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48–003 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–762 

PAKISTAN’S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL 

AREAS (FATA) CHALLENGE: SECURING ONE 

OF THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS AREAS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND 

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 20, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator From Minnesota .......................................... 5 

Dodaro, Gene, Acting Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 34 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts ..................................... 1 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 3 

Negroponte, Hon. John D., Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

(III)

(1) 

PAKISTAN’S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED 

TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) CHALLENGE: 

SECURING ONE OF THE WORLD’S 

MOST DANGEROUS AREAS 

TUESDAY, MAY 20, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:58 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry, 

chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Bill Nelson, Menendez, Casey, 

Lugar, Coleman, Isakson, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee 

will come to order. And I apologize to my colleagues, as well as to 

the Secretary, for the delay, a combination both of the vote and the 

difficult news that we’ve all heard. 

I want to thank the Secretary for coming before us today to talk 

with us about his strategy for dealing with what many of us believe 

is the most pressing national security issue facing the country 

today, and that is the center of jihadism, of radical religious extremism that emanates from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

of Pakistan, the lawless region along the border with Afghanistan. 

I don’t think there’s any member of this committee, or anyone who 

has thought about foreign policy, who doesn’t have serious questions about the depth of this menace. 

The Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, stated, 

in testimony before Congress in February, that al-Qaeda has, ‘‘retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, including top 

leadership, operational mid-level lieutenants, and de facto safe 

haven in Pakistan’s border area with Afghanistan.’’ The DNI’s 2008 

Annual Threat Assessment concluded, ‘‘Al-Qaeda is improving the 

last key aspect of its ability to attack the U.S.: The identification, 

training, and positioning of operatives for an attack on the homeland. We assess that al-Qaeda’s homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure 

targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
2 

struction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the 

population.’’ This is our intelligence assessments. 

So, we ask you to think about that. According to our best intelligence estimates, al-Qaeda is currently working on the final aspects of a plan to launch a devastating attack on the homeland 

from safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas. 

So, while we have been distracted and bogged down in Iraq, the 

more defined front line in the war on al-Qaeda has remained where 

many of us felt it has always been, which is along the AfghanistanPakistan border. In fact, it seems as if we’ve come full circle. Then, 

CIA Director George Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that in the 

summer of 2001, ‘‘the system was blinking red.’’ Now, 7 years later, 

our Nation’s chief intelligence agency is once again telling us that 

the system is blinking red. We obviously need to do everything in 

our power to make certain that history doesn’t repeat itself, and 

that is why many were concerned by the GAO report in April entitled, ‘‘The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the 

Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas.’’ 

I know that Secretary Negroponte doesn’t agree with the conclusion of that report, which is part of the purpose of having a hearing 

like this, and all of us look forward to hearing him explain the current comprehensive strategy and how it can be effective. And then 

we’ll have an opportunity to hear from Gene Dodaro, the Acting 

Comptroller General of the GAO, and we look forward to hearing 

his response. 

I think there’s one thing that all of us can agree on. We need a 

comprehensive approach to the FATA, that includes military, political, diplomatic, intelligence, developmental and economic power. 

We have read the reports about military operations, including 

Predator attacks on high-value targets, when adequate intelligence 

is available. And while I strongly believe we must protect our interests in this way, that approach is not, by itself, a long-term solution to the entire problem. 

We’re working on at least some of the other elements of a comprehensive strategy. This includes creation of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones and a 5-year, $750 million plan for bringing education, development, and economic opportunity to the FATA, although concerns remain about how this money will actually be distributed and accounted for. 

We’ve also redoubled efforts to assist the Pakistani’s with restraining their army to secure the border and conduct counterinsurgency operations and with strengthening the Frontier Corps, 

drawn from local tribes, that will, in theory at least, face less resistance than the national army. Also, Mr. Secretary, I strongly 

support making a long-term commitment to dramatically increasingly U.S. nonmilitary assistance, because directly supporting the 

Pakistani people is the key to securing our long-term interests, and 

theirs. We are concerned, however, that it’ll take several years for 

these efforts to counter the threat, and many people are concerned 

that time is not on our side. 

Even as we discuss the United States strategy, we need to recognize that Pakistan is a sovereign nation with a democratically 

elected leadership. It obviously deserves our support, and it has it. 

3 

This new government is understandably determined to break with 

what most Pakistani’s view as the failed policies of President 

Musharraf. As the committee members know, a few months ago 

Senators Hagel and Biden, the chairman of the committee, and I 

were in Pakistan to observe the election, and it was clear from our 

meetings with the new Pakistani leaders that they have a very different understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat in the 

FATA. If Chairman Biden were here, he would share that view 

with us, as would Senator Hagel. 

It was telling that, in 2 days of meetings, Osama bin Laden’s 

name was hardly ever mentioned. Instead, the Pakistanis are focused on confronting a growing domestic Pashtun insurgency led by 

Baitullah Mehsud. That’s why it’s not surprising that the Pakistani 

Government is reportedly on the verge of striking yet another, 

‘‘peace accord’’ with Mehsud that will call for the withdrawal of 

Pakistani military forces from the tribal regions in return for an 

agreement by the militants to cease attacks within Pakistan. 

It’s clear that the current strategy hasn’t succeeded. There may 

be some positive elements to the new approach, including a greater 

emphasis on economic and social development and increased political integration of the tribal areas, but we say ‘‘maybe,’’ fully remembering what happened in the failed deal that President 

Musharraf made in South Waziristan in 2006, which actually resulted in a dramatic increase in cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and the reestablishment of al-Qaeda training camps. 

So, I think many of us here have a certain skepticism about this, 

and we need to explore that today. 

Finally, many of us are particularly concerned that the current 

deal, as reported, at least, in the New York Times, does not include 

any prohibition on the use of these areas as a base for launching 

attacks into Afghanistan. In fact, with counterinsurgency operations in the FATA curtailed during negotiations, cross-border attacks have already more than doubled, compared with the same period last year. 

Our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are deeply intertwined. 

If there was any lesson I drew from my latest visit, which is one 

of several I’ve made, it is the degree to which what we do in Pakistan will affect our ability and capacity in Afghanistan, and what 

we do in Afghanistan will affect our capacities in Pakistan. They 

are closely intertwined. 

I know Secretary Negroponte shares this concern. Last week, you 

said, Mr. Secretary, that it was unacceptable for extremists to use 

the FATA as a base to launch attacks, and you also said, ‘‘We will 

not be satisfied until the violent extremism emanating from the 

FATA is brought under control.’’ So, we look forward, today, to exploring that with you, and I’ll just submit the rest of this statement 

to the record as if read in full. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

I want to thank Deputy Secretary Negroponte for coming before the committee 

today to discuss our strategy for dealing with what I believe is the most pressing 

national security issue facing America today: The terrorist threat from Pakistan’s 

4 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the lawless region along the border 

with Afghanistan. 

Nobody here should have any question whatsoever about the seriousness of this 

threat. The Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, stated in testimony before Congress in February that al-Qaeda ‘‘has retained or regenerated key 

elements of its capability, including top leadership, operational mid-level lieutenants, and de facto safe haven in Pakistan’s border area with Afghanistan.’’ 

The DNI’s 2008 Annual Threat Assessment concluded, and I quote: ‘‘Al-Qaeda is 

improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the U.S.: The identification, 

training, and positioning of operatives for an attack in the Homeland . . . We assess 

that al-Qaeda’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the 

population.’’ 

Think about that for a second: According to our best intelligence estimates, 

al-Qaeda is currently working on the final aspects of a plan to launch a devastating 

attack on our homeland from a safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas. 

So while we have been distracted and bogged down in Iraq, the real front line 

in the war on al-Qaeda has remained right where it has always been, along the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In fact, it seems like we’ve come full circle. George 

Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that in the summer of 2001 ‘‘the system was blinking red.’’ Now, 7 years later, our Nation’s chief intelligence agency is once again telling us that the system is blinking red. 

We obviously need to do everything in our power to make sure history does not 

repeat itself. That’s why many of us were so concerned by the April GAO report entitled: ‘‘The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist 

Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas.’’ I’m sure that Deputy Secretary Negroponte does not agree with the conclusions of that report, and we all look forward to hearing him explain what our current comprehensive strategy really is. We will then have an opportunity to hear 

from Gene Dodaro, the Acting Comptroller General of the GAO, and we all look forward to hearing his response. 

There’s one thing we can all agree on: We need a comprehensive approach to the 

FATA that includes military, political, diplomatic, intelligence, and economic power. 

We have read the reports about military operations, including predator attacks on 

high value targets when adequate intelligence is available—and while I strongly believe we must protect our interests in this way, that approach is not, by itself, a 

long-term solution to the problem. 

We are working on at least some of the other elements of a comprehensive strat- egy. This includes creation of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, and a 5-year, $750 

million plan for bringing education, development, and economic opportunity to the 

FATA—although concerns remain about how this money will actually be distributed 

and accounted for. We have also redoubled efforts to assist the Pakistanis with retraining their army to secure the border and conduct counterinsurgency operations, 

and with strengthening a Frontier Corps drawn from local tribes that will, in theory 

at least, face less resistance than the national army. 

I also strongly support making a long-term commitment to dramatically increasing U.S. nonmilitary assistance, because directly supporting the Pakistani people is 

key to securing our long-term interests—and theirs. However, I’m concerned that it 

will take several years for these efforts to counter the threat—and time is not on 

our side. 

Even as we discuss U.S. strategy, we must recognize that Pakistan is a sovereign 

nation, with democratically elected leadership that deserves our support. This new 

government is understandably determined to break with what most Pakistanis view 

as the failed policies of President Musharraf. 

In fact, I was in Pakistan with Senators Biden and Hagel for the election in 

February, and it was clear from our meetings with the new Pakistani leaders that 

they have a very different understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat in the 

FATA. It was telling that in 2 days of meetings, Osama bin Laden’s name was 

hardly ever mentioned. Instead, the Pakistanis are focused on confronting a growing 

domestic Pashtun insurgency led by Baitullah Mehsud. 

That’s why it’s not surprising that the Pakistani Government is reportedly on the 

verge of striking a ‘‘peace accord’’ with Mehsud that will call for the withdrawal of 

Pakistani military forces from the tribal regions in return for an agreement by the 

militants to cease attacks within Pakistan. It’s clear the current strategy has not 

succeeded, and there are certainly positive elements to the new approach, including 

a greater emphasis on economic and social development and increased political integration for the tribal areas. 

5 

At the same time, we all remember the failed deal that President Musharraf 

made in South Waziristan in 2006, which resulted in a dramatic increase in crossborder attacks into Afghanistan and the reestablishment of al-Qaeda training 

camps. I was actually in Pakistan at the time, and it was obvious even then that 

the deal was not going to work. 

It is not clear how this agreement is going to be any better for U.S. security interests. Many of us are particularly concerned that the current deal, as reported in the 

New York Times, does not include any prohibition on the use of these areas as a 

base for launching attacks into Afghanistan. In fact, with counterinsurgency operations in the FATA curtailed during negotiations, cross-border attacks have already 

more than doubled compared with the same period last year. Our efforts in Pakistan 

and Afghanistan are deeply intertwined, and we cannot succeed in Afghanistan if 

there is a safe haven for insurgents on the other side of the border. 

I know Deputy Secretary Negroponte shares this concern: You said last week that 

it was ‘‘unacceptable’’ for extremists to use the FATA as a base to launch attacks, 

and that ‘‘we will not be satisfied until the violent extremism emanating from the 

FATA is brought under control.’’ We will be very interested to hear how the administration plans to accomplish that. 

One point of possible leverage is the Coalition Support Funds we provide Pakistan 

as reimbursement for their counterterrorism efforts. We have given over $5.5 billion 

in CSF over the past 6 years, and many of us are concerned that there has not been 

adequate accountability for these expenditures—in fact, a recent interim report by 

the GAO found that: ‘‘After reimbursement to Pakistan for prior expenditures there 

is no requirement for further oversight of these funds by the U.S. Government.’’ 

Clearly, the taxpayers have a right to expect more in return for the billions in aid 

we’re providing Pakistan’s Government for fighting terrorism. 

We also understand the importance of balancing our national security interests 

with the need to support and respect Pakistan’s new government. We have already 

seen evidence of strains within the governing coalition as they grapple with stopping 

the spread of Islamic extremism, reinstating judges combating inflation, and bringing food, power, and economic opportunity to millions of people. Ensuring the survival of democracy in Pakistan is absolutely essential, and if the new government 

is seen as a puppet of the United States—as President Musharraf was—it may well 

lose the support of the people. As we forge this new relationship, we must articulate 

that we understand Pakistan’s many challenges and want to work together to advance our mutual interests. 

With that, we will now turn to Senator Coleman for his opening statement. When 

he is finished, Senator Menendez, who was among the Senators who requested the 

GAO report, will make a brief statement. When he is finished, Deputy Secretary 

Negroponte will make his opening remarks. We will then have a round of questions 

from the subcommittee’s members, which I request that they limit to 8 minutes. 

Thank you again for coming here today. 

Senator KERRY. Mr.—Senator Coleman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you 

for calling this important hearing. 

There certainly is some difference of opinion amongst us on this 

committee as to whether the battles that are being fought in Iraq 

are diverting our attention from other things that are done, vis-avis al-Qaeda. I take al-Qaeda at its word that Iraq has been a central battleground for them in their efforts to establish their caliphate in the Middle East. However, where there is absolutely no disagreement, Mr. Chairman, is the importance of having a comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threat in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

The analysis provided by our intelligence community on the activity of terrorists in the FATA region is alarming, as is the recent 

observed trend in all of Pakistan of increasing Islamic militancy. 

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan is a 

complex one, and the tremendous stakes involved in this relationVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
6 

ship obligate us—require us to have a thoughtful strategy to engage Pakistan and maximize the impact of our assistance to that 

country. We must ensure that the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas do not serve as a safe haven for terrorists. We must ensure 

that Pakistanis move toward democracy and stability to defuse the 

sources of extremism, whose effects are felt throughout the region. 

There is no disagreement with your assessment of the interrelationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan and what happens 

there. 

But, it’s clear, from the GAO report, their assessment is that the 

assistance that we have provided hasn’t achieved the desired outcome in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; they continue to 

serve as a base for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And efforts 

to address that challenge, beyond the military scope, seem to have 

lagged. 

So, I look forward to the Secretary’s testimony. I join you—with 

you in stressing the critical importance of having a comprehensive 

plan, the right plan, to deal with what is clearly a threat to this 

country. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I thank you, Senator Coleman. 

And normally we don’t run around the entire dais, but we do 

have the ranking member here; I just wondered, Senator Lugar, if 

you had any comment you wanted to make. 

Senator LUGAR. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Appreciate it. 

Mr. Secretary, thanks so much for taking time to be with us. We 

know you’re busy, and we appreciate your presence. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

I have submitted written testimony, so I will keep my remarks 

brief, and I look forward to getting into a discussion and an exchange on a number of the issues that you mentioned in your opening statement, sir. 

With the successful transition to elected Government in Pakistan, we have an historic opportunity to help the people of Pakistan build a base of democratic stability from which to counter violent extremism and fight international terrorism. This is vital to 

Pakistani interests, to United States interests, and to the interests 

of the international community at large. 

Pakistan, after all, is the world’s second-most populous Muslim 

state, it has nuclear weapons, and it is on the front lines of the battle against international terrorism. These facts prompt me to offer 

three overarching thoughts. 

First, the terrorist and extremist problem in Pakistan and the 

terrorist and extremist problem in Afghanistan are, just as you 

were saying, Mr. Chairman, inextricably intertwined. What happens on the Afghan side of the border has a direct impact on Pakistan, just as what happens on the Pakistani side affects AfghaniVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
7 

stan. We, therefore, must find ways to more effectively coordinate 

and synchronize operations by both nations, and thereby reduce the 

operating space where our common enemies function. 

Second, we must design and execute our strategy to assist Pakistan in such a way as to enlist other nations, including, but going 

beyond, Pakistan’s immediate neighbors, in helping the Pakistanis 

and the Afghans rid their national territories of terrorists and violent extremists. 

And third, the United States-Pakistan relationship runs much 

deeper than our mutual counterterrorism priorities. While the battlefield for the war against terrorism will be fought in the border 

regions, our programs to work with the people and Government of 

Pakistan will be critical to our success in these areas. We are committed to building a broader, longer term relationship with Pakistan. 

Given the gravity of the dangers Pakistan confronts, a broad, but 

integrated, commitment of assistance on the part of the United 

States is essential—development assistance, security assistance, 

and diplomatic assistance; and nowhere are common United StatesPakistan interests more in evidence than in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which have some of the worst social and economic conditions in the country. We, therefore, welcome the fact 

that the new government in Pakistan wants to implement a comprehensive strategy to better integrate the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas into Pakistan’s economy and body politic. Government 

leaders recognize that they cannot rid Pakistan’s territory of terrorists and violent extremists by military means alone; they must also 

create an environment inhospitable to terrorism and extremism. For our part, the administration will seek $750 million in support of infrastructure development, social welfare, and capacitybuilding initiatives in the tribal areas over the next 5 years, but 

we already have a strategy and programs in place to serve as a 

foundation for these additional initiatives. The United States Agency for International Development’s economic development programs 

in the tribal areas currently comprises 16 agency projects; that is 

to say, in the different tribal agencies. This month, for example, 

USAID will refurbish several hospitals, delivery and surgical facilities, will train maternal health and other medical professionals, 

and will continue working with a local official to restore police authority to a central market. These are just a few examples of the 

activities we are pursuing to improve lives and enhance governance 

in the tribal areas. 

Congressional support for the $60 million request for economic 

support funds for Pakistan in fiscal year 2008 supplemental will 

allow the agency to continue advancing these goals. 

We also believe Reconstruction Opportunity Zones can play a 

major role in development of this remote part of Pakistan. Again, 

we hope Congress will soon pass legislation to make Reconstruction 

Opportunity Zones a reality. 

Of course, establishing a secure environment is a prerequisite for 

fostering economic and social development. The United States principal contribution to establishing security in the FATA is the Security Development Plan, a 5-year, multifaceted program to enhance 

Pakistan’s ability to secure its border with Afghanistan. In fiscal 

8 

year 2009, the administration is seeking at least $100 million in 

foreign military financing for this plan in the bridge supplemental 

request. 

To site two important examples of our security assistance, United 

States training and equipment has allowed the special services 

group of the Pakistan Army to engage and prevail over enemy 

forces. We also are enhancing coordination among the Afghan, 

Pakistan, United States, and NATO forces in the Afghan-Pakistan 

border region. On March 29, we and our partners inaugurated the 

first of several border coordination centers at Torkham, Afghanistan. The centers will make it possible for Pakistani, Afghan, and 

International Security Assistance Forces representatives to more 

effectively counter efforts by our common enemies to skirt both 

sides of the rugged border with impunity. 

We worked hard to help Pakistan establish conditions conducive 

to free, fair, and transparent elections for the February 18 parliamentary elections. We are now working equally hard with Pakistan’s leaders, including the moderate Awami National Party, 

which won elections in the Northwest Frontier Province, to explore 

how we can help the Government of Pakistan extend the authority 

of the Pakistani state to the tribal areas. 

We’re encouraged by the electoral mandate that these parties 

possess. Our Embassy meets with representatives from all Pakistani political parties that have a stake in the new government. 

In closing, I want to thank Senators Biden and Lugar for their 

leadership in helping the United States help Pakistan, and you, 

Mr. Chairman, for your strong interest in that country, as well. 

Chairman Biden has issued a far-reaching proposal on restructuring our assistance to Pakistan which we are studying closely. 

We hope that, together, Congress and the administration can establish a new framework for political, economic, and security assistance to Pakistan’s democracy, one that enables the newly elected Pakistani Government to bring its remote tribal areas into the 

Pakistani mainstream and render them permanently inhospitable 

to terrorists and violent extremists. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, with the successful transition to 

elected government in Pakistan, we have a historic opportunity to help the people 

of Pakistan build a base of democratic stability from which to counter violent extremism and fight international terrorism. This is vital to Pakistani interests, U.S. interests, and international interests, which are not limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s other immediate neighbors. Pakistan is the world’s second most populous 

Muslim state. It has nuclear weapons, and it is on the front lines of the battle 

against international terrorism, the most serious security threat of the 21st century. 

The United States is determined to help Pakistan meet the challenges it faces. 

We believe that the newly elected Government of Pakistan welcomes our support 

with a determination as strong as our own. But before I discuss U.S. strategy 

vis-a-vis Pakistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in particular, I want to make three overarching points. 

First, the terrorist problem in Pakistan and the terrorist problem in Afghanistan 

are inextricably intertwined. Today I will focus on Pakistan, but I ask that you keep 

in mind the fact that we must have a fully coordinated strategy that addresses the 

ground truth on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border. What happens on the 

9 

Afghan side of the border has a direct impact on Pakistan just as what happens 

on the Pakistani side affects Afghanistan. Terrorists and violent extremists continue 

to exploit Pakistan’s rugged tribal areas as safe havens and cross the border to attack Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan. We, therefore, must find ways to 

more effectively coordinate and synchronize operations by both nations, and thereby 

reduce the operating space where our common enemies function. 

Second, we must design and execute our strategy to assist Pakistan in such a way 

as to persuade other nations—many other nations—to take the problems the Pakistanis confront as seriously as we do. Regional, Middle Eastern, European, African, 

and Asian interests are just as threatened by international terrorism and violent 

extremism as our own interests here in the Western Hemisphere. So we must have 

a strategy of broad diplomatic engagement in support of specific programs resourced 

by the United States. In short, we see U.S. objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan 

border regions as one single theater of operations that will require all of our skills— 

diplomatic, military, and developmental. 

Third, the United States-Pakistan relationship runs much deeper than our mutual counterterrorism priorities. While the battlefield for the war against terrorism 

will be fought in the border regions, our programs to work with the people and Government of Pakistan will be critical to our success in these areas. We are committed 

to building a broader, long-term relationship with Pakistan. 

Given the gravity of the dangers Pakistan confronts on a day-to-day basis, a broad 

but integrated commitment of assistance on the part of the United States is essential. This is true nationwide, as well as with respect to the tribal areas on which 

we focus today. Nationwide, our strategy is to help the newly elected Government 

of Pakistan strengthen democratic institutions, provide children with a modern education, reform economic structures, provide the people with food and energy, and 

transform the military into a more capable security force for the nation. 

And again, let me emphasize that our commitment to Pakistan applies to the 

tribal and frontier areas as well as the nation as a whole. Our goal is to help integrate these areas into the national and world economy, to help the new government 

bring the people there into the life of their own country, to help provide a modern 

education that draws children away from madaris, and to help the people of the 

area provide their own security and resist the pressures of extremists. 

Nowhere are common United States-Pakistan interests more in evidence than in 

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. But to address those interests, we first 

must help the Government of Pakistan exert its authority there. That is crucial to 

ameliorating the governance, economic, health, education, and security problems 

faced by the FATA’s inhabitants on a daily basis. 

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN EFFORTS

We welcome the fact that the new Government in Pakistan wants to implement 

a comprehensive strategy to better integrate the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas into Pakistan’s economy and body politic. Government and political leaders 

more generally recognize that they cannot rid Pakistan’s territory of violent extremists by military means alone—they also must create an environment inhospitable 

to terrorism and extremism. The Government’s objective is to persuade the people 

living in this traditionally autonomous region that their interest lies in supporting 

the government’s efforts to bring development to the area. By thus improving the 

relationship between the region and the rest of Pakistan, the government hopes to 

weaken the sway of terrorists and extremists, demonstrating to the population that 

they will benefit by supporting the government and denying terrorists safe haven. 

The Government of Pakistan’s comprehensive ‘‘Frontier Strategy’’ emphasizes economic and social development, while strengthening effective governance. As part of 

its Frontier Strategy and after consulting with all interested parties including the 

public, the government also has developed a 9-year, $2 billion Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas. The Government’s plan addresses the basic unmet 

needs that underlie the existing social and economic problems and outlines measures to improve services, upgrade infrastructure, increase government capacity, promote the sustainable use of natural resources, and bolster activity in the trade, commerce, and industrial sectors. This will be a demanding effort. Pakistan’s tribal 

areas have some of the worst social and economic conditions in the world. In some 

areas, the female literacy rate is as low as 3 percent. There is little access to safe 

drinking water or to even rudimentary health care. The system of public education 

is largely nonexistent. 

But the Government of Pakistan’s decision to partner with the United States, the 

United Kingdom, and other international partners, such as Japan and Australia, in 

this effort demonstrates Pakistan’s commitment to deny terrorists and violent exVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
10 

tremists the ability to exploit its territory. We applaud the fact that in 2007, the 

government made concerted efforts to reach out to its partners in various international fora, presenting its plan to members of the World Bank, the Group of 

Eight, the European Union, and various bilateral donors to coordinate political and 

donor support. This is consonant with the emphasis we place on broad international 

engagement with Pakistan. For our part, the United States has made a 5-year $750 

million commitment beginning in FY 2007 in support of infrastructure development, 

maternal and child health, education and capacity-building initiatives in the tribal 

areas and border regions of Pakistan. Additional resources are requested in the FY 

2009 emergency supplemental to support the Security Development Plan. 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRONTIER STRATEGY

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s economic development programs 

in the tribal areas and border regions of Pakistan target areas that have few jobs, 

low literacy, little hope and are vulnerable to militant infiltration. Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 had a profoundly positive impact on 

the people of Pakistan—generating good will that has lasted to this very day—we 

believe our support for developing the tribal areas will bring stability and prosperity. 

USAID’s program is fully operational in the tribal areas, with 16 Agency projects 

currently operating there. This month, for example, USAID will refurbish several 

hospitals’ delivery and surgical facilities, will train maternal health and other medical professionals, and will continue working with a local official to restore police 

authority to a central market. Other projects initiated in April, developed through 

a consultative approach that aims to build confidence and trust between the Government of Pakistan and tribal communities by identifying and implementing small 

community improvement opportunities, were in the health, drinking water, girls’ 

education, government capacity-building, and media sectors. Pakistani Government 

partners stated in April that the competitive and open procurement process established by USAID in implementing these small projects has increased their credibility in the communities in which they work. These are just a few examples of the 

activities we are pursuing to improve lives and enhance governance in the tribal 

areas, Northwest Frontier Province, and Balochistan. Congressional support for the 

$60 million Economic Support Fund request for Pakistan in the fiscal year 2008 

supplemental will allow the Agency to continue advancing these goals. 

We also believe Reconstruction Opportunity Zones can play a major role in 

promoting long-term economic development and stability of this remote part of Pakistan. We believe ROZs will provide the crucial economic component that complements our military and political strategies. We were very happy to see introduction of ROZ legislation by Senator Cantwell and her cosponsors, and we hope that 

Congress will soon pass legislation to make ROZs a reality. In addition, our security 

and development programs in the tribal areas are critical to achieving our highest 

objectives in the war on terror. These programs will boost sustainable, private-sector-led economic development and provide long-term, legitimate livelihoods for citizens in impoverished areas at the epicenter of the war on terror and drugs. Just 

as important, these efforts are essential to maintaining forward momentum in building a long-term, broad-based relationship with the Pakistani people. 

SECURITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Providing a secure environment that fosters economic and social development is 

critical. As the committee knows, in March 2006, President Musharraf asked President Bush for U.S. assistance in developing and funding a comprehensive strategy 

to deny terrorists and violent extremists the ability to exploit the undergoverned 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas which they have exploited as a hideout and 

safe haven. The United States agreed to provide support. 

Further, the Government of Pakistan has launched a program to increase the size 

of its Frontier Corps, a Pashtun-based paramilitary force raised in the border region. Members of the Frontier Corps have unique advantages operating in the tribal 

areas due to their linguistic and ethnic ties. The United States is supporting this 

expansion and is helping to train and equip the Frontier Corps to enhance Pakistan’s ability to secure its border and provide security to the indigenous population. 

The United States Government’s principal contribution to establishing security in 

the FATA and the western border region is the Security Development Plan, a 6-year 

multifaceted program to enhance Pakistan’s ability to secure its border with Afghanistan. The plan was codeveloped by our Embassy in Islamabad and U.S. Central 

Command, and fully coordinated with the Government of Pakistan. In fiscal years 

2007 to 2008, the Department of Defense provided over $200 million. In fiscal year 

11 

2009, the administration is seeking at least $100 million in Foreign Military Financing for the plan in the bridge supplemental request. Congressional support for the 

supplemental request will be instrumental in the U.S. Government’s ability to implement the Security Development Plan. 

We are working hard to ensure that Pakistan has the necessary will and tools 

to conduct aggressive and sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the years to come. To cite an important example, the Department of 

Defense will equip and train special operations units of the Pakistan Army. Training will focus on the Special Services Group and its helicopter mobility unit, the 

21st Quick Reaction Squadron, to enhance its ability to execute combat missions in 

the border region. Our programs are providing those forces with the skills needed 

to permanently prevent militants and terrorists from exploiting Pakistani territory 

as a staging ground for attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. 

We are also enhancing coordination among Afghan, Pakistani, United States, and 

NATO forces in the Afghanistan/Pakistani border region. Again, this effort focuses 

on the full internationalization of the response to a problem that threatens the 

world community at large. On March 29, we and our partners inaugurated the first 

of several Border Coordination Centers at Torkham, Afghanistan. The centers will 

make it possible for Pakistani, Afghan, and International Security Assistance Force 

representatives to more effectively coordinate to counter efforts by our common enemies from using their superior knowledge of the terrain to skirt both sides of the 

rugged border to avoid engagement. 

SUPPORTING THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE

As the committee knows first-hand, we worked hard to help Pakistan establish 

conditions conducive to free, fair, and transparent elections for the February 18 parliamentary elections. We are now working equally hard with Pakistan’s leaders, including the moderate Awami National Party which won elections in the Northwest 

Frontier Province, to explore how we can help the new Government of Pakistan extend the authority of the Pakistani state to the tribal areas. We are encouraged by 

the electoral mandate that these parties possess. Our Embassy continues to meet 

with representatives from all Pakistani political parties that have a stake in the 

new government. 

As we support Pakistan’s democratic transition, we continue to cooperate closely 

with Pakistan’s Government and military to combat violent extremism. The media 

has reported that the Government of Pakistan has been exploring peace agreements 

with certain groups in the tribal areas. Given past failures, we have raised our concerns about these negotiations with Pakistan’s leaders. It is our belief that a moderate government with a democratic mandate has been and will continue to be a 

good partner in this extremely difficult effort. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Pakistan’s tribal 

areas are of immense importance to the security of Pakistan and the world. That 

is why we must utilize a multifaceted approach to help the newly elected Pakistani 

Government and the Pakistani people bring these remote areas into the Pakistani 

mainstream and render them permanently inhospitable to terrorists and violent 

extremists. 

Senator KERRY. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. That’s helpful, 

and we appreciate it. 

We’ll start with 7-minute rounds. 

No. 2, that you just offered as one of the steps, is to enlist other 

nations to rid the area of these elements. Can you be more specific 

about precisely what you envision and how that would happen? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, principally, of course, in terms 

of donor support for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, there’s going 

to be a donor conference on Afghanistan very shortly, in Stockholm, 

Sweden, I believe. And with regard to Pakistan, we’ve encouraged 

a number of countries to take an interest in supporting them economically, and even specifically in the FATA areas. That’s been one 

of the subjects that I discuss quite regularly with my Japanese 

counterparts, for example, and they are being responsive. So, it 

was that kind of assistance we were talking about. 

12 

Senator KERRY. So, you’re principally talking about the economic 

construction component. But that can’t be within the FATA, as of 

now. That’s within the Punjab and other areas. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, it is also with regard to the 

FATA, just the way we are looking to—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, how is that even potentially controllable in 

an area where the government has no control? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. It’s not easy, but what we—— 

Senator KERRY. How can it even be—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. We have—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Contemplated? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. It does—it’s already begun to happen. We have the first installments of the $150-million-a-year moneys 

for the FATA, and what AID is doing is operating out of our Consulate General in Peshawar; but, working with NGOs and other 

contractors and with the assistance of the tribal authorities, the 

FATA authorities, we have begun to initiate some of these assistance projects. 

Senator KERRY. Is that a straight bilateral relationship between 

our folks and the FATA leaders, the tribal leaders, or is it through 

an intermediary? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, we work with the Northwest 

Frontier provincial authorities who oversee the FATA, and we work 

with NGOs, and it’s sort of a team effort. 

Senator KERRY. To what degree does that suffice to address the 

alarm bells sounded by the intelligence community itself? Let me 

come back to the statement that DNI McConnell said, ‘‘Al-Qaeda 

is improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the U.S.: 

The identification, training, and positioning of operatives for an attack on the homeland.’’ This is the area where they’re doing it. 

What, specifically, strategically—besides the sort of specific targeted attack, by Predator or otherwise, on specialized information, 

how would you define the day-to-day ongoing effort to defuse that 

particular threat, as defined? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. Well, first of all, I’d be the first 

to acknowledge that more can be done. I wouldn’t quarrel with that 

proposition. 

Senator KERRY. Is there more that could be done that you can 

talk about in this session? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think yes. First of all, as you suggest or imply by your question, we do have cooperation at other levels, which I think would probably be better discussed in closed session, and perhaps with witnesses, in addition to myself, from other 

agencies of our government. But, in our proposals, we envisage 

training and bolstering the capabilities of the frontier corps, which 

operate in the Pakistan frontier area and the Pakistani army counterinsurgency units mentioned their special forces. They’ve got to 

start making that shift from being a more conventionally aligned 

military, that was basically confronting this singular threat that 

they felt existed from India, to being able to more flexibly cope with 

the situation in the FATA. 

The other point I would make is—— 

Senator KERRY. May I interrupt you there for a second? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Sure. 

13 

Senator KERRY. When I met with President Musharraf, about a 

year ago, he was singularly pessimistic about the ability of his own 

troops to be able to be successful. And that was after they had, sort 

of, walked back from their period of confrontation, because they 

were, frankly, getting kicked around up there. So, there’s very little 

sense of control that he articulated to me, and I’ve seen nothing 

since then. 

Now this new initiative from the new government to conceivably 

negotiate, which leaves me feeling that this is going to be a very 

amorphous, open, uncontrolled and unaccountable area for the foreseeable future. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I don’t think—— 

Senator KERRY. I know it’s not easy. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No, no. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. I’m trying to get at—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No; I understand. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Sort of—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. You know, what are the possibilities—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Let me try. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Here. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. It’s a tough question. But, I think— 

nothing is ever quite as black or as white as it may seem. Example: 

The Pakistani Government has 120,000 troops between their frontier corps and their regular military, on the border area with Afghanistan. So, it’s not as if they’re without any presence whatsoever. And I think that that has had an influence on the situation. 

Senator KERRY. They’re in a very limited mission, and they’re 

there—I mean, there’s great reluctance to engage with some of the 

people we’d like them to engage. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Second—and I wouldn’t debate that— 

the second point I would make is that, when we’re talking about 

threats—and of course we’re concerned about any threats that 

might emanate from the FATA area, because we do know, and I 

know from my previous position as Director of National Intelligence, that is where plotting against our homeland occurs on a 

regular basis. But, I would cite to you some successes in disrupting 

those plots. And those successes didn’t come out of nowhere, they 

came as the result of some hard work by lots of people. But, I 

would refer you, for example, to the July 2006 plot, which was designed to have eight or nine airlines—transatlantic airlines coming 

from the United Kingdom to be blown up on the way to the United 

States. Well, that plotting activity was taking place in the FATA 

area, and the architects of that plot were captured. 

So, there is some good, ongoing work here. But, I certainly would 

agree with you that there’s more to be done. And I think one of the 

areas is in the strengthening and improving the capacity of the 

Pakistani security forces to deal with this kind of unconventional 

threat. 

Senator KERRY. My time has expired. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

14 

I want to talk a little bit about, first, our relationship with the 

new government. There’s been the—the new civilian leaders have 

talked about renewed efforts to negotiate with both the tribal leaders as well as the militants. NATO spokesmen expressed concern 

about this, that truce negotiations in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas may be behind the significant increase in violent attacks in eastern Afghanistan in April and May. During your lateMarch visit, you made note of that, that irreconcilable elements 

cannot be dealt with through negotiation. The Foreign Minister indicates that the government doesn’t intend to negotiate with terrorists, but does believe in political engagement. 

I have two questions for you. What’s the difference between ‘‘political engagement’’ and ‘‘negotiation’’? And, I guess, fundamentally, 

are Islamabad and Washington at odds when it comes to counterterrorism strategy in the region? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No; I don’t—I can’t speak for the Foreign Minister when he used those phrases. I think that he may be 

driving at a little bit of what I was talking about when I made the 

distinction between reconcilables and irreconcilables. I think those 

who are determined to carry out terrorist attacks against us and 

harm our way of life are not people we can or should negotiate 

with. There may be some others, not unlike some of the insurgents 

who were in the western part of Iraq, where some dialogue over 

time, might bear fruit. So, that’s the kind of distinction I would 

carry around, in my own mind. 

Are we concerned about the possibility of negotiations between 

the government, or elements of the government, and these extremist groups up there? I think the answer would be, ‘‘yes.’’ We saw 

such an arrangement entered into in 2005. It did—in the South 

Waziristan area—not produce satisfactory results, and the government itself felt compelled to withdraw from the agreement because 

of an increase in militant activity, not only in the FATA area, but 

in what the Pakistani’s call the ‘‘settled areas.’’ So, I would say 

that they need to be very cautious about proceeding with these 

kinds of discussions, and, if they’re going to proceed with them, to 

be sure that they are getting the kind of results that they say they 

really want. They say they don’t want to give free space to extremist elements who wish them harm or who want to cross—you know, 

engage in cross-border operations. But, I think this is something 

we’re going to have to watch very carefully. 

Senator COLEMAN. Are there any metrics to measure success, to 

measure whether we’re making progress? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I think one of the metrics would 

be, as you, I think, implied in your question, cross-border attacks 

into Afghanistan. Another would be if you saw the government operating effectively against some of these militant extremists, like, 

for example, bringing Baitullah Mehsud, the head of this extremist 

group in South Waziristan, capturing him and bringing him to justice, which is what should happen to him. 

Let me just say one other thing about dealing with this issue. In 

addition to improving their counterinsurgency capabilities, I think 

another important point is Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation. And 

I think it’s good that we’ve created this tripartite border center, 

15 

where we have Afghan-Pakistan officials, or military, and ourselves. I think we need to do more of that. 

Also, there was a jirga—you may recall that—last August, a 

cross-border jirga that involved both Afghan and Pakistani tribal 

elements. And there’s a suggestion that maybe another meeting of 

that kind would be a good idea. Anything that strengthens cooperation between the Pakistan and Afghans governments, from the two 

Presidents on down, is a positive thing. 

Senator COLEMAN. Can you address the central concern in the 

GAO report a little—just a little more specifically? The report says, 

‘‘Since 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close 

a terrorist safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.’’ 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes; I think I would acknowledge that 

maybe there could be more work done in the planning area; and, 

in fact, we are doing more. And right now, as we speak, under the 

auspices of the National Security Council we’re taking another look 

at the border area and seeing if we can look at the AfghanistanPakistan border in a more integrated way. But, we have had plans, 

Senator. We’ve had—we have a development plan, we have a military plan, we have an assistance plan. They may not have been 

tied together quite the way the GAO report suggests, and we’re 

working on that as we speak. 

One of the things we’ve done, in addition to this planning process—and this is very recent—we have just named border coordinators—this is in the State Department, now—at each of our embassies, and one in our Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs in 

the State Department. So, you have a sort of a three-way border 

coordinator nexus, if you will, that can focus exclusively on these 

common border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Senator COLEMAN. How would you assess the level of cooperation/coordination amongst State, Defense, intelligence, USAID, 

when it comes to this area? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. In Pakistan? I would say it’s very 

good. It’s done on a different basis than it is in Afghanistan or 

Iraq, because we operate in Pakistan under the country-team system; there is no military command. But, we have one of our most 

capable ambassadors there. Ambassador Patterson, as you know, 

was our Ambassador in El Salvador and in Colombia. She’s the 

best we’ve got. And she does a terrific job there. 

Where we also are challenged, though, I think, is in the coordination of cross-border issues, because you don’t have the same identical mechanisms between the two countries. But, we’re working on 

that, as well, and that’s one of the reasons for this border-officer 

mechanism that we have established. 

Senator COLEMAN [presiding]. Having worked with Ambassador 

Patterson when I chaired the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, 

and her work in Colombia, I share your assessment—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Of her capabilities. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

16 

Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your service and your presence 

here today, I wanted to pick up with a couple of comments you 

made just a few moments ago. 

On the question of—the question of negotiations—we know that 

there are a lot of charges back and forth about who is pushing negotiations, when and who’s most responsible for what has played 

out. Some would assert that the new government is pushing negotiations in a way that maybe the former government wasn’t. And 

the other side would contest that. What’s your sense of that, in 

terms of where the push is coming? Do you see a policy that’s been 

a consistent one as it pertains to these negotiations, or do you 

think the new government has a radically or substantially different 

approach than, for example, General Musharraf would? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I do not believe that the new government has radically changed the perception. When I was recently in 

Pakistan, I met with both Mr. Zardari, the head of the governing— 

the leading party, and with the Prime Minister; and, in fact, the 

Prime Minister just met with President Bush in Sharm el-Sheikh 

and expressed his strong commitment to carrying out the war on 

terror. 

My understanding is that some of the ideas about negotiations 

had been in existence well before this new government took office, 

and had been carried out, perhaps, more at the tactical level, if you 

will. That said, it remains a concern in our mind that there are elements of the government that appear to be interested in pursuing 

this track, and our—we’ve expressed our view. We are concerned, 

and we think that they ought to proceed cautiously in this. 

Senator CASEY. I know no one can predict the future on this, but 

you expressed a concern—you’ve expressed it a couple of times 

most recently. One of the concerns you have is that elements within the government are pushing this in the wrong direction. What 

is your sense, in the next couple of—let’s say, the next 6 months— 

that those elements will predominate, that their point of view will 

be having more influence than it is now? Do you have any sense 

that there’s a—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I can’t be certain. As I said, I 

would hope that they proceed cautiously and not accept an outcome 

that would give extremist elements the right or the ability to use 

the FATA area with impunity to carry out attacks on Pakistan, to 

carry out attacks on Afghanistan or the United States or the rest 

of the world. So, there’s a lot at stake here, and we’ve made that 

point repeatedly. 

There are those who would argue that—or, who would assess 

that, perhaps in this initial phase of this new government, that 

there are voices within the Pakistani body politic urging sort of a 

negotiating approach first before one has to resort to more vigorous 

security measures. But, I think the response to that is, that approach was tried before, in 2005, as I mentioned, and it turned out 

not to work. 

Senator CASEY. I want to transition to two different areas. One 

is something you raised in your response to a question about the 

ability of the Pakistani Government to make the transition from a 

conventional approach that sometimes had most of the time, I 

should say, had a focus on India—to a more counterinsurgency, 

17 

counterterrorism focus. (a) Where do you think they are in that 

process—scale of 1 to 10, say? And, (b), what do you think is impeding progress on their ability to make that transition? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes. I’d be reluctant to be grading 

their performance. I think I would say that there’s a lot of work 

to be done. 

One of the reasons I’m reluctant to engage in some kind of evaluation like that, a public evaluation, is, I think we’ve got to recognize the sacrifices that the Pakistani military and security forces 

have made. They’ve lost more than 1,000 people since 9/11. The 

number of suicide bombings has gone up dramatically in the past 

year; I think, five times as many suicide bombings last year as they 

were in the previous years, subsequent to 9/11. So, they’re paying 

a real price for this stepped-up terrorist activity. 

Senator CASEY. What do you think is impeding them from making the progress that you would hope that they would make, or 

would have made by now, in terms of their ability to carry out a 

counterterrorism or counterinsurgency? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as I said. I think they’ve had 

some successes. Plots have been disrupted. If you look at the number of, particularly, al-Qaeda elements that have been captured in 

Pakistan, if you look at some of the high-value detainees that we 

hold in Guantanamo, those have been the result of United StatesPakistan cooperation. So, it’s a mixed picture. 

I think the area where they could make improvements, and 

where we want to support them, is in adopting this integrated approach to the FATA, both on the economic and development side 

and on the side of establishing a more effective security presence, 

which, I think, in the long run, is going to come through strengthening the local security forces—the frontier corps and the local security forces there, who probably are more acceptable security presence to the local residents than the national army. 

Senator CASEY. I just have another 30 seconds or so. The last 

question is on USAID. It’s my understanding that, since 2001, 

Pakistan has received $5.3 billion in overt assistance and another 

$5.6 billion in so-called Coalition Support Funds, CSF funds— 

roughly about $11 billion. If you were responding to a taxpayer 

who says, ‘‘We’ve spent $11 billion, we’ve made some progress 

there, but the Pakistanis are not doing enough to root out the extremist elements and to prevent the launching of terrorist attacks 

on the United States or other allies,’’ what would you say to that 

taxpayer? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. The first thing I would say, as we all 

say up front—is that Pakistan’s a critical ally in the war on terror, 

and that, since 9/11, we’ve been very closely aligned with them in 

this fight, and that half of that money—it’s actually $5.9 billion— 

have been Defense Department reimbursements, effectively, for the 

costs that the Pakistan Security Forces have incurred in supporting 

us in the war on terror, including allowing for, and providing for, 

resupply of our effort in Afghanistan through Pakistani ports and 

roads and so forth. And the other $5 billion has been spent on various assistance programs, which, for a country of 160 million people 

over a 7-year period, I would say is not an unreasonable level of 

support, given the criticality of that country. 

18 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Senator KERRY [presiding]. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Negroponte, I’d like for you to characterize, if you can, 

the size and scope of the Taliban movement on both sides of the 

border, in this sense, that after the United States left Pakistan and 

left Afghanistan after the Soviets, and the Taliban regime came 

into power and protected the al-Qaeda camps. It was then that 

Americans discovered the Taliban, in that sense, but also discovered that there was a Taliban movement in Pakistan, or at least 

support of that on the other side of the border, and that has been 

a constant in this process. What I’m curious is—Do we have any 

data or any estimates of how large the Taliban movement is in Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan, and the relationship between 

these movements, or, maybe it is one movement on both sides of 

the border? This, as distinct from al-Qaeda cells or specific new 

types of insurgents? In other words, in terms of grassroots or a 

larger movement, how many persons do we think we’re dealing 

with? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I honestly don’t know the answer to 

that question, Senator. Obviously, I can supply it for the record. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

Due to uncertainties described below it is impossible to offer more than a very 

broad range when numbering active Taliban fighters. The security situation in most 

rural areas of Afghanistan is fluid and dependent upon constantly shifting relationships among local government representatives, tribal elders, local religious leaders, 

coalition forces, and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The security situation 

in most of the areas of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan is also fluid, though to a lesser 

degree. The periodic reduction of part-time fighters who put down their weapons to 

work the fields during the poppy harvest season causes a large seasonal fluctuation 

in the number of Taliban in both countries. The criteria for being counted as 

‘‘Taliban’’ also complicate the analysis. For example, based on a State Department 

review of military operations and insurgencies in Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet 

invasion, most Taliban are part-time fighters (estimated to be 2⁄3 to 3⁄4 of total fighters) whose fielded numbers regularly, and significantly, fluctuate depending on 

Taliban needs and United States and Coalition military operations, among other 

factors (including the poppy harvest season). We estimate 1⁄4 to 1⁄3 of total fighters 

are full-time Taliban. Given these considerations, various sources report Taliban 

numbers that range from perhaps 2,000 core fighters to as many as 24,000, when 

counting part-time recruits. 

We believe that the precise number of Taliban fighters is a less important factor 

than their operational ability to influence and intimidate the Afghan population. 

Therefore, our counterinsurgency efforts are designed to separate the people from 

the enemy and win over the population by helping Afghans develop trust and gain 

confidence in their national, provincial, and local governments, thereby rendering 

the Taliban irrelevant. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. But, what I would say is this, that in 

Afghanistan I think the Taliban suffered a very serious blow, obviously, when we retaliated in the wake of 9/11, and I think in the 

northern half of the country, clearly the Taliban have been much 

diminished. If you look at the areas in Afghanistan where they do 

still present a significant problem, I would say it’s in the two or 

three provinces that border on Pakistan—Helmand, Kandahar, and 

so forth. But, I’m afraid—and, of course, on the other side of the 

border, we’ve been particularly concerned that some of the Taliban 

leaders have been able to find refuge in Pakistan, and even engage 

in some of their operational activities, although, I would say, in recent years there have been a number of instances where Taliban 

19 

leaders have been captured and picked up by Pakistani authorities, 

so I think they’ve cracked down somewhat on that activity, as compared to previously. But, I’m afraid I don’t know the exact estimates. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I appreciate that, but I hope, in the Department, perhaps there’s some research on this, because the 

Taliban is a larger situation, in terms of numbers. Even if it is 

compressed in the southern part of the country, and some would 

see, if we are unsuccessful on either side, some resurgence of the 

Taliban. Not in an overthrow of the Karzai government, but, nevertheless, as a significant political movement and force within the 

country, which prevailed for a while previously, certainly prior to 

our entry into the situation, and the support of this, philosophically 

or theologically or what have you, on the Pakistan side, would appear to be more than simply leaders coming and going—in other 

words, an indigenous movement that perhaps we have not really 

thought about as much because of the dramatic incidence of specific 

terrorists or other individuals that we’re following. I’m just trying 

to, at least in my own mind’s eye, see what we have to deal with 

in the long run, what the Pakistani Government has to deal with, 

really, now, as a matter of fact. 

Now, the second part of my question is that, given that Pakistani 

Government, the—there’s a great deal of discussion in the press 

about the problems of Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif, as the leaders 

of the major factions, and one of the major problems centers now 

about the restoration of the judges and the judiciary. This obviously affects the relationship with these two leaders with President 

Musharraf, who obviously had an interest in this, in displacing the 

judges to begin with. Is this going to be a significant enough difficulty that this government is hobbled in tackling other problems? 

To what extent is this coalition likely to hold together, given these 

kinds of very fundamental problems as to how to proceed in governance of the country? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. The restoration of—or the issue of the 

judges—and we’ve said before, and I would repeat here—is something that we feel the government itself and the political forces in 

Pakistan need to resolve amongst themselves. It’s an issue that’s 

been under discussion between the leaders of the two principal political parties; and, thus far, they have not reached a resolution. I 

think I would say that when that issue is resolved, and assuming 

it is, and if it’s done in a way that doesn’t lead to some kind of political instability, I think that would then permit the government 

to concentrate more on other priority tasks. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, just picking up that point, some commentators would say that—in their own way, that Mr. Zardari and General Musharraf have a common cause here, for different reasons, 

with regard to the judiciary, but that Mr. Sharif has a very different point of view than the other two. And because this is apparently a fairly fundamental issue of governance, we get to the point 

that you just made; obviously, it would have more energy with regard to the rest of life if somehow this central focus was resolved, 

but it’s not necessarily a short-term affair, apparently. The attempt 

to get it over didn’t work out. 

20 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes. Well, there appear to be some 

stresses in the current coalition, because my understanding is that 

Mr. Nawaz Sharif has withdrawn his Cabinet members from the 

government. 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. So, it’s clearly an unresolved issue, 

it’s a dynamic situation, and there are considerable uncertainties; 

I would agree with that. 

Senator LUGAR. Finally, we are concentrating on insurgents. 

Does Pakistan have a problem of food security? Where does that 

stand in the midst, now, of the general thoughts around the world, 

that we are in trouble, in terms of feeding people? Is that true in 

certain parts of Pakistan? And, if so, what stress does this place 

on the government? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. They have difficulties in both the area 

of energy and food security. This is a country—— 

Senator LUGAR. In both, yeah. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. This is a country hat depends on energy and food imports, and that is a cause of both political and social concern. Perhaps not to the extremes that it might 

have been in certain other countries, but it’s definitely a cause of 

concern. And the last time I was there, it was mentioned to me frequently. 

Senator LUGAR. So, this should be a fundamental concern of 

ours, even as we’re concentrating on terrorists, back and forth; because, fundamentally, the stability of the government, whether it 

be the judges or the food or so forth, really play quite a part in how 

effective they may be. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, and it’s one of the reasons we 

have an interest in their economic development and why we care 

about these Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. Senator Cantwell 

has introduced legislation in the Senate. We don’t know if there’s 

yet been a corresponding piece of legislation submitted in the 

House, although we understand there may be some sponsors lining 

up. But, that would be a very concrete way in which our country 

could be helpful in creating additional economic opportunities for 

people who live in the border region—in all of Afghanistan, because 

these ROZs would apply to Afghanistan in its entirety, and to the 

border area of Pakistan. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

For over 5 years, we’ve watched al-Qaeda rebuild, while this administration has focused much of its attention on an endless and 

misguided war in Iraq. It has now become common knowledge that 

in the FATA region of Pakistan, al-Qaeda, the most real threat to 

our national security, has reconstituted itself and its operational 

capabilities. Before Pakistan’s election a few months ago, President 

Musharraf’s grip on power was unquestionably a roadblock, not 

only to addressing these terrorist threats, but also to strengthening 

democracy in Pakistan. Under his tenure, a political and religious 

upheaval grew across the country, while the threats to our national 

security increased, as well. 

21 

Now, with the election, Mr. Chairman, of a new government, we 

have an opportunity to support leaders in Pakistan who have 

pushed democratic principles to the forefront of their agenda, while 

also seeking to ensure our national security interests are met. We 

need to support this new government’s efforts to strengthen this 

democracy just as much as we support security and counterterrorism initiatives. That is because fighting terrorism and supporting the people of Pakistan are intertwined. Counterterrorism 

operations against al-Qaeda throughout the FATA region are critically important, but that alone will not make for a more secure, 

stable Pakistan. Terrorist safe havens, of which the FATA is probably the most dangerous example, require comprehensive policies 

that use all the tools at our disposal, long-term strategic planning, 

and the commitment of resources over the long term. They also require sustained high-level attention, something that too often has 

been sorely missing as this administration continues to overly fixate on the war in Iraq. 

If we fail to undertake this effort, we will have failed to learn the 

painful lessons of history in a region that is home to the greatest 

threat to our national security: Al-Qaeda. 

Mr. Secretary, President Musharraf clearly failed to neutralize, 

or even reduce, the strength of extremist elements along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. As the new coalition government is undertaking a renewed negotiation effort, I’m interested to hear your 

assessment of whether the new government can succeed in this initiative, particularly given the internal challenges that this coalition 

is facing at present and whether we support this initiative. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Earlier, with Senator Casey, I was 

saying, Senator, that the past experience of negotiating these kinds 

of arrangements with the extremist militants in South Waziristan, 

back in 2005, had not worked out, and the Government of Pakistan 

ultimately recognized that and abandoned that effort. It’s not entirely clear what is happening at this point in time. Our own assessment is that the government—the new civilian leaders are committed to the war on terror and to dealing with the militants. 

That’s something that the Prime Minister of Pakistan told President Bush in Sharm el-Sheikh, just a couple of days ago. There 

may be some discussions going on at a tactical level in Pakistan, 

but it’s not entirely clear whether a deal will actually be consummated with these extremist elements. But, if such a deal were 

to be negotiated, we would be very concerned if it didn’t deal with 

the issue of preventing people from using the FATA area as a safe 

haven. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Foreign Minister Qureshi has said that 

while he doesn’t believe in negotiating with terrorists, he does believe in, ‘‘political engagement.’’ What do you think that means 

with regard to the FATA region and the current agreement that’s 

being negotiated? And how will the U.S. suggest, you know, enforcing any negotiated agreements? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as I said, we have real reservations about a negotiated agreement, so I don’t think we’re ready to 

comment on how it would be enforced. I think one of the issues is 

that it’s difficult to enforce unless you have the requisite capabilities on hand, a strong security presence. And I think, as you were 

22 

saying earlier, in your statement, we need to work with the Pakistani Government to help them build an integrated approach and 

to support their integrated approach to the FATA area. I think 

that’s the best way to go about this. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. But we have real reservations—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. On that point—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. About some—— 

Senator KERRY. Let me interrupt you for one moment. 

I want to remind everybody here in the audience that we welcome people with different points of views, we welcome people to 

be seated and to listen thoughtfully to the hearing, but there is a 

rule in the committee against any kind of demonstration, of one 

kind or another, whether it’s standing, holding signs, signaling, or 

otherwise. So we ask citizens to please respect the rules and decorum of the Senate and this committee. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Negroponte, you were, sort of, starting to get at this—you 

know, what happens if these current negotiations do not succeed? 

What are the alternative options? What other strategies are being 

discussed if this idea of trying to come up with this kind of an arrangement doesn’t work? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, let me be clear, we’re not the 

advocates of negotiating with the extremist militants, so it seems 

to us what one has to do is depart from the question, ‘‘What is it 

that you can do about this extreme—militant extremism in the first 

place?’’ And it seems to us, you’ve got to have an integrated approach, deal with the development issues, deal with the questions 

of helping integrate the FATA into the rest of Pakistan, which is 

one of the objectives of this $2 billion plan that the Pakistani Government has. And we should—we want to be supportive of that 

with our own contribution. And then, there’s the security component, which involves building up local security forces and improving cross-border cooperation between us and the Afghans on each 

side of the border, between the Pakistani Government, on the one 

hand, and the Afghans, on the other. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you describe our relationship with the 

Awami National Party, the ANP? As a junior member of the coalition party in Islamabad, which leads the Northwest Frontier Province’s provincial government, and it’s now the main representation, 

as I understand it, from that region, does the ANP have a role in 

helping to bring about greater security throughout the region? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, regarding our relationship, certainly they achieved a striking political success—this is secular political party managed to win a large number of the seats in that 

northwest frontier area. I met with their party leader when he 

came to Washington recently. We maintain a good relationship 

with the party through our consulate in Peshawar. I think they are 

a voice, they are an element, but only one element, in helping deal 

with that situation, but I think they’re a voice for moderation, and, 

in that sense, we want to give them encouragement. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

23 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Negroponte, the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones you 

referred to—both in Afghanistan, as well as in the FATA—would 

you describe for me what one of these areas would look like? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. To the best of my ability. 

Senator ISAKSON. It portends that it’s an area that’s been destroyed or damaged by conflict, in my mind, but—am I wrong in 

that? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. This is the term that we came up 

with in other places. They have different names. I think there’s 

ones in Egypt, there’s ones in Jordan. They are in different parts 

of the world. But, basically, this would be an area where products, 

if they met certain criteria they would be able to export their products, duty free, to the United States. The basic idea is to give some 

incentive for investment in that area for manufacturing. And it 

would be for the FATA area, and, if I remember correctly, perhaps 

one or two other adjacent areas, but up in that border region of 

Pakistan. 

Senator ISAKSON. Would it include providing microloans or capital for that business to—or enterprise—to take—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, certainly, if the legislation 

might not, it would be within the capacity of our assistance—our 

AID programs to do that. 

Senator ISAKSON. On the question of education, a couple of times 

you refer to, I think, 3 percent literacy rate among women in the 

FATA—I think that was a reference—and there being no public 

education system except for the madrassas. Are these the only real 

source of education in that area? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I believe so, but, frankly, I don’t know 

the entire educational picture in the FATA. But, you’re certainly 

right that there is a lot of illiteracy. And I also sensed, when I’ve 

visited Pakistan, that there’s a great deal of desire in the NGO 

community to try to help improve conditions in the FATA. And that 

could be a positive element, as well. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, there are some other examples. I know 

in Ethiopia the effort through NGOs and the Basic Education Coalition dramatically changed that landscape over the last decade toward a Western favoritism, if you will. So, I think that investment 

is important. 

You made a reference, ‘‘To cite an important example, the Department of Defense will’’—prospectively—‘‘be equipping and training special operation units of the Pakistani Army for the purpose 

of special operations in the FATA.’’ Is that something that’s in the 

works and being done, or is that a plan to do? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, it’s a plan, and we’ve also 

sought funding for it. So, yes, it’s something that will be; it’s not 

a pipedream, it’s something we intend to carry out. 

Senator ISAKSON. Second part of the question is—the next sentence says, ‘‘Our programs are providing those forces with the skills 

necessary to permanently prevent militants and terrorists from exploiting the Pakistani territory as a staging ground for attacks in 

24 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond.’’ So, I take it, with that, the 

newly elected government wants to do that, establish a permanent 

plan to be able, through special operations, to interdict with militant operations and try and expel them from the FATA. Is that 

right? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I don’t know if they’ve ever commented specifically, as yet—they’ve been in office 6 weeks—I don’t 

know if they’ve ever commented specifically on a particular type of 

training. But, what they have said on repeated occasions—and, as 

I said earlier, including the Prime Minister to the President of the 

United States—that they are committed to the war on terror, they 

are committed to fighting against extremist militancy in their country. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, given your comment on the quality of intelligence, in your citing of the intelligence we were able to gain on 

the aircraft that was going to fly from Great Britain to the United 

States, it would seem that if our intelligence level continues at that 

rate, and hopefully improves, that this type of a force would be absolutely essential to eradicate those who would plot against us 

here, as well as in Afghanistan. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I think it would be, and I think 

it also—rather than talking, as sometimes people do, about unilateral solutions, I think it would be much better for us to work cooperatively and collaboratively with the Government of Pakistan, and 

work with them, so that they can increase their capabilities to deal 

with these issues. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I absolutely concur. Just as the Iraqis 

take over more of the operations, that’s better in Iraq; if the Pakistanis are taking over—taking control of their own operations initiatives, that’s in the best interest of the country and the war on 

terror. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Menendez was ahead of me. 

Senator KERRY. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to my 

colleague from Florida. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. 

I am one of the corequesters of the GAO report that we will be 

discussing in the next witness, a report—the title, which says it all, 

‘‘The United States Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the 

Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas,’’ a title that is, unfortunately, so tragically comical that it appeared on Jon Stewart’s ‘‘Daily Show.’’ 

Now, I am listening to your testimony, and I am trying to figure out, ‘‘Do we really have a grasp, here, of what we’ve done, $11 billion later?’’ In supplementary materials the State Department submitted to Congress outlining the plan for the 2008 supplemental 

request, it says, ‘‘Despite Pakistan’s military successes against terrorists and militants in the FATA, the U.S. and Pakistan agree 

that there can be no purely military solution to the problem.’’ 

Now, I contrast that sentence with the GAO report that states, 

‘‘According to the DOD’’—the Department of Defense—‘‘the PakiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
25 

stani Army has been unsuccessful at defeating terrorists in FATA, 

its security forces lack counterinsurgency capability, the army is 

neither structured nor trained for counterinsurgency, and serious 

equipment and training deficiencies exist in the frontier corps.’’ 

Do you disagree with DOD’s assessment? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think, Senator, this is a question of 

a glass half empty or half full. You can’t—I mean, there’s obviously 

so much to be done up there, and more improvements to be made. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But, do you disagree with DOD’s assessment? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, you’d have to—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. The assessment that they quoted directly in 

the Government Accountability Office report says that the Pakistan 

Army has been unsuccessful at defeating terrorists in FATA, that 

its security forces lack counterinsurgency capability, that it is neither structured nor trained for counterinsurgency, and that serious 

equipment and training deficiencies exist in the frontier corps. Do 

you disagree with that? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would partially agree with it. I 

think they lack requisite training and capabilities in the counterinsurgency area, and I think it’s an area that needs to be improved. 

But I would say that they have had some successes. We were talking about it earlier. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I heard what you referred to as ‘‘successes,’’ 

and that’s my problem here. I see what the Government Accountability Office said, I see the direct quote from the Department of 

Defense, that really has the military side of this, and clearly that 

leaves us $11 billion without—at least this Member of the Senate— 

without any satisfaction, and, I think, the American taxpayers, as 

well. And yet, it seems to me that you have a lower standard of 

what ‘‘success’’ is, $11 billion later. 

And when I look at your own description to the Congress, in 

terms of promoting the 2008 supplemental request, where you say 

there can be no purely military solution, look at the DOD’s report— 

I mean, the—the Government Accountability Office’s report, where 

their chart lists the six elements of national power—diplomatic, 

military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, law enforcement support—and then presents a funding breakdown for 

that period of time, 2002 through 2007—96 percent of the funding 

is for military efforts. And yet, this is the analysis that the DOD 

has after 96 percent of $11 billion went for that very purpose. 

Three percent went for border security, and 1 percent went for development assistance. 

I’ve listened to all your answers on development assistance, but, 

I say to myself, for 5 years we have been pumping 96 percent to 

military efforts, and we have the DOD saying that they don’t have 

the capability, and now we say we can’t achieve a military success 

simply in the FATA—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Region, but we have only done 1 percent of development assistance, $11 billion later. I mean, what 

is the plan. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. With respect, Sir, those figures just 

don’t strike me as accurate. 

26 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you dispute the Government Accountability Office’s report. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I have no interest in getting into a 

dispute with the Government Accountability Office, but I can tell 

you the figures that are looking at me, right here. As I mentioned 

earlier, about half the amounts of assistance are reimbursements 

to the Government of Pakistan for its support to us in the war on 

terror. So, I think of that more like an offset than I do as assistance. These are reimbursements directly to the Pakistan treasury. 

But, of the remaining $5.1 billion, $2.9 that has been—that’s a substantial percentage of that $5.1 billion, it’s almost 60 percent has 

gone to child survival and health programs, development assistance, economic support funds, international disaster and famine assistance, Public Law 480, and migration and refugee assistance. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. And human rights and 

democracy programs. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I’d refer you to page 10, to the 

chart, which very clearly says 96 percent is military efforts. One 

percent is development assistance, 3 percent is border security programs. So, somebody’s wrong, and I think we need to get it before 

we keep giving you money. 

Finally, let me ask you this. I have a little difficulty understanding—you know, Do we have a real grasp, here? The Center 

for Strategic and International Studies states that, ‘‘Pakistani and 

American analysts and officials have only a rudimentary understanding of the complicated alliances, dynamics, and threat posed 

by the numerous groups operating in the FATA region.’’ 

Do you agree with that statement? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. That we have a limited understanding? 

Senator MENENDEZ. That you have a rudimentary understanding 

of the complicated alliances, dynamics, and threat posted by the 

numerous groups—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, having been the Director of National Intelligence, I can tell you there are a lot of people working 

on understanding those dynamics, and I think, in a different setting, maybe they should provide you with a briefing on that. 

And also, I want to—I will come back to you on these figures of 

the General Accounting Office and address those, because I do believe they are incorrect, and I don’t think they are an accurate portrayal of our rather balanced assistance effort in Pakistan. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we look forward—I’d look forward to 

seeing it, because we cannot continue to provide a blank check for 

a failed policy, and that is what we are being asked to do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

According to the report, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas,’’ security-related and counterterrorism 

spending constituted 96 percent of total U.S. aid in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas, totaling $5.8 billion. This amount, however, includes of $5.5 billion reimbursed to the Government of Pakistan for expenses incurred directly supporting 

U.S. efforts in the War on Terror. Reimbursing Pakistan should not be considered 

27 

assistance. These countries expend national funds upfront, and the U.S. Government provides reimbursement later, through Coalition Support Funds. 

By our accounting, which does not include Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, total aid to Pakistan during 2002–2008 exceeded $5.1 billion. This assistance 

supported economic, governance, development, and security goals, with 59 percent 

of the funding directed toward non-security related programs. 

In 2006, Pakistan began in earnest its efforts to extend governance into the Frontier region—particularly the Tribal Areas—by supporting the security, development, 

and services required to transform this region. To this end, the Pakistani Government developed a 9-year, $2 billion, Sustainable Development Plan. The United 

States has seized this opportunity to help Pakistan address the root causes of violent extremism in the border areas: lack of education, employment, and health services. The U.S. Government pledged $750 million to support the Sustainable Development Plan over 5 years, starting in fiscal year 2007. Thus, we will support infrastructure development, social welfare, and capacity-building initiatives. Additionally, we have requested $100 million in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental for the 

Security Development Plan, designed to provide the security necessary for its success. With these programs, we will tackle the systemic sources of terrorism while 

helping Pakistan to integrate fully Tribal Area residents into the Pakistani state. 

Senator KERRY. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, when I was in Afghanistan, a month and a half 

ago, the role of narcotics was a prime topic of discussion. Ninetysix percent of the world’s supply of opium comes from Afghanistan 

and the borders are porous. I think of narcotics as corrosive to society and corrupting to the governments when it’s such a high percentage of Afghanistan’s overall economy. The question is, With porous borders, how much of an issue are the drugs and drug money 

in Pakistan, and efforts to really get a better handle on this area 

and the border? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. My understanding is that the issue of 

narcotics is not at anywhere near as acute as in Pakistan as it is 

in Afghanistan, and certainly not on the scale and in the amounts 

that we see in Afghanistan, although I would say, in Afghanistan, 

the areas where the problem is the worst is in the least secure 

areas, is where the government and the security forces have the 

weakest presence. 

Senator BARRASSO. The last time we visited in this committee, 

the elections had just occurred in Pakistan, the new government 

hadn’t been formed. Now that the new Government has been 

formed, could you give us an assessment on your opinion of how 

things are going with the formation of the new government? Knowing the history of military involvement in Pakistan, how do you see 

the newly elected government working along with the army and 

the relationship there with respect to the FATA? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I think that the government has 

only been, of course, as I mentioned earlier, in office 6 weeks. I 

think they’re still in a bit of a—you might call it a shakedown 

cruise. I mean, there are relationships to be worked out. These are 

civilian politicians who have been, both of them, in exile for long 

periods of time prior to taking office. So, I think this is—this process is still sorting itself out. 

As far as the military are concerned, I think they’re very committed to civilian rule, and supportive of that process. 

And I would like to say—there was a comment made about President Musharraf, previously—I’d like to commend President 

Musharraf for having made the elections possible, allowing them to 

28 

take place honestly, and having taken off his uniform, as requested 

and pressed by the various civilian political forces. So, before we 

criticize him too much, I think we ought to give credit where it’s 

due, and I think he deserves a considerable amount of credit for 

having allowed these democratic elections to take place. 

Senator BARRASSO. As you said earlier in your testimony, nothing is ever as black or as white as it may seem, and I appreciate 

that, and I know that is going to be an ongoing issue. I appreciate 

your comments and I look forward to visiting with you in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Barrasso. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary, and thank 

you for your public service, and thank you for your service in setting up the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to get to the matter of how, on September the 29th of last year, you could make a determination that, 

and I quote, ‘‘Pakistan is currently making demonstrated, significant, and sustained progress toward eliminating support or safe 

haven for terrorists.’’ And it was only just a few months thereafter, 

some 5 months, that your successor, Admiral McConnell, as the Director of National Intelligence, stated that, ‘‘al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates continue to pose significant threats to the U.S. at 

home and abroad, and al-Qaeda’s central leadership is based in the 

border area of Pakistan and is its most dangerous component.’’ 

So, tell me, on what basis—share with the committee—did you 

make that September 2007 certification, and would you be able to 

make that certification again today? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think we’re, here again, with the 

half empty and half full. I think we’re also in a situation where a 

government can be making good efforts, good-faith efforts to deal 

with militancy, but, at the same time, continue to face a significant 

problem. And I think that—when I made that certification, I think 

that what was brought to my attention was the ongoing efforts of 

the government, whether it had to do with capturing al-Qaeda militants, some of the 600 who have been picked up since the—since 

9/11, and some of the other efforts that they’re engaged in, intelligence cooperation and so forth. 

Would I be able to make that certification now? I probably would, 

but obviously before I did I would have to look at all the facts and 

have them brought before me, and I would have to do it based on 

some kind of a considered assessment. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, right now, for example, in whether 

or not you would issue such a certification, the current Pakistani 

Government is contemplating a cease-fire with militant groups in 

the FATA. Does that indicate that there are good-faith efforts to go 

after the safe haven for terrorists? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as I’ve said earlier today, we are 

wary of these efforts. We view them with some concern. And I 

think that, obviously, if such an agreement is reached, one would 

have to look at what the terms and conditions were, and the provisions, and see if they were enforceable and what measures were 

29 

implemented to enforce them. But, I’ve said repeatedly and on the 

record that we’ve had—have concern with talk of some such arrangement, and we know, from the past Pakistani experience, that 

when they entered into an agreement like that previously, it did 

not work out. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, that would be the policy position of the 

U.S. Government today, the administration would say that they 

have some concern about the cease-fire. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, the outcome we don’t want to 

see is any arrangement that allows extremist elements to operate 

with impunity in the FATA area against Pakistan, Afghanistan, us, 

or the rest of the world. 

Senator BILL NELSON. And that’s what cease-fires give, is the opportunity for the bad guys to train and to plan and to operate freely in the FATA—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, the last agreement—it depends, 

of course, what’s in the terms of the agreement—the last agreement said they would expel foreigners and they would take various 

measures to make sure that certain kinds of activities didn’t take 

place. But, a lot would depend on the ability to enforce that kind 

of an arrangement, and we have some skepticism about their ability to enforce any such arrangement. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You’re referring to the truce in Northern 

Waziristan between September 2006 and July 2007? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. And what was the impact of that truce on 

the efforts to eliminate the support for safe haven? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, it certainly wasn’t positive. Of 

course, the tribal areas consist of more than just one agency, there 

are seven different agencies, and there were efforts ongoing in 

other parts of the country, and also, Waziristan was kind of sealed 

off by their armed forces to contain the effects of the arrangement. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Secretary, I’m just a little country 

lawyer, but it seems to me common sense to know that a cease-fire 

basically causes the Pakistani military to pull back, and takes off 

all the pressure on the bad guys. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. You don’t—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I don’t have—— 

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. Disagree with that. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I don’t disagree with that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Then, maybe the policy of the United 

States Government ought to be, vigorously, to be convincing Pakistan not to enter into such a cease-fire. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, we have drawn their attention, 

and on more than one occasion, to what we see as the pitfalls of 

this kind of arrangement. I don’t disagree with what you just said. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Mr. Secretary, I don’t know if we want to do a another round of 

questioning. We have another panel, and I know we all want to get 

to it. The hour is late. But, I’m troubled by where we find ourselves, and I want to say it to you this way, if I may. 

30 

There is no question but that we are stronger as a country, and 

we will face our threats when we have a bipartisan consensus on 

our foreign policy. When we’re all on the same page, America has 

had its best moments. And there is nothing in my questioning that 

I want to ask you that is trying to play ‘‘gotcha’’ or put anybody 

in a politically defensive position. I want to assure you. However, 

I’m troubled. There’s sort of a ‘‘Houston problem’’ here, which is not 

of your making, but I want to try to understand it better on the 

table, and I think it will help us all think this through. There’s no 

easy solution here. 

These tribal areas are tough areas. People in their own country 

are having trouble being able to try to deal with it. But, the bottom 

line for us as Americans is that, in September 2001, those who attacked us and took down that airplane and those towers came out 

of Afghanistan and the free planning that they are able to do in 

that area. Now, we had a shot at taking them out when we first 

went in, and doing what we need to do at Tora Bora, and we didn’t. 

We’re now being told—61⁄2 years later, by our own intelligence professionals whose duty it is to protect us, that we don’t have a comprehensive plan, and that these terrorists are planning and are reconstituting, and are going about the business of doing what they 

did to us previously. And there isn’t one of us here who doesn’t understand this. And you do, too. 

So, the question for all of us is: If the DOD says to us they agree 

with the GAO, and USAID is saying they agree with the GAO, and 

you are still saying you’ve got a comprehensive plan, but we can’t 

quite grapple with it, how do you assure the committee and the 

American people that we’re doing everything that is in our power 

to be able to adequately secure the country and protect us against 

this plotting that we know is going on? This is troubling, would you 

not say? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. It is. I think what’s most troubling, of 

course, is the situation itself on the ground, and that we realize 

how difficult it is to deal with, because we can’t deal with it just 

unilaterally. 

Senator KERRY. Something’s missing here, clearly; either Pakistan, with this truce, is not going down the road that’s going to be 

sufficient to get control over the area—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think the—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Or—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think what’s missing is sufficient 

wherewithal on the part of the Government of Pakistan, assisted 

by its friends and allies, sufficient wherewithal to bring the state 

of affairs in the FATA area to a condition or a place where this 

kind of activity wouldn’t take place. And how do you deal with 

that? You have to deal with it in a multifaceted way. You have to 

improve the security capabilities, you have to improve the economic 

conditions, and you have to improve the government presence in 

those areas, and that’s what we’re—— 

Senator KERRY. Can those things be done at a rate that is fast 

enough to adequately deal with the definition—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, you’re, in a way, asking me to 

make a prediction about what might happen, but I think that clearVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
31 

ly it’s a matter that has to—it’s something that has to be dealt 

with as a matter of urgency. 

And, if I could add, I think, as time has gone on, we probably, 

in our minds, have elevated Pakistan today to a higher level of priority than it had been previously. I think, when we were looking 

at the situation in Afghanistan, we didn’t always think of dealing 

with the situation in Pakistan in one and the same breath, if you 

will. And I think we’re moving more towards that attitude and that 

point of view, and I think that’s probably a good thing. 

Senator KERRY. What concerned all of us who visited—Senator 

Biden, Senator Hagel, myself—was the sense we had that the Pakistanis themselves, particularly the new government, just don’t see 

al-Qaeda in the same terms as you and our Defense—and our intelligence folks and as we define it. And they view their insurgent 

threat as the tribal insurgency, not al-Qaeda. And so, there’s a difference, there’s a divergence here in focus, if you will, and energy, 

and that greatly complicates this, it strikes me. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, they say that—— 

Senator KERRY. Do you share that, that sense that there is a divergence in how they see it? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as I said earlier, one area where 

we have worked quite well with the Pakistani authorities over— 

since 9/11, has been in capturing or detaining a lot of these alQaeda elements, these 500 or 600 Arab terrorists who have been 

captured during this period and put out of—— 

Senator KERRY. How many have—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. Commission. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Crossed the border from various 

neighboring countries and—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right, yes, I mean, hundreds of others. I just don’t know the exact number, but clearly—— 

Senator KERRY. Understood. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. A lot. And the concern 

that you mentioned, that some of them are regrouping now and 

have been coming back from the Middle East and into the FATA 

area. 

Senator KERRY. This is difficult for any administration. No matter whose party is in power, this is tough, and I think we all have 

to understand that we’re going to have to figure it out and piece 

together something that is going to create this sense of comprehensiveness that people define as missing today. And, again, I say I 

don’t think this does lend itself to some easy swish-swash answer, 

so I appreciate your saying that, but I do think it’s also important 

for us to understand the divergence between where we want to be 

and where we are. 

Senator Coleman? 

Senator COLEMAN. No; I think the hour is getting late, and I 

would associate myself with the comments that you just made, Mr. 

Chairman. We have to sort this out, and it’s—it shouldn’t be—it’s 

not a partisan thing. This is a dangerous area of the world for us, 

and we’ve got to get it right. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

If there’s no other—Senator Lugar, anybody? 

[No response.] 

32 

Senator KERRY. We appreciate your taking the time to come in, 

and look forward to working with you on this, and we’re grateful 

to you for your efforts. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. If I could add one more point. I mean, 

the President committed $3 billion over a 5-year period, from the 

year 2005 to 2009, about half for development and half for security, 

and that was his commitment, back in fiscal year 2005. So, I think 

we have an opportunity now—— 

Senator KERRY. Over how many years? 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. This was over a 5-year period—it was 

$600 million a year, total—— 

Senator KERRY. Yes. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. Half was for development 

and half for security. 

Senator KERRY. Well, this is going to open up a whole new debate here that we don’t want to get into, but that’s one-quarter of 

what we spend in 1 month in a part of the world where they had 

nothing to do with 9/11. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, that was sort of going to my 

point. I think that we have an opportunity, as we look to the following period, to think about—and I would urge that we all think 

about Pakistan in a long-term—on a long-term basis. I mean, this 

is, as you have said, a very, very important relationship, and—— 

Senator KERRY. Yes. 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. We have to think about 

how we’re going to nurture and cultivate this relationship over the 

long terms rather than going through peaks and valleys and having—— 

Senator KERRY. Well—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. Ups and downs like 

we’ve had in the past. 

Senator KERRY. I agree with you. And as we close, I’d say to you 

that unless there is a greater border capacity, with overflight and 

sensors, a whole bunch of other things, I’m afraid that given what 

I saw, at least, of the tribal moving back and forth and the interrelationships of those families and the kidnaping of kids from Afghanistan into madrassas in Pakistan, and so forth, it’s going to 

take one hell of an effort up there to try to, ‘‘shut that down.’’ And 

I think you know that. 

That said, let’s move to the next panel, and we thank you, Mr. 

Secretary, for—— 

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Coming in. Thank you. 

And let’s try to make this as rapid a transition as we could, 

please. 

[Pause.] 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Dodaro, thank you, sir. If we could ask for 

your opening—I thank you for your patience. I’d like to get your 

opening in, because I’m under the gun to go downtown. I think 

Senator Coleman is, too. We don’t want to cut you off, but we want 

to make sure that you have a chance to lay out your arguments. 

You’ve heard the testimony of the Secretary, and I think it’s good 

for you to come in afterward and take issue where you think it’s 

33 

appropriate to, and set the committee straight with respect to the 

record, that would be helpful. 

STATEMENT OF GENE DODARO, ACTING COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. DODARO. Yes; thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss our work on U.S. efforts to address the terrorist threat and 

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

I’d like to take a minute to recognize our team, quickly, who have 

worked on this and produced some thoughtful contributions to the 

Congress. With me is Charles Johnson, who led the work, and we 

also have Hynek Kalkus, Ned George, Claude Adrien, David Hancock, Karen Deans, Mark Dowling, Jena Sinkfield, and Jeff 

Beelaert. 

In summary, we found that the United States has not met its national security goal to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe 

haven of Pakistan’s tribal areas. According to U.S. Embassy officials in Islamabad, and U.S. intelligence documents, since 2002 alQaeda and the Taliban have used the tribal areas in the border regions in Pakistan to attack Pakistani, Afghan, United States and 

coalition troops, plan and train for attacks against United States 

interests, destabilize Pakistan, and spread radical Islamic 

ideologies that threaten United States interests. 

Mr. Chairman, the DNI assessment that you mentioned in your 

opening statement also caught our attention, clearly. And the fact 

that al-Qaeda is now using the Pakistan safe haven to put in place 

the last elements necessary to launch an attack on America is disconcerting. 

The task of addressing the terrorist threat in this region is a difficult one, complicated by its unique characteristics. I’d mention, on 

the map here before you, as you well know, it’s a 373-mile region. 

Inhabitants in this area are some of the poorest in Pakistan, with 

per capita income of about $250 a year, the overall literacy rates 

less than 20 percent, and infrastructure and health care are underdeveloped. Residents are also legally separate from, and unequal 

to, other Pakistani citizens; for example, there’s no access to national political parties, no rights of appeal to Pakistani courts. 

Now, to address, as we’ve heard today, its national security goals 

in Pakistan’s tribal area and border regions the United States has 

relied principally on the Pakistani military. There have been relatively limited development assistance or efforts to improve governance as a means to mitigate underlying causes of terrorism. 

As shown in this chart, which Senator Menendez mentioned earlier, and just to clarify, these are funds that we looked at, that 

were dedicated to the Pakistani tribal areas. I think the Deputy 

Secretary was referring to all funds in Pakistan. But, for those 

funds that were dedicated to the Pakistani tribal areas, 96 percent 

of the $5.8 billion were the reimbursements for the Pakistani military through the Coalition Support Funds; 3 percent was directed 

toward a border security program; and 1 percent was spent on AID 

development activities. And this is for the 2002–07 period, so it 

does not yet cover some of the planned activities that the Deputy 

34 

1See GAO–08–622, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to 

Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas’’ (Washington, DC: Apr. 2008); and GAO–08–735R, ‘‘Preliminary Observations on 

Secretary mentioned. However, in terms of where the bulk of the 

money is going, that—— 

Senator KERRY. That’s 96 percent of the $5.8 billion—— 

Mr. DODARO. Right, that’s correct. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Not of the 11. 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. 

Senator KERRY. OK. 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. We’re—our focus was looking at the 

tribal areas and the border—— 

Senator KERRY. Understood. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. Region. 

Senator KERRY. Understood. 

Mr. DODARO. And that clarifies, I believe, that point for the committee. 

Now, while these military operations have been reported to 

produce some positive outcomes, as the Deputy Secretary mentioned, United States and Pakistani Government officials in power 

at the time of our review recognized that relying primarily on the 

Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al-Qaeda and 

closing the safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In 2006, United 

States officials, in conjunction with the Pakistani Government, 

began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of 

national power, such as development, infrastructure, and public diplomacy, in addition to the military efforts to address national security goals in the tribal areas. However, a comprehensive plan has 

not yet been developed, nor formally approved, by United States 

Government stakeholders who would play a key role in the funding 

and development of such an effort, and support from the recently 

elected Pakistani Government is uncertain. 

Now, we believe a comprehensive plan is needed. I was very 

pleased to hear the Deputy Secretary acknowledge that more could 

be done in the planning area, and that efforts were underway to 

strengthen and bolster their planning activity efforts. This is—— 

Senator KERRY. I apologize—— 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. May I break in so we can—— 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. 

Senator KERRY. Because we heard the dialogue. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Senator KERRY. And we’ve got your testimony, here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENE DODARO, ACTING COMPTROLLER GENERAL, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan combat terrorism in Pakistan’s Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and border region. My testimony is based on our 

two recent reports on the United States lack of a comprehensive plan to destroy the 

terrorist threat and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA, and preliminary 

results from our ongoing examination of U.S. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) reimbursements to Pakistan.1 Since October 2001, the United States has provided PakiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
35 

the Use and Oversight of U.S Coalition Support Funds Provided to Pakistan’’ (Washington, DC: 

May 2008). 2These goals have been set forth in the 2002 ‘‘National Security Strategy,’’ the 2003 ‘‘National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism,’’ and the 2004 ‘‘9/11 Commission Report,’’ and have been endorsed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108–458, sec 

7102(b)(3)) and the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(P.L. 110–53, sec. 2042(b)(2)). 3See Appendix I for a brief description of our scope and methodology. The work on which this 

testimony is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 4The FATA is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901. This legal system, 

codified under British rule, is separate from and unequal to the legal system governing the rest 

of Pakistan. The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent legal 

analysis but is based on interviews and secondary sources. 5 CSF reimburses Pakistan for a variety of activities in support of the global war on terror, 

the majority of which consists of Army and Air Force operations against terrorists in Pakistan’s 

FATA and the border region. However, some of the CSF also supports Pakistani Navy and Air 

Force activities outside of this area. Defense was unable to quantify what was reimbursed for 

activities outside the FATA and the border region at the time of our report, and therefore, we 

included all CSF as funds going toward the FATA and the border region. CSF reimbursement 

funds are paid to the Pakistani Government treasury and become sovereign funds. 

stan with over $10 billion for military, economic, and development assistance activities in support of the critical U.S. national security goals of destroying terrorist 

threats and closing terrorist safe havens.2 Approximately $5.8 billion of this amount 

has been directed at efforts to combat terrorism in Pakistan’s FATA and border 

region. 

My testimony today discusses (1) U.S. progress in meeting U.S. national security 

goals in Pakistan’s FATA region; (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA; and (3) the oversight of U.S. CSF provided to 

Pakistan.3

SUMMARY

In summary, we found the following: 

• The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist 

threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA, a mountainous region 

which shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan. According to U.S. Embassy 

officials in Islamabad and U.S. intelligence documents, since 2002, al-Qaeda 

and the Taliban have used Pakistan’s FATA and the border region to attack 

Pakistani, Afghan, as well as U.S. and coalition troops; plan and train for 

attacks against U.S. interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist 

ideologies that threaten U.S. interests. We found broad agreement that 

al-Qaeda had established a safe haven in the FATA. A 2008 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assessment states that al-Qaeda is now using the Pakistani safe haven to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack against America. The FATA’s rugged terrain, wide-spread poverty, 

high unemployment, low literacy, underdeveloped infrastructure, and unique 

legal structure 4 all add to the complexity the U.S. and Pakistani Governments 

face in addressing terrorist threats in this region. 

• The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address 

its national security goals in the FATA. There has been relatively limited development assistance or efforts to improve governance as a means to mitigate underlying causes of terrorism in the FATA. Of the approximately $5.8 billion 

directed at efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, we 

determined that about 96 percent ($5.56 billion) of this amount was used to reimburse the Pakistani Government through CSF5 for military operations, 3 per- cent ($187 million) was directed toward a border security program, and 1 percent ($40 million) was spent on USAID development activities. 

• Defense, State, intelligence, U.S. Embassy, and Pakistani Government officials 

in power at the time of our review, recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al-Qaeda and preventing the 

establishment of a safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the Embassy, Defense, 

State, and USAID, in conjunction with the Pakistani Government, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as 

development assistance, infrastructure improvements, and public diplomacy, to 

address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. However, this effort has not 

been formally approved by U.S. Government stakeholders who would play a key 

role in the funding and implementation of such an effort, and support from the 

recently elected Pakistani Government is uncertain. 

36 

6The administration’s 2003 ‘‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,’’ the independent 

‘‘9/11 Commission Report,’’ and Congress’s (1) Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 (P.L. 108–458, sec. 7120) and (2) the Implementing the Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110–53, sec. 2042 (c)) all support the development of a comprehensive plan that uses all elements of national power. Elements of national power include 

diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement 

support. 7GAO, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign 

Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists,’’ GAO–07–697 (Washington, DC, May 25, 

2007); GAO, ‘‘Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,’’ GAO–06–15 (Washington, DC, Oct. 21, 2005); and GAO, 

‘‘Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism,’’ GAO–03– 

519T (Washington, DC, Mar. 3, 2003). 8Submitted costs can be (a) recommended for approval; (b) ‘‘deferred’’ and returned for additional documentation; or (c) ‘‘disallowed’’ for not being consistent with the scope of CSF. 

• A comprehensive approach is needed as required by the administration’s own 

‘‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,’’ recommended by the independent 

9/11 Commission, and mandated by congressional legislation.6 Since 2002, the 

U.S. Embassy in Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported, comprehensive 

plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. We 

have recommended that the administration produce a comprehensive plan using 

all elements of national power to combat terrorist threats and close safe havens 

in Pakistan’s FATA region. The comprehensive plan should also include key 

components called for in the Intelligence Reform Act and components that we 

have previously reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans 

involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.7 Among other things, 

the plan should: 

• Place someone directly in charge of this multidepartment effort to improve 

accountability; 

• Articulate a clear strategy to implement the national security goal to destroy 

terrorists and close the safe haven in the FATA; 

• Clarify roles and responsibilities of each department for implementing the 

goal, including establishing compatible policies and procedures to operate 

across agency boundaries; 

• Provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to 

meet these national security goals; and 

• Require a monitoring system and provide periodic reports to Congress on the 

progress and impediments to meeting national security goals in Pakistan. 

• Continued oversight is needed to ensure the development and effective implementation of a comprehensive plan. Further, it is important that there is sufficient oversight of the billions of U.S. dollars devoted to assisting the Pakistani 

Government in its efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA. Preliminary results 

from our ongoing work focusing on the use and oversight of U.S. CSF show that 

Defense may have recently increased its oversight of CSF. For example, in 2007, 

Defense officials at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan—the Office of the Defense 

Representative to Pakistan (ODRP)—began playing a larger role in overseeing 

CSF reimbursement claims. Furthermore, Defense recently deferred or disallowed a larger amount of Pakistani claims. Specifically, for the months September 2004–February 2007, Defense disallowed or deferred an average of just 

over 2 percent of the Pakistani Government’s CSF reimbursement claims. For 

the most recent reimbursement (March–June 2007 claims) processed in February 2008, Defense disallowed or deferred over 20 percent of Pakistan’s claim. 

Our preliminary observations indicated that this was the first time that ODRP 

recommended significant denials or deferrals of Pakistani claims.8 The extent 

of ODRP’s oversight in the future is unclear, given that its role has not been 

formalized. 

• In response to our previous reports, Defense and USAID concurred with our recommendation that a comprehensive plan was needed; State asserted that a comprehensive strategy exists, while the Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated that plans to combat terrorism exist. In our view, these plans 

have not been formally integrated into a comprehensive plan as called for by 

Congress and that cover the full range of unique challenges associated with the 

FATA. Additionally, Defense recognized the importance and necessity of oversight over CSF. 

37 

9The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent legal analysis 

but is based on interviews and secondary sources. 

BACKGROUND

Some of the characteristics of the FATA make it attractive to terrorist groups, 

such as al-Qaeda and Taliban, seeking a safe haven. The FATA is mountainous and 

shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan. It has an estimated population of 3.1 

million people, and is one of Pakistan’s poorest regions, with high poverty, high unemployment, low literacy, and an underdeveloped infrastructure (See fig. 1). 

The FATA is governed by an administrative system and a judicial system different from the rest of Pakistan—the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, 

codified under British rule.9 Because Pakistan retained the colonial administrative 

and legal structures of the British, as codified in the FCR, the FATA populations 

are legally separate from and unequal to other Pakistani citizens. Examples of these 

differences under the FCR include: 

• The FATA residents do not have access to national political parties, and political parties are forbidden from extending their activities into the agencies of 

FATA. 

• The FATA is under the direct executive authority of the President of Pakistan. 

Laws framed by the National Assembly of Pakistan do not apply in the FATA 

unless so ordered by the President. 

• FATA residents do not have the right to legal representation. Those convicted 

are denied the right of appeal in Pakistan’s courts. 

• The President’s representatives to the FATA, who are called political agents, 

can punish an entire tribe for crimes committed on the tribe’s territory by 


gao1.eps
38 

10 A recent announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani regarding the repeal of the FCR drew mixed reactions from tribesmen and political leaders, some of whom called 

for amendments to the FCR, rather than its repeal. 11The DNI’s 2007 NIE and its 2008 ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment’’ are designed to help U.S. 

civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect U.S. national security interests and represent the combined judgments of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, according to the NIE. 

issuing fines, making arrests, implementing property seizures, and establishing 

blockades. 

Defense has noted that the FCR is a culturally acceptable recognition of the tribal 

structure of the FATA, where the population is ethnically different from the majority of Pakistan’s citizens and precludes forced assimilation. Further, Defense noted 

that removing the FCR without a replacement mechanism that is accepted by the 

indigenous population has the potential to create a vacuum that could result in negative consequences.10

The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan’s FATA; alQaeda Remains a Threat and Terrorist Safe Haven Still Exists 

The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist 

threat and close the safe haven in the FATA. While national security strategies 

have called for the use of all elements of national power, such as diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support, 

to meet these goals, the United States has relied principally on supporting the Pakistani military. We found broad agreement, however, that al-Qaeda has regenerated 

its ability to attack the United States and succeeded in establishing a safe haven 

in Pakistan’s FATA. In particular, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 

and 2008 DNI’s ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment’’ state that al-Qaeda has regenerated 

its attack capability and secured a safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA.11 These conclusions are supported by a broad array of sources, including Defense, State, and senior 

U.S. Embassy officials in Pakistan. 

The DNI’s 2008 assessment stated that the safe haven in Pakistan provides 

al-Qaeda with many of the same advantages it had when based across the border 

in Afghanistan. According to the assessment, the safe haven in the FATA serves as 

a staging area for al-Qaeda’s attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Further, it serves as a location for training new terrorist operatives for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States. U.S. Government officials in Washington and Pakistan also acknowledge that al-Qaeda has established 

a safe haven near Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. The NIE also found that in 

the past 2 years, al-Qaeda’s central leadership regenerated the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks against the United States. It also found that 

al-Qaeda’s central leadership, based in the border area of Pakistan, is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the United States. 

The DNI’s 2008 assessment and other sources have concluded that the resurgence 

of al-Qaeda terrorists on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan now pose 

a preeminent threat to U.S. national security. It states that al-Qaeda is now using 

the Pakistani safe haven to put the last element necessary to launch another attack 

against America into place, including the identification, training, and positioning of 

Western operatives for an attack. The assessment found that al-Qaeda and other 

Pakistan-based militants now pose a threat to Pakistan. The assessment found an 

unparalleled increase in suicide attacks against Pakistan’s military and civilians 

over the past year, with total casualties in 2007 exceeding all such attacks in the 

preceding 5 years. These attacks were ordered by Pakistan-based militants, many 

of whom are allied with al-Qaeda. The assessment concluded that radical elements 

now have the potential to undermine Pakistan itself. 

The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to Accomplish Its 

Goals in Pakistan’s FATA, With Limited Focus on Other Elements of National 

Power 

The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address U.S. 

national security goals in the FATA. There have been relatively limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes of terrorism in the FATA, such as providing development assistance or addressing the FATA’s political needs. For example, although the FATA has some of the worst development indicators in Pakistan 

and is ruled under colonial administrative and legal structures dating from 1901, 

the United States has devoted relatively little funding to address these issues in the 

FATA. 

Approximately $5.8 billion has been directed at efforts to combat terrorism in 

Pakistan’s FATA and the border region. As figure 2 shows, about 96 percent of this 

39 

12Department of State report to Congress, pursuant to Section 2042 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commissions Act of 2007 (P.L. 110–53). 

amount was used to reimburse the Pakistani Government through CSF for military 

operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, most significantly against terrorists in Pakistan’s FATA and border region. We identified only 

two nonmilitary activities that occurred in the FATA and border region: State’s border security program, which received about $187 million, and USAID development 

assistance activities, which amounted to about $40 million. 

According to a State Department report, Pakistan’s military forces have had some 

tactical successes in the FATA. The Pakistani Government stationed military and 

paramilitary forces along the border with Afghanistan, and security operations in 

the FATA disrupted terrorist activity by targeting and raiding al-Qaeda and other 

militant safe havens.12 According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or capture hundreds of suspected terrorists, including al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban leaders. 

Key Government Stakeholders Recognize That a More Comprehensive Approach Is 

Needed 

Defense, State, U.S. Embassy, and Pakistani Government officials recognize that 

relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing 

al-Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA. State’s 

April 2007 ‘‘Country Reports on Terrorism’’ states that, despite having Pakistani 

troops in the FATA, the Government of Pakistan has been unable to exert control 

over the area. The report concluded that Pakistan has now recognized that military 

operations alone would not restore security and stability to the FATA. Similarly, 

U.S. Embassy officials in Pakistan stated that Taliban and al-Qaeda elements have 

created a safe haven in the FATA and have used it to plan and launch attacks on 

Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Embassy further noted that al-Qaeda and the Taliban continue to recruit, train, and 

operate in the FATA. 

No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been Developed, 

as Called for by the Administration and Congress 

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), the independent 9/11 

Commission (2004), and Congress in repeated legislation (2004 and 2007) recognized 

that a comprehensive plan employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, 

military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to combat terrorism and close terrorist safe havens in Pakistan’s 

FATA region. However, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national security goals 

in the region has not yet been developed. Even after the creation of the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), an organization specifically intended to develop, 

implement, and monitor multidepartment plans to combat terrorism, the Embassy 

has lacked a Washington-approved, comprehensive plan that combines the capabilities of Defense, State, USAID, intelligence agencies, and other U.S. departments to 

combat terrorism in the FATA. 


gao2.eps
40 

13 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008. 14 In providing agency comments on GAO–08–622, USAID stated it received $88 million for 

these efforts in the Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation. 

In addition, Defense, State, Embassy officials, the DNI, and USAID recognize that 

a comprehensive approach is needed to meet U.S. national security goals in Pakistan. The Pakistani Government in power at the time of our review, also recognized 

that it must take a more comprehensive approach to defeating terrorism and that 

an intensified and sustained effort that combines administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms to defeat the terrorist threat is required, according to the DNI.13

Pakistan and the U.S. Embassy Are Encouraging More Focus on Other Key Elements 

of National Power to Achieve U.S. Goals in the FATA 

In March 2006, the President of Pakistan requested that the United States support Pakistan’s effort to support a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism in the FATA. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan began coordinating 

efforts by Defense, State, and USAID to develop department-specific efforts to support Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan for the FATA. Pakistan’s Sustainable 

Development Plan is a 9-year, $2 billion effort to provide economic development, extend the influence of the Pakistani Government, and establish security in the FATA. 

To assist this effort, Defense undertook a counterinsurgency assessment in the 

FATA and began developing its Security Development Plan. At the same time, 

USAID provided technical assistance to the Pakistani Government to help formalize 

its Sustainable Development Plan, as well as to plan USAID-development assistance 

activities in the FATA. This approach, if approved by the administration and key 

U.S. Government agency stakeholders, would constitute the U.S. Government’s first 

attempt to focus more attention on other key elements of national power to address 

U.S. counterterrorism goals in the FATA. 

Proposed bilateral efforts to focus on more elements of national power 

According to officials with the U.S. Embassy and Pakistani Government officials 

in power at the time of our review, a more comprehensive approach is critical to 

addressing the terrorist threat in the FATA and would represent a significant departure from the past. As such, the United States began an effort in fiscal year 2007 

to provide over $1 billion from fiscal year 2007 through 2011 for development assistance, security, infrastructure, and public diplomacy in support of the Pakistani Government. This approach represents the first effort by the U.S. Embassy to directly 

plan, implement, coordinate, and monitor a multidepartment effort to combat terrorism in the FATA. 

The embassy planned to spend $187.6 million on this initial effort using fiscal 

year 2007 funds. The funding has been directed to four areas: 

• Development: The $99 million development effort would be led by USAID and 

would include capacity-building for the FATA institutions needed to plan, manage, and monitor development projects; efforts to build community and government relations; funding for health and education services; and efforts to increase employment and economic growth.14

• Security: The $54.1 million Defense and State security effort would include 

training for military and paramilitary units in the FATA—including the Frontier Corps, special operations forces, and air crews—and for providing night 

vision goggles, radios, and other equipment. 

• Infrastructure: The $32.5 million the U.S. Embassy has designated for infrastructure improvements related to both its security and development efforts 

would be used for road construction, the Frontier Corps training center, and 

border surveillance outposts. 

• Public diplomacy: $2 million in funding was alotted for public diplomacy programs. 

According to the Embassy, the success of this new effort in the FATA will depend 

on close coordination among an array of institutions within the U.S. and Pakistani 

Governments. The new effort also will involve partner agencies and allies, including 

the United Kingdom, Japan, and Europe; the Asian Development Bank; nongovernmental organizations; and the Pakistani private sector, civil society, and the tribes 

of the FATA. 

This effort, however, does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan and has not 

been formally approved by U.S. Government stakeholders who would play a key role 

41 

16The March–June 2007 claims reimbursed in February 2008 are the latest claims reimbursed 

by DOD Comptroller, as of May 2008. 

in the funding and implementation of such an effort. Support from the recently 

elected Pakistani Government, at the time of our review, was also uncertain. 

Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds 

Provided to Pakistan 

For the period covering October 2001 through June 2007, the United States reim- bursed Pakistan about $5.56 billion in CSF for military operations in FATA and 

other support in the war on terror. CSF reimbursement funds are paid directly into 

the Pakistani Government treasury and become sovereign funds. Once they become 

sovereign funds, the U.S. Government has no oversight authority over these funds. 

In response to a Defense Inspector General review conducted in 2003, Defense implemented additional guidance to improve oversight of the CSF reimbursed to Pakistan. Moreover, in 2007, the ODRP began playing a larger role in overseeing CSF 

reimbursement claims. 

In performing oversight, ODRP reviews the Pakistani claims and indicates that, 

to the best of its knowledge, military support was provided and expenses were actually incurred. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) then validates that Pakistani operations listed were essential to support U.S. military operations in the theater. The 

claims are sent to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, who 

(1) performs a macrolevel review comparing the cost to similar operations, and (2) 

assesses whether the cost categories are reasonable, selected subcategories are reasonable compared to U.S. costs, and costs are consistent with previous claims. In 

addition, both the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the State Department 

verify that the reimbursement is consistent with the U.S. Government’s National 

Security Strategy and that the CSF payment does not adversely impact the balance 

of power in the region. 

In recent months,16 Defense has disallowed or deferred a larger amount of CSF 

reimbursement claims from Pakistan, as shown in figure 3. 

We plan to monitor the status and progress of the U.S. Government in developing 

this effort and provide an assessment in a subsequent report covering security, political, and development assistance activities undertaken by the United States to 

meet U.S. national security goals in the FATA. This work is being conducted in response to requests from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; the Subcommittee 

on the Middle East and South Asia, House Committee on Foreign Affairs; the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform; Senator Harkin; and Senator Menendez. 

CONCLUSION

Combating terrorism is the United States’ top national security priority at home 

and abroad. The U.S. national security strategies have consistently called for using 


gao3.eps
42 

16GAO–07–697, GAO–06–15, and GAO–03–519T. 1GAO–08–622, GAO–08–735R. 

all elements of national power to combat terrorism, including diplomatic, military, 

intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. Because the use of the various elements of national power falls under the authority 

of numerous U.S. Government agencies, a comprehensive plan is required to ensure 

that the full capacity of the U.S. Government is focused on meeting U.S. national 

security goals. 

We believe that such a plan would help to ensure coordination, integration, and 

implementation of U.S. efforts to close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. A comprehensive plan to combat terrorism in the FATA that establishes goals, objectives, 

priorities, outcomes, and milestones, including specific performance measures, would 

allow an assessment of progress and help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts. As 

such, we believe that the administration should develop a comprehensive plan using 

the full capabilities provided by Defense, State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies and 

stakeholders to further assist Pakistan in combating terrorism. 

Additionally, the U.S. has spent billions of CSF on Pakistan military operations 

in the FATA border region. As these funds continue to support Pakistani operations 

in the FATA, it is important that there is adequate oversight. 

PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION

In our report issued in April 2008, we recommended that the National Security 

Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and 

other executive departments as deemed appropriate, implement the congressional 

mandate to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to 

combat the terrorist threat and close their safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA region. 

The comprehensive plan should also include key components called for in the Intelligence Reform Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act of 2007, and components that we have previously reported as being needed to 

improve the effectiveness of plans involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.16 Among other things, the plan should: 

• Place someone directly in charge of this multidepartment effort to improve 

accountability; 

• Articulate a clear strategy to implement the national security goal to destroy 

terrorists and close its safe haven in the FATA; 

• Clarify roles and responsibilities of each department for implementing the goal, 

including establishing compatible policies and procedures to operate across 

agency boundaries; 

• Provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to meet 

these national security goals; and 

• Require a monitoring system and provide periodic reports to Congress on the 

progress and impediments to meeting national security goals in Pakistan. 

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

In response to our previous reports, Defense and USAID concurred with our recommendation that a comprehensive plan was needed, State asserted that a comprehensive strategy exists, while the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

stated that plans to combat terrorism exist. In our view, these plans have not been 

formally integrated into a comprehensive plan as called for by Congress. Additionally, Defense recognized the importance and necessity of oversight over CSF. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or other members have at this time. 

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Our objectives and findings for this testimony were based on two recently issued 

reports.1 To address these objectives, for our earlier reports, we reviewed relevant 

national security strategies, the 9/11 Commission Report, key congressional legislation, and related documentation from the Departments of Defense (Defense) and 

State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and disVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:09 Mar 18, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48003.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
43 

2We also requested meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security Council (NSC); however, only the 

CIA agreed to meet with us. 3GAO–07–697. 

4We met with international donors from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United 

Kingdom. 

cussed these issues with relevant department officials.2 To determine progress in 

meeting national security goals, we compared the national security goals with unclassified assessments conducted by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 

State, and U.S. officials operating in Pakistan. We have previously reported on the 

need for plans to combat terrorism to include elements that would enhance interagency cooperation and improve effectiveness.3

To determine if comprehensive plans that included these key elements were developed and contained the elements recommended by national security documents and 

legislation, we requested all plans addressing U.S. efforts in the FATA from the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense, NCTC, NSC, State, USAID, and the 

U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. We reviewed all plans made available from Defense, 

State, USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. The CIA, NCTC, and National 

Security Council (NSC) did not provide any plans. 

In addition, we conducted field work in Pakistan in both Islamabad and Peshawar, near the FATA, and met with officials from the U.S. Embassy and consulate, 

Pakistan’s Ministries of Defense and Interior, the 11th Army Corps, the Frontier 

Corps, the FATA Secretariat, and a Pakistani nongovernmental organization with 

experience working in the FATA, as well as international donors.4 We determined 

the amount of U.S. funding to Pakistan by analyzing Defense, State, and USAID 

budget documents covering the period from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. We determined the amount and oversight process used for CSF reimbursements to Pakistan by analyzing Defense documents covering reimbursement claims for the period 

from fiscal years 2002 through June 2007. 

We conducted these performance audits from July 2007 through May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings. 

based on our audit objectives. 

Senator KERRY. When you hear the Secretary say the ‘‘glass half 

full, glass half empty,’’ is that a fair explanation of where we are? 

Mr. DODARO. The assessment basically is—I think there’s been 

a lot of planning activities at individual departments and agencies 

level over time. I think the shift away from the military operations 

alone could have occurred earlier in the process. 

Senator KERRY. But, are they happening now? 

Mr. DODARO. Pardon me? 

Senator KERRY. Are they happening now—— 

Mr. DODARO. It seems—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. To your satisfaction? 

Mr. DODARO. It seems to be, Senator, but until there’s a comprehensive plan put together that’s approved and that’s funded and 

that everybody acknowledges it, I think it remains to be seen what 

the strategy will be. And, as I mentioned, we still have to, now, negotiate with the new Government in Pakistan to try to get agreement on what our plan would be. And this is a really important 

point, because I think, what our emphasis has been is to say that, 

‘‘You need a comprehensive plan that’s documented.’’ That plan can 

then be shared with the Congress, it can be shared with Pakistani 

Government officials, it can be shared with the international donor 

community so they could decide how they want to supplement that 

plan. And, importantly, that plan needs to be documented as we 

approach an upcoming transition to a new administration and a 

new President. 

44 

Senator KERRY. I assume you would agree that certain components of whatever that comprehensive plan are going to be classified and not appropriate to a public discussion. Is that part correct? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. Yes. That’s—— 

Senator KERRY. So, lay out for us the parts where you think appropriate—why do you believe DOD and USAID are expressing dissatisfaction with the current level of plan? What do they think is 

missing in their judgment? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, what we believe is missing are several elements. One, it’s not clear who’s in charge to integrate all the efforts 

of the individual activities. Second, it’s—— 

Senator KERRY. Is that from both sides of the border? Is that in 

Pakistan or Afghanistan? Or is that regionally? 

Mr. DODARO. Right now I’m just talking about U.S. planning efforts. 

Senator KERRY. Oh, really? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Senator KERRY. Just in terms of—— 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. It’s not clear who’s in charge. 

Mr. DODARO. Well, when you have multiple agencies involved— 

and this is a real challenge, I think, for our Government in the 

21st century—more and more challenges that we confront involve— 

have to involve efforts of multiple agencies over a period of time. 

And in order to make sure that the roles and responsibilities are 

clearly articulated, comprehensive planning is becoming more and 

more important, whether you’re dealing with national security 

issues, a Hurricane Katrina situation, planning for a pandemic, 

dealing with the world food security crisis, our Government has to 

be more flexible and develop plans that transcend bureaucratic 

boundaries. 

Senator KERRY. Let me ask you a question. 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. 

Senator KERRY. Does anybody believe they are in charge? 

Mr. DODARO. I wish you would have asked that question to the 

Deputy Secretary, but I’m not sure. 

Senator KERRY. You literally don’t know. There’s nobody who 

says, ‘‘I’m in charge.’’ Who convenes the interagency meetings on 

this issue? 

Mr. DODARO. I think it’s—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. The National Security Council, along with the National Counterterrorism Center, should play a lead role. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, basically, as Charles was saying, the National 

Security Council is in the position to prepare this—— 

Senator KERRY. They’re a convener—— 

Mr. DODARO. Is the—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Of the—— 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. Is the convener, and—— 

Senator KERRY. But, it’s your testimony to the committee that 

there is no designated person in charge within that framework. 

Mr. DODARO. I’d have to provide an answer for the record on 

that, Senator, and go back and consult with the team. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

45 

During the period in which we completed our review (July 2007 through May 

2008) we were not directed to any individual at the National Security Council, the 

National Counterterrorism Center, or any U.S. Government agency as the person 

in charge of or responsible for putting together a comprehensive U.S. strategy for 

combatting terrorism in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

Senator KERRY. But, whatever—— 

Mr. DODARO. Our point is, Senator, if I could just clarify—— 

Senator KERRY. Right. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. Is that, basically, the plan would articulate that, along with clear roles and responsibilities—— 

Senator KERRY. And you’re saying it doesn’t. 

Mr. DODARO. We’re saying that we’ve not seen an integrated 

comprehensive plan. That’s basically what we’re saying, that’s 

what we’ve recommended—— 

Senator KERRY. To what degree is the lack of comprehensiveness 

defined by Pakistan itself and the complications of the FATA, historically? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I think there’s clearly complications associated with the characteristics of the region that are difficult to deal 

with, and that’s why I think a plan that has all the elements of 

national power are important. In addition to the military, you need 

the diplomatic, economic, intelligence, development assistance, and 

law enforcement. 

Senator KERRY. Then that comprehensive piece has been missing—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Over these past few—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes; there are individual plans, and this is where 

we agree with the Secretary that there have been individual plans 

of departments and agencies. There have been interagency discussions, there’s a lot of dialogue going on, but it hasn’t coalesced into 

a coherent, comprehensive framework, and that’s why I was encouraged to hear him say that they were moving, it appeared to be, 

in that direction. 

Senator KERRY. I view it as what is sort of the equivalent of my 

time for questioning. I’ll yield to Senator Coleman, and Senator 

Menendez is going go close out the hearing. He’ll chair for me, because I have to go to another thing, and I apologize. 

Mr. DODARO. All right. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In terms of the funds that we have spent, how concerned are you 

that these funds have been used for the purposes which they were 

intended? 

Mr. DODARO. Senator, if we could put up our last chart, we are 

in the process of looking at that right now, and what we’ve observed is that the DOD is looking at and questioning some of the 

reimbursements from the Pakistani Government. As you can see by 

the spike in the chart here, in the March to June 2007 period, 

about 20 percent of the claims for reimbursement from the Pakistani Government have been questioned, compared to only just over 

2 percent that were questioned for the months between September 

2004 and February 2007. So, we think that there’s more oversight, 

but that part of the DOD process has yet to be formalized. So, 

we’re looking more indepth at that now, as part of the request from 

46 

Senator Menendez and others, and we hope to have a more formal 

report later. 

Senator COLEMAN. So, you’re not in a position to provide any 

level of confidence that the bulk of the funds have been devoted to 

the purposes for which they were intended? 

Mr. DODARO. I think it’s premature—it’s premature for us to 

make that judgment until we complete all the work, Senator. 

Senator COLEMAN. In terms of the coordination of the effort, 

what’s the capacity of the National Counterterrorism Center to 

play a central role in coordinating a comprehensive strategy? 

Mr. DODARO. Let me have Mr. Johnson respond to that question. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, specifically, the National Counterterrorism 

Center has been established to actually do that, to bring these 

interagency—this interagency effort together. It is our understanding that some efforts have been initially started, but yet, we 

have—as Mr. Dodaro mentioned, we have not seen an actual plan 

put in place by the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Senator COLEMAN. Just—and the last question—is the issue a 

question of resources, or is it a question of authority, in terms of 

their role? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we’re not certain about the resource issue at 

this point in time. It’s something we will continue to look into. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Coleman. 

Mr. Dodaro, let me first thank you and your team for the work 

that you’ve done in this regard. I think it’s critical that Congress 

have the most objective, best, well-informed analysis possible, and 

I think your team has done a pretty good job of understanding a 

complex set of issues, and I want to thank you for your professionalism. 

I appreciate your clarification on the chart that I was referring 

to. I was referring to all of the money that, in fact, was going to 

the FATA region when I mentioned $11 billion, that’s our overall 

program. You didn’t look at that part that did not go to the FATA 

region, as I understand it, right? 

Mr. DODARO. I—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Did you look at the other $5 billion or so? 

Mr. DODARO. We’re looking at that now. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; we’re looking at that now. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes; we have that—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. You didn’t look at it? 

Mr. DODARO. We’re looking at that now as part of—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. You’re looking at it now. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. The broader effort, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. So, we’ll look forward to your answer on 

that. 

But, as it relates to the $5.8 billion that did go to the FATA region, your chart, where 96 percent goes to military efforts, is still 

the case, is that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. For the—yes, for the money that went into 

the—those areas, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Which is around $5.8 billion? 

Mr. DODARO. $5.8—— 

47 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. That’s correct—billion. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, what I find interesting is that I hear 

now a lot of talk about, ‘‘We need to do elements of development 

assistance,’’ but, in fact, you know, we don’t have—we’ve done—at 

least for the first $5.8 billion, we’ve done 1 percent of that. And so, 

it seems to me that that’s a different scenario. 

Let me ask you this: With reference to this chart that you have 

on the—up there, you see this large spike in the claim amounts 

disallowed or deferred by the United States. Can you explain how 

it is that we go from a relatively stable process to a sudden spike 

in, I guess it was, March 2007? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes; my understanding is that DOD began a special 

effort, around that time, to have a designated individual take a 

closer look at some of the reimbursement claims. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Because it seems to say that someone came 

in, took a look at the receipts, and said, ‘‘Wait a minute, what’s 

going on here?’’ 

Mr. DODARO. That’s basically what we’ve noticed so far. We’re 

going to dig deeper in—to try to understand a little bit more about 

why, and—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you think your subsequent report, which 

we hope is going to come out sometime toward the end of June, is 

going to give us some insights in this, or whenever your timeframe 

is? What is—— 

Mr. DODARO. I believe—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Your timeframe? 

Mr. DODARO. I believe so, Senator. Let me ask Charles. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; we do intend to get more indepth on the oversight process, how that’s evolved over time—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Because I—— 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Whether or not there is adequate 

oversight and accountability 

Senator MENENDEZ. I know that we held a hearing, in December 

of last year, about the whole question of, where are these payments 

going, and what is the value in return? And, you know, we just see 

a spike that all of a sudden—seemed pretty much flat-lined and 

then all of a sudden has this huge spike. So, it seems to me there 

was—from a couple of years in which either there wasn’t the intensity of paying attention with the billions of dollars, or there was 

a dramatic change—something happened. And whether that is the 

intensity of oversight or whether that is a series of actions by the 

Pakistanis that were disallowed, something dramatically happened. 

Mr. DODARO. Definitely, it points to something that we need to 

delve deeper into, Senator Menendez, and we will include that in 

our report. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this: In the agency comments section of your report, I understand that the Department of 

Defense and AID concurred with your recommendations to develop 

a comprehensive plan to combat the terrorist threat and close the 

safe haven in the FATA. Is that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, the Department of State asserts that 

a comprehensive strategy already exists, and, in their comments, 

48 

they repeatedly reference both a plan and a strategy. Have you see 

either the plan or the strategy that the Department of State is referencing in their comments? 

Mr. DODARO. My understanding is—and I’ll ask Charles to elaborate on this, if he feels necessary—my understanding is, when they 

refer to the ‘‘strategy,’’ they’re referring to the individual plans in 

the interagency working efforts and those issues. We have not seen 

a comprehensive plan, which is why we recommended that one be 

developed. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, there can’t be a comprehensive plan if 

two major governmental entities, the Department of Defense and 

USAID, say that they agree with you that there is no plan and 

there needs to be a plan, and only one element of that team says 

that, ‘‘Yeah, we have a plan.’’ I mean, something is fundamentally 

wrong. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure that out. 

Mr. DODARO. I would agree with you, Senator. I mean, we basically think the situation is that the individual agencies have their 

plan activities, they meet, but there is no comprehensive plan that 

we’ve seen or—and that’s why we recommend that it be produced. 

And I think that’s what the Deputy Secretary was referring to earlier when he said that they’re looking at how to strengthen their 

planning efforts, and hopefully tie these individual plans together, 

deal with all the elements of national power, and include some key 

components of a plan that you would want to see in order to be 

able to measure progress over time. 

Senator Coleman mentioned, earlier, the question of metrics. The 

question of metrics ought to be included in a plan, and that would 

be standard activity. So, those are the type of elements that we’ve 

pointed out that need to be addressed in the comprehensive plan. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate at least what you’ve done 

so far. Of six elements of national power, only three were used to 

any extent, and 96 percent of it was all in military. And it seems 

to me that that—how one measures what is the value received for 

that type of investment, in terms of the success of undermining 

those who wish our country, as well as, as I view it, Pakistan and 

others, harm, is a measurement that, at least from my point of 

view, would be lacking for the investment that was made. But, I’m 

looking forward to your full report, as one of the requesters, and 

I hope the chairman will reconvene us at that time. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your report really fastening on the characteristics of 

the FATA area; as you point out, 373 miles of border, 3.1 million 

people. But then, strikingly, these are people who do not have representation in the Pakistani Government, essentially, nor recourse 

to courts. 

Now, you know, as Americans have thought about this situation, 

it is difficult for us to imagine a section of a country that has no 

recourse to either the legislative powers or the judicial powers; and 

yet, Pakistanis would testify, if they were here, that, historically, 

there has been relatively little control by the central government 

over this particular territory. It’s not been a no-man’s land, but the 

ability of the central government to be effective in the area is almost the other side of the coin of these folks not being a part of 

49 

the situation. Nevertheless, it’s a part of geographical Pakistan, 

and very important to us because it borders Afghanistan. 

Now, as you’ve also pointed out, in dealing with this, we’ve had 

multiagency attempts. They have not been well coordinated. There 

has not been a master plan or an overall plan. This, unfortunately 

is characteristic, in my judgment, of our overall view of Afghanistan, as we’ve had hearings there. We’ve asked, What is the business plan? How does this plan work? Usually the testimony has 

been, ‘‘We’ve made progress.’’ And, incrementally, province by province, someone could show that something good happened. But, in 

terms of the overall predicament of the stability of that government, its maturity, its working through the problems of economic 

growth, education, problems of bringing women into the society, 

and so forth, there would have been bits and pieces. 

And I think, you know, perhaps—and I agree with Senator 

Menendez—the asking of GAO to go after this may offer, once 

again, a spur for organization at this stage, because the problem 

continues on. 

Now, the practical reason for our dilemma is that Pakistan is a 

sovereign nation. Pakistan has not been willing to permit United 

States forces to go back and forth across the border, conduct air 

raids, military strikes, and so forth. Certainly, this has been suggested by military commanders from time to time. Those efforts 

have been rebuffed. 

So, now we come to a whole new government in Pakistan, as we 

explored with the previous witnesses, we are not really certain exactly where stability may lie and where their general situation may 

lie, what kind of problems that have arisen, internally, even with 

food problems for the whole country, quite apart from this border 

region. 

And all of us have to become much more sophisticated in understanding Pakistan and Afghanistan if we’re ever to come to policies, hopefully unified ones, or some plan. But, it is very timely 

that we consider this, because it’s a critical element in our success, 

or that of our friends in Afghanistan—is really influenced by how 

well we do. 

Having said all of that, it’s not surprising to me that the chart 

shows 96 percent of the money for military, because this is reimbursement of the Pakistani military, who are doing the job because 

our military was not there, could not be there; nor are we in a position, really, to go into civil society in the FATA area and begin reorganizing their schools or feeding programs or what have you. We 

could once again reimburse the Pakistani Government, but then 

this leads to the audit problem with which you’re now dealing. How 

well do the Pakistanis do these functions even after we offer funds 

for them to do these things? And, it is a mixed bag, and as you get 

into it further, maybe even more mixed. 

So, I look upon this hearing, once again, sort of, as a metric of 

its own. We, sort of, understand what’s been going on for several 

years, but how unsatisfying this is, really, to all the parties that 

are involved, and how fragile the situation may still be with regard 

to the Pakistani Government, vis-a-vis Afghanistan—I hope not 

vis-a-vis our relationship with them. I think that certainly there 

has been an outgoing mission by our military people, and many of 

50 

us have visited with Admiral Mullen and others who have spent 

some quality time there trying to understand, from the military 

standpoint, their military. Now, not much has been said, and that’s 

why I, finally, conclude with that thought, about the Pakistani 

military today. We’ve discussed the two elements of the new government, the problems of General Musharraf fitting into all this, 

while the judges will come and go. What is sort of, lost track of, 

right now, is: Where does the military fit into all of this? Have they 

become more efficient? Are they better in touch with us in that 

kind of communication, as opposed to through the central government? And I ask you, Do you have any preliminary thoughts, as 

you’ve examined it, as to the efficacy of the efforts of the military 

of Pakistan now? How aggressive are they likely to be? How aggressive will they be permitted to be? Even if they were aggressive, 

do they know how to do the job? This has been a tough job for them 

to do, historically. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes; most of our focus on that area has been in 

looking at DOD’s own assessments of the Pakistani military, and 

their view that they could use some counterinsurgency training to 

better deal with the situation and to broaden their range of skills 

beyond traditional military warfare. 

Senator LUGAR. Indeed, they could. But, is there any propensity 

whatsoever on the part of those folks to want to undertake this 

training or to work with us to obtain those skills? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes; I’m just not sure, and that’s the issue, Senator. 

Senator LUGAR. So, once again, we’re—— 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. We’re in a position of encouraging 

people to do the right thing, but this is a sovereign country, these 

are people dealing with whoever is in their land, and saying, above 

all, ‘‘This is our border, this is us.’’ And, you know, the question, 

diplomatically, both with the military, as well as the civilian assistance, is really of the essence, how effective our Government can be, 

whether it’s the President of the United States or the Secretary of 

State or Defense or the Joint Chiefs, because somebody really will 

have to come into some rapport with them here, or I fear we will 

examine, again and again, results that are less than satisfying, of 

people that don’t necessarily share our means, or maybe even our 

training. 

Mr. DODARO. I agree completely with your assessment. And 

that’s why we think that, if you have a comprehensive approach, 

at least among the U.S. Government, then you’re in a position to 

have that dialogue with the—— 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. New Pakistani—— 

Senator LUGAR. It’s a measure—— 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. Government—— 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Of at least what we want. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. And try to reach and use all the potential tools we have, which is even more important, given the fact 

that we’re dealing with a sovereign nation. 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Well, thank you very much. 

51 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. As always, I appreciate your overarching view of the matter. 

I just am concerned that, if we are going to spend billions more, 

that we have to have, even with a sovereign country, some understanding of what it is that we are spending billions on. 

Senator LUGAR. A plan. 

Senator MENENDEZ. A plan that we can at least move to mutually agree. 

Senator Coleman, is there anything else you would like? 

Senator COLEMAN. No, thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, with that, on behalf of Senator Kerry, 

thank you for your testimony. 

The record will be—remain open for 2 days. There may be other 

questions submitted by members. If there are, we ask you to answer them expeditiously. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Your full statement will be in the record. We 

thank you for your service. 

And, with that, the committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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