IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyree A. Lawson, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 277 M.D. 2022

: SUBMITTED: April 21, 2023

Court of Common Pleas of :

Montgomery County :

Prothonotary Office, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: December 21, 2023

Introduction

In this somewhat confusing matter, before the Court is the Montgomery 

County Prothonotary’s Office’s1 preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer2

1 While the complaint refers to the “Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Prothonotary Office,” we note that the Prothonotary, while a clerk of the trial court, see

Pennsylvania Constitution, Schedule to article V, § 15, is not synonymous with the court of 

common pleas, which is not a party and has not been served. Although not personally named, for 

purposes of considering this matter in our original jurisdiction, we treat the Prothonotary as 

synonymous with his office.

2

 In addition to the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, the Prothonotary also 

raised a preliminary objection for lack of personal jurisdiction due to an alleged failure to make 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

to the filing by Tyree A. Lawson, who is an inmate incarcerated at the State 

Correctional Institution (SCI)-Phoenix, pro se, purporting to be a “Petition for 

Review . . . And/Or In The Alternative Nunc Pro Tunc Appeal.” (Reproduced R. 

“R.R.” at 4a.)

An understanding of this dual filing is essential to our disposition. 

Lawson’s pleading is styled both as an original jurisdiction petition for review from 

a refusal to act by the Prothonotary and an appeal from an order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Montgomery County in underlying litigation issued in November 

2020. In the action brought in our original jurisdiction, Lawson seeks mandamus 

and declaratory relief to compel the Prothonotary to accept his filings and payment 

of filing fees in the underlying prisoner litigation (R.R. at 10a). With respect to the 

petition for review, we overrule the preliminary objection.

With respect to his appeal, Lawson asks for review nunc pro tunc of the 

trial court’s order, albeit without meeting any of the substantive or procedural 

requisites of a notice of appeal. Specifically, Lawson asks “[w]here the [trial] court 

failed to do such[,] and must [sic] reissue an accurate [o]rder to allow such” and “any 

other relief the [C]ourt deems just and proper.” As to the appellate aspect of 

Lawson’s filing, we quash the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

The Underlying Litigation

proper service of original process. The Prothonotary’s Office has withdrawn the objection to 

personal jurisdiction. (Respondent’s Br. at 8 n.4.)

Lawson filed a pleading styled as “preliminary objections to . . . [the Prothonotary’s] 

preliminary objections[’] misrepresentations.” The Court directed the matter to be submitted on 

briefs without oral argument.
3

The essential facts alleged by Lawson regarding the underlying 

litigation are as follows.3 In July 2018, Lawson, an inmate in the custody of the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, was relocated from SCI-Graterford to SCIPhoenix. During that move, Lawson avers that his personal property (records of 

other litigation) was lost, stolen, or otherwise confiscated by Department of 

Corrections staff. As a result of the alleged July 2018 confiscation of his property, 

Lawson filed an action in federal court against the former Secretary of Corrections 

and other officials of the agency. After the action was dismissed in federal court, 

Lawson refiled in the trial court in June 2020, seeking to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP). The request to proceed IFP was initially granted.

The defendants in the underlying litigation filed a motion to revoke 

Lawson’s IFP status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f), 

and Lawson filed a response. On November 16, 2020, the trial court issued an order 

revoking Lawson’s IFP status and dismissing the matter without prejudice.4[Order, 

Lawson v. Wetzel (C.C.P. Montgomery Cnty., Civil Division, Docket No. 2020-

10757, filed Nov. 16, 2020).] Lawson did not appeal within 30 days or seek 

reconsideration of the trial court’s order. Rather, over a protracted period, on dates 

not identified, Lawson attempted to revive the underlying litigation by tendering the 

filing fee to the Prothonotary. The Prothonotary has refused to accept the filing fee, 

3 We note that the recitation of the facts of the underlying litigation are drawn from Lawson’s 

filing; other than the order of the trial court dismissing the action and a printout of docket entries 

attached to the petition for review, there is a lack of any documentation of the underlying litigation 

in the record of the instant case.

4 Without records of the underlying litigation, we are left to surmise that the trial court revoked

IFP status and dismissed the matter in reliance upon Section 6602 of the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602, as suggested by Lawson. As discussed infra, whether that decision was 

correct is not properly before us.
4

stating cursorily in various responses that the underlying case was closed. Lawson

wishes to rekindle the underlying litigation under its original docket number because 

the statute of limitations on the underlying action has since run.

Issues Before the Court

The Prothonotary raises the following issues: 

[1] After a [trial] court order revokes a pro se plaintiff’s

[IFP] status and dismisses his complaint without giving 

the plaintiff an opportunity to pay his filing fee, must the 

Prothonotary . . . nevertheless accept . . . [Lawson’s]

subsequent tender of the filing fee and “reinstate” his 

dismissed complaint under the case’s original docket 

number? [and]

[2] May a plaintiff in a mandamus action against the 

Prothonotary[] . . . properly request and obtain leave to file 

a nunc pro tunc appeal of an order of dismissal entered in 

a different case which the plaintiff filed in a different court 

against different defendants.

(Prothonotary’s Br. at 2.)

The Original Jurisdiction Action

With regard to the first issue, the Prothonotary’s arguments generally 

track two of the three elements necessary for mandamus relief, i.e., that it has no 

duty to provide the relief sought and that Lawson failed to take advantage of other 

adequate or appropriate remedies.

5

 The Prothonotary argues that without reversal or 

modification of the trial court’s order dismissing the underlying action, it lacked the 

legal duty to accept Lawson’s subsequent tender of the filing fee and to “reinstate” 

5 To prevail, the petitioner seeking mandamus relief must establish the following: (1) a clear 

right to relief; (2) a corresponding duty in the respondent; and (3) the lack of any other adequate 

and appropriate remedy. Baron v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 169 A.3d 1268, 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017) (en banc).
5

the dismissed complaint under its original docket number. The Prothonotary further 

argues that Lawson could have sought reconsideration of the trial court’s order or 

filed a timely notice of appeal. The Prothonotary also argues that mandamus is 

improper because to accept a filing fee and “reinstate” a complaint that has been 

closed for (at the time of the brief) two years would be “futile and ineffectual” given 

the trial court’s order. Com. ex rel. McLaughlin v. Erie Cnty., 100 A.2d 601, 604 

(Pa. 1953) (“mandamus will not issue . . . where it is apparent that the writ will be 

futile or ineffectual by reason of the inability of the respondent to comply 

therewith”). The Prothonotary argues that Lawson’s issue is with the trial court, and 

not with him.

In one of our early cases, cited many times by the courts of this 

Commonwealth, we observed as follows: 

A [p]rothonotary may have the power, and even the duty, 

to inspect documents tendered for filing and to reject them 

if they are not on their face in the proper form . . . but this 

power is limited. He is not in the position of an 

administrative officer who has discretion to interpret or 

implement rules and statutes . . . . Any question of 

construction must be resolved by the courts, not by the 

[p]rothonotary nor the parties. The [p]rothonotary must 

accept papers and file them. He must also collect fees fixed 

by the legislature. He has no discretion in this matter nor 

does he act in a judicial capacity.

Warner v. Cortese, 288 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972) (emphasis supplied). The 

Prothonotary cannot say that he has no legal duty to accept the fee tendered—for the 

legislature has set the fee for filings.

6 Whether Lawson could have or should have 

availed himself of the ability to seek reconsideration by the trial court of its order or 

6 Section 1 of Act of February 14, 1986, P.L. 7, 42 P.S. § 21161.
6

pursued an appeal is irrelevant to the issue of whether a fee must be accepted. 

Further, whether the payment would be futile is not properly before us. As the 

Prothonotary takes pains to remind us, whether Lawson’s suit may proceed as filed

is a matter properly to be decided by the trial court.

At this stage, we must accept as true and accurate the averments in 

Lawson’s complaint (including the two attachments), which is the only information

we have regarding the underlying civil complaint or the subsequent events. We can 

see from the order that IFP status was revoked, and that the complaint was dismissed 

without prejudice, but we cannot tell the basis for that order. While we assume, from

Lawson’s pleading, that it was based upon the Prison Litigation Reform Act (see

infra note 4), was it on the basis of financial ineligibility,

7 or on the ground of 

multiple past instances of abusive litigation, or bad faith? If the latter, the dismissal 

without prejudice would seem to be an unlikely result but, at all events, we do not 

know the reason for the order. Moreover, we cannot tell whether Lawson’s alleged 

attempts to pay the filing fee occurred within the statute of limitations. Without 

development of facts such as these, we cannot say with certainty that the 

Prothonotary did not, by refusing to perform a mandatory duty to accept a filing fee, 

thwart Lawson’s legitimate attempts to reinstate his complaint before it was barred 

by the statute of limitations. If that were to be found, it might entitle Lawson to some 

form of equitable relief, but that is certainly not before us at this point. All we can 

say is that at the stage of preliminary objections we cannot say with certainty that 

Lawson is not entitled to any form of relief. 

The Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc

7 Since Lawson has stated that he attempted to pay the filing fee, IFP status could have been

revoked because he had, in fact, sufficient funds in his account. 
7

Turning to the appeal nunc pro tunc, we quash this portion of Lawson’s 

filing because we lack jurisdiction.

8

Lawson argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his case and 

denied him the opportunity to pay the filing fee when it revoked his IFP status. 

(Petition for Review/Notice of Appeal ¶ 34, R.R. at 9a.) However, the trial court’s 

order was filed on November 16, 2020, and Lawson did not file his appeal nunc pro 

tunc in this Court until May 15, 2022, some 16 months later. An appeal from a trial 

court’s order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order from which the 

appeal is taken. Section 5571(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(a) (“[t]he

time for filing an appeal . . . in . . . the Commonwealth Court shall be governed by 

general rules”); Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a), Pa. R.A.P. 903(a)

(“the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order 

from which the appeal is taken”). An appellate court “may not enlarge the time for 

filing a notice of appeal.” Rule 105(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 105(b). Appeals filed after the expiration of the 30-day appeal 

period are untimely and deprive the appellate court of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Com. v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014); Szura v. Zoning 

Hearing Bd. of Wyoming Borough, 397 A.2d 33, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).

While the appellate courts may, under certain circumstances, enlarge 

time to file an appeal, the reason for filing a late appeal “must be extraordinary and 

involve fraud or some breakdown of the court’s operation through a default of its 

officers, whereby the party has been injured.” Nixon v. Nixon, 198 A. 154, 157 (Pa. 

1938). An application to appeal nunc pro tunc must set forth “some legitimate 

basis” for the delay, that is, “sufficient facts upon which to conclude that the delay 

8 Because of our disposition, we do not reach the argument raised by the Prothonotary. 
8

was justified and should be overlooked.” Robinson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

582 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1990). No such facts have been alleged here. Moreover, the 

appeal nunc pro tunc must be filed within a reasonable time. Nixon, 198 A. at 157. 

Sixteen months from an order of a trial court is, quite simply, not reasonable.

As we have no jurisdiction, we must quash the appeal. See Szura, 397 

A.2d at 34.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Prothonotary’s Office’s preliminary 

objection in the nature of a demurrer is overruled. Furthermore, Lawson’s filing, to 

the extent it seeks to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, is quashed.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyree A. Lawson, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 277 M.D. 2022

:

Court of Common Pleas of :

Montgomery County :

Prothonotary Office, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2023, the Preliminary 

Objection of Respondent, Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Prothonotary Office, to the Petition for Review of Petitioner, Tyree A. Lawson, is

OVERRULED. Respondent is directed to file an answer within 30 days of the date 

of this order with regard to the original jurisdiction aspect of the above-captioned 

matter.

Petitioner’s Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is QUASHED. To the extent that 

Petitioner sought to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, we relinquish 

appellate jurisdiction of the above-captioned matter.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita