Washington Post, February 17, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.

com/world/national-security/turkey-and-the-us-agree-to-move-forward-not-dwell-on-past-differences/2

018/02/16/96ea2a58-6d07-4d58-830b-b02ecdbe4a87_story.html?utm_term=.170301538976>; Gardiner Harris and Carlotta Gall, “Turkey and U.S. Promise More Talks on Syria Crisis,” New York Times, 

February 17, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/middleeast/turkey-us-syria-tillerson-erdogan.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&conte

ntCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=7

&pgtype=collection>; and Semih Idiz, “Despite Progress on Paper, Turkey, U.S. Still Leagues Apart,” AlMonitor, February 20, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/turkey-unitedstates-still-far-from-resolving-differences.html?utm_campaign=20180221&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

212Bulent Aliriza and Zeynep Yekeler, “U.S.-Turkish Tensions in Syria: The Manbij Conundrum,” CSIS, April 5, 2018, available at <www.csis.org/analysis/us-turkish-tensions-syria-manbijconundrum>. 

213Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Jets Bomb Kurdish Militias in Syria,” New York Times, January 

21, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/world/middleeast/turkey-bombs-kurds-syria.

html?ref=todayspaper>; and Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Forces Move into a Kurdish Enclave in Syria 

to Attack U.S.-Allied Militias,” New York Times, January 22, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.
69

Between Russia and Iran

com/2018/01/21/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-kurds.html?ref=todayspaper>. 

214 “Comment by the Information and Press Department on Turkey’s Use of Armed Forces in 

the Northwest of Syria,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, January 20, 2018, available at <www.mid.

ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3026297>. 

215 On the complexities of the situation in Idlib, see “Is Turkey Aligned with al-Qaeda Affiliate 

in Idlib?” Al-Monitor, January 14, 2018. 

216 “Meeting with Heads of Russian Print Media and News Agencies,” President of Russia 

Web site, January 11, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56639>. 

217 Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 21–22, 40–42. 

218 A number of observers have drawn this same parallel. See, for example, Aliriza and Yekeler, “U.S.-Turkish Tensions in Syria; and Hamidreza Azizi, “Have Iran, Russia and Turkey Reached 

Agreement on Future Syrian State?” Al-Monitor, April 11, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.

com/pulse/originals/2018/04/iran-astana-process-trilateral-summit-ankara-turkey-russia.html?utm_

campaign=20180412&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

For an account of Erdogan’s earlier bargaining with Putin over Aleppo, see Parker, Putin’s Syrian 

Gambit, 39–45. 

219 Metin Gurcan, “Deciphering Russia’s Delivery of Tell Rifaat to Turkey,” Al-Monitor, 

March 29, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/03/turkey-syria-russiaturkish-army-besiege-tell-rifat.html?utm_campaign=20180330&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>; and Metin Gurcan, “Russia Sees Benefit of 

Nudging Turkey on to Manbij in Syria,” Al-Monitor, April 10, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.

com/pulse/originals/2018/04/turkey-russia-iran-tripartite-syria-summit-outcome.html?utm_

campaign=20180411&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

220 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

221 Liz Sly, “Kurds Pull Back from ISIS Fight in Syria, Saying U.S. ‘Let Us Down,’” Washington 

Post, March 7, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/kurds-pull-back-from-isis-fightin-syria-say-they-are-let-down-by-us/2018/03/06/3fd2c2ca-2173-11e8-946c-9420060cb7bd_story.

html?utm_term=.a33b3ed97f03>; Metin Gurcan, “Stakes Rise in Syria as Turkey Clashes with ProAssad Militias,” Al-Monitor, March 6, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/03/

turkey-syria-russia-managing-getting-harder-for-moscow.html?utm_campaign=20180307&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>; Fehim Tastekin, “Turkey 

Entangled in Syria Cease-Fire It Once Supported,” Al-Monitor, March 6, 2018, available at <www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/03/turkey-syria-ankara-entangled-in-ceasefire-it-supported.

html?utm_campaign=20180307&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20

Newsletter>; and Anne Barnard, “Turkey Asks U.S. to Stop Kurds From Shifting Fighters to Western 

Syria,” New York Times, March 7, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/world/middleeast/

turkey-syria-us-afrin.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=clic

k&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlace

ment=6&pgtype=collection>. 

222 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

223 “U.S. Set Up Base in Syria’s Manbij after Turkish Threats: Local Official,” Reuters, 
70 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

May 9, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-sdf/u-s-set-up-basein-syrias-manbij-after-turkish-threats-local-official-idUSKBN1IA1H4?utm_source=applenews>; 

Semih Idiz, “Has the U.S. Conceded to Turkey in Manbij?” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2018, available at 

<www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/turkey-syria-united-states-manbij-problem.html?utm_

campaign=20180531&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>; 

“U.S.-Turkey Joint Statement,” Department of State, June 4, 2018, available at <www.state.gov/r/

pa/prs/ps/2018/06/282929.htm>; Carlotta Gall, “U.S. and Turkey Reach Deal over Disputed Syrian 

Town,” New York Times, June 5, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/middleeast/

turkey-syria-kurds-manbij.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&actio

n=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&cont

entPlacement=11&pgtype=collection>; and Karen DeYoung and Erin Cunningham, “U.S. and Turkey 

Almost Came to Blows over This Syrian Town: A New Deal May Avert That,” Washington Post, June 

6, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-and-turkey-almost-came-to-blows-over-thissyrian-town-a-new-deal-may-avert-that/2018/06/05/626f5fa2-68c0-11e8-a335-c4503d041eaf_story.

html?utm_term=.4896b0fa275f>. For the view in Moscow on the Manbij agreement, see Maxim 

A. Suchkov, “Moscow’s Take on U.S.-Turkey Manbij Deal: Wait and See,” Al-Monitor, June 12, 

2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/russia-take-us-turkey-manbij-dealsyria-wait-see.html?utm_campaign=20180613&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

224 “Syrian Kurdish YPG Says Will Pull Military Advisers from Manbij,” Reuters, June 5, 

2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ypg/syrian-kurdish-ypg-sayswill-pull-military-advisers-from-manbij-idUSKCN1J11C0?utm_campaign=20180606&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>. 

225 Louisa Loveluck, “U.S.-Backed Syrian Force Resumes Offensive Against Islamic State,” 

Washington Post, May 2, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-backed-force-resumesoffensive-against-isis-in-syria/2018/05/01/9af129f2-4d2f-11e8-b966-bfb0da2dad62_story.html?utm_

term=.b84b28224f1d>; and Eric Schmitt, “Battle to Stamp Out ISIS in Syria Gains New Momentum, 

but Threats Remain,” New York Times, May 31, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/

world/middleeast/isis-syria-battle-kurds-united-states.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftoda

ys-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&v

ersion=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection>. 

226 Erin Cunningham, “Iran, Russia, and Turkey Plan Syria’s Future as Trump Seeks an Exit,” 

Washington Post, April 5, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-russia-and-turkeymeet-over-syrias-future-as-trump-mulls-troop-withdrawal/2018/04/04/c607e27c-3770-11e8-af3c2123715f78df_story.html?utm_term=.a2ef81ed8b88>; Amir Taheri, “Syria: The Putin-Erdogan Summit 

Was a Missed Opportunity,” Asharq al-Awsat, April 6, 2018, available at <https://aawsat.com/english/

home/article/1228896/amir-taheri/syria-putin-erdogan-summit-was-missed-opportunity>; Maxim A. 

Suchkov, “Ankara Summit Focuses on Syria’s Fate Once War Ends,” Al-Monitor, April 6, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/next-syria-ankara-summit-turkey-russia-iran.

html?utm_campaign=20180409&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20

Newsletter>; Gurcan, “Russia Sees Benefit of Nudging Turkey on to Manbij in Syria”; Azizi, “Have 
71

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Iran, Russia and Turkey Reached Agreement on Future Syrian State?”; and Marianna Belenkaya, “Iran, 

Turkey, and Russia Hope They’re All on Same Page,” Al-Monitor, May 2, 2018, available at <www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/iran-turkey-russia-same-page-astana-syria.html?utm_

campaign=20180503&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>.

227 Semih Idiz, “Will Ankara’s Support for Syria Strikes Impact Turkish-Russian Ties? AlMonitor, April 17, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/turkey-russiasyria-eyes-turn-ankara-moscow-ties.html?utm_campaign=20180418&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>; and “After Missile Strikes, Trump Resumes 

Exit Strategy for Syria,” Al-Monitor, April 15, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/trump-syria-chemical-weapons-us-withdrawal.html>.

228 Fehim Tastekin, “As Conditions Shift in Syria, Kurds Open to Talks with Damascus,” 

Al-Monitor, June 21, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/turkey-syriawhat-pushes-kurds-deal-with-regime.html?utm_campaign=20180622&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>; and Semih Idiz, “Turkey Wary of U.S.-Russia 

Deal on Syria,” Al-Monitor, July 17, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/

turkey-russia-united-states-syria-deal-worries-ankara.html?utm_campaign=20180718&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

229 “After Missile Strikes, Trump Resumes Exit Strategy for Syria.”

230 Author’s notes from the Valdai Discussion Club at Bolshaya Tatarskaya ulitsa, No. 42, 

Moscow, May 21, 2018, at which the following report was presented: Kuznetzov, Naumkin, and Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in the Middle East”; and “Prezentacija doklada ‘Rossija na Blizhnem Vostoke: garmonija 

polifonii’” [Presentation of the Report “Russia in the Middle East: The Harmony of Polyphony”], Valdai 

Club Event, video, 1:09, May 22, 2018, at 34:30 to 35:30 minutes, available at <www.youtube.com/

watch?v=2cgwtbm6fps>. On Astana dynamics, see also Anton Mardasov, “Syria Talks Involve Many 

Cooks—And Many Kitchens,” Al-Monitor, May 18, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2018/05/syria-talks-astana-sochi-russia-turkey-iran.html?utm_campaign=20180521&utm_

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

231 On the posture toward Iran, see again Suchkov, “Moscow’s Leverage in Syria Is Strong, 

but Limited.”

232 Fehim Tastekin, “Idlib Could Be Trump Card or Time Bomb for Turkey,” Al-Monitor, May 

31, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/idlib-looms-as-time-bomb-forturkey.html>.

233 “O telefonnom razgovore Ministra inostrannyh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova s Gossekretarem 

SShA R.Tillersonom” [On the Telephone Conversation between Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov 

and USA Secretary of State R. Tillerson], Facebook, January 20, 2018, available at <www.facebook.

com/MIDRussia/posts/1232586046840834>. 

234 Liz Sly and Louisa Loveluck, “At Least 200 Dead in Syrian Government Airstrikes 

as the War Ramps Up,” Washington Post, February 21, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.

com/world/one-of-the-bloodiest-attacks-of-syrias-war-kills-over-100-in-a-rebel-held-damascussuburb/2018/02/20/966127c2-161e-11e8-942d-16a950029788_story.html?utm_term=.0d0b1051665e>; 

Anne Barnard and Carlotta Gall, “Misery Mounts as Syria Shells Rebel Enclave,” New York Times, 
72 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

February 21, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/world/middleeast/syria-eastern-ghouta.

html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=

todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=colle

ction>; Philip Issa and Zeina Karam, “Hospitals Overwhelmed by Bombing Blitz of Damascus Suburbs,” 

Associated Press, February 22, 2018, available at: <www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-02-21/

new-strikes-kill-10-in-rebel-held-suburbs-of-syrian-capital>; and Tom Perry and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, 

“Russia, Assad Give Ultimatum to Syria Rebels Northeast of Damascus,” Reuters, April 3, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria/russia-assad-give-ultimatum-to-syria-rebelsnortheast-of-damascus-idUSKCN1HA0VP?utm_campaign=20180403&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>; “Senior Iranian Official Hopes U.S. Forces 

Will Be Driven from Syria,” Reuters, April 12, 2018, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-douma/syrian-government-raises-flag-in-douma-russian-agencies-idUSKBN1HJ0I8?utm_

campaign=20180412&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20

Minute>; and Louisa Loveluck and Asma Ajroudi, “Days after Suspected Chemical Attack, Russia 

Says Douma under Full Assad Control,” Washington Post, April 13, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/days-after-suspected-chemical-attack-russia-says-douma-under-full-assad-control/2018/04/12/cc103a3e-3e5a-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html?utm_term=.5b1a53df9bc5>. 

235 “Security Council Demands 30-Day Cessation of Hostilities in Syria to Enable Humanitarian Aid Delivery, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2401 (2018),” UN, February 24, 2018, available 

at <www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13221.doc.htm>.

236 According to point 2 of Resolution 2401, the Security Council “Affirms that the cessation 

of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al Qaeda and Al Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, 

undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated 

by the Security Council.” For detail on the opposition groups in Eastern Ghouta, of which Nusra 

was a small minority, see Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Ignoring a Cease-Fire Demanded by the 

U.N., Syrian Forces Attack Rebels,” New York Times, April 26, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2018/02/25/world/middleeast/syria-united-nations-ceasefire-ghouta.html?rref=collection%2Fissue

collection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&m

odule=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=collection>. 

237 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions during 

a Joint News Conference Following Talks with Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel, 

Moscow, February 19, 2018,” Russian Foreign Ministry Web site, February 19, 2018, available at 

<www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3085195>; Liz 

Sly, “Violence Rages Unabated in Ghouta as Syria Defies U.N. Cease-Fire Resolution,” Washington 

Post, February 26, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/violence-ragesunabated-in-ghouta-as-syria-defies-un-ceasefire-resolution/2018/02/25/9a4fc244-1a51-11e8-98f5-

ceecfa8741b6_story.html?utm_term=.d485fab4573c>; and Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Ignoring 

a Cease-Fire Demanded by the U.N., Syrian Forces Attack Rebels,” New York Times, April 26, 2018, 

available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/middleeast/syria-united-nations-ceasefire-ghouta.ht

ml?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=t
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Between Russia and Iran

odayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=colle

ction>. According to Washington, Russia flew an average of 20 bombing sorties a day against Eastern 

Ghouta from February 24–28. See “Statement by the Press Secretary on Russian and Syrian Regime 

Attacks on Eastern Ghouta,” The White House, March 4, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/

briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-russian-syrian-regime-attacks-eastern-ghouta/>). To 

compare Eastern Ghouta with Aleppo in 2016, see Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 25–32, 36–45. 

238 Hwaida Saad, “Syria Regains Control of Damascus, After Seven Years of Fighting,” New York 

Times, May 21, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/world/middleeast/syria-damascusrebels.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCol

lection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=14&pg

type=collection>; and Louisa Loveluck, “Syria’s Army Is on a Path to Victory after Ousting Rebels from 

Damascus,” Washington Post, May 27, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-armyis-on-a-path-to-victory-after-ousting-rebels-from-damascus/2018/05/25/695e4870-5e9b-11e8-b656-

236c6214ef01_story.html?utm_term=.fdf1cf42559d>. 

239 Secretary Mattis stated in early January 2018 that “I don’t think there’s a land bridge right 

now” across Iraq from Iran to Syria. See Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, “Media Availability by 

Secretary Mattis at the Pentagon,” transcript, DOD, January 5, 2018, available at <www.defense.gov/

News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1409471/media-availability-by-secretary-mattis-at-thepentagon/>. For one assertion that such a land bridge already exists from Iran to Lebanon, see “Syria’s 

Albou Kamal Border Crossing Opens Iran-Beirut Route,” Asharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2018, available at 

<https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1138051/syria%E2%80%99s-albou-kamal-border-crossingopens-iran-beirut-route>. 

240 John Hudson and Paul Sonne, “U.S. Sanctions Ensnare Russians with Ties to Trump World,” 

Washington Post, April 7, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administrationimposes-sweeping-new-sanctions-on-russian-elite/2018/04/06/97df2782-398e-11e8-b57c-9445cc4dfa5e_story.html?utm_term=.bd42102668f8>; and Gardiner Harris, “U.S. Puts New Sanctions on Putin’s 

Inner Circle,” New York Times, April 7, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/us/politics/

trump-sanctions-russia-putin-oligarchs.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-ti

mes&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlig

hts&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=collection>. 

241 Louisa Loveluck and Liz Sly, “Russian-Backed Peace Talks Endorse Path for Syria, but 

Opposition and Kurds Stay Away,” Washington Post, January 31, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/russian-backed-peace-talks-endorse-future-path-for-syriabut-opposition-and-kurds-stay-away/2018/01/30/5e0ac11a-05c2-11e8-ae28-e370b74ea9a7_story.

html?utm_term=.54a72ecdf085>; and Anne Barnard, “Russia Hosts Peace Talks on Syria, but Rebels 

Stay Away,” New York Times, January 31, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/

middleeast/syria-russia-sochi-talks.html?ref=todayspaper>. On the laborious path to Sochi, see the 

scene setter by Vladimir Frolov, “Sirija v Sochi. Uregulirovanie pod kontrolem Bashara Asada. Pochemu Kongress nacional’nogo dialoga ustroit ne vseh” [Syria in Sochi. Settlement Under Control of 

Bashar al-Asad. Why the Congress of National Dialogue Will Not Suit Everyone], Republic, January 29, 

2018, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/89194?utm_source=slon.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_
74 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

campaign=morning>. In its lack of participation by serious elements of the real Syrian opposition and 

the rigidness of Damascus representatives, who were under instructions not to discuss a new constitution and other key issues (see Barnard, “Russia Hosts Peace Talks on Syria, but Rebels Stay Away”), the 

Congress was in many ways a repetition on a larger stage of the inconsequential intra-Syrian talks that 

Russia hosted in Moscow in January and April 2015. Those also served to portray Putin as working for 

peace, but solved nothing and were soon followed by Russia’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria 

that summer. See Parker, Understanding Putin, 71; and Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 23–24.

242 On the unusual and not satisfactorily explained series of attacks against Russia’s bases 

in Syria beginning December 31, 2017, see Ivan Safronov, “Hmejmim popal pod ogon’. Radikal’nye 

islamisty obstreljali iz minometov rossijskuju aviabazu v Sirii” [Hmeimim Comes under fire. Radical Islamists Fired Mortars at the Russian Airbase in Syria], Kommersant, January 3, 2017, available 

at <www.kommersant.ru/doc/3514249>; Anton Mardasov, “Russian Media Tries to Sort out Source 

of Attack on Syria Airbase,” Al-Monitor, January 8, 2018; Liz Sly and Zakaria Zakaria, “Russia Says 

DIY Drones that Attacked Its Base in Syria Came from a rebel Village,” Washington Post, January 11, 

2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-says-diy-drones-that-attacked-its-basein-syria-came-from-a-rebel-village/2018/01/10/9e9bddd4-f615-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.

html?utm_term=.9992152c1f94>; Liz Sly, “Who Is Attacking Russia’s Bases in Syria? A New Mystery 

Emerges in the War,” Washington Post, January 11, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/

who-is-attacking-russias-main-base-in-syria-a-new-mystery-emerges-in-the-war/2018/01/09/4fdaea70-

f48d-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.cc7991de8603>; and Nick CummingBruce and Rick Gladstone, “Russian-Backed Attacks Pummel Syrian Enclave,” New York Times, 

June 12, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/world/middleeast/syria-fighting-russia.

html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>. 

243 Louisa Loveluck, “Civilian Casualties Spiral in Syria as Air Raids Target Areas Marked 

for Cease-Fire,” Washington Post, October 8, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/

middle_east/civilian-casualties-spiral-in-syria-as-air-raids-target-areas-marked-for-cease-fire/2017/10/0

7/523a97b2-a919-11e7-9a98-07140d2eed02_story.html?utm_term=.3386a4c98ec6>; and Nada Homsi 

and Anne Barnard, “Marked for ‘De-escalation,’ Syrian Towns Endure Surge of Attacks,” New York 

Times, November 19, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/world/middleeast/syria-deescalation-zones-atarib.html?ref=todayspaper>. 

244 Vladimir Frolov, “Amerika protiv «zlyh namerenij». Kak budut rabotat’ novye sankcii?” [America against “Malign Intentions.” How Will the New Sanctions Work?], Republic, April 6, 

2018, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/90359?utm_source=slon.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_

campaign=morning>. 

245 Aleksey Nikolsky, “Ataka SShA na Siriju udarila po reputacii Rossii v regione. Hotja 

ser’eznyh voennyh posledstvij ona imet’ ne budet” [The U.S. Attack on Syria Hit Russia’s Reputation 

in the Region. Although It Will Not Have Serious Military Consequences], Vedomosti, April 15, 2018, 

available at <www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2018/04/15/766741-ssha-udarila-reputatsii-rossiiregione?utm_campaign=newspaper_16_04_2018&utm_medium=email&utm_source=vedomosti>. 

246 Vladimir Frolov, “Udar po Sirii: itogi i vyvody. «Novyj Karibskij krizis» ne sluchilsja. No 

Rossii pora pereocenit’ svoi vozmozhnosti i celi na Blizhnem Vostoke” [Strike on Syria: Results and 
75

Between Russia and Iran

Conclusions. A “New Caribbean Crisis” Did Not Happen. But It Is Time for Russia to Reassess Its 

Capabilities and Goals in the Middle East], Republic, April 15, 2018, available at <https://republic.ru/

posts/90471?utm_source=slon.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=morning>. 

247 Anne Gearan and Karen DeYoung, “Trump Pulls United States Out of Iran Nuclear Deal, 

Calling the Pact ‘An Embarrassment,’” Washington Post, May 9, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-will-announce-plans-to-pull-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-despite-pleas-fromeuropean-leaders/2018/05/08/4c148252-52ca-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?utm_term=.

a610c431a3c6>; and Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Pact He Long Scorned,” New York Times, 

May 9, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.ht

ml?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=t

odayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=colle

ction>. 

248 James McAuley, “After Trump Says U.S. Will Withdraw from Iran Deal, Allies Say They’ll 

Try to Save It,” Washington Post, May 9, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/backersof-iran-nuclear-deal-wage-last-ditch-blitz-seeking-to-sway-trump/2018/05/08/9b15e3f0-523e-11e8-

a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_term=.a31ffee4107b>; “Foreign Ministry Statement on Developments around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Russian Foreign 

Ministry Web site, May 8, 2018, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/

cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3212053>; and “Meeting with Permanent Members of Security Council,” President of Russia Web site, May 9, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/

news/57439>. 

249 Underscoring the complexity and ambivalent nature of the relationship, Russia joined the 

United States and other major powers in approving over a half dozen UNSC resolutions critical of 

Iran after the exposure of Iran’s covert nuclear enrichment program in 2002. However, even as Russia 

as a member of the P5+1 continued its efforts to press Iran to curb its non-civilian nuclear ambitions, 

Russia and Iran worked to coordinate their efforts in Syria from 2012 to 2015. See Parker, Persian 

Dreams, 216–222, 250–274, 289–292, and 301–310; Parker, Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program, 

passim; and Parker, Understanding Putin, 24–28, 42–47, and 68–69.

250 Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Trump Disavows Accord With Iran on Nuclear Arms,” 

New York Times, October 14, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-irannuclear-deal.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>; and Anne Gearan and Abby Phillip, “Trump Sets New 

Conditions for U.S. to Stay in Iran Nuclear Deal, Tossing Issue to Congress,” Washington Post, October 

14, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-set-new-conditions-for-us-to-stayin-iran-nuclear-deal-tossing-issue-to-congress/2017/10/13/39ac3894-af82-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_

story.html?utm_term=.c06c121fdd49>. 

251 “Telephone Conversation with President of Iran Hassan Rouhani,” President of Russia Web 

site, September 25, 2017, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55694>. 

252 Parker, Persian Dreams, 216–222, 250–274, 289–292, and 301–310; Parker, Russia and 

the Iranian Nuclear Program,” passim; and Parker, Understanding Putin, 24–28, 42–47, and 68–69. 

253 Vladimir Frolov, “Tramp protiv vseh. Chto oznachaet vyhod iz jadernoj sdelki s Iranom? 

Samyj ser’eznyj krizis v otnoshenijah s sojuznikami po NATO. Novye vozmozhnosti dlja Moskvy” 
76 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 27

[Trump Against Everyone. What Does It Mean to Withdraw from the Nuclear Deal with Iran? The Most 

Serious Crisis in Relations with NATO Allies. New Opportunities for Moscow], Republic, May 9, 2018, 

available at <https://republic.ru/posts/90777?utm_source=republic.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_

campaign=morning>. 

254 John Hudson and Paul Sonne, “U.S. Sanctions Ensnare Russians with Ties to Trump 

World,” Washington Post, April 7, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administration-imposes-sweeping-new-sanctions-on-russian-elite/2018/04/06/97df2782-398e-11e8-b57c9445cc4dfa5e_story.html?utm_term=.bd42102668f8>; and Grigoriy Levchenko, “Rossijskij rynok 

ruhnul iz-za novyh sankcij. Chto dal’she?” [The Russian Market Collapsed Due to New Sanctions. 

What’s Next?], Republic, April 9, 2018, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/90384?utm_source=slon.

ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=morning>; and Neil MacFarquhar, “Putin, or the World? 

Sanctions May Force Russian Oligarchs to Choose,” New York Times, April 12, 2018, available at 

<www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/world/europe/sanctions-russia-economy-rusal-deripaska.html?rref=co

llection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper

®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection>. 

255 Erika Solomon and Nadzhmekh Bozorgmer, “Rossija mozhet pomeshat’ Iranu zarabotat’ na 

Sirii. Bashar Asad predpochitaet privlekat’ k rekonstrukcii strany Rossiju i Kitaj” [Russia Can Prevent 

Iran from Making Money on Syria. Bashar al-Asad Prefers to Involve Russia and China in the Country’s Reconstruction], Vedomosti, February 16, 2018, available at <www.vedomosti.ru/economics/

articles/2018/02/16/751191-rossiya-pomeshat-iranu>; Ali Alfoneh, “Tehran Stands to Lose in Syria’s 

Postwar Reconstruction,” Middle East Institute, February 19, 2018, available at <www.mei.edu/content/io/tehran-stands-lose-syria-s-postwar-reconstruction>; and Rohollah Faghini, “Iranian Mistrust of 

Russia Surges as Syrian War Winds down,” Al-Monitor, March 12, 2018. 

256 Ahmad Majidhar, “IRGC’s Role in Iran’s Economy Growing with Its Engineering Arm Set 

to Execute 40 Mega-Projects,” Middle East Institute, May 7, 2018, available at <www.mei.edu/content/io/irgcs-role-irans-economy-growing-its-engineering-arm-set-execute-40-mega-projects>. 

257 David E. Sanger and David D. Kirkpatrick, “A Risky Bet on Breaking Tehran’s Will,” New 

York Times, May 9, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-iran-nucleardeal-news-analysis-.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click

&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlace

ment=2&pgtype=collection>. 

258 Diane Munro, “U.S. Exit from Iran Nuclear Agreement Roils Global Oil Markets,” 

AGSIW, May 9, 2018, available at <www.agsiw.org/u-s-exit-iran-nuclear-agreement-roils-global-oilmarkets/>. 

259 Andrew E. Kramer, “Assad Makes Surprise Trip to See Putin,” New York Times, May 18, 

2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/world/middleeast/assad-putin-syria-iran-russia.htm

l?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=to

dayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=9&pgtype=colle

ction>; and Maxim A. Suchkov, “Assad in Surprise Sochi Visit as Russia Continues Iran-Israel Mediation,” Al-Monitor, May 18, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/assadputin-sochi-constitution-trade-economy-humanitarian-crisis.html?utm_campaign=20180518&utm_
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Between Russia and Iran

source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

260 Varvara Podrugina, “V Sochi ne udalos’ dostich’ progressa v sozdanii novoj konstitucii Sirii” [In Sochi Failure to Achieve Progress in Creating a New Constitution for Syria], Vedomosti, August 

1, 2018, available at <www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2018/07/31/777051-vstrecha-sochi?utm_cam

paign=newspaper_01_08_2018&utm_medium=email&utm_source=vedomosti>. 

261 Manar al-Freih/Ghossoun, “President al-Assad: Enhancing Economic Cooperation with 

Iran and Countries Defending Their Sovereignty to Resist Western Projects,” SANA, May 18, 2018, 

available at <https://sana.sy/en/?p=138062>. 

262 “Statements Following Russian-Syrian Talks,” President of Russia Web site, May 17, 2018, 

available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57488>. 

263 Andrey Ontikov, “Vezhlivo poprosili” [We Asked Politely], Izvestiya, May 22, 2018, available at <https://iz.ru/746106/andrei-ontikov/vezhlivo-poprosili>. 

264 Ahmad Majidyar, “Tehran Rejects Putin’s Call for Troop Withdrawal from Syria,” Middle 

East Institute, May 21, 2018, available at <www.mei.edu/content/io/tehran-rejects-putin-s-call-troopwithdrawal-syria>; and Ali Alfoneh, “Iran-Russia Divide over Syria Widens,” AGSIW, June 1, 2018, 

available at <www.agsiw.org/iran-russia-divide-syria-widens/>. 

265 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018. 

266 Author’s notes from the event held in Moscow at the Valdai Discussion Club at Bolshaya 

Tatarskaya ulitsa, No. 42, on May 21, 2018, and from “Presentation of the Report ‘Russia in the Middle 

East,’” video, 37:00 to 40:00 minutes (regarding resistance to Iranian bases in Syria) and 50:35 to 52:25 

minutes (regarding letting Iran and Israel shoot at each other). The quote is from the study being presented that day: Kuznetzov, Naumkin, and Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in the Middle East,” 18, 20. 

267 Igor Subbotin, “Hrupkij balans. Prevratitsja li Iran iz partnera v sopernika Rossii? Izrail’ vynuzhdaet Kreml’ vybirat’ storonu v poslevoennoj Sirii” [Delicate Balance. Will Iran Turn 

from a Partner into a Rival of Russia? Israel Forces the Kremlin to Choose Sides in Post-War 

Syria], Republic, May 31, 2018, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/91049?utm_source=republic.

ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=morning>; “Iran Wants to Stay in Syria Forever Despite 

Russian-Israeli Pressure,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 4, 2018, available at <https://aawsat.com/english/home/

article/1289726/iran-wants-stay-syria-forever-despite-russian-israeli-pressure>; and Adil al-Salmi, 

“Doubt Rattles Tehran over Putin, Assad Intentions,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 4, 2018, available at <https://

aawsat.com/english/home/article/1289716/doubt-rattles-tehran-over-putin-assad-intentions>. 

268 Maxim A. Suchkov, “Moscow Updates Playbook on Making Israel, Iran Happy,” Al-Monitor, June 1, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/russia-playbook-makingisrael-iran-happy.html?utm_campaign=20180604&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Daily%20Newsletter>; and Charles Lister, “In Syria, Iran Is Playing the Long Game,” Middle 

East Institute, June 4, 2018, available at <www.mei.edu/content/flash/2018-06-4>. 

269 “Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France in Joint Press Conference,” 

The White House, April 24, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-president-macron-france-joint-press-conference/>. 

270 Mattis, “Hallway Press Gaggle by Secretary Mattis,” November 13, 2017. 

271 Mark N. Katz, “Moscow’s Balancing Act in Syria,” Lobe Log, November 21, 2017, available at 
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<http://lobelog.com/moscows-balancing-act-in-syria/>; and the presentations by Mark Katz and Neda 

Bolourchi, “Iranian and Russian Involvement in Syria: Purposes and Prospects,” International Institute 

for Strategic Studies (IISS), at the IISS Manama Dialogue 2017 Discussion Series, video, 56:27, November 20, 2017, available at <www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2017-7df9/november-62a9/iranianand-russian-involvement-in-syria-49a8>. 

272 Moscow’s reaction to former Secretary Tillerson’s statement on January 17, 2018, was also 

low-key; see “Tillerson: SShA namereny sohranjat’ voennoe prisutstvie v Sirii i posle razgroma IG” 

[Tillerson: The USA Intends to Maintain a Military Presence in Syria Even after the Defeat of ISIS], 

TASS, January 17, 2018, available at <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4881761>; and Aleksey Bogdanovskiy, “SShA budut protivostojat’ vlijaniju Irana v Sirii, zajavil Tillerson” [The USA Will 

Confront Iranian Influence in Syria, Said Tillerson], RIA Novosti, January 17, 2018, available at <https://

ria.ru/syria/20180117/1512818134.html>. Moreover, in accepting that the United States has longer 

term goals in Syria, Russia has not gotten anything in return on Ukraine. This has long been thought by 

many as one of the goals of Putin’s military intervention in Syria. As previously argued by the present 

author, however, the United States and Russia resumed contacts on Ukraine when Secretary John Kerry 

and Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland met with Putin and Lavrov in Sochi on May 12, 2015—before 

Moscow focused on intervening militarily in Syria after the capture of Ramadi and Palmyra by IS. See 

Parker, Putin’s Syrian Gambit, 13–14. As the pundit Vladimir Frolov has pithily put it, Russia now runs 

the risk of being stuck with Syria under continuing sanctions while the West gets Ukraine. See Vladimir 

Frolov, “Beskonechnaja vojna” [Unending War], Republic, August 18, 2017, available at <https://republic.ru/posts/email/85900>. The new U.S. envoy for discussions on eastern Ukraine, Kurt Volker, first 

met with Vladimir Surkov, his Russian counterpart, on August 21, 2017, in Minsk, then in Belgrade, 

on October 7 and November 13. See “U.S., Russia Envoys Differ on Peace and Peacekeepers in Eastern 

Ukraine,” RFE/RL, November 14, 2017, available at <www.rferl.org/a/volker-surkov-meeting-ukraine-us-russia/28853193.html>. 

273 See the excellent analysis by Michael Eisenstadt, “Has the Assad Regime ‘Won’ Syria’s Civil 

War?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 15, 2018, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.

org/policy-analysis/view/has-the-assad-regime-won-syrias-civil-war>. 

274 Neil MacFarquhar, “At Least 4 Russians Killed in Syria in Firefight With ISIS; 43 Militants 

Reported Dead,” New York Times, May 28, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/world/

middleeast/russia-syria-isis.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&acti

on=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&cont

entPlacement=4&pgtype=collection>. Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Kills More Than 200 in a Part of Syria Not 

Used to Violence,” New York Times, July 26, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/world/

middleeast/isis-bombings-syria.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times&a

ction=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&co

ntentPlacement=16&pgtype=collection>.

275 Liz Sly and Mustafa Salim, “ISIS Is Making a Comeback in Iraq Just Months after Baghdad Declared Victory,” Washington Post, July 18, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/

isis-is-making-a-comeback-in-iraq-less-than-a-year-after-baghdad-declared-victory/2018/07/17/9aac54

a6-892c-11e8-9d59-dccc2c0cabcf_story.html?utm_term=.d4a46192b8b3>. 
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276 Hussein Ibish, “With the Military Attack, the U.S. Can Finally Start to Get It Right in 

Syria,” AGSIW, April 16, 2018, available at <www.agsiw.org/military-attack-us-can-finally-start-getright-syria/>; and Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, “In Syria, an Accidental Bulwark against Iran Shows 

Confusion of Trump Policy,” Washington Post, May 13, 2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.

com/world/national-security/in-syria-an-accidental-bulwark-against-iran-shows-confusion-of-trumppolicy/2018/05/12/458ed726-4ed7-11e8-af46-b1d6dc0d9bfe_story.html?utm_term=.6c0e690e3813>. 

ISIS forces briefly regained the town of Bukamal in Deir ez-Zour Province from Syrian regime forces 

in June 2018. See “Syrian Regime Oust IS from Border Town,” Middle East Online (London), June 11, 

2018, available at <www.middle-east-online.com/en/syrian-regime-oust-border-town>.

277 See, for example, Kuznetzov, Naumkin, and Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in the Middle East,” 

19 (figure), where the notation “Will Remain in Syria” includes “permanent bases” at Hmeimim and 

Tartus, plus aviation, air defense systems, and engineering troops. At the presentation of this report, 

co-author Naumkin stated that Russia needs the two bases and they will stay in Syria under legitimate 

accords. See author’s notes on the Valdai Club Event and “Presentation of the Report ‘Russia in the 

Middle East,’” video, at 46:25 minutes. 

278 On the question of the size and future mission of the American ground presence in Syria in 

November 2017, see Andrew deGrandpre, “A Top U.S. General Just Said 4,000 American Troops Are in 

Syria. The Pentagon Says There Are only 500,” Washington Post, November 1, 2017, available at <www.

washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/10/31/a-top-u-s-general-just-said-4000-americantroops-are-in-syria-the-pentagon-says-there-are-only-500/?utm_term=.1a12f87110c8>; “U.S. to Fight 

Islamic State in Syria ‘As Long As They Want to Fight’: Mattis,” Reuters, November 13, 2017, available 

at <http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/14/us-to-fight-islamic-state-in-syria-as-long-as-they-want-to-fightmattis?utm_campaign=20171114&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20

East%20Minute>; Karen DeYoung and Liz Sly, “U.S. Moves Toward Open-Ended Presence in Syria 

after Islamic State Is Routed,” Washington Post, November 23, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.

com/world/national-security/us-moves-toward-open-ended-presence-in-syria-after-islamic-state-isrouted/2017/11/22/1cd36c92-ce13-11e7-a1a3-0d1e45a6de3d_story.html?utm_term=.3b212e8a0597>; 

“More Than 400 U.S. Troops Leaving Syria: Coalition,” Reuters, November 30, 2017, available at 

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-military/more-than-400-u-s-troops-leaving-syria-coalition-idUSKBN1DU2AZ?utm_campaign=20171201&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Middle%20East%20Minute>; Jack Detsch, “Pentagon Acknowledges 

Higher Number of U.S. Troops in Syria,” Al-Monitor, December 6, 2017; John Ismay, “U.S. Discloses 

New Total of 2,000 Troops in Syria,” New York Times, December 7, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/us-troops-syria.html?ref=todayspaper>; and James F. Jeffrey, “U.S. 

Troop Deployment in Syria: Potential Pitfalls,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 12, 

2017, available at <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-troop-deployment-in-syriapotential-pitfalls>. 

279 The Russian president proposed at the press conference that “Russia and the United States 

apparently can act proactively and take—assume the leadership on this issue, and organize the interaction to overcome humanitarian crisis, and help Syrian refugees to go back to their homes.” See “Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press Conference,” 
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The White House, July 16, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-president-putin-russian-federation-joint-press-conference/>. 

280 Somini Sengupta, “The High Costs of Rebuilding Syria Will Be Political, Too,” New York 

Times, December 4, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/world/middleeast/syria-warrebuilding-homs.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0>. 

281 Laura Rozen, “U.S. Touts Success of Syria Cease-Fire Negotiated with Russia,” Al-Monitor, August 9, 2017. 

282 Frederic C. Hof, “Leaving,” Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, March 28, 2018, available 

at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/leaving>. 

283 Zogby Research Services, “Public Opinion 2017,” 9. 

284 Author’s conversations in Moscow, May 2018, and Kuznetzov, Naumkin, and Zvyagelskaya, “Russia in the Middle East,” 20. On recent tensions with Damascus, see also Raed Jaber, “Moscow 

Reports on Widening Differences with Damascus,” Asharq al-Awsat, May 13, 2018, available at <https://

aawsat.com/english/home/article/1266941/moscow-reports-widening-differences-damascus>; and 

Nazeer Rida, “Moscow Vows to Punish Violations of Syrian Regime Forces,” Asharq al-Awsat, May 27, 

2018, available at <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1282466/moscow-vows-punish-violationssyrian-regime-forces>. 

285 “Telephone Conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump,” President of Russia Web site, 

March 20, 2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57100>; Anton Troianovsky, 

“Trump Floated a Putin Visit to the White House in a March 20 Phone Call,” Washington Post, April 3, 

2018, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump-proposed-putin-visit-white-house-in-march20-phone-call-kremlin-says/2018/04/02/b0727634-367b-11e8-acd5-35eac230e514_story.html?utm_

term=.7c0738c4d1f8>; and Andrew Higgins and Peter Baker, “Russia Sends Hasty R.S.V.P. to Trump 

Invitation,” New York Times, April 3, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/world/europe/

trump-putin-white-house-meeting.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times

&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&

contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection>. On reports of preparations for a potential summit, see Brett 

Forrest and Peter Nicholas, “U.S. in Early Talks for Potential Summit Between Trump and Putin,” Wall 

Street Journal, June 1, 2018, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-in-early-talks-for-potential-summit-between-trump-and-putin-1527898635?utm_campaign=20180603&utm_source=sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter>. 

286 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.” Putin also praised the performance 

of the American economy during his annual marathon press conference on December 14, took a phone 

call from President Trump who thanked him for his positive remarks, and then called President Trump 

on December 17 in appreciation of the information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that 

helped foil a terrorist attack against the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg. See David Filipov, “Putin 

Thanks Trump for CIA Intel That Foiled a Planned Terrorist Attack in Russia,” Washington Post, December 18, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-thanks-trump-for-cia-intel-thatfoiled-a-planned-terrorist-attack-in-russia-the-kremlin-says/2017/12/17/f4274600-e349-11e7-9ec2-

518810e7d44d_story.html?utm_term=.2a5f39d2b7d9>.

287 “Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin,” President of Russia Web site, April 14, 
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Between Russia and Iran

2018, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57257>. 

288 Ilya Arkhipov and Evgeniya Pismennaya, “Putin Still Wants Deal with Trump, Even after 

Sanctions, Syria Attack,” Bloomberg, April 18, 2018, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-18/putin-said-to-seek-trump-deal-even-after-sanctions-syria-attack>. 

289 Maxim A. Suchkov, “Russia Takes Low-Key Approach to West’s Strike on Syria,” AlMonitor, April 16, 2018, available at <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/04/russia-responsesyria-strikes-trump.html?utm_campaign=20180417&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=Daily%20Newsletter>.
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About the Author

John W. Parker is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. He served previously in the U.S. 

Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he was Deputy Office Director 

and Chief of the Division for Caucasus and Central Asia in the Office for Russian and Eurasian 

Analysis. His principal areas of expertise are Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union 

and Russian-Iranian relations. He has served two tours at the American Embassy in Moscow, 

where he was Chief of the Political/Internal Section from 1989 to 1991, and was Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency’s “Research and Development—USA” exhibit in the Soviet 

Union in 1972. Dr. Parker has also been a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution. He holds a 

Bachelor of Arts from Indiana University and a Ph.D. from Yale University. 


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