2015 UT App 189

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ISAAC LORENZO,

Defendant and Appellant.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20140152-CA

Filed August 6, 2015

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department

The Honorable G. Michael Westfall

No. 131500545

Matthew D. Carling, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Lindsey L. Wheeler, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum 

Decision, in which JUDGES JAMES Z. DAVIS and JOHN A. PEARCE

concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 With his two young daughters in the car, Isaac Lorenzo 

led police officers on a high-speed chase through Cedar City. He 

was convicted of failure to respond to an officer’s signal, a third 

degree felony; reckless endangerment, a class A misdemeanor; 

reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor; and driving on a 

suspended or revoked driver license, a class B misdemeanor.

Lorenzo contends that insufficient evidence supported his 

reckless-endangerment, reckless-driving, and suspended-license 

convictions and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally 

ineffective assistance. We affirm.
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 2 2015 UT App 189

BACKGROUND1

¶2 Recognizing Lorenzo from prior encounters, a police 

officer stopped him for outstanding warrants and for driving 

with an invalid driver license. During the stop, the police officer 

smelled alcohol on Lorenzo’s breath and the two ‚started talking 

about the odor of alcoholic beverage.‛ In response, Lorenzo took 

off, leading the police officer on a high-speed chase through 

Cedar City.

¶3 Lorenzo sped through a residential neighborhood, ran 

stop signs, sped past multiple cars, and crossed in front of 

oncoming traffic and onto the freeway. Lorenzo then exited the 

freeway, turned through a busy intersection, and cut off cars as 

he sped toward the north-bound freeway. Lorenzo then entered 

the north-bound freeway, weaving in and out of traffic. During 

the chase, the police officer chased Lorenzo at speeds ranging 

from 90 to 110 miles per hour. The police officer called for 

backup, and another police officer joined the chase. Lorenzo 

exited the freeway again, ran another red light, and sped 

through a business district before stopping and surrendering in 

his residential neighborhood. Lorenzo’s two daughters stepped 

out of the car, ‚terrified.‛

¶4 At trial, Lorenzo admitted that ‚he was out of control‛ 

and that he ‚was driving probably very fast—a little fast.‛ He 

acknowledged that during the chase his ‚daughters were 

nervous‛ but that they were not in danger, because he ‚always 

drove well.‛

 

1. ‚On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.‛ 

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). ‚We present conflicting evidence only 

as necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.‛ Id.
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 3 2015 UT App 189

¶5 The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial. A jury tried 

Lorenzo for failure to respond to an officer’s signal, reckless 

driving, and reckless endangerment. The jury found Lorenzo 

guilty of all charges. Lorenzo did not move for a directed verdict 

or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions.

¶6 The trial court tried Lorenzo for driving on a suspended 

or revoked driver license. At the bench trial, the State called the

police officer and a hearing officer from the Division of Motor 

Vehicles (DMV) to testify. The DMV officer testified that 

Lorenzo did not have a valid driver license, that he could not get 

a valid driver license, and that his driving privileges ‚are 

restricted . . . so he cannot have any alcohol in his system when 

he drives.‛ The police officer testified that Lorenzo’s driver 

license was ‚suspended or revoked for alcohol.‛ After 

concluding that the alcohol restriction could only have resulted

from a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI)—an 

enhancement to the driver-license charge—the trial court found 

Lorenzo guilty of driving on a suspended or revoked driver 

license, a class B misdemeanor.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶7 Lorenzo asserts three claims of error on appeal. First, he 

contends that insufficient evidence supported his jury-trial 

convictions for reckless driving and reckless endangerment.

¶8 Second, Lorenzo contends that insufficient evidence 

supported his bench-trial conviction for driving on a suspended 

or revoked driver license.

¶9 Finally, Lorenzo contends that his trial counsel rendered 

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion 

to suppress evidence of the initial traffic stop on the ground that 

reasonable suspicion did not support the stop.
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 4 2015 UT App 189

ANALYSIS

I. Insufficient Evidence Claims

A. Reckless Driving and Reckless Endangerment

¶10 Lorenzo first contends that insufficient evidence 

supported his jury-trial convictions for reckless driving and 

reckless endangerment. He argues that his ‚driving did not 

amount to willful and wanton nor did it create a situation that 

was a substantial risk‛ of serious bodily harm or death, because,

‚*f+or the circumstances, Lorenzo did what he could to keep his 

daughters and everyone else safe.‛ The State responds that

Lorenzo failed to preserve this issue for appeal and that, in any 

event, ‚the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts 

for both reckless driving and reckless endangerment.‛

¶11 Under the preservation doctrine, a sufficiency claim ‚not 

raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.‛ State v. 

Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. ‚*T+o preserve an issue for 

appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a 

way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.‛ 

Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Because the trial court has no 

duty to examine the ‚sufficiency of the evidence unless the 

defendant moves the court to do so or there is an ‘apparent’ 

insufficiency, the preservation rule ensures that the issue will be 

brought to the trial court’s attention and the trial court will have 

the opportunity to address the issue.‛ Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 16. 

The preservation rule ‚prevent*s+ a defendant from deliberately 

foregoing relief below based on the sufficiency of the evidence, 

hoping that a remedial evidentiary defect might not be perceived 

and corrected, thus strategically facilitating the defendant’s 

chance for a reversal on appeal.‛ Id. We will not consider an 

unpreserved claim on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates 

that the trial court committed plain error, shows that exceptional 
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 5 2015 UT App 189

circumstances exist, or asserts ineffective assistance of counsel. 

State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 19, 192 P.3d 867.

¶12 Lorenzo has not preserved his sufficiency claim and does 

not raise any exception to the preservation rule on appeal. He 

instead argues that State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346, ‚did 

not determine that the ‘plain error’ exception was required to 

reach a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict.‛ In Holgate, our 

supreme court noted that the Utah Code provides that ‚the trial 

court ‘shall’ grant relief when the evidence is insufficient, even if 

a defendant fails to properly raise the issue, but only when the 

evidentiary defect is ‘apparent’ to the trial court.‛ Id. ¶ 15. From 

this language, Lorenzo argues that the trial court had ‚an 

inherent duty to ensure that the evidence was sufficient, 

requiring trial court action regardless of preservation.‛ But he

raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. ‚It is well 

settled that issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that 

were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived 

and will not be considered by the appellate court.‛ Allen v. Friel, 

2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Lorenzo’s sufficiency claim accordingly fails.2

B. Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Driver License

¶13 Lorenzo next contends that insufficient evidence 

supported his bench-trial conviction for driving on a suspended 

or revoked driver license. Lorenzo does not challenge the trial 

court’s finding that he was driving with a suspended license. 

Instead, he argues that the evidence supported at most a class C 

 

2. We note that Lorenzo’s sufficiency claim would have failed in 

any event. Indeed, his appellate counsel effectively conceded the 

sufficiency argument at oral argument when he stated, ‚Once 

that video . . . was shown to the jury, it was over. It was really 

over.‛
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 6 2015 UT App 189

misdemeanor, not a class B misdemeanor. He argues that 

because ‚the statute for driving on a suspended or revoked 

license calls for various and specific reasons why one has to be 

revoked or denied in order for someone to be found guilty,‛ it 

was ‚inappropriate *for the trial court+ to just infer or guess as to 

why Lorenzo’s license was revoked when the statute and the 

elements listed within it are very specific.‛ The State responds 

that the trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude that 

Lorenzo committed a class B, rather than a class C, 

misdemeanor.

¶14 ‚When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 

evidence, we must sustain the trial court’s judgment unless it is 

against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise 

reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.‛ State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ¶ 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (alterations 

in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚*I+n 

those instances in which the trial court’s findings include 

inferences drawn from the evidence, we will not take issue with 

those inferences unless the logic upon which their extrapolation 

from the evidence is based is so flawed as to render the inference 

clearly erroneous.‛ Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, ¶ 18, 181 

P.3d 791.

¶15 A person may be convicted of a class C misdemeanor for 

driving a motor vehicle with a ‚denied, suspended, disqualified, 

or revoked‛ driver license. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(1), (2) 

(LexisNexis 2010). This offense becomes a class B misdemeanor 

if the driver’s license was denied, suspended, disqualified, or 

revoked for, among other things, an alcohol-related prior 

offense. Id. § 53-3-227(3) (identifying enhancing alcohol-related 

prior offenses by Utah Code section numbers). 

¶16 At the bench trial, the police officer testified that 

Lorenzo’s driver license had been ‚suspended or revoked for 

alcohol,‛ but he did not specify which alcohol violation caused 
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 7 2015 UT App 189

Lorenzo’s license restriction. A DMV hearing officer testified 

that Lorenzo’s driving privileges ‚are restricted . . . so he cannot 

have any alcohol in his system when he drives.‛ The trial court 

and the parties then had the following exchange:

[Court]: Can I just infer that . . . if someone is 

alcohol restricted . . . that the only way their license 

can be alcohol restricted is if they have a prior 

DUI?

[Prosecutor]: Yes.

. . . .

[Trial Counsel]: *W+e’re not in the business of 

inferring anything here. It needs to be stated

specifically . . . .

[Court]: Are there other reasons that *Lorenzo’s+ 

license could have been . . . alcohol restricted other 

than having been convicted of a DUI?

[Trial Counsel]: That I’m aware of, no. 

. . . .

I just—when the proof is beyond a reasonable 

doubt to just simply infer I would argue is taking it 

a step too far.

On the basis of the testimony and the exchange with the parties, 

the trial court concluded that a prior DUI triggered Lorenzo’s 

driving restriction:

[B]ased on . . . what’s been presented in terms of 

argument, and that is that there is no way that he 
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 8 2015 UT App 189

could be [an] alcohol restricted driver other than to 

have been convicted of a DUI, then I do find that 

there is sufficient evidence to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he’s been convicted of a DUI 

and that that’s why his license was restricted at the 

time.

Lorenzo argues that the trial court’s inference that a DUI caused

his license restriction ‚was flawed and clearly erroneous‛ 

because ‚*t+here was no evidence presented showing what the 

alcohol restriction related to and when it was in place.‛

¶17 ‚*A+ reasonable inference arises when the facts can 

reasonably be interpreted to support a conclusion that one 

possibility is more probable than another.‛ State v. Cristobal, 2010 

UT App 228, ¶ 16, 238 P.3d 1096. Here, the court apparently 

believed that the inference it drew was not only a reasonable 

inference, but the only reasonable inference from Lorenzo’s 

alcohol-restricted license. Lorenzo did not identify at trial, nor 

does he identify on appeal, any crime that would result in an 

alcohol restriction but would not result in an enhancement. In 

other words, he identifies no competing inference from the 

evidence before the court. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated 

that the trial court’s finding contravened the clear weight of the 

evidence.3

 

3. A crime may exist that would result in an alcohol restriction 

but not an enhancement. But ‚*p+inpointing where and how the 

trial court allegedly erred is the appellant’s burden,‛ not the 

appellate court’s. GDE Constr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 2012 UT App 298, 

¶ 24, 294 P.3d 567. ‚An appellate court that assumes that burden 

on behalf of an appellant ‘distorts th*e+ fundamental allocation 

of benefits and burdens.’‛ Niemela v. Imperial Mfg., Inc., 2011 UT 

App 333, ¶ 24, 263 P.3d 1191 (alteration in original) (quoting 

(continued...)
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 9 2015 UT App 189

II. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim

¶18 Finally, Lorenzo contends that his trial counsel rendered 

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion 

to suppress evidence of the initial traffic stop on the ground that 

reasonable suspicion did not support the stop. Lorenzo argues 

that ‚*t+here was no sound trial strategy for failing to file a 

suppression motion on the basis that [the police officer] lacked 

reasonable suspicion to effectuate the initial traffic stop, which 

led to all other charges . . . and was thus highly prejudicial.‛ The 

State responds that because ‚no Fourth Amendment violation 

occurred,‛ filing a motion to suppress would have been futile.

¶19 To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, Lorenzo must establish that trial counsel performed 

deficiently and that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in 

prejudice. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984); State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 44, 345 P.3d 1195; State v. 

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 19, 12 P.3d 92. We review claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on 

appeal for correctness. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 11, 328 P.3d 

841.

¶20 In addition to proving both of the Strickland elements, 

when an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim turns on an 

alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the 

additional burden of proving that the ‚Fourth Amendment 

claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability 

that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable 

evidence in order to demonstrate prejudice.‛ Kimmelman v. 

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 

 

(...continued)

State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448). Accordingly, we 

decline to do so.
State v. Lorenzo

20140152-CA 10 2015 UT App 189

¶21 The legality of the initial stop of Lorenzo’s vehicle does 

not control this issue. A ‚prior illegality by officers does not 

affect the subsequent arrest of a defendant where there is 

an intervening illegal act by the suspect.‛ State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 

1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing United States v. Bailey, 691 

F.2d 1009, 1016–17 (11th Cir. 1982)); accord State v. Earl, 2004 UT 

App 163, ¶ 23, 92 P.3d 167. Thus, ‚notwithstanding a strong 

causal connection in fact between lawless police conduct and a 

defendant’s response, if the defendant’s response is itself a new, 

distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may arrest the 

defendant for that crime.‛ Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1016–17. ‚A 

contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from 

prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient 

causal connection to the police misconduct.‛ Id. at 1017.

¶22 This principle applies here. Even if the initial stop was 

unlawful, Lorenzo’s underlying Fourth Amendment claim fails. 

All of the charges against Lorenzo stemmed from his actions 

after he fled the scene of the stop. Lorenzo committed separate 

illegal acts—leading police on a dangerous, high-speed chase on 

the freeway and through residential and business districts—after

the allegedly unlawful stop. Because of Lorenzo’s intervening 

illegal conduct, a motion to suppress challenging the initial stop 

would have been futile. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 26, 

1 P.3d 546. Accordingly, Lorenzo’s ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel challenge fails.

CONCLUSION

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, Lorenzo’s convictions are 

affirmed.