Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Larry Tabb

Westville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Larry Tabb,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 7, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-1364

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court

The Honorable Roger V. Bradford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D01-0911-PC-11393

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 2 of 8

[1] Larry Tabb1 appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 

Because Tabb has not demonstrated the court erred in denying his petition, we 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] We take the facts underlying Tabb’s convictions from our opinion on direct 

appeal:

During the early evening of April 16, 2003, Porter County Drug 

Task Force officers were conducting surveillance of room 119 at 

the Dollar Inn Motel on Highway 20 in Portage, Indiana. 

Officers saw Kevin Easton (“Easton”) enter the room and leave 

minutes later. Easton was stopped, searched, and found to have 

cocaine on his person. He told officers that he had obtained the 

cocaine from Tabb.

The officers saw Tabb looking out the window of Room 119. 

They drew their weapons, entered Room 119, and arrested Tabb 

and William Melton (“Melton”). Officer Brian McDonald saw a 

plastic bag on the floor between the two beds in the room. The 

bag contained four plastic baggies, each having a white powdery 

substance inside. The substance was tested and found to consist 

of four and a quarter grams of cocaine.

On April 17, 2003, the State charged Tabb with Dealing in 

Cocaine. His jury trial commenced on September 6, 2005. On the 

morning of the trial, the State charged Tabb with Possession of 

1 Tabb contends his name is actually Larry Jones and claims Jones is the “real party of interest” because the 

charging information had an incorrect social security number. (Tr. Vol. II at 21.) As his conviction and 

sentencing orders refer to him as Tabb, we will do so as well.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 3 of 8

Cocaine, with reference to the same transaction as that of the 

Dealing in Cocaine count. The jury found Tabb guilty as 

charged. On January 3, 2006, the trial court entered judgments of 

conviction on each count and sentenced Tabb to thirty years for 

Dealing in Cocaine and four years for Possession of Cocaine, to 

be served concurrently.

Tabb v. State, 64A03-0707-CR-308, slip op. at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). On 

appeal, Tabb, pro se, argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence to 

support his convictions and that his convictions of Class A felony dealing in 

cocaine and Class C felony possession of cocaine violated double jeopardy. We 

concluded the State presented sufficient evidence Tabb committed the crimes. 

However, because the Class C felony was a lesser included offense of the Class 

A felony, and because the evidence presented indicated both convictions were 

based on a single transaction, we vacated Tabb’s conviction of and sentence for

Class C felony possession of cocaine. Id. at *3. 

[3] On November 5, 2009, Tabb filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On 

March 8, 2010, the post-conviction court issued a summary ruling, without 

having held a hearing, that denied Tabb’s petition for post-conviction relief. 

Tabb appealed, and the State moved for remand on October 27, 2010. In its 

motion, the State noted Tabb had filed a motion to dismiss in the postconviction court on October 21, 2010, and the State asked our court to transfer 

jurisdiction back to the post-conviction court for a decision on that motion. In 

the alternative, the State argued “that a remand to the post-conviction court for 

presentation of evidence, either by way of an evidentiary hearing or by affidavit, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 4 of 8

and for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is required in this case.” 

(App. Vol. II at 82.) Our court agreed, dismissed Tabb’s appeal without 

prejudice, and remanded the petition for post-conviction relief back to the trial 

court for either dismissal or the presentation of evidence in accordance with the 

Indiana Post-Conviction Rules. 

[4] On February 7, 2013, the post-conviction court granted Tabb’s request to issue 

subpoenas for his trial counsel and two other witnesses Tabb alleged had 

exculpatory evidence. Tabb filed a number of motions between 2013 and 2018, 

including a motion for summary judgment, “Motion to Dismiss on double 

jeopardy grounds[,]” “Motion to Dismiss based on confrontation of witnesses,” 

“Motion to Dismiss regarding what [Tabb] refers to as a binding over 

agreement[,]” and “Motion to Dismiss based on ratification[.]” (Id. at 119)

(errors in original). On February 5, 2018, the post-conviction court held a 

hearing on all pending motions. During that hearing, Tabb told the court that 

he had not been able to subpoena his trial counsel because the subpoena “came 

back unserved.” (Tr. Vol. II at 15.) The post-conviction court ordered Tabb to 

send the returned envelope of the subpoena Tabb sent to his trial counsel to the 

trial court so the court could “see why it was returned” and “then the Court can 

step in and order him to be here” if trial counsel had refused delivery of the 

subpoena. (Id. at 24.) Tabb did not present any other evidence regarding his 

petition at this hearing, and the post-conviction court took the matter under 

advisement pending receipt of the returned envelope from Tabb.

[5] On April 23, 2018, the trial court denied Tabb’s petition, stating in its order:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 5 of 8

The Court granted Petitioner time to provide the Court with 

documentation of Petitioner’s efforts to subpoena his trial 

counsel, Peter Boyles, for that hearing or to serve interrogatories 

on trial counsel. The information Petitioner has filed is not 

sufficient to show that there was an attempt to subpoena Mr. 

Boyles at any current address and nothing has been filed to 

otherwise support the allegations in Petitioner’s Petition for PostConviction Relief. Therefore, the Court denies the Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief in its entirety. The Court is not issuing 

any specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as there was 

no evidence presented from which the Court could find any facts

and additionally many portions of Petitioner’s Petition are 

incomprehensible.

(App. Vol. II at 120.)

Discussion and Decision

[6] As an initial matter, we note that Tabb proceeded before the post-conviction 

court, and proceeds before this court, pro se. It is well settled that

one who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of 

procedure that a trained legal counsel is bound to follow and, 

therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or 

her action. While we prefer to decide cases on the merits, we 

will deem alleged errors waived where an appellant’s 

noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so 

substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors. 

The purpose of our appellate rules, Ind[iana] Appellate Rule 46 

in particular, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the 

appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing 

the case. We will not become an advocate for a party, nor will 

we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly 

developed or improperly expressed to be understood.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 6 of 8

Ramsey v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[7] Here, Tabb presents fifteen issues for our review, including the following:

I. Whether trial Counsel was ineffective, by way of failure to 

object or motion the court to dismiss an insufficient charging 

affiant, affidavit and information, that constituted “Perjury’ on 

an affidavit (predecessor to information) and not seek a hearing 

pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978).

* * * * *

VII. Whether trial Court erred by denying appellant’s motion to 

compel arbitration filing of 5/6/2018, ‘Order’ denying 6/8/2018, 

Relevant to Breach of the Preliminary ‘binding’ agreement, an 

adhesion contract. 

* * * * *

XVI. Whether trial Counsel was ineffective, by way of failure to 

object or motion the court to dismiss, the count 1 information 

because of violations relevant to Extrinsic Fraud On The Court 

Duress Dismissal’ Count1, Conviction under TR, 12(b) (1), 

and 17 (A), ‘dismiss’ for failure to State the real party in interest.

(Appellant’s Br. at 5-6) (errors and emphasis in original). While Tabb cites the 

record and an abundance of case law, his arguments are confusing and 

incoherent. Unfortunately, we are unable to address most of his presented 

issues for this reason. See Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (Ind. Ct. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-1364 | August 7, 2020 Page 7 of 8

App. 1999) (failure to present a cogent argument waives the issues presented on 

appeal).

[8] Even though they are relatively muddled, we are able to address Tabb’s claims 

regarding alleged double jeopardy violations. In Tabb’s direct appeal, we held 

he was subject to double jeopardy when he was convicted of both Class A 

felony dealing in cocaine and Class C felony possession of cocaine. Tabb, slip 

op. at *3. Thus, any argument he raises regarding double jeopardy2 is precluded 

from our review based on res judicata. See State v. Holmes, 728 N.E.2d 164, 171 

2 Tabb’s arguments that reference double jeopardy are:

II. Whether the Court abuse its discretion, by allowing the State to violate petitioner’s 

double jeopardy protection, to amended an insufficient charging affiant, affidavit and 

information, the morning of trial. Constituted, MANIFEST, FUNDAMENTAL, 

PLAIN, and REVERSBILE ERRORS:

III. Whether the Court abuse its discretion, by allowing the State to violate petitioner’s 

double jeopardy protection, in order to obscure the Original double jeopardy violation, 

that exit in the original court 1 information charged under I.C. 35-48-4-1-(2), prior to the 

additional information Charging. Where two are more offenses, are the ‘same offense’.

* * * * *

V. Whether trial Counsel was ineffective by way of failure to object or motion the court 

to dismiss the count 1 information, because of violation relevant to petitioner’s double 

jeopardy protections, ‘evoked’ the morning of trial.

VI. Whether trial Counsel was ineffective, by way of failure to object or motion the court 

to dismiss the court II additional information because of violation relevant to petitioner’s 

double jeopardy protections.

* * * * *

IX. Whether trial Counsel was ineffective, by way of failure to object or motion the court 

to dismiss the count 1 information, because of violation of Wong sun, fruit of the 

poisonous tree, doctrine. Whether, evidence derived from the violation or petitioner’s 

double jeopardy protection.

(Br. of Appellant at 5-6) (errors and emphasis in original).
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(Ind. 2000) (holding res judicata barred Holmes’ claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct because the issue had been “thoroughly considered and decided” 

on direct appeal even though Holmes’ arguments about prosecutorial 

misconduct in his post-conviction petition recharacterized some of the issues).

Conclusion

[9] A majority of Tabb’s issues are waived because he did not make cogent 

arguments on appeal. His five issues regarding double jeopardy are barred by 

res judicata because the appellate court in Tabb’s direct appeal decided that

issue. Because Tabb has not demonstrated the court erred by denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.