PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 18-3613

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Appellant

v.

STEVEN BAXTER 

_____________

On Appeal from the District Court

of the Virgin Islands

District Court No. 3-17-cr-00024-001

District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 

_____________

Argued December 11, 2019

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: February 21, 2020)
2

John M. Pellettieri [ARGUED]

United States Department of Justice

Appellate Section

Room 1264

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

Everard E. Potter

Office of United States Attorney

5500 Veterans Drive

United States Courthouse, Suite 260

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Counsel for Appellant

Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III [ARGUED]

Daniel Lader

DiRuzzo & Company

401 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 1400

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Michael L. Sheesley

P.O. Box 307728

St. Thomas, VI 00803

Counsel for Appellee

 
3

_____________________

 OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________________ 

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Steven Baxter allegedly mailed two packages from 

South Carolina to St. Thomas, United States Virgin 

Islands. Upon arrival in St. Thomas, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) agents opened the packages and

discovered that they contained guns. Baxter was 

apprehended and charged with two counts of illegal 

transport of a firearm. During his criminal proceeding, he 

moved to suppress the guns as the fruit of unreasonable 

searches which violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 

The District Court of the Virgin Islands agreed and granted

the motion to suppress. The Government has appealed.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that CBP

permissibly conducted the searches pursuant to the bordersearch exception to the Fourth Amendment. Because the 

searches did not violate Baxter’s constitutional rights, we 

will vacate the order granting the motion to suppress and 

remand for further proceedings.
4

I.

A.1

On March 31, 2017, CBP K-9 Officer Joseph Lopez 

was working at the Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas 

with his trained and certified canine, Bo. Per his routine

daily duties, Lopez brought Bo into a cargo plane to 

inspect mail that was incoming to the Virgin Islands (also,

“the VI”). Bo alerted to a package, signaling in a manner 

indicating the presence of drugs. The package purportedly 

had been sent by Jason Price, whose address was in South 

Carolina, and had been mailed to a Mekelya Meade in St. 

Thomas. It was labeled priority mail and weighed 3 

pounds 2.2 ounces.

Officer Lopez reported the package to CBP Officer 

Richard Kouns, who removed it from the plane. Officer 

Kouns opened the box and brought out a piece of clothing

that smelled strongly of marijuana, although no drugs were 

found in the package. When Officer Kouns returned the 

item to the box, a magazine and round of ammunition fell

to the floor. The officers inspected the package more 

thoroughly and discovered the unassembled parts of a gun.

A few days later, on April 3, 2017, a postal inspector 

contacted CBP regarding another package which bore the 

1 The factual background is derived from the testimony 

presented during the June 4, 2018 suppression hearing.
5

same names and addresses as the March 31 package.2 

Officers Lopez and Kouns responded to the call and

procured the package. Because of the addresses and the 

weight of the package,

3 Officer Kouns suspected it might 

contain another gun and decided to x-ray it. The x-ray 

revealed items that appeared to be a gun and ammunition. 

Officer Kouns then opened the package and discovered 

what were indeed a gun and ammunition.

The CBP officers contacted Homeland Security. 

Homeland Security Special Agent Alicia Blyden arranged 

a controlled delivery of the two packages. Authorities

ultimately apprehended Steven Baxter as the alleged 

sender of the packages, and a grand jury charged him with 

two counts of illegal transport of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(a)(5).

B.

Baxter moved to suppress the guns, claiming that 

CBP’s warrantless searches of the two packages violated 

2 Two packages bearing these names were intercepted on 

April 3, 2017, but for present purposes, only one of the 

two (the package containing a gun) is relevant.

3 While the record does not contain information specifying

its precise weight, the second package weighed more than 

13 ounces.
6

his Fourth Amendment rights.4 After a hearing, the 

District Court initially denied suppression with respect to 

the March 31, 2017 search and ordered additional briefing 

as to the April 3, 2017 search. Subsequently, on 

November 26, 2018, the District Court vacated its earlier

partial denial and issued a detailed forty-two page opinion 

granting the suppression motion in its entirety. United 

States v. Baxter, No. 2017-24, 2018 WL 6173880 (D.V.I. 

Nov. 26, 2018).

In its opinion, the District Court observed that the 

packages sent from South Carolina to St. Thomas “never 

left United States territory.” Id. at *8. The District Court 

4 Before the District Court, the Government argued that 

Baxter lacked standing to challenge the searches because 

he lacked an expectation of privacy. Under its theory, 

because the packages were sent under the name Jason 

Price, only Price would have a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the packages. The District Court rejected the 

Government’s claim. On appeal, the Government has not

pursued the standing issue. The standing inquiry for 

challenging a search under the Fourth Amendment is not 

a jurisdictional matter and therefore can be waived. See 

United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 & n.11 (3d Cir. 

2014). Because the Government has waived the issue on 

appeal, we will not consider whether Baxter has standing 

to challenge the searches. See United States v. Joseph, 730 

F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013).
7

posited that, under the Fourth Amendment, the packages

“remain protected from a warrantless search unless . . . 

they are transferred to a foreign territory.”5 Id. at *7. The 

District Court acknowledged that, while the Virgin Islands

is not a “foreign territory” or a “foreign country,” id. at 

*7–*9, nonetheless “[a]rguably . . . , some type of 

border—or an approximation of one—exists” between the 

mainland United States and the VI for certain customs 

purposes. Id. at *14. But it concluded that searches at that 

customs border for purposes of enforcing customs laws are 

less important “than the interest of the United States in

enforcing its own Constitution.”

6

 Id.

5 The District Court observed that an exception applies if 

the warrantless search is conducted by a non-government

agent, but such an exception is irrelevant to Baxter’s case.

6 The United States’ interest in enforcing the Fourth 

Amendment is not typically considered when courts 

consider the balance of rights under the Fourth 

Amendment. Rather, the familiar balancing test weighs

the Government’s interest in conducting a search versus 

an individual’s interest in being free from a search. See 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[T]here is no ready 

test for determining reasonableness [of a search] other 

than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the 

invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.” (citation 

omitted)).
8

Our Court’s decision in United States v. Hyde, 37 

F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1994), established the applicability of 

the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment at 

the customs border between the mainland United States

and the Virgin Islands.7 Because the border-search 

exception permits the Government to conduct warrantless 

7 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, Hyde framed the 

Government’s power to conduct warrantless border 

searches as an “exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s 

warrant requirement. See, e.g., 37 F.3d at 119–20 (citing 

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 

537 (1985), United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 

(1977), and United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 

U.S. 123, 125 (1973)). Our reading of those cases 

suggests, however, that this is an imperfect locution: a 

border search is not an “exception” carved out from the 

Fourth Amendment’s application, but rather a border 

search is a circumstance in which the Fourth Amendment 

was never intended to apply. See Hyde, 37 F.3d at 119 

(“The inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to border 

searches was, to the [Ramsey] Court, evident: ‘That 

searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing 

right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and 

examining persons and property crossing into this country, 

are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur 

at the border. . . .’” (quoting 431 U.S. at 616)). 

Nonetheless, for consistency’s sake, we employ the 

“exception” terminology here.
9

searches at the Virgin Islands customs border, the District 

Court had to distinguish Hyde. It did so by relying on the 

direction that the packages were traveling—i.e., from the 

mainland to the Virgin Islands—not from the Virgin 

Islands to the mainland, as was the case in Hyde.

According to the District Court, 19 U.S.C. § 14678

authorizes customs inspections of persons and items upon 

entry into the United States, but “[t]he Court is aware of 

no statutory authority authorizing similar inspections of

persons or items entering the United States Virgin Islands 

8 Section 1467 provides: “Whenever a vessel from a 

foreign port or place or from a port or place in any 

Territory or possession of the United States arrives at a 

port or place in the United States or the Virgin Islands, 

whether directly or via another port or place in the United 

States or the Virgin Islands, the appropriate customs 

officer for such port or place of arrival may, under such 

regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe 

and for the purpose of assuring compliance with any law, 

regulation, or instruction which the Secretary of the 

Treasury or the Customs Service is authorized to enforce, 

cause inspection, examination, and search to be made of 

the persons, baggage, and merchandise discharged or 

unladen from such vessel, whether or not any or all such 

persons, baggage, or merchandise has previously been 

inspected, examined, or searched by officers of the 

customs.”
10

from the United States mainland.” Baxter, 2018 WL 

6173880, at *15. In addition, the District Court weighed

the interests at play and concluded that the balance is 

different than that struck in Hyde. The District Court 

weighed the Government’s interest in conducting the 

searches for customs enforcement purposes against 

individuals’ personal privacy interest in mailed packages

and determined “that the government’s interest in 

conducting the type of search at issue here is less 

compelling than the government’s interest in conducting 

the searches at issue in Hyde. In addition, the intrusion on 

privacy here is more significant than the intrusion 

presented in Hyde.” Id. at *14 n.7. Thus, it concluded

that, when traveling into the Virgin Islands, the personal 

interest prevails, and “the warrantless searches of the 

sealed mail packages in this matter were not reasonable.” 

Id.

The District Court reiterated, “[i]t is axiomatic that 

those things that originate in, and stay within, the territory 

of the United States remain free from border searches.” Id. 

at *15. Accordingly, the District Court granted Baxter’s 

motion to suppress the firearms.
11

II.

A.

The Government timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction over the Government’s appeal of the order 

suppressing evidence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We 

review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo. See 

Hyde, 37 F.3d at 118.

B.

Because we disagree with the District Court’s 

conclusion that Hyde is inapposite, we begin by turning

our attention to that case. In Hyde, three individuals were 

attempting to board a flight from St. Thomas to Miami, 

Florida. After the individuals were stopped by Customs, 

inspectors conducted pat-downs and discovered cocaine 

taped to their bodies under their clothes. The defendants 

moved to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of 

unconstitutional searches. The District Court granted the 

suppression motions. On appeal, the Government argued 

that the warrantless searches were constitutional under the

border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment. We 

agreed, concluding that an individual “may be subjected 

to a routine customs search prior to departure in the 
12

absence of any degree of suspicion that the individual is 

engaged in wrongdoing.” 37 F.3d at 118.

We first acknowledged the general rule that

“warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” 

Id. (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 

(1990)). But we also pointed out that searches at a border 

are, and always have been, a fundamentally different

category of search. Border searches are one of those 

“limited situations [in which] the government’s interest in 

conducting a search without a warrant outweighs the 

individual’s privacy interest.” Id. As such, “searches at a 

border, without probable cause and without a warrant, are 

nonetheless ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 118. Indeed, we 

reasoned that going back to our country’s founding, the 

very first Congress—the same Congress that proposed the 

Bill of Rights—specifically authorized warrantless border 

searches for the purpose of collecting customs duties, and 

“did not intend such searches to come within the

prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 119.

We observed in Hyde that the Supreme Court has 

recognized, explained, and reaffirmed the border-search 

exception in several cases. See id. at 119–20 (citing 

cases). Historically, the Government’s broad power to 

conduct border searches has been necessary to prevent 

smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entering 

the country. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 

8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). Border-search
13

jurisprudence demonstrates that the Supreme Court has 

“faithfully adhered to” the view that “border searches were 

not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth 

Amendment and were ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of 

that Amendment.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 

617 (1977). The border-search exception is grounded in 

the sovereign’s right to control “who and what may enter 

the country,” and for that reason, individuals have “limited 

justifiable expectations of privacy” when presenting 

themselves or their mailed parcels for entry at a border.

9

Id. at 620, 623 n.17. Thus, the balance between an 

individual’s lesser expectation of privacy at a border tilts

more favorably to the Government, which has a

heightened interest in regulating the collection of duties 

and preventing the entry of contraband. See United States 

v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537, 539–40

(1985).

We acknowledged in Hyde that the Supreme Court 

has applied the border-search exception only when an 

international boundary “or its functional equivalent”10 is at 

9

In Ramsey, the Supreme Court concluded that the bordersearch exception applies to mailed letters in the same way 

it applies to individuals. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620.

10 The “functional equivalent” of an international border 

may, for instance, be an airport, if the airport is the first 

point of landing after a nonstop flight from abroad. Hyde, 
14

play. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 120. The border between the 

United States and the Virgin Islands is neither an 

international boundary nor its functional equivalent, and 

so the Supreme Court’s border-search exception cases did

not, by themselves, control our decision in Hyde. Id. at 

122. Nonetheless, we decided that the rationale of the 

Supreme Court’s international border-search cases applies

with equal force at the customs border that Congress 

established between the mainland United States and the 

Virgin Islands.

11

 Id.

37 F.3d at 120 n.2 (citing United States v. Caminos, 770 

F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1985)).

11 The Virgin Islands is an “unincorporated American 

territory.” See Vooys v. Bentley, 901 F.3d 172, 176 (3d 

Cir. 2018) (en banc). That is, the VI has not been 

“incorporated” into the United States on a path to 

statehood. Id. at 176 n.10. Because of its unincorporated 

territory status, Congress “has the authority to create a 

border for customs purposes” between the VI and the rest 

of the country. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 121. Consistent with that 

authority, in the Tariff Act of 1930 (which remains in 

effect today), Congress specified that the customs territory 

of the United States excludes the Virgin Islands. Id.; see 

19 U.S.C. § 1401(h) (“The term ‘United States’ includes 

all Territories and possessions of the United States except 

the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, 
15

Like searches at an international border, routine 

warrantless searches at the Virgin Islands customs border 

would serve the United States’ interest in regulating its 

customs system. Id. “Routine warrantless border searches 

without probable cause would appear to be as essential to 

the accomplishment of the objects of that customs border 

as similar traditional searches have universally been 

recognized to be to the objectives of traditional customs 

systems at international borders.” Id. And, on “the other 

side of the balance,” we observed that individuals at the

customs border, like at an international border, have a 

lesser privacy expectation than they would within the 

mainland United States. Id. Thus, the searches of the 

Hyde defendants were reasonable and did not offend the 

Fourth Amendment. Id.

We completed our analysis in Hyde with the 

observation that the application of the border-search

exception at the customs border is consistent with the

protections of the Fourth Amendment, which apply within

the territory of the Virgin Islands. See Revised Organic 

Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (“The right to be secure 

against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 

violated. No warrant for arrest or search shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 

and particularly describing the place to be searched and 

Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island, and the 

island of Guam.”).
16

the persons or things to be seized.”). The existence of 

Fourth Amendment protections within the Virgin Islands 

does not undermine Congress’s ability to direct that a 

customs border exists between the United States mainland 

and the Virgin Islands and to protect that customs border 

by conducting searches that are “essential to the effective 

surveillance of the customs border and to the efficient 

collection of the duties Congress had imposed.” Hyde, 37 

F.3d at 123.

In sum, Hyde established that the border-search

exception to the Fourth Amendment permits routine 

warrantless customs searches at the customs border 

between the mainland United States and the Virgin 

Islands.12 Hyde’s vitality is undiminished today.

12 Hyde held that warrantless searches at the customs 

border are constitutionally permissible for the purpose of 

surveillance of that border and collection of customs 

duties. In Baxter’s case, however, it is immaterial whether 

the CBP officers conducted the searches of Baxter’s 

packages for the specific purposes that were discussed in 

Hyde. Rather, as the Supreme Court held in Whren v. 

United States, “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 

ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” 

517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Moreover, although Hyde 

concerned searches of individuals who were crossing the 

customs border, Hyde’s rationale applies to mailed 

packages as well. As the Supreme Court made clear in 
17

C.

 The routine customs searches of Baxter’s packages 

were reasonable under Hyde unless, as the District Court 

held, it makes a difference that the packages were leaving 

the mainland United States rather than entering into it.13 

Ramsey, as far as the applicability of the border-search 

exception is concerned, there is no distinction between 

persons and mailed items. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 

(“The critical fact is that the envelopes cross the border 

and enter this country, not that th[ey] are brought in by one 

mode of transportation rather than another. It is their entry 

into this country from without that makes a resulting 

search ‘reasonable.’”).

13 Neither party has suggested that CBP’s searches of 

Baxter’s packages qualify as anything other than routine 

customs searches. We are aware that appellate courts have

held that a customs search that poses a serious invasion of 

privacy and that would offend the average traveler—like a 

body-cavity or strip search—is non-routine and thus 

subject to heightened Fourth Amendment scrutiny. United 

States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2008)

(collecting cases); United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 

1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993). The searches of the mailed 

packages here fall far below that level of intrusion. 

Accordingly, there is no need for us to consider what 

constitutional requirements apply to a non-routine 

customs search. See id. (“When a border search and 
18

We conclude that this directional distinction should have 

made no material difference to the District Court’s 

analysis. The border-search exception applies regardless 

of the direction of a border crossing.

In United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 

1991), we considered the applicability of the bordersearch exception to searches of luggage traveling across 

the international border out of the United States. 

Specifically, customs inspectors at the Philadelphia 

International Airport conducted a warrantless search of 

Ezeiruaku’s suitcases, which were about to be loaded onto

an outgoing flight to Frankfurt, Germany.

14

 The

inspectors discovered $265,000 of unreported cash in one

suitcase. Ezeiruaku was charged with one count of 

exporting unreported currency, and he moved to suppress 

the cash as fruit of an unconstitutional search. The District 

Court granted the motion.

We reversed, rejecting Ezeiruaku’s claim that the 

border-search exception does not apply to articles leaving 

the United States. Id. at 143. Consistent with every Court 

of Appeals to have considered the issue, we concluded that 

seizure becomes nonroutine, a customs official needs 

reasonable suspicion to justify it.”).

14 Because it was the last point of departure before an 

international flight, the Philadelphia International Airport 

was the functional equivalent of an international border. 

Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 139.
19

“the traditional rationale for the border search exception 

applies as well in the outgoing border search context.”15 

Id. Thus, “[b]ecause the luggage . . . was at the functional 

equivalent of the border, we [held] that no warrant, 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause was needed to 

justify the search.” Id.

Baxter is correct in observing that the Supreme 

Court’s border-search cases primarily discuss the United 

States’ interest in protecting its borders from illicit entry

of persons and goods into the United States. See, e.g., 

Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620. This observation does not, 

however, undermine the policy reasons we took into 

account in Ezeiruaku that justify applying the bordersearch exception to any border crossing, regardless of the 

direction. The United States has an interest in monitoring 

15 At the time Ezeiruaku was decided, the Second, Fifth, 

Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had 

held that the border-search exception applies regardless of 

the direction of the border crossing. See Ezeiruaku, 936 

F.2d at 141–43. Since then, the First, Fourth, and Sixth 

Circuit Courts of Appeals have joined the consensus. See 

United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 

2003); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 

1999); United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th 

Cir. 1995). We are aware of no Court of Appeals to have 

reached a contrary conclusion.
20

persons and items that exit the country as well as those that 

enter it. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 143.

Indeed, in both Hyde and Ezeiruaku, we drew 

support for our conclusions based on public policy 

concerns. We recognized in Hyde that the United States 

has an interest in regulating commerce to enforce its 

customs border with the Virgin Islands. See Hyde, 37 F.3d 

at 122. This interest applies to goods and currency both 

entering and leaving the mainland by crossing that 

customs border. Moreover, we observed in Ezeiruaku that 

the Government’s concern with the influx of illicit items 

into the United States, such as drugs or similar contraband, 

gives rise to a parallel interest in monitoring the outflow 

of unreported cash that may be supporting the illegal 

narcotics trade. 936 F.2d at 143. So, even though drug 

trade was not at issue in Ezeiruaku’s case, “in an 

environment that sees a massive importation of drugs 

across our borders, . . . [s]trong dictates of public policy 

reinforce the necessity of identifying, if not monitoring or 

controlling, a cash outflow from the country as well as an 

influx of narcotics into the country.” Id. The United 

States has similar interests at the Virgin Islands customs 

border.16

16 Indeed, the United States has an additional interest in 

protecting its territories from the entry of illicit items like 

drugs and guns.
21

Thus, under Ezeiruaku, the direction of travel does 

not impact the applicability of the border-search 

exception. The District Court erred in concluding 

otherwise.

D.

Apart from his Fourth Amendment claim, Baxter 

also contends that the regulations that authorized the CBP 

officers’ searches of the mailed packages are 

unconstitutional and invalid for failure to comply with the 

Administrative Procedure Act.

17

 Baxter challenges: (1) 19 

C.F.R. § 145.1, a regulation that defines certain classes of 

mail; (2) 19 C.F.R. § 145.2, which authorizes, inter alia, 

customs examination of “all mail arriving from outside the 

U.S. Virgin Islands which is to be delivered within the 

U.S. Virgin Islands”; and (3) United States Postal Service

Domestic Mail Manual § 101.6.1, which provides that 

mail weighing over 13 ounces is “priority mail.” When 

considered in tandem, these three regulations authorized 

CBP officers to conduct the customs searches of the two 

packages here.

18

 

17 Baxter does not claim that the CBP officers violated any 

applicable statute or regulation in conducting the searches.

18 Due to their weight, Baxter’s packages qualified as 

“priority mail,” not “first class mail,” which is described 

in USPS Domestic Mail Manual § 101.6.1, or as “sealed 

letter class mail,” described in 19 C.F.R. § 145.1. By 
22

Baxter argues that these provisions are invalid for 

three reasons: the regulations (1) were issued in the 

absence of proper notice and comment procedures, 5 

U.S.C. § 553(b), (c); (2) are arbitrary and capricious, 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); and (3) constitute a violation of the 

nondelegation doctrine. The Government vigorously 

disputes each of these claims.

Baxter concedes, as he must, that he never presented 

these claims to the District Court, and so the District Court 

was never given the opportunity to consider them. These 

arguments could and should have been presented to the 

District Court in the first instance. Because these issues

were asserted for the first time on appeal, we deem them 

forfeited and will not consider them. See Gov’t of the V.I. 

v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2005).

III.

Border searches “have a unique status in 

constitutional law.” Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 142 (quoting 

United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th 

Cir. 1984)). Indeed, the “longstanding recognition that 

regulation, first class mail and sealed letter class mail are 

subject to heightened requirements prior to customs 

inspection. See 19 C.F.R. § 145.3(b), (e). The packages 

at issue here did not qualify for the benefit of those 

heightened protections and therefore were subject to 

customs inspection under 19 C.F.R. § 145.2.
23

searches at our borders without probable cause and 

without a warrant are nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a 

history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.” Ramsey, 

431 U.S. at 619.

The searches of the two packages here, which 

occurred at the Virgin Islands customs border, were 

routine customs searches that were reasonable under the 

border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment. See 

Hyde, 37 F.3d at 122; Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 143. Because 

the searches did not violate Baxter’s Fourth Amendment 

rights, the District Court erred by suppressing the fruit of 

those searches. We therefore will vacate the judgment and 

remand the matter to the District Court.