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i 

43–782 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–118] 

IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY 

OPERATIONS: APPROACHES TO INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2008 


Congress.#13
(II) 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

SUZANNE MCKENNA, Professional Staff Member 

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

SASHA ROGERS, Research Assistant 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

ERYN ROBINSON, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, February 26, 2008, Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations: 

Approaches to Interagency Integration .............................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, February 26, 2008 ................................................................................... 37 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 

IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: APPROACHES 

TO INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 3 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism 

and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ......................... 2 

Snyder, Hon. Vic, Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight and 

Investigations Subcommittee .............................................................................. 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ............. 2 

WITNESSES 

Davenport, Rear Adm. Dan, U.S. Navy, Director, Joint Concept Development 

and Experimentation Directorate (J–9), U.S. Joint Forces Command ............ 19 

Herbst, Ambassador John, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 5 

Holmes, Brig. Gen. Robert H., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director of Operations, 

U.S. Central Command ........................................................................................ 21 

Kearney, Lt. Gen. Frank, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .................................................................................................. 22 

Osborne, Col. Joseph E., U.S. Army, Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate 

(J–10), U.S. Special Operations Command ........................................................ 24 

Vickers, Michael, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low 

Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 45 

Davenport, Rear Adm. Dan ............................................................................. 61 

Herbst, Ambassador John ................................................................................ 54 

Holmes, Brig. Gen. Robert H. .......................................................................... 72 

Osborne, Col. Joseph E. ................................................................................... 79 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 44 

Snyder, Hon. Vic ............................................................................................... 41 

Page

IV 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac ...................................................................................... 47 

Vickers, Michael ............................................................................................... 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mrs. Davis of California ................................................................................... 103 

Mrs. Drake ........................................................................................................ 104 

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 100 

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 91 

(1) 

IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: 

APPROACHES TO INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUB- COMMITTEE, MEETING JOINTLY WITH TERRORISM AND

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUB- COMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 26, 

2008. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. 

As you know, this is a joint hearing that we are having this 

afternoon between the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of which I am the subcommittee Chair and Mr. Akin is the 

ranking member and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities of which Mr. Adam Smith is the 

chairman and Mr. Thornberry is the ranking. 

If you have any curiosity about why I am sitting here and Mr. 

Smith is sitting there, it is because, at some point about 12 years 

ago, there was a flip of the coin that determined I had overwhelmingly more senior status compared to him, even though the election 

was the same exact date. But, actually, it is because he is in the 

West Coast time zone, and the election in Arkansas closed in 1996 

slightly before the one in Washington State. 

You know, we have a big Presidential campaign going on right 

now, and all of us have followed this with some interest. I have not 

heard the phrases ‘‘Joint Interagency Coordination Group,’’ ‘‘Effects 

Synchronization Committee,’’ or ‘‘Irregular Warfare Fusion Center’’ 

come up at any of the debates or any of the speeches of any of our 

candidates, and yet we are all here today because we think this 

stuff is pretty important. We think it has a lot to do on some of 

the good things that have happened in our national security in the 

past and some of the better things we hope to happen in the future 

as we get better and better at these interagency relationships, and 

I, frankly, think we have quite a ways to go. So that is why we are 

here today. 

And we wanted to welcome you, and I think that is all I will say 

at this point, other than I want to give you fair warning we do 

have votes coming up probably in the 3:00–3:30 range. I would encourage all our witnesses to summarize your opening statements. 

2 

You need to tell us whatever you think you need to tell us, but I 

would err on the side of brevity, and I personally also would appreciate it if you avoided acronyms. There was a fairly impressive display of acronyms in the written statements. I considered putting up 

a jar that you would have to throw a dollar in the pot every time 

you used an acronym. Now this is risky for some of you because 

I suspect some of you have an acronym that you do not know what 

it stands for, but that will be fun, too. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

So Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Snyder. 

I agree with all the statements of Mr. Snyder and will be brief 

myself in respect to time and look forward to hearing from our witnesses and hearing the interaction. 

Obviously, these issues are very important. I have spoken to Mr. 

Vickers about it before. We are very interested in this committee 

on counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and what we can do to get 

better at it, and I guess the one piece that I am interested in most 

is the interagency cooperation piece, which is why, of course, we 

have the State Department and the Defense Department here, but 

there are many other agencies as well who have a piece of this. 

And I think one of the challenges in getting this right is figuring 

out what all of those pieces are and bringing them together, and 

the model that is, you know, stuck in my mind is what they have 

done over at Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) on the direct action piece. They do briefings, and they have everybody under 

the sun from all over the world from a whole bunch of different 

agencies. They get together—I think they get together once a day— 

to talk about it, so everybody is on the same page, everybody is 

playing, everyone has some idea who the other guys are. 

I think one of the challenges on the low-intensity conflict irregular warfare piece is, first of all, figuring out who those players are 

in the various different places, but then getting them together. So 

I am very interested in your ideas on how we could pull that together because that is my vision, is that we have, you know, that 

sort of hearing every day the same way they do at JSOC on the 

irregular warfare counterinsurgency side. 

So I look forward to the testimony, and I thank Chairman Snyder for doing this joint hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Thornberry. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You also will not hear in the Presidential debates that this is an 

issue that Republicans and Democrats, at least on these two subVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:28 Apr 02, 2009 Jkt 043782 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-118\43782.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
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committees, strongly agree upon, that this is a very important matter with a sense of urgency, and I think all of us, who have talked 

to folks coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan as well as a fair 

number of people within the beltway, share that sense of urgency 

that something has to be done to help this government be more effective at the kinds of things that we are talking about today. 

So I appreciate you all being here and look forward to your statements. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to pretty much echo what the others have said, this is an 

issue—the idea of extending jointness beyond just Department of 

Defense—that is attractive for a couple of different reasons. One, 

the potential for improving how we operate with foreign countries 

is tremendous, and the second is that, unlike most issues that we 

deal with—you have the liberals, conservatives, Republicans, 

Democrats—everybody is interested and has the sense that this is 

a very high payback kind of project to be working on. So just a 

whole lot of interest. 

And if I could submit my opening statement for the record, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Dr. SNYDER. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Any opening statements of committee members will 

be made part of the record. 

Your all’s opening statements, without objection, will be made 

part of the record. 

I also wanted to mention in the spirit of both Mr. Thornberry 

and Mr. Akin that Bill Delahunt, who is one of the subcommittee 

Chairs on Foreign Affairs, is very interested in this topic. He and 

I have talked about doing joint committee hearings on it. Mr. Tierney from the Government Reform and Oversight Committee—he is 

one of the subcommittee Chairs there—he is also very interested 

in this topic and would have been here today but for a conflict. And 

Sam Farr from the Appropriations Committee is very interested in 

this topic and has attended several of our hearings here. 

That is by way of saying this is of bigger interest than just one 

small or two small subcommittees. I think there is a lot of interest. 

I know Mr. Skelton is very interested in this topic, too. 

With that, Mr. Vickers, we are going to put on the five-minute 

clock. When the red light goes off, you feel free to keep talking if 

you have something to tell us, it is just to give you an idea of 

where your time is at. 

Mr. Vickers. 

4 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL VICKERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY 

CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. VICKERS. Thank you. 

Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Akin, 

Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the subcommittees, I am pleased to be here with you today to discuss the 

Department’s progress in developing capabilities and capacities for 

irregular warfare and stability operations and in integrating these 

capabilities with those of other U.S. Government departments and 

agencies. 

Today and for decades to come, the United States and our international partners must contend with terrorists with global reach, 

with rogue regimes that support terrorists and seek to acquire 

weapons of mass destruction, with threats emerging in and emanating from ungoverned areas and weak or failing states, and with 

new manifestations of ethnic and sectarian and tribal conflict. Most 

importantly, many of these threats emanate from countries with 

which the United States is not at war and thus placing a premium 

on interagency cooperation and integration. The responses to these 

many threats extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or department. 

It is my responsibility as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities to implement the vision provided in the 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) across all of the Department’s warfighting 

capabilities, while providing policy oversight over their employment. 

The QDR importantly established that irregular warfare, with 

stability operations as an important subset, is as strategically important to the United States and the Department of Defense as traditional warfare. As a result, it was incorporated into the Department’s force planning construct, influencing not only the size of our 

force, but the shape of our force and its capabilities as well. 

Irregular warfare includes counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations, although stability operations also can be outside of irregular warfare. Many of the capabilities required to execute these 

missions are resident in some parts of our force, but not with sufficient capacity to meet expected demand. In other cases, we need 

to develop new capabilities to address emerging challenges. 

Rebalancing the overall defense portfolio to ensure that the Joint 

Force is as effective in irregular warfare as it is in traditional warfare requires focused efforts in three areas: growing Special Operations Forces capacity while ensuring continued quality, rebalancing general purpose force capability toward irregular warfare 

while maintaining their capability for a conventional campaign, 

and then promoting increased integration between SOF, Special 

Operations Forces, and our general purpose forces, between the Department of Defense and our interagency partners, and between 

the U.S. Government and our international partners. 

We are exploring several transformational ways to enhance our 

irregular warfare capabilities. Very recently, Deputy Secretary of 

5 

Defense Gordon England initiated a departmentwide review of the 

capabilities required to train, advise, and assist foreign security 

forces. The results from this study will soon be reflected in the Department’s strategic planning and resource priorities. 

The Department’s strategic plan will direct further examination 

of irregular warfare capabilities across a wide range of scenarios, 

and it will identify areas where we can accept some risk to increase 

investment in areas where we are less proficient, including irregular warfare. We are in the early stages of developing a Department of Defense (DOD) directive that takes a comprehensive view 

of irregular warfare concepts and requirements, and we believe this 

approach will facilitate more efficient use of our resources. 

We strongly support interagency planning efforts in irregular 

warfare ranging from the Counterterrorism Center to the Interagency Management System, and we have made significant 

progress across the interagency. 

In a separate venue, I would be happy to provide additional detail regarding the progress we have seen in our partnerships with 

the intelligence community. 

DOD strongly supports the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, a $249 million program in the State Department’s fiscal year 2009 

budget request, which answers the President’s call to improve the 

United States’ ability to respond to instability in conflict. 

In sum, the Department recognizes that winning the war on terror requires synergistic effort from the entire U.S. Government 

working by, with, and through our international partners. With 

your continued support, we will continue to exercise the agility 

needed to strengthen these partnerships in ways that preserve and 

protect the values and interests of our Nation. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vickers can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Vickers. 

Mr. Herbst. Ambassador Herbst. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN HERBST, COORDINATOR 

FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador HERBST. Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking Members Akin and Thornberry, distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

As Secretary Vickers pointed out, we face unusual dangers today 

in the world from failed states. These unusual dangers require a 

new response, a response which takes count of all the assets of the 

U.S. Government and, for that matter, of U.S. society. 

The steps to successfully meet this challenge require doing something that is done by the military, which is building the necessary 

human capacity to develop planning and management systems, to 

train experts with the necessary skills in the situations they are 

likely encounter, and to repeatedly exercise with partners until our 

people are ready. 

At the center of this preparation is the effort to strengthen the 

partnership within the United States Government between civilians and the military, so that as new threats evolve and possibly 

6 

rise to the level of military engagement, we have relationships that 

will serve our Nation effectively. 

My office operates under National Security Presidential Directive 

44, which calls on both civilian and military elements of the federal 

government to promote our national security through improved coordination, planning, and implementation. Our job is to support the 

Secretary of State in her lead role in integrating U.S. efforts to prepare for, plan, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities. A core part of this job is harmonizing civilian and military efforts so that civilians are planning and working with the military 

before the start of any operation. 

Over the last year, we have been working together across 15 civilian and military agencies to significantly improve the management of U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization operations. This unprecedented process has brought together a tremendous range of experts to determine the civilian capacity of the U.S. 

Government, what it needs in stabilization operations. It has required an extraordinary commitment to staff and has required expertise that has also benefited from the impressive support from 

Members of Congress, outside experts, including the academic community. 

The examination has identified three required levels of 

deployable civilian efforts for use in failed states: an Active Response Corps of up to 250 first responders from civilian federal 

agencies. This Active Response Corps will be comprised of people 

who are able to deploy within 48 to 72 hours of a decision. They 

would be able to deploy with the 82nd Airborne, if that was considered necessary. 

Backing them up will be a Standby Response Corps of over 2,000 

government officials who have full-time day jobs, but who train 

several weeks a year and who will be able to deploy within 45 to 

60 days of a decision. We should be able to deploy anywhere from 

200 to 500 of the Standby Response Corps in a crisis. 

Backing them up will be a Civilian Reserve Corps, modeled after 

our military reserve system, comprised of private citizens from 

across the country who would sign up for four years, who would 

train for several weeks a year, and who would deploy for up to one 

year in that four-year period. We are talking about having 2,000 

people in the Civilian Reserve Corps of whom we could deploy up 

to 25 percent at any one time. 

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative would create these three 

corps of people. It was embraced by the President and presented 

to the Congress in the fiscal year 2009 budget. The cost for this is 

$248.6 million. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative, as outlined in 

the President’s budget request, will provide a full complement of 

U.S. civilian personnel that can respond quickly and flexibly to stabilization challenges. It provides for new positions within the U.S. 

State Department, the Agency for International Development 

(AID), and other partner agencies devoted to increasing civilian reconstruction and stabilization expertise. 

This initiative is a critical first step to ensure that we have the 

right people with the right skills ready to deploy quickly. However, 

making sure that these experts are doing the right things on the 

ground according to one strategic plan, with full synchronization 

7 

between military and civilian operations, continues to be the most 

complex and challenging task under National Presidential Security 

Directive 44. In response to the challenge, we have created the 

Interagency Management System. This system fully links efforts of 

the State Department, the other civilian agencies, and the Department of Defense to ensure a single plan of operations in a stabilization crisis. 

We have already been partnering with our other civilian agencies 

and the military and, for that matter, with international partners 

to test the Interagency Management System. We have worked out 

planning systems and potential challenges in the training and exercise environment so we will be ready to respond effectively when 

the next crisis occurs. 

There is no question that failed states represent a premier, if not 

the premier, security challenge of the next generation. Building a 

U.S. civilian planning and response capability as embodied in the 

Civilian Stabilization Initiative will ensure that we are able to 

partner with the military, providing the necessary skills to deal 

with our national security challenges. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Herbst can be found in 

the Appendix on page 54.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, we were wrong in our estimation of our 

times. The beepers went off. There will be a series of votes. We are 

going to try to get in a question or two or three. I am going to ask 

one question and go to—who is next then? Mr. Smith? 

I wanted to ask, in your written statement, Ambassador Herbst, 

on page three, you state, ‘‘Just as the military underwent tremendous reform in the 1980’s following the passage of the GoldwaterNichols Act, we are proposing shifts across our civilian agencies 

that will bring all elements of national power to bear in the defense 

of America’s vital interests.’’ 

A lot of us have talked about the Goldwater-Nichols, I guess, 

more as a metaphor or example of proposed change. What do you 

see that is on the scene right now that rises to the level of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act in terms of what is going on? I 

mean, I do not see that level. I do not see that level of mandate, 

that level of incentive in personal policies, that level of transparency, that level of drive from the highest levels of government, 

but what do you see that compares what you all are doing right 

now to that level of mandate? 

Ambassador HERBST. I think that the Interagency Management 

System under National Security Presidential Directive 44 is roughly analogous to Goldwater-Nichols. This National Security Presidential Directive and our agreement as we implement it have established interagency coordination which did not exist in the past. 

We will have an Assistant Secretary level group called the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group overseeing policy. 

Every civilian agency which has assets to bear in a stabilization 

crisis will sit on this policy group. Under this group, there will be 

a secretariat which will write a plan of stabilization operations. 

If the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is approved, if it is funded, 

we will create standing bodies of 250 Active Response Corps members who will sit in all civilian agencies, who will train extensively 

8 

as a team, who will be represented in my office which will function 

as an interagency office, to produce an interagency plan with interagency teams to deal with the crisis of stabilization operations. 

This will give us an effective interagency tool using each asset 

of the interagency linked up entirely with our military to deal with 

stabilization crises. 

Now there are some things that could still be done. The Interagency Management System has to be utilized. We have to adjust 

not just training procedures—that is underway—but also employment practices. But these are things which are right now being 

considered for addition in, for example, the State Department’s personnel system to insist that people get involved in interagency activities, to make that part of the standards for advancement in the 

Foreign Service. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Smith for five minutes for questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I will try to be quick. 

Just sort of following up on what Dr. Snyder said, I think our 

real concern on—certainly on my subcommittee that Mr. Thornberry and I have talked about and I think Dr. Snyder shares that 

concern as well—is the level of commitment to these types of 

changes, and there are, you know, a lot of things we are worried 

about that have not happened. 

I mean, you look at the Defense Department budget, you know, 

post-9/11, it has gone up. You can look at that, and you see everything that has happened post-9/11 and really get a good gauge of 

our commitment to sort of the shooting side of the war, if you will. 

On this side of it, on the counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, 

you know, development aid has not really gone up. The United 

States Information Agency has been, you know, gotten rid of, not 

really focused on very much. USAID declassified within the State 

Department. None of that has been replaced. The budgets across 

the board for you at State anywhere have not gone up. 

And the other question is—when you look at what you are talking about putting together here, the question of sort of who is running it—you know, back to my JSOC analogy, without getting too 

much into that because a lot of it is classified, I know who is in 

charge of that, and you can look at that and you can see how they 

have structured it to make sure it gets done. 

On this side of it, it seems like, number one, we were painfully 

slow to react. We were into 2006 and 2007 before we started doing 

some of these things, and even now there is a lot of activity, but 

there is not a lot more money. So where are we pumping the 

money in? How are we, you know, raising the focus, getting someone who is in charge, really making those shifts? 

And I ask that as a friendly question because we on this committee want to help. You know, we want to help direct money. We 

want to help place greater emphasis there. We just want to get sort 

of a feeling on the Administration side, what are they truly doing 

to bring this about, if there are not those changes that I have just 

talked about in some of the key areas, particularly when you talk 

about the bottom line, money, getting the money in to really beef 

these things up. 

Ambassador HERBST. Mr. Chairman, I think that there is no 

question that the fiscal year 2009 budget presented by the AdminVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:28 Apr 02, 2009 Jkt 043782 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-118\43782.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
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istration reflects the same concerns that you have just expressed. 

It reflects the recognition that to enhance our national security, we 

have to beef up not just the personnel and the budget at the State 

Department and USAID, but also create this fast response capability, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, for which I am responsible. 

Now, given your concerns, I would hope that there would be support for the budget request we have put forward, but we understand that the budget is an important part—but not the only 

part—of it. To deal with the type of crises that we are facing and 

are going to face for the next generation or two, we need to have 

the interoperability within the U.S. Government on the civilian 

side which we have not seen in the past. 

A very smart guy in my office posted a sign on his door quoting 

Machiavelli saying, ‘‘There is nothing more difficult than to create 

a new system in government.’’ I can appreciate the insight of 

Machiavelli, having done this job for the last 20 months, but point 

of fact, we have made a breakthrough in the Administration. 

Over a year ago at an Assistant Secretary level group that I 

chaired in January of 2007, we reached agreement on the civilian 

capabilities we need. We reached agreement on Interagency Management System. And this was then approved at higher levels in 

the Administration. 

What we need now is to get the approval and support of the Congress to do this, and with that, we could have this capability up 

and running within 15 to 18 months, once we have the approval. 

And then we will be able to put these civilians into the field, and 

we will need a vast improvement over how we have been doing 

things to date, although I am certain we will find new problems 

that we will have to fix. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

Dr. SNYDER. We will give Mr. Thornberry a quick bite at the 

apple before we have to run. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Vickers, let me play devil’s advocate for just a second. I 

would argue perhaps that there are elements of irregular warfare 

that are fundamentally incompatible with big bureaucracies. 

You mentioned in your statement strategic communications, for 

example. So, whether you are talking about within the Department 

of Defense or on an interagency basis, if you are not moving in real 

time with communications and making decisions and getting messages out, you are not a player in the game. If you have to run up 

the chain of command and get this approval and that sign-off, you 

are irrelevant to the communications that are going on at that 

point. 

And so the skeptic in me would say adding layers of new coordinating committees is not going to solve this problem. It requires 

deeper change than that. 

Now do you think I am wrong? 

Mr. VICKERS. No, I think you are absolutely right. As a veteran 

of the Central Intelligence Agency, a lot of things that we were able 

to do in the 1980’s depended on just those kinds of shortcuts. 

10 

Strategic communications is probably an area where not just the 

interagency system, but our strategy and, to some extent, our capabilities, but fundamentally our strategic approach has the furthest 

to go, and I will be quite candid about that. 

I think the important point that you were making, which I would 

underscore, is interagency integration is not enough. You really 

need interagency capabilities, and you need appropriate strategies. 

All the integration in the world is not going to work if we do not 

have the right tools to work with, and that is why things like the 

Civilian Stabilization Initiative or—as my own Secretary has said, 

we have done a lot to improve our intelligence since 9/11, we have 

expanded the Department of Defense, we have done correspondingly less in the Department of the State, and we need to shore up 

capabilities in that area. 

And then I agree strategic communications is an area where 

there is much to be done. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, when we come back, you will begin. You 

will get your full five minutes. 

I think we are in for several votes. The staff will work with any 

of you here, both our first and second panel, if you need phones or 

a private room or whatever it is that we can help you with. I apologize for this, but we will be back. 

[Recess.] 

Dr. SNYDER. We appreciate your all’s patience. The House floor 

business is done for the day, so unless lightning strikes, we are in 

good shape here. We appreciate you being here. I know some of you 

have had to move schedules around. 

What we will do is finish with the questions of you, Mr. Vickers 

and Mr. Herbst, and then have you all slide down, bring our other 

witnesses, hear their opening statements, and then go another 

round, and we certainly understand if anybody needs to leave. We 

appreciate your patience. 

Mr. Akin for five minutes. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We were pretty much, as I recall, on the subject of trying to develop this concept of jointness, and I understand, Ambassador, your 

concept that, first of all, if you start where you are all agreeing to 

what the plan is, that that is a very good first step. 

When we looked at jointness some years ago, I am afraid before 

my time even, there were several things that were felt were important. One of them was basically to force people to interoperate so 

you are mixing your management up with people from all sides. 

The first question is: Is that necessary? 

The second question: I have heard it said the State Department 

just the way it is organized as an agency does not fit into this kind 

of concept very well anyway, just because of the structure of the 

way that they think and organize. I do not know if that is excessive 

pessimism or realism. I am not sure. 

And then the third thing would be: As you take a look at putting 

things together on the side of the administration, do you have a 

problem with the fact that—military people, you say, ‘‘Go there’’ or 

‘‘Do that.’’ The State Department people say, ‘‘I do not think I want 

that assignment. I will take something else.’’ How do you deal with 

that question? 

11 

So I think that is just a start. 

Ambassador HERBST. Well, first of all, it is certainly true that in 

order to develop effective civilian interagency operations, we need 

to plan, train, and deploy together, and all of this is envisaged 

under the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Even before we had put 

this initiative forward, we had been planning and training together. There have been various exercises, civilian and civilianmilitary, which have participation from USAID, Treasury, Justice, 

State and so on. This is the future, and we understand that, and 

approval by Congress for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative will 

give us an enormous amount of momentum. 

Regarding the State organization, I am not here to address the 

past. I am here to address what we are doing and what we expect 

to be doing in the future. We understand—the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Secretary of State operating under S/CRS understand—that interoperability, working with our interagency partners, is absolutely essential to meet our national security interests, and that is what we are 

developing, and that is what we intend to do. 

Finally, the notion of assignments and how people get to go to 

the world’s more interesting and less benign places. The force that 

we are developing is meant to be used in all circumstances, including hostile circumstances. The Active Response Corps will be deploying people to places where bullets are flying, perhaps along 

with, at the same time as, our military. 

S/CRS has already pioneered this concept in miniature. I have a 

10-person Active Response Corps, and my folks have been to Lebanon, to Darfur, to Eastern Chad, to Nepal, to Sri Lanka, to Haiti, 

to Kosovo. We have been to the places where the chips are on the 

table. 

And when people sign up for the Active Response Corps, they understand that they will be going at times in harm’s way, this is 

part of the pitch, and if people choose not to go, then there are penalties. The penalties are being fired. Penalties are being forced to 

pay for any training that they may have received. So we believe 

that this system will work at putting State Department and other 

civilians into the world’s wild places to our advantage. 

Mr. AKIN. It seems to me to be odd to hear you say it is the same 

team that could go to all those different places. I would think you 

would have people that are sort of both language-wise, but also culturally very attuned to a more specialized block of countries, instead of having somebody that is supposed to speak 100 different 

kinds of languages. Am I missing something? 

Ambassador HERBST. Well, right now, you would say that I have 

a boutique capability. Ten people are interesting, but not much 

more than that. With 10 people, there are limits to what you can 

do. 

But if we create a corps of 250 of the Active Response Corps, and 

then the standby and the Civilian Reserve Corps, first, we will find 

a number of people have many of the languages that we will need. 

Second, but more importantly, we will be training, besides the experts to go out, people who have functional skills that we need, police skills, lawyering skills, engineering skills. 

12 

We will couple them with area experts, with language experts. 

So, when we send a team to Haiti, they will include French, and 

not just French speakers. If we send someone to Afghanistan, they 

will speak Dari as well as having functional skills, and we will be 

training people to operate in different environments. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Saxton for five minutes. 

Mr. SAXTON. First, let me congratulate you on endeavoring to fix 

a problem that, as you have heard us all say, we think is quite important. 

When we went to Iraq, the first few days of the experience were 

quite successful, and then we got into a situation that perhaps 

none of us could have anticipated or did anticipate at least, and 

during that time, it became obvious that there were a number of 

issues in Iraq that needed attention. Perhaps as well-intended as 

we were, we sent a team of folks who did not have all those skills. 

They were trained to do other things, and they did them very well, 

frankly. The Special Operations Command did well. The various divisions that were deployed to Iraq did well in doing what they were 

trained to do. However, they were not trained to stabilize the country. 

I have here a little chart that came from a joint publication from 

Joint Operations on September 17, 2006, and it is a model that depicts various stages of conflict, and we did fine. We seized the initiative, we dominated the military fight, and then we got to the 

stabilization stage and ran into trouble, and so the stabilization 

stage, I think, is what we are endeavoring to fix. 

Congressman Sam Farr has introduced legislation, which I think 

you are familiar with, which, frankly, I am a co-sponsor of, and so 

I think that we owe you a debt of gratitude for endeavoring to put 

together a program to plug a hole that we see in that phase that 

this chart calls stabilization because the real aim for us is to get 

Iraq back up on its feet and other countries that we may be involved in, like Afghanistan, which is also a problem, same kind of 

problem—different issues, same kind of problem. 

So I guess my question is, in a couple of minutes, which is all 

I have left really in my five-minute time, can you just say, in the 

case of Iraq, which you are all intimately and painfully familiar 

with, if your program were in place, how do you visualize it would 

be dealing with stabilization in Iraq in a way that would better enable us to come to Phase 5, which is turning it over to a civilian 

authority, the Iraqis? 

Ambassador HERBST. Well, it is always a little dangerous to address hypotheticals, Mr. Congressman. 

And thank you for your kind remarks. 

But let me just make a few general points. If we had at the time 

of our operation in Iraq the capability that we want to create in 

this Civilian Stabilization Initiative, we would have been able, one, 

through the Interagency Management System to draw up a plan of 

civilian operations that were completely linked with the military 

plans so that from the moment the military engaged, civilians 

would have either been alongside of them or ready to move shortly 

after they had won the military battle. 

13 

We would have a single command-and-control structure for civilian operations overseeing all aspects of civilian activities so they 

would be responsible, for example, for all civilians on the ground, 

the contractors as well as the members of the U.S. Government. 

They would be overseeing those contracts that the contractors are 

performing. There would have been a single address for all civilian 

activities ensuring that there was no duplication of activities and 

no operations at cross-purposes. 

We also would have, if we had in place the people we are asking 

for in the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, been able to put into the 

field, into Iraq, within 60 days of a decision anywhere from 900 to 

1,200 people to man this command-and-control structure. They 

would have been able to begin operations immediately alongside, if 

it seemed prudent at the time, their military partners. 

What that would have done for the outcome is difficult to say, 

but that is what we would have had, and this is the capability that 

we are offering you or asking for your support to help us build, and 

I do not have any doubt this will make our future endeavors, if we 

find ourselves in similar situations, more successful. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, if I could have just one follow up? 

You have talked a lot about partnerships, and I think that is a 

good concept. But somebody has to be in charge. Who is in charge 

of the partnerships? 

Ambassador HERBST. Well, the way we have structured this in 

the Interagency Management System, you would have an interagency group at the lower policy level co-chaired by the regional assistant Secretary of State, his or her counterpart at the NSC, and 

the head of my office. 

But point of fact, any serious decisions regarding a major operation would be made at much more senior levels. This group would 

then have responsibility for overseeing the implementation of that, 

and chances are that oversight would fall to my office as an implementer. We would not be running policy. We would be overseeing 

implementation, and you would, therefore, have one-stop shopping 

when it comes to getting questions asked about how implementation is proceeding. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Kline for five minutes. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I just came back from Afghanistan a week ago today, and what 

I heard is being echoed all over this place from tremendous American leaders, military personnel saying, ‘‘We need civilians.’’ We 

need farmers for one thing, people who understand agriculture, understand processing, shipping, marketing, and all those sorts of 

things. So the need is urgent, and the cry is loud, and it is way 

past time to start doing something about it. So I applaud the efforts being made here. 

But I also remember 20 years or so ago when I was still in uniform and we had Goldwater-Nichols, and we decided to do joint and 

be able to operate, have Joint Operations and ‘‘interoperability’’ 

was a big word. Frankly, that was a very painful exercise for those 

of us in uniform. If it had not been for statute, we probably would 

not have done many of those things. It included orders to places 

we had not wanted to go to before, going to schools, making the 

14 

schools joint, all sorts of things, getting to be Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) and all of that. 

One of those things, clearly, that I think has made a difference 

and where the Department of Defense and the military services 

have been able to do as well as they have in meeting responsibilities besides warfighting, besides shooting has come because of the 

terrific education system that we have. The war colleges, all of 

them, have done a fabulous job. There has even been sort of token 

representation from some people in civilian attire, very small numbers, but we are always glad to have them there, and with some 

of the faculty, you have some expertise in areas besides the uniformed services. 

My point is I think that has been an important part of the interoperability and the success that the uniformed military is having, 

and if we are going to have this sort of success in this interagency 

operation, I just wonder are there discussions between the departments, within the departments, within State, within other agencies 

about such an education system that would bring others up to that 

same level of understanding, either one or both of you? 

Ambassador HERBST. There is no question that one of the reasons why the Pentagon produces outstanding leaders is that they 

have the personnel that can take time off from doing jobs to go into 

training, and they have excellent courses at the war colleges. 

Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. If I can interrupt for just a minute, I 

would just throw out here that during those early days, particularly in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, there were members of the 

services—I would just pick on the Navy in particular—who said, 

‘‘We do not have time to do that. We cannot take time off from our 

regular job. We have to run ships, and we have to do other things.’’ 

So I do not know if I am detecting a resistance, ‘‘We do not have 

the time to do that,’’ in civilian attire, but I will just tell you that 

the military services felt like they did not have time to do it either. 

So I am sorry. Back to you. 

Ambassador HERBST. You detected something that was not there. 

Mr. KLINE. Oh, good. I am glad to hear it. 

Ambassador HERBST. The point that I started to make was that 

the Pentagon is sufficiently staffed with people so that they can 

take time off from their jobs and go to the war colleges, and they 

have someone else to do their jobs while they are away, and, in 

fact, going to the war college is an important part of their professional advancement, something they have to do in order to rise in 

the ranks. 

Mr. KLINE. Exactly. 

Ambassador HERBST. In the State Department, we do not have 

the number of people we need in order to take that time off, and, 

in fact, that is one of the reasons why in this year’s budget request 

we have asked for an increase in State Department personnel to 

give them time so that they could take time off to do the war college and, for that matter, to do language training. 

By the way, this is not my area of responsibility, but I happen 

to know a little bit about it. 

So we get the concept. We need the resources in order to do it 

the right way. That is point one. 

15 

Point two: In the little area that I am responsible for, we get the 

notion that training is critical. It is critical in part but not only because we are teaching skills which people who join the State Department have not necessarily acquired before they signed up. 

But one thing my office does well by State Department standards 

is planning. We still have a way to go to match our military planners, but we are getting stronger by the week. That is a skill that 

we are teaching our fellow officers at State. We have created training courses which include planning, which include interoperability 

with other agencies, including with the military, and anyone who 

signs up to work at my office takes those courses. For that matter, 

some staff members in Congress have taken those courses—they 

can vouch for their utility—as have many soldiers—people going off 

to Iraq and Afghanistan have taken them and have welcomed these 

courses—as have foreigners, part of our reach-out. 

The point is we get this. We get this. 

In order to do it right, though, we will need more resources. The 

Civilian Stabilization Initiative includes several million dollars—I 

can give you the exact figure, but I do not have it off the top of 

my head—for training. If we approve the initiative, we are going 

to need to train within a few months 44,250 people. 

We will do that by using the Foreign Service Institute, by using 

our friends in the military, the Army War College, Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM), and so on in order to give these thousands of 

people the necessary training they need to be able to go into a difficult unstable environment. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. KLINE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. We will go to Mr. Hayes and then to Mrs. Davis and 

then to Mrs. Gillibrand. 

Mr. Hayes for five minutes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Vickers, I enjoyed being with you Friday. 

What guidance has been given to the combatant commanders on 

pinpointing and prioritizing our stabilizing stability operations and 

what sort of list has the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

developed that relates to these priorities? 

Mr. VICKERS. Well, we started in this area in 2005 with DOD Directive 3000–05, which is military support for stability, security, reconstruction, operations, and then the Quadrennial Defense Review 

provided additional strategic guidance. That guidance in turn has 

been implemented in an irregular warfare road map and most recently in the department’s strategic plan in the guidance for the development of the force, which lays out investment priorities for fiscal years 2010 through 2015 and then looks out 15 years beyond 

that. 

The combatant commands, as part of this process, sent in their 

integrated priority lists for capability shortfalls, a number of which 

now reflect stability operations or irregular warfare capabilities, 

with Central Command (CENTCOM) being the prime example of 

that since they have the most business right now. But all the combatant commands basically are stepping up in this area. 

16 

One final point, to shape our capabilities in this area, we are 

completely revamping our defense planning scenarios. Three years 

ago—this gets into a classified area, but I will talk about it in general terms—we had three scenarios. None of them involved irregular warfare or stability operations. 

We are developing a family now, I believe, of about 15 of them. 

They span homeland defense to irregular war and stability ops to 

a broader range. There are probably six or seven or so that deal 

with irregular warfare and stability ops that then ought to shape 

the future military and, of course, how we interact with our interagency international partners. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, sir. That was not quite as specific as I 

wanted to get, but—— 

Ambassador Herbst, have you talked to your folks in the field 

about the critical importance of interagency communications and 

how vital that is to the process and how that is being improved? 

Can you comment on that? 

Ambassador HERBST. Certainly it is critical. We understand it. 

Before the 82nd Airborne deployed to Afghanistan last year to take 

control of American operations in Afghanistan as opposed to NATO 

operations, we were asked by the commander to send a team out 

to improve communications among his staff, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and our embassies, and we did that. 

The Interagency Management System calls for use of something 

called an integration planning cell, which would be deployed to the 

regional combatant commander in an operation led by American 

troops, by that regional combatant commander where there are 

also civilian operations, to ensure that civilian and military operations are completely linked up. 

So we understand that this is critical, and we have built this into 

our operations. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

Perhaps this actually just follows, Mr. Ambassador, on what you 

said and particularly the emphasis on planning, training, and deploying together. 

We happened to be at Camp Lejeune yesterday, and they spoke 

of the training that the Marines will be getting before they deploy 

to Afghanistan, and I think it is the bulk of the Marines who will 

be going. I understand that Fort Bragg is perhaps doing some 

interagency work. 

When I asked the general what is going to be different about 

their training, he spoke about the cultural training and he spoke 

about the linguistic training. He did not mention, but perhaps it is 

there, that there would be this kind of interagency coordination 

going on, and if you talk to anybody who has been out in the field 

with PRTs, they will say how valuable it would have been had they 

been able to plan and train together. 

Are you working on this with the training of the Marines at 

Camp Lejeune specifically? 

Ambassador HERBST. Okay. We understand the importance of 

this. We have engaged in training at Fort Bragg. We and USAID 

17 

have engaged along with the military at Fort Bragg, but we have 

not been engaged at Camp Lejeune. It is something we will look 

into, and if we can make a contribution, we would be happy to. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I hope you would consider that because—— 

Ambassador HERBST. Okay. I will definitely look into it. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. It seems like it works, and into everything that you have been saying, and if there is something that 

Congress can do to be helpful, if there is authority that you need, 

whatever it is, it sounds like you already have it basically because 

you are doing it in other settings. 

Ambassador HERBST. We have the authority right now to help 

with training. I have a staff which can do this, but is actually rather small. If the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is approved, our 

staff will grow much larger and we will have the capability to do 

a great deal more. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Great. Thank you. I hope you 

will follow up on that. 

Ambassador HERBST. I will definitely follow up. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I yield back my time. Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Gillibrand for five minutes. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your testimony. 

Ambassador, the fiscal year 2009 budget request supports the recruitment, development, and training of 250 interagency Active Response Corps and about a 2,000-member Standby Response Corps. 

Based on last year’s personnel problems and the Department of 

State requirement to fill jobs in Iraq, do you see this concept as 

viable, given that these individuals will likely to deploy to hostile 

environments? 

Ambassador HERBST. This is concept is extremely viable. The 250 

members of the Active Response Corps will be newly recruited from 

outside the government or maybe from within the government. We 

can create 250 positions, and we will be seeking people who have 

the skills necessary for use in a destabilized country. 

People will be hired: A, with those skills; B, with the understanding that they will be going into dangerous places at times; 

and, C, with the understanding that they will be able to make an 

enormous difference, including for our national security. 

I have done a great deal of public speaking over the past 18 

months, and I can tell you there are a lot of Americans who have 

done well in life in all the skill areas we need who are looking for 

the opportunity to make a contribution and who would be willing 

to do something, which is both very adventurous and maybe a little 

bit dangerous. So I do not have any doubt we will be able to find 

the people to fill these positions. 

The Standby Response Corps will be made up of people who are 

currently in the government. We will need 2,000 of those. That 

will, frankly, be a little bit more difficult than finding 250 among 

the whole American public, but I believe there, too, we have done 

a great deal of work interagency, reaching agreement on those 

numbers. We will be using as part of this corps our Foreign Service 

nationals in the State Department and USAID, people who are actually doing very good work right now in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

18 

and I think we will be able to come up with 2,000 members of this. 

And also we have to find 2,000 members of the Civilian Reserve 

Corps. Drawing upon 300 million Americans, it is eminently doable. 

So there will be some glitches in the system, but the people are 

out there with the skills, with the enthusiasm, with the patriotism. 

This is an eminently doable project. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. But why do you have such confidence because, 

obviously, we have been trying to staff these PRTs for a while, particularly in Afghanistan, and what we have heard from the military 

is that they are largely staffed by military personnel still. In your 

memo that is attached to your testimony, it says, ‘‘This strategy 

works to ensure that the United States is ready to meet the next 

crisis, bringing all necessary expertise to bear.’’ Is it your intention 

that this will actually take time and not be useful for Afghanistan 

or Iraq? 

Ambassador HERBST. If our budget request is approved, say, in 

January of next year, then by May or June of 2010, the capability 

I have described or my testimony describes would be up and running. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. By 2010? 

Ambassador HERBST. It will take us 15 months, 18 months to do 

that. Far be it from me to play prophet. So, if you think that we 

will be in Afghanistan or in Iraq in a major way at that time, we 

will have a capability that could be used for those operations in 

2010. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. And what would your intention be for longterm sustainability of these two new organizations? I mean, is your 

goal to integrate this into both the State Department and military 

portfolio? How would they work together? 

And, obviously, if you are going to be sending these folks to war 

zones, they are going to have to have some kind of protective training, unless you intend to staff all of these teams with military personnel to protect their work? 

Ambassador HERBST. People who sign up for this will certainly 

be trained to operate in hostile environments, and there will need 

to be some form of security for them. They will also be trained to 

operate as an interagency team. It will be under the Secretary of 

State because that is what National Presidential Security Directive 

44 says, but my office already has a sharp interagency flavor, and 

that flavor will only grow, and people will be used to operating as 

an interagency team because that is the only way we can be effective in these environments. 

We will find these folks. It will be a sustainable capability. For 

example, in the Active Response Corps, we believe, we can keep 80 

percent in the field at any one time. Then we will see that 20 percent as people coming in and coming out of the corps. 

The Standby Response Corps is a little bit more difficult to put 

out in the field because these are people who have full-time jobs, 

so we are only counting on right now being able to deploy 10 percent of them at any one time, but we feel we should be able to work 

up to 25 percent, but no more. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. That seems like a relatively small number. For 

example, if we just look at the work that is needed done in Iraq 

19 

and Afghanistan today, that seems very small, and one of the 

things this committee has looked at under the chairmanship of Ike 

Skelton is renewed view of roles and missions and what could we 

be doing to think outside the box about how we grow our military 

to be more effective. 

And one of the discussion points that we have talked about is 

doing exactly what you are doing here, but on a much larger scale 

and actually training National Guard and Reserve to do some of 

these stability missions so that we have an ongoing force that is 

significant to handle not only issues in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, but also in the U.S. if we have a terrorist attack here in 

the U.S., should we have national disasters in the U.S., where you 

actually need the complement of ability and training to do stability 

and reconstruction. 

And so I see this as a wonderful idea, but it sounds like it is 

going to take a very long time to put in place, and it is going to 

be quite small. My concern is it is not enough of what really needs 

to happen to keep America safe. 

Dr. SNYDER. Ambassador Herbst, if I might, why don’t we move 

to the next panel since that time period is up, and I think there 

will be opportunities to amplify on this. 

Ambassador HERBST. So I should or should not answer the question? 

Dr. SNYDER. Let’s not answer that one right now. I think, given 

the late hour, what I would like you to do, Secretary Vickers, Ambassador Herbst, if you can kind of slide on down to your all’s 

right—and I also realize that I had neglected to formally introduce 

you. 

Honorable Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities in the U.S. Department of Defense. 

Ambassador John Herbst, coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, U.S. Department of State. 

You will now be joined by Rear Admiral Dan Davenport, director 

of the joint concept development and experimentation, U.S. Joint 

Forces Command; Brigadier General Robert Holmes, deputy director of operations, U.S. Central Command; Lieutenant General 

Frank Kearney, deputy commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and Colonel Joseph Osborne, director of irregular warfare 

directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command. 

What we will do is have—I think we have three opening statements—you all come on forward to your assigned pew there, if you 

would please. 

It is my understanding that we have three formal statements 

here. As I said before, your written statements will be made part 

of the record. As I said before, feel free to share with us anything 

you think we need to hear. You may want to err on the side of 

brevity. And then we will go to members for questions. 

Admiral Davenport, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. DAN DAVENPORT, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION DIRECTORATE (J–9), U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND 

Admiral DAVENPORT. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon. 

20 

Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Akin, 

Ranking Member Thornberry, and members of the subcommittees, 

on behalf of General Mattis, the commander of the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

My testimony will address the role of Joint Forces Command in 

developing irregular warfare and stability operations concepts and 

doctrine as well as our ongoing efforts to improve interagency integration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

As described in my written testimony, Joint Forces Command is 

actively contributing to the development of concepts, capabilities, 

and doctrine to improve U.S. forces’ ability to conduct irregular 

warfare and stability operations and to integrate those operations 

effectively with interagency and international partners. 

Informed by operational analysis, lessons learned, and best practices from current operations, Joint Forces Command provides solutions and practical tools for the Joint Force commander in the form 

of doctrine, concepts, experimentation, capabilities, exercises, and 

training. These products reflect the evolution and maturation of 

military and interagency thought and practice. 

The intellectual underpinning of Joint Force Command’s 

(JFCOM’s) pursuit of irregular warfare and stability operation solutions and interagency advocacy resides in our joint concept work. 

Developed in coordination with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and services, our Joint Operating Concepts address gaps in 

current capabilities and provide the base for developing solutions 

for the challenges we face in the future operating environment. 

The comprehensive approach to interagency integration is 

foundational to our concept work. JFCOM’s experimentation program examines and validates concepts and capabilities that span 

the range of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, 

planning, and policy activity necessary to provide the Joint Force 

commander and his interagency partners the capabilities required. 

Irregular warfare, stability operations, and interagency integration are major focus areas for JFCOM’s Concept Development Experimentation Portfolio. In fact, the largest and most complex 

projects in my Joint Experimentation Portfolio are focused on these 

important areas. 

Joint Forces Command is committed to provide the concepts, doctrine, and capabilities needed by our Joint Force to integrate effectively with interagency partners in the execution of irregular warfare and stability operations. The continued support of the Congress and these subcommittees for this important work is essential 

to getting this right. 

My written testimony provides a detailed accounting of our efforts, and I ask that it be placed into the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I stand by for questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Davenport can be found in 

the Appendix on page 61.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Holmes. 

21 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. ROBERT H. HOLMES, U.S. AIR 

FORCE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL 

COMMAND 

General HOLMES. Thank you. 

Chairman Snyder and Ranking Member Akin, members, today, 

I will provide a brief description of Central Command’s organizations and activities that partner across the interagency as we plan 

to conduct lines of operation associated with irregular warfare and 

stability operations. 

You have my written testimony, and I ask that it be submitted 

for the record, but if I may take just a few minutes to hit some 

high points from that—— 

In three headquarters organizations—first, the Joint Interagency 

Coordination Group and then the Effects Synchronization Committee and then an emerging Irregular Warfare Fusion Center— 

Central Command fosters horizontal and vertical integration of not 

only our component warfighters’ activities but with other interagency instruments of power. 

Now this includes the kinetic combative effects that you would 

expect with traditional military operations, but very importantly 

goes beyond that, as it includes governance, information, economic 

development, law enforcement, threat finance, as well as societal 

and cultural development, all of the elements of irregular warfare, 

as they are outlined in the Department’s Joint Operating Concept 

for irregular warfare, and I intend to make these injects, these 

lines of operation, as they are described in that, as part of 

CENTCOM’s review to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Vickers and his team as they draft a new irregular warfare directive. 

In all of this, the overarching importance of strategic communications cannot be overstated. In addition to these three organizations 

that I have named, we have three tactical level activities, some of 

which have been mentioned here particularly by Chairman Smith 

earlier. They are classified within our component organizations, 

and I would be glad to discuss those in a classified forum. 

The battlefield lessons of the last five years demonstrate that 

conventional military operations are but a single component in a 

vast array of capabilities that are available to the United States 

Government to defend our national security interests. The threats 

that we face in Central Command, as we see them, present themselves as networks of violent extreme actors which are linked and 

networked beyond CENTCOM’s regional boundaries and authorities, thus making us look to the interagency for solutions. 

These threat networks are agile and adept, utilizing asymmetric 

means to attack our strengths. To counter these threats and asymmetric attacks, we envision, if you will, an effective blue force network to achieve unity of effort and purpose across the entire 

United States interagency and that of our allies, with an aim to 

foster a blue force network, if you will, to prosecute rapid crossfunctional integration across the array of interagency capabilities 

and thus maximize the effects of an irregular warfare campaign. 

The hostile threats that we see went to school in the teachings 

of Tsun Szu and Mao, and it is clear in those teachings that the 

key to learning is hearts and minds. So it is clear to secure this 

22 

terrain, the hearts and minds of the military instrument of power 

in and of itself would not be sufficient. 

We have achieved success in the security line of operation 

against mid- and senior-level al Qaeda, Taliban members, in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but to secure these kinds of gains, we 

must sustain and refine Central Command’s interagency relationships and capabilities. 

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group formed in 2001 as a 

multifunctional advisory and coordinating element works across all 

directorate lines at the headquarters and that of our components 

and with our interagency partners to access capabilities and resources to carry out CENTCOM’s operations and plans. 

The Effects Synchronization Committee is our means to 

operationalize these interagency activities. So we have coordination, but we must operationalize into our planning and campaign 

structure. Recent successes of this committee include executive orders to prosecute action with regard to threat finance, and I can 

go into a number of those, if you would choose, later. 

Other Effects Synchronization Committee actions include the 

criminalization of former regime elements in Iraq and high-valued 

individuals across our theater in operations combating terrorism. 

Additionally, this committee has been able to bring about special 

actions against the violent extreme media outlets. 

So, in conclusion, the interagency collaboration of the past five 

years has matured to a point where we now need to establish an 

Irregular Warfare Fusion Center. It is our next logical step so that 

we can focus our interagency integration to current and future 

needs. This Fusion Center, this Irregular Warfare Fusion Center, 

will, in fact, be an engine room for developing concepts of operation 

for irregular warfare and become a focal point for persistent, coordinated, and synchronized efforts to prosecute irregular warfare, 

but more importantly to identify the measures of effectiveness so 

that we can gauge our success. 

In all of this, we energetically support ASD Vickers in developing 

a new policy for the department in irregular warfare. 

Thank you for this opportunity today to share these views. 

[The prepared statement of General Holmes can be found in the 

Appendix on page 72.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Holmes. 

General Kearney. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK KEARNEY, U.S. ARMY, 

DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General KEARNEY. Chairman Snyder, Chairman Smith, Representative Akin, and distinguished members of the committee, 

thanks for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) role in irregular warfare as well as interagency coordination and strategic communications. 

USSOCOM’s mission, as you well know, is to provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its 

interests and to synchronize the Department of Defense operations 

against terrorist networks. Our implementation of a global synchronization process is a continuous systematic program that fuses 

23 

the efforts of the combatant commanders, the Department of Defense, the interagency, and our key allies. 

We have established a standing interagency task force with 

USSOCOM members and representatives of 12 interagency partners, linking knowledge with decision makers. Many recognize that 

the ongoing struggle against extreme terrorist organizations cannot 

be won strictly through military means. Our Nation’s success is dependent on the efforts of the interagency team. 

Today’s threat is complex and patient. To overcome our enemies, 

we pursue two mutually supporting and often intertwined approaches: direct and indirect. These approaches integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations 

while positively impacting the environment in which they operate. 

The indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. 

The indirect approach requires more time to achieve effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort. This is where irregular warfare 

actions become crucial. 

Irregular warfare encompasses many of the activities normally 

associated with those found at the low end of the warfare spectrum. It requires getting out and influencing people by engagement 

and building relations. It is both offensive and defensive in nature. 

It necessitates a whole-of-government awareness that everyone is 

a participant, that no one is a spectator. That type of strategic engagement is protracted and must be conducted using regional and 

global campaigns designed to subvert, disrupt, attrit, and exhaust 

an adversary and prevent instability from occurring. 

While opportunities to push critical United States Government 

messages abound, many challenges make these efforts more difficult than they initially appear. Additionally, the network asymmetric enemy we face transcends geographical boundaries so commonly used by the U.S. Government to assign communication responsibilities and deconflict the same. 

Effective strategic communications represents a defining characteristic in the direct approach that is critical to irregular warfare. 

Deeds in synchronization with words are at the core of this approach. This is the mindset that has historically allowed Special 

Operations Forces to gain access, build relationships, foster influence, and legitimize our partners by us being true partners. 

This is also the same mindset that is taking hold in the rest of 

the Department of Defense. Indirect activities, such as foreign 

counterpart training, civil military operations, information distribution, infrastructure development, and the establishment of medical, 

dental, and veterinary clinics, are now commonplace in our conventional forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The need for a unified U.S. Government message which is synchronized across the enterprise is clear. The role of the Department 

of State as the lead strategic communicator with DOD support is 

clear. Despite the absence of any compelling structure for integration, there is positive movement in this direction. 

I thank the distinguished members of the committee for your role 

in helping us achieve continued success and enabling us to protect 

our Nation, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you 

today. 

24 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General. 

Is Colonel Osborne going to make a statement or—— 

STATEMENT OF COL. JOSEPH E. OSBORNE, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR, IRREGULAR WARFARE DIRECTORATE (J–10), U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Colonel OSBORNE. Chairman Smith, Chairman Snyder, Ranking 

Member Akin, distinguished members of the committees, I am honored to be here today to report to you on the continuing efforts of 

the U.S. Special Operations Command to move the irregular warfare concept to a full-scale capability for our command, the department, and our Nation. 

I have submitted a statement for the record, but I would like to 

forego reading the bulk of that to the committees and instead provide some brief opening remarks on the broader context of irregular warfare. 

For USSOCOM, irregular warfare is deeply ingrained in our history, culture, and collective experience. For this reason, we assumed the leading role in the development and publication of the 

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept following the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review. Key in understanding this concept is 

the recognition that the center of gravity has shifted from targeting 

an adversary’s military forces or government to influencing populations. While the term ‘‘winning hearts and minds’’ seems trite, in 

the case of irregular warfare, it is not far off the mark. 

In order to maintain the momentum in irregular warfare planning and policy development, the commander of USSOCOM, Admiral Eric Olson, established an irregular warfare directorate designated at the J–10 in June, 2007. We reached our initial operating 

capability in October of last year, and we continue to expand our 

capabilities. We work closely with and through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities to support DOD’s efforts to develop and integrate the concepts, capabilities, and capacity necessary to wage protracted irregular warfare on a global 

scale. 

I would like to thank the distinguished members of the subcommittees for the opportunity to be with you here today and discuss this very important topic. This concludes my remarks. I am 

prepared to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Osborne can be found in the 

Appendix on page 79.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

I will now ask questions under our five-minute rule. 

I think I will take it off specifically the written statement that 

you, General Kearney and Colonel Osborne, provided in which you 

state—I am reading on page six—‘‘Much of the cooperation is initially based on personal relationships,’’ and then it goes on to say, 

‘‘In short, our success in interagency integration requires constant 

monitoring and attention.’’ 

My question is, if I am a combatant commander today and I decide that I need a brigade combat team with a full complement of 

skills, not just military, but all the kind of necessary civilian expertise that we have been talking about here today, what structure is 

25 

in place today to ensure that when that brigade combat team arrives, the civilian personnel are there, that I, in fact, have the skill 

sets that I think are required? And then I would like you to contrast that today with what you think it ought to be and any comments that any of you have about that. 

General KEARNEY. Thank you for the question, Chairman Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. My point of that is if I am the combatant commander and I decide I need something, I do not have time to develop personal relationships. We need a structure that ensures that 

I have the skill sets I need. 

Go ahead. 

General KEARNEY. Right. The structure in the brigade combat 

team, as you well know, does not have those additional adjunct capabilities that are required. The combatant commander would then 

go back through the Secretary of Defense, and he would ask for 

those capabilities from our interagency partners and identify the 

skill sets and the capability gaps that he needs to work those. 

If the situation was a crisis situation, we would take the assistance that we have, we would work with the country team that is 

there, and we would begin to move forward based on what relationships the combatant command has and has historically executed. If 

we have time to train—and we have become very, very effective in 

this in our pretraining operations to bring a unit forward—we normally bring them in at our pre-readiness exercise before deploying, 

and we can do that. But there is not currently a structure that 

partners interagency folks with U.S. brigade combat teams in order 

to rapidly give you that fused team that we do through relationships now. 

Now, in many of our commands, we have had a long-term historical relationship with interagency partners. In particular in some 

of our Special Operations organizations, and the history that we 

have today with seven years of combat, we have begun to build 

those relationships. So very much so folks know who to go and ask 

for by name that they have worked with over time. 

I think that General McCrystal would tell you from Task Force 

714 that one of his major efforts underway is to professionalize the 

force, and that is exactly what he is trying to do, is build those 

long-term relationships through habitual assignments. 

Dr. SNYDER. My follow up would be going back to when I cut off 

Mrs. Gillibrand in discussion with Ambassador Herbst, and Ambassador Herbst and I have had this discussion at previous hearings. 

The structural changes that you all are talking about are for future 

crises, and you are not satisfied. You just went through a series of 

things. We will begin moving forward. Well, you know, we have already gone through that, and we had a very unhappy Secretary 

Gates testifying here, sitting right there, about how dissatisfied he 

was with the responsiveness of the current system. 

This is like five years after we were in Afghanistan. So we do not 

have a system. We are not talking about something for future conflict, when we have been at least in Afghanistan since 2001. So you 

are not satisfied with what you describe? Is that a fair statement? 

General KEARNEY. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. 

26 

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Vickers, Ambassador Herbst, do you have 

any comments on the issue? I am talking about the person on the 

ground who thinks they needs skill sets and what system do we 

have today versus what we think we ought to have for getting 

them. 

Mr. VICKERS. We have a ways to go, Chairman Snyder. We are 

making some steps. For instance, we have shifted our civil affairs, 

which is military analog in terms of capabilities, of some of the civilian capabilities we need to build in other government departments and agencies. We are partnering one reserve civil affairs brigade with each BCT, brigade combat team, and the Marine Corps 

and Navy are expanding their civil affairs capabilities as well. 

As you know, in Afghanistan, on an ad hoc basis, we now have 

embedded PRTs with the BCTs as well, forming relationships, but 

we need to institutionalize these capabilities and develop more habitual relationships, as Ambassador Herbst’s capabilities come on 

stream. 

Dr. SNYDER. Ambassador Herbst, I do not have much time. If you 

would err on the side of brevity here, but respond to me and to 

Mrs. Gillibrand’s comments before. 

Ambassador HERBST. Respond to you? 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. And Mrs. Gillibrand was on the same thing 

about future. 

Ambassador HERBST. The point is very simple. Our office would 

not exist if we did not realize there were inadequacies in the way 

we are responding, and we represent a way to solve the problems 

we have been identifying. 

Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Smith for five minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually think I have 

probably more than five minutes worth of questions and answers, 

but I will live with the five minutes and I may have a follow up 

at the end if we do not have too many members here. 

I think from what we have heard from all of you, the Joint Operating Concept and Directive 44 and what is going on with that, 

sounds promising, but seems more of a crisis response setup, and 

it seems sort of focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. You know, we 

were not ready when we had to go in there and do that. You know, 

how can we get ready for those two and be ready for the next one? 

I think that is fine. I think it is definitely something that we will 

need to beef up as many members and all of you have pointed out 

as well in terms of resources and so forth. 

But what I am really looking for is a more comprehensive strategy that does not wait for the crisis, and I would recommend to you 

something the Brookings Institution put out this morning. We did 

a little conference on the release of the report on failed states, 

which is an incredibly comprehensive analysis of, I think, over 100 

countries and their various level of failure in four different areas— 

economic, political, security, and also social welfare—that gives sort 

of a blueprint of where our problems might crop up and how we 

might get in front of them. 

And if you can dovetail that over, you know, where is al Qaeda 

operating, where are they spreading their message, then that feeds 

back into the strategic communications piece of, you know, how are 

27 

we countering that message, what is the message, how are we 

countering it. That, I think, is the kind of comprehensive approach 

we need. 

I mean, once you get to the state where you are at in Iraq and 

Afghanistan—it has to be done, no question. We have to dive in 

there and work at it—I think you would all agree, having been 

there, it gets real difficult, you know, once the existing structure 

has been blown up and conflict reaches that level. 

And we have to do it, but if we do it in a more preventative manner, I think we can be far, far more successful, and toward that 

end, I guess the first question I have is—there are a lot of resources involved in that sort of development effort, and I am wondering about the possibility of leveraging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public-private partnerships. I have talked to 

some of you about this before. 

Obviously, on the strategic communications piece, you know, we 

have to do that with the government. We cannot be envisioning 

some NGO that we try to enlist as our propaganda tool. That would 

undermine their mission. It would not successfully deliver ours. 

But if you are looking at a failed state, if you are looking at the 

type of reconstruction we are talking about—and there are organizations out there that are building schools, that are providing 

health care—leveraging those dollars would make an enormous 

amount of sense. Now that is difficult in Afghanistan and Iraq because a lot of those people have been, you know, kidnapped or 

killed and they have been a little discouraged. It is going on, certainty in Afghanistan, less so in Iraq. 

I am curious what your experiences have been in those two 

places and what you might think about better leveraging those. 

And, Mr. Vickers, I do not know if you want to start out and then 

anyone else who wants to dive in. 

Mr. VICKERS. To the general point about strategy, you are absolutely right that the way we believe we will win the war on terror 

is through steady-state continuous operations that prevent crises 

from developing by shoring up our partners, through a full range 

of national instruments, rather than responding to acute crises 

when they develop. 

Now we need to have these response capabilities, no question, 

but we believe most of our successes around the world will come 

from prevention and, accordingly, we are shifting resources in the 

Department from responsive capabilities to more proactive, and 

that cuts across irregular warfare and stability operations, from 

counterterrorism to train, advise, and assist versus large-scale 

counterinsurgency, a number of efforts I could go into in more detail. 

But you are absolutely right about the strategic comparative of 

doing so. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Does somebody else wish to take a crack at it, jump in? 

General KEARNEY. Chairman Smith, one comment: We work 

right now at SOCOM in a nascent relationship with the business 

executives for national security who have actually come to us and 

talked to us, a wide group of businessmen that have interests in 

the security of the United States, but would like to take their acVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:28 Apr 02, 2009 Jkt 043782 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-118\43782.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
28 

cess and their abilities for many reasons, not just as good patriots, 

but also because there is a market, there is opportunity out there 

for them, and so we are bringing them in and taking a look inside 

of SOCOM now at how we can work with that group in particular 

and then others like it to help them come in and help us do our 

job better. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. 

General HOLMES. Chairman Smith, if I may just for a moment, 

as we look forward into the future and work past Iraq, past Afghanistan, in Central Command, we are seeing the need for a comprehensive theater campaign across the framework of Theater Security Cooperation that uses the interagency. One thing that we 

are doing with our Effects Synchronization Process is to bring those 

irregular elements, non-traditional elements, of the instruments of 

power into our traditional planning process to do just that for the 

long haul. 

Mr. SMITH. And I will follow up just quickly and sneak my last 

question in here. It is a more specific question. It follows up a little 

bit on this, and this has to do with the deployment of the Special 

Ops Forces, and I am interested in Mr. Vickers’ standpoint and 

also General Kearney’s, and that is the idea of forward deployed 

versus being deployed back closer to home. 

Now, obviously, there are several levels to this, and the biggest 

point here is most of the SOCOM guys I talk to, you know, they 

want to be closer to the populations they are trying to work with 

because they are a key piece of the irregular warfare that we are 

talking about here, work that is going on in the Philippines and Africa and a bunch of other places that are developing relationships 

with the population. 

Now, obviously, this means more than just, you know, where 

they are currently deployed overseas, which are not necessarily the 

hotspots. What are your thoughts in terms of the forward deployed 

versus being back here and then sending them out? 

Mr. VICKERS. The broad strategic shift we are trying to make for 

the war on terror with our SOF posture is to go from episodic presence around the world to persistent presence. Doing that, of course, 

requires more capacity, ability to integrate better with the existing 

structure the U.S. Government has overseas, and then a balance 

between forward station forces, which, again, may not be forward 

based in just a region, but specifically in 59 some plus Global War 

on Terror (GWOT) priority countries while supplementing that 

with rotational forces, and that mix is something under study. 

If we went all the way to rotational forces, it would be more expensive and hard to get the persistent presence that you get from, 

say, as our State Department colleagues and agency colleagues do, 

living in a country for a period of time and developing those relationships and language skills. On the other hand, the rotational capability gives the combatant commanders flexibility to move quickly across a GWOT area. 

So there is a balance that is needed there, and it is something 

that we are continuing—— 

Mr. SMITH. And you do not have a set plan right now? That is 

still something you are—— 

29 

Mr. VICKERS. We are developing a plan and, of course, as you 

know, 80-some percent of our forces are currently engaged in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Which makes it difficult. 

Mr. VICKERS [continuing]. Which is why we need to grow the 

force, growing various parts of the U.S. Government, to meet what 

we see as the future demand. 

Mr. SMITH. Great. Thank you. 

General, do you have anything to add to that? 

General KEARNEY. Yes, Chairman Smith. We are right now finalizing what we call the global SOF posture, which is exactly what 

you are referring to, our deployments worldwide and where we 

would sit permanently, and, as Secretary Vickers has said, where 

we would have a rotational presence. 

We are due to present that back to the Joint Staff in March, and 

we continue to come back, and the key principles are exactly as you 

have said, persistent forward presence with the right people at the 

right place to build those relationships, and I think what you will 

find is that in each geographic combatant commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), we will probably have a different approach 

based on the ability to be there, our access, and our ability to get 

to where to where we need to go and overcome the tyranny of distance, yet balance the deployment of the force away from their families and where they need to be. 

But we have that on the plate. Admiral Olson is digesting that 

now, and we are making the final fine tunes before we come back 

to the Joint Staff and the Secretary of Defense on what that will 

look like. 

Mr. SMITH. Great. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a quick question along the same lines as a couple of my previous colleagues were asking, and that is, obviously, it is a lot 

cheaper if you can work on a more preventive side, and I assume 

that special operators have been doing that for some long period of 

time. What is the shift? Is it more from a continuous presence to 

just go in and take out-one particular problem? Is that how the 

new system is supposed to operate? 

And, also, what is the change particularly with Directive 44 in 

terms of the decision of when you make preemptive kinds of moves 

within a country. Is that mostly done in a joint context with the 

leadership of that country? If you could just develop that little bit. 

Mr. VICKERS. Well, I will start, and then I think Ambassador 

Herbst will want to talk about National Security Presidential Directive–44 (NSPD–44), but the shift to more of a preventive or 

proactive posture has to do more with having persistent presence 

in more places than we have had before and trying to be proactive, 

for example, about counterterrorism, rather than being reactive. 

Rather than waiting for terrorists to do something and then responding to it, we are out trying to deal with them. 

A large part of this preventive posture is really building the capacity of our international partners. The war on terror absolutely 

requires that. It requires the U.S. Government harnessing its inVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:28 Apr 02, 2009 Jkt 043782 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-118\43782.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
30 

struments with our other partners to support the security of a 

number of countries around the world, and that is really how prevention would take place, by bringing these various instruments, 

development aid, political development, security assistance, focused 

on trying to prevent insurgencies from ever starting in the first 

place or keeping them at very low levels. 

Ambassador HERBST. I would endorse what Secretary Vickers 

said. You might say there is a military and a civilian component 

to preventive measures, and most of the measures would be on the 

civilian side, and there you are talking about most effectively doing 

this work with a civilian capacity, and the capacity we are trying 

to grow would enable us to put dozens or even hundreds of people 

on the ground, civilians on the ground, to do preventive work, and 

we have devoted a great deal of attention to prevention. 

Mr. AKIN. I just got back from a visit to Japan and South Korea, 

had a chance to talk to that shy and retiring General Bell, and he 

had his ideas about the importance of having basing on the continent there and an overall perspective. It seemed to me that just 

as dealing with little problems, prevention is a good thing and 

working jointly with other countries is a good thing. 

It appeared that he was advocating the same thing to deal with 

big problems, and that was, again, that when you develop allies 

like Japan with the missile-defense destroyers that they are building that that also is a very good strategy, both financially, economically, but also in developing those partnerships in other countries 

that can have a different perspective in terms of dealing with 

things politically. They represent a different interest and, therefore, can sometimes prevail on someone to think in a certain way 

that we could not. 

Anybody want to comment on that? 

Mr. VICKERS. I will be talking tomorrow to the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee just about cooperative missile defense, so I agree 

fully. 

Ambassador HERBST. An important part of what my office is trying to do is to grow the international capability to respond in stabilization crises. Like you, I took a trip to East Asia—this was last 

spring—to talk about cooperation with the Japanese, with the 

South Koreans, as well as with the Chinese. We see a great many 

potential areas of involvement around the world, and the United 

States is not going to do all of them or even most of them. We are 

looking for as many partners as we can find, and we are getting 

a positive response. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Marshall for five minutes. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. It works now. 

In an ideal world, we would not even have these hearings, 

threats would not be there, and we would not have to spend any 

money trying to address those threats, reorganize ourselves, et 

cetera. We accept that the threats that are most pressing and likely to be so for the next few decades for the foreseeable future that 

we are not able to address well are unconventional. 

We are not well set up to deal with world pandemics. We are not 

set up to deal with angry young men forming cells that get access 

31 

to growingly lethal things and wanting to damage, many of them 

motivated by religion, but motivated by other things as well, scattered around the globe. 

We accept that climate change is going on, at least most of us 

do at this point, and that there is going to be substantial economic 

disruption as a result of that, and all of us recognize that, what, 

a third of the world maybe is living on less than $2 a day, and they 

know how we live. So there are huge challenges here, and they are 

scattered around the globe, and it would be nice if they would all 

go away, but they are not. 

And we also recognize that we cannot meet all those challenges. 

We need the leverage, we need to build partner capacity, et cetera, 

and ideally other states would keep those challenges from ever becoming a challenge to us. And this is what you guys think about 

all the time. You think about it from the perspective of the specific 

roles that you have. So it is DOD, it is State, it is SOCOM, it is 

the specific things that I need to do, how I need to adjust, how my 

group needs to adjust in order to better address the situation. 

I would like each of you to think about what you have read lately, you know, authors, articles, books, critics, commentators, the 

people you think have been particularly perceptive about the 

threats and how we as a country need to try to reorganize ourselves, as a country, not just your individual bailiwicks, how we 

need to reorganize ourselves so that we maximize our effectiveness 

in the long run in addressing those threats. 

I would like each of you to think about that for just a second and 

independently just tell me who out there you think is quite 

thoughtful about this, has written some good stuff, has some good 

views, and I would like you to be open-minded enough to say, 

frankly, they are kind of critical of what we are doing, you know, 

they do not agree with me, but they are pretty thoughtful. 

And then the second thing I would like you to offer me is where 

you think we are falling short, we are clearly going to fall short, 

we do not have it right now, we have not quite figured it out. 

And if you would just run through, I have only five minutes here. 

So if each of you could take 30 seconds or so and quickly give me 

answers to that, it would be helpful. 

I guess, Mr. Vickers, we will start with you since you started off 

the whole hearing. 

Mr. VICKERS. Sure. A couple of good things I have read recently. 

David Ignatius had a good column, I think, a couple of weeks ago. 

He just came back from a trip in Iraq and Afghanistan and talked 

about the combination of soft power and hard power through PRTs 

and Special Operations Forces. 

I think there is a lot more going on there than that, but he captured the essence of a couple of important instruments that we 

have and how in some cases we are leveraging small amounts of 

capability to really achieve outsized effects. You know, things have 

gotten worse in Afghanistan, but they could have gotten much 

worse. The much feared 2007—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. We are not going to get through the whole list 

before the chairman cuts us off, if you editorialize—— 

32 

Mr. VICKERS. All right. The second thing is Bob Kaplan, stealth 

supremacy, an article in The Atlantic recently about how to do a 

global posture. Recently. It is probably two years old or so. 

Shortfalls—I talked earlier about strategic communications. I 

think the war on terror requires a different approach than the approach we have had in the past, and I think that is still the hardest problem that we are facing. 

Ambassador HERBST. There was testimony given a few weeks ago 

by among others Carlos Pascual and Michele Flournoy about developing a civilian responsible capability, which I would recommend. 

If you talk about something a little bit broader focused, I forget 

the author’s name, but the book, The Pentagon’s New Map, is very, 

very interesting and worthwhile reading. There is a book by Frank 

Fukuyama on nation-building which is a cautionary book which I 

think is worth reading, as well as the RAND guide to nation building. 

Thank you. 

Admiral DAVENPORT. At Joint Forces Command, we developed a 

product called the Joint Operating Environment, which is a future 

look at what the operating environment might be, and it gets to 

many of the threats that you just talked about, and so we see that 

there is a wide expanse of possibilities out there, but what is foremost on our scope right now is irregular warfare. 

Colin Gray has written some recent articles and books on irregular warfare and the challenges we face there that we are looking 

at real hard right now, and Joint Forces Command overall has an 

increasing emphasis on trying to ensure we are addressing that irregular warfare threat and the challenge we face in the future. 

General HOLMES. I would say Dr. Joseph Nye at the JFK School 

of Government, a lot of writing about soft power that I have read 

recently, and then the occasion about eight or nine months ago to 

hear Newt Gingrich as he went through changes that he felt like 

had to be made across our structures. 

Where we are falling short—I think being able to articulate exactly what strategic communications is or is not and then being 

willing to do it, and then also to articulate what irregular warfare 

is and what it means to us. 

General KEARNEY. I think the two authors that I have read certainly that best describe the threat are George Weigel—it was a 

book given to me by former CIA Director Woolsey, and I forget the 

title, and I will get it to you, sir—and then Walid Phares’ Future 

Jihad. Both get right at the core of why jihadis are what they are. 

And then I would tell you the thing that keeps me awake at 

night is that we have failed to educate American on the threat. We 

knew more about the Soviet formation that moved across the Fulda 

Gap than we know about the threat facing us today, and we have 

failed to provide them that narrative is our strategic communications. 

Colonel OSBORNE. Yes, sir. I do not recall the author. A retired 

British general published a book called Utility of Force, an exploration of how force applies in the broader context of irregular scenarios, and he cited many instances in his career spanning his 

early days in Northern Ireland through Desert Storm, Desert 

Shield. 

33 

The other one is a book called Infidel by Miriam Ali. It is a compelling personal narrative of a woman’s journey from Somalia to 

actually living in the United States, and while her story is compelling, her street-level observations on the changes that were taking 

place in a society in the 1980’s, early 1990’s are indicative of the 

sort of awareness that we need to be able to develop to understand 

culture, societies, and secondary and tertiary effects of what is happening in our strategic global enterprise. 

I think, sir, the most frustrating thing that we see right now, almost everybody has hit on it, is the strategic agility side of how we 

deal in this 21st century. We tend to move in a cumbersome, lethargic way, particularly compared against our current adversaries, 

and plowing through that is one of the greatest challenges that we 

face. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are you done, Mr. Marshall? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you for the time. 

Dr. SNYDER. That list of readings makes my reading a couple of 

nights ago, Llama, Llama Red Pajama to my son seem kind of 

lightweight, but—— 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Gillibrand for five minutes. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

I want to follow up on the issue of the primacy of strategic communication. 

Colonel Osborne, in your testimony, you say, ‘‘While opportunities to push critical United States Government (USG) messages 

abound, many challenges make these efforts more difficult than 

they initially appear. For example, the ability to communicate in 

the most appropriate medium is not necessarily aligned with the 

authority to do so.’’ 

Can you expand upon that and tell me what authority you are 

lacking and what you are referring to? 

Colonel OSBORNE. Yes, ma’am, and I will try to answer that, and 

then I will defer. I am not by career field a strategic communicator. 

I think most important when we talk about strategic communications from the soft perspective, and I think the irregular warfare 

perspective, it is important to note that we are talking about deeds. 

That is the most compelling message that we send, and it is lining 

up all of the other communication mediums to support that. 

And I think that that, in many cases, has been that struggle 

where we are capable fully of planning operations and doing so in 

a way from the tactical to the strategic continuum that are achieving good effects and clearly articulating our desires and eliciting 

the behaviors that we want, but on the flip side, not being able to 

at the same time recognize that primacy of the communications 

side to attach to those deeds, and be able to push that through, as 

I said a moment ago, a somewhat cumbersome bureaucracy that allows us to link those two elements most effectively. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I think in your testimony you said that you 

thought the State Department would take the lead with support 

from the DOD. I would like comments from the State Department 

on what you think that would mean and whether there are barriers 

for you to do that now. 

34 

Ambassador HERBST. If we set up the Interagency Management 

System, there will be an interagency group which develops the concept as to how we would deploy in a stabilization operation. There 

will be irregular warfare circumstances where the State Department would not be engaged or there may be somewhere that we 

might be engaged in a strictly supportive role. It will depend upon 

the circumstances. There is no single answer or single template to 

deal with the problems we are facing. There needs to be flexibility. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

I would also like to turn a little bit more to the challenges of recruitment. Obviously, you have all created an idea and a plan 

about how to restructure to handle stability and reconstruction operations better, but my concern is that we have not put in place 

a plan to really achieve what your goals are in terms of the recruitment to have the diversity of manpower. 

And I would certainly like some thoughts from Special Operations forces because if our goal was to double the size of Special 

Ops within the next two or three years, I do not think that is physically possible based on earlier testimony I have asked from various 

generals who have come before this committee. So I would like you 

to talk a little bit about your plans for recruitment and retention, 

how you can diversify and have these skill sets that you are looking for. 

Again, I would like you to also talk a little bit about National 

Guard and Reserve because one thing the National Guard is doing 

is they have deployed the agribusiness development team to Afghanistan, which I think is fantastic because what these teams will 

be able to do is help address the issue of whether you can have replacement crops, whether you can create economic development 

through agriculture that is beyond opium, and I think that is a 

very important step for the future of Afghanistan. 

Can you envision a National Guard in particular where you do 

have these individual skill sets already developed within the population because of the nature of the Guard and the Reserve as part 

of this solution, even though the testimony we heard earlier is not 

going to draw from our current forces? So I would like you to comment on that. 

And then last, just because I want to get all my questions in, I 

am very concerned about cyberterrorism, and as part of the process 

of reforming our abilities, what kind of recruitment are you doing 

to get our best engineers and technology experts from the best engineering schools in the world to want to serve in this capacity so 

that we have the strength that we need to make sure we keep this 

country safe? 

And I only raise the question because in the news this morning, 

in Pakistan, you know, they were able to shut down YouTube. A 

country shutting down a Web site, very unusual. It has been done 

before in a number of countries, but the capacity of cyberterrorism 

is growing, and I want to make sure we are prepared. 

General KEARNEY. Yes, ma’am. I will try to quickly move through 

those and then leave time for others to comment. 

First off, recruiting-wise, I think we are doing very, very well 

right now. We are moving through in our five-year plan to expand 

five Special Forces battalions. We are adding the five psychological 

35 

operations (PSYOPs) companies, and we are expanding from a battalion to a full civil affairs brigade in the active component. 

Those are moving at the right pace. We have accelerated the 

amount of people we can put through the school, and, of course, humans being more important than hardware and quality being more 

important than quantity are principles we live by, and we are pacing ourselves to do that. To double the size of Special Operations 

Forces, as you have stated, would not be possible in a three- to fiveyear period, and I think we are moving at a rate that we can sustain for a period of time for those forces. 

In the National Guard and the Reserve, we have a great breadth 

of skill sets that come and work for both our special forces, our civil 

affairs brigades, which are 90 percent in the Reserve component, 

and our PSYOPs groups, and we have recruited those specialists 

into those forces and they do day to day in their civilian jobs exactly what we would like them to do. 

We have become through the long war prisoners of our mobilization policy. When you put those skill sets alone in the Reserve component, then as you achieve mobilization horizons, you now are 

without them for a period of time unless you grow the capacity in 

the Reserves as well as the active component. So, right now, we are 

a prisoner of the pace at which we are operating. 

From a cyberterror point of view, one of the things that Admiral 

Olson is trying very, very hard to do is have more influence with 

the services on recruiting, retention, and how we go after and target that soldier that will become the Special Forces cyberterror operator of the future, and that is one of the things that we are working with the services right now. 

But to get that caliber of individual, it is often very, very difficult 

to recruit that person in at pay levels that are not commensurate 

with what his skills or her skills would draw on the outside without tremendous bonuses and other things, and I think we are trying to explore that. We have built some capability inside of our 

Special Operations Forces and some of our special mission units to 

do just what you are talking about and partner with our interagency partners in the intelligence community who are doing this. 

But we are all competing for the same pool and so, again, as the 

ambassador has stated, very often we need to work to how are we 

going to gain this capability, who is best suited to bring that on 

board to work. 

But I think your questions are all spot on, ma’am. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Will you follow up with me on what your plan 

is, particularly for recruiting with cyberterrorism, because you may 

well have to create a different kind of formula to get these best and 

brightest in technology to want to, number one, serve in the military and, number two, it may require higher pay. But I just think 

it is such a vital component that we have not developed yet, that 

it may require thinking outside the box because a typical individual who may be willing to serve this country may not be that 

engineering graduate who could go work at some dot-com for an extraordinary amount of money to bring them in to public service. 

General KEARNEY. Exactly. And I would tell you that we are nascent, and what I would need to do is come back to you with a more 

detailed strategy to answer your question, but what I can tell you 

36 

is what we have done successfully in other special missions units 

is to profile the person who has a propensity to do that, to do it 

well and will stay, and I think our first approach will be to take 

a look at the folks we have who are doing that very, very well, analyze their psychological, physical, and mental profiles, and then go, 

‘‘How do we get at them?’’ and then ‘‘What are the incentives it will 

take to make them join our force?’’ or another agency’s force to do 

that. 

But I would be glad to come back to you, ma’am. 

Mr. VICKERS. If I could add to that, in my interdependent capabilities hat, I have oversight of our cyberwarfare capabilities across 

the Department of Defense. Some of this we would have to discuss 

in classified session, but cyberwarriors, while very different people 

than Special Operations warriors, are attracted by a similar motivation in some cases to work on problems you simply cannot work 

on anywhere else. 

I just spent the day out at the National Security Agency (NSA) 

a couple of days ago, and that challenge of dealing with growing 

threats to our Nation, whether they come from states or non-state 

actors is something some Americans thankfully take on as a very 

serious responsibility, and we are making good progress, but I 

would have to talk to you about in another session. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith, anything further? 

Mr. SMITH. Nothing from me, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin? 

Mr. Marshall, anything further? You need any more books listed 

there for you? [Laughter.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. Mr. Marshall would like to have all that listed 

down and passed out to all the committee. Yes. 

I was struck, in closing, Colonel Osborne, by your phrase ‘‘strategic agility,’’ and we hear a lot of terms. 

One of them is ‘‘soft power’’ that we use, I think, as an important 

phrase. It implies no sense of urgency about it, and soft power kind 

of, I think, implies that you could just spend days and weeks and 

months trying to get the process together to get everything together that you need. If that included veterinarians or whatever, 

you would have time to do it. 

‘‘Strategic agility,’’ I think, is more of the goal, I think, of the interest of these subcommittees and others, which is that needs to be 

available on day one, that if you decided you need to have a combat 

team plus two ag officials or three State Department trainers in 

local government that they would be available, too, and I do not 

think that any of us think that we are anywhere near that right 

now as far as we are into these wars that we are fighting. 

We appreciate your time. I apologize again for the interruptions. 

Both your written statements and your conversation today have 

been very helpful. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 26, 2008 

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2008 

(91) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER 

Dr. SNYDER. Assistant Secretary Vickers, the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 

Concept identifies eight key risks and associated mitigation strategies. One is that 

the United States Government might not develop the interagency integration mechanisms necessary to achieve unity of effort at every level. The JOC directs DOD to 

conduct concept development and experimentation focused on improving interagency 

integration. What actions has the Department of Defense taken to address the need 

for interagency integration mechanisms? The same unity of effort considerations 

apply with respect to stability operations. Are the efforts to improve interagency integration for irregular warfare and stability operations occurring on parallel tracks 

that create new stovepipes? 

Mr. VICKERS. The Department supports efforts to establish interagency integration mechanisms across the USG, recognizing that irregular challenges manifest 

themselves in ways that cannot be overcome solely by military means. The responses those challenges demand extend well beyond the traditional domain of any 

single government agency or department. 

The Department supports recent efforts to institutionalize interagency integration, two of which are particularly focused on irregular warfare and stability operations: 

– The establishment of the Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead the implementation of NSPD–44 ‘‘Management of Interagency Efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization’’ to include the 

development of civilian capabilities and the integration of those capabilities 

with the U.S. military for contingencies. Several aspects of USJFCOM’s Unified 

Action experimentation series has focused on the integration of civilian and 

military capabilities in support of NSPD–44. 

– The establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), which 

reports to the NSC staff, to lead interagency steady-state and surge, or contingency, planning for the War on Terrorism. Through the NCTC’s Directorate for 

Strategic Operational Planning, DOD participates in an interagency dialogue to 

improve collaboration on a wide range of initiatives and objectives, such as the 

National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, the National Action Plan 

for Combating Foreign Fighters, and the National Action Plan for Countering 

Terrorist Finance. 

– The implementation of a semi-annual War on Terrorism Global Synchronization Conference, sponsored by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This conference brings together senior strategists, planners, 

and operators from all of the Combatant Commands, a broad majority of the 

Defense Agencies, and several of our interagency partners. Through this venue 

DOD has improved collaboration, promoted interoperability, maximized effects, 

and shared lessons learned. Each iteration of the conference draws a wider 

interagency audience, reinforcing the importance of working across traditional 

stovepipes to fully leverage all elements of national power in the War on Terrorism. 

DOD has also developed interagency planning and coordination mechanisms to 

support operational-level integration in the field. DOD is integrating the interagency through Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) established at 

Combatant Commands (COCOM), the structures of which are adjusted according to 

COCOM priorities and available interagency personnel. In addition, DOD participates as a member of the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s 

Regional Security Initiative that takes a regional approach to prevail against al 

Qaeda and its affiliates. 

Efforts to improve interagency integration do not create stovepipes. From a DOD 

perspective, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy leads the development of all 

guidance regarding interagency integration. This guidance is developed in close coordination with the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, the Services, and civilian agency partners. 

92 

Dr. SNYDER. Assistant Secretary Vickers, what impact will Secretary England’s direction to you to combine the Irregular Warfare Roadmap with DOD Directive 

3000.05 have on the effort to put stability operations on par with combat operations? 

Mr. VICKERS. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the need to rebalance capabilities across the Department to improve joint force proficiency in countering irregular challenges. To implement the vision of the QDR, the Department 

developed implementation roadmaps for building partnership capacity, irregular 

warfare, and supporting DOD processes. DODD 3000.05, which pre-dates the 2006 

QDR, provided influential foundational concepts for Departmental programs to 

counter irregular challenges. 

Last summer, the Department reported on the progress of DODD 3000.05 initiatives to give stability operations a priority comparable to combat operations. These 

initiatives informed Department-wide concepts for defeating irregular challenges by 

working with and through the indigenous population and legitimate government to 

isolate and defeat irregular adversaries. As DOD worked to enhance relevant capabilities, significant synergies across capabilities became evident. 

The Department is now developing a directive to capitalize on these synergies, establish capstone policy for irregular warfare capabilities, and describe the relationship among key activities, including stability operations. In so doing, the directive 

will integrate the key lessons learned from the QDR Execution Roadmaps, DODD 

3000.05, and best practices from current operations. It will synchronize capability 

development across a wider range of operational environments—permissive, contested, and denied. This approach will help DOD maintain readiness for more contingencies—and provide the Nation with more strategic alternatives. 

Recognizing that stability operations are essential to traditional warfare, irregular 

warfare, and a range of activities that are not characterized as warfare per se, the 

Department continues to develop initiatives under the auspices of NSPD–44 and 

other interagency authorities. Our strategic guidance reflects this view, and recognizes that in many cases unified action across multiple government agencies is crucial to enduring success. DOD remains engaged with our interagency and international partners to create synergies among our capabilities and synchronize their 

application in pursuing national security objectives. 

Dr. SNYDER. Assistant Secretary Vickers, can you comment on how the President’s 

FY 2009 budget reflects implementation of the policy to make stability operations 

as important as combat operations in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (or the so-called ‘‘DOT-MILP-F’’)? 

Mr. VICKERS. DOD will not be creating separate stability operations budget lines, 

but rather driving a shift in capability development priorities. DOD is working 

through existing capabilities development processes to determine future needs. A 

critical element of that process will be determining those adaptations made in response to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and funded through 

supplemental appropriations that need to be institutionalized for this new environment. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services and Combatant Commands to identify and prioritize the ‘full range’ of capabilities required for 

Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations to include their DOTMLPF implications. 

In his recent testimony regarding the FY09 budget, the Secretary of Defense highlighted a theme running throughout the FY09 budget request: ensuring the Department is prepared to address the international landscape characterized by new 

threats and instability. Specific budget requests highlight this change: 

– Increased End Strength: increasing Army size by 7,000 over and Marine 

Corps by 5,000 over FY08 levels enabling the Department to relieve stress on 

the force caused by the Long War and ensuring it is able to excel at conventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations. (Personnel) 

– Global Train and Equip: providing commanders a means to fill longstanding 

gaps in our ability to build the capacity and capabilities of partner nations. (Authorities) 

– Security & Stabilization Assistance: allowing the Department to transfer up 

to $200 million to the State Department to facilitate whole-of-government responses to stability and security missions. (Authorities) 

– AFRICOM: funding to launch the new Africa Command, allowing the Department to have a more integrated approach. (Organization) 

93 

– Foreign Languages: providing for increased language training for all forces to 

improve preparation for irregular warfare, training and advising missions, humanitarian efforts, and security and stabilization operations. (Training) 

Dr. SNYDER. Assistant Secretary Vickers, GAO reported that DOD has not fully 

established mechanisms that would help it obtain interagency participation in the 

military planning process at the combatant commands. What mechanisms currently 

exist to facilitate interagency coordination at the combatant commands and how effective are they? What mechanisms are planned for the future? JFCOM reports that 

OSD declined to take further action on its concept of operations for the role and 

placement of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at the combatant 

commands. Can you explain the rationale behind that decision? 

Mr. VICKERS. DOD is developing mechanisms to increase interagency participation in the military planning process here in DC, at the combatant commands, and 

in the field. In many ways, the most important integration points are here in DC 

and in the field, at U.S. Embassies; because those are the places where our interagency partners make decisions and operate. Other Departments and Agencies do 

not have organizational corollaries to Combatant Commands (COCOM), making 

COCOMs a difficult integration point for our interagency partners. 

What mechanisms currently exist to facilitate interagency coordination at the 

combatant commands and how effective are they? 

Each of the Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOM) has established a Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to assist with liaison and planning at the 

operational level. The structure of the JIACGs varies based on the COCOM’s priorities and the participation of interagency personnel. All COCOMs have noted that 

other Federal Agencies have difficulty providing qualified liaisons to JIACGs on a 

permanent basis. 

Each COCOM has tailored their JIACG to fit its mission. Some examples are illustrative: 

– USSOUTHCOM has established a J9 staff section that includes the JIACG 

liaisons as well as military staff to coordinate interagency efforts. In the context 

of USSOUTHCOM’s operational environment and focus, this approach works 

well. 

– USNORTHCOM’s mission and location uses a different approach—using direct liaison with Federal agencies as well as a JIACG. 

– USEUCOM and USPACOM both employ JIACGs for interagency planning, 

and participation is tailored to their respective missions. 

It is important to note that DOD is currently funding interagency participation 

in JIACG organizations. It may be more effective for other Federal Agencies to program and fund JIACG personnel, creating a more stable personnel management 

method and expanding the pool of qualified interagency planners and operators. 

What mechanisms are planned for the future? 

Recent changes to DOD planning guidance encourage interagency cooperation in 

the development of military plans. DOD is working with interagency partners on selected plans already. As these efforts progress, DOD will identify best practices and 

incorporate lessons learned into future guidance. We are grateful to the State Department for the input it has provided on selected plans. 

In addition, the development and use of whole-of-government planning frameworks will facilitate civilian agency integration into military planning and vice 

versa. Recent interagency involvement in global war on terror planning through 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) Global Synch Conference is a good 

model upon which the Department will look to build for the future. In addition, 

DOD has collaborated on the development of the Integration Planning Cell concept, 

a team of civilian agency planners and experts who would deploy to the CoCom 

under the Interagency Management System, to facilitate the harmonization of military and civilian planning for reconstruction and stabilization. 

JFCOM reports that OSD declined to take further action on its concept of operations for the role and placement of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups 

(JIACGs) at the combatant commands. Can you explain the rationale behind that 

decision? 

DOD does not want to impose a one-size-fits all approach. Rather, we recommended that the COCOMs tailor their JIACGs for regional missions. 

Dr. SNYDER. Assistant Secretary Vickers, GAO reported that DOD’s policies and 

practices inhibit sharing of planning information and limit interagency participation 

in the development of combatant command plans. Specifically, DOD does not have 

a process in place to facilitate information sharing with non-DOD agencies early in 

the process without the specific approval of the Secretary of Defense. What steps 

94 

is DOD taking to amend its policies and practices to improve information sharing 

with interagency partners in the planning process? 

Mr. VICKERS. Currently, we share aspects of many of our plans with elements of 

other agencies, while not necessarily sharing the entire plan itself. When DOD considers sharing its campaign and contingency plans, the Department must balance 

the benefits with the need for force protection, operational security, and timely plan 

development. Combatant Commands can work in coordination with OUSD(P) and 

Joint Staff to integrate other agencies into plan development with the approval of 

the Secretary of Defense. In the execution of current operations, DOD encourages 

field coordination between Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Missions as 

well as with liaison officers. 

Recent changes to DOD planning guidance task the COCOMs to develop campaign plans, moving the Department away from an exclusive focus on contingencydriven planning. Campaign plans will provide an opportunity for greater coordination and synchronization of USG activities to shape the current security environment in order to prevent potential threats to our national security interests from 

developing. 

However, to ensure the maximum effectiveness of input from interagency partners, the USG must build the capabilities of other agencies to understand military 

planning, review military plans, and engage in national-level planning processes. 

Regarding information sharing, DOD’s Chief Information Office (CIO) established 

an Information Sharing Steering Group to serve as the focal point for guidance, direction, and oversight of DOD information-sharing initiatives. This effort builds 

upon the most effective practices in cooperative venues like the National Counter 

Terrorism Center (NCTC). 

The CIO has a number of ongoing initiatives to improve information sharing 

across agencies, e.g.: 

– An Information Sharing Action Plan for Civil-Military support to stability operations that enhances unclassified components of civil-military planning in a 

collaborative environment. 

– An Information Sharing Task Force with other Federal Departments to establish an information sharing environment that spans agency boundaries. 

These efforts, along with the provision of required authorities and funding to procure the necessary information technologies across the Federal Government, will enhance whole-of government collaboration under the process envisioned by applicable 

NSPDs. 

Note: In a separate venue, the Department can provide an overview of the 

progress we have seen in our partnerships with the intelligence community to increase our effectiveness in supporting international partners in eliminating the most 

dangerous threats to security. 

Dr. SNYDER. How does S/CRS currently view its role in leading or otherwise supporting the NSPD–44 process? 

Ambassador HERBST. Under NSPD–44, the President has vested in the Secretary 

of State the responsibility to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts 

to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS 

has been charged by the Secretary with implementing this directive. S/CRS has led 

and will continue to lead the interagency effort in Washington to implement the 

President’s vision to develop the systems and procedures to provide comprehensive, 

whole-of-government planning for and management of reconstruction and stabilization policy and operations. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the roles and responsibilities of the regional bureaus and 

the new Foreign Assistance Bureau? For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the regional bureaus, not S/CRS, have the lead. 

Ambassador HERBST. In carrying out its responsibilities under NSPD–44, S/CRS 

works closely with the regional bureaus, with other State Department bureaus, and 

with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate. Should a decision be made to 

activate the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

(IMS) to address a particular crisis, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization 

Group (the Washington-based interagency policy coordination body for the situation) 

would be co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Assistant Secretary of the relevant regional bureau, and an appropriate regional senior 

director from the National Security Council staff. The CRSG works within the context of the State Department regional bureau’s foreign policy lead and the Secretary’s foreign assistance structure. 

Dr. SNYDER. How would you describe the current status of interagency planning 

for stabilization and reconstruction activities? 

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Ambassador HERBST. S/CRS has developed processes and mechanisms for enabling and supported whole-of-government planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations, based on NSPD–44. These planning processes can be applied with 

or without the Interagency Management System (IMS). 

The Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordination Committee coordinates 

interagency efforts to develop a planning framework for U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. This framework has been tested and exercised in a number of 

civilian-military exercises, experiments, and table top events. The planning framework has been taught to U.S. Government personnel (both civilian and military) 

through the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute and at numerous military education and training institutions. Allied nations have also participated in S/ 

CRS training. 

S/CRS has facilitated and/or assisted interagency planning for specific country engagements in support of U.S. national security interests. S/CRS country-planning efforts drawing on the whole-of-government approach have been applied to Sudan, 

Haiti, Cuba (in support of CAFC II), Kosovo, and Afghanistan (at the PRT level). 

These planning efforts involved significant participation from across the civilian 

agencies and DOD. 

Dr. SNYDER. What specific actions is State taking to facilitate a greater understanding of the planning processes and capabilities between DOD and non-DOD organizations for stabilization and reconstruction activities? 

Ambassador HERBST. S/CRS is undertaking many actions to facilitate greater reciprocal understanding in both civilian and military planning processes and capabilities. Specifically, we are engaged in joint planning activities, development and 

application of an interagency planning framework, outreach to DOD, joint education 

endeavors, and interagency exercises. 

For example, in close coordination with DOD, S/CRS is heavily engaged in interagency planning for a range of country stabilization and reconstruction efforts, such 

as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Haiti. These real-world engagements are perhaps the 

best way to involve our civilian agency and military counterparts and expose them 

to the relatively new interagency planning process. 

S/CRS is also leading an interagency process at the Policy Coordination Committee level to finalize the development and testing of a planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction activities—a process that will be reviewed and approved by the NSC. 

In addition, S/CRS has led two separate interagency exercises over the past year 

with robust participation from various levels of DOD and two separate combatant 

commands. S/CRS has also participated in a range of military exercises, especially 

those where exposure to interagency planning tools and response mechanisms builds 

civil-military capacity. Also, S/CRS has successfully encouraged DOD and civilian 

agency participation in numerous reconstruction and stabilization courses at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute that give students an in-depth exposure to planning tools and new interagency capabilities provided by NSPD–44. S/ 

CRS officers have participated and shaped the curriculum of numerous military 

planning courses offered by DOD as well. 

S/CRS has also established relationships with OSD, Joint Staff, and every major 

Geographic Combatant Command and service component, in an effort to further 

their understanding of the interagency planning framework, the Interagency Management System (IMS), and civilian active and reserve expeditionary capabilities. 

Dr. SNYDER. In your view, would the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at 

the combatant command be an appropriate interagency planning mechanism to engage in deliberate planning? 

Ambassador HERBST. It is my understanding that the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) largely serve in an advisory role to the Commander and were 

not set up to perform deliberate planning. However, I would refer you to the DOD 

for further information on the role and capabilities of the JIACG. 

Dr. SNYDER. How would the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups interact with 

the NSPD–44 framework’s Interagency Planning Cells when stood up for crisis planning? 

Ambassador HERBST. The Interagency Management System establishes a civilian 

planning cell that deploys to the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to harmonize civilian and military planning in support of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization strategic objectives. This cell would focus specifically on the planning for 

the reconstruction and stabilization operation, while the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) would provide the Commander with advice on issues and 

topics related to the entire GCC Area of Responsibility. 

Individual agencies (such as USAID or Justice) in consultation with the Combatant Commander, would determine if their personnel at the JIACG would support 

96 

the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) or if additional personnel would need to be deployed to fulfill the IPC requirements. 

Dr. SNYDER. How, if at all, does NSC-approved Interagency Management System 

(IMS) developed under NSPD–44 differ from the NSPD–1 structures and processes 

used for operation in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Ambassador HERBST. NSPD–1 establishes the interagency bodies for consideration 

of policy issues affecting national security, including the Principals Committee (PC), 

Deputies Committee (DC), and Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs). NSPD–44 

directs the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead interagency efforts to prepare, 

plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 

As a part of the specific coordination function articulated in NSPD–44, the Secretary of State is directed to provide decision makers with detailed options for an 

integrated U.S. Government response to specific reconstruction and stabilization operations including recommending when to establish a limited-time PCC-level group 

called the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG). 

In accordance with NSPD–44 and NSPD–1, the CRSG have the role and responsibilities provided to a PCC. The CRSG is responsible for coordinating interagency 

crisis response and providing recommendations on strategic guidance on all policy 

and resource issues related to the specific country or crisis, including recommendations on lead roles between all elements of the interagency. It is chaired by the 

State Department Regional Assistant Secretary and/or Special Envoy, the National 

Security Council Staff Senior Regional Director, and S/CRS and includes Assistant 

Secretary-level membership from all relevant agencies and offices. Interagency representation on a CRSG makes this body the focal point for overall planning and program integration. 

Dr. SNYDER. In what specific ways would the IMS and other elements of the 

framework improve the U.S. management of those operations? 

Ambassador HERBST. The Interagency Management System (IMS) is fundamentally about ensuring integrated, whole-of-government planning and operational integration for future stabilization and reconstruction missions. This happens through 

facilitated real-time information sharing that can provide the interagency process in 

Washington, the Combatant Command, the Embassy, and agencies in the field with 

one shared operating picture and a mechanism for improved communication and decision-making. This shared picture will allow us to engage in more effective joint 

planning, to better leverage resources across U.S. agencies and among international 

partners, and would allow for more coherent mobilization of civilian and military 

resources to the field. 

Dr. SNYDER. If the IMS would, in fact, help improve the U.S. response in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, why is the Administration not using the system for those operations? 

Ambassador HERBST. The IMS was approved by the NSC in March 2007, well 

after the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were already underway. S/CRS 

and other departments and agencies that were actively involved in developing the 

IMS have worked with the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG) and 

the Iraq Policy and Operations Group (IPOG) to facilitate the sharing of stabilization and reconstruction lessons learned to help improve the U.S. response. Given the 

wealth of operational experience and lessons learned already resident in the existing 

interagency structures for Afghanistan and Iraq, it would not be advantageous to 

implement the IMS for those engagements at this time. 

Dr. SNYDER. How will DOD’s new direction to issue a comprehensive irregular 

warfare directive impact the NSPD–44 efforts? Will NSPD–44 be rewritten? 

Ambassador HERBST. NSPD–44 provides a whole of government planning and operating framework for operations that require similar supporting DOD capabilities. 

Within the context of NSPD–44, the Pentagon has the responsibility to develop 

its own departmental doctrine for contributing to the U.S. Government response to 

national security challenges such as failed and failing states. 

Dr. SNYDER. How will your office be involved in irregular warfare planning? 

Ambassador HERBST. In the context of NSPD–44, we are working with the Pentagon and Combatant Commands on stabilization and reconstruction issues and expect this cooperation to continue as DOD works out its doctrine. 

Dr. SNYDER. Representative Marshall asked you to name any authors or writings 

that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our country should best 

confront the unconventional threats it faces. Would you please name any authors 

or works that have influenced your thinking, whether in agreement or disagreement, on this subject? 

Ambassador HERBST. The following works have been particularly useful to me in 

my work: 

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• State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, by Frank 

Fukuyama; 

• The Pentagon’s New Map, by Thomas Barnett; 

• The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building, by James Dobbins, Seth Jones, 

Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse; and 

• Political Order in Changing Societies, by Samuel Huntington. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Holmes, please describe CENTCOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group including who is on it and what they do. 

General HOLMES. USCENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group’s (JIACG) 

mission is to facilitate planning by the Commander, USCENTCOM, and his staff; 

coordinate information sharing between U.S. military and U.S. government agencies; and advise Commander, USCENTCOM and staff on interagency issues in the 

execution of U.S. Central Command’s mission. 

However, as directed by the acting Commander, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group merged into an Interagency Task Force (IATF) to continue this mission 

and better incorporate other Central Command elements by combining the offices 

of JIACG, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (Counter-IED) Group, Strategic 

Communications and Information Operations into one division within the Operations (J3) Directorate. 

IATF provides: 1) a whole of government approach to USCENTCOM engagements, 2) multi-agency and multi-lateral coordination across Areas of Responsibility 

(AOR) and Combatant Command (COCOM) objectives, and 3) regional influence/ 

venue coordination. 

Focus areas supported by IATF are: 

1) Set conditions for stability in Iraq through: 

a. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 

b. Training Programs for Border Security, Threat Finance, and Rule of Law 

c. Iraq Threat Finance Cell 

2) Expand governance and security in Afghanistan through: 

a. PRTs 

b. Counter Narcotics Efforts 

c. Counter Threat Finance 

d. Training Programs 

3) Degrade violent extremist networks and operations, with defeating al Qaeda 

the priority through: 

a. Detainee interrogations support 

b. High Value Individual 

c. Iraq Threat Finance Cell 

d. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) support 

4) Strengthen relationships and influence states and organizations to contribute 

to regional stability and the free flow of commerce through the Alternative Development Program. 

5) Posture the force to build and sustain joint and combined warfighting capabilities and readiness in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) and Major Regional Exercises. 

Issues requiring an interagency approach include: 

1) Strategic Effects, 2) Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3) Regional War on Terror, 

4) Transnational Crime, 5) Maritime, Port & Border Security, 6) Disaster Relief, 7) 

Counter-Terrorism, 8) Counter Threat Finance, 9) Long-Term Posture, 10) Security 

Assistance, 11) Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, 12) Counter-IED, 

13) Counter-Narcotics, 14) Pandemic Influenza, 15) Exercise Support to OIF/OEF, 

16) Strategic Communication, 17) Partner Security Forces, 18) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and 19) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

The IATF participates in planning efforts with the following organizations: 

1) Effects Synchronization Committee—CENTCOM’s committee to synchronize 

collection and strategic targeting against those who significantly influence the operations, direction or funding of terrorists and terrorist insurgencies throughout the 

region 

2) National Counter Terrorism Center. 

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To achieve the interagency approach, IATF integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the following personnel to meet non-traditional security threats and challenges: 

1) Director (SES, with 0–7 oversight) 

2) Deputy Director (0–6) 

3) Three Branch Chiefs (2 x 0–6, 1 x GS–15) 

4) Admin Support (1 officer, 3 enlisted) 

5) Action Officers (Mix of officer, enlisted, civilian) 

6) Representatives from other Federal agencies including: Department of State, 

Federal Bureau of Investigations, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of 

Homeland Security, Treasury Department, and United States Agency for International Development. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Holmes, CENTCOM’s Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of 

Africa conducts many of the core missions inherent in stability operations. What 

interagency participation is there at the CJTF headquarters and what part does 

your Joint Interagency Coordination Group play in organizing the efforts of the 

other departments and agencies in support of the task force? 

General HOLMES. Interagency participation in the Combined Joint Task Force— 

Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is largely coordinated in the Embassy Djibouti Country 

Team. The CENTCOM IATF coordinates several classified interagency operations 

among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of State (DOS). 

The IATF serves as a coordinator between the interagency organizations in Washington, DC and the CJTF-HOA. Specifically, our Department of State Liaison facilitates host nation permission for military entry into territorial waters of a HOA nation to effect a counternarcotics operation. Further, Department of State supports 

embassies or consulates in every HOA country except for Somalia. Our FBI Liaison 

facilitates investigations and coordinates U.S. law enforcement actions in the HOA 

nations as requested by the U.S. or local governments. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Holmes, CENTCOM appears to have exercised only a monitoring role of its Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. While 

there are differences between the composition and mission emphasis of the teams 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, shouldn’t CENTCOM be playing a greater role in developing the joint and even interagency doctrine that guides them? How is CENTCOM 

assessing the progress the PRTs are making? 

General HOLMES. At the combatant command level, CENTCOM conducts and 

oversees its components with instructions for policy guidance, promulgates Department of Defense directives and other documents such as handbooks and assists in 

the implementation of operating concepts and memos of agreement from Joint Staff, 

Office of Secretary of Defense and the interagency. CENTCOM provides doctrine review and recommends Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTP) to Joint Forces Command regarding Stability Operations. 

Primarily, CENTCOM exercises a monitoring role over PRTs, focusing mainly on 

stability and security progress/status in our area of responsibility. Numerous DOD 

and USG agencies assess (to varying levels of degrees) the progress and success of 

the PRTs. PRTs are managed in two diverse manners in Iraq and Afghanistan; Iraq 

PRTs are led by the Department of State and Afghanistan PRTs are led by the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Both concepts achieve the overarching goals of promoting the expansion of the Central government into the provinces and mentor and coach the provincial leadership in being good stewards on behalf of the provincial population. 

In Iraq PRTs have been led by the Department of State, since inception. Originally, called Provincial Support Teams (PST) they have limited military involvement. After Ambassador Khalilizad moved from Afghanistan to Iraq at the end of 

2004, the PRT program stepped forward because he saw this as the way ahead and 

supported its development. When they were reconfigured into the PRTs of today, 

Civil Affairs was tasked to be the lead military element within the PRT, directed 

by the Department of State. 

The current military/civilian relationship in Iraq is effective and progressive. 

MNF-I forces continually incorporate non-kinetic options into their operational missions with success. PRT staffs work with Brigade Combat Teams as well as the 

interagency and other non-governmental agencies to effect positive change in the 

communities they serve. As security improves, PRT effects will increase as all personnel are able to interact more freely. The project development and monies for Iraq 

PRTs are actually not at issue, since Iraqi budgets fund their projects and Iraq Provincial Councils are developing construction plans in accordance with the Iraq Development Strategy. 

99 

ISAF administers PRT activities in Afghanistan. ISAF, with help from its many 

member nations is achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs by solidifying personnel 

from over 20 different nations into an organized command quite capable of assisting 

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA). In demonstration, ISAF published its 

PRT Handbook; endorsed by the ambassadorial-level PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in Kabul as the standard for PRT operation. This document focuses 

in on the various pillars that need shaping in order to have a functioning society. 

This culminates more than four years of inputs from the GOA, ISAF, Combined 

Forces Command—Afghanistan (CFC-A), United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and international development agencies. The handbook outlines basic guiding principles and proven best practices each PRT should draw upon 

when designing and implementing strategy to meet the challenges of its particular 

area of operations. ISAF also orchestrates the efforts each government’s financial efforts, ensuring all accomplishments are nested and vetted against the Afghanistan 

National Development Plan (ANDP). ISAF also works with USAID and other major 

contributors to manage projects across the country with funds provided by sources 

in addition to each PRT’s lead government. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Holmes, a new irregular warfare document will replace 

DODD 3000.05. Is CENTCOM taking a proactive role in assessing and recording its 

counterinsurgency experience from Iraq and Afghanistan for inclusion in this directive? 

General HOLMES. USCENTCOM has conducted active collection through other 

agents, including USSOCOM and USJFCOM, and established a classified lessons 

learned program which receives information, recommendations and suggestions 

from all sources. This data is collected, assessed and validated against findings and 

observations collected while forces are engaged in Irregular Warfare/Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations. These findings (or lessons learned) cover the full spectrum 

of COIN operations from non-kinetic activities to full kinetic actions. The information is contained in a database to archive these lessons learned and will eventually 

be resident on our command’s Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JILLS) 

database and in USJFCOM’s Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR), (both systems are currently under development and implementation). A number of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs) statements of requirement have been initiated by USCENTCOM that will enhance ongoing and future COIN operations. 

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Osborne, according to the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 

Concept, in the future, Irregular Warfare campaigns will increasingly require military general purpose forces to perform missions that in the last few decades have 

been viewed primarily as Special Operation Forces (SOF) activities. How might this 

change the future mission of SOF? 

Colonel OSBORNE. In my opinion, SOF will not change its core tasks or mission 

focus. However, an increased use of general purpose forces in select scenarios will 

increase our capacity to conduct engagement activities and allow SOF to focus on 

the most appropriate missions. 

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Osborne, the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept proposes three alternatives for further development and experimentation that would 

provide models to coordinate interagency command and control: (1) extending the 

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to irregular warfare; (2) establishing interagency Advisory Assistance Teams at sub-national levels of government; and (3) expanding the use of U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) to conduct and support irregular warfare. Can you explain the pros and cons of each approach? 

Colonel OSBORNE. The potential approaches identified in the Irregular Warfare 

(IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) are being explored as part of the concept development and experimentation currently underway by the U.S. Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), Joint Forces Command and a number of other agencies. 

Some thoughts are expressed below however a thorough analysis has yet to be completed. 

The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) Model has proved to be a valuable command and control mechanism for integrating civil-military operations in operational 

areas, but have been historically a short term military led organization. JIATF’s operate under the operational control of the Geographic Combatant Commander and 

are by definition not part of the U.S. Mission (Embassy), therefore not part of the 

Country team which could lead to sub-optimization and over-militarization of the 

‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach to solving or managing the political problem in 

question. 

The IA Advisory Assistance Teams at the sub-national levels of government have 

proven to be successful, but more recent Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 

Iraq have been challenged because of insufficient numbers of them, being asked to 

100 

do too much, inadequate civilian manning, inadequate efforts to integrate them, and 

a relatively lower priority than combat units. 

The expanded MILGRP Model could be a long term solution and organic to the 

U.S. Mission, fully integrated into the Country Team, and much more likely to subordinate its military activities to the broader ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach led by 

the Chief of Mission. Although a permanent organization would solidify relationships and allow for continuous oversight more effectively, it would require more infrastructure and manning to execute. This model will also likely have to function 

under constraints imposed by both the host nation and our own Country Team. 

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Osborne, please describe SOCOM’s Interagency Task Force. 

How does it relate to the J–10, which you direct? How does the J–10 interact with 

SOCOM’s Global Synchronization Division, which works with the National Counterterrorism Center in the War on Terror? 

Colonel OSBORNE. The USSOCOM Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) serves as a coordinating activity within the Department of Defense (DOD) and across the InterAgency (IA). The goal is to be a reliable and connected entity that is able to integrate IA efforts while solving discrete problem sets that support the global war on 

terror (GWOT). The IATF is functionally organized along two major focus areas and 

several enduring tasks. Major focus area efforts are combating the foreign terrorist 

network (FTN) and expanding United States Government document and media exploitation (DOMEX) capacity. The IATF’s enduring tasks include counter narcoterrorism, threat finance, persistent surveillance requirements, counterterrorism research and analysis, information operations, support to the inter-agency partnership 

program (IAPP), and time-sensitive planning. 

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Osborne, what role has SOCOM played in implementation 

of NSPD–44, given its proponency for the civil affairs mission? 

Colonel OSBORNE. Civil Affairs (CA) is outside my area of expertise but I believe 

the USSOCOM role is primarily as a force provider for the Geographic Combatant 

Commanders. In that capacity we provide trained and equipped Civil Affairs forces 

to support theater specific plans and operations. Additionally, as the DOD proponent, we are responsible for individual, unit, and institutional training of CA core 

tasks which are fundamental to stability operations. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is the principle vehicle through which this training is developed and conducted. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL 

Mr. MARSHALL. Assistant Secretary Vickers, could you name any authors or 

writings that struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our country should 

best confront the unconventional global threats it faces? 

Mr. VICKERS. I recommend Vali Nasr, Bernard Lewis, Fawas Gerges, and Walid 

Phares as scholars who offer important insights on the challenges our Nation faces. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Admiral Davenport, could you name any authors or writings that 

struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our country should best confront 

the unconventional global threat it faces? 

Admiral DAVENPORT. We draw ideas from a wide range of academic writings, 

think-tank monographs, and other informed authors to help understand our problem 

sets and their potential solutions. Colin Gray is an author that has strongly influenced my thinking as Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) examines ways to deal with 

the global threat environment. Some of his most significant works include: 

– Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Apr 07) 

– War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History 

(Jul 07) 

– ‘‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2007). 

Additionally, we develop ideas from a wide range of academic white papers, thinktank monographs, and other outside agency sources to help understand our problem 

sets and their potential solutions. Important source documents that influence our 

thinking as we examine ways to deal with the global threat environment include: 

– More Than Humanitarianism; A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa (January 2006) is a Council on Foreign Relations study chaired by Mr. Anthony 

Lake and Ms. Christine Todd Whitman. The document views Africa as more 

than just a charity case and advocates for a strong mix of policies, programs 

and organizational reforms that will address the broader range of African issues 

that influence U.S. national interests. 

101 

– The Quest For Viable Peace: International Intervention And Strategies For 

Conflict Transformation (May 2005) was co-authored by Mr. Len Hawley, who 

has worked with us in JFCOM as a Senior Mentor on numerous projects, and 

Mr. Jock Covey and Mr. Michael J. Dziedzic. The book reviews the issues involved with nation-building and makes concrete recommendations on rebuilding 

shattered societies based on the principles of defeating militant extremism, inculcating rule of law, and establishing a political economy that reduces rather 

than ignites conflict. 

– The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (2007) is a 330-page RAND monograph done by James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole 

DeGrasse. As described by RAND, the guide is a ‘‘. . . practical ‘how-to’ manual 

on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, 

rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development . . . The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- 

and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a 

comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building . . .’’ 

Finally, Joint Forces Command has a very robust professional reading list that 

I frequently use and regularly refer to. This list contains a wide range of books and 

articles that provide background and thought provoking analysis on many topics of 

interest. I have included the list below for your convenience and hope you find it 

useful: 

1. GEN (Ret) Rupert Smith (British Army), The Utility of Force. Former deputy 

SACEUR, commanded the British armored division in the 1991 Gulf War, commanded the U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia in 1995 and spent many years in 

Northern Ireland. In this book he describes the new model of war: ‘‘The ends for 

which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome 

to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.’’ (2007) 

2. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War. Van Creveld argues that 

Clausewitz, whose tenets form the basis for Western strategic thought, is largely irrelevant to nonpolitical wars such as the Islamic jihad and wars for existence such 

as Israel’s Six-Day War. Wars in the future will be waged by terrorists, guerrillas 

and bandits motivated by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties; conventional battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres. (1991) Recommend 

whole book. 

3. FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5. Manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is 

contextual and presents its own set of challenges. Nonetheless, all use variations of 

standard themes and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign 

plan. This manual addresses common characteristics of insurgencies to provide 

those conducting counterinsurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies. (2006) Recommend whole book. 

4. MG Robert Scales (Ret), Yellow Smoke. MG Scales argues that, given Iraq, Afghanistan, and the ongoing war against terrorism, the importance of land warfare 

seems certain to grow. Despite superiority on almost every front, the U.S. armed 

forces have been effectively challenged on battlefields near and far. War remains as 

much art as science and MG Scales offers on example of what to expect if we substitute science and technology wholesale for the understanding of history and humanity. (2003) Recommend whole book, but could scale to Chapters 1, 2, 7, and 9. 

5. Colin Gray, Fighting Talk—Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy. Gray 

discusses the nature of strategy, war, and peace, organized around forty maxims. 

This collection of mini-essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive 

general public against many fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about 

war, peace, and security. The maxims are grouped into five clusters: War and Peace; 

Strategy; Military Power and Warfare; Security and Insecurity; and History and the 

Future. (2007) 

6. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf 

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Available at 

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf 

The Unified Command Plan (UCP). Available at http://j5.js.smil.mil/sp/Organization/links/2006%20UCP.pdf (SIPRNET) 

7. GEN (Ret) Gary Luck, ‘‘Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science’’ A 

Common Perspective (November 2006). GEN Luck argues that the United States 

102 

and its allies are engaged in a protracted global war within a very complex security 

environment. Our enemies are not only foreign states, but also non-state entities, 

loosely organized networks with no discernible hierarchical structure. These adversaries can not be defined only in terms of their military capabilities. They must be 

defined, visualized, and ‘‘attacked’’ more comprehensively, in terms of their interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/acp14_2.pdf 

8. Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, ‘‘Countering Global Insurgency’’ Small 

Wars Journal (NOV 2004). The paper proposes a new strategic approach to the global War on Terrorism, arguing that the War is best understood as a global insurgency. Therefore counterinsurgency rather than traditional counterterrorism may 

offer the best approach to defeating global jihad. But classical counterinsurgency is 

designed to defeat insurgency in a single country. Therefore a fundamental reappraisal of counterinsurgency is needed, to develop methods effective against global 

insurgency. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf 

9. George Packer, ‘‘Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘‘War 

on Terror’’ The New Yorker (18 December 2006). Packer’s populist summary of 

David Kilcullen’s thesis (above) ‘‘There are elements in human psychological and social makeup that drive what’s happening. The Islamic bit is secondary. This is 

human behavior in an Islamic setting. This is not ‘Islamic behavior. . . . People 

don’t get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their social 

networks.’’ 

http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/12/18/061218fa_fact2 

10. Montgomery McFate, ‘‘The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture’’ Joint Force Quarterly (JUL 2005). Cultural knowledge and warfare are inextricably bound. Knowledge of one’s adversary has been sought since Herodotus studied his opponents’ conduct during the Persian Wars (490–479 BC). Although ‘‘know 

thy enemy’’ is one of the first principles of warfare, our military operations and national security decision-making have consistently suffered due to lack of knowledge 

of foreign cultures. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1038.pdf 

11. Advising Foreign Forces: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures—Center for 

Army Lessons Learned Special Edition No. 06–01 dated January 2006 (requires 

AKO account). A practical guide for individuals and units to use in preparation for 

missions as trainers and advisors to foreign military units. 

Mr. MARSHALL. General Holmes, could you name any authors or writings that 

struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our country should best confront 

the unconventional global threats it faces? 

General HOLMES. The following authors and their works influenced my thinking 

and understanding on Irregular Warfare: 

1) All works by Dr. Joseph Nye, Director of JFK School of Government 

2) The works, briefings and general writings of Newt Gingrich 

3) ‘‘Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War’’ by J. Michael Waller 

4) The current writings of LTG (ret) David Barno 

5) ‘‘Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare’’ by Gen John Mattis, USMC and 

ADM Eric Olsen, USN 

Mr. MARSHALL. General Kearney, could you name any authors or writings that 

struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our country should best confront 

the unconventional global threats it faces? 

General KEARNEY. The two publications mentioned were ‘‘Future Jihad’’ by Walid 

Phares and ‘‘Faith, Reason, and the War Against Jihadism: A Call to Action’’ by 

George Weigel. As noted during the hearing, I think these publications best describe 

the threat we are facing. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Colonel Osborne, could you name any authors or writings that 

struck you as especially perceptive insights on how our country should best confront 

the unconventional global threats it faces? 

Colonel OSBORNE. During testimony I mentioned two books that I’ve recently 

read, ‘‘The Utility of Force’’ by General Sir Rupert Smith and ‘‘Infidel’’ by Ayaan 

Hirsi Ali. In addition to these two books, I recommend the following books that have 

contributed to the irregular warfare dialogue: ‘‘Information Strategy and Warfare’’ 

edited by John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, ‘‘Warrant for Terror’’ by Shmuel Bar, 

‘‘Counterinsurgency in Africa’’ by John P. Cann, ‘‘Counterinsurgency Warfare’’ by 

David Galula, ‘‘The I.R.A. & Its Enemies’’ by Peter Hart, and ‘‘To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad’’, a thesis by Stephen Coughlin. 

103 

The last book on my list is ‘‘The Savage Wars of Peace’’ by Max Boot. This list is 

not all inclusive but does represent a good cross section of the current literature. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Our O&I subcommittee has investigated training operations currently underway between State Department/USAID and the individual 

services prior to PRT deployments. Is there any other interagency training going on 

or planned? Are copies of the curriculum available to Congress? 

Ambassador HERBST. The State, USAID, and DOD courses represent the formal 

training for PRT members at present. In addition, some deploying PRT members 

have also taken other courses offered at the Department of State’s Foreign Service 

Institute (FSI). S/CRS has worked with FSI since late 2005 in the design and delivery of a reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) training curriculum that currently 

includes seven courses. These courses cover a range of issues important to reconstruction and stabilization missions (to include the work of PRTs) including R&S assessment and planning and the Interagency Management System for R&S, as well 

as integration issues among rule of law, infrastructure, transitional security, and 

governance in an R&S environment. They are all interagency in design and participation. Copies of the course outlines are available. 

We are currently working closely with a number of other institutions that are developing courses on R&S including the National Defense University, the Naval PostGraduate School, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, among others. Their courses will 

be included in a study on training on complex operations conducted by USIP for the 

Consortium for Complex Operations that will be published within the next few 

months and will help guide future training expansion. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. How did this non-PRT type of interagency training develop? 

Ambassador HERBST. The State Department’s courses on reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) were developed in 2005 by S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute 

with an interagency team that included representatives from the U.S. Institute of 

Peace, USAID, and National Defense University, based on an interagency R&S 

training strategy. The courses have been continually revised to reflect the latest developments in interagency planning and R&S operations, integrating lessons from 

experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan among others. 

This strategy is currently being updated through the NSPD–44 implementation 

process in a broad interagency effort—the Training, Education, Exercises, and Experimentation Sub-PCC—co-chaired by S/CRS, USAID, and DOD. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Does the Department of State or the Department of 

Defense need additional authorities to carry out interagency training for Stability 

and/or Reconstruction Operations? Are there other barriers in law or policy? 

Ambassador HERBST. The authorities of the Department of State and those of our 

partner agencies are currently adequate to allow us to train together. Funding is 

the immediate barrier to increasing our training cooperation. The FY 2009 budget 

request for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative would cover our requirements for cooperative course design and delivery, administration, staffing, as well as tuition, 

travel, and per diem for training participants. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is it feasible to extend interagency training to the 

3,200 Marines scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan later this year? 

Ambassador HERBST. Presently this level of unit training is being supported by 

civilian role players at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin and the Joint 

Readiness Training Center at Ft Polk. S/CRS is working with the interagency to improve civil-military integration training at the Brigade Task Force level in these 

venues including Marine mobilization and readiness exercises at Twenty Nine 

Palms, California. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Has S/CRS examined the Ft. Bragg model for Afghanistan PRT training? 

Ambassador HERBST. S/CRS has been a partner and actively involved with the 

creation and evolution of the Fort Bragg training, from initial efforts to the interagency field assessment conducted this month to inform training planned for fall 

2008. This past year, S/CRS briefed PRT military staff, delivered a day-long training 

on interagency assessment and planning at the Fort Bragg series to the full PRT 

teams, played a key role in developing the scenarios for the week-long capstone 

training event, and provided mentors during the exercise itself. In these activities, 

S/CRS is in support of State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and 

USAID’s Office of Military Affairs. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What about for future deployments? 

104 

Ambassador HERBST. S/CRS continues to be involved in the Fort Bragg Afghanistan PRT training and is currently participating in development of the next 

iteration. The lessons from Afghanistan training will be collected through an upcoming interagency PRT Lessons Learned Workshop and during an April training assessment in Kabul. These lessons will be integrated into current planning for predeployment training in future deployments. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can S/CRS extend Ft. Bragg’s model of interagency 

training for Afghan PRTs to Iraq PRT training, which is now limited to a five day 

optional course at the Foreign Service Institute and does not train teams together 

nor does it connect to the BCT that it will work within theater for its Mission Rehearsal exercise? 

Ambassador HERBST. Following announcement of the New Way Forward in January 2007, the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense, and other agencies created an interagency PRT training course 

at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute in order to provide specialized training for the hundreds of State, DOD, and other agency personnel deploying 

to Iraq. The State-led Iraq interagency constantly re-evaluates and makes adjustments to PRT training. It is important to note that aside from the name, PRT operations in Iraq and Afghanistan profoundly differ in leadership, structure, staffing, 

and focus. Because Iraq PRT’s do not rotate as a unit, and because not all Iraq 

PRT’s are paired with a Brigade, it is not feasible to replicate the training structure 

used for Afghanistan. However, we recognize the value of joint civilian-military 

training and are exploring ways to increase those opportunities. For example, the 

Iraq PRT inter-agency working group, in which S/CRS regularly participates, recently expanded interagency attendance at the regular Iraq PRT training meeting 

to, among other objectives, discuss opportunities for military and civilian elements 

of the PRTs to train together and to support each others’ training efforts. S/CRS 

will continue to support such efforts to share best practices and lessons learned 

across agencies and across theaters. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE 

Mrs. DRAKE. I enjoyed visiting Joint Forces Command on many occasions. On one 

such trip I was given the opportunity to observe the Noble Resolve experiment and 

I am pleased this work is being down in the Hampton Roads Region. I believe it 

will help to contribute to the overall preparedness, security and safety of Virginia 

and our nations. As I understand it, this experiment is heavily focused on interagency cooperation, particularly Homeland Security, and the involvement of the National Guard and FEMA. In your written statement, you state ‘‘JFCOM is engaged 

in a broad array of efforts to improve DOD and interagency integration and capabilities, and is rapidly inserting these improvements into the operating force.’’ Can 

you explain how Noble Resolve experiments will lead to improved interagency collaboration and coordination? Can you explain what your future plans are for Noble 

Resolve? Will this experiment expand beyond the Tidewater area? 

Admiral DAVENPORT. One of our major focal points for Noble Resolve is information sharing between all elements of national response to threats to and crisis within the homeland—including defense, federal, state and local responders. This line 

of effort identifies, evaluates, and socializes new technologies, processes, and organizational constructs that overcome barriers to information sharing within DOD as 

well as between DOD elements and interagency, NGO, and multinational partners. 

We continue to work closely with USNORTHCOM on establishing a common operational picture that can be shared between all participants in our experimentation 

events. We’re also looking at solutions to the problem of sharing information across 

security domains, from secret to unclassified systems, etc. We expect information 

sharing to remain a priority for Joint Experimentation for the foreseeable future. 

Our Noble Resolve effort, which is being conducted in direct support of 

USNORTHCOM, has been focused well beyond the Tidewater area. In 2007, in addition to our work with Virginia, we conducted experimentation with military and civilian organizations in the state of Oregon. In this year’s campaign (Noble Resolve 

08), we are attempting to raise our level of engagement to better address regional 

issues. While Noble Resolve 08 work will focus on issues with regional impact, we 

still engage a limited number of individual states as our actual experiment partners. 

In 2008, we are working with Virginia, Indiana, Texas, and Oregon. In future work, 

we will partner with states that are capable and interested in helping address those 

critical areas of Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities that 

have been identified for joint experimentation. 

105 

Mrs. DRAKE. How much will AFRICOM’s efforts toward a ‘‘whole of government’’ 

target inform your progress toward interagency coordination first envisioned in the 

joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) concept? Should we expect most of 

these gains to be material, organizational, or doctrinal in nature? 

Admiral DAVENPORT. Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) efforts at establishing 

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at the combatant commands should 

be seen as an important first step at institutionalizing the concept of ‘‘whole of government’’ into the military planning processes. The interagency groundwork laid by 

the JIACG program provides a baseline from which both AFRICOM and 

SOUTHCOM are organizing to exploit the powerful synergy of USG agencies working in alignment toward larger national goals. The proposed AFRICOM structure 

is another important step in placing ‘‘whole of government’’ thinking into military 

operations and the larger government as a whole. JFCOM is supporting the development of AFRICOM by facilitating an Interagency Mission Analysis to be completed 

in a series of workshops/process that illuminate the direction our work is taking: 

– Several portions of the Interagency Mission Analysis are being led by the appropriate USG civilian agencies, supported by JFCOM; 

– Workshops focus on delineating the roles and responsibilities of AFRICOM 

and civilian agencies and analyze the challenges that AFRICOM will confront 

in taking a comprehensive approach to USG planning, programming and implementation and management of activities in Africa. 

– The workshops are examining the ways which representatives from various 

USG Departments and Agencies are assigned to and integrated into the staff 

in functional roles (as opposed to liaison officers) in the proposed AFRICOM 

structure. 

We expect most of the expected gains in interagency coordination to be seen, first 

organizationally and then doctrinally, as the new command organizes its staff to develop the structures, processes and procedures to execute its mission in Africa. 

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