# FILED
March 23, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL AP PEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
JAMES HIGGINS, ) ) Appellant, ) MADISON COUNTY ) C.C.A. NO. v. ) W1999-01726-CCA-R3- PC ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellee. )

ORDER

This case came to be heard on the motion of the State of Tennessee for an affirmance of the judgment

of the trial court

pursuant to Rule 20 o

f the Rules of the Co

urt of Criminal Appe

als. On September 9, 1998, the Appellant pleaded guilty to aggrava ted robbery before the Madison County Circuit Court. Pursu

ant to his plea ag

reement, he was

sentenced to

eigh t years with the Department of Correction as a range I standard offender. His sentenc e was ordered to run concurrently

with a previous sentenc e fro m Chester County , and he was also g

iven credit on his sentence for the time he had already served for the Chester County conviction. Only months after

his plea, the Appellant filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Ten

nessee Rules of Cr

iminal Procedure . Through this fili ng, h e contended

that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by coe rcing him into pleading guilty, thereby rendering his guilty plea involuntary. I N particular, he asserted

that althou gh he was guilty of rob bery, he was not guilty of aggravat

ed robbery . Given the substan ce of the Appella

nt's pro se complaint, the trial court c orrectly tre ated the filing as a petition for post-conviction relief and appointed counsel to assist the Appellant. See N orton v. Everhart

, 895 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn. 1995 )(stating that a trial court is not bound by

the title of a plea

ding but may

instead construe

it according to its substance and the relief sought). The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on February 26, 1999.

At the post-convicti

on hearing, the

Appell an t testified that co unsel wanted only

toclear his caseload and was notinterested in assisting him. However, the Appellant readily admitted that he understood the nature of his plea agreement. He also stat ed that h e chose to plead g uilty because he feared that he might receive a gr

eater punishment

if he were convi

cted at trial, as h

is attorney ha

d warned him. Following the hearing, the trial court denied pos t-convict ion relief. In so doing, the trial court found that the Appellant, by his own testimony , fully understood what he was pleading to and what sentenc

e was called for

by his plea a

greement. The

trial court found further that the
mere fact that counsel truthfully informed the Appellant that he could accept the plea agreement or p roceed to trial and risk a g

reater punishme

nt than that called

for in the plea ag

reeme nt did no t amount to deficient

performance in any way . The trial court also reviewed the transcript of

the guilty ple a su bmi ssi on h eari ng an d fo und no e vid ence sugg est ing t hat the ple a was inv olu nta ry.

Based on our review of the rec ord in this case, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied post-conviction relief. The Appellant's claim that his counsel wanted only to clear his caseload is nothing more than a bald assertion without any supporting particularized proof. We simply cannot conclude that the Appellant has offered clear and convincing evidence to

prove his allegations in this regard as is required under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). In fact, the record reveals that counsel secured a plea agreement which offered the Appellan t the minimum sentence to run concurr ently with a previously-imposed sentence. Add iti ona lly, the State

agreed to dismiss a second ch

arge agains

t the Appellant in c

onjunction with the plea agreeme

nt. Moreover, the Appellant testified at the guilty plea submission hearing that he was satisfied with counsel's performance.

Furthermore, the Appellant rea dily admitted

that he fully

understood the na

ture of his plea agreement. The Appellant testified that he made a "hard choice" to accept the plea ag reement because, as his counsel had warned him, he feared he might receive a greater punishment if he were convictedat trial. It is well-settled that a petitioner's fear that he or she may rec eive a gre ater punishmentif convicted at tr ial does not rende r a guilty p

lea a product of c

oercion or other

wise inv olu nta ry. Hicks v. State , 983 S.W.2d 240, 248 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); Parham v. State 885 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1994); Kathy Ho well Knig ht v. State , Meigs County, No. 24 (Tenn. Crim. App., filed March 14, 1991, at Knoxville), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 1991). The transcript of the guilty plea submission hearing indicates that the Appellant was adequately advised of his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty. Although he initially expressed concer n overpleading guilty to ag gravated robb

ery, he ev

entually sta

te d that he w as choosing to ple ad guilty because it was the best course of

action consideri

ng all fo the surr

ounding circums

tances. From our review, there is nothing in the record which suggests that the Appellant's decision to accept the plea agre eme nt w as t he p rod uct of co erci on o r ot herw ise inv olu nta ry.

Acco rdi ngly, the judgment of the trail cou rt denying po st-conviction re

lief is AFFIRMEDpursuant to

Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Crimi nal Appeals. Costs a

re taxed to the state.

_____________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
CONCUR:

_____________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

_____________________________ JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE