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DEFICIENT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AT U.S.

FACILITIES IN IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 30, 2008

Serial No. 110–134

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JACKIE SPEIER, California

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 30, 2008 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania .............................................................................................................. 35

Williams, Charles E., Jr., Director, Defense Contract Management Agency, accompanied by Dave Graff, Director, International Division; Keith

Ernst, former Director, Defense Contract Management Agency; Jeffrey

P. Parsons, Executive Director, Army Contracting Command, U.S.

Army; Gordon S. Heddell, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department

of Defense, accompanied by Don Horstman, Deputy Inspector General

for Policy and Oversight, U.S. Department of Defense; and Thomas

Bruni, Theater Engineering and construction manager, KBR, Inc. ......... 43

Bruni, Thomas ........................................................................................... 79

Ernst, Keith ............................................................................................... 53

Heddell, Gordon S. .................................................................................... 71

Parsons, Jeffrey P. ..................................................................................... 60

Williams, Charles E., Jr. .......................................................................... 43

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Bruni, Thomas, Theater Engineering and construction manager, KBR,

Inc., prepared statement of .......................................................................... 81

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 39

Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 33

Ernst, Keith, former Director, Defense Contract Management Agency,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 55

Heddell, Gordon S., Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 73

Parsons, Jeffrey P., Executive Director, Army Contracting Command,

U.S. Army, prepared statement of ............................................................... 62

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 112

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California:

Staff report ................................................................................................. 4

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 23

Williams, Charles E., Jr., Director, Defense Contract Management Agency, prepared statement of ............................................................................. 46

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DEFICIENT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AT U.S.

FACILITIES IN IRAQ

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, , Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Waxman, Higgins, Altmire, McCollum,

Tierney, Sarbanes, Lynch, Davis of Virginia, Brady, Marchant,

Speier, Issa, and Bilbray.

Staff present: Kristin Amerling, general counsel; Caren Auchman

and Ella Hoffman, press assistants; Phil Barnett, staff director and

chief counsel; Jen Berenholz, deputy clerk; Margaret Daum, counsel; Christopher Davis, professional staff member; Zhongrui ‘‘JR’’

Deng, chief information officer; Miriam Edelman, Jennifer Owens,

and Mitch Smiley, special assistants; Ali Golden, investigator;

Earley Green, chief clerk; Karen Lightfoot, communications director and senior policy advisor; David Rapallo, chief investigative

counsel; Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Lawrence

Halloran, minority staff director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief

counsel for oversight and investigations; Keith Ausbrook, minority

general counsel; John Brosnan, minority senior procurement counsel; Steve Castor, minority counsel; Mark Lavin, minority Army fellow; Brian McNicoll, minority communications director; and John

Ohly, minority professional staff member.

Chairman WAXMAN. The meeting of the committee will please

come to order.

Our soldiers and their families make enormous sacrifices for our

country. And they make these sacrifices understanding the deadly

risks that they may face. Since the Iraq war began over 5 years

ago, over 4,000 servicemen and women have been killed and over

30,000 injured. But no soldier should die while relaxing in a swimming pool, or washing a vehicle, or taking a shower. Yet that is exactly what happened in Iraq. As a result of widespread electrical

deficiencies throughout U.S. military facilities, our soldiers have

been shocked and killed needlessly.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine why this happened

and to determine whether the actions taken by the Defense Department and its largest contractor in Iraq, KBR, are sufficient to prevent these senseless deaths.

There was no shortage of warnings about the electrical dangers

in Iraq, just a shortage of will to do the right thing by our troops.

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In 2004, the U.S. Army Safety Center issued a report warning

about widespread electrical hazards throughout Iraq. The report

explained that five U.S. soldiers had been electrocuted in Iraq that

year alone. According to the report, one of these soldiers ‘‘was

found dead, lying on a shower room floor with burn marks on his

body.’’ The report attributed his death to ‘‘electricity that traveled

from the water heater through the metal pipes to the showerhead.’’

The 2004 report warned commanders that they ‘‘must require

contractors to properly ground electrical systems.’’ But despite

these warnings, few actions were taken by Pentagon leadership or

KBR officials.

In February 2007, the Defense Contract Management Agency reported that there had been 283 fires at facilities maintained by

KBR in a 5-month period from August 2006 through January 2007.

These fires burned down the largest dining facility in Iraq. And

they killed at least two soldiers.

The Defense Contract Management Agency report described the

widespread electrical deficiencies as a ‘‘major challenge’’ and the

‘‘primary safety threat, theater wide.’’ It also warned that ‘‘some

contractors connected to KBR were not following basic safety principles.’’

But Defense Department officials again took no action. In a May

2008 e-mail, a DCMA official warned his superiors that the ‘‘lack

of action with regard to any corrective action, or increased surveillance, results in a direct liability for our Agency.’’

In his testimony today, Jeffrey Parsons, the executive director of

the Army Contracting Command, says that the Defense Department now recognizes that ‘‘neither LOGCAP nor DCMA have sufficient skill sets or expertise to perform adequate oversight of electrical work being performed by KBR.’’

Well, that is a remarkable admission. We will ask why it took

the Defense Department 4 years to realize that it lacks the skill

and expertise to oversee KBR. In total, 19 U.S. military and contractor personnel may have been killed as a result of electrocution

or faulty wiring in Iraq. These young heroes might still be alive

today if the Department had done the proper oversight.

One of the individuals who died by electrocution is Staff Sergeant

Ryan Maseth, a decorated Army Ranger and Green Beret who was

electrocuted in his shower on January 2, 2008. Army investigators

concluded that he was killed when his water pump overheated,

‘‘thereby causing the failure of the breaker switch, capacitor, and

internal fuse.’’

A preliminary report by the Defense Department Inspector General on Sergeant Maseth’s death was provided to the committee on

Monday and leaked to the press yesterday. This IG report absolves

the military and KBR of responsibility in the death and asserts

that there was ‘‘no credible evidence’’ that they knew of electrical

problems with Staff Sergeant Maseth’s shower.

As part of the Oversight Committee’s investigation, we obtained

many new documents about Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. When

we described these documents to the Inspector General’s staff yesterday, they said they believed they did not have this new information.

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Now, we do not know whether the Inspector General failed to ask

for the right documents, which would be a stain on the Inspector

General’s work, or whether the documents were withheld from the

Inspector General, which would call into question the motives of

the Department and KBR. But we do know that these documents

appear to contradict the Inspector General’s findings.

My staff has prepared an analysis of the new information about

Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. And I ask that this staff analysis

and the documents it cites be made part of today’s hearing record.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. There is no objection, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, that will be the order.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. The documents obtained by the committee

include work orders from the facility where Staff Sergeant Maseth

was electrocuted. These work orders appear to show that Sergeant

Justin Hummer, who occupied Staff Sergeant Maseth’s quarters

until October 2007, repeatedly warned KBR and the military about

electrical shocks in the shower.

According to Sergeant Hummer, he was shocked ‘‘four or five

times in the shower,’’ between June and October 2007. On at least

one occasion, he ‘‘had to use a wooden handle to turn off the shower nozzle because the electrical current was so strong.’’

If these work orders are accurate, they show that in July 2007,

6 months before Staff Sergeant Maseth was electrocuted, KBR may

have installed the water pump that ultimately malfunctioned, resulting in his death.

The electrical problems that led to Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death

were not new problems. In February 2007, KBR conducted an assessment of the facility where he worked. The KBR assessment

found major electrical problems, including with the building’s main

circuit panel.

These problems were confirmed in a second KBR assessment prepared after Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death. The report found that

the majority of electrical panels in the complex ‘‘are in disrepair

and require replacement’’ and that a majority of electrical systems

are ‘‘in complete disarray.’’

The serious electrical hazards are finally getting some attention.

KBR recommended in March that troops immediately evacuate at

least six buildings at the compound where Staff Sergeant Maseth

was killed because the ‘‘electrical conditions in all buildings make

them uninhabitable for safety and health reasons.’’

Today we will ask why it took so long for KBR and the Defense

Department to protect our troops from these dangerous conditions.

We are going to ask our witnesses tough questions about the documents we have obtained, and we will try to understand both the

specific cases and the broad systemic problems at issue.

I know that one of our witnesses recently retired and did not

have to appear today. I know that others flew in from Iraq for this

hearing. And I want to thank all of you for your cooperation with

the committee’s investigation.

Before we call on our witnesses, I want to recognize Mr. Davis.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to

be brief, because I know we have Senator Casey. We are happy to

have you here today.

Today’s hearing will examine injuries and deaths of military personnel resulting from deficiencies in the electric system at facilities

occupied by our forces in Iraq. There is no question every one of

these accidental deaths is a tragedy. There is also no doubt the

electric infrastructure in Iraq is a mess and presents a constant

danger to everyone there.

Further, there is little question the electric systems within many

of the facilities occupied by our personnel are significantly below

U.S. standards. In many cases, pursuant to command decisions, we

are forced to use buildings built and wired during the regime of

Saddam. Apparently, the regime had the same disdain for building

codes it showed to U.N. resolutions.

The first step in preventing injuries and death from electrocution

is to do a better job training our soldiers to appreciate the inherent

dangers of living, working, and fighting in the middle of a Third

World electrical infrastructure. These are considerations you don’t

often work about in the United States and other First World countries. Our soldiers are trained and equipped to deal with the inevitably dangerous environment of Iraq and other war zones, but are

they sufficiently prepared to understand the dangers of

ungrounded high voltage electric current?

As you said, Mr. Chairman, on January 2, 2008, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan D. Maseth was electrocuted while showering in his

Special Forces compound in Baghdad. Sergeant Maseth was electrocuted when the ungrounded water pump on the roof of his facilities failed and electrified the water distribution pipes. The safety

shut-off also failed, apparently, because tar from recent roof repairs

followed the circuit breaker.

Sergeant Maseth’s death is 1 of 16 electrocutions identified by investigators from the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector

General. The accidental deaths have occurred under myriad circumstances. IG investigators determined eight of the cases involved

contact with power lines during military or construction operations.

Four cases were caused by improperly grounded or faulty electric

equipment. The three remaining cases involved individuals attempting to repair faulty electric equipment.

These deaths raised the question of whether our soldiers are

properly trained to be aware and vigilant. For example, in May

2004, a soldier was electrocuted after trying to use a shower that

was taken out of service for maintenance reasons. It was locked

and the wiring disconnected, but a tired soldier looking for some

clean water and comfort put the shower back into service with

tragic results. Another unfortunate incident involved a service

member who died after being clipped by a low hanging power line

while atop a 7-ton truck.

Better communication and safety awareness training may have

prevented these deaths, and I think would have prevented these

deaths. These accidents are troubling, occurring under a variety of

circumstances in different locations throughout Iraq. They have occurred in facilities such as forward operating bases and camps,

along power lines, atop towers, while traveling in vehicles, and outVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:11 Apr 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48065.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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side tents. Fatalities have occurred in connection with servicing

generators, communication equipment, radar equipment, lighting

systems, and air conditioning units.

According to the IG, these unfortunate incidents had no correlation with each other in terms of causal factors other than the need

for better safety standards and practices in an inherently unsafe

environment. So based on what we know, it is premature to attribute electric incidents to just contractor performance. And the

familiar contractor blame doesn’t make soldiers safe by themselves,

but we need to look at it and understand it further.

It is true that the death of Sergeant Maseth occurred in a facility

maintained by KBR, the former Halliburton subsidiary that provides most of the logistical support for our forces in Iraq. The contract calls only for repairs when requested by the military unit,

and we will learn more about this as we move through the hearing

today.

An internal report by the IG on the Maseth tragedy found no evidence, no credible evidence, that representatives from KBR, or

DCMA, were aware of imminent life-threatening hazards prior to

the electrocution, but other aspects of the incident are in litigation.

And this committee should tread carefully so that we don’t interfere with prejudice into that.

This hearing should also help raise awareness of important safety issues affecting our soldiers, sailors, and Marines abroad. Any

death of deployed personnel by electrocution in theaters should be

promptly and thoroughly investigated. All factors contributing to

unsafe conditions should be immediately remedied. At times, this

involves making sure contractors do what DOD pays them to do.

It will always mean doing everything possible to increase occupational safety, training, and awareness, for those we send to do the

most unsafe thing imaginable, and that is fight a war. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Let me ask unanimous consent that Representative Brady and Altmire be permitted to sit with us in our

hearing today. They are not members of the committee, but we

want to welcome them and their interest in this subject.

I am pleased to welcome Senator Bob Casey to give a statement

to the committee. Senator Casey, who represents the family of Staff

Sergeant Ryan Maseth, has been actively involved in these issues

in the Senate, and I thank him for being here and for his testimony

today. Senator, this committee is unusual in that every witness

that testifies before us does so under oath. And we would like to

ask you if you would rise and hold up your right hand?

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that you answered

in the affirmative. We are pleased to have you here and to recognize you for such statement as you wish to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., A U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the

privilege that I have to testify today before this committee and for

your leadership on this issue. I want to thank you and thank Ranking Member Davis for this opportunity, and especially for the commitment that you have made to find the truth, the truth as it relates to the death of Ryan Maseth, as well as the other soldiers and

others who have lost their lives because of this problem we have

had in Iraq. And I want to thank other members of the committee

who are here. I know that Jason Altmire, from Pennsylvania, who

as well represents this family is here with us today.

And I am really here for a number of reasons, but I think the

principal reason I am sitting here today, and maybe the principal

reason that many of us are sitting here today, is because of the

courage of a number of people, but in particular, the courage and

the determination that Cheryl Harris has shown. To do two things

really, one obviously, as a mother, as a member of a family who

lost someone tragically in Iraq to get answers, to get the truth

about what happened to her son. No one would expect anything

less of her. But she has also been so committed to finding the truth

about this so that it doesn’t happen to any other family. Over and

over again, she has emphasized that.

And when you think about all of the ways that a soldier can die

in battle, die on the battle field, no one would ever imagine, and

I think one of the major questions that hangs over this hearing and

this tragedy, and the series of tragedies, is why should a soldier be

put at risk when he is taking a shower, or when he is washing a

Humvee, or doing the things that soldiers do in their daily lives

when they are not on the battlefield, when they are not under fire?

And as you said, Mr. Chairman, Ryan Maseth is a native of

Shaler, PA, in western Pennsylvania. A decorated Army Ranger

and Green Beret. And when he was killed, he didn’t die of enemy

fire, but he was electrocuted simply by taking a shower. His mother, Cheryl Harris, was first told by Army officials that Ryan died

because he took an electrical appliance into the shower. Only after

further digging did she learn that he died because an improperly

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grounded water pump produced an electrical current in Ryan’s

shower.

And it is because of her passion and drive to find the truth that

I, and others, are here today. What she deserves and what every

family deserves is very simple, an honest explanation of what led

to the death of her child, and accountability for those whose actions

may have, may have, contributed to an unnecessary death.

We are, I believe, at the beginning of what should be a comprehensive inquiry. We have many more questions at this time

than answers. Multiple actors, including the Defense Department,

private contractors, and others, may bear varying levels of responsibility and we should not leap to presume guilt by anyone. But it

is important that we pursue this matter wherever it may lead. I

wrote in my initial letter to Secretary Gates last month that we

need to know ‘‘what steps the Department of Defense has taken to

ensure that no more American men or women serving in Iraq suffer needless deaths by electrocution due to faulty wiring or negligent maintenance.’’

Mr. Chairman, just a quick summary of some of the history here,

some of which you have already outlined. You cited testimony and

evidence that indicates that in October 2004, only 18 months after

the United States entered Iraq, the Army published a safety bulletin describing electrocutions as a ‘‘killer of soldiers.’’ Frank Trent,

a safety specialist with the Army Corps of Engineers, was quoted

in the report as follows, in part, ‘‘We’ve had several shocks in showers and near misses here in Baghdad, as well as other parts of the

country. As we install temporary and permanent power on our

projects, we must ensure we require our contracts to properly

ground electrical systems.’’ So said a safety specialist with the

Army Corps of Engineers in October 2004.

And as you cited, Mr. Chairman, between June and October

2007, Sergeant 1st Class Justin Hummer residing at the same Palace Complex, where Ryan Maseth would later live, during this time

period Mr. Hummer reports being shocked in the shower at least

four times and submits a work order at that time, each time for

an appropriate repair to be made.

And then finally, on January 2, 2008, Sergeant Maseth steps into

the shower and was electrocuted. His body, burnt and smoldering,

is discovered at that time by a fellow soldier who himself is then

severely shocked due to a lingering current.

We were initially told that 12 Americans had died due to electrocution deaths in Iraq. On July 8th, General David Petraeus, in response to a question that I submitted to him, stated, in fact, that

13, not 12, 13 Americans, 11 soldiers and two contractor employees,

died by electrocution. When I met with Mr. William Utt, the president and CEO of KBR last Friday, he told me that KBR believes

that 15 Americans have died by electrocution. Finally, just in the

last 24 to 48 hours, the Department of Defense Inspector General

is reporting 16 non-combat electrocutions in Iraq since 2003. So, we

have to get to the bottom of what that number is.

Mr. Chairman, when I met with the KBR CEO on Friday, he told

me that KBR does not bear responsibility for Ryan Maseth’s death

because KBR, allegedly, was operating at the complex in Baghdad

under the so-called Level B contract engagement. Under this type

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of contract, Mr. Utt asserted that KBR technicians were responsible for servicing problems brought to their attention by the Army,

and not given the broader task of preventive maintenance and

proactively identifying problems, as a ‘‘Level A’’ contract responsibility would have required.

We don’t know what the truth is there. Just because someone asserts what their responsibility was doesn’t make it so. We need to

know more about Level B and Level A, but especially what Level

B meant.

I have sent letters to both Mr. Utt and the Pentagon to ascertain

the facts. But it does not explain why, even after four separate

work orders were filed in a matter of months on the same shower,

why that shower was never fixed and why Ryan Maseth was electrocuted in that same shower. It is my hope today that this hearing

will begin to shed further light on this question, and other questions as well. I look forward to reviewing what the Defense Department Inspector General has to say.

I was, however, yesterday, disappointed that the Pentagon’s chief

spokesman, at his daily briefing, made an unprompted statement

questioning the rationale for this hearing and implying that partisan politics are involved in this hearing. The U.S. Congress

should not apologize for carrying out one of its core functions, as

envisioned by the Framers of our Constitution, oversight of the executive branch. While they died under different circumstances, we

know that these Americans, and possibly more, died of electrocutions in Iraq. Sixteen deaths do not make for isolated incidents

or random occurrences. They constitute a pattern and are of genuine danger to our men and women serving in Iraq.

As this danger continues to this very day, my office has heard

from several active-duty soldiers, who report that, as recently as 3

weeks ago, soldiers in Iraq continue to receive electrical shocks on

a regular basis as they carry out their daily activities, including

taking showers. Electric shocks are not the only danger produced

by faulty wiring. There have been hundreds and hundreds of electrical fires at U.S. military facilities throughout Iraq since 2003.

The Defense Department itself acknowledged that almost 300

electrical fires in one 5-month period between 2006 and 2007. On

June 25th, a faulty light fixture sparked a blaze that destroyed 10

buildings in the U.S. encampment outside Fallujah. Thank God,

there were no casualties, but members of the Lima Company 3rd

Battalion 6th Marine Regiment lost their entire possessions. They

have been forced to write home and ask for donations to replace

personal items.

Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude with this. I am not here, nor

is anyone here, to point fingers, but simply to demand the truth.

We are not here to prejudge the culpability of KBR, the Defense

Contract Management Agency, the U.S. Army, or any other entity.

The Congress must proceed with an open and transparent investigation. But Cheryl Harris, and the loved ones of at least 15,

maybe more, other Americans, deserve answers. They need to know

why faulty wiring in Iraq has been highlighted, time and time

again, as a major safety hazard going back to as early as 2004, but

little or no action has been taken.

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The American people and these families have a right to know the

truth. We arrive in America at the truth by asking tough questions

and demanding honest and complete answers. Our system of justice is by its very nature adversarial. We know that the truth

doesn’t fall like raindrops, clear raindrops from the sky. It must be

elicited from individuals or unearthed in documents or other evidence. The only way to bring about justice is to get the truth.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before

this hearing.

[The prepared statement of Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr., follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Casey.

I agree with you. It is our responsibility to get to the truth. And

I am amazed that someone would consider this in any way partisan. It is ironic to hear that people that should have been doing

the oversight within the military, who are saying that they did the

best they could, and the contractor saying he did the best he could,

and then as Congress looks at it, they say, well, if you look at it,

it must be partisan. One of the best ways to keep people honest is

to make sure that we get to the truth and the people know the

truth is going to come out, not so much because we want to blame

people but because we want these problems corrected.

I, too, met with Cheryl Harris and I know of her commitment to

make sure that what she suffered with the loss of her son doesn’t

happen to anyone else. And I congratulate you as her Senator, and

Congressman Altmire as her Representative in the House, for insisting on this investigation, and insisting on this hearing, and insisting on knowing the facts, not with any other purpose but to get

the facts so that this sort of thing will never happen again. I thank

you for being here.

Mr. Davis, do you have comments?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, Senator Casey, we very much appreciate your being here and your leadership on there, and I just

want to reiterate what the chairman said. This is not partisan politics. We support this hearing, and I think we would be remiss and

even negligent if we didn’t follow through and investigate. This is

something that the executive branch has really not seen fit to follow through on. If the executive branch doesn’t want to get to the

bottom of this, this committee certainly will, and we appreciate

your efforts on this and will continue to work with you. Thank you

for being here.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. With the indulgence of the other Members,

we would like to move to the second panel. Thank you very much,

Senator, for being here.

I want to now call forward the following witnesses: For the

DCMA, Charlie E. Williams, Jr., the Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency; Keith Ernst, the former Director of the

Defense Contract Management Agency; he retired from that position in May 2008. From the Army, Jeffrey P. Parsons, the Executive Director of the U.S. Army Contracting Command. From the

Defense Department, Inspector General Gordon Heddell, Acting Inspector General at the Department of Defense, and he is accompanied by Don Horstman, the Deputy Inspector General for Policy

and Oversight; and from KBR, Thomas Bruni, who is KBR’s Theater Engineering and construction manager for Iraq.

We are pleased to have all of you here. Even before you sit down,

you might as well keep standing, because it is our practice to put

all witnesses under oath. So, if you would raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. The record will indicate that each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative. For those of you who have

given us a prepared statement in advance, that statement will be

in the record in its entirety. What we would like to ask each of you

is to give us an oral presentation of around 5 minutes. We are

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going to have a clock that will indicate that green for 4 minutes,

yellow for the last minute, and then when the 5-minutes is up, it

will turn red. And when you see a red light, we would very much

appreciate it if you would conclude your testimony.

We are delighted that you are all here and I thank you for being

here.

Mr. Williams, why don’t we start with you.

STATEMENTS OF CHARLES E. WILLIAMS, JR., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED

BY DAVE GRAFF, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION;

KEITH ERNST, FORMER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT

MANAGEMENT AGENCY; JEFFREY P. PARSONS, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND, U.S. ARMY;

GORDON S. HEDDELL, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY DON

HORSTMAN, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR POLICY

AND OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND

THOMAS BRUNI, THEATER ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGER, KBR, INC.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. WILLIAMS, JR.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, Chairman Waxman, Congressmen

Davis, and distinguished members of the Committee on Oversight

and Government Reform. I appreciate the opportunity to appear

before you and discuss your concerns about the Defense Contract

Management Agency’s contract management and oversight in Iraq.

With me today is Captain Dave Graff, Director of our International

Division.

First, I would like to recognize the families of our fallen patriots

for their courage and strength. We honor their children, spouses,

and siblings for the great sacrifices they have made in support of

their country and each of us. The loss of life is always tragic.

Please know that the entire DCMA team is committed to the care

and safety of our warfighters, civilians, and contractor personnel.

I became the Director of DCMA in May of this year, and my comments today reflect my observations over the last 3 months. I am

extremely proud to lead the DCMA team of approximately 9,900

professional civilians and military located in over 700 locations

around the world. DCMA is responsible for the administration of

about 324,000 contracts with unliquidated obligations of over $180

billion awarded to over 17,000 contractors. DCMA accepts approximately 750,000 shipments of supplies and some 1,200 aircraft each

year. We also manage over $100 billion of government property and

administer about $32 billion of contract financial payments each

year. I am greatly impressed with the dedication and commitment

of our employees to support our warfighters and I am honored to

serve as the DCMA Director.

Since the standup of the Defense Contract Management Command in March 1990, except for aircraft maintenance, closeout, and

vehicle heavy repair, the Agency’s contract administration services

have been primarily focused on weapons systems. We have, however, applied our support to battlefield service contracts awarded

by the military services, largely under the Army’s Logistics Civil

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Augmentation Program [LOGCAP], and to a lesser extent the Air

Force’s Contract Augmentation Program [AFCAP].

DCMA does not develop or retain employees with deep technical

skills in overseeing construction and facilities contracts. To perform

contract management responsibilities for service contracts in Iraq,

DCMA relies on obtaining technical expertise from the military

services in the form of contracting officer representatives or support provided by other Department of Defense entities.

Since initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, DCMA has taken on an increasing role in providing contract management services in support of operations in the

theater. In late 2007 and early 2008, DCMA deployed an additional

100 personnel to support the expanded need for additional contractor oversight of personnel security contracts and various other theater-wide contract activities. We anticipate that the total DCMA

managed capability in theater will be approximately 225 personnel

by the end of this year.

Today DCMA manages contracts in excess of $12 billion, supporting 124 forward operating bases and approximately 350,000 coalition forces and civilian/contractor personnel in Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar

and Afghanistan. DCMA is currently working with the Army on

the transition planning for LOGCAP IV, ensuring that there is no

disruption in logistical support to our forces or loss of accountability for the government property that we oversee.

Additionally, DCMA has been working very closely with the Joint

Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan to develop better controls

of contractor movement in theater via the use of Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker system and on various other

contract management needs.

From a comprehensive agency perspective I think it is important

to recognize that just as our contingency contracting theater mission has grown, our traditional CONUS mission has also grown

and become more complex. In fiscal year 2001, we managed contracts with $100 billion of unliquidated obligations, and today that

number is $180 billion.

Balancing these two missions has further stressed the already

downsized DCMA work force and represents risks on both missions. Since fiscal year 1990, DCMA’s civilian work force has declined by 59 percent to under 10,000 personnel. To address our resource requirements, the Agency is working closely with the Office

of the Secretary of Defense to ensure we have the required resources to support the needs of the Department.

I would like to also thank the Congress for passage last year of

the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, commonly

known as Section 852. That fund certainly helped get us started

down the road.

Let me close by stating that my assessment during the past 21⁄2

months is that we are moving in the right direction, collectively in

the Department and in DCMA. We have learned from the early

days of LOGCAP and we continue to learn every day. This allows

us to identify gaps in our administration oversight and continuously revise the processes needed to effectively manage the O&M

contract requirements.

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In closing, we appreciate the congressional support of our efforts

as the Department’s primary contract management agency in providing our nation’s warfighters and allies with quality products and

services. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this

committee today to address DCMA’s role in this matter. I look forward to answering any questions the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Williams.

Mr. Ernst.

STATEMENT OF KEITH ERNST

Mr. ERNST. Chairman Waxman, Congressman Davis, and distinguished members of the Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss your concerns about contract management and oversight in

Iraq.

Before I begin, I would like to recognize the men and women who

serve our country and especially the families of our fallen heroes

for their courage and heart. Our servicemen and women and their

civilian counterparts lay their lives on the line every day and the

death of any soldier, sailor, airman, marine, or civilian is a tragedy.

It was my privilege for close to 25 years to work in helping to

ensure that the military men and women who serve this country

are provided with the best equipment and services possible. From

January 2006 until my retirement at the end of April, this year,

I had the opportunity to serve as both the Acting Director and then

Director of DCMA. Every member of the Defense Contract Management Agency team that I had personal contact with during my career take their responsibility to support the warfighter very seriously. Those men and women that perform this mission in theater

in support of our deployed members are some of the most motivated people I have ever worked with.

The Defense Contract Management Agency’s mission is worldwide and complex. DCMA excels at the oversight and management

of contracts performed in plant environments across the globe for

a full range of products serviced by the military. To be successful

in this mission requires that DCMA’s personnel be proficient not

only in the business and financial management aspects of the contract but to also have a detailed understanding of the technical requirements of the product or service being acquired. This technical

understanding for in-plant work is gained through professional

classroom training, extensive on the job training, and experience.

This training and experience package allows the quality assurance

rep to ensure conformance to technical requirements.

One of the main hurdles to accomplishing the oversight mission

in Iraq and Afghanistan is that DCMA does not perform the technical function this mission requires outside of theater. As a result,

DCMA does not have a corps of personnel with extensive knowledge in the areas of potable water, waste treatment, dining facilities, security contracts, or facility construction and maintenance.

The Gansler Commission clearly recognized this issue when they

recommended that DCMA be provided additional resources and be

assigned this mission in the continent United States. The Commission realized this was necessary in order to gain both the training

and experience required to excel in the performance of this mission.

Clearly, either DCMA needs to be assigned this mission CONUS

with appropriate resource increases or those organizations responsible for this mission outside of theater needs to accept the responsibility for performance of this mission in theater.

From 2001 to 2008, DCMA’s personnel decreased by close to 25

percent while its mission, as measured by unliquidated obligations,

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increased by nearly 80 percent. Due to the Agency’s decreasing

number of personnel, increasing requirements both in-plant and intheater, and a lack of experience in the technical areas required by

theater mission, DCMA implemented an oversight process in Iraq

and Afghanistan utilizing an extensive network of contracting officer representatives. These individuals are typically members of the

operational units receiving the services of the contractor and are

the technical experts that DCMA relies on to help ensure conformance to contractual technical requirements.

The input of these individuals is critical in identifying technical

performance issues and providing timely feedback to the DCMA

quality assurance representative for appropriate action with the

contractor. At the end of April 2008, DCMA had over 600 of these

CORs providing technical oversight of the mission and reporting

the results to the QAR responsible for overseeing the contractor.

In closing, I appreciate the support of both the Department and

the Congress of DCMA’s effort as the primary contract management agency in providing our nation’s warfighters and allies with

quality products and services. The in-theater contract oversight

mission is a formidable one. Aspects of such a mission, including

personnel security and safety, workload shifts and dispersion, and

personnel placement, are a continual challenge.

During my time as Director of DCMA, I worked to effectively balance resource requirements between our core, in-plant mission and

our contingency contracting mission to ensure that the high risk

missions in both environments received the type of coverage required. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this

committee today to address DCMA’s role in this matter and answer

any questions the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ernst follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ernst.

Mr. Parsons.

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY P. PARSONS

Mr. PARSONS. Chairman Waxman, Congressman Davis, and distinguished members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you

and discuss your concerns related to injuries and deaths associated

with electrical issues in Iraq and the Department’s management

and oversight of these contractors performing Operation and Maintenance [O&M], of the facilities where our military and civilian

personnel work and live each and every day. Just as the committee

is concerned with the injuries and deaths that have taken place in

Iraq, so is the Army.

Each injury and loss of life is a tragedy and we must do all we

can to minimize the threats to our personnel. Our management

and oversight of contractor performance must ensure that our contractors are meeting the standards and requirements specified in

their contracts. To this end, the Army continues to pursue and implement many of the recommendations identified by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, which released its final report, ‘‘Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,’’ on October 31, 2007.

Why I am here today as the Army witness, I do work for the U.S.

Army Materiel Command. Our responsibility in the CENTCOMM

theater of operations primarily consists of management and execution of a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program [LOGCAP]. This

program is managed by the Army Sustainment Command located

at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, a subordinate command of the

Army Materiel Command.

Based upon our review of available information, it appears that

there are a total of 16 deaths resulting from electrocutions or other

electrical related incidents since the inception of our operations in

Iraq. The majority of these deaths are the result of accidents associated with the conduct of military or construction operations, although three and possibly a fourth appear to be related to electrical

issues associated with facilities over a 5-year timeframe.

The only fatality that we can connect to a facility maintained

under the LOGCAP III contract is the tragic January 2, 2008 incident, where Staff Sergeant Maseth was electrocuted while taking

a shower. Those quarters that he lived in are commonly referred

to as the RPC. This is a pre-existing Iraqi facility occupied by U.S.

personnel. The circumstances surrounding his death are currently

under investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General. I can assure the committee that the Army is cooperating with

the Inspector General and will quickly respond to the Inspector

General’s final report. In addition to corrective actions already

taken, we will take whatever additional corrective actions are required to protect the life, safety and health of our personnel.

At the time of Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death in January 2008,

the LOGCAP contract included O&M requirements for the facility

where the accident occurred. The task order covering the O&M of

the facilities in the RPC was issued in February 2007. The specific

O&M requirements were jointly developed with the customer for

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the facility in question and commonly referred to as Level B. This

means the contractor, in this case Kellogg, Brown and Root, was

only required to provide limited maintenance. Limited maintenance

does not include routine inspections, preventative maintenance and

upgrades. Any repairs that need to be conducted on the facility are

initiated with a service request by the customer.

We are also aware that there were previous contracts for the

O&M of this facility prior to the task order issued under LOGCAP

III. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded three previous contracts starting in November 2003 that required the O&M of these

facilities. Knowing that they were additional contracts requiring

O&M of facilities in Iraq, we are in the process of identifying the

scope of their contractual requirements. This review should provide

us with a holistic picture. The electrical issues in Iraq involve more

than just the LOGCAP III contract.

As a result of our investigations, we have taken a number of corrective actions. We are working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to obtain additional expertise in the oversight of electrical

work by our contractors. Furthermore, we are working with the

Corps of Engineers, DCMA, and the customer to develop a plan to

conduct inspection verifications of those buildings recently inspected by KBR for life, health, and safety issues. We will utilize

a third party to validate those inspections.

The LOGCAP Program Director also met with KBR officials to

discuss their hiring practices and requirements for electricians to

include certification requirements. Following this meeting, the contracting officer issued a contract modification to the LOGCAP III

contract on July 21, 2008 to more clearly specify personnel and certification requirements.

KBR was also directed to submit a Trades Certificate and Validation Plan to the Government describing the process they will use

to recruit, train, and retain qualified personnel. The plan must address the criteria through which personnel, including non-U.S. citizens, will be qualified and/or certified as a master journeyman or

apprentice, and the proposed schedule for implementing the plan.

This requirement is also applicable to all subcontractors.

Expeditionary military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have

placed extraordinary demands on our contracting system and the

people who make it work. The vast majority of our military and civilian contracting personnel perform well in tough, austere conditions. We know that the success of our warfighters and those who

lead them is linked directly to the success of our contracting work

force. We are working hard to ensure that contracting is a core

competency with the Army. We appreciate the concerns expressed

by the committee and we are aggressively moving out to make improvements. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parsons follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Parsons.

Mr. Heddell.

STATEMENT OF GORDON S. HEDDELL

Mr. HEDDELL. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of this

committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this

morning. My name is Gordon Heddell and I am the Acting Inspector General for the Department of Defense. The magnitude and

complexity of the Department of Defense requires nothing less than

a full time effort. We are in a time of war and our work not only

saves taxpayer dollars, but also, and much more importantly, the

lives of U.S. service members.

To that end, I assure you that we take issues regarding safety

very seriously. The men and women engaged in Operation Iraqi

Freedom, whether service members, Federal employees, or contractor personnel, deserve an environment that is free from preventable dangers. In response to recent concerns regarding electrocution deaths of service members in Iraq, my office has initiated two

complementary reviews.

The first review, which is still ongoing, is looking into the relevant management, contracting, and maintenance actions prior to

and subsequent to the death of Staff Sergeant Ryan D. Maseth,

U.S. Army. This review is being conducted at the request of the

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

in response to inquiries made by Representative Altmire, and observations were provided earlier this week.

I want to emphasize and strongly caution that the information

I provide here this morning is preliminary in nature and subject

to change. This is an interim response, a status report, if you will,

not a final report. Just last night we received significant information from this committee. This was not unexpected, as we work to

obtain additional information and documentation from various

sources leading to our ultimate findings and conclusions, which will

be contained in our final report.

The second review evaluated the sufficiency of criminal investigations involving electrocution deaths of U.S. military or Department of Defense related personnel in Iraq. This review also sought

to glean from the investigative case files information concerning

the nature of the electrocutions that might be helpful in responding

to the Deputy Under Secretary and to Members of Congress.

Since March 2003, there were 16 electrocution fatalities in Iraq.

Fifteen of those were military members and one Defense Department foreign national civilian employee. We determined that investigations conducted by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service accurately determined the nature and cause of death in each instance. We also

found that these 16 electrocutions can be attributed to a variety of

causes. This includes electrocution deaths caused by contact with

power lines, ungrounded and/or faulty electrical equipment, and

working with electrical equipment or attempting to make an electrical repair.

Based on the investigations reviewed, we are concerned that

Iraq’s infrastructure continues to pose a significant hazard to U.S.

personnel in-country. This is due to poor design, inferior construcVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:11 Apr 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48065.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tion standards, a failure to upgrade electrical systems, and systems

that are not properly grounded.

Let me once again assure you, my office takes the safety of our

men and women serving in Iraq, and elsewhere, very seriously. We

have additional work to perform, and we will keep you aware of the

progress of our efforts regarding the death of Sergeant Maseth. We

extend our sympathies to the family of Sergeant Maseth, and to his

friends, and to other individuals and families of others that have

been involved in these very, very unfortunate and tragic incidents.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I am

ready to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Heddell.

Mr. Horstman.

Mr. HORSTMAN. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Bruni.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS BRUNI

Mr. BRUNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Thomas

Bruni. I am the Theater engineer and construction manager for

KBR in Baghdad in support of United States and Coalition troops.

I am here today to assist the committee in its inquiry regarding the

maintenance of electrical systems in facilities occupied by U.S. military and contractor personnel in Iraq.

I would like to begin my remarks by expressing on behalf of KBR

our deepest sympathy to all of the families and friends who have

lost loved ones. It is important to honor these soldiers by examining the circumstances surrounding their untimely deaths, and KBR

is completely committed to assisting in this process. From everything we presently know, KBR’s actions were not the cause of any

of these terrible accidents, however, I hope that my testimony

today will help the committee answer its questions about this important issue.

I am a civil engineer and a former member of the U.S. Marine

Corps and the Army National Guard. I have also served as the director of Engineering for Northeastern University and as the director of Capital Projects Management for Boston College.

I first joined KBR in 2005 as a Deputy Project Manager in Al

Anbar Province. I am now the Theater Engineering and Construction Manager.

KBR is one of many contractors providing support to United

States and Coalition personnel in Iraq. The current environment in

Iraq presents unique maintenance challenges. Many U.S. military

personnel and contractors currently occupy facilities that were built

during Saddam Hussein’s reign and contain inferior electrical and

other systems compared to U.S. standards. KBR is, therefore, even

more acutely aware of electrical safety concerns.

A number of electrical shock incidents have recently gained attention in the media and in Congress. There are media reports that

as many as 15 soldiers have been killed by electrical shocks in

Iraq. These reports have contained a number of factual errors and

inaccuracies. The reality is that KBR’s actions were not the cause

of any of these terrible accidents. In fact, only one of the 15 incidents even occurred at a facility where KBR had maintenance responsibility. And I would like to describe KBR’s current understanding of that incident.

KBR had, as directed, maintenance responsibilities at the

Radwaniyah Palace Complex [RPC], where a soldier died from an

electrical shock in January 2008. RPC, which consists of roughly

200 buildings, was built and controlled by Saddam Hussein’s regime until occupied by the U.S. military. The military had assigned

Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth to live in a small, one-level building

at RPC, now known as LSF–1, with another Army staff sergeant

and an Iraqi interpreter.

At the time that KBR was first tasked with any maintenance for

this building in 2006, all of the electrical systems and equipment

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had already been installed, though KBR does not know when or by

whom. KBR’s maintenance responsibility at that time was limited

to repairs only at the direction of the Army.

It is important to understand how the Army categorizes maintenance responsibilities. Under LOGCAP, the Army directs KBR to

perform different levels of maintenance service. In some facilities,

KBR provides Level A maintenance service, in which KBR is authorized to perform maintenance and repairs without specific instructions from the Army. In other facilities, KBR provides Level

B maintenance service performing repairs only when specifically directed to do so by the Army. The decision to classify any building

at a specific level is a decision made by the Army, at its own discretion.

In February 2007, KBR conducted a technical inspection of LSF–

1. Under LOGCAP, KBR conducts such inspections to assess the

conditions of a building, and the Army determines the level of service required for that building. For LSF–1, the Army directed KBR

to provide Level B service. Therefore, KBR was not authorized to

perform repairs without specific direction from the Army.

This February 2007 technical inspection identified a number of

electrical deficiencies. However, the Army did not authorize KBR

to repair the identified electrical deficiencies. In November 2007, at

the Army’s request, KBR again produced the same February 2007

technical inspection. Once again, the Army did not authorize KBR

to make the repairs.

It is my understanding that the Army now believes that Staff

Sergeant Maseth’s death was the result of a malfunctioning water

pump on the roof of his building. Though we cannot be certain who

installed the water pump, we do know that KBR did not do so, and

that it was most likely Iraqi-installed. We have been told that the

water pump contained camel-hair string in place of Teflon tape,

which is a practice frequently used by local Iraqi workers.

Finally, at the direction of the Army, KBR has subsequently performed additional inspections in the LSF–1 building, as well as

other buildings throughout RPC. KBR has also conducted at the

Army’s direction, inspections of all occupied hard-stand structures

in Iraq.

As I have described, KBR views safety as a top priority and will

continue to pursue the highest level of safety throughout Iraq. I

hope that my testimony has aided the committee in understanding

these issues, and I will do my best to answer any questions you

may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bruni follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bruni.

We will now have questions from members of the committee. I

will start off.

I want to ask about the death of Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth.

He was a highly decorated Army Ranger, a former Green Beret,

killed in January of this year while taking a shower. Army investigators determined that he was electrocuted. Both the Defense Department and KBR have said they had no knowledge of any electrical problems that resulted in his death, and that they didn’t

know of any in that building.

Mr. Heddell, you are the Acting Defense Department Inspector

General, and your office issued an interim memo on Monday stating that you had ‘‘no credible evidence’’ that either KBR or Defense

Contract Management agency knew of these problems. And I would

like to ask you about some documents the committee obtained that

you did not or may not have.

First, the committee obtained a work order. This is a work order

from July 8, 2007 that was submitted by Sergeant 1st Class Justin

Hummer.

Sergeant Hummer lived in the exact room before Staff Sergeant

Maseth moved into it, and Sergeant Maseth replaced Sergeant

Hummer in October 2007. So they both used the exact same shower. This work order seems to indicate that Sergeant Hummer

warned of exactly the electrical problem that killed Sergeant

Maseth, and I think we furnished you with a copy of it. It says

LSF. That is the building they lived in, ‘‘pipes have voltage, get

shocked in shower,’’ and on the bottom, you can see it says, ‘‘Kellogg Brown & Root Proprietary Data.’’

Mr. Heddell, on its face, this document seems to be credible evidence that KBR was aware of this hazard last July; do you agree?

Mr. HEDDELL. I do agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Were you aware of this document before you

issued your interim memo on Monday?

Mr. HEDDELL. No, sir. I was not.

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a correction for the

record.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, let me ask you about some of the questions that I have and then we will give you an opportunity to do

that. I want to show you another document. This is a spreadsheet

of task orders that the Defense Department provided to the committee. And this spreadsheet lists the same work order from July

8, 2007 warning that Sergeant Hummer gets shocked in the shower. Mr. Heddell, this document seems to be credible evidence that

the Defense Department was aware of this problem as well. Do you

agree?

Mr. HEDDELL. It would appear so, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. And finally, Mr. Heddell, let me show you

a sworn statement signed by Sergeant Hummer.

On June 6, 2008, in this statement, Sergeant Hummer says this

wasn’t the only work order he submitted. He says, he was ‘‘shocked

four or five times in the shower,’’ between June 2007, when he first

moved into the building, and October 2007, when he moved out,

and Staff Sergeant Maseth replaced him.

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Mr. Heddell, I know your memo was not a final product, the

memo you issued yesterday. You said it was interim. It was a snapshot of what you learned to date, but someone leaked the document

last night, and the press reported you absolved KBR and the Defense Department of any knowledge of this problem or any responsibility for fixing it. Given these new documents, do you stand by

the statement in your memo, or would you like to go back and review them in light of this new information?

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, there is nothing really to change, Mr. Chairman. My position has never been to absolve anyone of responsibility or culpability. What we provided to your office on Monday of

this week, sir, and to this committee, and also to the Secretary of

Defense, was a status, meaning our preliminary observations of

what we have found up to that point. It is not a report and it was

simply a status. A final report will be forthcoming.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I am concerned, Mr. Heddell, because

it seems like you have less information than the committee. It

raises the question of whether you were doing your job, or whether

the Defense Department or KBR officials were withholding information from you. And as our investigation continues, we are going

to need answers to these questions. And I presume you are going

to need answers to these questions, as well.

Mr. HEDDELL. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I can’t presume to tell

you whether information was withheld. I can only tell you what we

knew up until Monday when we provided the committee with an

idea of what we were going to be testifying to today.

I will tell you, you don’t have to be an Inspector General to be

very concerned about these tragic deaths, and you don’t have to be

an Inspector General to expect candor and forthcoming from entities who might have knowledge or information regarding this. I am

not saying that anyone withheld, but what I am saying at this

point, these documents that you brought to my attention this morning, I had not seen these, was not aware of them, until this committee brought them to our attention last night, I believe it was.

They are certainly very dramatic, and they certainly are documents

that we will have to spend a lot of time looking at. We anticipate,

as we have even before this committee was announced for this

hearing, that we would find a lot of additional information, Mr.

Chairman, and we think that we will.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, I appreciate that. And these new documents do undermine the tentative conclusion you submitted to us

earlier this week.

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, we have absolved no one, let the record be

clear on that, never have and have not at this moment.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Heddell, I would like

to continue, we are the Committee on Oversight and Reform, and

I always try to remember that we look at the reform part of this.

When we look at this contract, or any contract that essentially

says, take somebody else’s work and maintain it, and that work is

not essentially up to U.S. standards, or even comfortable at U.S.

standards in voltage, in plugs, and so on, are we inherently producing a contract that puts us, and I ask Mr. Bruni too, aren’t we, and

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I am leading a little bit, but aren’t we inherently, if we limit a contract to that and we don’t have a separate oversight who does a

clean bill of health on the structure and the equipment, aren’t we

inherently handing something off that has a gap in its safety and

reliability?

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, with all due respect, Congressman, I understand what you are saying, and in principle I agree with that, but

when you look at the system, for instance, the contract that was

in play in this particular instance, and the process that was set up,

the relationship process, let’s say, between the contractor, KBR,

and the contract administrator, DCMA, there are hoops that have

to be jumped through, that have to be looked at and acknowledged,

and the customer, as Mr. Parsons referred to it, being the Army in

this case, they have to bring items to the attention of appropriate

people and then things begin to happen, changes are made, and

therefore. I think everyone that is in Iraq, soldier, contractor, civilian, deserves the feeling that they are being protected.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Well, Mr. Parsons, maybe I will go to you next because somebody died who, based on the contracts this committee

has, should not have died because there were warnings based on

this document that should have caused a look for, why are there

shocks to somebody in a shower. When you are dealing with high

voltage there is no question that is not a small what-if.

So when we look at the contract and the command structure because, of course, these people worked for commissioned officers,

NCOs and commissioned officers, where was the gap that allowed

this to happen in your opinion? Granted I am asking you to Monday morning quarterback, but this committee needs to make sure

that procurement going forward doesn’t have these loopholes in it.

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I would say, from my personal opinion, that

it goes back to what is the requirement? And in this case, through

the requirements determination process, it is clear that the customer, in this case it would have been Multinational Corps Iraq,

and the mayor, the local mayor that is responsible for that RPC

Complex, had done some prioritization on what buildings were

going to get what level of maintenance. In this case they elected

to Level B, which does not require routine inspections and preventative maintenance. I can’t tell you why that decision was made.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Well, let’s go back through the command structure

for a moment. The chairman is taking one line, but I am not going

to take a different line in this case because people died, a person

died who shouldn’t have died. I am a former Army officer. Somebody had to look out for the well-being of every soldier, every soldier’s weapon, every soldier’s equipment. Who was that somebody,

and what did that person do to ensure that living condition was

safe?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, in my opinion, the mayor of that RBC Complex is ultimately the one that has to make the calls on those types

of things, or what repairs are going to be affected and executed,

and I can’t tell you, I think the DOD IG is taking a look at that

entire process. I think you are right, there probably are some gaps

that need to be examined.

Mr. ISSA. OK. I am a little disappointed, but let me go back to

Mr. Heddell for just a second. Can you come back to this commitVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:11 Apr 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48065.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tee, because I don’t believe you are prepared to answer today and

tell us within the command structure that says no uniformed soldier shall ever not have a chain of command that includes uniformed superiors, can you tell us today, or by written backup, who

that was? Who was responsible?

And with all due respect, Mr. Parsons, I am not here to blame

KBR, because it appears as though their contract was fairly limited, and it doesn’t appear as though they were tasked properly.

Mr. Heddell, I need to know what soldier was responsible for that

soldier, and if it was a mayor, and I assume this is an Iraqi

mayor—it was a U.S. mayor?

Mr. PARSONS. Let me correct you. The military units appoint,

make their mayors, it is a term that is used for their—it is equivalent to——

Mr. ISSA. OK. It was a commissioned officer?

Mr. PARSONS. I am not sure. I can’t answer whether it was a

commissioned officer or not.

Mr. ISSA. For the record, because I am out of time and I want

to be respectful of the committee’s time, I would like to know the

chain of command, because as a former Army officer, and I appreciate the chairman’s indulgence for just a second, we need to know

that the chain of command met its responsibility for the health and

safety of its personnel. And that includes obviously the procurement irregularities that may or may not have occurred, but we

have to understand who was responsible for that person’s welfare.

Today, that is not really what we are talking about. I don’t want

to look at an electrician who did or didn’t get a task order. I want

to look at the chain of command and did it do its job, and if there

are changes that we need to make, or the House Armed Services

Committee needs to make, we need to provide that guidance. So I

hope you will respond for the record, and I hope other Members

will perhaps pick up if you have answers. I thank the chairman for

his indulgence.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bruni, I would like to ask you about Staff Sergeant Maseth,

who was electrocuted on January 2, 2008. In your written testimony today, you state that KBR wasn’t allowed under contract to

make repairs to Staff Sergeant Maseth’s building without specific

direction from the Army. You also say that the Army did not authorize KBR to make these repairs. And then, you address the

water pump that electrocuted Staff Sergeant Maseth. You said,

‘‘Though we cannot be certain who installed the water pump, we

do know that KBR did not do so.’’ That is your testimony; correct?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir. It is.

Mr. HIGGINS. The committee has obtained documents that seem

to suggest that KBR may have installed the faulty water pump. Let

me go through these documents and ask you about them. First, we

have already talked about the work order submitted by Sergeant

Justin Hummer, who lived in the same quarters before Staff Sergeant Maseth moved in. Let’s put that up there. If you recall, this

work order warned that the pipes have voltage and that he was

getting shocked in the shower. This was the same shower that

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Staff Sergeant Maseth was subsequently electrocuted. Have you

ever seen this work order before?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir. I have.

Mr. HIGGINS. OK. Let me show you another work order. This one

is from the next morning on July 9, 2007. You can see that it is

the same building. It is the same person, Justin Hummer. He

signed it at the bottom. And when you look at the task box, it says,

‘‘Replace pressure switch and water pump.’’ And when you look at

the labor box, it says, ‘‘3 x 3,’’ meaning three people worked for 3

hours, and you can see the total of 9 hours. And then, when you

look at the material box, there are various items, and over on the

right, you can see one says, ‘‘One water pump.’’ This work order is

stamped finished at the top. Does this mean that KBR installed the

water pump that malfunctioned that caused Staff Sergeant

Maseth’s death?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. It does not. We believe that this particular

installation occurred not at LSF–1, but at another building. There

is another document that says that the pump and switch were located on the eastern side of the building. The pump unit for LSF–

1 is on the roof. We believe that this work was accomplished in another building. Sergeant Hummer placed a service order request for

more buildings than just LSF–1.

Mr. HIGGINS. Why would Sergeant Hummer request a replacement of the water pump for other buildings other than the one he

was staying at?

Mr. BRUNI. Because he wrote work orders, Mr. Congressman, for

other buildings, not just LSF–1.

Mr. HIGGINS. I see. Well, this work order says, time started, was

July 9, 2007, 0800 hours, and it says, time completed was the same

day at 1100 hours. Does that indicate that they actually did the

work on the day of those 3 hours?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir. It would appear that it was accomplished on

that day.

Mr. HIGGINS. This is Sergeant Hummer’s declaration stating

that, ‘‘During the months that I was living at the LSF Advisor

Building, I was shocked four or five times in the shower, the same

shower where Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth was electrocuted.’’ That

is Sergeant First Class Justin Hummer.

Mr. Chairman, KBR’s spokeswoman, Heather Brown, has stated

publicly that there is no evidence of a link between KBR’s work

and these electrocutions. Her statements appeared in various press

accounts on July 18th. To me, this document raises serious questions about KBR’s work, and it appears to contradict not only Mr.

Bruni’s testimony but the public statements KBR’s officials have

made for weeks on this issue. I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Higgins.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you very much. Let me start with

the Army. Mr. Parsons, an initial cost estimate was requested to

refurbish the Palace Complex, as I understand it, where the

Maseth tragedy occurred, and it would have brought the facilities

up to LOGCAP standards, which was $10 million. A second estimate was done for Level B maintenance, but under Level B, faciliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:11 Apr 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48065.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ties were taken and it would reduce the price to $3 million. Is that

right?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I have heard about the first estimate before.

I have not seen anything to verify that estimate was actually produced.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK. But they went with Level B, is that

right?

Mr. PARSONS. It was for the entire RPC area, for the maintenance of the RPC area?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Yes, they went with the Level B instead

of a whole refurbishing. Is that fair to say, LOGCAP standards?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I am not sure that I follow you, but the actual

estimate again was negotiated between the LOGCAP program office and the contractor, including the customer, to determine what

level maintenance was going to be required.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So, the customer in this case—was KBR

involved in that? Would they have been negotiating that?

Mr. PARSONS. KBR was involved from the standpoint that they

were preparing the price estimate in response to what the requirement was.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Would the requirement have included

making this basically shock-proof, the showers there?

Mr. PARSONS. Not for this particular facility, because this particular facility was designated, as I said before, as a Level B, which

did not require any upgrades or repairs.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Right. Now, but there had been previous

reports of people being shocked there, hadn’t there?

Mr. PARSONS. Based on, previously? Before the LOGCAP contract?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Yes.

Mr. PARSONS. Yes, were under the impression that there were

some electrical issues identified with that building.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So why would you go with the Level B?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I can’t answer that question.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Who would have made that decision?

Mr. PARSONS. It would have been again the mayor’s cell, which

again, is not an Iraqi mayor. It is the unit that occupied that RPC

Complex.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. And what unit? Who is the person, do

you know?

Mr. PARSONS. What?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Who is that?

Mr. PARSONS. I am not sure who that is, sir.

Unidentified SPEAKER. Colonel in the command structure.

Mr. PARSONS. It would have been someone from the MultiNational——

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. It is Colonel, we don’t know his name in

the command structure.

Mr. PARSONS. Do not.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Can you get that to us, and get that to

the committee?

Mr. PARSONS. Yes, we will take that further.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Is risk mitigation a factor when you decide how much to spend and what level maintenance to provide?

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Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I think the risk mitigation is always a factor

when they decide what the requirement is going to be, and I can

only assume in this case that there was some of that going on

when they determined what level of maintenance was going to be

required for the different facilities.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Are the operational commanders who are

using the services of contractors fully informed about the levels of

risks they are taking on by opting for less than full Level A maintenance?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I can’t answer that question. I don’t know how

far down that information flows. So I would say that the mayor,

who is responsible for that RPC, certainly knows the risks associated with the different level of maintenance. How that is flowed

down from there, I cannot tell you.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me ask, Mr. Bruni, who is to blame

for this? Is KBR to blame?

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, I do not believe so. No, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Is the Army to blame?

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, I don’t know if it is that simple, a black and

white case.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, if it is not the Army, and it is not

KBR, then who could it be?

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, all I can tell you is that from the KBR perspective, we don’t understand what tactical or force protection issues

may have been required to be factored into the Army’s decision in

this decisionmaking process. We don’t know.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, whatever decision was made, you

would agree that someone shouldn’t turn on the shower and get

electrocuted, wouldn’t you?

Mr. BRUNI. I would agree that is not something that should have

happened. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Yes. And particularly, if there were previous reports of people being shocked in the shower? It is not like

this was without warning?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So, under that scenario, if KBR, as you

maintain, is not to be blamed, who else could you possibly blame

for this? Wouldn’t it be the Army? I am not trying to focus on any

individual in the Army. We don’t even know the Colonel’s name

who was making these decisions. But wouldn’t it be fair under that

to say that the Army would be responsible?

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, even if the Army had——

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I am just asking you a question.

Wouldn’t the Army be responsible? Or do you think the soldier

should be responsible for taking a shower?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. It shouldn’t be the soldier.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK. Should it be the Army?

Mr. BRUNI. I think that the Army could have turned the situation differently.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, it surely could have. In retrospect,

they should have. So aren’t they responsible? I know they are a client and you are looking for more contracts, but you are saying you

are not responsible. I can understand that. Wouldn’t the Army then

be responsible for this in one way, shape or form?

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Mr. BRUNI. I think that the Army has some responsibility in this.

Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, if they have some, who would have

the rest of it? Just conceivably, who else could have it, if the Army

just has some responsibility? Would KBR have some then?

Mr. BRUNI. The responsibility lies with the Army.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. That is all I am asking to just try and

figure it out. Nobody is dodging. This is a tragic case. Let me ask,

Mr. Parsons, of the 16 electrocutions, how many occurred on KBRmanaged facilities?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, our understanding, and based on records that

we looked at, only one was connected to a KBR-maintained facility.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Now, that was the Maseth death, OK.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Ms. McCollum, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Parsons, you made a comment in your testimony on page 6

that I find absolutely remarkable. You say that ‘‘neither LOGCAP

nor DCMA have sufficient skill set or expertise to perform adequate oversight of electrical work being performed by KBR.’’ Then

you say, we are trying to acquire the expertise. My question to you

is, who has been overseeing KBR’s electrical work for the past 5

years?

Mr. PARSONS. Ma’am, as Mr. Ernst testified earlier in his opening statement, for those LOGCAP contracts, DCMA has been providing quality assurance oversight, which really focuses on the contractors’ processes. They focus on whether the contractor has the

right QA processes in place. They aren’t doing actual inspections.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I am hearing processes. I want to know who was

going in, and looking, and inspecting KBR’s electrical work for the

past 5 years?

Mr. PARSONS. Again, for the technical inspections, they rely on

what we call contracting officer representatives, which are appointed in each of the Units. Those are the individuals that have

the subject matter expertise to provide that type of level of oversight.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Parsons, I am going to move on, but you

have already said that there was no one available with that type

of expertise. The DCMA and the Army have responsibility for, the

ultimate responsibility is what you are saying, through all of these

subcontracting, and whatever that they did, to oversee KBR’s work.

Your statement that you don’t have the expertise to oversee the job

adequately basically said that no one in our Government was taking on the responsibility of making sure that the safety of our

troops was being looked at and handled quickly.

In my opinion, that is just strictly deplorable. And it is astounding how dependent our military has become on private companies,

that they just don’t have the can-do, I can do it myself, as past

military had had where they could call on people directly to take

care of things.

Now, in Staff Sergeant Maseth’s building, there were work orders to fix the electrical problems for his shower. And here is a

sworn statement on June 6, 2008, by the individual who lived in

the building who used this shower before Staff Sergeant Maseth.

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His name is Sergeant Justin Hummer. And he stated, ‘‘During the

months I was living in the LSF building, I was shocked four or five

times in the shower, the same shower where Staff Sergeant Maseth

was electrocuted.’’

He said on one occasion he had to use a wooden spoon. If you

are bringing wooden spoons to the shower, it is telling something

that our servicemen knew that there was a big problem here, because the electrical current was so strong. He stated that in response to each work order, personnel from KBR showed up, but the

problems persisted. He said his roommate even submitted a work

order for these problems. According to Sergeant Hummer, he made

these requests over and over and over.

Mr. Parsons, KBR never adequately addressed these problems,

did they? And, the fact that maybe they had work orders for another Unit that was faulty doesn’t mean that there aren’t work orders that exist that were generated by Sergeant Justin Hummer.

Can you work to provide the committee with these work orders, because obviously we are missing some?

Mr. PARSONS. Ma’am, with this new information that we have received, we will work with the Department of Defense IG to look

and gather more of the work orders.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, the fact that we don’t have the work orders for something that was pretty specific in what this committee

was going to be dealing with, with the death of one of our servicemen, is a little astonishing. So obviously, we are not going to find

work orders stamped fixed after four or five times Sergeant Justin

Hummer requested the shower be fixed.

My question is, basically, where was the Government in all of

this? I heard you folks refer to customers. A customer is someone

who has a choice of where to go shopping for their cell phone. A

customer is not a soldier who is going in to take a shower. That

soldier does not have a choice. But we have a responsibility. So, did

anyone ever go out and check and see if KBR did what it was supposed to do? Your quality assurance officials, where were they?

Mr. ERNST. Congresswoman, let me try to answer that again,

what Mr. Parsons had said. As I stated in my opening statement,

we do not have the requisite skills to see facilities and maintenance

oversight. We are assigned that mission in theater by the Department. In order to bring the kind of skills that we lack, we work

with the service units themselves to bring the technical experts

that have the kind of skills required to oversee it. I don’t have the

specifics in this instance. We would have to go back and take a look

at the report from the COR, to see if there were reports from the

COR on the ground to the——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Chairman Waxman for having

these hearings. And we have had hearings on the U.S. Embassy

and all of the shoddy work that is going on there, as well. We don’t

want State Department and other people being electrocuted. And

I am glad that you are going to produce the work orders that Sergeant Justin Hummer had put in four or five times.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Ms. McCollum. Mr. Bilbray, you

are recognized for 5 minutes.

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Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield to Mr. Issa for

a moment.

Mr. ISSA. I thank you. I will be very brief.

Mr. Horstman, are you a military veteran?

Mr. HORSTMAN. Yes, sir. I am.

Mr. ISSA. What were you in, what branch?

Mr. HORSTMAN. I was in the Navy for 26 years.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Commissioned officer?

Mr. HORSTMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Well, that means that I have six people here who

are all military veterans, Air Force, Army, Navy. I am sorry, I had

you listed as Air Force Reserve. OK, well then, I will leave you out

of this.

I put my hat on for a minute while I was waiting for the young

lady’s comments to end, which were good. As Lieutenant Darrell

Issa, or Captain Darrell Issa, I had to ask the question, how dare

any of us think that the first mistake wasn’t a Sergeant reporting

a near electrocution four times, and the command structure didn’t

close down that shower, including maybe that whole facility until

it was clarified.

Now, for those who served, please answer just a quick question,

do any of you know a good reason that the immediate chain of command didn’t take that action until it was corrected for the safety

of that Sergeant, forgetting about the work order? KBR, don’t answer as a contractor, answer as a former military person, isn’t the

first responsibility of the immediate commander who has the authority to say, I can’t have that guy in that shower? I have to have

him showering down the hall, or be in a different barracks. Do any

of you disagree with that at all here?

Mr. HORSTMAN. No, I don’t.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bilbray, thank you. I yield back.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you.

Let me first clarify that the gentlelady was concerned about the

issue of contracting out a lot of these services. Well, let me say this

as somebody who represents one of the largest concentrations of

military service individuals in the entire world. There are going to

be these contracts and they are essential. You can’t ask and nor do

they want to participate in having sworn service members issuing

towels at a gym or doing a lot of these maintenance work that we

have been contracting out since we sent contracts out to build the

forts in the West.

But that aside, we have over 100,000 service personnel in Iraq

today. As somebody who comes from being a mayor, and a council

member, and a county chairman, it is not brain surgery to know

how to set up a building inspection system where the unified building code is enforced. The most successful Government regulation

ever comprised in the world is a unified building code.

Are we saying, Mr. Parsons, we don’t have somebody on staff, or

on contract, and probably contract, that has a background as a

building inspector would be required in a city, which has practical,

not book learning, doesn’t come out of college, but has experience

in the field that they are inspecting? Do we have on staff, or on

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contract, preferably contract, former electricians who now function

as the building inspector for electrical work?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, we are in the process of working with the theater, with Multi-National Corps-Iraq, to do exactly that. They have

brought in some Seabees. They have brought in some Air Force

Red Horse teams with those types of engineers. Army Corps of Engineers is also going to be sending some of those types of experts

to help do that type of thing that you were talking about with the

inspections of the buildings to really understand what the safety

issues are with them.

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, Mr. Bruni, work in the United States, when

you go in and put in a pump, put in an electrical system, isn’t it

traditional that before the job is done, you get a sign-off from a

Building Inspector?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir. You pull a permit.

Mr. BILBRAY. And who does the sign-off when you are in Iraq,

and you finish putting in an electrical system? Who signs it off?

Mr. BRUNI. If there is a QAR available and assigned to that task,

he will do that.

Mr. BILBRAY. And that QAR has the background as a trained

electrician who has experience in the field that they are inspecting?

Mr. BRUNI. I can’t vouch to that. No, sir. I do not know.

Mr. BILBRAY. OK. Mr. Bruni, just let me tell you flat out, if you

are going to look for the Seabees, if you are going to look for the

engineers, you are going to look for in-house operations. It doesn’t

take brain surgery to contract former Building Inspectors and bring

them out on short-term contracts to be able to get this job done.

We are doing contractors, and that is why I disagree with the

gentlelady that, this ought to be all in-house.

The ability to grab somebody who has experience doing this all

over America, has been doing it for 20, 30 years, and be able to

spot the fact that a ground was not properly grounded, is not brain

surgery to these guys who have the experience. I know those of us

that haven’t worked in this field, it is magic. But what I am concerned about is, there is not a city in this country, at 10,000,

15,000, that doesn’t have the ability to have a building inspector

check out an electric system before the switch is allowed to be

thrown. Why can’t we do the same operation in a facility, or an operation in Iraq, that has over a 100,000 personnel out there that

we need to protect?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I don’t think there is anything to prevent us

from doing that. That is one of the things I believe Major General

McHale has been tagged by General Petraeus in the Multi-National

Corps to get his arms around. He is looking at the different options

that he has to bring those type of companies and personnel into

theater to do those types of inspections. And we are working closely

with Defense Contract Management Agency.

Mr. BILBRAY. Is it a policy today that the unified building code

will apply unless it is waivered? Is that a policy for our——

Mr. PARSONS. Can you repeat that sir?

Mr. BILBRAY. Does the unified building code apply to all projects,

all construction in Iraq, unless those codes are waived, or are those

not even considered?

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Mr. PARSONS. Sir, my understanding is that there are various

codes that are being used. Again, one of the charges to General

McHale is to come up with a unified standard that will be used by

troops, and by all contractors.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time, it is just that

you know and I know that the entire United States, almost every

municipality and every Government agency, and every contractor

uses the unified building code as the universal consensus. I don’t

see why we have to reinvent the wheel.

And I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, in fact, we had

somebody inspecting those things. In 2008, after the death of Staff

Sergeant Maseth, KBR conducted a complete electrical inspection

of all the buildings in the Radwaniyah Palace Complex where the

Sergeant lived. The inspection found that a majority of the electrical systems are in complete disarray, that a majority of the electrical panels are in disrepair and require replacement, and that 45

water pumps needed to be replaced because of electrical shortage

or age.

These problems were so severe that KBR’s own site manager recommended that service members immediately evacuate six buildings. We have a copy of this recommendation from KBR to the

Army, and let me read it to you.

‘‘The electrical conditions in all buildings make them uninhabitable for safety and health reasons. The recommended course of action, if the buildings will continue to be used, is to disconnect the

power to the buildings immediately and completely replace the

electrical systems.’’ Now, Mr. Bruni, why didn’t KBR recommend

evacuating the troops from these buildings when they were inspected in 2007?

Mr. BRUNI. I am sorry, sir. I couldn’t hear you. Could you repeat

that please?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure. Why didn’t KBR recommend evacuating the

troops from these same buildings when you inspected them in

2007?

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, when we inspected them in 2007 and produced

the technical inspections that identified the deficiencies, we had

submitted them directly to the mayor, and it was then his responsibility to take that and make decisions about what we should be

turned on to perform.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, you didn’t recommend that people evacuate

the building in 2007, did you?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. We did not.

Mr. TIERNEY. And everyone keeps referring to the mayor. The

mayor is a military individual; is he not?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now, Mr. Ernst, in February 2008, you received the memo from the head of the DCMA in Iraq. The memo

said that the problems KBR identified in 2008 were virtually the

same identical to those that were identified in 2007. Let me read

that memo, if I could. ‘‘The overwhelming majority of these findings

in the Legion Security Force area were identical to those findings

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or problems as either alleged or identified in the 10 February 2007

limited inspection.’’ Is that right?

Mr. ERNST. Could you clarify which report that was, sir?

Mr. TIERNEY. This was the report that you received in February

2007, relating to the inspections in 2007, the 10 February 2007 limited inspection.

Mr. ERNST. What was that the safety inspection report in 2007?

Mr. TIERNEY. It was a memo that you received from the head of

the DCMA.

Mr. ERNST. OK. I understand, sir. I received that in 2008, but

the reference, just for refresher purposes, was that the safety inspection?

Mr. TIERNEY. I believe it was, but we can check if that makes

a difference. You either remember getting it, or you don’t.

Mr. ERNST. I don’t remember getting the safety inspection, but

I do remember getting this one.

Mr. TIERNEY. You remember getting the one that I just read?

Mr. ERNST. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now, Mr. Bruni, KBR, at that time, said that

these defects were serviceable. This year, you look at the same

buildings, and the same problems, and you find that they are not

inhabitable, and they are the same problem. So, what has changed

in the intervening 12 months?

Mr. BRUNI. Essentially, nothing, sir. The classification as serviceable, but requiring, with qualifications. The qualifications are that

the deficiencies were to be repaired. To further answer your previous question, after those technical inspections were delivered to

the military at the RPC, there were meetings held between the site

management and the mayor to discuss the next steps and onward

progression of what should be done.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, what concerns me here, is it looks to be, and

maybe you are clarifying that now, it looks to be in 2007, as serious

as these were, nobody recommends that the buildings be evacuated.

In 2008, the same problems, all of a sudden, it being recommended

that people evacuate, or just don’t use the facilities, or whatever.

All that seems to have happened in the interim is that the Staff

Sergeant died, and this committee started investigating. But are

you telling me that you had verbal conversations back after the

2007 reports and made a recommendation to evacuate?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. We did not make that recommendation. That

is not our recommendation to make in a normal situation.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, it was your recommendation to make in 2008,

why wouldn’t you possibly see something that serious in 2007,

something that could result in something this harmful to somebody

and not make a recommendation that they evacuate.

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, we made the recommendation that the deficiencies that had been identified be fixed, that they be repaired.

When it finally got to the point in February that nothing was happening, the general program manager for KBR in Iraq met directly

and personally with the Commander of DCMA and said, something

has to be done.

Mr. TIERNEY. Why didn’t he feel that way in 2007? I mean, it

was just as serious then?

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Mr. BRUNI. Sir, I can’t answer that question. I don’t know why

he didn’t.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. Sarbanes.

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to

the Level I, Level II maintenance distinction. Is that the right terminology? Or Level A and Level B? Is that what it is? So Level A

is a higher degree of responsibility for upgrade and maintenance

than Level B is? And you said that you are not sure how the determination was made as to why this particular location was under

a Level B designation? Is that right?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, do you mind repeating that question?

Mr. SARBANES. I think you said that you are not sure who made

the decision that this would be a Level B designation in terms of

the particular location that we have been focusing on today?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, from our review of the information that we

have seen for the circumstances surrounding that, it was a team

effort between the customer, which in this case is the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. The actual units that are occupying that RPC

are LOGCAP Program Office was involved with those negotiations.

DCMA was part of that negotiation, as well.

It is a team effort on determining, based on the customer’s resources and their prioritization and risk assessments on what those

tradeoffs are going to be. I can’t tell you for sure what the thought

processes are for that specific building and why they decided that

one was Level B, and others Level A, but those are resource tradeoffs associated with risks that the units are making as they occupy

those buildings.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Bruni, does KBR, I mean, what kind of perspective does KBR bring to the discussion of whether something is

going to be designated as a Level A, or a Level B, maintenance responsibility for you all.

Mr. BRUNI. Sir, that is basically a decision made by the military,

by the mayor, based on his tactical or planning process for the use

of that base.

Mr. SARBANES. OK. So a KBR maintenance person will come

across a situation and they might determine that a certain amount

of upgrade needs to be performed, and then they will consult with

their status of being either in a Level A, or a Level B, before they

decide whether to do that upgrade. In other words, does the KBR

person sit there and say, my goodness, we have a bad situation

here, but this is a Level B situation or facility and, therefore, my

hands are tied in terms of what I can do; is that how it works?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir. Basically, we produce a technical inspection

that quantifies those deficiencies, and in a Level B maintenance or

service status, that technical inspection is turned over to the mayor

of the military entity at that camp to make a decision of whether

we should be told to make those repairs.

Mr. SARBANES. And, if you are not told to make those repairs,

and you come back and you see the situation hasn’t changed, you

just do another report?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. There would be most probably, and I don’t

know specifically in this case, but there would follow-on discussions

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with the mayor about his process and priorities for moving forward

to make these changes, the deficiency remediations.

Mr. SARBANES. So, presumably, that happened but you still

weren’t getting the orders to fix and upgrade this particular situation that we have been focusing on.

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SARBANES. Does KBR contract with the Government have

provisions in it that indemnify you against claims that are brought

in situations where you make the Government aware of a situation

in a Level B status, and they don’t react and take action on one

basis or on a repeated basis, do you know?

Mr. BRUNI. I am not aware of that, sir. I don’t know the answer

to that question.

Mr. SARBANES. I guess the evidence was, or the testimony we

have, is that there has been 283 fires at facilities that are maintained, or were maintained, by KBR that are traceable to electrical

problems and dysfunction, is that correct?

Mr. BRUNI. We have just come into possession of that report from

DCMA, and we are looking at it right now, sir.

Mr. SARBANES. I mean, I just find it implausible that a contractor of your size and experience wouldn’t have pretty specific guidelines in place in terms of who would be liable under these circumstances. I mean, I guess, you are making the case that your arriving in a situation where there has already been equipment installed, and then you are just supposed to maintain it, but I would

think you would get some kind of liability protection. You said you

don’t know who installed these things?

Mr. Chairman, before my time runs out, I would just like to ask,

does anybody know who did the original fitting out of this electrical

work? All right. So, how is it possible that nobody knows that? I

mean because it was done before we were on the scene; is that the

idea?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, we became aware that there were previous

contracts for these facilities that were issued by the Corps of Engineers dating back to 2003. I have asked the Corps of Engineers to

research and go through those contracts to understand what the

scope of work is. We will share that information with the DOD IG.

They have an interest in that as well, because I had the same

question that you did. All right.

What was the original assessment made on these buildings when

we first started occupying them? And I can’t give you that answer

right now, but we will definitely get to the bottom at taking a look

back at what happened in 2003, 2004, when these buildings were

being occupied by our forces.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sarbanes.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for

holding this hearing, and I appreciate the panel coming forward to

try to help us make sense of this. I just had an opportunity over

the weekend to visit Iraq again, specifically, with the focus on this

hearing. I had an opportunity to sit with General Tim McHale, who

is conducting the investigation here. And the bottom line here, this

is a terrible tragedy.

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Sixteen fine young Americans put on the uniform for this country, and they were not protected in a very basic way. And we did

not provide an environment for them within their own bases and

within their own housing facilities that protected them in a meaningful way. Now, as sad as that tragedy is, it would be a greater

tragedy to point the finger of blame at other individuals who may

not deserve it.

But I do want to, with all due respect, and I think it is our duty

to those families, and also to the 142,000 folks that are still over

there, that we correct this, that we get to the bottom of this, and

that we do justice to their memory. It is completely mind-boggling

that a family in America today would send their sons and daughters off to war in defense of this country, knowing full well what

the dangers were with respect to combat and the situation over

there, and then to have something like this. Something like this

electrocution happened. It is just extremely, extremely sad.

Let me start with Mr. Bruni. Mr. Bruni, I understand. I am also

a construction manager, which is why they sent me over there.

That was in my former life. You seem to be positing two choices

here on inspection, and one is you are authorized to inspect, but

then you need a further authorization to make those corrections; is

that what you are testifying to today, sir?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir. That is correct.

Mr. LYNCH. But sir, and believe me I do not fault you in any

way, but sir, in my experience, there is a third option. And once

you discover a deficiency in a system, especially in an electrical

system, there is a latent danger in that system. And I know from

my own experience as a construction manager that you can tie that

off, that you can flag that, and that you can require that system

not be used until it is corrected. It doesn’t mean you have to correct

it. It doesn’t mean you have to be authorized to make the repairs,

but you are protecting someone from using a system that is inherently dangerous.

Can I ask you why that option was not used here? I understand

it was in the first instance when the gentleman was electrocuted

in 2004, there was actually a lock put on, which was the proper

way to handle this thing. And then someone got a key and unlocked that, and then the tragedy occurred. So I cannot fault the

action taken by the authority in that instance. However, in a lot

of these other cases, I think there may have been an opportunity

to tie this thing off, to shut it down, and to flag it, so that someone

else didn’t come along and continue to use it.

We have testimony here of one fine young soldier who was

shocked four or five times. Now, that in my mind is not acceptable

and should not have happened. Can you help the committee understand why this third option was not used?

Mr. BRUNI. Well, sir, the decision to keep those soldiers in those

facilities is made by the military. It is not made by KBR. And we

finally reached the point in February where action was taken by

the leadership at KBR with DCMA to actually sever power and

water connections to a number of buildings at the RPC, and also,

working with the military to establish——

Mr. LYNCH. Sir, when was that? I just want to make sure I understand. When was that decision finally made?

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Mr. BRUNI. I believe it was February 2008.

Mr. LYNCH. February 2008?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. I’m sorry. Did you want to say anything more

on that?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. I’m finished. Thank you.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. The other thing that troubles me greatly is, I

had a chance again to sit with Major General Tim McHale, and

there seems to be a fairly coherent action plan this morning after

the deaths of 16 of our best and bravest. One, there was an assessment made that, yes, we went into a country that had terribly deficient electrical standards, it had an assortment of Codes in place,

none of which in my mind really reached to the standard that we

require in this country.

Notwithstanding that fact, we moved our folks into these buildings, and there was no really coherent effort to bring those buildings up to standards in any meaningful way, not in a comprehensive way, maybe, in a patchwork sort of fashion. And it seems in

hindsight, I realize in hindsight, it seems pretty basic that we

should have done that.

The second thing was there is no data base. There was no data

base for these different Units to understand the dangers that were

being faced, and the injuries and the fatalities that were being encountered by some units elsewhere. And those are just two basic

things that we are going to do now, thanks to General Tim McHale,

and some others. But why did it take 16 deaths to get to that

point? Can anybody on the panel help me with that?

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I would just comment that I think this committee’s interest in this, and the issues that have been highlighted

to me have pointed out that we do have a gap from a doctrinal

standpoint that when we do go to an operation and occupy buildings built by other countries that don’t meet our standards, what

is our process. I mean, who is making those decisions on what

buildings we will utilize and which ones will be upgraded. And I

am confident that the Department is going to go and tackle that.

Again, to me, it is a gap. This has been a long, protracted war.

We have been occupying facilities that weren’t built to U.S. standards, and I think we need to come up doctrinally with solutions on

how do we do that in the future. Obviously, General Petraeus is

taking this very seriously, and so is Major General McHale, and

they are tackling it now.

Mr. LYNCH. Sir, if I can just say in closing before I yield back,

we have a lot of situations over there right now. Some number of

troops are going to be there for a while. And I have been to Afghanistan as well, and we got a similar situation there. You guys have

to get this right. You have to get this straightened out. And it

shouldn’t take a work authorization to remove a dangerous situation. It should just be assumed that if the contractor sees a dangerous situation, you flag it, and you remove it, take it out of service, and then, it would force the contracting authority to authorize

the changes.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much for your questions.

Mr. Altmire.

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Mr. ALTMIRE. Mr. Bruni, I recently met, as you know, with KBR

CEO William Utt. During our conversation, he informed me, and

it has been reiterated today by both you and Mr. Parsons in your

testimony, that KBR was not involved in any electrocutions, as far

as maintenance, except for Staff Sergeant Maseth’s incident, and I

assume you would still agree with that?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ALTMIRE. So I want to turn to another incident that you referred to in your written testimony today. It involves the incident

with Sergeant Christopher Everett, who was electrocuted in September 2005, when he was power washing a Humvee in a motor

pool at Camp Al Taqqadum. Now, on page 5, in your written statement, you say, ‘‘Though KBR did have a presence . . . at Camp A

Taqqadum . . . KBR had no responsibility for maintenance of the

power washer, the motor pool, or the generator that supplied power

to the motor pool.’’

So we put in front of you a document, which I have here. It is

too small to put up on the board, but it has two pieces to it. The

first page here is a letter of technical direction dated January 5,

2005, fully 9 months before Sergeant Everett was electrocuted. And

in this letter, DCMA is tasking KBR with inspecting and maintaining all generators at Camp Al Taqqadum that are shown on the attached spreadsheet, which is the second and third lists. And if you

go to the end of this list, five up from the bottom, you will see the

motor pool on there.

So you can see that the generator at the motor pool is, in fact,

included on this document. It looks like KBR was, in fact, responsible for maintaining the generator that supplied power to the

motor pool that contributed to the death of Sergeant Christopher

Everett. And so, to give you a moment to review that document,

would you agree with that?

Mr. BRUNI. Excuse me, sir, it does list the generator, yes, sir. But

it is our understanding that this particular generator did not power

the motor pool. Rather, it was approximately 100 or 200 meters

away from the motor pool. It did not power the motor pool.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Do you, given that, and we will reference that at

the committee, do you want to revise your statement earlier, when

you said KBR had no responsibility for the maintenance of the

power wash in the motor pool, or the generator that supplied power

to the motor pool?

Mr. BRUNI. No, sir. I do not.

Mr. ALTMIRE. You stand by that?

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Well, we would hope that you would review these

documents a little bit more closely, and we will return to this subject.

Mr. BRUNI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ALTMIRE. The next question, following the death of my constituent, Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth, the Combined Joint Special

Operations Task Force, which from my understanding has authority over U.S. Special Forces soldiers and Iraqi Special Forces soldiers in Iraq, sent teams of electricians out to inspect and repair

all facilities under its command. Additionally, on January 21, 2008,

the report states that following the death of Staff Sergeant Maseth,

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DCMA funded KBR to fix hazards throughout Sergeant Maseth’s

compound.

While I commend the Special Forces and DCMA for taking these

steps to protect our Nation’s Special Forces troops, I wonder if

similar steps have been taken to protect Americans not serving

under this command. So, I would say to Mr. Heddell, have you determined in your review if similar steps have been taken by other

military commands throughout Iraq?

Mr. HEDDELL. Sir, we know that there have been actions taken

since January 2nd, after Sergeant Maseth’s death, and some of

those actions were undertaken by the Multi-National Corps-Iraq,

and others followed approximately a month later, by the Multi-National Forces Iraq. I can be more specific if you would like. Would

that be helpful in terms of exactly what has been done?

Mr. ALTMIRE. Well, I wanted to in my brief time also followup

with Mr. Williams very quickly, if I could, on the same subject.

Mr. HEDDELL. OK.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Has the DCMA provided additional funding to

KBR so that they may at the very least perform repairs on all facilities known to have deficiencies?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Congressman, I would say that DCMA obviously

orders the contractor, or directs the contractor, based on funding

that comes from the Army, or the Multi-National Corps, based on

their prioritization efforts. To the extent the DCMA has been given

that funding to apply to the contract, I am sure that has occurred.

I would also observe that I think one of the reasons that General

Petraeus is looking at this very seriously is because it is a theaterwide issue, and in many cases, they are facilities that do not followup under the particular contract that DCMA may have authority

over. So, there are those facilities that still are outside of the range

of the contract, and I think that is why General McHale is taking

a closer look theater-wide.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Thank you, and I thank the chairman for allowing

me to participate today.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Altmire.

Mr. Brady.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me

to participate in this hearing today. You are right. This is not a Republican or Democrat issue. I appreciate the leadership of yourself,

Congressman Altmire, Senator Casey, and Senator Cornyn of

Texas on this issue. Losing one American life and one soldier’s life

to faulty grounding is unacceptable. Continuing to lose more is unforgivable.

In our case, my constituent, Ms. Larraine McGee of Huntsville,

Texas lost her son, Staff Sergeant Christopher Everett. He was

killed in Iraq on September 7, 2005 when he was electrocuted by

an improperly grounded power washer as he washed down the

Humvee. And in Chris’ death, we lost a promising 23-year old National Guardsman, who had a bright future and came from a very

loving family, who wants answers to that death. His mom was led

to believe this was the first death by electrocution. It turns out it

was by then at least the fourth, and it has continued to happen.

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gles, but you don’t suspect death to come from a swimming pool,

or a shower, or a car wash.

And to date, we have 16 deaths, a number of them due to contact

with power lines, which raises other questions, but to date, we

have seven known deaths attributed to improperly grounded electrical devices, and if KBR is responsible for that then the company

should have the book thrown at it. But my frustration is I cannot

seem to determine who is responsible for installing that equipment

and maintaining it, and I so I want to ask those who ought to

know, our Army representatives, and we have talked about Staff

Sergeant Maseth, but earlier than that Sergeant Michael

Montpetit, who was killed in Baghdad, electrocuted while working

on a generator at his camp. To our Army representatives, Mr. Williams, Mr. Parsons, and Mr. Heddell, in that case, who installed

that equipment, that generator, and who was responsible for maintaining it, do you know?

Mr. HEDDELL. Are you asking me, sir?

Mr. BRADY. All three of you.

Mr. HEDDELL. From an Inspector General’s point of view, we are

attempting to find out, but we do not know the answer to that.

Mr. BRADY. Don’t know?

Mr. HEDDELL. Don’t know.

Mr. BRADY. Don’t know?

Mr. PARSONS. Don’t know.

Mr. BRADY. Don’t know?

Mr. ERNST. Sir, I do not know the answer either.

Mr. BRADY. Don’t know?

Mr. WILLIAMS. No, Sir, I do not know.

Mr. BRADY. Thank you. And in 2005, Staff Sergeant Christopher

Everett was killed, electrocuted by a power washer, who installed

that motor pool, that power washer? Who was responsible for maintaining it, do you know?

Mr. HEDDELL. I do not know, sir.

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I do not know either.

Mr. WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Mr. BRADY. In 2004, Corporal Marcos Nolasco was electrocuted

while showering in his base in Baji. Do you know who installed

that shower, and who was responsible for maintaining it?

Mr. HEDDELL. Again, Mr. Brady, this is a question that we are

attempting to pursue, and will continue, but we do not know the

answer.

Mr. BRADY. Private First Class Brian Cutter, killed in Al Asad,

electrocuted while working on trying to fix the AC unit outside his

tent. Do we know who installed that AC unit, and who was responsible for maintaining it?

Mr. HEDDELL. The Inspector General’s Office does not know, sir.

Mr. BRADY. Specialist Chase Whitman, killed in Mosul, electrocuted while just swimming in a pool. Do we know who installed

that pool, and who is responsible for maintaining it?

Mr. HEDDELL. No, sir.

Mr. BRADY. Same answer.

Mr. HEDDELL. We are pursuing that.

Mr. BRADY. Finally, Specialist Marvin Camposiles, killed as early

as April 2004, 41⁄2 years ago, Coalition Base near Samarra, electroVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:11 Apr 06, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48065.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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cuted while working on a generator as well. Does the Army know

who installed the generator, and who was responsible for maintaining it?

Mr. HEDDELL. Mr. Brady, on all of those that you cited, the investigations conducted by Army CID and NCIS, we have reviewed

those, and I believe that I can say accurately that based on our review of those investigations, we do not know the answers to your

questions.

Mr. BRADY. And I guess my frustration is, it has been 41⁄2 years,

since the first death, why don’t we know? Why does not the Army

know who installed that equipment in those deaths, and who was

responsible for maintaining it? Why don’t we know now? I know we

have sent letters and I have spoken personally to Secretary Gates,

and I know Congressman Altmire, and I know the chairman has

as well. This is not a new issue. Why don’t we know now who put

those facilities in and who was responsible for maintaining them?

Mr. HEDDELL. If you are asking me, sir, I do not know why we

do not know, but I do know that almost every question that we are

addressing here today comes down to an issue of leadership, but

those questions should have answers, but they don’t at this time.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Parsons.

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, I can’t explain why there are no answers to

those questions. And I have asked the same ones that you have.

Again, that is why I am working with the Army Corps of Engineers

to try to understand the scope of the contracts that they had in

place, and what their contractors were maintaining. No excuse, but

it is a complex issue. We are talking 80 some thousand facilities

just under LOGCAP alone, but I don’t have a good answer on why

those types of strings weren’t pulled at the time of the accident.

And I can assure you that the Department will continue to work

with the DOD IG to ferret that out.

Mr. BRADY. And I understand how complex Iraq is, and Afghanistan, I understand that, but I would think the red flag occurred 41⁄2

years ago. It should be a focus for our country to find out why that

occurred. So, my followup question is, when will we know? When

will you get back to this committee with answers of who installed,

and who maintained in those deaths specifically?

Mr. SARBANES. Sir, I will have to get back to you on a time line

on when we think we will actually have all of that information.

Mr. BRADY. Inspector General.

Mr. HEDDELL. Sir, we anticipate completing our review of this by

October of this year.

Mr. BRADY. In October. And will it include specifically who was

responsible for installing and maintaining?

Mr. HEDDELL. We are going to try. We are attempting to answer

every question that you have asked, sir, and I hope that our report

contains that.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chair, it needs to. It needs to. And again, one,

we need to fix the problem that is occurring today. And two, we

need to find out and hold accountable who did it, and my frustration is we cannot seem to get the answers that I think our soldiers,

and their moms deserve. Mr. Chairman, I have two questions of

Mrs. McGee, Chris Everett’s mom asked me to ask. Would you like

me to submit that, in writing, to KBR?

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Chairman WAXMAN. If you wouldn’t mind, we would like you to

submit it, in writing, and again a response for the record.

Mr. BRADY. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brady. I want to

thank Mr. Brady for the questions he asked, and all the other

members of this panel, because from what I have heard from the

witnesses before us, there is a lot we don’t know that we should

know.

Yet last night, there is a fellow named Geoff Morrell, who is the

Pentagon Press Secretary, and he called a press conference to say

about our hearing for today, ‘‘There seems to be a misperception

out there that our facilities in that theater are replete with electrical hazards that have caused hundreds of fires and multiple fatalities.’’

And, Mr. Morrell went on to say, it is ‘‘flat out wrong’’ to suggest

that there has been a lack of oversight by the Pentagon. I find that

incredible, that he would say, he knows that it is an overblown

issue.

Well, it is not an overblown issue to Cheryl Harris, when she is

trying to find out the truth for her son and what happened to him.

It is not an overblown issue for the family of Corporal Marcos

Nolasco, in their son’s death, who was also electrocuted while taking a shower, and they are trying to find out the answers about

that. It is certainly not overblown for the family of Petty Officer

David Cedergren who was electrocuted in the shower. Specialist

Chase Whitman was electrocuted in a swimming pool. Their families don’t think these risks are overblown.

And I have to say that while there are a lot of things we don’t

know, as soon as Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth was killed, the Army

said they knew how he died. They told his mother he must have

brought in some electrical appliance into the shower with him.

Well, I just hope that all of you when you go back to the Pentagon

that you tell the people there after this hearing that the Press Secretary ought to stop trying to spin these facts away and start looking out for the health and safety of our troops.

We expect people to know what has happened, to hold people accountable for what they did, and the most important thing is to

make sure it doesn’t happen again. But I can’t say after this hearing that I feel assured that the Pentagon, KBR, the Inspector General, or any of you, are on top of this situation. It is all an interim

report still being worked on. Let’s find out the answers. This panel

didn’t supply them. I am disappointed, but we still insist on getting

those answers. And we are going to continue to press from the congressional side, and we hope that the Pentagon will continue to

press as well from the military side.

I thank all of you for your participation, and particularly, the two

guests for our committee, our two colleagues that joined us. We

very much appreciate your being here. That completes the business

of the hearing, and we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Diane E. Watson follows:]

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