Filed 11/9/23 In re Joel H. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JOEL H., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B327983

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 20CCJP03202B)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.M.,

Defendant and 

Appellant.
2

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Charles Q. Clay, Judge. Affirmed.

Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Senior

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

I.M. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s exertion of 

dependency jurisdiction over her 12-year-old son Joel H. as well 

as its orders that she submit to a psychological examination and 

drug and alcohol testing. We conclude there was no error and 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

I. The Family

Joel H. is the child of mother and Joel H. (father), who 

passed away in May 2021. Mother and father separated before 

father’s death, and mother began dating Daniel B. (boyfriend) in 

late 2019. By January 2022, mother and Joel were living with 

boyfriend in boyfriend’s residence.

1 Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we set 

forth the facts in the light most favorable to the rulings below. 

(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
3

II. Prior Dependency Case Based on Domestic Violence 

With Father

In August 2020, the juvenile court exerted dependency 

jurisdiction over Joel after sustaining allegations that (1) mother 

and father engaged in domestic violence in Joel’s presence, 

including one incident of physical violence where mother beat 

father with a broomstick, father pushed mother, and Joel put 

himself between them; and (2) mother has a history of substance 

abuse, including using methamphetamine and amphetamines. 

The court ordered Joel removed from mother’s custody, but 

returned him to her custody approximately one year later after 

she completed her case plan, which included substance abuse 

treatment, drug and alcohol testing, a domestic violence support 

group, and individual counseling. The court terminated 

jurisdiction over Joel on January 18, 2022.

III. Domestic Violence With Boyfriend

Just months after the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction over Joel, mother stopped taking the psychotropic 

medications prescribed by her primary physician for the PTSD he 

suggested she had. Mother also stopped attending therapy for 

the PTSD and the “abandonment issues” she claimed to 

experience when her mother did not accompany her and her 

father when they immigrated to the United States decades ago. 

In place of her prescribed medication and therapy, mother 

decided to self-medicate by smoking pot. She also resumed 

drinking alcohol. Due to her cessation of taking her medications 

and therapy, mother started to “feel[] anxious and started being 

needier.” From late January 2022 to October 2022, mother and 

boyfriend had verbal fights, including a “verbal dispute” in 
4

October 2022 where police responded to boyfriend’s residence and 

found mother “very intoxicated and at times incomprehensible.”

Things came to a head on November 1, 2022. That night, 

while watching a movie with Joel, mother and boyfriend drank 

alcohol and got into a verbal argument over boyfriend’s loyalty to 

her. After boyfriend threw an object at mother and mother 

threatened to call the police, boyfriend tried to leave. Mother 

blocked his path, but boyfriend wove his way around her. Once 

out in the driveway, boyfriend punched mother in the stomach 

and pushed her away, causing her to fall backwards and hit her 

head on the bumper of a car. Joel was present for the entire 

altercation, and was able to tell the police what he saw. Mother 

also reported that “an incident like this” “might have happen[ed]” 

previously.

In subsequent interviews, mother recanted the statements 

she made to police on the night of November 1, contending 

instead that boyfriend never touched her and that her fall was 

accidental. Joel also recanted his statements to police, 

contending instead that he was not present and, paradoxically, 

that the entire event was an “accident” (because mother and 

boyfriend told him it was). Mother was also less than forthright: 

She denied the existence of the prior dependency case, denied 

using alcohol on November 1, and admitted to lying about these 

issues only after being confronted with contrary evidence.

IV. Current Dependency Case

On December 28, 2022, the Los Angeles County

Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) 

filed a petition again asking the juvenile court to exert 

dependency jurisdiction over Joel due to (1) mother’s “history of 

engaging in violent altercations” with boyfriend, including the 
5

November 1 altercation; (2) mother’s “history of substance abuse” 

and her “current use[] of alcohol and marijuana”; and (3) mother’s 

“mental and emotional problems[,] including a diagnosis of 

PTSD.” As a result, the Department alleged, mother had “failed 

to protect” Joel and “endanger[ed his] physical health and 

safety,” thereby placing him at “risk of serious physical harm” 

that justified the exertion of jurisdiction under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).2

On March 2, 2023, the juvenile court held the jurisdictional

and dispositional hearing. The court sustained all three 

jurisdictional allegations, left Joel in his mother’s custody, and 

ordered the Department to provide mother with family 

maintenance services. Those services were comprised of (1) drug 

and alcohol services, including a 12-step program and random 

drug and alcohol testing; (2) mental health counseling, including 

a psychological evaluation and requiring mother to take all 

prescribed psychotropic medications; and (3) individual 

counseling to address case issues. 

V. Appeal

Mother filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence

Mother argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence. (I.J., supra, 

56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes the assertion of 

dependency jurisdiction where a child “has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
6

or illness, as a result of” (1) “[t]he failure or inability of the child’s 

parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child”; or (2) 

“[t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the 

child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness . . . or substance 

abuse.” (§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(D).) Exposing a child to 

domestic violence can constitute a failure to protect a child from 

the risk of serious physical injury under subdivision (b) of section 

300 (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194 (Heather 

A.); In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941), at least if, at the 

time of the jurisdictional hearing, the evidence supports a finding 

that the “violence is ongoing or likely to continue” rather than 

being a one-time incident unlikely to recur (In re Daisy H. (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717, disapproved on other grounds by In re 

D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 278; In re M.W. (2015) 238 

Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453-1454; cf. In re J.N. (2010) 181 

Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025-1027). A parent’s substance abuse or 

mental illness can also justify the exertion of dependency 

jurisdiction, at least if at the time of the jurisdictional hearing 

there is a defined risk of harm linked to that substance abuse or 

mental illness. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830.) 

Under any of these grounds, risk of harm means just that: The 

juvenile court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or 

injured to assume jurisdiction.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 

Cal.App.4th 159, 165; In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 

1376, 1383 (Kadence P.), superseded by statute on other grounds 

as stated in In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 322; In re 

Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993.) A parent’s past 

conduct is a “good predictor” of her future conduct, and hence 

whether a child is at risk. (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 

133 (T.V.).)
7

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings in this case. Substantial evidence 

supports the court’s finding that Joel is at substantial risk of 

serious physical harm by virtue of the domestic violence between 

mother and boyfriend. Joel was present when boyfriend punched 

and pushed mother on November 1, and Joel has shown a 

willingness to get in between mother and her assailants; Joel is 

therefore in harm’s way. (Accord, Heather A., supra, 52 

Cal.App.4th at p. 194 [“Obviously the children were put in a 

position of physical danger from [domestic violence occurring in 

their presence], since, for example, they could wander into the 

room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit”].) 

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that mother’s 

neglect of her mental illness by not taking her prescribed 

medications and ceasing her therapy, as well as her use of alcohol 

and marijuana, placed Joel at substantial risk of serious physical 

harm. Mother herself admitted that it was her neglect of her 

mental illness that led to her self-medication through alcohol and 

marijuana, which led to her feeling anxious and needy, and which 

thus prompted her to instigate the argument with boyfriend that 

escalated to physical violence in Joel’s presence on November 1. 

What is more, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding 

that Joel remained at risk at the time of the jurisdictional 

hearing because the ingredients that led to the November 1 

incident that placed Joel in harm’s way still remained: (1) 

Mother and boyfriend continued to be in a relationship; (2) 

mother had yet to address the mental health and substance 

abuse issues that precipitated verbal arguments that, on two 

occasions, escalated into physical violence between them; and (3) 

Joel continued to be in the household. Mother’s subsequent 
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statements lying about past events and minimizing the 

November 1 incident show mother’s willingness to conceal facts 

in order to keep custody of Joel, even when such custody 

exacerbates the risk to Joel. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 

Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to 

determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior 

in the future without court supervision”].)

Mother resists this conclusion with what boil down to two 

sets of arguments.

First, mother asserts that mental illness and substance 

abuse are, by themselves, insufficient to warrant the exercise of 

dependency jurisdiction. This is true (In re L.W. (2019) 32 

Cal.App.5th 840, 849; In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044, 

1050), but also irrelevant. That is because the evidence here 

supported the juvenile court’s implicit finding that mother’s 

mental illness and substance abuse contributed to the domestic 

violence that put Joel at substantial risk of harm. (Cf. In re L.C.

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 646, 652-654 [parent’s methamphetamine 

use did not create risk of harm when parent left child in care of 

competent adult while using the drug]; In re J.A. (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046-1047 [mother’s use of edible marijuana 

gummies did not create risk of harm to fetus when no evidence 

established actual adverse effects on the fetus, and parent 

immediately stopped consuming gummies once informed of 

potential adverse effect].)

Second, mother asserts that any risk of harm to Joel no 

longer exists because her fight with boyfriend was an isolated 

incident and because mother went back on her prescribed 

medication, tried to resume therapy, and stopped drinking once 

the Department again became involved. We reject these 
9

assertions. Accepting mother’s assertion that the November 1 

altercation was an isolated incident would require us to ignore 

mother’s earlier statements in favor of her later, self-serving 

statements; this is inconsistent with the governing standard of 

review. And mother’s recent and hasty resumption of medication 

and therapy does not negate all risk. Mother’s past conduct in 

stopping her medication and therapy (and using marijuana and 

alcohol to self-medicate) after the prior dependency case closed 

supports a reasonable inference mother would do the same thing 

again if Joel were not subject to the court’s jurisdiction in this 

case. (Accord, In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1653 

[parent’s refusal to take medication contributed to risk and 

indicated parent’s “unwillingness to accept and acknowledge how 

her mental problems contributed to [the] situation”].) The 

juvenile court acted reasonably in concluding that Joel remained 

at risk until mother had established she would not engage in the 

same pattern of conduct again.

II. Dispositional Order

Mother also challenges two of the juvenile court’s 

dispositional orders—namely, (1) that mother submit to a 

psychological assessment, and (2) that mother submit to drug and 

alcohol testing. A juvenile court has wide discretion to impose 

“reasonable orders to the parents,” and this standard is satisfied 

as long as the order is “appropriate and in the child’s best 

interest” and is designed to “eliminate [the] conditions that led to 

the court’s finding [of jurisdiction].” (§ 362; In re A.L. (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 138, 145 [orders imposed as part of family 

maintenance services must also satisfy these standards]; see In 

re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229.) We review a juvenile 

court’s decision regarding which orders to impose for an abuse of 
10

discretion (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186-187), 

and review any subsidiary factual findings supporting such 

orders for substantial evidence (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p.

136).

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 

either challenged order in this case. The court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering the psychological assessment because, as 

noted above, substantial evidence showed that mother’s 

untreated mental illness was a contributing factor to the 

domestic violence that posed a risk to Joel. Although it is true (as 

mother argues on appeal) that mother’s personal physician had 

diagnosed her with PTSD, mother nevertheless freely admitted 

no psychologist had examined her, and the court ordered the 

assessment “to ensure the reliability of [the non-psychologist 

physician’s] diagnosis” and “to ensure that mother is pursuing 

the appropriate course of treatment in terms of medication and 

therapy.” (Accord, Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 

Cal.App.4th 195, 199-203 [“psychological evaluation is an 

‘information-gathering tool’” that is “frequently used in 

dependency cases”].) This order was accordingly appropriate, in 

Joel’s best interest, and aimed at trying to eliminate one of the 

conditions supporting the court’s finding of jurisdiction. And 

even if we assume that mother properly preserved her objection 

to the drug and alcohol testing, the court also did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering that testing because substantial evidence 

showed that mother’s self-medication using marijuana and 

alcohol was also a contributing factor to the domestic violence 

that posed a risk to Joel.
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DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST 

_________________________, J.*

KWAN

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.