If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ELHAM MA AMAWI, also known as JULIANNE 

WINSTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 20, 2023

v No. 362538

Berrien Circuit Court

STEVEN ALAN DEMING, LC No. 2014-003582-DP

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SHAPIRO and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this child custody dispute, plaintiff, Elham Ma Amawi, appeals by right the trial court’s 

order granting defendant, Steven Alan Deming, sole legal and physical custody of their two minor 

children. Plaintiff has filed a brief on her own behalf on appeal. In her brief, she complains 

generally about the Friend of the Court (FOC), the trial court’s referees, and the trial judge. She 

also claims that the trial court erred in numerous ways that she believes warrant relief. We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

Defendant and plaintiff had a brief relationship during which they had two sons: CD and 

JA. The trial court initially awarded plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the children.

Defendant admitted that he had a problem with alcohol and that he was arrested for drunk 

driving. He went to prison and was released in 2018. Defendant apparently addressed his alcohol 

abuse problem in prison and he tried to be a part of his sons’ lives after his release. Plaintiff, 

however, did not agree that defendant should be a part of the children’s lives, so she did not 

cooperate with the parenting-time orders. She eventually moved the children to another county 

and continued to deprive defendant of parenting time.

The trial court eventually found plaintiff to be in contempt for violating the parenting-time 

orders. Plaintiff also repeatedly tried to get defendant’s parenting time suspended. Evidence in 

the record indicates that, even when defendant exercised parenting time, plaintiff used Children’s 

Protective Services (CPS) and police officers to interfere with his parenting time. In May 2022, 
-2-

after years of conflict over parenting time, defendant moved to change the children’s custody to 

joint legal and physical custody because plaintiff alienated the children from him. A referee held 

a hearing on the proposed change in July 2022. The referee found that it served the children’s best 

interests to award defendant sole legal and physical custody of the boys.

II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS: RECORD, WAIVER, AND JURISDICTION

Both parties have appeared in this Court in propria persona, and both have included 

documents with their submissions on appeal that they believe this Court should review. This 

Court’s review, however, is limited to the original record. See MCR 7.210(A); Dora v Lesinski, 

351 Mich 579, 581; 88 NW2d 592 (1958). For that reason, we have only considered those 

documents that were part of the lower court record.

We further note that plaintiff submitted only one transcript to this Court, even after this 

Court’s clerk informed her that she needed to submit all the relevant transcripts. See 

MCR 7.210(B)(1). We decline to consider any issue on appeal that cannot properly be decided as 

a result of plaintiff’s failure to provide the relevant transcripts. See Myers v Jarnac, 189 Mich 

App 436, 443-444; 474 NW2d 302 (1991).

We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs on appeal and, giving them the benefit of 

the doubt as parties appearing in propria persona, we have attempted to address every issue that 

they arguably have raised in this Court. To the extent that we have not addressed a particular claim

of error, it is because the claim lacked factual or legal analysis sufficient to permit us to address it; 

therefore, we treat those claims as having been abandoned on appeal. See Mitcham v Detroit, 355 

Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).

Defendant also challenges this Court’s jurisdiction. He asserts, in effect, that plaintiff filed 

her claim of appeal too soon because the trial court’s order had not yet become final and plaintiff

objected to the order in the trial court. The fact that the order changing custody had not yet taken 

effect is not dispositive. In re Application of Ind Mich Power Co to Increase Rates, 329 Mich App 

397, 411; 942 NW2d 639 (2019). The trial court’s order changing custody was a final order under 

MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). Plaintiff had to file her appeal within 21 days of its entry pursuant to MCL 

7.204(A)(1)(a). Plaintiff filed her claim of appeal within 21 days of entry of the order at issue, and 

her challenge to entry of the order in the trial court did not deprive this Court of jurisdiction. See 

Nordstrom v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 486 Mich 962; 782 NW2d 779 (2010). Nevertheless, we agree 

that some of plaintiff’s claims may be beyond the scope of her appeal. See MCR 7.203(A) 

(limiting jurisdiction to review of that portion of the order with respect to which there is an appeal 

of right). To the extent that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s appeal as an 

appeal of right, in the interests of finality, we treat plaintiff’s appeal of such issues as on leave 

granted. Wardell v Hincka, 297 Mich App 127, 133 n 1; 822 NW2d 278 (2012).

III. CHANGE IN CUSTODY

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In child custody disputes, this Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings by examining 

whether the findings are against the great weight of the evidence. See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 

Mich 871, 877-878; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). A finding is against the great weight of the evidence 
-3-

when it is so contrary to the weight of the evidence that it is unwarranted or is so plainly a 

miscarriage of justice that it would warrant a new trial. Id. at 878. This Court reviews a trial 

court’s discretionary rulings in a custody dispute for a palpable abuse of discretion. MCL 722.28. 

“An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative 

of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of 

passion or bias.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Finally, this 

Court reviews the trial court’s selection, application, and interpretation of the law governing 

custody disputes for “clear legal error.” MCL 722.28. The clear-legal-error standard is the same 

as the ordinary-legal-error standard. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 881. Accordingly, this Court reviews 

de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. See Kaeb v Kaeb, 309 Mich App 556, 

564; 873 NW2d 319 (2015). This Court similarly reviews de novo whether a party received due 

process. See Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 157; 693 NW2d 825 (2005).

B. NOTICE

On appeal, plaintiff briefly asserts that she had no notice of defendant’s motion to change 

custody and no notice of the hearing. The record does not support her claim.

Plaintiff had a due-process right to service of notice “by the best means available, by 

methods reasonably calculated to give [her] actual notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to 

be heard and to present objections or defenses.” Hill v Frawley, 155 Mich App 611, 613; 400 

NW2d 328 (1986). Defendant formally moved for a change in custody on May 4, 2022. Because 

plaintiff’s address was confidential, see MCR 3.203(F), an FOC staffer mailed the notice on 

May 9, 2022, to plaintiff’s last known address, which was adequate under the court rules. See 

MCR 3.203(A); MCR 3.203(F) (stating that the party with the confidential address has the 

obligation to provide an alternate address for service).

Moreover, the referee inquired about the notice provided to plaintiff, and the FOC 

Supervisor, Kelly Milnickel, testified at the hearing that the FOC had received an e-mail from 

plaintiff in which she stated that she had actual notice of the hearing a week before the hearing 

date. Plaintiff asserted in that e-mail that she had no transportation and wanted the hearing 

adjourned. Milnickel stated that plaintiff had a habit of requesting adjournments premised on 

transportation; she had done so three times previously. Milnickel agreed that plaintiff had 

10 weeks to arrange transportation for the hearing held in July 2022. Under the circumstances, 

plaintiff has not demonstrated that the procedures for giving notice of the hearing did not comply 

with minimum due process. See Reed, 265 Mich App at 157; Hill, 155 Mich App at 613.

C. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

We next address plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to establish proper cause or a change 

of circumstances that warranted a hearing on custody.

Michigan courts generally avoid unwarranted and disruptive changes to a child’s custodial 

environment. See Elliott-Mault v Elliott, 329 Mich 544, 552-553; 46 NW2d 373 (1951). For that 

reason, a party requesting a change in the child’s custodial environment must demonstrate a 

“change of circumstances” since the last applicable order before revisiting the child’s custodial 
-4-

environment. See Sweet v Sweet, 329 Mich 251, 255-256; 45 NW2d 58 (1950). The Legislature 

codified that requirement under MCL 722.27.

The Legislature provided that a trial court “shall not modify or amend its previous 

judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of 

a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the 

child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The Legislature established the higher burden of proof for changes 

that alter an established custodial environment to “minimize the prospect of unwarranted and 

disruptive change of custody orders and to erect a barrier against removal of a child from an 

‘established custodial environment,’ except in the most compelling cases.” Baker v Baker, 411 

Mich 567, 576-577; 309 NW2d 532 (1981). Accordingly, the party requesting the change must 

establish proper cause or a change in circumstances before the trial court may even hold a hearing 

to consider the request. See MCL 722.27(1)(c); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499; 675 

NW2d 847 (2003).

In Vodvarka, this Court identified the nature of the change that would warrant revisiting 

custody. It stated that “not just any change” will suffice to justify revisiting custody—the 

“evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes” to rise to the level of 

a change of circumstances that would warrant revisiting custody. Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 513-

514. The change must be concerning the conditions of custody and must be changes that have 

had, or could have, a significant effect on the child’s well-being. Id. at 513. Courts generally look 

to the best-interest factors stated under MCL 722.23 when considering whether the allegations 

implicate proper cause or a change in circumstances. Id. at 511-512. This Court in Vodvarka 

further clarified that the threshold determination typically involved a question of fact, but it stated 

its belief that trial courts will often be able to decide the question of proper cause or a change of 

circumstances without a hearing because the facts alleged would often be undisputed or could be 

accepted as true for purposes of deciding whether to hold a custody hearing. Id. at 512, 517. When 

there is a question of fact, the moving party has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that there is either proper cause or a change of circumstance that warrants revising 

custody. Id. at 509; see also Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 603-604; 766 NW2d 903 

(2009).

In May 2022, defendant moved to change custody; specifically, he asked the trial court to 

change the children’s custody from sole legal and physical custody with plaintiff to joint legal and 

physical custody for both parents. Defendant asserted that plaintiff refused to follow the trial 

court’s orders regarding parenting time over the past three years which warranted a change. He 

also alleged that plaintiff deliberately alienated the children, refused to disclose the location of the 

children, neglected the children’s education, and had verbally and mentally abused him in front of 

the children during parenting exchanges. The trial court agreed that such sufficed to warrant an 

evidentiary hearing and scheduled it for July 22, 2022.

Under the best-interest factors, a trial court must consider “the willingness and ability of 

each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship 

between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents.” MCL 722.23(j). The record 

amply demonstrated that plaintiff had repeatedly denied defendant parenting time over a period of 

years. Indeed, she had been held in contempt for denying defendant his parenting time and still 

refused to comply with the trial court’s orders. The continued disruptions to defendant’s parenting 
-5-

time strongly implicated MCL 722.23(j). Moreover, because the record itself supported those 

allegations, the trial court could reasonably conclude that defendant demonstrated proper cause or 

a change in circumstances that warranted a custody hearing without first holding a hearing on his 

allegations. See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App 512, 517. The trial court did not err when it determined 

that defendant established proper cause or a change of circumstances that warranted revisiting the 

children’s custody.

D. BEST-INTEREST FACTORS

Plaintiff also argues that the referee did not adequately address the best-interest factors 

when deciding whether to grant defendant’s motion to change custody. We disagree.

When considering whether and to what extent to change custody, the trial court had to 

consider the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23. See MCL 722.26a(1)(a). The Legislature 

determined that, for purposes of the child custody act, the best interests of the child means the 

“sum total” of the enumerated factors, which were to be “considered, evaluated, and determined 

by the court.” MCL 722.23. The trial court had to state its findings and conclusions for each of 

the factors when rendering its custody determination. See MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 

267 Mich App 449, 451-452; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). Although the trial court was not required to 

discuss every “piece of evidence entered” and every “argument raised” by the parties, the record 

must “be sufficient for this Court to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against 

the trial court’s findings.” Id. at 452. The trial court was not required to give equal weight to each 

factor; it could consider the relative weight of the factors as appropriate to the circumstances. See 

Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 184; 729 NW2d 256 (2006).

The referee who held the hearing found that the children had an established custodial 

environment with plaintiff—even though he opined that that was in significant part because 

plaintiff had denied defendant the “opportunity to have any kind of an established custodial 

environment with these children in derogation of their best interests.” For that reason, the referee 

correctly recognized, defendant had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed 

change in custody served the children’s best interests using the factors stated under MCL 722.23. 

See MCL 722.27(1)(c).

Turning to the factors, the referee first found that the evidence that plaintiff had been 

depriving the children of parenting time with defendant implicated several factors. He opined that 

her behavior was not indicative of love and affection under Factor (a). See MCL 722.23(a). 

Instead, the referee found the behavior to be a “twisted, outlandish, irrational perception of the 

children’s needs.” He similarly felt that the behavior implicated plaintiff’s capacity to give the 

children love, affection, and guidance under Factor (b). See MCL 722.23(b). The referee wrote 

that the behavior showed that plaintiff was “hobbling” the children from having a “normal and 

constructive adulthood.” The referee also found that plaintiff’s conduct amounted to a 

destabilizing force for purposes of Factor (d), see MCL 722.23(d), and found that she had done 

everything possible to prevent defendant from having a relationship with his children, which 

directly contravened Factor (j), see MCL 722.23(j). The referee found that these factors favored 

defendant.
-6-

On appeal, plaintiff asserts that no evidence proved that she had been alienating the 

children from defendant except for the two instances of contempt. She further claims that she had 

the right to protect the children from domestic violence under MCL 722.23(j).

Significant evidence in the record establishes that plaintiff had been deliberately preventing 

defendant from exercising his parenting time with the children. Defendant testified at the hearing 

that he last saw his children in February 2022, about five months before the hearing. He also 

testified that plaintiff had been found in contempt on at least two occasions for depriving him of 

parenting time. He noted that the trial court had earlier awarded him 10 weeks of make-up 

parenting time, which he received, but he had not received any other make-up parenting time. He 

noted that the problems with parenting time began in 2019 when plaintiff prevented him from 

having parenting time in a therapeutic setting.

Defendant also testified that, even when he had parenting time, the children resisted his 

efforts to parent. He stated that the children were disinterested in activities and referred to him by 

his first name. He stated that they did so because plaintiff wanted them to do so. Plaintiff also 

gave the children phones, which she used to disrupt parenting time. When he took the phones 

from the children, plaintiff called CPS and the police department to investigate him during his 

parenting time. Defendant also testified that one son had even tried to force himself to throw up 

during parenting exchanges so that he could claim to be sick and avoid parenting time. Milnickel 

confirmed that plaintiff had an extensive history of denying defendant parenting time.

The evidence strongly supported the finding that plaintiff had not, and would not, facilitate 

and encourage a close relationship between the children and defendant. See MCL 722.23(j). 

Indeed, the evidence showed that plaintiff actively sabotaged defendant’s efforts to have a 

relationship with the children, which was an important factor to consider when determining what 

custody arrangement would be in the children’s best interests. See Martin v Martin, 331 Mich 

App 224, 237-243; 952 NW2d 530 (2020). Moreover, no evidence established that plaintiff acted

to protect the children from domestic violence; indeed, no evidence established that defendant had 

engaged in domestic violence. See id. at 238-239. Rather, the evidence showed that plaintiff

placed her own desire to prevent defendant from having parenting time ahead of the children’s 

needs, which implicated the other factors identified by the referee. On this record, it cannot be 

said that the referee’s findings on these factors were contrary to the great weight of the evidence. 

See Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant sent police officers to her home and caused them to violate 

her constitutional rights. She suggests that this evidence should have been considered against 

defendant.

1

 Defendant testified that, after plaintiff completely cut him off from his children, he 

began to worry about their welfare. For that reason, he called police officers to perform welfare 

checks. The referee heard this testimony and apparently did not consider it worthy of note in his

 

1 This may be a reference to an incident when defendant obtained the help of police officers to 

collect the children after plaintiff’s arrest. However, there was no testimony or other evidence in 

the record about this alleged incident for this Court to consider.
-7-

findings. The referee’s decision not to give this testimony any adverse weight was not contrary to 

the great weight of the evidence. See id.

Under Factor (c), the referee found that defendant had the ability to provide the children 

with the necessities of life. See MCL 722.23(c). Although there was no evidence concerning 

plaintiff’s capacity to provide the children with the necessities of life, the referee found that neither 

party was favored under this factor. The referee also found the parties equal for purposes of moral 

fitness under MCL 722.23(f).

Plaintiff asserts on appeal that defendant lied about his criminal record and his failures as 

a father. She also claims that defendant again had been arrested, which under the terms of the 

parenting-time order, should—in her view—have resulted in the immediate suspension of his 

parenting time. She suggests that the referee should have considered those facts as well.

The referee heard defendant’s testimony about his past encounters with the law. Defendant

testified that he had stopped drinking and completed the conditions of his parole. He testified as 

well that he completed substance-abuse counseling. He stated that he was done drinking and had 

no other present issues. There was also no evidence at the hearing that established that defendant

had again been charged with a criminal offense or had been drinking. Defendant further 

acknowledged that he had not been a good father to his daughter from a previous relationship.

The referee had a sufficient basis for assessing defendant’s credibility and whether his past 

conduct was relevant to the best-interest factors for the motion at issue. The referee determined 

that defendant’s history should not be held against him, and this Court must defer to the referee’s 

findings. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.

Plaintiff also asserts that defendant lied about his child support obligations. She fails to 

cite where in the record he misrepresented his obligations, and she has not cited any record 

evidence to support her allegation. She similarly asserts that defendant lied about his living 

situation. More specifically, she claims that defendant actually lived with a girlfriend. Again, she 

cites no evidence to support her allegation. Accordingly, there is no basis for this Court to secondguess the referee’s assessment of the weight and credibility to afford defendant’s testimony. See 

id.

Plaintiff also writes in her appeal brief that she would be better able to provide for the 

children. For example,2she writes that she lives in a spacious brand-new home with four 

 

2 Over several pages at the end of her brief on appeal, plaintiff alleges that she would be the better 

parent in numerous other respects. She asserts—by way of example—that defendant is a drug 

dealer, a compulsive liar, a manipulator, a gambling addict, emotionally unavailable, and mentally 

unstable, and she states that he lives off women and uses them for sex and money. She also claims 

that defendant’s new girlfriend mentally and physically abused the children. There are additional 

unsupported allegations, which are too numerous to cite and summarize. Plaintiff has not 

identified any record evidence to support these claims, and none of these claims are properly before 

this Court. See Kent Co Aero Bd v Dep’t of State Police, 239 Mich App 563, 580; 609 NW2d 593 

(2000).
-8-

bedrooms. She states that there is a five-foot flat-screen television in each child’s room and that 

each child has his own Play Station, fridge, desk, laptop, iPad, and Alexa. Plaintiff’s assertions 

on appeal are not evidence and cannot be considered on appeal. See Kent Co Aero Bd v Dep’t of 

State Police, 239 Mich App 563, 580; 609 NW2d 593 (2000) (“A party is not permitted to enlarge 

the record on appeal by asserting numerous facts that were not presented at the trial court.”). 

Plaintiff failed to appear at the evidentiary hearing, and there was no evidence presented at the 

hearing concerning the children’s living arrangement while in her care. Because there was no 

evidence about plaintiff’s living conditions, the referee’s findings were not contrary to the great 

weight of the evidence. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.

The referee found that plaintiff changed her residence four times since 2020, which, it 

stated, was not stable. Whereas defendant had maintained the same home for the past two years. 

The referee found on that basis that Factor (e), see MCL 722.23(e), favored defendant.

As for Factor (h), which addresses the home, school, and community record of the children, 

see MCL 722.23(h), the referee recognized that there was little information because plaintiff had

kept defendant in the dark about the children. The referee still found that this factor favored 

defendant based on the evidence that the children were living a transient lifestyle and had missed 

a lot of school under plaintiff’s care.

Defendant admitted that he had had a problem with alcohol and that it led to arrests for 

drunk driving.3 He stated, however, that he addressed that problem in prison. After his release, 

defendant remained sober and he began working as a contractor performing home renovations. 

Defendant testified that he had a modest income, rented the same home for about two years, and 

could provide the children with the basic necessities.

No record evidence contradicts defendant’s testimony that he no longer drank, had 

consistent employment, and had a stable home. There was, as the referee noted, no evidence about 

plaintiff’s ability to provide the necessities, but the referee still found the parties to be equal for 

purposes of morality and the ability to provide the necessities of life. There was also evidence that 

plaintiff had repeatedly moved the children over the past few years and that the children had an 

unacceptable number of absences from school. The evidence, therefore, supported the referee’s 

finding that plaintiff led a transient lifestyle and was not providing the children with a stable home. 

Accordingly, the referee’s findings as to these factors was not contrary to the great weight of the 

evidence. See Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

The referee found that there were concerns about plaintiff’s mental health, even though she 

had not been diagnosed with a mental-health disorder. The referee found that defendant was 

mentally and physically healthy. From these findings, the referee determined that Factor (g), see 

MCL 722.23(g), favored defendant.

 

3 Contrary to plaintiff’s contention on appeal, there is no record evidence that defendant went to 

prison for domestic violence.
-9-

On appeal, plaintiff asserts that no evidence other than a “malicious accusation” that she 

had any mental-health problems existed. She further complains that defendant and Milnickel 

committed perjury.

The record reflects no evidence that plaintiff had been diagnosed with a mental-health 

condition. The only evidence tending to reflect on plaintiff’s mental health were the testimonies

by Milnickel and defendant about plaintiff’s behaviors. Milnickel stated that plaintiff acted

argumentative, communicated through racing speech, and appeared to have a view of events that 

did not conform to reality. Defendant testified that plaintiff tried to attack him during a parenting 

exchange, tended to “fly off the handle,” was stuck in her own ways, and engaged in verbal and 

mental abuse. Although the referee acknowledged that plaintiff had not been formally diagnosed 

with a mental-health problem, the referee nevertheless felt that plaintiff’s behaviors were 

sufficiently concerning to warrant a psychological examination.

Plaintiff’s claims that defendant and Milnickel offered false testimony is not a sufficient 

basis for concluding that the referee’s findings were contrary to the great weight of the evidence. 

It was for the referee to assess the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimonies. See Berger, 

277 Mich App at 705. The referee found defendant and Milnickel to be credible, and we will not 

second-guess the referee’s assessment of their credibility. See id. Given the testimony that 

plaintiff had difficult and odd interactions with the FOC staff and others, evidence supported the 

referee’s finding that at least a concern existed that plaintiff’s mental health might be affecting her 

ability to provide the children with a healthy custodial environment. As such, the referee’s finding 

that Factor (g) favored defendant was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence. See 

Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

The referee stated that the children were of an age to express their own views, which was 

a factor to consider under MCL 722.23(i). The referee noted, however, that he had not been able 

to ask the children about their preferences because plaintiff had not brought them to any hearings. 

Indeed, the referee found that obtaining the children’s preferences appeared to be next to 

“impossible.” The referee also stated concern that plaintiff would likely “sabotage any attempt” 

to obtain a free expression of preference. The referee concluded that, even if the children expressed 

a preference to remain in their mother’s sole care, that preference would not be dispositive. 

Finally, the referee determined that Factor (k), MCL 722.23(k), which addressed domestic 

violence, and the catchall Factor (l), see MCL 722.23(l), did not warrant discussion.

Plaintiff asserts on appeal that defendant engaged in domestic violence against her and that 

defendant failed to follow court orders. No evidence anywhere in the record before this Court, 

however, supports those allegations. Plaintiff did not appear at the evidentiary hearing and she 

failed to submit any transcripts from any earlier proceeding that might support her claims. See

Myers, 189 Mich App at 443-444. Because no evidence in the record contradicts the referee’s 

findings on these last factors, it cannot be said that the findings were contrary to the great weight 

of the evidence. See Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

Examining all the factors, the referee determined that it served the children’s best interests 

to order defendant to have sole legal and physical custody of both children. On this record, the 

referee did not commit a palpable abuse of discretion when he determined that it would be in the 

children’s best interests to change custody. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.
-10-

IV. OTHER CLAIMS OF ERROR

At various points in her brief on appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in some 

respect when applying the law applicable to cases involving the termination of parental rights. 

This case involved a custody dispute between natural parents who both have—and continue to 

have—a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. See In re AP, 283 

Mich App 574, 591; 770 NW2d 403 (2009). The parties’ custody dispute was governed by the 

Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.21 et seq., which the trial court properly applied to the 

filings at issue. See MCL 722.25(1) (requiring trial courts to resolve custody disputes between 

parents according to the best interests of the child); MCL 722.27 (listing the powers that a trial 

court has for resolving a custody dispute). There were no petitions under the juvenile code, see 

MCL 712A.1 et seq.; the trial court did not take jurisdiction over the children under the juvenile 

code; and the trial court did not terminate plaintiff’s parental rights, see MCL 712A.2(b); 

MCL 712A.19b; MCR 3.961(A). Plaintiff continues to be the children’s parent and continues to 

have her parental rights.4

Likewise, although a party has the right to the assistance of counsel in a case involving the 

termination of parental rights, see MCL 712A.17c(4); MCR 3.915(B)(1)(b), there is generally no 

right to have counsel at the state’s expense in a custody dispute. Cf. MCL 722.26e(2)(a) (giving 

the trial court the authority to appoint a lawyer for a parent when a third party has initiated a 

custody dispute). This case also does not involve children with Native American ancestry. 

Accordingly, the trial court cannot be faulted for failing to apply the juvenile code to this custody 

dispute, for failing to appoint a lawyer to represent plaintiff at the state’s expense, or for failing to 

apply the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq., or the Michigan Indian Family 

Preservation Act, MCL 712B.1 et seq.

On appeal, plaintiff has also cited statutory provisions governing custody and child welfare 

from other states. The trial court had no obligation to apply foreign law. Foreign authorities may 

be persuasive, see Franks v Franks, 330 Mich App 69, 97 n 4; 944 NW2d 388 (2019), but plaintiff

has not identified how her foreign authorities should be used in the proper application of Michigan 

law.

Plaintiff also asserts that the referee, the trial court, and the FOC staff were biased and 

engaged in misconduct. Plaintiff had the right to have an impartial decision-maker hear her case. 

See Kern v Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App 212, 231; 905 NW2d 453(2017). However, on appeal, 

plaintiff does not identify any evidence showing that the referee or the trial court were biased 

against her. She generally cites the fact that the referee made findings against her interests and 

that the trial court, for example, subjected her to contempt proceedings, which she feels were 

improper. “[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a 

 

4 On appeal, plaintiff invites this Court to terminate defendant’s parental rights based on her 

allegations. This Court is an error-correcting court, see Apex Laboratories Int’l v Detroit, 331 

Mich App 1, 10; 915 NW2d 45 (2020), and does not have original jurisdiction to consider a petition 

to terminate a parent’s parental rights, see MCL 712A.1(e) (defining the court to be the family 

division of a circuit court); MCL 712A.2(b) (defining the court’s jurisdiction over minors in a 

termination proceeding).
-11-

motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism 

that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial 

impartiality.” Id. at 231-232 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff also claims that—at a contempt hearing—the trial court promised her lawyer that 

he would “make the attorney win all other cases” if her attorney did not assist her at the contempt 

hearing. She further alleges that her attorney accepted the deal, and she accuses the trial court of 

conspiring with the court reporter to “forge” the transcripts against her. Again, plaintiff has no 

evidence to support her accusations. Moreover, by failing to submit the relevant transcripts from 

all the prior proceedings, plaintiff abandoned any claim that those proceedings showed evidence 

of bias. See Myers, 189 Mich App at 443-444. Indeed, there is no basis for this Court to conclude 

that the contempt proceedings were anything but proper. See Kern, 320 Mich App at 230 n 2 

(recognizing that a party’s failure to submit the relevant transcripts hampers this Court’s ability to 

question a lower court’s decision). On this record, plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court 

or referee held a bias against her or otherwise acted inappropriately. Plaintiff also has not 

identified any basis for concluding that the FOC staff held a bias against her or that Milnickel’s 

testimony was anything other than accurate. In any event, even if Milnickel held a bias against 

plaintiff, it was up to plaintiff to explore that bias at the evidentiary hearing. See Powell v Saint 

John Hosp, 241 Mich App 64, 72; 614 NW2d 666 (2000) (noting that evidence of bias is always 

relevant).

Plaintiff also alleges that the FOC engaged in misconduct. She claims, by way of example, 

that the FOC improperly waived her right to receive child support, but the record belies that 

accusation. The record shows that the FOC calculated defendant’s child support and enforced his 

obligation to pay consistent with the law until he went to prison. After defendant’s release, the 

FOC again enforced the payment schedule consistent with the law.

Plaintiff also claims that the trial court ordered the FOC to arrange transportation for the 

parenting-time exchanges, but she cites no order to that effect, and she acknowledges that the FOC 

informed her that she was responsible for arranging her own transportation. Plaintiff further 

accuses the FOC of blackmailing her, protecting defendant, and working only for defendant’s 

benefit. Plaintiff’s accusations are completely unsupported.

Plaintiff also complains that defendant maliciously caused her to be prosecuted for 

contempt. More specifically, she asserts that the FOC gave her permission to take the children to 

Florida, giving her every right to deprive defendant of his parenting time. She also asserts that she 

had a medical excuse for failing to allow defendant to exercise his parenting time on another 

occasion, so she could not be held in contempt. Plaintiff claims as well that the FOC investigator 

lied under oath by stating at the hearing that defendant had not been arrested and had not had his 

parenting time suspended automatically, which would preclude a finding of contempt. She also 

states that defendant came at her in a rage during one contempt hearing.

Plaintiff has not appealed the trial court’s orders of contempt, so whether the trial court 

erred when it ordered a sanction for contempt is not properly before this Court. See In re Moroun, 

295 Mich App 312, 229; 814 NW2d 319 (2012). Additionally, she has not submitted any of the 

transcripts from the contempt proceedings. For that reason, there is no record permitting this 

Court’s review of the propriety of those proceedings and no basis for this Court to conclude that 
-12-

anyone lied under oath or misbehaved at the proceedings. See Myers, 189 Mich App at 443-444. 

Plaintiff has not established any other errors in the lower court proceedings that warrant relief.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the trial court improperly ordered that the change of 

custody served the children’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court did not err.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ James Robert Redford