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47–097 PDF 2009

EXAMINING WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND VIOLENCE

AGAINST LABOR UNION LEADERS IN COLOMBIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND LABOR

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 12, 2009

Serial No. 111–1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, Vice Chairman 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, Virginia 

Lynn C. Woolsey, California 

Rube ́n Hinojosa, Texas 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Susan A. Davis, California 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Timothy H. Bishop, New York 

Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania 

David Loebsack, Iowa 

Mazie Hirono, Hawaii 

Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania 

Phil Hare, Illinois 

Yvette D. Clarke, New York 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio 

Jared Polis, Colorado 

Paul Tonko, New York 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,

Northern Mariana Islands 

Dina Titus, Nevada 

[Vacant] 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California, 

Senior Republican Member 

Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin 

Peter Hoekstra, Michigan 

Michael N. Castle, Delaware 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan 

Judy Biggert, Illinois 

Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

John Kline, Minnesota 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Tom Price, Georgia 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

Brett Guthrie, Kentucky 

Bill Cassidy, Louisiana 

Tom McClintock, California 

Duncan Hunter, California 

David P. Roe, Tennessee 

Glenn Thompson, Pennsylvania

Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director 

Sally Stroup, Republican Staff Director 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Hearing held on February 12, 2009 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of Members: 

Altmire, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Pennsylvania, prepared statement of .......................................................... 71

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ Senior Republican Member, Committee 

on Education and Labor ............................................................................... 5

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 6

Article, the Washington Post, April 19, 2008, ‘‘Colombia’s Case: The 

Intellectual Poverty of a Free-Trade Deal’s Opponents’’ .................... 63

Miller, Hon. George, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor ......... 1

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Additional submissions: 

Documents submitted by Colombian Ambassador Carolina Barco, 

dated February 12, 2009, Internet address to ............................. 7

AFL–CIO letter and fact sheet, dated February 2009, ‘‘Colombia: 

Continued Violence, Impunity, Flawed Labor Laws and NonEnforcement of the Law Eclipse the Colombian Government’s 

Few Accomplishments’’ .................................................................. 71

Letter, dated November 5, 2008, from the Colombian Embassy .... 78

Letter, dated September 12, 2008, sent to Colombian President 

Alvaro Uribe Ve ́lez ......................................................................... 98

Letter, dated November 20, 2008, from Human Rights Watch ...... 107

Letter, dated February 10, 2009, from Gustavo Gallo ́n Giraldo, 

et al .................................................................................................. 110

Statement of Witnesses: 

Morales, Yessika Hoyos ................................................................................... 22

Prepared statement of (English) .............................................................. 24

Prepared statement of (Spanish) ............................................................. 26

Roberts, James M., research fellow for economic freedom and growth, 

Center for International Trade and Economics, the Heritage Foundation ................................................................................................................. 40

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 42

Sa ́nchez, Jose ́ Nirio, former Colombian judge in special court for laborhomicide cases ............................................................................................... 27

Prepared statement of (English) .............................................................. 29

Prepared statement of (Spanish) ............................................................. 30

Sa ́nchez-Moreno, Maria McFarland, Esq., senior Americas researcher, 

Human Rights Watch ................................................................................... 32

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 33

Additional submission: ‘‘Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for 

Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia,’’ Human Rights Watch, October 

2008, Internet address to ...................................................................... 40

Va ́squez, Jose ́ Luciano Sanin, Director of the Escuela Nacional Sindical 

(‘‘National Labor School’’) of Colombia ........................................................ 8

Prepared statement of (English) .............................................................. 10

Prepared statement of (Spanish) ............................................................. 16

(1)

EXAMINING WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND

VIOLENCE AGAINST LABOR UNION 

LEADERS IN COLOMBIA 

Thursday, February 12, 2009

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Education and Labor 

Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George Miller [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Miller, Kildee, Payne, Andrews, Woolsey, Kucinich, Wu, 

Davis, Grijalva, Sestak, Hirono, Hare,Courtney, Shea-Porter, 

Fudge, Polis, Sablan, Titus, McKeon, Souder, Platts, Guthrie, 

Cassidy, and Roe. 

Staff present: Paulette Acevedo, Legislative Fellow, Education; 

Aaron Albright, Press Secretary; Tylease Alli, Hearing Clerk; Tico 

Almeida, Labor Counsel (Immigration and International Trade); 

Chris Brown, Labor Policy Advisor; Jody Calemine, Labor Policy 

Deputy Director; Lynn Dondis, Policy Counsel, Subcommittee on 

Workforce Protections; Adrienne Dunbar, Education Policy Advisor; 

David Hartzler, Systems Administrator; Lloyd Horwich, Policy Advisor, Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary and Secretary 

Education; Jessica Kahanek, Press Assistant; Sara Lonardo, Junior 

Legislative Associate, Labor; Ricardo Martinez, Policy Advisor, 

Subcommittee on Higher Education, Lifelong Learning and Competitiveness; Alex Nock, Deputy Staff Director; Joe Novotny, Chief 

Clerk; Rachel Racusen, Communications Director; Meredith 

Regine, Junior Legislative Associate, Labor; Melissa Salmanowitz, 

Press Secretary; Michele Varnhagen, Labor Policy Director; Mark 

Zuckerman, Staff Director; Robert Borden, Minority General Counsel; Cameron Coursen, Minority Assistant Communications Director; Ed Gilroy, Minority Director of Workforce Policy; Rob Gregg, 

Minority Senior Legislative Assistant; Richard Hoar, Minority Professional Staff Member; Alexa Marrero, Minority Communications 

Director; Jim Paretti, Minority Workforce Policy Counsel; Molly 

McLaughlin Salmi, Minority Deputy Director of Workforce Policy; 

and Linda Stevens, Minority Chief Clerk/Assistant to the General 

Counsel. 

Chairman MILLER [presiding]. The Committee on Education and 

Labor will come to order for the purposes of conducting the hearing 

on examining worker rights and violence against labor union leaders in Colombia. This is an important hearing for a number of rea-
2

sons. And I want to thank the members of the committee for participating. 

And certainly, I want to thank our witnesses for participating. It 

is my understanding that this hearing—we will be using translators for our witnesses. It is my understanding that when we 

speak, there will be simultaneous translation so our witnesses will 

understand what we are saying. 

When the witnesses are speaking, the translators will then 

translate to us. So this is going to take a little more time than a 

usual hearing with the witnesses, but we want to provide sufficient 

time so the witnesses can properly give us the information that 

they have traveled this distance to do so. 

I would like to begin by recognizing myself for the purposes of 

an opening statement. And then I will recognize Congressman 

McKeon for his opening statement. 

Today this committee meets to examine whether ongoing violence 

and weak labor protections are impeding the ability of Colombian 

workers to exercise their fundamental human rights. Sadly, Colombia has been the most dangerous place in the world to belong to 

a labor union for the past two decades. In some recent years, there 

have been more labor killings in Colombia than in the rest of the 

world combined. 

According to the National Labor School, a leading Colombian 

think-tank, almost 2,700 trade union members have been killed in 

Colombia over approximately the past 20 years. And, the number 

of labor union members killed last year jumped by more than 25 

percent over the 2007 levels. It remains difficult to know who is responsible for most of these deaths because so few cases have been 

investigated, let alone prosecuted. 

The Colombian Commission of Jurists tells us that the impunity 

rate for these crimes still remains at a staggering 96 percent. At 

Colombia’s current pace of investigations and indictments, it would 

take several decades to get through the backlog. This means that 

thousands of killers continue to escape justice. 

We will hear testimony today that many labor killings have been 

perpetrated by rightwing paramilitary death squads, whose leaders 

have acknowledged targeting union leaders. According to reports, 

many of the killings have been carried out by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC. Although the right-wing paramilitary group was officially disbanded a few years ago, the demobilization process may have been unsuccessful. 

Some former AUC paramilitary fighters appear to be now operating within organized criminal gangs. When I was in Colombia 

last year, union leaders told me they were increasingly receiving 

death threats from a new deadly gang called the Black Eagles. 

Another possible explanation for the rising violence is the disturbing phenomenon of extrajudicial killings. This is where innocent civilians are murdered by Colombian armed forces and inappropriately classified as casualties of war. These so-called false 

positives, the deaths of these individuals, have taken the lives of 

thousands of Colombian citizens, including union members. 

We will hear testimony today of a case where the Colombian 

Army killed three unarmed labor union leaders and then altered 
3

the crime scene in order to make it look like the victims had engaged in an armed conflict. 

There is concern that some anti-labor violence stems from decisions by the Colombian business and political leaders. For instance, 

paramilitary leaders have admitted accepting money from a broad 

array of Colombian and multinational corporations. And President 

Uribe’s former director of national intelligence has been accused of 

turning over hit lists to right-wing paramilitaries containing the 

names of union leaders under government protection. 

While Colombian prosecutors have made some modest progress 

very recently in securing some convictions in these labor-homicide 

cases, important questions still remain. First, do these investigations and convictions actually find out the truth behind the murders? We will hear testimony today that prosecutors often accept 

motives without investigating the real underlying motive. 

And, prosecutors too often investigate with preconceived and incorrect theories of the case. One young woman who is testifying 

today intervened in her deceased father’s investigation. She will 

tell us that her intervention was because prosecutors were advancing a false theory that her father’s death was a result of a crime 

of passion stemming from an adulterous affair. Indeed, ongoing 

complaints about the publication of inaccurate motives has led the 

Colombian attorney general’s office to stop issuing public reports 

regarding motives in these cases. 

Second, are prosecutors conducting thorough and systematic investigations aimed at holding all those who are responsible for both 

the planning and executing the labor killings? Some legal observers 

say that prosecutors are shortchanging investigations only after securing convictions of the material author of the crime. The material 

author is likely to be a low-level person who pulled the trigger and 

not one of the intellectual authors who either ordered, planned or 

paid for the killing of that individual. 

Finally, today’s hearing will inquire about additional obstacles 

that prevent the Colombian workers from exercising their fundamental rights. The International Labor Organization has identified 

significant areas where Colombia’s labor laws are non-compliant 

with the core international labor standards. 

By raising these questions today, I hope that we can begin to 

find solutions to ensure that the backlog of murders are finally adjudicated and that Colombian workers have basic labor rights to 

which all workers should be entitled and should be able to exercise 

without fear of violence against them and/or their families or their 

organization. 

Thank you very much. And I would like now to recognize Congressman McKeon, the senior Republican on the committee for the 

purposes of his opening statement. 

[The statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. George Miller, Chairman, Committee on 

Education and Labor 

Today this committee meets to examine whether ongoing violence and weak labor 

protections are impeding the ability of Colombian workers to exercise their fundamental human rights. 
4

Sadly, Colombia has been the most dangerous place in the world to belong to a 

labor union for the last two decades. In some recent years, there have been more 

labor killings in Colombia than in all of the other nations of the world combined. 

According to the National Labor School, a leading Colombian think-tank, almost 

2,700 trade union members have been killed in Colombia over the past twenty 

years. And, the number of labor union members killed last year jumped by more 

than 25 percent over 2007 levels. 

It remains difficult to know who is responsible for most of these deaths because 

so few cases have been investigated, let alone prosecuted. 

The Colombian Commission of Jurists tells us that the impunity rate for these 

crimes still remains at a staggering 96 percent. 

At Colombia’s current pace of investigations and indictments, it would take several decades to get through the backlog. 

This means that thousands of killers continue to escape justice. 

We will hear testimony today that many labor killings have been perpetrated by 

right-wing paramilitary death squads, whose leaders have acknowledged targeting 

union leaders. 

According to reports, many of these killings have been carried out by the United 

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia—or A.U.C. Although the right-wing paramilitary 

group was supposedly disbanded a few years ago, the demobilization process appears to be unsuccessful. 

Some former A.U.C. paramilitary fighters appear to be now operating within organized criminal gangs. 

When I was in Colombia last year, union leaders told me they are increasingly 

receiving death threats from a new deadly gang called the ‘‘Black Eagles.’’

Another possible explanation for the rising violence is the disturbing phenomenon 

of extrajudicial killings. This is where innocent civilians murdered by the Colombian 

Armed Forces are inappropriately classified as casualties of war. 

These ‘‘false positives’’ have taken the lives of thousands of Colombian citizens, 

including union members. We will hear testimony today of a case where the Colombian Army killed three unarmed labor union leaders and then altered the crime 

scene in order to make it look like the victims had engaged in armed conflict. 

There is concern that some anti-labor violence stems from decisions made by Colombian business and political leaders. 

For instance, paramilitary leaders have admitted accepting money from a broad 

array of Colombian and multinational corporations. 

And, President Uribe’s former director of national intelligence has been accused 

of turning over ‘hit lists’ to right-wing paramilitaries containing the names of union 

leaders under government protection. 

While Colombian prosecutors have made some modest progress very recently in 

securing some convictions in these labor-homicide cases, important questions still 

remain. 

First, do these investigations and convictions actually find out the truth behind 

the murders? 

We will hear testimony today that prosecutors often accept motives without investigating the real underlying motive. 

And, prosecutors too often investigate with pre-conceived and incorrect theories of 

the case. 

One young woman, who is testifying today, intervened in her deceased father’s investigation. She will tell us that her intervention was because prosecutors were advancing a false theory that her father’s death was a result of a ‘‘crime of passion’’ 

stemming from an adulterous affair. 

Indeed, ongoing complaints about the publication of inaccurate motives has led 

the Colombian Attorney General’s Office to stop issuing public reports regarding motives in these cases. 

Second, are prosecutors conducting thorough and systematic investigations aimed 

at holding all those who are responsible for both the planning and executing the 

labor killings? 

Some legal observers say that prosecutors are shortchanging investigations after 

only securing convictions against the ‘‘material author’’ of the crime. The material 

author is likely to be the low-level person who pulled the trigger and not one of the 

‘‘intellectual authors’’ who either ordered, planned or paid for the killing. 

Finally, today’s hearing will inquire about additional obstacles that prevent Colombian workers from exercising their fundamental rights. The International Labor 

Organization has identified significant areas where Colombia’s labor laws are noncompliant with core international labor standards. 
5

By raising these questions today, I hope that we can begin to find solutions to 

ensure that the backlog of murders are fully adjudicated and that Colombian workers have basic labor rights to which all workers should be entitled. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are here today for 

the first hearing of the Education and Labor Committee in the 

111th Congress. Last week we learned that nearly 600,000 Americans lost their jobs in the month of January. About 3.6 million jobs 

have been lost since the recession began just over a year ago. Stock 

values are down, and with them the value of millions of workers’ 

retirement savings. 

I could go on about the grim economic circumstances before us, 

but I think we are all well-aware of the challenges we face and particularly the impact on the American workforce. Any of these challenges would seem an appropriate topic for the first hearing of this 

panel. 

Unfortunately, we are not here to examine our nation’s dire economic straits today. Instead the majority has decided the first 

order of business for this committee, the committee that oversees 

job training and retirement security and health care is an examination of the circumstance of workers in Colombia. 

Don’t get me wrong. I am troubled by the reports of the violence 

in Colombia. And I personally believe that one of the best things 

we can do to stem the violence and improve conditions in that 

country would be to enact the stalled Colombia free trade agreement. 

But here in this room where we have a responsibility to look out 

for the concerns of the American workers, American students and 

American families, I find it baffling that we are setting those issues 

aside to look at the situation facing workers in a foreign country. 

Certainly, this Congress has a role to play in protecting human 

rights around the world. And to that end, we have an entire committee dedicated to foreign affairs. 

To the witnesses who are here today, I do want to thank you for 

joining us. While I clearly believe we should be focused on issues 

impacting American workers, I know that you have compelling stories to share and insights to offer. As long as we are here to examine this topic, perhaps we can expand the scope of the discussion 

to reflect the need for free trade to help put an end to the unacceptable pattern of violence in the nation of Colombia. 

I would also like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that Ambassador 

Barco is here from Colombia. I think she should be recognized. I 

hope as we continue to work on this issue, if we are going to do 

that, it would be good to let her have a chance to state perhaps the 

other side of the issue. It is unfortunate that we can’t have her testifying here today. 

Once again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I hope 

the next time this panel gathers the topic will hit a little bit closer 

to home. I think we owe that to the 600,000 workers who lost their 

jobs last month. 

And I yield back. 

[The statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]
6

Prepared Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, Senior Republican 

Member, Committee on Education and Labor 

Thank you. We’re here today for the first hearing of the Education and Labor 

Committee in the 111th Congress. Last week, we learned that nearly 600,000 Americans lost their jobs in the month of January. About 3.6 million jobs have been lost 

since the recession began just over a year ago. Stock values are down, and with 

them, the value of millions of workers’ retirement savings. 

I could go on about the grim economic circumstances before us, but I think we’re 

all well aware of the challenges we face, and particularly the impact on the American workforce. 

Any of these challenges would seem an appropriate topic for the first hearing of 

this panel. Unfortunately, we’re not here to examine our nation’s dire economic 

straits today. Instead, the majority has decided that the first order of business for 

this committee—the committee that oversees job training and retirement security 

and health care—is an examination of the circumstances of workers in Colombia. 

Don’t get me wrong. I am troubled by reports of the violence in Colombia, and 

I personally believe that one of the best things we can do to stem the violence and 

improve conditions in that country would be to enact to the stalled Colombia free 

trade agreement. 

But here in this room, where we have a responsibility to look out for the concerns 

of American workers, American students, and American families, I find it baffling 

that we’re setting those issues aside to look at the situation facing workers in a foreign country. 

Certainly, this Congress has a role to play in protecting human rights around the 

world. And to that end, we have an entire committee dedicated to foreign affairs. 

To the witnesses who are here today, I do want to thank you for joining us. While 

I clearly believe we should be focused on issues impacting American workers, I 

know that you have compelling stories to share and insight to offer. As long as we’re 

here to examine this topic, perhaps we can expand the scope of the discussion to 

reflect the need for free trade to help put an end to the unacceptable pattern of violence in the nation of Colombia. 

Once again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I hope that the 

next time this panel gathers, the topic will hit a little bit closer to home. I think 

we owe that to the 600,000 workers who lost their jobs last month. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. I thank the gentleman for his statement. He 

will get an opportunity to help those 600,000 workers later today 

on the floor when we vote on the Economic Recovery Act that extends their unemployment benefit, extends their food stamp benefit, extends their health care benefits. So we will get an opportunity to do that later today. 

I, too, want to recognize Ambassador Barco. She has sent, on behalf of the Colombian government, transmittal to us providing us 

additional information of documents that have been prepared by 

the government on this continuing issue. 

This is not a minor issue between these two countries. And it is 

not a minor issue with respect to the free trade agreement. I am 

trying to have these hearings outside of the consideration of the 

free trade agreement so we can develop an answer to the questions 

that are being raised by people across our country about this issue 

and whether or not American workers are going to be required to 

compete with people that when they try to organize a workplace, 

the army shows up to put an end to it. So this is fundamental to 

wages in this country and to protections in this country. 

So without objection, I would ask that the documents submitted 

by Ambassador Barco be included in the record of this hearing. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The information provided by the Colombian Government may be 

accessed at the following Internet address:]
7

http://colombiaemb.org/docs/labor%20documents/

embassy%20of%20colombia%20material%20on%20labor%20february%202009.pdf 

Chairman MILLER. I would also say that Ambassador Barco has 

been very helpful to this committee, to me, both when I traveled 

to Colombia and in following up on questions that we have submitted to various agencies of the Colombian government with respect to this issue. She has worked very hard to get us responses 

and to go back and get us more comprehensive responses when we 

weren’t satisfied with the first ones. So I want to thank her for her 

service. And I would like to recognize her. 

Ambassador Barco, please—thank you very much. 

And with that, for those who just came in, we will be allowing 

our witnesses some additional time because of the need for translations. And we have discussed this with the minority, and both 

sides have agreed to it. 

With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses today. Several 

of them have traveled all the way from Colombia. And we are very 

grateful for their willingness to come here and to share their perspectives and opinions. 

We are aware that some of our witnesses may be taking on substantial personal risk by being here today. Far too many times, 

senior government officials in Colombia have made statements stigmatizing legitimate human rights work, labor union advocacy and 

criticism of the government’s policy as somehow a cover for the 

FARC guerilla activities. 

Such comments were made publicly just this past weekend about 

those Colombians who travel abroad to discuss current human 

rights situations. Given that those unfortunate comments have 

been made just days prior to the travel of the witnesses we have 

invited here today, I must state that I trust and hope that the Colombian government will treat our witnesses at today’s hearings respectfully and will refrain from making similar accusations against 

them. 

I would like to begin by introducing Jose Luciano Sanin, who is 

the professor of constitutional law and director of the National 

Labor School, a research organization based in Medellin, Colombia. 

Mr. Sanin is executive director since 2006. And prior to that, he 

was the organization’s academic director. He has written extensively on a broad range of topics, including the Colombian constitutional court, political and human rights and the core labor standards set out by the International Labor Organization. 

Our next witness will be Yessika Hoyos from Bogota, Colombia, 

where she recently graduated from law school and now works on 

human rights cases at a nonprofit law firm. Ms. Hoyos comes to 

this work after having personally experienced the loss of her father 

to anti-union violence. She is a founding member of the organization called Sons and Daughters Against Impunity, which advocates 

for justice to be done in uninvestigated and untried cases currently 

pending in the Colombian judicial system. 

Judge Jose Nirio Sanchez was a distinguished Colombian judge 

for 35 years. And during that time, he received commendations 

from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency for his work to help bring 

Pablo Escobar to justice. Judge Sanchez is among the original set 
8

of three judges appointed in 2007 to serve on a special court designed to address the backlog of labor-homicide cases. 

After only 6 months on that special court, Judge Sanchez was 

unexpectedly removed by a very narrowly split vote of a judicial 

committee. To my knowledge, nobody has offered any meaningful 

explanation for his removal, though I do note that the Colombian 

vice president wrote me and stated that Judge Sanchez was an excellent judge. Given that high recommendation,I am glad that Mr. 

Sanchez has agreed to share the lessons learned from his time adjudicating labor-homicide cases with the committee today. 

Maria McFarland is a senior America’s researcher for Human 

Rights Watch where she covers Latin America and serves as the 

organization’s primary expert on Colombia’s ongoing internal 

armed conflict. Ms. McFarland has traveled extensively throughout 

Colombia and has researched and written several major publications on that topic. She has also testified before the U.S. Congress 

and the Canadian Parliament and is a frequent voice in the media 

on Colombia-related issues. 

Our final witness will be James M. Roberts, who is a research 

fellow in economic freedom and growth at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for International Trade and Economics. He previously 

served the U.S. State Department as a foreign service officer for 25 

years and coordinated various U.S. assistance programs. Mr. Roberts holds a master’s degree in international and developmental economics from Yale University, an MBA from the University of 

Pittsburgh and a bachelor’s degree in international affairs from Lafayette College in Eastern Pennsylvania. 

Welcome to all of our witnesses. And again, we will provide sufficient time so that you can properly lay out the concerns that you 

want this committee to hear. 

And, Mr. Sanin, we are going to begin with you. And you are 

going to have to figure out how you share the microphone with 

your interpreter. 

STATEMENT OF JOSE ́ LUCIANO SANIN VA ́ SQUEZ, DIRECTOR, 

ESCUELA NACIONAL SINDICAL, MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA 

Mr. SANIN [speaking Spanish]. 

TRANSLATOR. I will be doing the interpretation when he finishes. 

Chairman MILLER. Why don’t you cut it into thirds, if you might? 

Thank you. Don’t worry about it. We will get through this. 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. Colombia is in the midst of a 

very serious and unique situation of hostility towards the exercise 

of labor union rights and freedom of association. A few statistics 

are sufficient to demonstrate this fact. 

And first, I am going to talk about violence against labor unions 

in Colombia and impunity as well. Approximately 1 union worker 

has been murdered every 3 days over the past 23 years, which 

translates into 2,694 murders between the first of January of 1986 

and December 31, 2008. 

After a reduction of 60 percent in the rate of homicides between 

the years 2003 and 2007, in 2008——

Chairman MILLER. We are going to need you to speak right into 

the microphone. I don’t know if you need an adjustment. Thank 

you. 
9

TRANSLATOR. Sorry about that. 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. In 2008 we had a serious increase of 25 percent, going from 39 homicides in 2007 to 49 in 

2008. Sixteen of those murdered were union leaders. And as far as 

we have gotten this year, we already have three cases of homicides 

and 14 death threats. 

Every year more than 60 percent of union members that are 

murdered throughout the world are Colombians. The rate of union 

murders in Colombia is five times greater than that of any other 

place in the world, including those dictatorial regimes that don’t 

allow unionization. 

Union workers in Colombia have been the victims of 9,911 violent acts in the last 23 years. In addition to the murders, 231 union 

members were the victims of attempted murder. One hundred and 

ninety-three were victims of forced disappearance. Four thousand, 

two hundred were threatened with death. And here in my hands 

I have the copies of 70 threats that were issued against union 

members in 2008. 

Thirty-five percent of these acts of violence have occurred under 

the government of President Alvaro Uribe. And 482 of the assassinations have occurred during his government. 

Of the 2,694 union members that have been murdered in the last 

23 years, the attorney general’s office informs us that it is investigating 1,104, which means that 60 percent of these cases either 

do not exist or we are not told about the existence of any criminal 

investigations that are underway. Additionally, only about 90 of 

the murdered union members have had cases successfully prosecuted against their murderers. This means that close to 96 percent of these murders remain unsolved and in impunity. 

These court decrees do not allow us to see the truth behind the 

facts because they punish only the material authors of these crimes 

and not their intellectual authors. The investigation is done case by 

case without a global strategy for investigating them. The union 

movement has been insistent in demanding an investigation of all 

cases and in proposing changes to the method of investigation that 

is currently being used. 

At the current rate of sentencing, justice will take approximately 

37 years to overcome impunity. And that is under the assumption 

that no more murders occur from today on and that the special investigation and prosecutions unit is maintained. 

These numbers contradict what the Colombian government is 

telling the world, that anti-union violence and impunity are problems that have been overcome. Quite the contrary. The measures 

adopted are insufficient and inadequate because they have not 

been able to break the structural and historic anti-union violence 

in the country. 

And I am going to give you some more numbers that have to do 

with the limitations and violations of workers’ rights. In Colombia 

we have an institutional design and a governmental practice and 

business practice that goes against union freedom. One of these situations is made clear by the following numbers. 

First of all, I am going to talk about the obstacles to unionization. There are 18,749,836 workers in Colombia, out of whom less 

than 3 million have the right to associate in a union because the 
10

law establishes that this can be done only by those workers who 

are related through work contracts. That means that only four out 

of every 100 workers are currently affiliated to a union in Colombia. 

Chairman MILLER. If you can ask that Mr. Sanin, if you might, 

start to wrap up his testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. The ministry of social protection 

between 2002 and 2007 denied the registration of 253 new unions. 

This situation was reported several times to the Committee on 

Freedom to Unionize at the ILO, which produced various recommendations for these acts, arbitrary acts of the state to stop the 

creation and working of these unions. 

These acts began to diminish, thanks, not to the government, but 

because the constitutional court issued several decrees according to 

which the ministry of social protection is not authorized to deny 

the registration of these unions. This is partial progress to end the 

agreements under the ILO. But it requires legal regulation that 

will eliminate the obstacles and conflicts that persist today. 

Finally, I just want to talk about how this has affected the working cooperatives in Colombia. And this is a new model of labor relations that means very low costs and no workers’ rights. And it is 

absolutely unsustainable. 

Recently there was a new law issued, but that ignores the recommendations that were made by ILO because it does not recognize those who are associated under these labor cooperatives. And 

it doesn’t recognize their rights of association, negotiation or to 

strike and also does not give it sufficient measures to ensure that 

this is not used as a way to cheat on labor rights and to put at 

risk the conditions, the working conditions of Colombian workers. 

And I will be giving you an annex document with more details. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Sanin follows:]

Prepared Statement of Jose ́ Luciano Sanin Va ́ squez, Director of the 

Escuela Nacional Sindical (‘‘National Labor School’’) of Colombia (English) 

Colombia is in the midst of a very serious and unique situation of hostility towards the exercise of labor union rights and freedom of association. A few statistics 

are sufficient to demonstrate this fact: 

1. Violence against labor unions in Colombia 

One union worker has been murdered approximately every three days over the 

past 23 years, which translates into 2,694 murder victims between the first of January of 1986 and December 31, 2008. 

Despite the great emphasis the current administration is placing on security, after 

a few years of declining murder rates, violence against labor unions showed a steep 

increase in 2008 of 25%, going from 39 murders in 2007 to 49 in 2008. In addition, 

it is very serious that in 2008, the number of murdered labor union leaders was 16, 

compared to 10 murdered in all of 2007. 

More than 60% of the all murdered unionists in the world are Colombians. The 

murder rate of unionists in Colombia is five times that of the rest of the countries 

of the world, including those countries with dictatorships that have banned union 

activity. 

Violence against the union movement in the last 23 years has included 9,911 acts, 

in violation of the right to life, integrity and freedom of union members, one act of 

violence everyday. The highlights of these acts include 231 assaults on union leaders 

and 193 cases of forced disappearance. At least 4,200 unionists have received death 

threats because of their union activity, and 1,478 have been forced to leave their 

homes.
11

VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF

UNIONISTS IN COLOMBIA 

[January 1, 1986 to December 31, 2008] 

Type of Violation Number of Cases Percentage 

ILLEGAL HOUSE SEARCH .......................................................................................................... 43 0.4

THREATS ................................................................................................................................... 4,200 42.4

ASSAULT WITH OR WITHOUT INJURY ........................................................................................ 231 2.3

DISAPPEARANCE ....................................................................................................................... 193 1.9

FORCED DISPLACEMENT .......................................................................................................... 1,478 14.9

ARBITRARY ARREST ................................................................................................................. 587 5.9

MURDER OF A FAMILY MEMBER .............................................................................................. 3 0.0

MURDERS ................................................................................................................................. 2,694 27.2

HARASSMENT ........................................................................................................................... 246 2.5

OTHERS .................................................................................................................................... 2 0.0

KIDNAPPING .............................................................................................................................. 161 1.6

TORTURE .................................................................................................................................. 73 0.7

Total ........................................................................................................................... 9,911 100

Of the 9,911 violations perpetrated against the life, liberty and physical integrity 

of unionists in Colombia between January 1, 1986 and December 31, 2008, 3,470, 

equaling 35%, have occurred during the administration of the current president of 

Colombia, Alvaro Uribe Ve ́lez. 

Of the 2,694 murders of unionists in Colombia during that same historical period, 

482, equaling 18%, have occurred during this administration. These figures contradict the administration’s assurances to the international community that the 

problem of violence against labor unions has been overcome, and the government 

has it under control.

VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF

UNIONISTS IN COLOMBIA 

[August 7, 2002 to December 31, 2008] 

Type of Violation Number of Cases Percentage 

ILLEGAL HOUSE SEARCH .......................................................................................................... 23 0.7

THREATS ................................................................................................................................... 2,083 60.0

ASSAULT WITH OR WITHOUT INJURY ........................................................................................ 65 1.9

DISAPPEARANCE ....................................................................................................................... 30 0.9

FORCED DISPLACEMENT .......................................................................................................... 316 9.1

ARBITRARY ARREST ................................................................................................................. 254 7.3

MURDERS ................................................................................................................................. 482 13.9

HARASSMENT ........................................................................................................................... 175 5.0

KIDNAPPING .............................................................................................................................. 29 0.8

TORTURE .................................................................................................................................. 13 0.4

Total ........................................................................................................................... 3,470 100

The structural factors that have made violence against labor unions possible are 

still in place. The increase in murders in 2008 is an indication of that fact, as are 

the security plans that more than 1,500 union leaders still have in place. 

The most worrisome fact is the political exclusion of the labor union movement, 

which has created widespread anti-union sentiment, fostered and exacerbated by an 

increasingly common and recurring practice on the part of the President of the Republic and high-level government officials, who make statements that undermine 

the legitimacy of labor unions by linking them to guerilla groups, or justifying the 

violence against labor unions as violence between the armed parties to the conflict, 

thereby, suggesting that labor unions are one of these groups. 

The ILO has referred to this situation for several years. Recently, at the 97th 

Conference (June of 2008), the Committee on the Application of Standards stated: 

‘‘(* * *) the Committee expressed its concern over an increase in violent acts 

against trade unionists in the first half of 2008. In view of the commitments made 

by the Government and referred to above, the Committee urged it to take further 

steps to reinforce the available protective measures * * * All of these steps were 
12

essential elements to ensure that the trade union movement might finally develop 

and flourish in a climate that was free from violence (* * *)’’

2. Impunity of murders of unionists 

The investigation and prosecution of crimes against labor unionists was an obligation of the Colombian government that had been forgotten. The Subdivision of the 

Public Prosecutor and the judges specializing in this area constitute the government’s first effort to respond to the critical situation of human rights and violence 

against the labor union movement. 

However, 2,694 unionists have been murdered in the past 23 years, and the Subdivision of Investigation has only recognized the existence of 1,302 cases to be prosecuted, and has only been able to physically locate the case files of 1,104, which 

means that 60% of the cases do not exist, or are not the subject of any reported 

on-going criminal investigation. 

The reports issued by the Public Prosecutor led to the conclusion that there are 

no important results in terms of moving forward with the criminal investigations. 

According to the January 2009 report of the Public Prosecutor, with regard to the 

1,104 cases they are investigating, 654 cases (59.23%) are in preliminary stages. 

That means that in more than half the cases, no suspect has been identified. Two 

hundred and eight cases (18.84%) are in the preliminary investigation stage, which 

is the stage in which a formal investigation of an identified suspect is carried out. 

In 91 cases (8.24%), the Public Prosecutor has filed charges before the judges. 

With regard to the total of 1,104 cases under investigation, the number of convictions was 120. This means that only 10.86% of the cases have made progress in determining the responsibility of the perpetrators of crimes against labor unionists. 

With regard to the 185 prioritized cases, the number of convictions covered only 

31 victims. That is, with regard to the total number of prioritized cases, there have 

been convictions in only 16.75% of the victims’ cases. 

There have been convictions in just 90 cases of murdered unionists. Presuming 

that there is some progress in terms of impunity for these victims, the percentage 

of those whose cases remain in impunity is 96.7% of the crimes. According to the 

January 2009 report, without access to all the information provided in July of 2008, 

but rather just on the basis of the numbers of convictions by judges, and assuming 

that each conviction represents one victim, impunity remains at nearly 96%. 

Calculating the monthly average output of the judges, between September and 

December of 2007, an average of 11 convictions were issued per month. This same 

monthly calculation for all of 2008 and January of 2009 yields 5.9 convictions per 

month. We can conclude from this quantitative analysis of the work of the subdivision and the judges, that at the rate of 70 convictions handed down annually by 

the country’s judges and the ILO sentencing judges, each one representing one labor 

unionist victim, it would take the justice system around 37 years to overcome the 

prevailing impunity, presuming no more murders occur starting today, and the continued existence of the special investigation and prosecution division. 

With regard to the convictions handed down, the following matters are cause for 

grave concern: 

1. The convictions have primarily identified the material authors and their intentions. In the majority of cases, the chain of responsibility of those responsible has 

not been established. 

2. In the majority of the convictions, no reference is made to the personal context 

of the victim, or the union affiliation, or regional context, in which the violence 

against labor unions occurred. 

3. Investigations are carried out on a case-by-case basis, with no comprehensive 

investigational strategy for cases that are clearly systematic, deliberate and selective, as are the cases of violence against labor unions. The labor union movement 

has consistently proposed changes to the methods of investigation used. Given that 

nearly 75% of the violence against labor unions has been committed against 30 labor 

union organizations in 6 departments of the country, the investigations should be 

re-organized. 

4. The investigations fail to identify all the crimes committed and, therefore, the 

convictions fail to punish the perpetrators for all of them. In multiple convictions, 

for example, torture and forced disappearance are not punished, and the perpetrators are sentenced for the murder only. This leaves acts that constitute violence 

against labor unionists in impunity. 

5. There are only convictions at the level of second instance in five cases. That 

means that of the 108 convictions counted as of July of 2008, 103 could still be reversed by means of appeals the convicted persons may file, and they could, therefore, ultimately be acquitted. 
13

On several occasions, the ILO has referred to the matter of impunity. Recently, 

during the 97th Conference, June 2008, the Committee on the Application of Standards stated: ‘‘(* * *) the Committee urged it (. * * *) to render more efficient and 

expedient the investigations of murders of trade unionists and the identification of 

all of its instigators. Such measures should include an enhanced investment of necessary resources in order to combat impunity, including through the nomination of 

additional judges specifically dedicated to resolving cases of violence against trade 

unionists. All of these steps were essential elements to ensure that the trade union 

movement might finally develop and flourish in a climate that was free from violence (* * *)’’

3. Limitations and violations of Freedom of Association 

In Colombia, we have an institutional design, as well as government and company 

practices that are contrary to the freedom of association. This places a large number 

of obstacles in the way of the creation of union organizations, and the free functioning of existing unions. This includes election of representatives, modification of 

by-laws, collective bargaining, striking, participation in public dialogue, etc. The following figures are evidence of this: 

a. Obstacles to Freedom of Association 

In Colombia today, there are 18,749,836 workers, of which, fewer than 3 million 

have the right to join a union. This is because the law specifies that only those 

workers working under employment contracts can exercise that right. This is in violation of international labor conventions and standing ILO recommendations to the 

Colombian government. Thus, only 4 of every 100 workers are affiliated with a labor 

union in Colombia. 

The Ministry of Social Protection, in the period of 2002-2007, denied the registration of 515 labor union registry petitions. Of these, 253 were denials of new labor 

union charters.

Labor Union

Charters 

Registration of 

Board of

Directors 

Creation of

Subcommittees 

Creation of

Committees 

Changes to

Bylaws 

Revocation of 

Registration Total 

253 189 47 9 7 10 515

This situation has been reported on multiple occasions before the ILO Committee 

on Freedom of Association, which issued recommendations to register these charters, as it considered these acts to constitute undue government interference. Just 

by way rulings C-465, C-621 and C-672 of 2008 among others, of the Constitutional 

Court, the Ministry of Social Protection lost its jurisdiction to deny registration in 

the labor union registry. This is an advance that partially satisfies ILO conventions. 

These rulings address only one problem, that of arbitrary government interference 

at the time of registration in the registry. However, an additional series of legal limitations of the right of association persist in Colombia, which have not been modified. Laws that impede the right of free association for all types of workers, Art. 

5 CST, must be modified or repealed. Likewise, laws that limit the freedom to 

choose the union structure the workers see fit, Art. 365 CST, must also be modified 

or repealed. The establishment of an expedited judicial mechanism, that would provide a means of quickly resolving possible conflicts in the registration of labor union 

charters and other matters related to union representation, is also necessary. 

The ILO has repeatedly made comments and recommendations in the area of the 

right to free labor union association. Recently, during the 97th ILO Conference, the 

Committee on the Application of Standards stated: ‘‘(* * *) it called upon the Government to ensure that all workers, including those in the public service, may form 

and join the organization of their own choosing, without previous authorization, in 

accordance with the Convention. In this regard, the Committee called upon the Government not to use discretionary authority to deny trade union registration * * *’’

b. Collective Bargaining, a right accorded to few 

In Colombia, only 1.2 of every 100 workers benefit from a collective bargaining 

agreement. If we compare the period of 1996-1997 with the period of 2006-2007, we 

will find that in the first period, 1,579 collective bargaining agreements were signed, 

of which 983 were collective contracts, 592 were collective pacts, and 5 were union 

contracts, covering 462,641 beneficiaries; while in the second period, 925 collective 

bargaining agreements were signed, of which 639 were collective contracts, 276 were 

collective pacts, and 10 were union contracts, covering 176,948 beneficiaries. This 

demonstrates a significant reduction in collective bargaining and its coverage: 

285,693 beneficiaries lost their contractual guarantees, approximately 62% of the 
14

beneficiaries of a decade ago are now unprotected. This phenomenon is explained 

by the enormous legal and practical obstacles to the existence and free operation 

of workers’ organizations, to the lack of promotion of bargaining, to the small number of workers able to bargain, and to the failure of the government to modify its 

legislation to comply with the labor standards of conventions 87, 98, 151 and 154, 

ratified by Colombia. 

The primary problems are as follows: 

• Collective pacts and extralegal benefits plans are permitted, to the detriment 

of the unions’ right to collective bargaining. 

• Unionization is hampered, and therefore, so is the signing of collective bargaining agreements for workers with contracts differing from employment contracts, 

Art. 5 CST. This excludes workers with service contracts, those associated with 

work cooperatives, those with apprenticeship contracts, the unemployed, workers 

with a regulatory relationship with the government, and workers in the informal 

sector, which make up more than 85% of the working population. 

• The Ministry of Social Protection exercises poor oversight. It does not investigate or sanction the union-busting practices of employers, nor does it promote the 

protection of the right of association and bargaining. 

• The imposition of obligatory arbitration courts to resolve points not agreed upon 

in negotiations. This is an intervention by authorities that, in principle, impinges 

on, and makes collective bargaining more difficult. 

• The prohibition of collective bargaining and striking by unions of public employees. 

• The lack of bargaining by field or economic activity, and the inability to bargain 

for different levels. 

The right to promote and defend the interests of workers by means of collective 

bargaining that seeks to improve working conditions is, in current practice, illegal 

for some and nearly impossible to exercise for others. This is due to legal provisions 

that limit or prohibit free bargaining between the parties. This is a situation that 

ILO oversight bodies have identified as contrary to the conventions ratified by Colombia, and whose recommendations have been intentionally ignored by the government, which has failed to take measures to promote bargaining. 

c. Right to Strike—its exercise is practically impossible 

The right to strike is a fundamental right of all workers, used to defend their 

labor rights in a peaceful manner. This right is not absolute in nature. The ILO acknowledges that the right to strike can be limited in those services whose interruption may endanger the life, safety or health of a person or a portion of the population, but these limits can only be established for democratic reasons, and those 

necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others, and always by way of law. 

In the period 2002-2007, 122 petitions of illegality of suspension of activities were 

submitted to the Ministry of Social Protection, of which, 66 were declared illegal. 

Against this backdrop, we can understand why unions stage few strikes in Colombia. The legislative limitations and the actions of the Ministry of Social Protection 

demonstrate that staging a strike is nearly impossible, because of legislation contrary to the conventions on freedom of association. More so, if we take into account 

the fact that Art. 450 num. 2 allows employers to fire workers who participate in 

an illegal strike. In this context, on July 14, the Congress promulgated Law 1210 

of 2008, which modifies the provisions that regulate the exercise of the strike in the 

country. Law 1210 includes only two of the ILO’s ten recommendations to Colombia 

in the area of strike regulation. First, it transfers the jurisdiction the Ministry of 

Social Protection formerly had, to determine the illegality of a strike to labor jurisdiction. And second, it creates of a voluntary arbitration court, which was formerly 

obligatory if a strike went beyond 60 days. 

On the other hand, in violation of ILO doctrine, article 1, paragraph 2, of this law 

gave the President of the Republic the authority to order the cessation of strikes 

‘‘* * * If a strike seriously impairs the health, safety, public order or economy of 

all or part of the population due to its nature or scope * * *’’

The changes introduced by the law are procedural and not substantive. This, 

being the case, going forward, judges will declare strikes to be illegal for the same 

reasons the Ministry of Social Protection did so in the past. 

The most critical part of Law 1210 of 2008 is not so much what it includes, but 

rather what it fails to include, given that the exercise of the right to strike is extremely limited in Colombia, when compared to the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) of the ILO. The following 

are the most serious omissions in the law: 
15

1Statist published on the web site of the superintendency for economic solidarity, accessed 

February 6, 2009

1. The Colombian legislation defines the strike as a point in collective bargaining, 

and not as the fundamental means of defense of workers. It is only permitted in 

the process of negotiation of a list of demands and in no other case. 

2. Contrary to the principles of freedom of association, the prohibition of strikes 

by federations and confederations, or those staged by unions by field of economic 

activity was not repealed. This right remains reserved for company unions, which 

represents a curtailment of the right to strike. 

3. It is necessary to define what is meant by essential public service, and to regulate the concept of provision of minimal services. The lack of such definitions results 

in near total prohibition of the exercise of the strike by workers employed by companies that provide public services. 

4. Changes must be made to current strike regulations such that solidarity strikes 

are not prescribed. 

5. The law requires a qualified majority to declare a strike, that is, half plus one 

of the workers of a company. This makes it nearly impossible to achieve a strike 

declaration in practice, especially in companies with a large number of workers or 

when the union is in the minority. 

6. The omission regarding strikes for the purpose of resolving a local or section 

problem must be resolved. 

7. The legislation should allow workers with contractual relationships different 

from employment relationships to exercise their right of association and their right 

to strike. 

8. A declaration of illegality of a strike results in the employer’s ability to fire 

workers, who intervene in or participate in an illegal suspension of activities. 

4. The large deficit of good jobs in Colombia—the case of the Associated Work Cooperatives 

The labor policies and laws of recent years have been characterized by maintaining the exclusion from social and labor protection of more than two thirds of workers, and by denying and evading the minimum labor rights of 12 million workers. 

The Colombian government, rather than advancing in terms of minimum labor 

standards, produces legislation and practices that are contrary to decent work, 

thereby, leaving nearly 70% of workers in a situation of job insecurity. The Associated Work Cooperatives are evidence of this situation of job insecurity. 

The recent strikes of African palm workers and cane cutters, the conflict with the 

workers of the Port of Buenaventura, as well as the situation of workers in superstores, the apparel industry, floriculture, the health sector, security guards, etc., 

demonstrate that the so-called associated work cooperatives (AWC), have contributed to the deterioration of the quality of employment in Colombia. The organizations that have been established under the legal definition of the AWC do not, in 

fact, represent cooperative principles, and they abuse the right to cooperative association, in order to evade workers’ rights to the benefit of employers and of those 

who seek to establish such organizations as fronts for employers. The so-called 

AWCs are pseudo cooperatives. 

The AWCs are used by companies as a form of outsourcing, that has allowed them 

to transfer company costs and replace or fire workers with employment contracts, 

and, in many cases, unionized workers with collective bargaining agreements. The 

hugely lower cost, and an employment relationship with no rights, resulted in the 

spread of the AWCs as a ‘‘new model of labor relations’’ to the extent that in February of 2008, there were 12,068 registered AWCs. In 2007, it was estimated that 

there were 4,221,108 1 AWC members. 

In the face of this job insecurity, Law 1233 of 2008 was promulgated, which had 

its origins in a bill presented by the government, as the North American congress 

was approaching a vote on the FTA with Colombia. The bill was limited to establishing the obligation to pay parafiscal taxes on the part of the Associated Work Cooperatives (AWC). While this bill was making its way through the Congress of the 

Republic, there were many debates and proposals, and as a result, the law addresses additional matters as well. 

However, the government will not be able to point to this law as an advance in 

relation to international demands in this area, since the recommendations of the 

ILO oversight bodies have been clearly ignored. Law 1233 does not recognize the 

rights of association, bargaining and strike of the affiliates of an AWC, nor does it 

provide sufficient measures to prevent the AWC from being used as a means of 

evading labor and union rights. In sum, we can affirm that this law allows the 
16

AWCs to continue to be used as tools for evading labor rights, and creating insecure 

conditions for workers since it did not resolve crucial matters such as: 

1. AWC members do not enjoy the fundamental and essential rights they would 

have as workers under labor contracts. 

2. When hiring AWCs, companies are able to externalize payroll costs and render 

them not chargeable to the company. The companies are only responsible for what 

they sign off on in the commercial bid, with no possibility even of suing them for 

violation of labor rights. 

3. In order to avoid the costs of social security contributions, employers prefer to 

hire AWCs, in which such contributions are wholly the responsibility of the members. 

4. The primary activity of the AWC is to act as a labor intermediary. The great 

majority of the activities of the AWC stem from contracts with companies as labor 

intermediaries, and in practice, companies replace their workers with AWC members. 

5. There is a near complete lack of oversight of AWCs. Thus, only a small fraction 

of them are currently in compliance with applicable regulations. 

6. There is a lack of democratic participation of AWC members. Due to the lack 

of reasonable limits on the terms of the administrative boards of the AWCs, many 

members believe that the AWCs have owners instead of administrator, since the 

commercial bid signed by the company and the AWC is not subject to the approval 

of a general assembly of the members. 

7. There is competition among AWCs to offer the worst and cheapest contracts, 

which creates a sort of war for pennies among them. 

8. The AWCs are used as a tool to weaken and diminish the unions. AWC members do not have the right to unionize, because according to the Ministry of Social 

Protection, they are not employees, but rather, providers of labor. 

The ILO has issued several comments and recommendations regarding Associated 

Work Cooperatives. Recently, during the 97th Conference (June of 2008), the Committee on the Application of Standards stated: ‘‘* * * In particular, the Committee 

expected that legislation would be adopted rapidly so as to ensure that service contracts, other types of contracts, cooperatives and other measures were not used as 

a means of undermining trade union rights and collective bargaining * * *’’

Prepared Statement of Jose ́ Luciano Sanin Va ́ squez (Spanish) 

En Colombia se vive una muy particular y grave situacio ́n de hostilidad para el 

ejercicio de los derechos laborales y las libertades sindicales, basta mencionar 

algunas cifras para demostrar esta situacio ́n: 

1. Violencia antisindical en Colombia 

Aproximadamente cada tres dı ́as durante los u ́ltimos 23 an ̃ os ha sido asesinada 

una trabajadora o un trabajador sindicalizado, lo que se traduce en 2.694 vı ́ctimas 

asesinadas entre el primero de enero de 1986 y el 31 de diciembre de 2008. 

Pese al gran e ́nfasis que el actual gobierno hace en la seguridad, la violencia 

antisindical luego de algunos an ̃ os de disminucio ́n en los homicidios, presento en 

2008 un grave incremento del 25%, pasando de 39 homicidios en 2007 a 49 en 2008. 

Adicionalmente, resulta muy grave que en 2008 los dirigentes asesinados son 16 

frente a 10 asesinados durante todo el 2007. 

Ma ́s del 60% de los sindicalistas asesinados en todo el mundo son colombianos. 

La tasa de sindicalistas asesinados en Colombia es cinco veces mayor a la del resto 

de paı ́ses del mundo incluidos aquellos donde regimenes dictatoriales proscriben el 

sindicalismo. 

La violencia contra le movimiento sindical en lo u ́ltimos 23 an ̃ os ha significado 

9911 hechos violatorios del derecho a la vida, la integridad y la libertad personal 

de las personas sindicalizadas, un hecho de violencia cada dı ́a. Entre las que se 

destacan 231 atentados contra lı ́deres sindicales y 193 casos de desaparicio ́n 

forzada. Por lo menos 4200 sindicalistas han recibido amenazas de muerte por su 

actividad sindical y 1478 han tenido que desplazarse forzadamente.

VIOLACIONES DEL DERECHO A LA VIDA, A LA LIBERTAD Y A LA INTEGRIDAD FISICA DE 

SINDICALISTAS EN COLOMBIA 

[1 Enero 1986 al 31 Diciembre 2008] 

Tipo de Violacio ́n Nu ́mero Casos %

ALLANAMIENTO ILEGAL ............................................................................................................. 43 0,4
17

VIOLACIONES DEL DERECHO A LA VIDA, A LA LIBERTAD Y A LA INTEGRIDAD FISICA DE 

SINDICALISTAS EN COLOMBIA—Continued

[1 Enero 1986 al 31 Diciembre 2008] 

Tipo de Violacio ́n Nu ́mero Casos %

AMENAZAS ................................................................................................................................ 4200 42,4

ATENTADO CON O SIN LESIONES ............................................................................................. 231 2,3

DESAPARICION ......................................................................................................................... 193 1,9

DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO .................................................................................................... 1478 14,9

DETENCION ARBITRARIA .......................................................................................................... 587 5,9

HOMICIDIO DE FAMILIAR .......................................................................................................... 3 0,0

HOMICIDIOS .............................................................................................................................. 2694 27,2

HOSTIGAMIENTO ....................................................................................................................... 246 2,5

OTROS ...................................................................................................................................... 2 0,0

SECUESTRO .............................................................................................................................. 161 1,6

TORTURA .................................................................................................................................. 73 0,7

Total ........................................................................................................................... 9911 100

De las 9.911 violaciones perpetradas contra la vida, libertad e integridad de 

sindicalistas en Colombia entre el 1 de enero de 1986 y el 31 de diciembre de 2008, 

3470 equivalentes al 35% se han presentado durante el gobierno del actual 

presidente de Colombia Alvaro Uribe Ve ́lez. 

De los 2.694 asesinatos de sindicalistas ocurridos en Colombia en ese mismo 

periodo histo ́rico, 482 equivalentes al 18% se han presentado durante este Gobierno, 

cifras que contradicen el argumento del Gobierno ante la comunidad internacional, 

de que la violencia antisindical es un problema superado y esta ́ bajo control por 

parte del Estado.

VIOLACIONES DEL DERECHO A LA VIDA, A LA LIBERTAD Y A LA INTEGRIDAD FISICA DE 

SINDICALISTAS EN COLOMBIA 

[7 Agosto 2002 al 31 Diciembre 2008] 

Tipo de Violacio ́n Nu ́mero Casos %

ALLANAMIENTO ILEGAL ............................................................................................................. 23 0,7

AMENAZAS ................................................................................................................................ 2083 60,0

ATENTADO CON O SIN LESIONES ............................................................................................. 65 1,9

DESAPARICION ......................................................................................................................... 30 0,9

DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO .................................................................................................... 316 9,1

DETENCION ARBITRARIA .......................................................................................................... 254 7,3

HOMICIDIOS .............................................................................................................................. 482 13,9

HOSTIGAMIENTO ....................................................................................................................... 175 5,0

SECUESTRO .............................................................................................................................. 29 0,8

TORTURA .................................................................................................................................. 13 0,4

Total ........................................................................................................................... 3470 100

Los factores estructurales que han posibilitado la violencia antisindical persisten, 

el incremento de homicidios en el an ̃ o 2008 es muestra ello, ası ́ como los esquemas 

de proteccio ́n que aun tienen ma ́s de 1500 dirigentes sindicales. 

El facto mas preocupante es el referido al proceso de exclusio ́n polı ́tica del 

movimiento sindical que ha generado una profunda cultura antisindical, promovida 

y agravada por una pra ́ ctica cada vez ma ́s comu ́n y recurrente del Presidente de 

la Republica y de altos funcionarios del gobierno nacional, que realizan 

declaraciones en contra de la legitimidad del sindicalismo, vincula ́ndolo con los 

grupos guerrilleros, o justificando la violencia antisindical como una violencia entre 

los actores armados del conflicto, sen ̃ alando de paso que el sindicalismo es parte de 

alguno de ellos. 

Desde hace varios an ̃ os la OIT se ha referido a esta situacio ́n, recientemente en 

la 97 Conferencia (junio de 2008) la Comisio ́n de aplicacio ́n de normas sen ̃ alo: 

‘‘(* * *) la Comisio ́n expreso ́ su preocupacio ́n en relacio ́n con el aumento de actos 

de violencia contra sindicalistas durante la primera mitad del an ̃ o 2008. En vista 

de los compromisos asumidos por el Gobierno antes mencionados, la Comisio ́n lo 

insto ́ a que adopte nuevas acciones para reforzar las medidas de proteccio ́n 

disponibles. * * * Todas estas medidas son elementos esenciales para asegurar que 
18

le movimiento sindical pueda finalmente desarrollarse y afirmarse en un clima libre 

de violencia (* * *)’’

2. Impunidad en los homicidios contra sindicalistas 

La investigacio ́n y juzgamiento de los crı ́menes contra sindicalistas era una 

obligacio ́n del Estado colombiano echada al olvido. La Subunidad de Fiscalı ́a y los 

jueces especializados en el tema constituyen el primer esfuerzo del Estado por responder a la crı ́tica situacio ́n de derechos humanos y de violencia contra el 

movimiento sindical. 

Sin embargo, 2.694 sindicalistas han sido asesinados en los u ́ltimos 23 an ̃ os y la 

a Subunidad de investigacio ́n ha reconocido tan solo la existencia de 1.302 casos que 

deben ser llevados y tan so ́lo han encontrado fı ́sicamente los expedientes de 1.104, 

lo que significa que en el 60% de los casos no existen o no se informa la existencia 

de investigaciones penales en curso. 

De los informes producidos por la Fiscalı ́a se puede concluir que no hay resultados 

importantes en materia de impulso a las investigaciones penales. Segu ́n el informe 

de la Fiscalı ́a de enero de 2009, respecto de los 1.104 casos que esta ́n investigando, 

654 casos (59,23%) se encuentran en etapa preliminar, es decir, en ma ́s de la mitad 

de los casos no hay identificacio ́n del presunto autor. 208 casos (18,84%) se 

encuentran en instruccio ́n, etapa en la que se adelanta la investigacio ́n formal 

contra alguna persona identificada. En 91 casos (8,24%) de los casos tienen 

acusacio ́n frente a los jueces por parte de la Fiscalı ́a. 

Respecto de la totalidad de los 1.104 casos investigados, las sentencias producidas 

fueron 120, esto significa que solo el 10,86% de los casos tiene algu ́n tipo de avance 

en determinacio ́n de responsabilidad de los autores de los crı ́menes contra 

sindicalistas. 

Sobre los 185 casos priorizados el nu ́mero de sentencias producidas es solo sobre 

31 vı ́ctimas. Es decir, respecto del total de los casos priorizados so ́lo el 16,75% de 

las vı ́ctimas llega a obtener sentencia. 

Solo sobre 90 sindicalistas asesinados hay sentencias condenatorias. Suponiendo 

que para esas vı ́ctimas haya algu ́n tipo de avance en materia de impunidad, el 

porcentaje de los que continuarı ́an en ella es del 96,7% de los crı ́menes. De acuerdo 

al informe de enero de 2009, sin tener la posibilidad de conocer todos los datos 

proporcionados en julio de 2008, sino solamente por el dato nume ́rico de las 

sentencias de los jueces, y asumiendo que cada una de las sentencias contiene una 

vı ́ctima, la impunidad se mantiene en casi el 96%. 

Haciendo un promedio mensual del trabajo de los jueces, entre septiembre y 

diciembre de 2007 se produjeron en promedio 11 sentencias al mes. Ese mismo 

ca ́lculo mensual durante todo el 2008 y enero de 2009 ha arrojado 5,9 sentencias 

al mes. Este ana ́lisis cuantitativo del trabajo de la subunidad y de los jueces nos 

permite concluir que al ritmo de unas 70 sentencias anuales emitidas por los jueces 

del paı ́s y los de descongestio ́n de OIT, en las que cada una de ellas se refiriera 

a una vı ́ctima sindicalista, se tomarı ́a la justicia alrededor de 37 an ̃ os para superar 

la impunidad, bajo el supuesto de que no ocurran ma ́s asesinatos a partir de hoy, 

y se mantenga la unidad especial de investigacio ́n y juzgamiento. 

Respecto de las sentencias emitidas, estos aspectos son de honda preocupacio ́n: 

1. Las sentencias han encontrado fundamentalmente autores materiales y sus 

intenciones. En la mayorı ́a de los casos no se establece la cadena de responsabilidad 

de los autores. 

2. En la mayorı ́a de las sentencias no existe ninguna referencia al contexto personal de la vı ́ctima ni de la organizacio ́n sindical y/o regional en la que la violencia 

antisindical ocurre. 

3. La investigacio ́n se realiza caso a caso sin una estrategia integral de 

investigacio ́n en casos de cara ́ cter claramente sistema ́ticos, deliberados y selectivos 

como los son los casos de violencia antisindical. El movimiento sindical ha sido 

insistente en proponer cambios en el me ́todo de investigacio ́n utilizado, si cerca del 

75% de violencia antisindical ha ocurrido contra 30 organizaciones sindicales en 6 

departamentos del paı ́s, la investigacio ́n deberı ́a reestructurarse. 

4. Las investigaciones omiten la calificacio ́n jurı ́dica de todos los delitos cometidos 

y por tanto, las sentencias no sancionan a los autores por todos ellos. En mu ́ltiples 

sentencias la tortura o la desaparicio ́n forzada, por ejemplo, no son sancionadas, 

condenando exclusivamente por homicidio. Esto deja en la impunidad las acciones 

que integran la violencia contra sindicalistas. 

5. Solo en cinco casos hay sentencia de segunda instancia, es decir que de las 108 

sentencias contabilizadas a julio de 2008, en 103 de ellas esta ́ pendiente la 

posibilidad de que la decisio ́n sea cambiada por los recursos que puede interponer 

el condenado, y por tanto, pasar a tener una absolucio ́n. 
19

La OIT en varias ocasiones se ha referido al tema de impunidad, recientemente 

en la 97 Conferencia junio de 2008) la Comisio ́n de aplicacio ́n de normas sen ̃ alo: 

‘‘(* * *) la Comisio ́n lo insto ́ a (. * * *) garantizar una mayor eficacia y rapidez de 

las investigaciones de asesinatos de sindicalistas y la identificacio ́n de todos sus 

instigadores. Tales medidas debera ́n incluir un aumento de los recursos necesarios 

para combatir la impunidad, incluido el nombramiento de jueces adicionales 

especialmente dedicados a resolver los casos de violencia contra sindicalistas. Todas 

estas medidas son elementos esenciales para asegurar que el movimiento sindical 

pueda finalmente desarrollarse y afirmarse en un clima libre de violencia (* * *)’’

3. Limitaciones y violaciones a las libertades sindicales 

En Colombia contamos con un disen ̃ o institucional y una pra ́ ctica gubernamental 

y empresarial contraria a las libertades sindicales, que impone una gran cantidad 

de obsta ́ culos para que las organizaciones sindicales puedan ser creadas o para que 

las existentes puedan funcionar libremente, esto es, elegir sus representantes, 

modificar sus estatutos, negociar colectivamente, ejercer la huelga, participar de los 

escenarios de dia ́logo social, etc. Una muestra de esta situacio ́n son las siguientes 

cifras: 

a. Obsta ́ culos a la Asociacio ́n sindical 

Hoy en Colombia existen 18.749.836 de trabajadores, de los cuales menos de 3 

millones tiene derecho a asociarse a una organizacio ́n sindical, pues la legislacio ́n establece que pueden ejercer dicho derecho solo aquellos trabajadores vinculados a 

trave ́s de contratos de trabajo, contrariando con ello los convenios internacionales 

del trabajo y las recomendaciones realizadas por la OIT de manera permanente al 

Estado Colombiano. Por ello tan solo 4 de cada 100 trabajadores se encuentran 

afiliados a una organizacio ́n sindical en Colombia. 

El Ministerio de la Proteccio ́n Social en el periodo de 2002-2007 nego ́ el registro 

de 515 actos de registro sindical, de estos 253 fueron negativas a constitucio ́n de 

nuevas organizaciones sindicales.

Constitucio ́n de 

sindicatos 

Inscripcio ́n de 

junta directiva 

Creacio ́n de 

subdirectivas 

Creacio ́n de 

comite ́s 

Reformas 

estatutarias 

Revocatorias del 

registro Total 

253 189 47 9 7 10 515

Esta situacio ́n fue denunciada en mu ́ltiples ocasiones ante el Comite ́ de Libertad 

Sindical de OIT, emitiendo este recomendaciones para alcanzar la inscripcio ́n de 

dichos actos por considerarlo una injerencia indebida por parte del Estado. Tan so ́lo 

con las sentencias C-465, C-621 y C-672 de 2008 entre otras, de la Corte 

Constitucional, el Ministerio de Proteccio ́n Social perdio ́ la competencia para negar 

la inscripcio ́n en el registro sindical, un avance que satisface parcialmente los 

convenios de OIT. 

Estas sentencias abarcan tan so ́lo un problema, la injerencia arbitraria por parte 

del Estado al momento de la inscripcio ́n en el registro, sin embargo en Colombia 

persisten otra serie de limitaciones legales al derecho de asociacio ́n que no han sido 

modificadas, se hace necesario derogar o modificar las normas que impiden el derecho de asociacio ́n a todo tipo de trabajadores, art. 5 CST, de igual forma derogar 

o modificar las normas que limitan la libertad de eleccio ́n de la estructura sindical 

que los trabajadores estimen convenientes, Art. 365 CST, se hace necesario 

establecer un mecanismo judicial, y expedito, que permita en corto tiempo solucionar 

los posibles conflictos en el tramite del registro sindical y otros temas relacionados 

con la representacio ́n sindical. 

La OIT de manera reiterada ha sen ̃ alado observaciones y recomendaciones en materia del derecho de asociacio ́n sindical, recientemente en la 97 Conferencia de la 

OIT, la Comisio ́n de aplicacio ́n de normas sen ̃ alo: ‘‘(* * *) solicito ́ tambie ́n al 

Gobierno que se asegure que todos los trabajadores, incluidos aquellos del sector 

pu ́ blico, puedan formar las organizaciones que estimen convenientes, sin 

autorizacio ́n previa, y afiliarse a las mismas de conformidad con el Convenio. A este 

respecto la Comisio ́n solicito ́ al Gobierno que no utilice discrecionalmente su 

autoridad para denegar el registro sindical * * *’’

b. Negociacio ́n Colectiva un derecho para pocos 

En Colombia tan so ́lo 1,2 de cada 100 trabajadores se beneficia de una convencio ́n 

colectiva, comparando el perı ́odo 1996-1997 con el periodo 2006-2007, encontramos 

que en el primero se suscribieron 1579 convenios colectivos, de los cuales 983 eran 

convenciones colectivas, 592 eran pactos colectivos y 5 contratos sindicales, con una 

cobertura de 462.641 beneficiarios; mientras que en el segundo perı ́odo se firmaron 

925 convenios colectivos, de los cuales 639 eran convenciones colectivas, 276 pactos 
20

colectivos y 10 contratos sindicales, con una cobertura de 176.948 beneficiarios. Se 

muestra una significativa caı ́da en la negociacio ́n colectiva y su cobertura: 285.693 

beneficiarios perdieron sus garantı ́as convencionales, aproximadamente un 62% de 

los beneficiarios de hace una de ́cada hoy esta ́n desprotegidos. Este feno ́meno 

encuentra explicacio ́n en los enormes obsta ́ culos jurı ́dicos y pra ́ cticos que se imponen 

a las organizaciones de los trabajadores para existir y desenvolverse libremente, a 

la falta de fomento de la negociacio ́n, a los pocos trabajadores que pueden negociar, 

y al incumplimiento por parte del Estado de modificar su legislacio ́n para que 

cumpla con los esta ́ndares laborales de los convenios 87, 98, 151 y 154 ratificados 

por Colombia. 

Los principales problemas son los siguientes: 

• Es permitida la celebracio ́n de pactos colectivos y planes de beneficios 

extralegales, en perjuicio del derecho de negociacio ́n colectiva de los sindicatos 

• Se impide la sindicalizacio ́n y por tanto la firma de convenciones colectivas de 

trabajadores con contratos diferentes al laboral, art. 5 CST, excluyendo a quienes 

tienen contratos de prestacio ́n de servicios, asociados a cooperativas de trabajo, los 

de contrato de aprendizaje, desempleados, trabajadores con una relacio ́n 

reglamentaria con el Estado o trabajadores del sector informal que constituyen mas 

del 85% de la poblacio ́n ocupada. 

• El Ministerio de la Proteccio ́n Social ejerce un pobre control, no investiga ni 

sanciona las pra ́ cticas antisindicales de los empleadores, ni tampoco promueve la 

defensa del derecho de asociacio ́n y negociacio ́n. 

• La imposicio ́n de tribunales de arbitramento obligatorio para decidir los puntos 

en los que no se llegue a un acuerdo durante la negociacio ́n, es una intervencio ́n 

de la autoridad que en principio vulnera y hace ma ́s difı ́cil la negociacio ́n colectiva 

• La prohibicio ́n de la negociacio ́n colectiva y de la huelga a los sindicatos de 

empleados pu ́ blicos 

• La inexistencia de negociacio ́n por rama o actividad econo ́mica, y la 

imposibilidad de negociar por diversos niveles 

El derecho a fomentar y defender los intereses de los trabajadores por medio de 

negociaciones colectivas que busquen mejorar las condiciones de empleo, es en la 

pra ́ ctica actual, ilegal para algunos o casi imposible de ejercer para otros, esto se 

debe a disposiciones legales que limitan o prohı ́ben una libre negociacio ́n entre las 

partes, situacio ́n que los organismos de control de la OIT han previsto como 

contrarias a los convenios ratificados por Colombia y cuyas recomendaciones han 

sido intencionalmente ignoradas por el gobierno, omitiendo tomar medidas que 

fomenten la negociacio ́n. 

c. Derecho de Huelga pra ́ cticamente imposible su ejercicio 

El derecho a la huelga es un derecho fundamental de todos los trabajadores, por 

medio del cual se busca defender sus derechos laborales de una manera pacifica. 

Este derecho no tiene cara ́ cter de absoluto, es aceptado por OIT que la huelga puede 

verse limitada en los servicios cuya interrupcio ́n pueda poner en riesgo la vida, 

seguridad o la salud de una persona o parte de la poblacio ́n, pero estos limites so ́lo 

pueden establecerse por razones democra ́ticas y necesarias para proteger los 

derechos y libertades de los dema ́s, siempre a trave ́s de la ley. 

En el perı ́odo 2002-2007 se presentaron al Ministerio de la Proteccio ́n Social 122 

solicitudes de ilegalidad de cese de actividades, de los cuales 66 fueron declarados 

ilegales. 

Bajo este panorama se entiende como los sindicatos realizan pocas huelgas en Colombia, las limitaciones legislativas y las actuaciones del Ministerio de Proteccio ́n 

Social muestran como ejercer una huelga resulta casi imposible debido a que la 

legislacio ́n es contraria a los convenios de libertad sindical, ma ́s si se tiene en 

cuenta el Art. 450 nu ́m. 2 da la posibilidad para que el empleador despida a los 

trabajadores que hayan participado en una huelga ilegal, bajo este panorama el 

Congreso expidio ́ el pasado 14 de julio, la Ley 1210 de 2008, por la cual se modifican 

disposiciones que regulan el ejercicio de la huelga en el paı ́s. Esta Ley 1210 recoge 

tan solo dos de las diez recomendaciones que la OIT le ha hecho a Colombia en materia de regulacio ́n de la huelga, uno, la competencia que tenı ́a el Ministerio de la 

Proteccio ́n Social para calificar la ilegalidad de la huelga, la traslada a la 

jurisdiccio ́n laboral y dos, la creacio ́n de un tribunal de arbitramento voluntario, que 

antes era obligatorio, cuando la huelga pasaba de 60 dı ́as. 

De otro lado contrariando la doctrina de la OIT, esta ley su artı ́culo 1, pa ́ rrafo 

2, le dio la Facultad al Presidente de la Republica de ordenar la cesacio ́n de las 

huelgas ‘‘* * * Si una huelga en razo ́n de su naturaleza o magnitud, afecta de 

manera grave la salud, la seguridad, el orden pu ́ blico o la economı ́a en todo o en 

parte de la poblacio ́n * * *’’
21

1 Estadı ́stica publicada en la pagina web de superintendencia de economı ́a solidaria, tomado 

el 6 de febrero de 2009. 

Los cambios introducidos por la ley son procedimentales y no sustanciales, ası ́ las 

cosas los jueces en adelante declararan ilegales las huelgas por las mismas razones 

que lo hacia antes el Ministerio de la Proteccio ́n Social. 

Lo ma ́s crı ́tico de la Ley 1210 de 2008 no es tanto lo que incluye sino lo que le 

quedo ́ faltando, toda vez que el ejercicio del derecho de huelga en Colombia, cuando 

se compara con las recomendaciones del Comite ́ de Libertad Sindical (CLS) y la 

Comisio ́n de Expertos en Aplicacio ́n de Convenios y Recomendaciones (CEACR) de 

la OIT, se encuentra en extremo limitado. Estos son los faltantes ma ́s serios de la 

Ley: 

1. En la legislacio ́n colombiana se entiende la huelga como un momento de la 

negociacio ́n colectiva y no como el medio esencial de defensa de los trabajadores, 

permitida solamente en un proceso de negociacio ́n de un pliego de peticiones y no 

en otro caso. 

2. Contraria a los principios de libertad sindical, se omitio ́ derogar la prohibicio ́n de huelgas a federaciones y confederaciones, o las que hagan sindicatos por rama 

de actividad econo ́mica, derecho que queda reservado a los sindicatos de empresa, 

lo cual representa un recorte al derecho de huelga. 

3. Es necesario definir que ́ se entiende por servicio pu ́ blico esencial y regular la 

figura de la prestacio ́n de servicios mı ́nimos, pues la falta de dichas definiciones 

provoca la prohibicio ́n casi absoluta para ejercer la huelga a los trabajadores de 

empresas que prestan servicios pu ́ blicos. 

4. Es necesario realizar cambios en la regulacio ́n actual de la huelga de tal forma 

que no queden proscritas las huelgas de solidaridad. 

5. La ley exige una mayorı ́a calificada para declarar la huelga, o sea la mitad ma ́s uno de los trabajadores de la empresa, haciendo que en la pra ́ ctica la declaratoria 

de las huelgas sea casi imposible de alcanzar, sobretodo en empresas con gran 

cantidad de trabajadores, o cuando el sindicato sea minoritario. 

6. Se hace necesario solucionar la omisio ́n que existe sobre huelgas cuya finalidad 

sea la solucio ́n de una problema ́tica local o seccional. 

7. La legislacio ́n debe permitir a los trabajadores vinculados con formas 

contractuales diferentes a la laboral, ejercer su derecho de asociacio ́n y su derecho 

a la huelga. 

8. De la declaratoria de ilegalidad de la huelga se sigue como consecuencia la 

facultad del empleador de despedir a los trabajadores que hubieren intervenido o 

participado en una suspensio ́n ilegal de actividades. 

4. El gran de ́ficit de trabajo decente en Colombia. El caso de las Cooperativas de 

Trabajo Asociado 

Las polı ́ticas y leyes de los u ́ltimos an ̃ os en materia laboral se han caracterizado 

por mantener en la exclusio ́n de la proteccio ́n social y laboral a ma ́s de las dos 

terceras partes de los trabajadores; por negar y evadir los derechos laborales 

mı ́nimos a ma ́s de 12 millones de trabajadores; el Estado colombiano, antes que 

avanzar en esta ́ndares mı ́nimos laborales, genera legislacio ́n y pra ́ cticas contrarias 

al trabajo decente, dejando a casi el 70% de los trabajadores en condiciones de 

precariedad laboral. Las Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado son una muestra de esta 

situacio ́n de precariedad laboral 

Las recientes huelgas de los trabajadores de la palma africana y de los corteros 

de can ̃ a, el conflicto con los trabajadores del Puerto de Buenaventura, ası ́ como la 

situacio ́n de los trabajadores de los hipermercados, las confecciones, la floricultura, 

el sector de la salud, la vigilancia, etc., evidencian que las llamadas cooperativas de 

trabajo asociado (CTA), han contribuido a deteriorar la calidad del empleo en Colombia. Las entidades que se han constituido al amparo de la figura legal de las CTA, 

no responden realmente a los principios cooperativos y hacen uso abusivo del derecho de asociacio ́n cooperativa, para burlar los derechos de los trabajadores, en 

beneficio de los empresarios y de quienes a manera de testaferros de empleadores 

promueven la creacio ́n de las mismas. Las llamadas CTA son seudo cooperativas. 

Las CTA son usadas por las empresas como forma de tercerizacio ́n que han 

permitido externalizar costos de la propia empresa, y remplazar o despedir 

trabajadores con contrato laboral y en muchos casos trabajadores sindicalizados con 

convencio ́n colectiva. El costo inmensamente inferior, y una relacio ́n laboral sin 

derechos, produjo que las CTA se extiendan como un ‘‘nuevo modelo de relaciones 

laborales’’ al punto que en febrero de 2008 existı ́an 12,068 CTA registradas, en 2007 

se estimaba que habı ́an 4.221.108 1 asociados a CTA. 

Ante semejante precariedad se expidio ́ la Ley 1233 de 2008 que tuvo como origen 

un proyecto de ley presentado por el gobierno cuando se aproximaba la decisio ́n del 
22

congreso norteamericano sobre el TLC con Colombia; proyecto que se limitaba a 

crear la obligacio ́n del pago de los impuestos parafiscales en las Cooperativas de 

Trabajo Asociado (CTA). Durante el tra ́mite de este proyecto en el Congreso de la 

Repu ́ blica fueron muchos los debates y propuestas, y por ello el resultado fue una 

ley que considera otros temas adicionales. 

Sin embargo, el Gobierno no podra ́ presentar esta Ley como un avance en relacio ́n 

con las exigencias internacionales sobre la materia, pues de manera clara se ignoran 

las recomendaciones realizadas por los o ́rganos de control de la OIT. Esta Ley 1233 

no reconoce a los asociados de las CTA los derechos de asociacio ́n, negociacio ́n y 

huelga, y tampoco preve ́ medidas suficientes para impedir que no se utilicen las 

CTA como forma de defraudacio ́n de derechos laborales y sindicales. En suma, 

podemos afirmar que esta ley les permite a las CTA seguir siendo herramientas 

para evadir derechos laborales y precarizar las condiciones de vida de los 

trabajadores pues no resolvio ́ temas cruciales como: 

1. Los asociados a las CTA no cuentan con derechos fundamentales y esenciales 

que sı ́ tendrı ́an como trabajadores vinculados por contrato. 

2. Al contratar CTA, las empresas logran que los costos de no ́mina laboral sean 

externos y no imputables a ellas. Las empresas u ́nicamente responden por lo que 

firmen en la oferta mercantil, sin que sea posible siquiera demandarlas por 

vulneracio ́n de derechos laborales. 

3. Para evadir los costos por aportes a seguridad social, los empresarios prefieren 

contratar con CTA, en las que dichos aportes corren, en su totalidad, a cargo de los 

asociados. 

4. La principal actividad de las CTA es la intermediacio ́n laboral. La inmensa 

mayorı ́a de actividades que realizan las CTA se da por contrataciones que hacen las 

empresas como intermediacio ́n laboral, y en la pra ́ ctica las empresas remplazan sus 

trabajadores por asociados a CTA. 

5. Hay una ausencia casi total de control a las CTA, por lo que un nu ́mero ı ́nfimo 

de ellas se encuentra actualmente cumpliendo con la normatividad vigente. 

6. Hay ausencia de participacio ́n democra ́tica de los asociados de las CTA. Por la 

inexistencia de lı ́mites razonables para el periodo de las juntas de administracio ́n 

de la CTA, son muchos los casos en que los asociados esta ́n convencidos de que e ́stas 

tienen duen ̃ o en vez de gerente, porque la oferta mercantil firmada entre empresa 

y CTA no esta sujeta a la aprobacio ́n de la asamblea de asociados. 

7. Hay competencia entre las CTA por ofrecer peores y ma ́s baratas formas de 

contratacio ́n, lo que genera una especie de guerra del centavo entre ellas. 

8. Las CTA se usan como herramienta para debilitar y disminuir a los sindicatos. 

Los asociados a CTA no tienen derecho a sindicalizarse porque, segu ́n el Ministerio 

de la Proteccio ́n Social, no tienen la calidad de trabajadores sino de aportantes de 

su fuerza de trabajo. 

La OIT ha emitido varias observaciones y recomendaciones sobre las Cooperativas 

de Trabajo Asociado, recientemente en la 97 Conferencia (junio de 2008), la 

Comisio ́n de aplicacio ́n de Normas sen ̃ alo: ‘‘* * * En particular, la Comisio ́n espero ́

firmemente que se adoptara ́n sin demora disposiciones legislativas para asegurar 

que los contratos de servicio o de otro tipo y las cooperativas u otras medidas no 

sean utilizados como medios para menoscabar los derechos sindicales y la 

negociacio ́n colectiva * * *’’

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Thank you very much. Some of 

you looked a little perplexed as you hear the whistling here. It is 

very high winds today. Others have suggested it is not the winds, 

that it is really the ghost of Chairman Perkins who spoke with a 

whistle. Whenever he spoke, he also whistled at the same time. 

You can pick your explanation of it, but apparently the architects 

have never been able to fix it. 

So with that, we will go—Ms. Hoyos, please? Welcome to the 

committee. And we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF YESSIKA HOYOS MORALES, BOGOTA, 

COLOMBIA 

Ms. HOYOS [through translator]. I am Yessika Hoyos Morales, 

the daughter of Jorge Dario Hoyos Franco, one of the 2,694 labor 

unionists murdered with impunity in Colombia. 
23

Eight years ago, I was living with my mother, my sister and my 

father in Fusagasuga. My father was a dreamer. He was very committed to the cause of justice, deeply concerned about oppression 

and poverty. That is why he was committed to the union struggle 

from the time that he was very young. 

He started working with national agrarian organizations, and his 

leadership led him to the International Federation of Agricultural 

Workers and then on to the International Federation of Miners. 

In our town, my father worked broadly with labor unions, student organizations and women’s organizations. He worked to defend the rights of communities, and he was widely recognized and 

loved by the people for his work. My father was a cheerful, generous man. He was kind to us and showed us love and showed solidarity with others. He was our friend and our hero, the man who 

gave us advice, who helped us discover the world. 

From the time I was very young, I was witness to raids on our 

house by the police, threats to my father. We got phone calls, funeral prayer cards, funeral wreaths. We were persecuted. That is 

how I learned that union activity in Colombia is dangerous and 

that thinking and protesting puts your life at risk. 

Still, we were happy until the night of March 3, 2001, when two 

confessed hit men of the paramilitary, shot my father repeatedly in 

the face until they killed him. My mother and my sister, who was 

only 14, found him on the ground with blood running out of his 

body, having lost his smile and his dreams and the kisses and hugs 

that he used to give us. 

The murderers made good on their threats. My father made good 

on his word. He never gave in to the demand that he stop fighting 

for the people. That was the first union death, my father’s. But 

then, the murderers attempted a second and definitive killing, the 

one that they are trying to impose on us in Colombia, the one that 

is clad in forget and impunity. 

The day of the funeral itself, tragedy took another turn. Threats, 

harassment and persecution started against the rest of us so that 

we wouldn’t make any reports or claims. And because of that, we 

were forced to leave our home and hide out in Bogota, where they 

found us anyway, to the extent that we had to move five times in 

a single year. 

As with the other 2,694 murders of union members, impunity 

began to be cast the very night of that horrific crime when the perpetrators where caught. They were two young hit men who immediately were visited in their cell by a police officer who told them 

what to say in their statements. The investigational hypothesis 

cast by the authorities held that it was a crime caused because my 

father was involved with another man’s wife. This is the typical explanation that Colombian authorities give to cover up the truth. 

True to my father and following his example of passion for truth 

and justice, at 17 I joined the same battle that thousands of young 

people, widows, parents, brothers and sisters have had to wage in 

search of truth, justice and reparation, victims’ rights that are denied in my country. To this end, I granted power of attorney to the 

law firm of Jose Alvear Restrepo to represent me in my civil intervention in the government’s criminal case. 
24

In 2003, the two hit men were sentenced to 23 years in jail for 

aggravated homicide of a protected person, since my father was the 

labor leader. This weak sentence, however, did not overcome impunity because the search for those who ordered the murder only got 

to the point of linking it, in absentia, to a second police lieutenant 

by the name of Monroy, who after the crime and using another instrument of impunity, was retroactively relieved of his post in the 

month of February, 2001 in an attempt to demonstrate that on 

March 3, 2001, he was no longer an active-duty police officer. Still, 

the criminal proceedings established that my father’s murder had 

been planned in December of 2000. 

Officer Monroy was always a fugitive who was never caught. In 

August of 2007, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison for homicide of the unionist Jorge Dario Hoyos Franco. This fact was publicized by the Colombian government as a great stride in justice. 

And perhaps it would have represented progress if not for the 

fact that I discovered in December of last year by a simple request 

for information at vital statistics that Monroy had died on May 3, 

2006. In other words, a dead man had been condemned, somebody 

who was still wanted by the prosecutor’s office. 

Despite two court decrees in which Colombian judges ruled that 

my father was murdered for being a labor unionist, the prosecutor’s 

office, in order to continue hiding the truth, continued to maintain 

that it was a crime of passion up through August of 2008. It took 

international pressure for the prosecutor’s to acknowledge the 

truth with respect to the motivation of this crime. 

I have forgiven my father’s killers, but we will continue to demand that the intellectual authors of this crime be investigated because the murder of union members in Colombia is the result of 

systematic government policy. We know that there is evidence of 

other guilty parties, including members of the national army. The 

investigation is still open, but with no follow-up of evidence as requested and no identification of other possible perpetrators. 

I continue to look for justice, along with other sons and daughters of those who remember and are against impunity, this organization that sprang from our need to oppose barbarism. We have 

many brothers and sisters, and we know that we are the children 

of the dreams of justice and equality of our parents hoping to have 

a better country in the future where there is life and the right to 

think, to dissent and to dream. 

[The statement of Ms. Hoyos follows:]

Prepared Statement of Yessika Hoyos Morales (English) 

I am Yessika Hoyos Morales, daughter of Jorge Darı ́o Hoyos Franco, one of the 

2,694 labor unionists murdered with impunity in Colombia. 

Eight years ago I was living with my mother, my sister and my father in 

Fusagasuga ́. He was a man with dreams; he was very committed to the cause of 

justice; he was deeply pained by oppression and poverty. That is why he was very 

committed to the union fight from the time he was very young. He started working 

with national agrarian organizations, and his leadership took him to the international federation of agricultural workers, and then to the international federation 

of miners. 

In our town, my father worked broadly with the labor unions, student organizations, women’s organizations. He worked to defend the rights of communities, he 

was widely recognized and loved by the people for his work. 
25

My father was a cheerful, generous man. He showed us tenderness, love and solidarity with others. He was our friend and our hero, the man who gave us advice, 

who helped us discover the world. 

From the time I was a little girl, I was witness to raids on our house by police, 

threats to my father. We received phone calls, funeral prayer cards, funeral 

wreaths, persecution. That was how I learned that union activity in Colombia is 

dangerous, and that thinking and protesting puts your life at risk. 

However, we were happy until the night of March 3, 2001, when two confessed 

paramilitary hit men, shot my father repeatedly in the face until he was dead. My 

mother, and my sister, who was only 14 years old, found him on the ground with 

blood running down his body, now without his smile, without his dreams, without 

his kisses and hugs to give us. 

The murderers made good on their threats. My father made good on his word—

he never gave in to the demand that he stop fighting for the people. That was the 

first death, the death of a union leader, my father. But then, the murderers attempted a second and definitive killing, the one they are trying to impose on us in 

Colombia, the one that is clad with forgetting and impunity. 

The very day of the funeral, the tragedy took another turn. Threats, harassment, 

persecution started against us, so that we wouldn’t make any denouncements or 

claims. And because of that we had to leave our home and hide out in Bogota ́, where 

we were found anyway, to the extent that we had to move five times in a single 

year. 

And as with the other 2,694 murders of unionists, impunity began to be cast the 

very night of that horrific crime, when the perpetrators where caught, two young 

hit men, who were immediately visited in their cell by a police officer who told them 

what to say in their statements. The investigational hypothesis cast by the authorities held that it was a crime caused because my father had gotten involved with 

another man’s wife. This is the typical explanation the Colombian authorities give 

to cover up the truth, to deny that people are murdered there for being labor unionists. 

True to my father, following his example of passion for truth and justice, at 17, 

I joined the same battle that thousands of young people, widows, parents, brothers 

and sisters have had to wage in the search for TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REDRESS—

victims’ rights that are denied in my country. To this end, I have granted power 

of attorney to the law firm of Jose ́ Alvear Restrepo to represent me in my civil intervention in the government’s criminal case. 

In 2003, the two hit men were sentenced to 23 years in prison for aggravated 

homicide of a protected person, since my father was a labor unionist. This weak sentence did not overcome the impunity since the search for those who ordered the 

murder only got to the point of linking it, in absentia, to a second lieutenant of police by the name of MONROY, who, after the crime, using another instrument of 

impunity, was retroactively relieved of his post in the month of February, 2001, in 

an attempt to show that on March 3, 2001, he was no longer an active-duty police 

officer. However, the criminal proceedings established that my father’s murder had 

been planned in December of 2000. 

Officer MONROY was always a fugitive. He was never caught. In August of 2007, 

he was sentenced to 40 years in prison for homicide against the unionist JORGE 

DARIO HOYOS FRANCO. This fact was publicized by the Colombian government 

as a great stride for justice, and perhaps it would have been an advance, if not for 

the fact that I discovered in December of last year, through a simple information 

request at the national registry of vital statistics, that MONROY died on May 3, 

2006. In other words, a dead man was sentenced—one who is still wanted by the 

prosecutor’s office. 

Despite the two sentences, in which the Colombian judges have ruled that my father was murdered for being a labor unionist, the prosecutor’s office, in order to continue hiding the truth, maintained the hypothesis of a crime of passion up until August of 2008. It took international pressure for the prosecutor’s office to acknowledge 

the truth with respect to the motive for the crime. 

I have forgiven my father’s perpetrators, but we will continue to demand that the 

intellectual authors be investigated, as the murder of unionists in Colombia is the 

result of a systematic government policy. We know there is evidence of other perpetrators, including members of the national army. The investigation remains open, 

but with no follow-up of the evidence as requested, and no identification of other 

possible perpetrators. 

I am Yessika Hoyos Morales, one of many daughters of Colombian men and 

women, who like Jorge Darı ́o Hoyos Franco, were murdered with complete impunity. 

I am not alone. We are not alone. We are brothers and sisters united by hope, by 

dreams of justice, truth and freedom. We are Sons and Daughters for Remembering 
26

and Against Impunity, an organization that sprang from our need to oppose barbarism. With the good fortune of love and solidarity, we have found many older brothers and sisters around the world who keep us going on the path of hope with their 

encouragement and faith. We know that we are the children of the dreams of justice 

and equality of our parents, and it is for that very reason that we are ethically and 

morally obligated to build a great country, where there is respect for life, where 

there is the right to think, to dissent and to dream. 

Prepared Statement of Yessika Hoyos Morales (Spanish) 

Soy Yessika Hoyos Morales, hija de Jorge Darı ́o Hoyos Franco uno de los 2.690 

sindicalistas asesinados impunemente en Colombia. 

Ocho an ̃ os atra ́s vivı ́a con mi madre, mi hermana y mi padre en Fusagasuga ́. E ́ l 

era un hombre son ̃ ador, comprometido con las causas justas, a e ́l le dolı ́a en el alma 

la opresio ́n y la miseria, por eso desde muy joven se decidio ́ por la lucha sindical. 

Inicio ́ con organizaciones agrarias nacionales, y por su liderazgo llego ́ a la federacio ́n 

internacional de trabajadores agrarios y luego a la federacio ́n internacional de 

mineros. 

En nuestro pueblo, mi papi desarrollo ́ una amplı ́a labor social con los sindicatos, 

con organizaciones estudiantiles, de mujeres, en pos de reivindicar los derechos de 

las comunidades, labor por la que adquirio ́ reconocimiento y carin ̃ o de las personas. 

Mi papa ́ era un hombre alegre, generoso, nos ensen ̃ o ́ su ternura, su amor, y la 

solidaridad con la gente; e ́l era nuestro amigo y nuestro he ́roe, el hombre que nos 

daba consejos, con el que descubrimos el mundo. 

Desde nin ̃ a fui testigo de allanamientos a la casa por la fuerza pu ́ blica, de 

amenazas a mi papi, recibimos llamadas, sufragios, coronas fu ́nebres, persecuciones, 

por eso aprendı ́ que la actividad sindical en Colombia es peligrosa y que pensar y 

protestar pone en riesgo la vida. 

Sin embargo, e ́ramos felices hasta la noche del 3 de marzo de 2001, cuando dos 

sicarios confesos paramilitares dispararon repetidamente en la cara de mi papi 

hasta quitarle la vida. Mi madre y mi hermana, quien tan solo tenı ́a 14 an ̃ os, lo 

encontraron en el suelo, con la sangre corriendo por su cuerpo, ya sin su risa, sin 

sus suen ̃ os, sin el beso y el abrazo para darnos. 

Los asesinos cumplieron sus amenazas. Mi papa ́ cumplio ́ con su palabra pues 

jama ́s cedio ́ a la exigencia de abandonar la lucha social. Esa fue la primera muerte 

del lı ́der sindical, mi padre, pero luego los asesinos intentaron una segunda y 

definitiva muerte, esa que nos quieren imponer en Colombia, la que esta revestida 

de olvido e impunidad. 

El mismo dı ́a del funeral, la tragedia tomo otra cara, comenzaron las amenazas, 

hostigamientos, persecuciones contra nosotras, para que no fue ́semos a denunciar, 

para que no fue ́semos a reclamar. Por ello tuvimos que salir desplazadas a 

escondernos en Bogota ́, donde au ́n ası ́ fuimos ubicadas al punto que en un solo an ̃ o 

tuvimos que cambiar 5 veces de residencia. 

Y co ́mo en los otros 2.690 homicidios contra sindicalistas la impunidad empezo ́ a 

fraguarse desde la misma noche de ese horrendo crimen, cuando capturaron a los 

autores materiales, dos jo ́venes sicarios, a quienes de inmediato visito ́ en su celda 

un policı ́a quien les advirtio ́ lo que tenı ́an que decir en sus declaraciones. La 

hipo ́tesis de investigacio ́n forjada por las autoridades sen ̃ alo ́ que era un crimen 

ocasionado porque mi padre se habı ́a involucrado con la mujer de otro hombre. 

Tı ́pica explicacio ́n que dan las autoridades colombianas para ocultar la verdad, para 

negar que allı ́ se asesina a las personas por ser sindicalistas. 

Fiel a mi padre, siguiendo su ejemplo y pasio ́n por la verdad y la justicia, a los 

17 an ̃ os inicie la misma batalla que miles de jo ́venes, viudas, padres, hermanos han 

tenido que librar en busca de VERDAD, JUSTICIA Y REPARACION, derechos de 

las vı ́ctimas que son negados en mi paı ́s. Por ello otorgue poder a la Corporacio ́n 

Colectivo de Abogados ‘‘Jose ́ Alvear Restrepo’’ para que me representara como parte 

civil. 

En el an ̃ o 2003, los dos sicarios fueron condenados a 23 an ̃ os de prisio ́n, por 

homicidio agravado en persona protegida por ser mi padre un sindicalista. Esta 

tenue condena no significo ́ superacio ́n de la impunidad, pues la bu ́ squeda de los 

determinadores solo alcanzo ́ para vincular como persona ausente a un sub teniente 

de la policı ́a de apellido MONROY, a quien con posterioridad al crimen, utilizando 

otro mecanismo de impunidad, lo destituyeron retroactivamente en el mes de febrero 

de 2001, intentando demostrar que para el dı ́a 3 marzo de 2001 ya no era policı ́a 

activo, sin embargo en el proceso penal esta ́ demostrado que el homicidio de mi papi, 

lo planearon desde el mes de diciembre de 2000. 
27

El policı ́a MONROY siempre estuvo pro ́fugo, nunca se le capturo, en el mes de 

agosto 2007 fue condenado a 40 an ̃ os de prisio ́n por homicidio contra el sindicalista 

JORGE DARIO HOYOS FRANCO. Este hecho fue publicitado por el Estado 

colombiano como un gran logro de justicia, y tal vez hubiese sido un avance si no 

fuera porque descubrı ́, en diciembre del an ̃ o pasado, con un simple derecho de 

peticio ́n a la registraduria nacional del estado civil, que MONROY fallecio ́ desde el 

03 de mayo de 2006, es decir se condeno ́ a un muerto, al cual todavı ́a la fiscalı ́a busca. 

No obstante las dos condenas, donde los jueces colombianos han fallado que a mi 

papa ́ lo asesinaron por ser sindicalista, la fiscalı ́a, con el fin de seguir ocultando la 

verdad, hasta agosto de 2008 mantuvo la hipo ́tesis de un crimen pasional, fue 

necesario la presio ́n internacional para que esta reconociera la verdad en cuanto al mo ́vil del crimen. 

He perdonado a los asesinos materiales de mi padre, pero seguimos exigiendo que 

se investigue a los autores intelectuales pues el asesinato de sindicalistas en Colombia es producto de una sistema ́tica polı ́tica de Estado. Sabemos que hay pruebas de 

otros responsables incluyendo miembros del eje ́rcito nacional, la investigacio ́n sigue 

abierta pero sin practicar las pruebas solicitadas y sin vincular a otros posibles 

responsables. 

Soy Yessika Hoyos Morales, soy otra hija de hombres y mujeres colombianos que 

como Jorge Darı ́o Hoyos Franco fueron asesinados en total impunidad. No estoy 

sola, no estamos solos, somos hermanos unidos por la esperanza por los suen ̃ os de 

justicia, verdad y libertad. Somos Hijos e Hijas por la memoria y contra la 

impunidad, una organizacio ́n surgida de la necesidad de oponernos a la barbarie. 

Por la fortuna del amor y la solidaridad, hemos encontrado en todo el mundo 

muchos hermanos mayores que con su aliento y su fe nos mantienen vivos y en el 

camino de la esperanza. Tenemos la certeza de que somos hijos de los suen ̃ os de 

justicia e igualdad de nuestros padres, y que justamente por ello estamos en la 

obligacio ́n e ́tica y moral de construir un paı ́s grande en el que se respete la vida, 

el derecho a pensar, a disentir, a son ̃ ar. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Judge Sanchez? 

STATEMENT OF JOSE ́ NIRIO SA ́ NCHEZ, FORMER COLOMBIAN 

JUDGE IN SPECIAL COURT FOR LABOR–HOMICIDE CASES, 

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. I would like to extend a sincere and cordial greeting to all of those present. Thank you for inviting me. My name is Jose Nirio Sanchez, former second criminal 

judge of the specialized circuit of the Republic of Colombia. I held 

this post from July 1, 2007 until December 31, 2007. I served the 

Colombian government for 35 years. 

I had national jurisdiction to rule on acts of violence committed 

against labor union leaders and unionists. During my tenure as 

judge, I issued eight convictions. And my conclusion from this personal experience and from having read my colleagues’ rulings is 

that there is a clear pattern in all of these investigations. 

The public prosecutor formally orders an investigation, but does 

not carry it out fully. They make mistakes in legal classifications 

of the crime. And for one reason or another, they misdirect the investigations, and they fail to investigate the intellectual authors. 

I want to tell you about the facts and legal outcomes of three of 

the cases that I ruled on. In the case of the murder of Mr. Dario 

Hoyos, father of Yessika, who is here with us, the motives that led 

to the death of this labor union, community and civic leader were 

his union convictions and battles. The threats were not only aimed 

at him, but even at his family. 

However, the prosecutor developed another hypothesis, arguing 

that the death was a crime of passion. The evidence did not sup-
28

port this hypothesis, which was later rejected during the sentencing. 

Mr. Monroy, a former police officer, was sentenced to 40 years in 

prison for this crime. However, several days ago, I discovered that 

this sentence was in vain since the accused had died more than one 

year earlier. 

This crime, as in other cases, thus remains unpunished. The true 

intellectual authors were not brought to account. Also, it is disturbing that the prosecutor did not realize that a person with an 

outstanding arrest warrant was, in fact, deceased. And in this 

manner, the prosecutor wasted a large amount of physical and 

human resources that could have been used to clear up other criminal acts and to identify the intellectual authors of the crime. 

A second case—in the murder of three unionists in Arauca, Colombia, four Colombian servicemen and one civilian were sentenced 

to 40 years in prison as material authors because they conspired 

in their criminal intent. Their objective was to cause the death of 

the three unionists. 

From the moment these acts occurred, both those charged and 

those who were responsible for the operation, directly or indirectly, 

allowed the scene of the crime to be concealed, destroyed or 

changed in order to throw the investigation off course. In fact, the 

firing test on the person who was said to have fired the weapon 

came out negative as an inoperable pistol was placed upon that 

person. 

The material authors were convicted, but the officers higher up 

in the chain of command were not investigated. As far as their conduct, direction and responsibility for the outcome, Colonel Medina 

Corredor and two other captains never had to explain their behavior. They kept silent. They must at least be held accountable as 

guarantors, which is why I ordered they be investigated. 

I understand that the Inspector General of the nation removed 

them from their positions and disqualified them from holding official positions for 20 years. However, in this case as well, the prosecutors failed to investigate these officials, officers, even though 

they could have been tried along with the material authors. 

Lastly, in the murder of the unionist Luciano Romero, two material authors were sentenced to 40 years in prison. The deceased 

was preparing to testify as a witness in the policies of the 

transnational company, Nestle-Cicolac, at the session of the permanent people’s tribunal in Switzerland. Three labor union leaders 

from the same union as well as employees from the same company 

were also murdered under similar circumstances. 

I ordered an investigation of the case. And as always, verification 

of attested copies were ordered from the Nestle-Cicolac board in 

order to investigate the presumed participation in, and/or, determination of the murder of labor union leader Luciano Romero. Mr. 

Carlos Alberto Ve ́lez, in his capacity as Nestle-Cicolac’s chief of security for Latin America, sent a letter to the prosecutor’s office 

warning that if this investigation were to become public, it would 

seriously affect its reputation and foreign investment. 

And as a final conclusion, it is a systematic pattern that in all 

of these criminal acts, the prosecutor is satisfied with establishing 

the responsibility of the material authors, leaving out the intellec-
29

tual authors, who are the most important ones, given that they are 

the ones who sponsor, order the executions, put up the money, and 

they always remain in impunity. Thus, these crimes will not stop, 

since the true perpetrators are not prosecuted. 

The investigations are directed off course toward other 

hypotheses that the judge ultimately debunks in his ruling or accepts with no reservations whatsoever. By then, it is already too 

late. 

The evidence no longer exists and the authors disappear, when 

the normal thing would be for them to be identified in the initial 

phase of the investigation. This waste of resources causes an increase in crime and a decrease in the credibility of the institution, 

which is reflected in the unwillingness of witnesses to testify. 

And finally, I would like to say that I love my country very 

much, and that I am very pained by these murders committed 

against unionists and labor leaders. And I want to say that you are 

very brave for fighting for this cause, which is our cause. But this 

will surely have benefit for the entire international community. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Sanchez follows:]

Prepared Statement of Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez (English) 

I would like to extend a sincere and cordial greeting to all those present. Thank 

you for inviting me to help shed light on the truth regarding the criminal acts 

against Colombian labor union leaders. With my testimony, I hope to contribute to 

reducing these criminal acts to zero, and to making sure those that have been committed do not remain in impunity. 

My name is Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez, former 2nd criminal judge of the specialized circuit of the Republic of Colombia. I held this post from July 1, 2007 to December 

31, 2007, by unanimous designation. I was replaced January 12, 2008 in an election, 

in which I lost re-election by one vote. I served the Colombian government for 35 

years. 

I had national jurisdiction to rule on acts of violence committed against labor 

union leaders and unionists, as part of the program to fight impunity that the national government is pursuing. 

During my tenure as judge, I issued 8 convictions. My conclusion from this personal experience and from having read my colleagues’ rulings, is that there is a determining pattern in all of these investigations. The Public Prosecutor formally orders an investigation, but does not carry it out. They make mistakes in judicial classification of the crime. For one reason or another, they misdirect the investigations, 

and they fail to investigate the intellectual authors. 

I want to tell you about the facts and legal outcomes of three of the cases I ruled 

on. 

1. For the Murder of Mister Darı ́o Hoyos: The motives that led to the death of 

this labor union, community and civic leader were his union convictions and battles. 

The threats were not only directed at him, but even at his family. But the Public 

Prosecutor developed another hypothesis, arguing that the death was a crime of passion. The evidence did not support this hypothesis, which was later rejected in the 

sentence. 

Mr. Monroy was sentenced to 40 years in prison for this crime. However, several 

days ago, I discovered that this sentence was in vain, since the accused had died 

more than one year earlier. This case, like other cases, thus, remains in impunity. 

The true intellectual authors were not brought to account. Also, it is disturbing that 

the Public Prosecutor did not realize that a person with an outstanding arrest warrant was in fact deceased. In this manner, the Public Prosecutor wasted a large 

amount of physical and human resources that could have been used to clear up 

other criminal acts and to identify the intellectual authors of the crime. 

2. For the murder of three unionists in Arauca, Colombia, 4 Colombian servicemen and one civilian were sentenced to 40 years in prison as material authors because they conspired in their criminal intent. Their objective was to cause the death 

of the three unionists. From the moment these acts occurred, both those charged 

and those who were responsible for the operation, directly or indirectly, allowed the 
30

scene of the crime to be concealed, destroyed or changed, in order to throw the investigation off course (the firing test on the person who was said to have fired the 

weapon was negative, an inoperable pistol was placed on him). 

The material authors were convicted but the officers up the chain of command 

were never investigated. With regard to their conduct, direction and responsibility 

for the outcome, Coronel LUIS FRANCISCO MEDINA CORREDOR, and other officials, Captain HIZNARDO ALBERTO BRAVO ZAMBRANO and Captain LUIS 

EDUARDO CASTILLO ARBELAEZ, never explained their behavior. They remained 

silent. They must at least be held accountable as guarantors, which is why it was 

ordered they be investigated. I understand that the Inspector General of the Nation 

removed them from their posts, and disqualified them from holding official posts for 

20 years. However, in this case as well, the public prosecutors failed to investigate 

these officials, even though they could have been tried along with the material authors. 

3. For the murder of the unionist Luciano Romero, 2 material authors were sentenced to 40 years in prison and other accessory penalties. The deceased was preparing to testify as a witness to the policies of the transnational company, NESTLECICOLAC, at the session of the Permanent People’s Tribunal, which was to take 

place October 29 and 30, 2005, in Bern, Switzerland. Three labor union leaders from 

the Union of Food Industry Workers and former CICOLAC workers were also murdered in similar circumstances: VICTOR MIELES, ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ 

TORIBIO DE LA HOZ and HARRY LAGUNA. As always, verification of attested 

copies was ordered from the NESTLE-CICOLAC board, in order to investigate their 

presumed participation in, and/or, determination of the murder of labor union leader 

LUCIANO ROMERO. Mr. Carlos Alberto Ve ́lez, in his capacity as Chief of Security 

for Latin America, sent a letter to the Public Prosecutor, warning that if this investigation were to become public, it would seriously affect its reputation and foreign 

investment. As I considered the situation serious and abnormal, I ordered an investigation, as I stated earlier. 

Final Conclusion 

It is a systematic pattern that in all of these criminal acts, the Public Prosecutor 

is content to determine the responsibility of the material authors, leaving out the 

intellectual authors, who are the most important, given that they are the ones who 

sponsor, order the executions, put up the money, and always remain in impunity. 

Thus, these crimes will not stop, since the true perpetrators are not prosecuted. The 

investigations are directed off course toward other hypotheses that the judge ultimately debunks in his ruling, or accepts with no reservations whatsoever. Then, it 

is already too late. The evidence no longer exists and the authors disappear, when 

the normal thing would be for them to be identified in the initial phase of the investigation. This waste of resources causes an increase in crime and a decrease in the 

credibility of the institution, which is reflected in the unwillingness of witnesses to 

testify. 

Prepared Statement of Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez (Spanish) 

Un atento y cordial saludo a todos los presentes gracias por invitarme a contribuir 

al esclarecimiento de la verdad que se relaciona con los actos criminales contra la 

dirigencia sindical colombiana. Con mi testimonio pretendo que esta criminalidad se 

reduzca a cero y la existente no quede impune. 

Mi nombre es Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez, Exjuez 2nd. penal del circuito especializado—

de la repu ́blica de Colombia, ejercı ́ el cargo desde el primero de julio de 2007 al 31 

de diciembre de 2007, designacio ́n por unanimidad. Fui reemplazado en enero 12 de 

2008 en eleccio ́n en la que me falto ́ un voto para ser reelegido. Preste ́ mis servicios 

al estado Colombiano por 35 an ̃ os. 

Tenı ́a competencia nacional para fallar los hechos de violencia cometidos contra 

dirigentes sindicales y sindicalistas, dentro del programa de lucha contra la 

impunidad que adelanta el gobierno nacional. 

Durante el ejercicio como juez dicte 8 fallos condenatorios, mi conclusio ́n de esa 

experiencia personal y por haber leido los otros fallos de mis colegas, es que en todas 

estas investigaciones existe un patro ́n determinante la fiscalı ́a formalmente ordena 

una investigacio ́n pero no la realiza, se equivoca en la calificacio ́n jurı ́dica de los 

hechos, por una u otra razo ́n desvı ́a las investigaciones, y omite investigar los 

autores intelectuales. 

Quiero contarles los hechos y conclusiones jurı ́dicas de tres de los casos en que 

yo dicte fallos 
31

1- Por el Homicidio del sen ̃ or Darı ́o Hoyos: Los motivos que condujeron al deceso 

de este lı ́der sindical, comunitario y cı ́vico fueron sus convicciones y luchas 

sindicales. Desde un comienzo se establecio ́ que, las amenazas no solamente se 

cernı`an sobre e`l sino hasta su familia. Sin embargo, la Fiscalia desarrollo` otra 

hipo ́tesis, que era un crimen pasional. Las pruebas no sustentaron esta hipo ́tesis y 

esta se rechazo en la sentencia. 

El sen ̃ or Monroy fue sentenciado a 40 an ̃ os de prisio ́n. Sin embargo, hace unos 

dı ́as me entero que esta sentencia fue en vano puesto que el sentenciado habı ́a 

fallecido hacı ́a mas de un an ̃ o. Este como otros casos queda entonces en la 

impunidad. No se responsabilizaron los verdaderos autores intelectuales. Por otra 

parte, es preocupante que la Fiscalia no se dio cuenta que habı ́a fallecido una persona que tenı`a orden de captura. De esta manera, la Fiscalia desperdicio recursos 

fı`sicos y humanos que se habrı`an podido utilizar en el esclarecimiento de otros 

hechos delictivos y en la bu ́ squeda de los autores intelectuales del hecho. 

2- Por el homicidio de tres sindicalista en Arauca Colombia, fueron sentenciados 

a 40 an ̃ os de prisio ́n 4 militares colombianos y un civil en calidad de autores 

materiales porque convergieron en su voluntad dolosa, su objetivo era causar la 

muerte a los tres sindicalistas. Desde el primer instante de la ocurrencia de estos 

hechos, tanto los acusados como las personas que tenı ́an a cargo la operacio ́n directa 

o indirectamente permitieron que se ocultara, destruyera o modificara la escena, 

para desviar el curso de la investigacio ́n (la prueba de disparo resulto negativa a 

quien le imputaban haber disparado, colocandole una pistola inservible). 

Se condenaron los autores materiales pero no se investigaron los oficiales en la 

cadena de mando. Estos u ́ltimos nunca explicaron su comportamiento. Guardaron 

silencio. En lo que respecta a la conducta del Coronel LUIS FRANCISCO MEDINA 

CORREDOR, y de otros oficiales Capita ́n HIZNARDO ALBERTO BRAVO 

ZAMBRANO, Capita ́n LUIS EDUARDO CASTILLO ARBELAEZ, la direccio ́n y 

responsabilidad de su resultado; al menos deben responder como garantes, razo ́n por 

la que se ordeno` investigarlos. Tengo entendido que la procuradurı`a general de la 

Nacio`n los destituyo` y los inhabilito` para ejercer cargos oficiales durante 20 an ̃ os. 

Aquı` tambie`n la Fiscalı`a dejo` de investigar a estos oficiales, a pesar de que se les 

habrı`a podido resolver en el mismo fallo con los autores materiales. 

3- Por el homicidio del sindicalista Luciano Romero, fueron sentenciados 2 autores 

materiales a 40 an ̃ os de prisio ́n y dema ́s accesorias. El occiso se preparaba para ser 

testigo de la polı ́tica de la trasnacional NESTLE-CICOLAC, en la sesio ́n del Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos, que se realizarı ́a los dı ́as 29 y 30 de octubre de 

2005 en Berna Suiza, en similares circunstancias tambie ́n fueron asesinados 3 

dirigentes sindicales del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Alimentos y 

extrabajadores de CICOLAC: VICTOR MIELES, ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ 

TORIBIO DE LA HOZ y HARRY LAGUNA, como siempre se dispuso la compulsa 

de copias contra los directivos de NESTLE-CICOLAC , a efecto de investigar su 

presunta injerencia y/o determinacio ́n en el homicidio del lı ́der sindical LUCIANO 

ROMERO, y en razo`n a una carta que enviara el sen ̃ or Carlos Alberto Ve ́lez a la 

Fiscalı`a, en su condicio ́n de Gerente de Seguridad para Ame ́rica Latina, advirtiendo 

que de conocerse esta investigacio ́n se afectarı`a gravemente su reputacio`n y la 

inversio`n extranjera. Por considerar gra ́ve y ano ́mala la situacio ́n ordene ́ se 

investigara como dije anteriormente. 

Conclusio ́n final 

Es sistema ́tico que en todas los hechos criminales, la fiscalı ́a se conforme con la 

responsabilidad de los autores materiales, dejando de un lado los autores 

intelectuales, quienes son los ma ́s importantes por ser quienes auspician, ordenan 

las ejecuciones, aportan los dineros, quedando siempre en la impunidad. Por 

consiguiente los crı ́menes no pararan en razo ́n a que no se judicializa a verdaderos 

autores. Desvı ́an las investigaciones hacia otras hipo ́tesis que finalmente destruye 

el juez en el fallo o lo acepta sin reparo alguno, cuando ya es tarde, las pruebas 

se pierden y los autores desaparecen, siendo lo ma ́s normal descubrirlos en la etapa 

inicial de la investigacio ́n. Este desgaste de recursos hace que aumente la 

criminalidad y disminuya la credibilidad en la institucio ́n, feno ́meno que se refleja 

en el rechazo de los testigos en declarar. 

Chairman MILLER. Ms. McFarland? 
32

STATEMENT OF MARIA MCFARLAND SA ́ NCHEZ–MORENO, 

LATIN AMERICA SPECIALIST, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Thank you very much. Colombia has by far the 

world’s highest rate of trade unionist killings. As previously stated, 

more than 2,600 unionists are reported to have been killed since 

1986. And some 4,200 are reported to have received threats. 

More than 400 of the killings have happened during the administration of current president Alvaro Uribe. After hitting a peak in 

the 1990s, the rate of killings dropped for several years. But it has 

recently risen again to 49 killings in 2008 from 39 in 2007. Also, 

union members reported receiving 485 threats last year, almost 

twice the number recorded the previous year. 

The overwhelming majority of these cases have never been 

solved. Colombia’s attorney general reports that in the last 8 years 

there have been 171 convictions for anti-union violence. This number reflects a big jump in convictions starting a couple of years ago 

when the attorney general’s office established a specialized group 

of prosecutors to reopen many of the uninvestigated cases. 

But despite this increase, 96 percent of all the unionist killings 

remain unsolved. And even at the current rate of conviction with 

no new killings, it would take 37 years for the prosecutor to get 

through the backlog. 

Also, as we explained in a November letter to Speaker Pelosi, 

which I would like to submit for the record, there are serious reasons to be concerned about the sustainability of the increasing convictions. For one, the specialized prosecutors are only investigating 

1,104 of the total cases of 2,694 killings, 4,200 threats and other 

acts of violence. And they do not have a clear plan to review the 

remaining cases. 

Second, many of the convictions involve paramilitaries who are 

participating in what is known as the justice and peace process in 

which in exchange for their supposed demobilization, they will 

serve only very short sentences of 5 to 8 years for all of their 

crimes. These convictions do little to clarify the truth, as in many 

cases, the convicted paramilitaries simply accept responsibility for 

the crimes without explaining the circumstances surrounding them, 

who ordered them or why. 

And once the process is over, it is likely the conviction rates will 

drop again. Finally, in some of the most high profile cases like the 

investigation of Uribe’s former intelligence chief, Jorge Noguera for 

alleged involvement in union killings, there has been little 

progress. 

While some of the violence is attributable to the military, left 

wing guerrillas or to common crime, by far the largest share of the 

killings where perpetrators have been identified are attributable to 

paramilitary mafias who have deliberately persecuted unionists. So 

to address anti-union violence effectively, it is crucial that the government dismantle the paramilitary groups that are most responsible for it. But the government has failed to do so. 

The Uribe administration claims that the paramilitaries have demobilized. But scores of new groups closely linked to the 

paramilitaries are operating all over the country engaging in extortions, killings, forced disappearances, forced displacement and drug 
33

trafficking just like their predecessors. I have personally interviewed many of their victims. 

The bulk of the threats received by unionists last year have been 

signed by these groups. The paramilitaries have also infiltrated 

some of the highest circles of political power, including much of the 

Colombian congress. Seventy-four members of the congress, nearly 

all of whom are members of President Uribe’s coalition, are under 

investigation or have been convicted for collaborating with 

paramilitaries. Unfortunately, as I documented in our latest report, 

which I would also like to submit for the record, the Uribe administration has often taken steps that would undermine these investigations. 

President Uribe has launched personal public attacks against the 

supreme court justices who have led the investigations. And he has 

blocked meaningful efforts to reform the congress to eliminate 

paramilitary influence. 

Another problem the government must address is the large number of extrajudicial killings of civilians by the Colombian Army. 

The attorney general’s office is currently investigating cases involving more than 1,000 victims of such killings in recent years. Twenty-two of the union killings in the last few years are believed to 

have been executions by the military. 

It is difficult to take the government’s commitments to contain 

anti-union violence seriously when its security forces appear to be 

engaged in widespread executions of civilians. It is also difficult 

when senior government officials, including President Uribe himself, continuously make statements stigmatizing union activity and 

human rights work as linked to guerrillas like he did just last 

weekend. 

In sum, the Colombian government has a long way to go to make 

sure that workers in Colombia can exercise their rights. But the 

Colombian government senses that change has come to Washington 

and that more progress is expected. 

The United States should seize this opportunity by standing firm 

on the need for fundamental changes in Colombia and providing 

support to achieve those changes. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. McFarland follows:]

Prepared Statement of Maria McFarland Sa ́nchez-Moreno, Esq., Senior 

Americas Researcher, Human Rights Watch 

Mr. Chairman, Committee members: I am honored to appear before you today. 

Thank you for your invitation to address the situation of workers’ rights and violence against trade unionists in Colombia. 

I am the Senior Americas Researcher at Human Rights Watch, where I have been 

covering Colombia for several years. I frequently travel throughout different regions 

of the country to conduct research and interviews with a wide array of sources, and 

I have written numerous reports and public documents about the horrific abuses 

committed by left-wing guerrillas, paramilitary groups, as well as the armed forces 

in Colombia. 

Despite the rosy picture of the human rights situation that is often painted by 

Colombian government officials, Colombia to this day presents widespread human 

rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions of civilians, enforced disappearances, kidnappings, use of child soldiers and antipersonnel landmines, extortion and 

threats. More than 3 million Colombians are internally displaced, having been 

forced to flee their homes due to the violence. 
34

Violence against Trade Unionists 

One of the issues I monitor closely in Colombia is the plight of Colombia’s trade 

unionists. Over the last couple of decades, Colombia’s unions have suffered extreme 

violence, mostly at the hands of right-wing paramilitary groups that have deliberately targeted unions. 

In fact, Colombia has the highest rate of trade unionist killings in the world. According to the National Labor School (Escuela Nacional Sindical or ENS), Colombia’s leading organization monitoring labor rights, 2,694 unionists have been killed 

since 1986, the year the ENS started recording the rate of killings. In addition, 

some 4,200 unionists have reported receiving threats. 

The rate of yearly killings has fluctuated over time, increasing dramatically in the 

1990s, when paramilitary groups were rapidly expanding throughout the country, 

and then dropping again between 2001 and 2007. 

This reduction may be explained by many factors, including the consolidation of 

paramilitary control in many regions of Colombia starting around 2002, as well as 

the establishment of a protection program—partly funded and supported by the 

United States—for threatened union leaders. 

But according to statistics maintained by ENS after dropping to 39 in 2007, the 

number of killings of trade unionists has increased once again, to 49 in 2008. This 

represents a 25% increase in the number of killings compared to 2007. Of those 

killed in 2008, 16 were union leaders. In addition, the ENS recorded 485 threats 

against trade unionists in 2008, almost twice the number—246—recorded the previous year. 

The national government also recorded a substantial increase in trade unionist 

killings in 2008, going up from 26 in 2007 to 38 in 2008. The official statistics are 

lower than the ENS numbers because of differing definitions of who counts as a 

trade unionist, among other reasons. The Office of the Attorney General of Colombia 

(the Fiscalı ́a), however, uses numbers that are closer to the ENS’s, reporting 42 

trade unionist homicides in 2008. 

Some commentators—including the Washington Post’s editorial page—have 

sought to downplay the gravity of the problem by arguing that it is safer to be ‘‘in 

a union than to be an ordinary citizen,’’ noting that the rate of unionist killings is 

lower than the national homicide rate. But this rhetorical claim compares apples 

and oranges: the supposedly ‘‘ordinary’’ citizen includes many people at unusually 

high risk of being killed, including drug traffickers, criminals, and people living in 

combat zones, which skew statistical results. The national homicide rate (33 per 

100,000 in 2008) is exactly the same for all these people as it is for civilians in the 

safest neighborhood in the capital, Bogota. 

Such loose comparisons fluctuate easily: for example, as explained recently by Colombian political analyst Claudia Lo ́pez, if instead of looking at the rate of unionist 

killings, one looks at the rate of killings of union leaders for 2008, one finds that 

the homicide rate for union leaders in 2008 was approximately 48 per 100,000. In 

other words, union leaders are about 50% more likely to be killed than the supposedly ‘‘ordinary’’ citizen. Lo ́pez also points out that just looking at raw numbers, 

one finds that in 2002, 2003, and 2004, more trade unionists than police officers 

were killed each year in Colombia. 

Setting aside the statistical discussion, it’s important to bear in mind that trade 

unionists are not random victims who are being killed accidentally or in crossfire. 

While some of the killings are attributable to the military, guerrillas, or common 

crime, by far the largest share of the killings—based on the information compiled 

by the Office of the Attorney General as well as analyses by the ENS—are attributable to paramilitaries, who view labor organizing as a threat to their interests, 

and who stigmatize unionists as guerrilla collaborators. For example, the New York 

Times described in one article last year how a unionist was forcibly ‘‘disappeared,’’ 

burned with acid and killed after he participated in protests against paramilitary 

violence in March 2008. Such targeted killings—unlike common crime—have a profound chilling effect on workers’ ability to exercise their rights. 

Impunity 

An important factor perpetuating the violence is the overwhelming impunity in 

these cases. The Office of the Attorney General reports that from 2001 to this day, 

there have been 171 convictions in 130 cases of anti-union violence. Of these, 151 

convictions are for homicides, while 20 are listed as being for other crimes. 

This number reflects a substantial increase in yearly convictions starting in 2007, 

when the Attorney General’s office established a specialized group of prosecutors to 

reopen many of the uninvestigated cases. Between 2002 and 2006 the rate of convictions fluctuated between 7 and 12 per year. Then, in 2007, they jumped to 44, and 

they went up again, to 76, in 2008. 
35

Yet as the Colombian Commission of Jurists, a prominent Colombian human 

rights group, pointed out in a letter to Chairman Miller this week, 96 per cent of 

all trade unionist killings remain unsolved. At the current rate of convictions, it 

would take approximately 37 years for the prosecutors to get through the backlog. 

Also, as we explained in a November 20, 2008 letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi 

(which I would like to submit for the record), there are serious reasons to be concerned about the sustainability of this increase: 

1. The specialized prosecutors are not investigating the majority of reported cases. 

The Office of the Attorney General reports that as of January 20, 2009 the specialized prosecutors unit is only reviewing a total of 1,302 cases involving 1,544 victims of anti-union violence. They have only located the physical case files in 1,104 

of these cases. The cases under review include 610 cases involving the killings of 

816 victims, as well as 289 cases involving threats. 

In other words, the Attorney General’s office is reviewing less than one third of 

the 2,695 killings reported by the ENS and only a tiny percentage of the threats. 

When I met with representatives of the Office of the Attorney General last November, I asked what they planned to do with the thousands of other reported cases 

of threats and killings. They gave multiple explanations: 

First, the Office said that the specialized group was only looking at the cases that 

had already been reported to the International Labor Organization (ILO) at the time 

the specialized group was created. But the ENS and trade unions later submitted 

all information they have on all 2,685 cases recorded as of May 2008 to the ILO. 

It makes no sense to exclude many cases from investigation just based on the date 

on which they were reported to the ILO. 

Second, the Office said they had decided not to expand the number of cases assigned to the specialized prosecutors simply because they do not have the resources 

to handle that many cases. Thus, the remaining cases would be assigned to ordinary 

prosecutors who may be spread out around the country, who will not be focused specifically on anti-union violence and are more vulnerable to pressure or threats. This 

explanation is surprising in light of the vast resources the US Congress has already 

assigned to the Human Rights Unit, precisely to strengthen these sorts of investigations. It is also not a good reason to simply exclude more than half the cases from 

the specialized prosecutors’ workload, rather than organizing and prioritizing them 

in a useful manner. 

Third, the Office said that many of the cases had been inaccurately reported as 

trade unionist killings. According to the Office, in some cases the victims were not 

union members or had been killed for non-union-related reasons. Yet when Human 

Rights Watch asked the Office for a list of all the cases that the specialized group 

was investigating, as well as the list of cases that they had decided not to investigate because they did not really involve unionist killings, they refused to provide 

such a list. The Office has also refused to provide such lists to union representatives, making it impossible to have a meaningful discussion about the basis on 

which they are excluding many cases from investigation. 

2. Many convictions involve paramilitaries in the Justice and Peace process. 

One factor that appears to have contributed to the increase in convictions is that 

some paramilitary commanders participating in what is known as the ‘‘Justice and 

Peace’’ process have been accepting responsibility for unionist killings. But this 

means that once the Justice and Peace process is over, the rate of convictions is 

likely to quickly drop off. Also, the convictions in these cases often do little to further truth or justice. 

Under the ‘‘Justice and Peace Law,’’ paramilitaries known to be responsible for 

atrocities are given an opportunity to admit all their crimes. In exchange, they are 

set to receive a single reduced sentence of five to eight years, rather than the much 

longer sentences—up to 40 years, in some cases—that would normally be ordered 

in individual cases of trade unionist assassinations. 

The law began to be applied in 2007, around the same time as the convictions 

for unionist killings started to go up. Based on Human Rights Watch’s review of several of the rulings in these cases, as well as the statements of persons close to the 

investigations, a substantial share of the convictions in unionist cases are of 

paramilitaries who are participating in the Justice and Peace Law process. According to the Office of the Attorney General, of the 76 convictions obtained in 2008 (in 

57 cases), 50 were reached pursuant to plea bargains. The Office states that six of 

the convictions were obtained with ‘‘information from’’ the Justice and Peace Law 

process, but it does not specify how many of the convicted persons are Justice and 

Peace Law participants. In our review of a portion of the 2008 sentences, we found 

that a substantially larger number than six were convictions of Justice and Peace 

Law participants. The Office of the Attorney General also states that it has already 

prepared plea bargains for 75 individuals in the Justice and Peace Law process. 
36

The statements in these cases are often general. For example, paramilitary commanders like Ever Veloza (also known as ‘‘HH’’) have admitted having commanded 

responsibility for thousands of killings, including unionist killings. But they often 

do not describe the circumstances surrounding the killings or identify other accomplices or participants in the crime. As a result, these convictions often do little to 

establish the truth about the killings. 

3. Lack of progress in high-profile cases 

In some of the most high-profile cases of unionist killings there has been little 

progress. 

One example is the investigation of the former head of the National Intelligence 

service, Jorge Noguera. Noguera has been under investigation since 2005 for allegedly cooperating closely with paramilitary groups, including by giving sensitive information about trade unionists and others under government protection to 

paramilitaries who later targeted and killed some of the protected persons. The 

Noguera investigations have moved slowly and have repeatedly been delayed due 

to procedural errors. At this time, Noguera is under arrest pursuant to a December 

order by the Attorney General that found probable cause to hold him for collaborating with paramilitaries. Investigations for his alleged involvement in trade 

unionist killings have shown little signs of progress. 

Similarly, in the murder of labor leader Luciano Romero, despite a court order 

to investigate potential involvement of the Nestle Corporation in the killings, the 

Office of the Attorney General has failed to move any such investigation forward. 

When I interviewed officials from the Office in November, they told me that they 

had not pursued the investigation of Nestle because they disagreed with the judge. 

Stigmatization of Union Activity 

High-level officials continue to stigmatize legitimate union activity as a cover for 

the abusive left-wing guerrillas. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has in the past 

dismissed international concerns over the violence, describing the unionists as ‘‘a 

bunch of criminals dressed up as unionists.’’

More recently, President Uribe has just last week suggested that those who criticize his government’s human rights record abroad, or oppose the US-Colombia Free 

Trade Agreement, belong to a sort of ‘‘intellectual block’’ of the Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. 

Such statements put unionists and human rights defenders at grave risk, suggesting that the violence against them might be justified and that accountability for 

the killings may not be a priority for the government. 

Paramilitary Violence 

Most trade unionist killings have never been investigated, so it is impossible to 

know exactly who is responsible and why all the killings have been committed. 

What is clear is that in many cases, the killers have been mafia-like paramilitary 

groups, who have admitted to deliberately persecuting unions. 

As of March 2008, the Office of the Attorney General reported that of all the persons convicted in unionist killings, 73 (the largest share) belonged to paramilitary 

groups. 

As a result, to address the violence against unionists in a sustained manner, it 

is crucial that the Colombian government effectively dismantle the paramilitary 

groups that have historically posed the greatest threat to unions. 

Uribe administration officials often dismiss concerns about paramilitary violence 

by claiming that the paramilitaries are now ‘‘extinct’’ thanks to the government’s 

demobilization program. But while more than 30,000 individuals supposedly demobilized, Colombian prosecutors have turned up evidence that many of them were 

not paramilitaries at all, but civilians recruited to pose as paramilitaries. Law enforcement authorities never investigated most of them. 

Meanwhile, scores of ‘‘new’’ groups closely linked to the paramilitaries and composed of thousands of members are operating all over the country. 

A recent report by the Colombian organization Nuevo Arco Iris estimates, based 

on official data, that there are 21 of these armed groups operating in 246 municipalities around the country, and that they could be composed of over 10,000 members. 

These groups are engaging in extortion, killings, forced displacement, and drug 

trafficking—just like their predecessors. Several foreign embassies in Bogota, the 

Organization of American States’ mission verifying the demobilization, and dozens 

of human rights defenders have reported receiving threats from the new groups 

since 2007. 

In Medellı ́n, where the homicide rate had been dropping substantially for years, 

violence has shot up, with murders jumping from 771 in 2007 to 1044 in 2008—
37

a 35% increase, largely due to the activities of these new groups. The former head 

of the prosecutor’s office in the city, who is also the brother of Colombia’s Interior 

and Justice Minister, is now under investigation for alleged links to these groups. 

The new groups are also contributing to a rise in internal displacement. In fact, 

starting in 2004, around the same time paramilitaries supposedly started to demobilize, the rate of internal displacement in the country began steadily rising. The Colombian organization CODHES, which monitors internal displacement, has reported 

that 270,675 people had become internally displaced in just the first six months of 

last year—a 41% increase in displacement over the first six months of 2007. It is 

still collecting data on the second half of 2008. In a large share of these cases, the 

victims report being displaced by new armed groups that operate in the regions that 

were historically under paramilitary control. 

There are good reasons to believe that these new armed groups pose a serious 

threat to trade unionists. In fact, the bulk of the threats received by unionists last 

year have been signed by groups purporting to be paramilitaries, such as the Black 

Eagles. And the regions where the most cases of anti-union violence were registered 

in 2008 are the same regions where the new armed groups are most active. These 

include, for example, Santander, Norte de Santander, Magdalena, and the coffeegrowing states of Quindı ́o, Risaralda and Caldas. 

Paramilitary Infiltration of Colombia’s Democratic Institutions 

Colombia’s democracy today faces a serious threat due to paramilitary infiltration 

of key institutions like the Colombian Congress, which is now undergoing a major 

crisis of legitimacy, one that is unprecedented not only in Colombia but in all of 

Latin America. Seventy-four members of the Congress—including approximately 

35% of the Senate—are under investigation or have been convicted for rigging elections or collaborating with paramilitaries. Nearly all the congresspersons under investigation are members of President Uribe’s coalition. 

The fact that these investigations are occurring at all is of historic importance. 

But these gains are still tentative and fragile. They are the result of a fortuitous 

combination of factors, including the independence and courage of a select group of 

judges and prosecutors, a Constitutional Court ruling that created incentives for 

paramilitary commanders to disclose some of the truth about their crimes, the actions of Colombian civil society and a handful of journalists, and international pressure on the Colombian government. 

And unfortunately, as we documented in a report we released in October 2008, 

entitled ‘‘Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia’’ (which I would like to submit for the record) the administration of President 

Uribe is squandering much of the opportunity to truly dismantle paramilitaries’ mafias. While there has been progress in some areas, some of the administration’s actions are undermining the investigations that have the best chance of making a difference. 

Of greatest concern, the Uribe administration has repeatedly launched public personal attacks on the Supreme Court and its members in what increasingly looks like 

a concerted campaign to smear and discredit the Court. 

It has also opposed and effectively blocked meaningful efforts to reform the Congress to eliminate paramilitary influence. In particular, Uribe blocked an effort to 

apply what is known as the ‘‘empty chair reform’’ to current members of Congress. 

That reform would have sanctioned political parties linked to paramilitaries, barring 

them from simply replacing the congresspersons who are investigated or convicted 

with other politicians who were elected in the same manner. 

What is at stake here is Colombia’s future: whether its institutions will be able 

to break free of the control of those who have relied on organized crime and often 

horrific human rights abuses to secure power, and whether they will be able to fulfill their constitutional roles unhindered by fear, violence, and fraud. 

Also at stake is the future of labor rights in the country. As long as important 

Colombian institutions remain under the influence of paramilitaries who have persecuted trade unionists, it will be impossible for union members to freely exercise 

their rights. 

Extrajudicial executions by the Army 

In recent years there has been a substantial rise in the number of extrajudicial 

killings of civilians attributed to the Colombian Army. Under pressure to demonstrate operational results by increasing their body count, army members apparently take civilians from their homes or workplaces, kill them, and then dress them 

up to claim them as combatants killed in action. The Attorney General’s Office is 

currently investigating cases involving more than a thousand victims of such 

extrajudicial executions dating back to mid-2003. 
38

While most of these cases do not involve trade unionists, an increasingly significant share of trade unionist killings are believed to be attributable to state actors. 

Twelve per cent of the killings recorded by the ENS in 2008 were believed to have 

been committed by state actors. 

One significant case involves the military’s killing of three trade unionists in the 

region of Arauca in 2003. Unfortunately, while lower level soldiers have been convicted of the killings, prosecutors appear to have made little progress in investigating the potential responsibility of military officers up the chain of command. 

More broadly, the large number of extrajudicial executions being attributed to the 

Army has contributed to the broader climate of intimidation that severely affects 

union activity. And the government’s commitment to contain anti-union violence 

cannot be taken seriously so long as its security forces appear to be engaged in 

widespread executions of civilians. 

The Defense Ministry has issued directives indicating that such killings are impermissible. But such directives have been regularly undermined by statements 

from high government officials, including President Uribe, who until recently accused human rights defenders who reported these killings of colluding with the 

guerrillas in an orchestrated campaign to discredit the military. 

Since October of last year, after a major scandal over the military’s alleged execution of several young men from the capital of Bogota, the Uribe administration has 

started to more explicitly acknowledge the problem and has dismissed several soldiers and officers from some military units in connection with some of the most well 

known killings. However, it is crucial that these dismissals be followed by effective 

criminal investigations, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for executions—including commanding officers who may have allowed or encouraged them—

that have been reported on a regular basis all over the country. It is too early at 

this time to determine whether such punishment will occur. 

It is also crucial that the government review and reform military policies, such 

as its rewards and promotions system, that may be creating incentives to produce 

false results by executing civilians. 

Colombia is not meeting international labor standards 

Anti-union violence is so pervasive in Colombia, that it is impossible for workers 

to fully exercise their rights. This is a fundamental problem that must be confronted 

head-on if workers’ rights are ever to be respected in that country. 

But violence is not the only problem affecting labor rights in Colombia. Colombia’s 

labor law itself also falls short of international standards, as reported repeatedly by 

the International Labor Organization (ILO) in its annual review of Colombia. The 

Colombian government has attempted to downplay the shortcomings, asserting in 

a 2008 embassy publication that legal reforms passed in 2000, combined with additional ‘‘legislative, regulatory and judicial opinions during the Uribe Administration’’ 

have eliminated ‘‘most’’ of the inconsistencies between Colombian labor law and ILO 

norms. But that same year, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 

Conventions and Recommendations (Committee of Experts) noted in its own 2008 

report that glaring problems remain. The problems criticized by the ILO include obstacles to trade union registration, violations of workers’ rights to strike, and the 

use of cooperatives to undermine workers’ right to organize. 

Human Rights and the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 

Human Rights Watch takes no position on free trade per se. But we believe any 

free trade agreement should be premised on respect for fundamental human rights, 

especially the rights of the workers producing the goods to be traded. In Colombia, 

those conditions are far from being met. That’s why we have called on Congress to 

delay consideration of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) at this time, 

until Colombia shows concrete and sustained results in addressing the violence 

against trade unionists, impunity for that violence, and the broader human rights 

context that makes it difficult for workers to exercise their rights. 

Without concrete and sustained results in addressing these basic problems, ongoing anti-union violence, impunity and human rights abuses would, as President 

Barack Obama has noted, make a ‘‘mockery’’ of labor protections in the agreement. 

Colombia should be in compliance with such protections before the accord takes effect, as has generally been demanded with FTA commercial provisions. 

We believe that the US Congress’s decision to delay consideration of the FTA has 

put pressure on the Colombian government to take some initial steps to address 

these issues. As previously described, the Office of the Attorney General has established a specialized group of prosecutors to investigate some of the country’s thousands of unsolved cases of trade unionist killings, and the group has obtained an 

increase in convictions. Yet this progress is still fragile and incomplete, and there 
39

are many reasons (as previously described) to be concerned about the sustainability 

of this effort. And in other areas (such as the rate of violence), Colombia has been 

sliding back this year. Meanwhile, the government has yet to address the rise of 

successor groups to the paramilitaries, the influence of these groups in the political 

system, continuing stigmatization of unionists, and the Army’s disturbing practice 

of extrajudicial executions of civilians. 

Among other steps, Colombia should be required to meet concrete benchmarks in 

the following areas: • Demonstrating a sustained and meaningful increase in well-grounded convictions of perpetrators of anti-union violence. These should include convictions in a 

sufficient number of the 2,695 killings of trade unionists reported since 1986 to 

show a significant shift in the long-term pattern of impunity. The convictions should 

be based on more than the mere admissions of guilt by paramilitary commanders 

participating in the ‘‘Justice and Peace’’ process, as these confessions often do little 

to establish the truth about the killings or accountability for the perpetrators. To 

achieve this goal, there are many steps Colombia has yet to take. For example, it 

must ensure that the specialized prosecutors for labor union cases handle all the 

reported cases, not just the reduced number they are currently investigating. • Dismantling the paramilitary groups that pose the greatest threat to unions, by 

holding accountable paramilitaries and their accomplices in the military, political 

system, and business sectors; confiscating paramilitaries’ illegally obtained assets 

and returning stolen lands to their rightful owners; and actively investigating and 

confronting new or never demobilized paramilitary groups that have appeared in the 

wake of the supposed demobilization of the AUC paramilitaries. • Ensuring accountability for the extrajudicial executions of civilians that the 

Army has allegedly been committing by the hundreds in recent years. It is crucial 

that the government response go beyond mere internal investigations and dismissals of officers to also include criminal investigations, prosecutions, and appropriate 

punishment, as well as the reform of policies that may create incentives for such 

executions. 

In any case, Congress should make clear that, given the serious crisis of legitimacy in the current Colombian Congress, the Free Trade Agreement should not be 

considered until the Colombian Congress has been meaningfully reformed to remove 

paramilitary influence, or until after the current Colombian Congress ends its term 

in 2010. The United States should urge the Uribe administration to promptly take 

the necessary measures to clean up its political system. Such measures include approving political and electoral reforms to sanction the political parties that have, in 

past elections, allowed paramilitaries to infiltrate them. In particular, political parties should lose any seats held by congresspersons who are convicted or resign due 

to investigations for collaborating with paramilitaries. The Uribe administration 

should provide full support to criminal investigations of public officials, ceasing its 

attacks on the courts and investigators handling the parapolitics investigations. 

The United States can take several additional steps to maximize the effectiveness 

of this principled approach to the Colombia FTA. 

First, it should make clear that the delay in the Colombia FTA does not reflect 

political or anti-trade agendas. Given Colombia’s specific labor rights and human 

rights situation, the Colombia FTA should not be bundled with the Panama FTA 

or any other free trade agreement. 

Second, the US should substantially increase assistance to the institutions on the 

front lines of this fight. This means not only supporting the specialized group of 

prosecutors investigating trade unionist killings, but more broadly increasing aid to 

institutions—including the Attorney General’s Office and Supreme Court—that are 

conducting investigations of paramilitaries’ past crimes and networks (including 

paramilitaries’ accomplices in the military and political system). The United States 

should also increase aid to institutions and organizations—such as the Ombudsman’s Office’s Early Warning System, as well as civil society groups—that monitor 

the actions of armed groups, including the new paramilitary groups, and play a key 

role in preventing human rights abuses around the country. 

Given what is at stake for Colombia—the success or failure of a generational 

struggle to break the hold of brutal mafias over the country’s political life, and in 

turn the ability of Colombia’s workers to exercise their rights without fear of being 

threatened or killed—and given the Uribe government’s reluctance to engage in that 

struggle except when under pressure to do so, the United States should not seek 

FTA ratification prematurely or in exchange for partial measures. The Uribe government recognizes that change has come to Washington and senses that it will 

have to demonstrate greater progress if there is to be any chance for the FTA. The 

United States should seize this opportunity by standing firm on the need for fundamental changes in Colombia, and providing support to achieve those changes. 
40

Colombia still has a lot of work to do before the FTA should be considered. By 

continuing to delay the deal’s approval, the United States will show that human 

rights are not just words, but rather basic values that have real consequences for 

US policy. 

[The study, ‘‘Breaking the Grip? Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia,’’ Human Rights Watch, October 2008, 

may be accessed at the following Internet address:]

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia1008web.pdf 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Roberts? 

STATEMENT OF JAMES ROBERTS, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE 

HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. 

I am here today in my personal capacity. And the title of my testimony states my theme, which is that the best protection for both 

Colombian and American workers is stronger market-based democratic institutions in Colombia. 

Colombia is one of America’s best friends in the Caribbean-Andean region. The government is one of the oldest in South America 

and is solidly committed to its partnership with the United States 

and is following a similar path toward market-based democracy 

and rule of law that has made the United States the most prosperous nation on Earth. 

A decade ago, Colombia was wracked by violence and seized with 

fear, drug pins, narco-funded leftists, terrorists and guerrillas, far 

right paramilitaries and an assortment of other gangsters operated 

with impunity while government, military and law enforcement officials cowered in their offices and barracks. Today by comparison, 

Colombia is bustling with people excited to see their homeland 

growing more prosperous and at last more peaceful. 

The majority of Colombians are focused on enhancing their peace 

and prosperity by accelerating Colombia incorporation into the 

globalized economy. And it is interesting to note that many proglobalization Colombians are unionized workers enjoying the prosperity from the hundreds of thousands of jobs created in Colombian 

export industries. 

Progress is explained by several factors. Plan Colombia, the U.S. 

joint effort with the U.S. government started under former President Bill Clinton. President Alvaro Uribe has been an exceptionally 

effective president—and a new spirit among the Colombian people. 

In my written testimony, I outline the historical context the tragic 

violence that has plagued Colombia for 60 years. Indeed, violence 

in the entire region from Mexico through the Andes is far too high. 

The combination of FARC, drug traffickers and paramilitaries 

nearly destroyed the Colombian state. The restoration of order and 

civilian authority with the help of Plan Colombia has allowed 

President Uribe’s free market policies to bear fruit. And economic 

growth in Colombia has taken off. 

Indeed, our recently published index of economic freedom the 

Heritage Foundation publishes with the Wall Street Journal ranks 

Colombia’s economy as 72nd freest in the world out of 179 coun-
41

tries. By comparison, in neighboring Venezuela, the score held at 

the bottom at 174 just ahead of Cuba. And in Ecuador, which is 

also headed by a populist leftist government, did not do much better at a score of 137. 

In addition to Plan Colombia, to stabilize market-based democracy, President Uribe and former President Bush signed the U.S. 

Colombia Free Trade Agreement in February of 2006. The FTA is 

much more than just a trade agreement. It would help Colombia 

and the United States complete a contiguous free trade zone alone 

the entire Pacific rim. It would further stabilize many Latin nations from Mexico through Central America and into the Andes in 

their struggles against both extreme poverty in certain segments of 

the populations and the malignant affects of narco-terror on their 

societies. 

It would also increase U.S. exports to Colombia. Regrettably, the 

Congress has delayed approval of the U.S./Colombia FTA. Protectionist U.S. labor unions and anti-globalization leftist groups have 

joined with far left allies in the region to try to block the Colombia 

FTA. Their main argument, as we have heard this morning, is that 

the history of violence against leaders of Colombian trade unions 

and allegations that Colombia has tolerated or sanctioned violence 

and impunity for extrajudicial killings should disqualify Colombia 

for an FTA. 

I would argue that Congress put the violence and the benefits to 

Colombia and the United States into context. Stronger democratic 

institutions in Colombia will reduce violence. It is clear that all of 

Colombian society has suffered from violence. But when Uribe took 

office, there were almost 29,000 people murdered every year in Colombia. That rate has dropped. 

But the Washington Post reported last year that only .2 percent 

of victims were members of trade unions. Some of them were members of the household. And union membership in Colombia is just 

2 percent of the population. 

Plan Colombia has really helped, and Uribe has had, as we have 

heard, a demobilization program. Thirty thousand AUC and other 

paramilitaries demobilized, a truth and reconciliation process. Violence is down. Extraditions are up, including key narco-traffickers 

due to the—strategy of the United States to face prosecution. The 

murder rate has dropped dramatically by 40 percent. Kidnappings 

are down 83 percent, terror attacks down 75. Murders of trade 

unions also dropped 75 percent, although, as was noted, they did 

increase very slightly in 2008. 

There has been also a dramatic drop in extrajudicial killings. 

And it is not, I don’t think, true to allege that impunity is still tolerated, although some AUC and paramilitaries have become common criminals. 

Judicial reform has also helped Colombia with help of the USAID 

going to a U.S. model of accusatory system. The labor standards 

have been improved. General Barry McAffrey has reported that the 

human rights record has improved. And, in fact, progress has been 

made across the board in poverty reduction, education and health 

in Colombia since 1999. 

The U.S./Colombia FTA will lock in these gains for both countries. It will spur additional economic development in Colombia and 
42

push the Colombian government to build up and strengthen institutions and judicial/economic regulation. And a full spectrum of 

voices across the aisle, Republican and Democrat, have supported 

its approval. And if it is not approved, we think that it will have 

serious negative consequences. So I would urge the Congress to approve it. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Roberts follows:]

Prepared Statement of James M. Roberts, Research Fellow for Economic 

Freedom and Growth, Center for International Trade and Economics, the 

Heritage Foundation 

My name is Jim Roberts. I am the Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and 

Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining Heritage in 2007, I served for 25 years as a Foreign Service 

Officer with the State Department and worked on a variety of economic and political 

issues in a number of Latin American countries. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position 

of The Heritage Foundation. 

Colombia is one of America’s best friends in the Caribbean—Andean region. The 

Colombian government—the oldest democracy in South America—is solidly committed to its partnership with the United States and is following a similar path toward market-based democracy and strong rule of law that has made the United 

States the most prosperous nation in world history. 

A decade ago Colombia was a nation wracked by violence and seized with fear, 

where drug kingpins, narco-funded leftist terrorists and guerillas, far-right 

paramilitaries, and an assortment of other gangsters operated with impunity, while 

government, military, and law enforcement officials cowered in their offices and barracks. 

Today, by comparison, Colombia is again bustling with people who are excited to 

see their homeland growing more prosperous and, at last, more peaceful. The vast 

majority of Colombians are focused on enhancing their peace and prosperity by accelerating Colombia’s incorporation into the globalized economy. Interestingly, many 

of these pro-globalization Colombians are unionized workers enjoying the prosperity 

created in recent years by the hundreds of thousands of jobs in Colombian export 

industries (e.g., cut flowers, mining, petroleum products, coffee, textiles, sugar, and 

bananas). 

In the intervening years, many things changed, but they can be summarized in 

a few words: Plan Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe, and a new spirit among the 

Colombian people. Plan Colombia is a bold, multi-year program begun in 1999 by 

former President Bill Clinton and President Andres Pastrana, Uribe’s predecessor. 

Through this plan, which was continued and strengthened under former President 

George W. Bush, the two countries began rebuilding the Colombian state. Plan Colombia has helped the Colombian government regain control of territory and extend 

security to the towns and the countryside. Progress has been especially dramatic 

since 2002 when President Uribe took office and Congress significantly increased 

U.S. funding for Plan Colombia. 

A History of Violence 

Colombia’s tragic history of violence in the modern era goes back to at least 1948, 

when revolutionaries began rioting to protest the assassination of Jorge Eliecer 

Gaitan, a lawyer and somewhat populist leftist politician who was running for president against the conservative oligarchy then in power.1

Thousands perished in the Bogotazo, as the riots came to be known, including Colombian soldiers, revolutionaries, and innocent bystanders. Colombia’s major political parties were unable to put a stop to the extreme levels of violence (La Violencia) 

triggered by the Bogotazo until a decade later in 1958, after more than 200,000 Colombians had been killed. The 1970s and 1980s saw the rise of violent leftist guerilla warfare groups such as the Marxist-oriented Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC), the Colombian Liberation Army (ELN) and M-19 movement. During this insurgency by the FARC and ELN, drug cartels in Cali and Medellin dramatically increased cocaine production and smuggling. Drug traffickers enlisted 

guerrillas to make direct assaults on the government as occurred in October 1985. 

By the late 1980s, Pablo Escobar, the notorious leader of the Medellin Cartel, had 

become the seventh richest man and the most feared terrorist in the world. His 

power was such that he threatened ‘‘to usurp the Colombian state.’’ 2
43

Colombians’ penchant for resolving disputes through violence has many root 

causes, including the longstanding existence of criminal and violent narco-terror/

trafficking gangs; the Colombian government’s lack of effective control in the past 

over much of its vast territory (the combined size of California and Texas); the 

fiercely independent and stubborn nature of the average hard scrapple Colombian, 

who must carve out a living from often rough and inhospitable terrain; and the long 

history of class warfare that has been stoked, organized, and funded by Marxist revolutionary groups over the past 60 years. Other countries in the region have also 

been disproportionately affected by violence, for many of the same reasons. 

Colombia’s Ongoing Struggle for Modernity and Prosperity 

The FARC is a long-time enemy of Colombian democracy. Long isolated in the Colombian jungles, FARC leaders are out of touch with the 21st century. They reject 

market-based democracy, individual freedoms, urban life, and modernity in general. 

Their visions of Colombia’s future would follow in the footsteps of the apostles of 

revolutionary violence from Mao Zedong to Che Guevara. Colombia government officials say that negotiations with the FARC are very difficult, since there is little the 

government can offer to them. 

FARC continued to pursue the overthrow of the government of Colombia during 

the 1990s, but more worldly FARC members also turned to the lucrative and fastgrowing businesses of drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. The resulting violence led some far-right landowners in Colombia to form paramilitaries to protect 

their property in the absence of effective governmental authority. The government’s 

negotiations with the FARC ended in 2002 after the FARC turned a safe haven 

twice the size of El Salvador into a laboratory for violence, misrule, drug trafficking, 

and kidnapping.3

The best known of the paramilitary groups was the United Self-Defense Forces 

of Colombia (AUC),4 which waged war against the left and the government in the 

general chaos generated by the armed left and the drug trade. AUC members engaged in a vicious guerrilla campaign against the FARC and the ELN, drug traffickers, and the Colombian army. Some AUC members were also corrupted by the 

temptation of easy money from narco-trafficking, and a significant number of large 

landowners in Colombia who sponsored paramilitaries were the drug lords themselves. The combination of FARC, drug traffickers, and paramilitaries nearly destroyed the Colombian state. 

Defending Market-based Democracy in Colombia 

The restoration of order and civilian authority has allowed President Uribe’s free 

market policies to bear fruit, and economic growth in Colombia has taken off. The 

gross domestic product (GDP) has been growing at an increasing rate since Uribe 

took office, reaching an estimated 7 percent in 2007 5 before falling back slightly last 

year in the wake of the worldwide economic slowdown. Colombia’s economic growth 

has been spurred by the duty-free access it has enjoyed under the Andean Trade 

Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), [which] gives Colombia access to 

the U.S. market as a way to reduce poverty and fight the drug trade.’’ 6

The 2009 Index of Economic Freedom, which was recently published by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal and scored 179 countries worldwide, 

ranked Colombia’s economy at 62.3 out of a possible 100 (with 0 equaling ‘‘repressed’’ and 100 indicating ‘‘free’’), making it the world’s 72nd freest economy. Colombia is ranked 15th out of 29 countries in the Latin America/Caribbean region.7

By comparison, neighboring Venezuela’s score fell all the way to the bottom of the 

2009 Index, to 174th place (just ahead of Cuba),8 while Ecuador was not much higher ranked at 137th out of 179 countries.9

For the first time in memory people are enjoying the freedom of safely walking 

Colombia’s once mean streets. Uribe’s popularity has soared along with the economy, while the favorable rating of the FARC has plummeted to almost zero.10

The U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement 

To stabilize market-based democracy, President Uribe and former President 

George W. Bush negotiated the U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which 

the two governments signed in February 2006. It is much more than just a simple 

trade agreement. The Colombia FTA would help the United States complete a contiguous free trade zone along the Pacific Rim from Canada to Chile and further stabilize many Latin nations from Mexico through Central America and into the Andean region in their struggles against both the extreme poverty in segments of their 

populations and the malignant effects of narco-terror on their societies. Importantly, 

the FTA would also increase U.S. exports to Colombia and would seal a deeper partnership between two nations that are long-time friends and great defenders of market-based democracy. The FTA would fortify a bulwark against the rising tide of 
44

Cha ́vism that nearly surrounds Columbia and threatens to undermine U.S. hemispheric interests. 

Regrettably, Congress has delayed approval of the U.S.–Colombia FTA. Protectionist U.S. labor unions and anti-globalization leftist groups have joined with farleft allies in the region to try to block Congressional approval of the FTA. 

On the surface at least, their main argument against the FTA is that a history 

of violence against leaders of Colombian trade unions and allegations that the Colombian government has tolerated or even sanctioned that violence should disqualify 

Colombia from further consideration for a FTA with the United States. However, 

these opponents conspicuously ignore the historical context of the violence (both 

within Colombia as well as in the region) as well as the considerable progress the 

Uribe government has made in reducing it. 

Stronger Democratic Institutions in Colombia Will Reduce Violence 

FTA opponents place heavy emphasis on the tragic history of violence against Colombian labor leaders and the alleged impunity for their government assailants. All 

of Colombian society, including union members, has clearly suffered from the 

horrifically high murder rate of the past few decades. However, more than half of 

all union members are in the Colombian public sector, with teachers comprising the 

largest union in the public sector. Given the nature of their work and the lack of 

any direct connection to paramilitaries sponsored by large landowners, most killings 

of teachers were likely the result of apolitical, ‘‘normal’’ motives (e.g., robbery and 

crimes of passion). 

Over the years certain labor union members and leaders were undeniably targeted for assassination by paramilitaries and others in Colombia. Yet while the 

AFL-CIO reports the overall toll of violence against teachers and other union members, it fails note that the vast majority of the ‘‘2,500 murders of trade unionists 

since 1986’’ 11 occurred prior to 2001. According to statistics from the Embassy of 

Colombia, the number of murders of union members in Colombia has dropped drastically since 2001, one year before Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was sworn into 

office. In 2001 and 2007, union killings totaled roughly 200 killings annually. The 

number fell by half in 2003 and has declined since then.12

By the time President Uribe took office in 2002, almost 29,000 Colombians were 

being murdered annually. Many politicians from Uribe’s own political party were 

among the dead. While a few teachers were certainly killed because of their leftist 

ideology, a large number of the killings should not be included in the AFL-CIO’s 

‘‘union killings’’ figures. Many of the murders involved persons in union members’ 

households, not the union members themselves. A high percentage of them occurred 

for reasons unrelated to union affiliation. As The Washington Post recently noted: 

‘‘There were 17,198 murders in 2007. Of the dead, only 39 (0.226 percent) were even 

members of trade unions, let alone leaders or activists, according to the Colombian 

labor movement. (Union members make up just under 2 percent of the Colombian 

population.)’’ 13

Strengthened Colombian Government Institutions Have Reduced Violence 

Plan Colombia and a strong, market based economy have helped President Uribe’s 

government to achieve many successes to reduce violence in Colombia. 

Demobilization: The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative reports that more 

than 30,000 AUC and other paramilitaries have been demobilized since 2005, when 

the Colombian government implemented the Justice and Peace Law, which set the 

rules for the demobilization process.14

Truth and Reconciliation: Under the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, over 1600 

bodies of some of the victims of the FARC and the AUC have been recovered and 

their families have been partially compensated with assets seized for a reparation 

fund. There are more people now in jail in Colombia for human rights violations 

that at any other similar (post-conflict) period in the history of any Latin American 

country.15

Violence Down: As the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently 

noted, the FARC and other drug-traffickers are on the run, and violence is down 

significantly. The government has ‘‘a legitimate state presence in all of Colombia’s 

1,099 municipalities’’ and ‘‘[t]he guerrillas have been driven out of many areas that 

they previously dominated and their military capability sapped by the resurgence 

of state security force.’’16

Extraditions up: Another indicator of the success of Plan Colombia, and a development also very helpful to U.S. law enforcement efforts in the war against drugs, is 

the dramatic increase in the number of significant narcotics traffickers extradited 

to face prosecution in the United States since President Uribe took office. 
45

Dropping Murder Rate: When President Uribe assumed power, violence was ripping the very fabric of the Colombian nation. However, the overall murder rate has 

dropped by 40 percent, kidnappings are down 83 percent, and terror attacks are 

down 76 percent.17 Plan Colombia has helped to cut cocaine production and smuggling significantly.18 The streets of Medellin, once ruled by Pablo Escobar, are now 

safe enough for visits by senior Bush Administration and congressional officials.19

The number of murders of trade unionists has dropped by 75 percent.20 Although 

the number of trade unionist murders increased very slightly in 2008, to 32, the 

Uribe government has maintained and accelerated its efforts to reduce the level to 

zero.21

One pro-FTA Colombian union leader’s courageous advocacy of the U.S.–Colombia 

trade agreement apparently cost him his life. Jairo Giraldo Rey was murdered in 

his hometown of Cali in November 2007, just before he was to travel to Washington 

with other pro-FTA Colombian union leaders to lobby Congress to pass the agreement. As reporter Monica Showalter noted, ‘‘Giraldo’s murder not only silenced an 

unexpected voice for free trade, it also jacked up union killings data to stoke the 

case in the U.S. against Colombia’s pact.’’ 22

Dramatic Drop in Extrajudicial Killings: A constant refrain heard from U.S. and 

Colombian leftist NGOs and unions is that the paramilitaries can still act with impunity and are protected by the Colombian government. This allegation is false. 

While extrajudicial killings are still occurring, they have been greatly reduced. 

President Uribe made it clear from the day he took office that his government would 

not tolerate paramilitary activity and would prosecute criminals in the AUC and 

other far-right groups. In fact, nearly all of the paramilitaries have been demobilized and disbanded under the Uribe administration. 

Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he Colombian government has tripled spending on protection for 

unionists, human rights activists, and other at-risk individuals and established a 

special unit to prosecute crimes against trade unionists.’’ 23 In 2008, the Colombian 

government spent US$42 million on this security program to protect at-risk individuals.24 Of the 9,400 individuals benefiting from individual protection schemes—

which range from bodyguards and armored vehicles to cell phone networks—1,959 

are unionists, which is an increase from 2006, when unionists accounted for 1,504 

of the 6,097 individuals being protected.25

The Prosecutor General’s office has led the charge in dealing with past killings, 

resolving 73 cases of union member murder and convicting 156 individuals since 

2001. In November 2006, a special labor Sub-unit was created in the Office of the 

Prosecutor General to focus on labor union killings and has since resolved 40 cases 

and convicted 67 people.26 The unit has three specialized judges, 19 prosecutors, 22 

additional lawyers, and almost 100 judicial police investigators.27

Adoption of U.S. Legal System Model: With technical assistance from the U.S. 

government, beginning in 2004 Colombia switched from the Napoleonic inquisitorial 

legal system to the accusatory, open-court criminal trial procedures based upon U.S. 

and English common law. These reforms will strengthen Colombia’s judicial system 

and make it more efficient with a speedier trial process. The transition to the new 

system will take time, however, and the first new law school students rained in the 

new procedures only graduated recently.28

Improved Labor Standards: The AFL-CIO alleges that the Colombian government 

is ‘‘not in compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards.’’ 29 Yet a November 2007 ILO report concluded, based on a visit to Colombia, 

that the labor situation in Colombia is positive and that the government has made 

significant progress. The ILO report praised the ‘‘the cooperation of the Government 

of Colombia with the ILO officials in their work to conclude the Tripartite Agreement on Freedom of Association and Democracy.’’ 30

Opponents are also willfully blind to the many successes stemming from a wide 

variety of substantial USAID programs that are jointly funded with the Colombian 

government. These programs target development assistance to address the problems 

that festered during the ‘‘lost years’’ of rampant violence. These programs train all 

employers—small, medium, and large—in proactively ensuring compliance with all 

Colombian labor laws on occupational safety, child labor, working hours, and other 

issues of concern to Colombian workers. 

These programs are also intended to bring more workers into formal economy, 

where they can receive benefits and contribute to the tax base. USAID and the Colombian government are working cooperatively with business owners, but are also 

establishing protocols to enforce laws with a system of fines and incentives. The Colombian Labor Ministry is also funding programs to increase availability of vocational training programs.31

Improved Human Rights Record. Human rights activists opposed to the FTA have 

faulted the Colombian government’s treatment of Internally Displaced Persons 
46

(IDPs).32 However, some of those persons labeled as IDPs by the left are actually 

economic migrants who have gravitated to large cities in search of work and a better 

life, as is common in many developing countries. Furthermore, numerous neutral observers have noted tremendous progress on human rights in recent years. Retired 

General Barry McCaffrey, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command and 

Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, visited Colombia 

in October 2007 and reported that ‘‘[t]he human rights situation has improved immeasurably during the President Uribe tenure.’’ 33

According to a report from the Colombian government: 

Impressive progress has been made in poverty reduction, education and health 

since 1999. Increased stability has allowed the government to provide more and better services to the country’s poor. • Social spending represents 40 percent of the national budget • Poverty levels have decreased since 1999 from 55 percent to 45 percent • Programs have been developed to improve infant nutrition and health, encourage school enrollment, empower women, and provide food for millions of children • More than 20 million of the country’s poor receive full or partial health coverage • Infant and child mortality have decreased • Child immunizations have steadily increased • Student completion of elementary school has increased to almost 100 percent, 

while the number of completing secondary school has also significantly risen.34

The U.S.–Colombia FTA Will Lock-in Gains for Both Countries 

My colleague at Heritage, Dr. Ray Walser, has noted that former Bolivian president Jorge Quiroga recently observed the irony that two key ‘‘commodity exports’’ 

(oil and cocaine) are entering the U.S. duty free from several countries in Latin 

America, while the U.S. Congress debates the duty-free entry of legal products from 

pro-American Colombia (which already has duty-free access to the U.S. market for 

most of its products through ATPDEA).35

The FTA will spur additional economic development in Colombia and, just as importantly, push the Colombian government to build up and strengthen government 

institutions and judicial and economic regulation to ensure that continued economic 

progress will not depend on any particular political personalities. 

As Dr. Walser has already reported to Congress, a full spectrum of the wisest 

voices—U.S. and Latin American presidents, former senior officials, both Democratic 

and Republican—and the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institute, the 

American Enterprise Institute, The Heritage Foundation, to name a few, as well as 

mainstream-media editorials are unanimous in urging swift passage of pending 

agreements with Colombia and Panama.36 Colombia will certainly be willing to 

work with the Obama Administration and Congress to accommodate additional reasonable measures aimed at protecting labor and environmental standards. 

If the Congress votes down the Colombia FTA, it will deliver a major psychological victory to the FARC, the narco-traffickers that the U.S. has battled for decades in Colombia, and other enemies of market-based democracy in the region. It 

will seriously risk the progress and momentum made by the Plan Colombia war on 

drugs on which the U.S. has spent hundreds of millions of dollars during the Clinton and Bush Administrations. 

Iinflicting economic punishment on a U.S. ally in the Andean region by defeating 

the FTA is not in the U.S. interests. Left-wing populism is fueled by poverty and 

lack of opportunities, as seen in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. To counter this 

possibility in Colombia, the development of strong democratic institutions must be 

accompanied by continued economic development and growth.37

A defeated FTA might also force Colombia reluctantly into closer ties with a very 

eager and suddenly conciliatory Venezuela, which is already Colombia’s second largest export market after the U.S., and Colombia cannot afford to ignore it. Cha ́vez’s 

dangling of petroleum carrots will not be ignored by the Colombians. If Colombia 

is spurned by the U.S., it will continue to seek trade agreements with many other 

countries (e.g., Canada and Mexico) and trading blocs, such as the EU, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). 

This would only further isolate the U.S. 

A failed FTA will lead Colombia and other Latin American countries to conclude 

that the U.S. is not a reliable partner. It will also fuel a return to narco-trafficking 

and other illicit activity by the urban and rural poor, who would not benefit from 

the many jobs that would be created by the legitimate alternative economic development that will be created by the Colombia FTA. 

Congress should quickly approve the pending trade agreements with Colombia 

and Panama. These actions will send a strong signal that the new Congress and 

the Obama Administration will be adopting a forward-looking trade policy agenda 
47

that emphasizes the creation of new U.S. jobs through expanded export opportunities. 

ENDNOTES

1 Brian Latell, After Fidel: Raul Castro and the Future of Cuba’s Revolution: The Inside Story 

of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 

101—106. 2Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Penguin 

Books, 2001), p. 15. 3 Author’s notes from visit to Bogota, Columbia, December 2007. 

4Peter DeShazo, Phillip McLean, and Tanya Primiani, Back from the Brink: Evaluating 

Progress in Colombia, 1997-2007 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies Press, 2007), p. 6, at www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071112-backfromthebrink-web.pdf. 5 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008, at 

www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx (April 9, 2008). 6 Christopher A. Padilla, Under Secretary for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce ‘‘Outlook on the Americas 2008,’’ remarks at Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America, Coral Gables, Florida, January 24, 2008, at www.ita.doc.gov/press/

speeches/padilla—012408.asp (April 14, 2008). 7Terry Miller and Kim R. Holmes, 2009 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The 

Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2009), pp. 135-136, at www.heritage.org/

research/features/index/countries.cfm. 8 Ibid., pp 423-424

9 Ibid., pp. 163-164

10Author’s notes from visit to Bogota, Colombia, December 2007. 11 James Parks, ‘‘Act Now to Stop Colombia Free Trade Deal,’’ AFL-CIO Weblog, March 24, 

2008, at http://blog.aflcio.org/2008/03/24/act-now-to-stop-colombia-free-trade-deal (April 5, 

2008). 12 Embassy of Colombia, ‘‘Progress Report: Strengthening the Rights, Benefits and Security of 

Unions,’’ October 2007, and the Colombia Ministry of Social Protection, cited in Daniel Griswold 

and Juan Carlos Hidalgo, ‘‘A U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Strengthening Democracy 

and Progress in Latin America,’’ Cato Institute Free Trade Bulletin No. 32, February 7, 2008, 

Figure 1, at www.freetrade.org/node/839 (March 17, 2008). 13 Editorial, ‘‘Columbia’s Case,’’ The Washington Post, April 18, 2008, p. A14, at 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/18/AR2008041802900.html (April 

21, 2008). 14Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘‘Columbia FTA Facts,’’ March 2008, at 

www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade—Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia—FTA/asset—upload—file144—

13716.pdf (April 11, 2008). 15 Embassy of Colombia, ‘‘Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice and Labor Rights,’’ 

Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at www.colombiaemb.org). 16DeShazo et al., Back from the Brink, p. viii. 17Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘‘Columbia FTA Facts.’’ 18 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 

‘‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2008,’’ March 2008, at www.state.gov/p/inl/

rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100776.htm (April 21, 2008). 19Press release, ‘‘Secretary Gutierrez to Lead Fourth Congressional Delegation to Colombia,’’ 

U.S. Department of Commerce, February 28, 2007, at www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/

PressReleases—FactSheets/PROD01—005275 (April 5, 2008). 20 Hugh Bronstein, ‘‘Colombia Trade Deal Dead This Year, U.S. Unions Say,’’ The Washington 

Post, February 12, 2008. 21 Embassy of Colombia, ‘‘Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice and Labor Rights,’’ 

Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at www.colombiaemb.org). See also Jose ́ de 

Co ́rdoba, ‘‘Colombia’s Uribe Says Passage of Free-Trade Pact Is Critical,’’ The Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2008. 22Monica Showalter, ‘‘U.S.–Colombia Deal Faces Labor Deceit,’’ Investor’s Business Daily, 

April 7, 2008, at www.investors.com/editorial/IBDArticles.asp?artsec=16&issue=20080407 (April 

11, 2008). 23Doug Palmer, ‘‘Labor Leaders to Visit Colombia As Bush Presses for Vote,’’ Reuters, February 7, 2008, at www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0739641220080207 (February 

19, 2008). 24 Embassy of Colombia, ‘‘Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice and Labor Rights,’’ 

Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at www.colombiaemb.org). 25Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘‘Columbia FTA Facts,’’ and author’s notes, meeting 

with U.S. Embassy officials in Bogota, Columbia, December 2007. 26 Ibid. 27 Embassy of Colombia, ‘‘Colombia: Actions to Advance Labor Justice and Labor Rights,’’ 

Washington, DC, November 2008 (also available at www.colombiaemb.org). 28 Ibid. 29 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, ‘‘Worker’s Rights, 

Violence, and Impunity in Colombia,’’ January 9, 2008, p. 8, at www.aflcio.org/issues/

jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/colombia—briefing.pdf (April 5, 2008). 30 U.N. International Labour Office, ‘‘Fourth Supplementary Report: Implementation Process 

of the Tripartite Agreement on Freedom of Association and Democracy in Colombia,’’ GB.300/

20/4, November 1, 2007, para. 8, at www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed—norm/—relconf/

documents/meetingdocument/wcms—087328.pdf (April 5, 2008). 
48

31 U.S. Agency for International Development, ‘‘FY 2006 Budget Justification to the U.S. Congress,’’ s.v. ‘‘Colombia Program: Alternative Development,’’ June 14, 2005, at www.usaid.gov/

policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/pdf/co514-008.pdf (December 13, 2007), and author’s notes, meeting 

with USAID officials, U.S. Embassy, Bogota, Colombia, December 5, 2007. 32 News release, ‘‘Colombia: Death Threats Drive Thousands from Their Homes Every Year,’’ 

International Committee of the Red Cross, February 4, 2008, at www.icrc.org/web/eng/

siteeng0.nsf/html/colombia-news-020408!OpenDocument (April 5, 2008), and Human Rights 

Watch, Displaced and Discarded—The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Bogota ́ and 

Cartagena, October 2005, at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia1005 (April 5, 2008). 33General Barry McCaffrey, quoted in Embassy of Colombia (Washington, D.C.), Colombia: 

Perspectives on Progress, January 2008, p. 5, at www.colombiaemb.org/docs/

2008perspectivesonprogressreport.pdf (April 5, 2008). 34 Ibid, p. 11 (original bullet points). 35 Ray Walser, Ph. D., ‘‘U.S Policy toward Latin America in 2009 and Beyond,’’ Testimony before The Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United 

States House of Representatives, February 4, 2009 36 (From Walser Testimony) Some examples recommending approval include: Jose Miguel 

Insulza, Secretary General, Organization of American States (OAS), ‘‘Recognize and Build on 

Our Progress,’’ Americas Quarterly, Fall 2008, pp 103—105, at http://as.americas-society.org/

article.php?id=1332 (January 28, 2009); Council on Foreign Relations, ‘‘U.S.—Latin America Relations: A New Direction For A New Reality,’’ Independent Task Force Report No. 60. pp. 17—

19; ‘‘Rethinking U.S.—Latin Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for A Turbulent World,’’ Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November 2008, p. 22; and ‘‘Democrats 

Support Colombia FTA,’’ Latin Business Chronicle, April 21, 2008, at http://

www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=2314 (January 28, 2009). 37Griswold and Hidalgo, ‘‘A U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement,’’ Cato Institute, Center for 

Trade Policy Studies, February 7, 2008, at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-032.pdf 

(February 11, 2009) 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you 

And thank you to all of the witnesses for your testimony. 

Mr. Sanin, I would like to ask you a question. And then I would 

like to have Judge Sanchez comment on the question. 

The question is to Mr. Sanin, in your written testimony, you 

state that almost 75 percent of the violence against union members 

and leaders is concentrated against just 30 labor unions that are 

in six of Colombia’s departments, suggesting that those unions 

have experienced most of the violence. And you raised the question 

that, given this fact, and what appear to be the targets of much 

of the violence, that the attorney general’s office might rethink how 

they are prosecuting the cases, especially if you were trying to get 

to the intellectual authors of that violence. 

And then I would like to have Judge Sanchez comment on this 

question and the answer also since he has raised the same question 

about how do you move the prosecution to the intellectual authors. 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. Yes, thank you very much. What 

we would like to bring up here is that the method that the attorney 

general’s office uses is a case by case methodology. It is something 

that allows them to see the trees but they can’t see the forest of 

anti-union violence. 

What we are saying is that we need to be clear in the investigations, that the concentration of these cases against 30 unions and 

in six departments has a very unique character. And we need to 

talk about having a systematic way of investigating this as a global 

problem. 

In this way, we would get not only the actual perpetrators of 

these crimes, but also the intellectual authors. And more importantly, we need to get behind to what their motivation is, what the 

reasons are and who benefits from these crimes. That is it. I will 

let the judge comment now. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 
49

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. Thank you for letting me use 

the floor. I suppose we could present a potential solution here, 

which is that of institutional and political commitment from the 

government of Colombia. However, there is one more aspect. And 

that is a personal, deeply rooted commitment, both from the prosecutors and the judges. First from the prosecutors, they must be 

willing to investigate so that the judge is then able to rule. 

However, the problem is that for both judges and prosecutors, 

sometimes they see these incidents as one more case file, a simple, 

routine number to be filed and dealt with. But there is no desire 

to go in-depth to get to the intellectual authors behind these 

crimes. It is the intellectual authors that generate the violence. 

So there is nothing that can be done if we don’t get a personal 

commitment from prosecutors and judges and from the Colombian 

government. We need to get political will from them. It is that simple. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Hoyos, you have also made an effort to try and identify the 

intellectual authors of the murder of your father. Can you tell us 

what that entails? 

Ms. HOYOS [through translator]. It has been a real struggle for 

me to try to identify the intellectual authors of my father’s murder. 

The fact is that nobody shows the will to identify those people. In 

fact, the fact is there is a state policy to do away with and eliminate all of these union people. 

This hasn’t been easy for me. It has been hurtful, painful because it is the state, the government that should be investigating 

these things. But I have had to face this pain of interrogating the 

material actors of these crimes. I have had a face-to-face interview 

with the man who killed my father in my attempt to try to find 

out who the intellectual authors are behind this crime. 

And although I have made some progress, I keep running up 

against the brick wall of impunity in Colombia. There really is no 

will to investigate these cases. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I will turn to Mr. Souder. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I listened to all the 

statements in the anteroom and read through all the documents. 

I have a question, Mr. Miller. I am sorry I missed the start. Did 

you insert into the record the correspondence with the Colombian 

embassy? 

Chairman MILLER. Yes, yes. 

Mr. SOUDER. Okay, good, thank you. There are obviously different perspectives here. And one of my frustrations—I have 

worked the narcotics area since I was first elected to Congress and 

have been to Colombia at least 12 times or more. That the American people already are struggling with a mislabeling of Colombia. 

It is for one a beautiful country. And it would be nice if when people come in with criticism that they would remind the American 

people what a beautiful country it is rather than just criticizing 

their country because all America hears is criticizing Colombia. 

That Congressman Frank and I have sponsored legislation and 

worked to try to open up the cruise ships. In the Cartagena, as we 
50

saw the violence go down, there has been an incredible drop in violence in the nation of Colombia. 

A lot of people think of Colombia solely as cocaine or maybe coffee or maybe emeralds. But it is a very diversified economy. Most 

of the flowers in America—you can go to the huge areas on 

Medellin as well as Bogota and throughout the country, and they 

will be all the way to Indiana in 48 hours coming in overnight into 

Miami and spreading around. I think, 67 percent of cut flowers in 

America come from Colombia. 

The cement industry, the coal industry, the huge coal mines that 

are open again—you were once our eighth largest supplier of oil 

until FARC cut the lines and cut the rails, which are now mostly 

getting reopened. But it is a country that, unlike most of Latin 

America where you have 2 or 3 percent of the people having all the 

wealth, is arguably the biggest middle class. 

Yes, there are still rich families. Those rich families still dominate. But compared to the rest of Latin America, is an extraordinary story of a middle-class development, of a spread society that 

has still great poverty, as there is all over Latin America. But it 

is an extraordinary success story and becoming more of a success 

story. 

Killing Pablo is not all of Colombia. Nor is this terrible violence. 

Anyone who has a family member killed, any person who is killed 

is a tremendous tragedy. And it is really sad that prosecutions 

aren’t going fully forth in every country in the world where that 

happens, including in Colombia. 

But we need to get this in perspective because there was really 

minimal perspective here, that violence—Colombia is also the oldest democracy in Latin America, by the way, and successful democracy—that narcotics, mostly because of problems in the United 

States as well as in Europe, have driven an incredible problem of 

violence throughout the country. There was always violence. It has 

gone up and down. 

But the incredible problem of violence—to put it in perspective, 

whether you believe it is 42 or slightly higher to 80 homicides in 

the trade union movement, we are talking about basically last year, 

which was an improved year, homicides totaling 17,000. And we 

are debating whether it is 40 or 80 in a country where there is 

17,000, which, by the way, is a drop from 27,000 that when I first 

went to Colombia in my first term about 12 years, 11 years ago, 

I guess it was, when we actually went in. 

After a period of time where you couldn’t even move anywhere, 

we could just go in for 3 hours. Then we could stay overnight. The 

last few times I have been into Medellin, you could wander around 

if you needed to. If you wanted to walk, you could walk. Up where 

the coal mine was, where the railroads had been cut and they are 

no longer cut, at one point, somewhere near 80 percent of the mayors and councils in the country were unoccupied because the leaders had been assassinated. There has been an incredible turnaround in Colombia. 

We need to make sure that the judicial system progresses. We 

have poured money into making the judicial system try to progress. 

But, you know, there is only so much the United States can do to 

tell countries when we say follow the rule of law, you have to do 
51

it our way or the highway. And that we have seen improvements. 

We need to make more improvements. 

But this selective, what I believe is reliving the 1980s, the FARC 

may have started like the Sandinistas or Guatemala or Salvador. 

But it has turned into drug thugs. Then the business groups, admittedly probably anti-union as well, formed paramilitaries that 

communicated violence throughout the country. Then those 

paramilitaries went off on their own and became drug thugs. And 

that some of those people then were interrelated. And as they try 

to clean up, their parties are going to be interrelated, some of 

them. Medellin is a classic example of the struggle there with that. 

But to not stress the progress and only highlight a small sector 

of the country is a terrible disservice to the nation of Colombia, to 

this government that is working hard to do it, to a president of 

their country who had his father assassinated, a vice president who 

was kidnapped, who has taken on his own area where the 

paramilitaries in Medellin and tried to work with them. It is not 

as easy as it is made sound. 

And I would like to hear in general some praise of Colombia for 

their progress, not just harp, harp, harp, criticize. Human Rights 

Watch when I met with them the first time—I was sent there because I was favorable to trying to deal with Human Rights Watch. 

Robin Kirk has written a good book that shows some of the trouble. 

But Human Rights Watch has had selective vision on what they 

say in Colombia and has become, in my opinion, a discredited flack 

and that your numbers when you tried to relate in your testimony 

that the Bogota versus the general population assassination rate, 

without saying that most union members were not in Bogota and 

that Bogota has, in fact, changed, that the mere presentation that 

you made to this Congress and some of the others are so academically flawed as to be seen as partisan, not really trying to help the 

United States deal with a very difficult problem. 

And that is how do we, in fact, if we do a free trade agreement, 

work with your government to protect union rights. I agree with 

the premise. It is terrible what happened to this lady’s father and 

anybody else who gets killed, whether they are union members or 

others in Colombia. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Hare? 

Mr. HARE. Well, I don’t know where to start. To my friend who, 

you know, was talking about the flowers. I had an opportunity with 

several other members of Congress to meet some women who came 

from Colombia and worked in the flower industry. And I saw what 

their hands looked like. I saw and heard the hours that they had 

to work, the treatment that they were subjected to—would not be 

tolerated in this country. 

I can’t for the life of me believe that—with Valentine’s Day coming up I can tell you I am not sending my wife flowers. And I am 

doing so because for those people who are having to go through 

that type of a situation every day. I will do the candy route, and 

they can bag the flowers. 

I will tell you, Mr. Roberts, I could not disagree with you more. 

You have brought a wonderful paint brush for our country and tell-
52

ing us just how great things are. Yet I am looking at numbers that 

2,694 murders, 96 percent of them unsolved, people who lose their 

father and aren’t prosecuted. And if they are, the prosecutions are 

a sham. 

You talk about a trade agreement. You mentioned trade unionists, which I happen to be one. And I take great pride in that. So 

I thank you for that compliment. 

But I have to tell you if we are supposed to pass a trade agreement at some point with the country, I would think that it would 

be inherent upon this Congress and upon all Americans to want to 

trade with a country who has basic fundamental rights and respects them. And with all due respect to the numbers that you 

have given to us today, you know, I don’t think that is going to 

happen. And I don’t think it ought to happen until the act is 

cleaned up. 

It may have been reduced. But I can tell you that wouldn’t be 

tolerated in this country. And we are supposed to look at a trade 

deal when this young woman’s father and this judge was fired simply because he had the unmitigated gall to prosecute people. So, 

you know, with all due respect to your facts and your figures, I find 

it appalling that this is still going on and the numbers are going 

up. 

And while some people say, well, maybe it has gone from only 

39 to 49, these are human beings. They are fathers. They are mothers. They are sons. They are daughters. 

You have young people getting together trying to—have to find 

out because the government won’t do it and they are covering it up. 

And everybody in this room knows it. And, you know, I just—with 

all due respect, you know—you also mentioned the term protectionist. And then I will ask Dr. Sanchez a question. 

If protectionist means to me protecting the lives of people who 

want to have and work in an industry, whatever that industry is, 

protecting their lives so that they don’t have to go home and have 

their sons and daughters see them shot before their very eyes and 

then be harassed at the funeral of their father—if that is protectionism, then, again, I will wear that as a badge of honor. 

Let me just say, Judge Sanchez, you presided over a case that 

Representative Grijalva and I circulated a dear colleague letter on 

Juan Carlos Ramirez Ray. And you also ordered the Colombian attorney general’s office to conduct an investigation into the role of 

the prison director and the prison supervisor in his killing. Do you 

know if the attorney general ever pursued anyone beyond the hired 

guns in this case? 

In other words, we have heard a lot about the intellectual authors. And let me ask you two other quick questions because I 

know my time is going to run out. Do you see the government undertaking any real effort to fully investigate cases? Or is it content 

in most cases to just convict the gunman but not follow the evidence to the intellectual authors? 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. Thank you. Regarding the 

case of Juan Carlos Ramirez, he was, in fact, murdered in front of 

his mother. No one gave him any help. And he was killed by members of the AUC, the self-defense forces in Colombia. 
53

Unfortunately, the prosecutors did not investigate the intellectual authors of the crime, and they investigated only some of the 

material authors of the crime. In fact, they dropped an investigation versus a sergeant who was indirectly involved in order to avoid 

a total impunity. However, we later found out that this sergeant 

was having a love affair with the director of the prison. So I ordered an investigation of that prison official as a possible participant as an intellectual author. 

To date we have no information at all on the outcome of that investigation of that case. And that is what we need. We need reporting in order to tell the community what happens with these investigations and what are the outcomes. 

Going back to the case of Juan Carlos Ramirez, he was a young 

man who was murdered along with others because of his unionist 

beliefs. He was a young man of about 25 years of age or so. And 

he lived with his mother. And basically he was a person who fought 

for the rights of others. 

This particular murder took place when he was made fun of in 

front of a formation. He was threatened by prison officials. He was 

told that he would be murdered by the AUC. And, in fact, the AUC 

did back up that threat. It was a member of the AUC who ended 

up killing him. 

For me this is a shameful situation as a Colombian. It pains me 

to see this taking place in my country. And that is why I am here. 

I am here to try to put an end to these murders. It is precisely because my country is beautiful that I am here, that I want to put 

an end to this so that it can be a more beautiful country, so that 

all of you can go visit there without any major risk. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman [speaking Spanish]. 

Mr. Roberts, I had a delegation from Colombia in my office several months ago, union leaders and business leaders. And they 

were really wanting us to do the Colombia Free Trade Agreement, 

wondering why we couldn’t move forward on this because they really wanted it for the betterment of their businesses, their unions, 

their family situation and their country. 

As you know, our economy has been experiencing severe hardships. Can you explain how a continued delay of passage of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement impairs our economy and holds back 

American workers? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you, sir. Yes, I agree that there are—our research has indicated many unionized workers in Colombia, as I 

stated, as I testified, as in favor of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement. And I also met with the leaders of some of those unions. And 

they understand that Colombia’s future is in a globalized economy 

and that they will benefit and their children will benefit where 

they will have more prosperity if they go that route rather than try 

to go backwards into a system of autarchy and socialism. 

I would compare Colombia’s situation with Mexico’s in that 

whereas Mexico has benefited from having the NAFTA in place 

now for more than 10 years and has had a substantial increase in 

the middle class jobs, Mexico is currently suffering from a terrible 

problem with narco-terrorists, especially in the Northern part of 
54

the country. Whereas in Colombia, they need that FTA to catch up 

to where Mexico is in terms of institution building. But they also 

need—whereas Plan Colombia has been more successful 

counterinsurgency at this point than the Merida Initiative, which 

we also support expanding and funding. 

In terms of U.S. jobs, clearly, the last count I saw was that U.S. 

manufacturers and people—United States companies selling to Colombia had to pay $1 billion in tariffs every year. That makes us 

less competitive. 

That means jobs at Caterpillar and other places are not there because we are not able to sell into a country like Colombia where 

they do have a vibrant economy, where they do need tremendous 

investment in infrastructure that can only be done if the country 

has jobs and is producing tax revenues. And that will come with 

the continuation of the globalization process, I think, in Colombia. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. What provisions specifically are contained within 

the Colombia Free Trade Agreement to specifically address violence 

towards Colombian labor? Because the agreement has not been 

passed, is it fair to say that Colombian workers are worse off than 

they otherwise might be due to congressional inaction? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I don’t have the agreement in front of me. I do 

know that after the Speaker Pelosi and the Democrats took over 

in 2006, there were provisions added about labor environment, 

which we would support as long as they don’t disrupt too much private investment. 

However, the fact that—I think it is the process that strengthens 

the government and the institutions. It is the constant meeting 

with hundreds and thousands of private sector people and government people that go along with having a free trade agreement, negotiating one and then having one in place. That is what strengthens a government. And that is what will, as has already been the 

case. As we have seen, there has been progress made since 2002, 

since Colombia launched on the path toward modernizing and 

doing free trade agreements. 

And I would note that it is not just free trade agreements with 

the United States. But Colombia has negotiated free trade agreements with a lot of our competitors up and down the Western 

hemisphere and in Europe. And so, the United States, really, I 

think, needs to get onboard here. And we need a Pacific rim trade 

area so that we can be more competitive with our colleagues in 

Asia and Europe. 

Mr. MCKEON. Less than 2 years ago the Democratically controlled Congress ratified the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 

with overwhelmingly bipartisan support. How similar are the labor 

provisions that are contained in the Colombia agreement to the 

Peru agreement? 

Mr. ROBERTS. As far as I know, there is virtually no difference. 

And it is befuddling to me, sir, why the Congress would have approved the deal with Peru and not with Colombia because they are 

very much almost two sides of the same coin in terms of the problems that they face, their resources, their commitment of their governments to moving forward with globalization. So I don’t understand why there would be a delay. 
55

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Andrews? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for their testimony. And I apologize for not 

being present throughout the time. But I have read and understand, tried to understand what you are saying. 

Mr. Roberts, on page nine of your testimony, you highlight the 

fact that the prosecutor general’s office in Colombia has resolved 73 

cases of union member murder and convicted 156 individuals since 

2001. How many open cases are there in Colombia with respect to 

alleged murders of union officials? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I know there are a number, sir. I would have to 

get back to you with the specific number. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think from the prior testimony, the number is at least 1,032 cases that have been under prosecution. Now, 

let me say that that is probably a number that is understated. 

Since there are some number of cases where there are files that 

can’t be located. There are 1,104 cases that were initiated, but only 

1,032 files can be identified. And there were, at least by the accounts of one witness, 2,694 murders. 

So first of all, it looks like a minority of the murders have any 

kind of prosecution. But let us look at the ones that the government itself says there have been prosecutions for, which is 1,032. 

What kind of record do you think it is, 73 resolutions out of 1,032 

cases? Do you think that is pretty good prosecutorial batting average? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Clearly, sir, that would be unacceptable. And as I 

have testified, the Colombian government has taken many steps to 

deal with that, including the setting up of a special unit. One of 

the former judges is here with us. 

I have also noted in my written testimony that a number of these 

murders occurred before 2001, probably the vast majority. Record 

keeping being what it is in a developing country like Colombia, I 

think it is understandable that there would be some problems. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, of course, I would note that the judge who 

testified is a former judge. And the reasons he is a former judge 

are somewhat interesting. But, I mean, one of the arguments implicitly in your testimony is that the great progress that has been 

made by the Colombian government should be rewarded in whatever fashion by the United States. Yes, I find these numbers to be 

disturbing that where you have the number of over 1,000 open 

cases—here is the breakdown, as I understand it, from the earlier 

testimony. 

One hundred and twenty convictions, little over 10 percent; 208 

cases where a suspect has been identified but there has not been 

yet a resolution of the case; and 654 cases, 59 percent of the cases, 

where there is no suspect that has been identified, which indicates 

either a very preliminary form of investigation or a very ineffective 

form of investigation. And I am not asking you to commit to the 

truth of this statement, but hypothetically that if these data would 

indicate a government that is at best incompetent when it comes 

to prosecutions and at worst, indifferent or complicit, do you think 
56

it should be the policy of this country to reward such a government 

or not? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, sir, as I have tried to put it in my case is 

you have to put this in context. All of these governments in the region have been historically weak. We know that the government of 

Colombia in Bogota—its reach to that extent throughout the whole 

country, which is the size of California and Texas put together. 

There were areas that were basically lawless. That explains why 

there were these mercenary groups formed by landowners. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, but with all due respect, do the other countries in the region have the record of labor murder that Colombia 

does? My understanding is 60 percent of the reported labor murders in the world came from Colombia. I mean, do the other countries have this sort of problem? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I am not sure of exact comparisons. I know that 

other countries do have problems. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Of this magnitude? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Right now in Colombia there are more people in 

jail for human rights violations after an episode of post-conflict period than in any other country in Latin America in history. So the 

government has taken steps. 

And I think in terms of the United States leverage, it is with a 

free trade agreement, with international——

Mr. ANDREWS. But those steps have been, in my view, shockingly 

ineffective. Over 1,000 prosecutions, out of a universe of 2,700, by 

the way, but 1,000 or so prosecutions and, according to our records, 

120 convictions. And 60 percent of the cases have not been followed 

through to the point where there is a suspect identified. 

I mean, at the very least that raises a presumption of incompetence. It may raise a presumption of something worse than that, 

of complicity on behalf of the organization that is involved. 

And when we hear the former judge’s testimony, it would tend 

to lend one’s thought to the complicity. So I think this is a dismal 

track record of prosecution. And I think any decision we make has 

to be framed in that regard. 

I would yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman MILLER. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Kildee? 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Edwards would appreciate your help with my brief opening 

statement [speaking Spanish]. 

A little translation? 

Ms. EDWARDS. Yes. Last summer I spoke to a priest who told me 

that I cannot go to Heaven unless I speak Spanish. And I do want 

to go to Heaven, and therefore, I am speaking Spanish. However, 

I don’t want to go today, so I am going to go back to speaking 

English. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you. 

I understand, Mr. Sanin, that the Colombian government recently passed a law that gives the president the right to declare 

any strike illegal if it affects the economy. Don’t all strikes affect 

the economy, at least some small part? Is this law consistent with 

ILO standards? What changes do you believe should be made to 
57

this particular law? And what additional ways have Colombia’s 

laws regarding the right to strike been criticized by the ILO? 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. What I can say is that there was 

a new law that was implemented, law number 1210 of 2008, which 

is supposed to regulate the issue of strikes. And I would say it addresses and resolves two of the 10 issues brought up by the ILO. 

The big problem is that the—the problem that persists is that 

there is still presidential authority to declare strikes illegal. 

And as far as what ILO has recommended, the problem with this 

law is that there is actually no change in substance. The only thing 

that it has addressed is a change in authority. That is the authority to declare the illegal has passed from the ministry to the 

judges. But there is nothing substantively different in this law. 

So therefore, strikes continue to be illegal. And this problem persists in Colombia. I can give you numbers. 

In the past 6 years, 62 strikes were declared illegal. And what 

this implies for workers also is that their employers can fire them 

with impunity. So in sum, I can say that this law has given us no 

substantive changes in procedures. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you. Go with God. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I think you make us all look like fools, Mr. Kildee. 

Thank you, witnesses. You have been wonderful. And you have 

been brave. And you have been appropriately outspoken, I believe. 

It is obvious that most of us here are actually appalled hearing 

your testimony about how slow worker protections are coming 

about in Colombia. It is not good enough to be this slow. Nor is it 

good enough for us as individuals to be outraged sitting up here. 

So what I would like to ask you, Dr. Sanchez and Ms. McFarland 

is—and then the rest of you, if there is time. What can we in the 

United States, what can the international community do to protect 

trade unionists in Colombia and to protect workers in general? 

What would be your suggestions? 

Why don’t we start with you, Ms. McFarland? 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Thank you. I think the U.S. has a very powerful tool at its disposal, which is the U.S./Colombia Free Trade 

Agreement. And unfortunately, I don’t think these issues can be 

addressed through the agreement. It is not like anti-union violence 

or killings are going to be reduced because, you know, there is language in the agreement that says that the right to strike will be 

respected. 

Instead, the changes have to happen beforehand. The U.S. 

should press Colombia to meet benchmarks, meet conditions before 

the agreement is entered into. President Obama himself noted that 

without real change in addressing human rights abuses he would 

make a mockery of the labor protections in the agreement. 

And we have a lot of ideas about what specific steps Colombia 

needs to take. In the first place, Colombia needs to significantly increase the number of convictions for trade unionist killings and 

other violence. This means that they need to investigate the whole 

universe of cases of trade unionist killings, not just the 1,000 they 

have open. 

They need to create a systematic plan to investigate these cases 

and not just one by one, as has been described here. They need to 

go after intellectual authors. 
58

The other thing that they need to do is go after the paramilitary 

groups. Sure, the Colombian government says that they have demobilized the paramilitaries. But as I have described, even though 

30,000 individuals went through this demobilization process and 

turned in weapons and went through ceremonies, there is lots of 

evidence that many of those people weren’t even paramilitaries. 

They were civilians recruited to pose as paramilitaries for purposes of these ceremonies. And now scores of groups are all over 

the country. They are estimated to have tens of thousands of members. And they are committing the same abuses that the 

paramilitaries were committing in the past. 

The congress of Colombia is heavily infiltrated, apparently, by 

these groups, if you go by the supreme court investigation. And unfortunately, the Colombian government has not supported the investigation. It has not taken seriously the claims that there are 

new paramilitary groups out there. And until it starts doing that, 

you are not going to make progress in anti-union violence. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. All right. 

Dr. Sanchez? 

Thank you, Ms. McFarland. 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. Thank you. Your question is 

what can the United States do in order to help protect unionists. 

And the answer is you must do everything you can. You must spare 

no effort. However, in principle what needs to happen is that the 

judicial apparatus needs to be strengthened. It must come before 

the military apparatus. 

As far as prosecutors and judges, in the schools where they are 

trained, we must raise awareness among them that they need to 

investigate, not only the material authors, but also the intellectual 

authors. Because as I said before, they are the ones behind all of 

this. And only by stopping them can we end this scourge. And if 

we do not do that, this problem will go on and on and on. Thank 

you. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Congresswoman Titus? 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for your testimony, especially Ms. Hoyos. 

That must be very difficult to speak personally about your father. 

We have heard from Mr. Roberts and others who defend President Uribe and things that have happened recently as having gotten much better. They paint a rosy picture, even, of the situation 

since the demobilization of 2006. They seem to argue that the paramilitary groups no longer exist and they refer to them, and I quote, 

as emerging gangs or criminal bands. 

A number of human rights organizations, though, and scholars 

like Gustavo Duncan at the University of the Andes have taken the 

opposite position. They seem to say that groups like the New General and the Brack Eagles, especially have taken the place of these 

old paramilitary groups. And they are doing the exact same things 

and that these union deaths and the displacement of so many Colombians from the rural part of the country, a problem we haven’t 

even addressed but that is getting more and more serious, can 

stem from their activities. 
59

I wonder if you would just address in more detail these organizations, who the members are, who is financing them, if they do still 

have ties with the old AUC and then conclude and tell me if perhaps maybe it is time for a truth commission and international 

courts to start to look at this problem. Thank you. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Thank you. Well, these new groups are connected to the paramilitaries. A lot of their leaders are never demobilized mid-level commanders of the paramilitaries. They are operating in the same regions as the old paramilitaries. And they are 

engaging in extortion, threats, displacement of civilians, killings 

and drug trafficking, just like the old paramilitaries. They have inherited their drug trafficking routes. 

There are about 22 of them. Their command structure is less 

clear perhaps than with the old groups. And that is one distinction. 

But whether they are paramilitaries or emerging criminal gangs 

is primarily a matter of semantics. It is not about the substance. 

And they are having a serious humanitarian impact. 

The rate of displacement in Colombia has not been going down 

in recent years. It has been going up since 2004. Last year in the 

first 6 months of the year, according to the main organization monitoring displacement, there were 270,000 people who were internally displaced just in 6 months. And that was the highest rate in 

23 years, a lot of that because of the new armed groups. 

In Medellin, which has been touted here as this example of security now, last year there was a 35 percent increase in homicides, 

also because of these new groups, apparently. So these are serious 

threats. And they are a threat to trade unionists as well. Most of 

the trade unionist killings that happened in the last year or two 

have happened in the regions where these groups are active. 

So I would say it is a very serious problem that needs to be addressed. And the government by calling them emerging criminal 

gangs and dismissing them is refusing to deal with it. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Sanin? 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. Okay, what I can say is I have 

here—I was talking about some of the threats and some of the 

numbers. And I would be glad to share the numbers with you. Most 

of the crimes that have occurred against union members in the last 

few years have been done by these groups. They go by different 

names, but the problem is the same. It hasn’t changed. 

And the threat to trade unions exists because the trade unions 

exist because they exist to defend workers’ rights. And although I 

can’t tell you what the size of these new groups might be or what 

their names are, we feel their threat every day daily. We have 

threats and we have—we are harassed by these people. 

I can tell you that Monday of this week the cooperative in the 

city of Antioca received a threat. The threats have not stopped. 

And I can also give you another number, which is that 1,500 union 

members are protected by this federal government. And they are 

protected because the federal government has determined that they 

are at risk. And that risk is determined by an investigation that 

is carried out by the state. And the state has found that those people at risk are at risk precisely because they are threatened by 

these groups that have all emanated from the previous auto-defense groups. 
60

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Cassidy? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Yes, thank you. 

I guess I direct my question more to Ms. McFarland than to Mr. 

Roberts for your comments on that. I am struck that through history when there is more trade, an economy becomes more open. As 

the economy becomes more open, typically workers’ rights improve. 

And I think about the role of multi-nationals in South Africa in 

which the South Africans under apartheid did not have—had a second-rate health care, unless they worked for a multi-national. And 

then the multi-national basically demanded that they be put into 

a private hospital with the same kind of protections. 

Similarly, I think of how when Nike went to China, there are allegations that they weren’t treating their workers right. And indeed, Nike brought in Western style of how you treat workers because of domestic pressure, if you will, United States pressure, 

upon their business structure. 

So when I hear—Ms. McFarland, I am very sympathetic to eliminating these paramilitary groups if they exist. Except for the question of facts, both sides saying different things. I think the real 

issue is how do we bring workers’ rights. 

Now, as I look through history, the more closed a society, the 

more likely there is abuse of workers. The more open the society, 

the less likely. 

And so, I actually wonder if we are not—if we oppose the Colombian Free Trade Agreement that we are not actually condemning 

the workers, if you will, just accepting for a second the argument 

that there is a problem, condemning the workers to a prolonged 

kind of absence of rights. And if we open it up and our guys walk 

in and Nike comes in and brings those kind of human rights and 

says we are not going to tolerate abuses of our unionized workers, 

et cetera, et cetera, if that wouldn’t be an independent force for 

change, a very powerful force for change if we look at history. 

I remember there used to be similar arguments about Korea. 

Don’t give them free trade until they open up their economy and 

open up their political system. We did it anyway, and now they are 

one of the most open governments in the Far East. So it almost 

seems like the paradigm is allow trade and trade brings in workers’ 

rights. 

How would you respond to that, Ms. McFarland? 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Well, my understanding is that the academic 

record is very mixed on that question of whether trade actually improves rights or not. But in any case, in Colombia’s situation, when 

U.S. corporations have been present, that hasn’t necessarily reduced anti-union violence. 

In fact, Chiquita brand operated actively in the Uraba region in 

Colombia in probably the worst period of anti-union violence in 

that country for years and is now—you know, has recently accepted 

having been paying paramilitary groups there. I don’t think necessarily investment and allowing access to markets and all that 

will improve the situation of violence, which is very particular, by 

the way. 

It is not just about, you know, changing the laws or changing the 

rules and how you are treating workers. We are talking about 
61

killings. And if you are living under fear that you will be killed, 

you are not going to be able to exercise your rights freely. 

Mr. CASSIDY. I am not familiar with the Chiquita brand, but I 

am willing to accept that. okay? But the very fact that Chiquita 

brand will stop doing that now that there is the light of U.S.-kind 

of, my gosh, am I going to buy their bananas or not in my store 

at Harris Teeter. Actually, Chiquita is going to change their ways. 

Whereas if there were a domestic industry, domestic to Colombia, 

there would be no such pressure upon them. The fact that they are 

an American brand bringing their bananas in through Biloxi, Mississippi distributed across the United States means that Chiquita 

is more likely to change. That almost makes my argument. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. I think that is purely speculative. We don’t 

know that Chiquita is likely to change. All we know is what it did. 

Mr. CASSIDY. I suspect——

Ms. MCFARLAND. It spent several years paying paramilitaries. 

Mr. CASSIDY. I just say that because if we look at the example 

of Nike, we can expect that they would. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Why? Was Nike charged with——

Mr. CASSIDY. Nike was allegedly—did not have workers’ rights in 

the plants, I think, in China. And they went back and they made 

sure they corrected it. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. As I understand in Nike’s case, there have been 

campaigns to get it to change. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Yes. Isn’t that great? And that is because free trade 

made them subject—and they are a moral—I am not knocking 

them. I am not knocking Nike. In fact, I am kind of praising them 

for being responsive. But also saying that they have been a positive 

instrument for change in the countries in which they were operating. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. And what I am saying is that in the country 

where trade unionists are getting killed in large numbers, it is just 

as likely that foreign corporations coming in will be sucked into 

that situation. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Well, I am not sure I agree with that. 

Mr. Roberts, what are your thoughts? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, it should not come as a surprise that I agree 

with you, sir. And I think you have stated an excellent case. I think 

you should be a guest contributor to our index next year, actually. 

And I think you are right that this globalization effect is positive 

for workers and for consumers and citizens alike. And there are 

unique cases. 

I know that Chiquita had some problems. But in general, I don’t 

think we need to be this speculative. I think we can look at the 

facts. 

We can look at how the data shakes out that when you have 

stronger rule of law, when you have clear access to property rights 

and a transparent and non-corrupt judicial system, when you have 

rules of the road, a level playing field for investors, for businesses, 

you have private capital that you have many more actors than just 

a government, that you have wealth disbursed with many power 

centers. You do tend to have this affect of more openness of more 

of a push for rights and for rule of law than if you were in a closed 

system. 
62

You know, I would say, to use the Nike term for the U.S./Colombia Free Trade Agreement, just do it. And let us enjoy these benefits. 

Mr. CASSIDY. You know, I think also to be philosophical, Michael 

Novak in the spirit of democratic capitalism as a Catholic theologian looked at that and found that, my gosh, capitalism actually 

does tend to bring in a freer society. 

So I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I thought they were two great 

examples of great corporate citizens, Nike with the charge of what 

they pay in China and what they charge for those sneakers, you 

know, in our cities and little kids pressuring their parents to buy 

Nike sneakers because they play basketball and that is about all 

they look up to, these basketball players. And so, these parents are 

almost extorted by their kids saying we have got to have these 

Nike sneakers or I am not in with the group. 

So I don’t want to get started on Nike as a great corporate citizen or even Chiquita banana that had the U.S., you know, put a 

charge against the lomay countries that were getting banana preferences from Great Britain. One thing Great Britain did was to say 

our former colonies could sell us their bananas because we felt a 

responsibility to their trade. And we don’t grow bananas in the 

United States. 

But Chiquita and their Mr. Cantor, our trade ambassador, sued 

the European countries who were assisting the Caribbean countries. And now the banana business is gone, and drugs have replaced the employment of people who used to grow bananas. You 

know that Chiquita has pretty fancy bananas. And the poor Caribbean countries were unable to compete. 

But they were two great examples of how this globalization, if 

you look at the other side of the picture, hasn’t presented a very 

positive picture for countries that are struggling as I indicated, especially in the Caribbean where they have no more banana industry. And they are almost out of the way. But that wasn’t what I 

was going to ask. 

I just wanted to—so it is interesting how we can look at the 

same set of circumstances and have a totally different position. 

Certainly, I have traveled through Colombia in 2007, my last trip 

to Bogota and to Quito out in Soachaa. And, of course, I agree, 

Cotahana is a beautiful place. 

But I would instruct people to go out to Soacha and to some of 

the other areas where Afro-Colombians and indigenous people, who 

we hear very little about—many of the indigenous people really 

have been eliminated over the years. And the Afro-Colombians who 

live in very squalor conditions, virtually no rights—I have met several times with President Uribe who says he really wants to improve things. And he has. He has done better than the previous 

persons, but, you know, when you compare what they did, absolutely nothing, any little bit is a little bit better, I think, than nothing. 

But the situation that I saw was very depressing. And the fact 

that labor leaders—we have seen the numbers that have been 
63

killed. I know my specific question, I guess, would deal with the 

Colombian government’s claim that it has taken steps to improve 

labor rights in Colombia by passing in 2008 in June a new law on 

labor cooperatives. 

Last fall, thousands of sugar cane cutters, many of whom are African-Colombians, Afro-Colombians, protested over 50 days due to 

poor labor conditions experienced under the labor cooperatives 

model. Afro-Colombian sugar cane cutters claim that these cooperatives do not provide them with benefits, do not allow them to organize unions, bargain collectively for wages and protect their labor 

rights. The labor cooperative model is used by the sugar cane and 

the oil palm industry, which employs many Afro-Colombians. 

And I just might ask you, Mr. Sanin, what is your opinion of this 

model. And in your opinion, is there a trend in sectors that employ 

Afro-Colombians to discourage Afro-Colombians from organizing 

into trade unions? And is the Afro-Colombian—is the Colombian 

government in general addressing, in your opinion, the basic concerns of Afro-Colombian workers in that country? 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. Thanks very much for your question. On this issue of the cooperative labor organizations is very, 

very sensitive in Colombia. There are 4 million workers who work 

under these conditions. And they have absolutely no rights. They 

are a very low-cost labor. 

They are not allowed to unionize. And they are barred also from 

striking. The ILO has clearly said that these rights—that this goes 

against everything that has to do with workers’ rights. The new 

law that Colombia enacted in 2008 is no solution to these problems. 

So we have a model now in Colombia where we have no workers’ 

rights, no right to unionize, no right to collective bargaining. And 

that is why these workers went on a spontaneous strike. And it did 

involve the palm workers, the sugar cane cutters as well as port 

workers. And as you rightly said, many of these workers are AfroColombian. And they find themselves in a situation of extremely 

precarious work conditions. And again, I repeat. This new law has 

not resolved any of these problems. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate that. And 

we will continue to press that issue. 

And the palm workers—many of the Afro-Colombians don’t want 

to deal with the palm industry in the first place. And as I mentioned before, the Chiquita—that was the WTO that the suit went 

in against the Caribbean islands that, of course, Chiquita won, and 

the Caribbean islands lost. And the WTO and, like I said, are 

struggling now to exist with no commodities to sell. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Before I recognize 

Congressman Polis, I would—Congressman McKeon has asked that 

I insert in the record as part of this hearing the Washington Post 

editorial from Saturday, April 19, 2008 called Colombia’s Case. And 

without objection, it will be done. 

[The information follows:]

[From the Washington Post, April 19, 2008]

Colombia’s Case: The intellectual poverty of a free-trade deal’s opponents 

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) says the Bush administration’s free-trade 

agreement with Colombia may not be dead, even though she has postponed a vote 
64

on it indefinitely. If the White House doesn’t ‘‘jam it down the throat of Congress,’’ 

she said, she might negotiate. Ms. Pelosi wants an ‘‘economic agenda that gives 

some sense of security to American workers and businesses * * * that somebody is 

looking out for them’’—though she was vague as to what that entails. Nor did she 

specify how anyone could ‘‘jam’’ through a measure on which the administration has 

already briefed Congress many, many times. 

Still, in the hope that Ms. Pelosi might in fact schedule a vote, it may be worth 

examining once more the arguments against this tariff-slashing deal. Perhaps we 

should say ‘‘argument,’’ because there is really only one left: namely, that Colombia 

is ‘‘the most dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist’’ and that the government of President Alvaro Uribe is to blame. As AFL-CIO President John 

Sweeney put it in an April 14 Post op-ed, union workers in Colombia ‘‘face an implicit death sentence.’’

Colombia is, indeed, violent—though homicide has dramatically declined under 

Mr. Uribe. There were 17,198 murders in 2007. Of the dead, only 39—or 0.226 percent—were even members of trade unions, let alone leaders or activists, according 

to the Colombian labor movement. (Union members make up just under 2 percent 

of the Colombian population.) 

This hardly suggests a campaign of anti-union terrorism in Colombia. Moreover, 

the number of trade unionists killed has fallen from a rate of about 200 per year 

before Mr. Uribe took office in 2002, despite a reported uptick in the past few 

months. (Arrests have already been made in three of this year’s cases, according to 

Bogota.) And evidence is sparse that all, or even most, of the union dead were killed 

because of their labor organizing. As Mr. Sweeney and other critics note, precious 

few cases have been solved, which is hardly surprising given that Colombia’s judicial system has been under attack from left-wing guerrillas, drug traffickers and 

right-wing death squads—a war, we repeat, that Mr. Uribe has greatly contained. 

But in cases that have been prosecuted, the victims’ union activity or presumed support for guerrillas has been the motive in fewer than half of the killings. 

An April 10 letter to the editor from Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch 

suggested that we would not make such arguments ‘‘if death squads with ties to the 

U.S. government were targeting Post reporters for assassination.’’ We like to think 

that our criticism would be energetic but fair, especially if the government was responding aggressively to such a campaign and the number of killings was declining. 

No fair-minded person can fail to note that Colombian unionists are far safer today 

than they used to be. 

There are two important countries at the north of South America. One, Colombia, 

has a democratic government that, with strong support from the Clinton and Bush 

administrations, has bravely sought to defeat brutal militias of the left and right 

and to safeguard human rights. The other, Venezuela, has a repressive government 

that has undermined media freedoms, forcibly nationalized industries, rallied opposition to the United States and, recent evidence suggests, supported terrorist groups 

inside Colombia. That U.S. unions, human rights groups and now Democrats would 

focus their criticism and advocacy on the former, to the benefit of the latter, shows 

how far they have departed from their own declared principles. 

Congressman Polis? 

Mr. POLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman [speaking Spanish]. 

First, thank everybody for coming, especially Yessika Hoyos. It 

is very difficult to open her heart and share. And we deeply appreciate that. 

My question is for Dr. Sanchez [speaking Spanish]. 

The question is how does the justice system function in Colombia 

with regard to labor issues and the prosecution of those who attack 

labor leaders compared to other forms of crimes and how the labor 

system functions, corruption or prosecution of right wing radicals 

who attack others. 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. Yes, this is considered a more 

serious crime in Colombia. I am referring to killing someone who 

is protected by international law, by international agreements as 

unions are. There is a harsher sentence. The fact is it is a more 

serious crime to commit against the life of this person. 

And could you please repeat the second part of your question? 
65

Mr. POLIS [speaking Spanish]. 

I can in English. Is the implementation of the law more highly 

flawed with regard to prosecuting the crimes of labor leaders, not 

compared to a perfect model, but compared to in reality the prosecution of other crimes? 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. Yes, it is about——

Mr. POLIS [speaking Spanish]. 

Mr. SANCHEZ [speaking Spanish]. 

Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chair, if I can address, it looks like the other gentleman would like to address the question as well. 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. The law is enforced equally to 

all persons in Colombia, whether they be citizens or not. The law 

applies the same. And investigations are carried out the same. 

That in some cases, in fact, the intellectual authors behind a 

crime are not investigated. That depends on the judge behind that 

investigation. But in the law, per se, it is applied equally to all. 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. The problem that we have is 

that we have very few prosecutors and very few investigators for 

this kind of crime. There is a tremendous imbalance in the system. 

We have, for example, lots and lots of prosecutors for intellectual 

property rights, for example. There is no equilibrium here. There 

is no balance in the two. The institutional design of the country is 

not balanced. 

We have lots of protections and lots of prosecutions for crimes 

against property, for example, against business, but very, very little protection or prosecution of cases that have to do with workers’ 

rights. For example, I can give you just one number. The crimes 

that affects trade unions. 

Anything that is done against trade unions is a crime. And yet 

we have not one single case that has been prosecuted against people who are guilty of operating against trade unions. And as we 

said before, we have a 96 percent rate of cases that have not been 

solved. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Sestak? 

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sanin, could you let me know what you think would be the 

prospects for improved unionization and for protection of unionists 

if the treaty, the Colombian treaty, is not passed as compared to 

if it is? 

Mr. SANIN [through translator]. Okay, thank you very much for 

the question. The issue is that Colombian society is different from 

any other society. It is not like Central America. It is not like Peru. 

It is not even like any of the other Andean community countries. 

We have to bear in mind that 60 percent of unionized workers 

killed worldwide are killed in Colombia. The whole structure of the 

law and the practice of the law in Colombia goes against basic ILO 

standards. More than 50 percent of Colombian workers are not protected. 

So this makes us a very vulnerable society for the issue of trade 

integration. However, I would like to point out that this discussion 

that is being held in the U.S., this debate can possibly help. It may 

help push Colombia to make this a priority issue and to get it resolved. Thank you. 
66

Mr. SESTAK. Ms. McFarland, may I ask you the same question? 

You have watched this and have an historical perspective. There is 

things in the treaty like our own unions are able to go to the labor 

department and now under this treaty make a representation by 

the treaty that something is amiss. And then if the labor department finds it is amiss, they can report to our trade representative. 

Agnostically, my question is the same. If this treaty is not 

passed, what are the prospects for the improvement of unionization 

and their protection of unionists as compared to if it is passed? 

Ms. MCFARLAND. I think the question is really under what conditions can it be passed. I mean, at least at Human Rights Watch 

we are not anti-trade. We are not pro-trade. We are agnostic on 

that issue. What we do think——

Mr. SESTAK. That is why I decided you would be the second one 

just from your perspective on unionization, improvement or not 

with the passage. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. What we do think is, what I do think is that 

with the passage of the free trade agreement you are not going to 

solve the problem of anti-union violence, which is the most serious 

problem affecting union rights in Colombia. And with conditions on 

the agreement, preconditions that problem can be addressed. A lot 

of progress could be made. And that is why we are calling for delay 

in the consideration of the agreement. 

Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Sanchez? 

I mean, we just might have to deal with the treaty as it is. 

Dr. Sanchez, that same question. The treaty as it is—will unionization prospects be improved by the passage and protection of 

unionists be improved if this treaty were passed or as compared to 

if it is not passed? 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. This issue is really one for the 

experts in trade. I am a criminologist, and I can’t really say if this 

agreement is going to be a good thing or a bad thing. It should 

really be addressed by someone who is more informed on that 

issue. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. I appreciate your input. I do believe that 

whether it is 36 or 54 murders and assassinations in 2007 out of 

the 17,900 and some, whether it is systemic or not is really the 

question, not just the magnitude. 

But for me the real question on this treaty, having voted for the 

Peru treaty, is are unionists aided, abetted in making this less systemic because the potential leverage we may then have as compared to us potentially having a different political dynamic in that 

country, particularly in view of what you said this administration 

has now changed in having this passed this. Are we better or not 

better for addressing that systemic issue by the passing of this 

treaty? Thank you very much. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Wu? 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I understand that this hearing was convened, not expressly to 

talk about trade treaties, but since we are on that topic, I have 

spent a good amount of time drafting some provisions to be added 

to a bill which was submitted in the last Congress to put human 

rights on a par with environmental; provisions and with labor pro-
67

visions and other fundamental provisions of the trade agreement so 

that they are subject to the same kind of scrutiny and review after 

the fact and similar enforcement mechanisms. 

Now, I understand that, and I am a believer in asking folks to 

meet certain preconditions before trade treaties are signed or ratified. But I want to also hear whether these in-treaty mechanisms, 

if they can be incorporated in treaties and if they can be enforced, 

whether that would be helpful to the human rights and organizing 

regimes going forward post-treaty. 

Chairman MILLER. If I just might, the gentleman is quite correct. 

These witnesses did not come here to testify on the free trade 

agreements or treaties or what have you. They are free to comment 

on your question, but I just want them to know that they are also 

free not to comment because they did not come here to testify on 

that subject matter. 

Mr. WU. Absolutely. I just wanted to follow up on—particularly 

our witness from Human Rights Watch since she seemed to have 

some opinions on this topic. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Yes, I think it would be a great thing to start 

looking at ways in which human rights can be incorporated into 

trade agreements. However, I don’t think that that is the way to 

solve the problem in Colombia. 

Getting Colombia to do anything about the anti-union violence 

and impunity has been like pulling teeth. And it has only been 

with the possibility of non-ratification of the free trade agreement 

on the table that they have established this special prosecutors 

unit that is starting to make a little bit of progress. I think now 

we have the possibility of moving them a little further on that now 

that there is change in Washington. 

But it is not something that you are going to achieve through a 

side agreement once the agreement has been ratified. I mean, what 

is really motivating the Colombian government and moving things 

forward right now is its desire to have the agreement ratified. Once 

it is in place, you know, you can get little things, maybe, but it 

won’t be the same. 

Mr. WU. Okay, thank you for that comment. I want to make 

clear that I agree with you that it is important to make major 

strides so that the human rights environment is roughly proportional pre-treaty. But what I have in mind is not a side agreement, 

but to have something integral to the agreement with strong enforcement mechanisms so that post-agreement there is an enforcement mechanism and leverage, not just on issues of tariff or nontariff barriers, but also for enforceable provisions for environmental 

concerns, labor concerns and human rights concerns. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. I think we would certainly welcome the opportunity to work with you on developing such language. I just think 

that, as I said before, the situation in Colombia is very particular. 

Mr. WU. Yes. 

Ms. MCFARLAND. And——

Mr. WU. They tend to be in each particular country. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I also was not prepared to address this topic 

with this panel today. But since we are on this subject and we have 

a good panel, for anyone who is interested in the language as drafted, I would like to get that to you before the end of the hearing. 
68

And I would very much appreciate your comments to the extent 

that you have helpful suggestions going forward. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Ms. McFarland, if I might—and we are going to wrap this hearing up. I have questions now, and then Mr. Hare has questions, 

and that will be the end of the inquiry here. 

It has now been a couple of years since the former intelligence 

chief, Jorge Noguera was arrested and indicted. Can you bring us 

up to date what is taking place with respect to this case? 

Ms. MCFARLAND. Sure. Mr. Noguera came under investigation 

for widespread collaboration with paramilitaries within the intelligence service while he was the chief of the intelligence service. He 

has been charged with, not only cooperating with the 

paramilitaries, but also providing them—well, he is under investigation for allegedly providing paramilitary groups with lists of 

trade unionists who are under the protection of the intelligence 

service and some of whom were later killed by the paramilitaries. 

Unfortunately, the investigation of that piece, his alleged involvement in the homicides of trade unionists, has not really moved forward. And the entire case has suffered lots of delays basically because of procedural problems with the attorney general’s office. 

The attorney general was supposed to assume direct responsibility for the investigation. He decided to delegate it to another 

prosecutor. One court told him he couldn’t do that. He decided to 

ignore that decision based on the opinion of his deputy attorney 

general. 

And so, the supreme court finally had to tell him last year you 

can’t delegate, you have to do this yourself. And Noguera has been 

arrested, released, arrested, released a few times. He was recently 

rearrested for the charges involving collaboration with the 

paramilitaries. But the part about trade unionist homicides is sort 

of floating with no clear direction. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Hoyos, I wonder if you might comment on what it is you 

hope to achieve with your new organization. 

Ms. HOYOS [through translator]. My organization, the sons and 

daughters, children of people who are victims of human rights violations, people who have been killed, who have disappeared. We 

are a generation that are dreaming of a new country. And we are 

stigmatized because we have this dream of a new country. 

I love Colombia. I am not here because I don’t love Colombia. I 

am here because I do love Colombia. I am here because we are 

looking for the truth, because we don’t want a repeat of these 

crimes. We don’t want these crimes to be forgotten. We don’t want 

impunity. And we don’t want any more young people to suffer what 

we suffered through. 

Just last year, I met a young woman, a 24-year-old—21-year-old, 

excuse me, the daughter of Guillermo Rivera, who was assassinated also in this manner. And I met her only because she found 

herself in the same circumstance that I had found myself in. 

We don’t want other people to suffer what we have suffered 

through. We want a country that respects us, that respects life, 
69

that respects our dreams and that does not pursue us and does not 

condemn us because we have those dreams and those thoughts. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, thank you very much. And obviously we 

wish you well with your organization. 

I had the opportunity a month ago to view the video that you 

and your sister made in tribute to your father and also in pursuit 

of justice. And it is really quite remarkable. And he must have 

been quite a remarkable and important person in his community 

and certainly to his family. So thank you for doing that to share 

with others who are concerned with this issue. 

Mr. Hare? 

Mr. HARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ms. Hoyos, let me first of all tell you how sorry I am about 

your father. Just from listening he was obviously a wonderful man. 

And I am sure he is very proud of you. 

You said that you have, you know, forgiven the two people who 

did this, the assassins. What do you know about—I mean, what led 

them to become hired assassins, that you know? And how did you 

come to the decision to forgive them, which is an incredible thing 

for you to be able to do? 

Ms. HOYOS [through translator]. I forgave these two young men 

precisely because they are very young men. And in Colombia, unfortunately, many young men turn to violence because of lack of opportunities to do anything else. I forgave them because they are 

young, because they are just two young people. 

That doesn’t mean that I have given up on finding out the truth. 

I want the truth. I want to know who is behind these two young 

men. I want to know who the intellectual authors of this crime are 

because I know that those people are still free and perhaps are still 

committing more crimes. 

Mr. HARE. Okay. 

And then my last question would be to you, Dr. Sanchez. Why 

do you think that the killers see union leaders as such a threat? 

Or maybe if anybody would like to take a crack at that. 

I mean, why do they see this as such a threat to Colombia? 

Mr. SANCHEZ [through translator]. Labor unions in Colombia 

have always been labeled as sympathizers of the left or of the guerrillas. But the fact is that unionists are killed by both the guerrillas as well as the AUC. In other words, they are killed by the 

left as well as by the right and in some cases, even by common 

criminals simply because these people do not agree with the beliefs 

of the unions. 

However, there is also a climate of intolerance in Colombia. People in Colombia and people in the world seem to sometimes forget 

that it is thanks to the labor movement that we have days off, that 

we have an 8-hour work day, that we have Social Security. It is 

thanks to their commitment that we have that. 

And it is because of that dissent expressed by labor unions. That 

dissent is sometimes seen by some as a threat to the system. It is 

used as an excuse. 

However, not all murders are institutional in nature or against 

the institution of labor. Some people simply feel that it is okay. 

There was, in fact, a time in Colombia in my country when a lawyer said that it was no crime to kill the indigenous. It was that ex-
70

treme attitude that we are facing then and that we have to work 

against. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. I want to again thank, certainly, 

all the members of the committee for their participation. 

And I want to thank our panelists for traveling here today to 

share your expertise and your knowledge of this situation. And I 

appreciate your courage in coming forth. 

It was referred to a number of times here about the beauty of 

the country of Colombia. And for those who have visited Colombia 

it would not take more than a few seconds to realize why people 

say that because of the spectacular nature of the country and its 

natural assets and, of course, when you meet its people. 

But that is not a substitute for serious inquiry into human 

rights. I can remember standing at the American embassy with the 

American ambassador at the height of violence in Chile and him 

telling me that this is a beautiful country, and that I really should 

go to Valparaiso and enjoy the beaches and see the people who use 

the beaches, and I should go shopping and enjoy the people who 

are shopping, and that my concerns were misplaced because it is 

such a beautiful country. My concerns weren’t misplaced. 

It took almost 30 years, but we brought Mr. Pinochet to justice. 

And the world now knows the history of what was taking place 

while people were suggesting it is a beautiful country. 

I had the same treatment from then President Dabusan, that I 

should go walk and enjoy the rivers of Salvador because it is such 

a beautiful place. And we all know the history of violence by that 

government against its people. 

People will vote, and members of Congress, I mean, will vote, 

and people will consider pro or con the free trade agreement. This 

inquiry by this committee is independent of the consideration of 

that agreement. I hope what we do will be helpful to members of 

Congress should that agreement be put back forth in front of the 

Congress. That is a decision for the new president of the United 

States and for the Congress. 

But I laid out in my letter to President Uribe the purposes of this 

investigation in my September 12th letter of 2008 when there was 

going to be an opportunity for us to meet with one another. And 

I made it very clear. 

I said I would like to discuss with him at that time, but I have 

said this as we embarked on this inquiring using the committee resources that my goals and purposes were, one, an effective and sustainable and transparent Colombian system of justice to protect the 

rights of working people and to vindicate the lives of the victims 

of the anti-labor violence; two, further investigation and prosecution of the intellectual authors who planned the attacks and the 

killings of labor union leaders in Colombia; and three, additional 

reforms to bring Colombia labor laws up to the minimum core labor 

standards set by the International Labor Organization and cited by 

both the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Labor. 

That is the intent of this inquiry. This inquiry will continue until 

those results are achieved. That is the purpose of this inquiry. 

I had the opportunity to travel and to meet with Judge Sanchez 

at that time when I was in Colombia and with the other judges, 

with the prosecutors and believed—and the Fiscalia’s office—and 
71

believed that these assets should be strengthened and encouraged 

by this government. And this Congress spoke to that issue by redirecting some money from Plan Colombia to the Fiscalia’s office to 

strengthen the prosecutions. In an explicable fashion, that money 

was not sent for a year. 

So in a quest to achieve a sustainable and transparent Colombian system of justice with respect to this issue, we lost almost a 

year’s time in strengthening that office. That was tragedy. I don’t 

know what the Bush administration was thinking when that 

money was not forwarded in a timely fashion. And hopefully we 

will get into that when we get back into the appropriations process 

in this Congress. 

But I want people to be very clear about the intent of this inquiry and the expected results of this inquiry and the sustainability of the ability of this committee to continue this. I have been 

involved in very, very long human rights inquiries in many parts 

of the world. And we expect to see this one through to a satisfactory conclusion with respect to the protection of human rights of 

workers and their families and others, in this case, in the country 

of Colombia. 

And again, I want to express my appreciation for the cooperation 

that we have received from the government of Colombia as we have 

tried to sort through this subject matter. So again, thank you so 

very much for your contribution to the effort of this committee. And 

I hope that we will be able to continue to call upon you as a resource for our future discussions. 

And with that, the members of Congress will have 14 days to 

submit additional materials for the hearing record. It may be that 

some members of Congress will submit follow-up questions that we 

will forward to you. And we would hope that you would be able to 

answer them in a timely fashion. 

And with that, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Altmire follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Jason Altmire, a Representative in Congress 

From the State of Pennsylvania 

Thank you, Chairman Miller, for holding this hearing on workers’ rights and violence against union leaders in Colombia. 

As the Chairman said, over the past twenty years, Colombia has been the most 

dangerous place in the world to belong to a labor union. There have been more labor 

killings in Colombia than in all other nations of the world combined over the past 

few years, and according to a leading Colombian think-tank, the National Labor 

School, almost 2,700 trade union members have been killed in Colombia over the 

past two decades. I appreciate all of the witnesses here today lending us their time 

to examine this situation in Colombia. I hope that through this hearing, we can 

shed light on the atrocities that are ongoing in Colombia. 

Thank you again, Chairman Miller, for holding this hearing. I yield back the balance of my time. 

[Additional submissions by Mr. Miller follow:]

AFL–CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, 

Washington, DC, February 26,2009. 

Hon. GEORGE MILLER, Chairman, 

Committee on Education and Labor, U.S.House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN MILLER: Please find attached the AFL–CIO’s latest fact sheet on 

violence, impunity and labor law in Colombia. We wish to submit this information 

to be included in the record of the hearing held by the House Committee on Edu-
72

cation and Labor on February 12 entitled, ‘‘Examining Workers’ Rights and Violence 

Against Labor Union Leaders in Colombia.’’

ATTACHMENT

Colombia: Continued Violence, Impunity, Flawed Labor Laws and Non-Enforcement of the Law Eclipse the Colombian Government’s Few Accomplishments

February 2009 Update 

Violence Against Trade Unionists On The Rise 

The National Labor School (ENS) now reports that 49 trade unionists were murdered in Colombia in 2008, a 25% increase over the number of trade unionists murdered in 2007—39. Even the Colombian government’s statistics show an increase in 

assassinations.1 Of note, sixteen trade union leaders were assassinated last year, for 

example, Guillermo Rivera Fuquene, President of the Union of Public Service Workers of Bogota (SINSERVPUB), Carlos Burbano, Vice-President of the Hospital Workers Union (ANTHOC), Leonidas Gomez Roso, officer of the National Bank Workers’ 

Union (UNEB), and William Rubio Ortiz, officer of the Union of National Environmental System Workers (SINTRAMBIENTE). This too represents an increase over 

2007, when 10 leaders were murdered. 

Because of the flawed demobilization process, thousands of ‘‘demobilized’’ and 

never-demobilized paramilitaries are creating new and dangerous organizations. 

The OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) has noted 

the resurgence of several new groups with thousands in their ranks. Many of the 

157 individual and collective death threats against trade unionists in 2008 were 

issued by such groups, including Aguilas Negras Bloque Norte de Colombia, Nueva 

Generacion Aguilas Negras de Santander, Aguilas Negras Bloque Sena de Colombia, 

Comando Carlos Castano Vive, Campesinos Embejucaos de Colombia and Aguilas 

Negras Comando No Paheces. 

There is no question that the continued murders and death threats have a chilling 

effect on union activity. Today, workers continue to have good reason to fear for 

their lives when they exercise their fundamental labor rights—especially the crucial 

rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike. They know that 2,694 union 

members have been murdered in Colombia since 1986, with 482 of those murdered 

during the Administration of President Alvaro Uribe. 

The Colombian government claims that union members are killed at no greater 

rate than the overall population. It is simply not meaningful to compare random 

crime statistics to targeted assassinations. Clearly, trade unionists who are engaged 

in industrial disputes, or who are active in human rights activities, are targeted precisely for their work. In Colombia, trade unionists continue to be assassinated precisely for exercising freedom of association and collective bargaining rights and 

other forms of trade union advocacy, and account for a preponderance of all labor 

leaders killed throughout the world. 

Persistent Impunity 

The Fiscalia General reports that it has secured 171 sentences in 131 cases related to violence against trade unionists.2 Further, the government has obtained 

sentences in 31 of the 185 priority cases, or 16.75%. The recent increase in prosecutions, the vast majority of which were carried out in 2007 and 2008 (and following 

significant international pressure for results), is an improvement over past neglect 

by the current and previous administrations. However, behind these statistics are 

several troubling realities. First, nineteen of the sentences handed down were not 

for murder, but to a lesser charge, so do not address the impunity rate for homicides. In roughly 35% of the sentences, the person found responsible for the crime 

was tried in absentia or is otherwise not in custody and thus potentially still at 

large. And in the majority of cases, the person convicted of the crime is not the intellectual author, but rather the foot soldier that carried out the order to kill. For 

these reasons, the Uribe Administration still has a long way to go to end impunity 

in Colombia. Even if one reads the statistics in the light most favorable to the government, the rate of impunity still hovers around 96 percent. 

Of note, the Office of the Attorney General is not even attempting to investigate 

all outstanding unsolved murder cases, but rather only the subset of cases that have 

been previously presented to the ILO and new murder cases from 2006 onward. 

Thus, the Attorney General is charged with investigating about 1,302 cases, which 

accounts for less than half of all union murder cases since 1986. 

The government has claimed that the recent rulings show that in most cases, the 

crimes bear no relation to trade union activity. However, the information that the 

Attorney General used to provide regarding motives in cases of anti-union violence 
73

does not necessarily represent the determinations of the sentencing judges. In one 

report, the Attorney General claimed that the motive in 38 sentences was ‘‘alleged 

membership in subversion,’’ implying that the perpetrator of the crime believed that 

the victim was a member of the guerrilla forces. However, in Colombia, legitimate 

human rights advocates, community leaders, and union members are accused of 

being ‘‘guerillas’’ simply for advocating on behalf of their constituency. Further, 

these statistics reflect the state of mind of the gunmen (who may have been told 

to kill someone on the false pretense that the target is a guerilla), not the people 

actually responsible for planning the crimes, and thus do not necessarily reflect the 

true criminal intent. 

For example, in the case of Luciano Enrique Romero, a former Nestle worker and 

member of Sinaltrainal, the Attorney General writes, ‘‘If it is true that he was a 

unionist, it is also true that he was an informant of the 6th Front of the ELN, according to the testimonies gathered in the process, that he was very close to Comandante Tulio, and that he was known by the alias ‘PEPE.’ ’’ This definitive statement 

is directly contradicted by the judge in the case. After viewing all of the evidence, 

Judge Jose Nirio Sanchez wrote that ‘‘the supposed guerrilla military affiliation of 

the deceased was not proven, though his ideology of defending human and labor 

rights was frequently noted * * * It can be inferred that the deceased, Luciano 

Enrique Romero Molina, had no military status nor could he be characterized as a 

combatant.’’ He goes on to say that the alias ‘‘Pepe’’ belonged to another person entirely and that the initial claims, which had been cited in the Attorney General’s 

documentation, were unfounded. 

This is but one of the numerous examples where the statistics of the Attorney 

General and the sentences of the specialized judges diverged. Of note, the Attorney 

General, as of December 2008, is no longer reporting motives in its statistical updates. 

Judiciary Politicized 

In 2007, the government named three special judges to preside over cases related 

to violence against trade unionists. However, the judiciary has removed one highly 

qualified judge, Judge Sanchez, for unexplained reasons. It was this judge who, in 

addition to contradicting the Attorney General in the Luciano Romero case, sentenced officers of the 18th Brigade of the Colombian Army for murdering three 

union leaders in the department of Arauca. The judge found that these officers had 

planted guns in the hands of the unionists to make it appear that the victims were 

members of the guerrilla organization, ELN. This decision put the judge directly at 

odds with President Uribe, who continues to accuse these and other unionists of 

being guerrillas. 

The six-month term of these judicial posts came under criticism as undermining 

the government’s commitment to investigating and prosecuting the thousands of unsolved homicide cases. However, after intense international pressure, the government announced on March 28, 2008, that it had approved the budget to create and 

fund three permanent specialized courts. However, a new decree from the judiciary, 

issued on July 11, 2008, merely assigns three judges to adjudicate these cases for 

one more year. Under the decree, the cases will be transferred to the new 10th and 

11th benches of the special criminal circuit and the 56th bench of the criminal circuit of Bogota. The government once again failed to demonstrate long-term commitment to the process, favoring instead short-term extensions of judicial authority to 

review these important cases. 

Finally, significant questions remain as to whether these judges will be able to 

perform their important jobs without interference from the Uribe Administration. 

For example, President Uribe has attempted to intimidate the Colombian Supreme 

Court on numerous occasions by publicly attacking the lead justice handling the 

parapolitics investigation, which led to the threat of mass resignation by the other 

justices last year. In August 2008, in an effort to further undermine the Supreme 

Court, the Uribe Administration proposed a constitutional amendment that would 

remove all investigations into members of Congress from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and move them to a local court in Bogotμ. The amendment is a clear 

effort to put an end into the investigations of these congressmen, the vast majority 

of which belong to President Uribe’s governing coalition. 

Failed Demobilization Contributes to More Anti-Union Violence 

The flawed demobilization process has also contributed to thousands of ‘‘demobilized’’ and never-demobilized paramilitaries creating new and dangerous organizations. The regular reports of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) have noted the resurgence of several new groups with thousands in their ranks. Although they have assumed distinct organizational frame-
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works, many of these groups are associated to powerful local or regional economic 

and political interests, and continue the violent legacy of the paramilitaries, including narcotics trafficking and targeted assassinations. Groups such as the ‘‘Aguilas 

Negras’’ (Black Eagles) are responsible for some of the death threats leveled against 

trade unionists in 2007-08. This year, the Aguilas Negras have issued death threats 

against members of SINALTRAINAL, the trade union representing food and beverage workers in Colombia, and members and leaders of the Union Sindical Obrera 

(USO), which represents workers in the oil industry. The Aguilas Negras also issued 

a gruesome warning to the organizations responsible for organizing the March 6 

Peace March, some of which were in fact murdered shortly thereafter.3

Labor Law Reform 

In response to years of intense domestic and international pressure, the government recently approved legislation that would reform the labor code with regard to 

the right to strike and on the administration of labor cooperatives. However, these 

new laws create new problems as they attempt to resolve old ones. 

Strikes 

Article 2 of Law 1210 of 2008 responds to one persistent ILO criticism by transferring the authority to determine the legality of a strike from the Ministry of Social 

Protection (MSP) to the Labor Chamber of the Superior District Court. The reason 

why this decision should lie with the courts, not the government, is that it is far 

less likely that a court will issue a decision based on political, rather than legal, 

grounds. However, the new law maintains a substantial role for the MSP. Under 

Article 4, the MSP can on its own initiative file a complaint with the court contesting the legality of the strike. Indeed, the MSP may file a complaint even if none 

of the parties, such as the employer, chooses to file a complaint. The fact that the 

MSP may unilaterally intervene in the judicial process may substantially limit the 

effectiveness of this legal reform.4

The government also approved a new law on compulsory arbitration, which partially addresses the ILO’s concerns. Before, the MSP had the authority to suspend 

a strike and refer a dispute to mandatory arbitration when the strike exceeded 60 

days. The ILO criticized compulsory arbitration because, in most cases, compulsory 

arbitration robs unions of their leverage in a labor conflict, as the employer can simply decide to wait out the strike knowing that the government will eventually bring 

it to and end. Article 1 of the Law 1210 provides that, sixty days after the initiation 

of a strike, the employer and union should spend three days trying to resolve their 

differences by whatever mechanism they choose. If the parties are unable to reach 

an agreement during this time, the government or a party can petition for the intervention of the sub-commission of the Wage and Labor Policies Commission. This 

sub-commission will attempt to mediate the conflict for up to five days. If there still 

is no resolution, then both parties together may request the establishment of an arbitration tribunal from the MSP. If the parties opt for arbitration, the workers are 

obligated to return to work within 3 days. 

However, Article 1(2) now provides that the President may order the cessation of 

any strike that, ‘‘with regard to its nature or magnitude, affects the health, security, 

public order or the economy, in whole or in part, of the population.’’ This language 

very loosely tracks the ILO’s ‘‘essential service’’ proviso, but differs in important 

ways. The ILO has held that strikes may be prohibited in essential services, with 

the term ‘‘essential service’’ meaning ‘‘those services whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.’’ 5

The ILO definition is different from Law 1210 in significant ways. First, a strike’s 

impact on the ‘‘economy’’ is not relevant under ILO jurisprudence. Indeed, if a strike 

could be prohibited merely because it affects the economy, almost no strike would 

ever be legal. An otherwise legal strike may also affect the ‘‘public order,’’ loosely 

defined. The term ‘‘security’’ or ‘‘public order’’ may be legitimate only if those terms 

are read to be synonymous with ‘‘personal safety.’’ Second, the ILO requires that 

the interruption of a service ‘‘endanger’’ the life, personal safety or health of the 

population. The Colombian law provides that a strike need only ‘‘affect’’ health, security, public order or the economy, which is a far lower standard than ‘‘endanger.’’

Finally, these two reforms leave many of the obstacles with regard to the right 

to strike in place. For example, there is still a total prohibition on the calling of 

strikes by federations and confederations. The law also bans strikes in several sectors of the economy that are not properly considered ‘‘essential services’’ under international law, such as transportations, civil service, and the oil industry. Further, 

the law allows for the dismissal of union members that have participated in a strike 

in an industry that is not properly deemed an essential service under international 

law. 
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Cooperatives 

In theory, a labor cooperative is a voluntary association of workers, is democratically self-managed and equitably distributes the gains realized by the economic activities of its members. However, it is quite the opposite for Colombian workers. 

Today, several hundred thousand workers are routinely exploited in managementcreated and/or dominated associated labor cooperatives in Colombia. One of the central problems associated with these cooperatives is that those who work for them 

are classified as ‘‘associates’’ rather than ‘‘employees’’ and thus excluded from the 

coverage of the nation’s labor laws. This means that workers in cooperatives cannot 

form a union, bargain collectively or strike. It also means that maximum hour and 

overtime pay provision are not applied to them. 

This situation has led to very low wages, few benefits, and, particularly in the 

rural sector, extreme forms of exploitation. This does not just affect low-skilled 

labor. Indeed, many health care professionals have been affected. As public hospitals 

and health centers were privatized in recent years, the successor private employer 

dismissed the workers and rehired them, non-union, through a cooperative or temporary service agency at much lower wages and for much longer hours. 

The government recently issued a new law on labor cooperatives, Law 1233, 

which, with few exceptions, largely restates many of the provisions found in Decree 

4588 of 2006. Importantly, the new law does absolutely nothing to bring workers 

employed in these cooperatives under the coverage of the nation’s labor laws—maintaining a permanent underclass of workers without access to the basic labor guarantees that are to be enjoyed by all workers. As the ILO Committee on Freedom of 

Association recently observed, ‘‘workers associated in cooperatives should have the 

right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing.’’ 6

The new decree does require labor cooperatives to make contributions to three 

government benefits programs (National Apprenticeship Service—SENA, Colombian 

Institute for Family Wellbeing—ICBF, and the Family Equalization Fund) as well 

as the social security system, which covers health care and retirement. The decree 

also requires the labor cooperative to pay the monthly minimum wage for the class 

of work performed. In 2008, the monthly minimum wage in Colombia is 461,500 

pesos, or roughly $265. If enforced, this provision does establish a floor on wages, 

albeit low, that did not previously exist. However, as the U.S. State Department has 

observed, ‘‘The national minimum wage did not provide sufficient income to purchase the basic market basket of goods for a family of four.’’ 7 According to DANE, 

the cost of the basic basket of goods in 2008 is 955,990 pesos, roughly double the 

minimum wage. 

The decree does state that labor cooperatives are prohibited from ‘‘intermediation,’’ meaning the hiring out of a cooperative associate to a third party like a temp 

worker. If this provision is violated, the decree provides that the third party and 

the cooperative are jointly responsible for any wages and benefits owed to the worker. This prohibition is nothing new and is essentially a restatement of a largely unenforced provision of Decree 4588 of 2006. The new law also does not prohibit thirdparty contracting altogether. Like Decree 4588, the law allows for cooperatives to 

engage in third-party contracting to produce goods and services, so long as the purpose is to produce or perform a specific object or task. 

It is almost certain that employers will continue to use these cooperatives as a 

means to evade the formation of unions, collective bargaining, and other such responsibilities they would normally face if the workers employed in cooperatives were 

simply treated as workers. Indeed, one of the largest labor conflicts with regard to 

cooperative workers occurred after this new law was issued. 

Roughly 20,000 people work in Colombia’s lucrative sugar industry—planting, 

harvesting and processing sugarcane. Most of these workers have been hired 

through associated labor cooperatives. In the sugar industry, workers often perform 

this backbreaking work in excess of seventy hours a week and, for this, do not even 

receive the minimum wage. Further, without adequate protective equipment, or no 

equipment in many cases, workers sustain serious occupational injuries, some of 

which are disabling. On August 25, 2008, thousands of sugarcane workers held an 

assembly in Candelaria, Valle, where they then authorized a ‘‘strike’’ over the failure of the owners of the sugar industry to negotiate with the workers over a list 

of basic demands submitted on July 14, 2008. The strike began on September 15, 

2008, as the employers had completely refused to negotiate. 

In response, the sugar mills were largely militarized and several workers had 

been threatened with death or have received threatening calls since the strike 

began. Other workers have been fired simply for holding meetings with fellow workers. Rather than trying to mediate the conflict, Minister of Labor, Diego Palacio, has 

denounced the strike and accused the strikers of being manipulated by forces ‘‘outside of the labor movement’’—a very thinly veiled reference to the guerillas. 
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Due to intense international pressure, the sugar mill owners finally capitulated 

and accepted some of the workers demands. The union won an average 15% wage 

increase, a limitation on the working day of 8 hours plus a maximum of two hours 

overtime (replacing the 12-14 hours previously worked daily), employer contributions to sick pay, and employer commitments to housing, education and social security for workers and their families. Stricter controls are to be placed on the weighing 

of harvested cane, a procedure through which workers have in the past been routinely robbed. However, the union was not able to win direct employment contracts 

to replace the system of cooperatives that has allowed the mill owners to evade responsibility for collective bargaining and health and retirement benefits. 

Finally, these reforms in no way address all of the concerns raised by the ILO. 

First, the application of the labor law is limited to less than three million people, 

of a working population of nearly nineteen million. As most workers do not have 

a direct contract of employment, they are deemed outside the scope of the law. Colombian labor law also continues to present serious obstacles to the full exercise of 

the right to freely associate, to bargain collectively and to strike.8 The refusal to register new unions, described below, was also a serious issue. These factors explain 

in part why only 4 out of 100 workers are in unions today, and why far fewer are 

covered by a collective barraging agreement. 

Denial of Union Registration 

The ILO has provided that a government may establish registration requirements 

that are solely a mere formality. If conditions for granting registration were tantamount to obtaining previous authorization from the authorities for the establishment of a union, this would constitute an infringement of ILO Convention 87.9 In 

Colombia, the government has in fact applied the regulations to arbitrarily deny 

unions their registration. According to ENS, 253 new union organizations were denied registration by the Ministry of the Social Protection between 2002 and 2007. 

It is important to note that the denial of union registration skyrocketed under the 

current administration. In 2000-2002, only four union registrations had been denied. 

In 2003 alone, the first full year of the Uribe Administration, the number soared 

to 70. 

The ILO has taken note. In June 2008, the Committee on the Application of 

Standards ‘‘called upon [Colombia] to ensure that all workers, including those in the 

public service, may form and join the organization of their own choosing, without 

previous authorization, in accordance with the Convention. In this regard, the Committee called upon the Government not to use discretionary authority to deny trade 

union registration.’’ 10

Recently, the Colombian Supreme Court issued a series of rulings in late-2008 

which divested the Ministry of Social Protection of the ability to deny registration 

to new unions, changes in union statutes, or new boards of directors. However, new 

regulations putting into effect this ruling have yet to be issued. And, it remains to 

be seen what will be done in all of those cases over the last several years where 

workers were illegally denied the right to form a union. 

The ILO ‘‘Blacklist’’

The GOC has repeatedly asserted that the ILO has given it a clean, or at least 

cleaner, bill of health, because Colombia was not included on a non-existent ILO 

‘‘blacklist.’’ In fact, Colombia continues to be subject to the scrutiny of the ILO system because its violations of Convention 87 and 98 are so egregious. Indeed, Colombia continues to be under the review of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, the ILO Committee of Experts, and, the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of International Labor Standards. 

There is simply no ILO ‘‘blacklist.’’ Governments are invited to appear before the 

Committee on Standards to address the concerns raised in the annual report of the 

Committee of Experts, based on an agreed-to list between the Employers and Workers Groups. Although the Employers Group unjustifiably vetoed the Workers Group 

demand to include Colombia on the list of governments for review during the June 

2008 session, Colombia agreed to appear before the Committee. During that session, 

the Committee on Standards found that the sharp increase in trade union murders 

in 2008 was particularly disturbing and signified a major problem with respect to 

ending impunity. Moreover, the Committee unequivocally concluded that the proposed changes in the labor law were inadequate in reversing the effective violations 

of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights due to the creation of cooperatives, the use of temporary employees, and other legal ruses. 

The GOC’s assertion that it has been removed from an ILO blacklist due to its 

voluntary agreement to appear before the Committee on the Application of Inter-
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national Labor Standards at the ILO conference in Geneva in June of 2008 is a distortion of fact and of ILO reality. 

Para-Politics Scandal Widens, Calling into Question Legitimacy of Colombian 

Congress 

Today, over 60 members of Congress, roughly 20%, have come under criminal investigation for collaborating with paramilitaries. More than 30 of them are already 

under arrest. Nearly all of these individuals are members of President Uribe’s inner 

circle. This circle includes his cousin and ally, Senator Mario Uribe, who recently 

attempted to evade arrest by unsuccessfully seeking refuge in the Embassy of Costa 

Rica in Bogota. President Uribe has attempted to take credit for the housecleaning, 

and has invoked the recent arrests as an example of his administration’s adherence 

to the rule of law. However, the investigations would most likely not have happened 

but for the efforts of the independent Supreme Court. Indeed, President Uribe’s proposal to let all of the implicated politicians avoid prison contradicts this assertion. 

Most recently, President Uribe blocked a bill that would bar political parties linked 

to paramilitaries from holding onto the seats of those members who are convicted 

of paramilitary collaboration. If the bill were implemented, President Uribe would 

lose his majority in Congress. 

Without questions, the government’s direct ties with the paramilitaries preclude 

it from being able to effectively end impunity from trade union violence and to pass 

the necessary reforms in Congress to assure compliance with core labor standards. 

ENDNOTES

1The Fiscalia General de la Nacion (Office of the Attorney General of Colombia), registered 

42 murdered unionists in 41 cases in 2008, up from 27 murdered trade unionists in 26 cases. 

This is a 50% increase according to the government. 2 As stated in the report of the Fiscalia General dated January 20, 2009. 

3The threat, which bore the image of a human skull with black wings, warned: ‘‘Death to the 

leaders of the March for Peace and guerillas and supporters who disguise themselves as displaced persons but are guerillas and for this we declare them military objectives of the Black 

Eagles and also such NGOS, associations and foundations * * * You used the march of March 

6 this year to diminish us further and to put the people against us, we will start to kill you 

one by one, we are going to be implacable. We will not leave any loose ends.’’ 4 In the U.S., for example, an employer may file a charge with the NLRB to seek a determination as to whether the strike constitutes an unfair labor practice. In some cases, an employer 

may also seek an injunction with a court. However, the government has no independent right 

to file a complaint concerning the legality of a strike. 5 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), Digest of Decisions 2006 ¶ 576. 

6 CFA Digest of Decisions 2006 ¶ 262. 

7 U.S. State Department, Human Rights Country Practice Report (Colombia), March 11, 2008. 

8For a list of those concerns, see pp. 12-15 of Workers’ Rights, Violence and Impunity in Colombia, available online at www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/colombia—briefing.pdf. 9See, e.g., Digest ¶ 294. 

10See also, ILO CEACR, Individual Observation Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention No. 87, Colombia (2008). 
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U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, September 12, 2008. 

President ALVARO URIBE VE ́LEZ, 

Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Bogota ́, Colombia. 

DEAR PRESIDENT URIBE: I was very pleased to learn that you will travel to Washington, D.C. next week to meet with Congressional leaders, and I look forward to 
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discussing our mutual concern over the historical and ongoing violence against Colombians who are labor leaders, labor organizers, or simply members of labor 

unions. As you know, I traveled to your beautiful country earlier this year and met 

with your Vice President and Attorney General, as well as various leaders from Colombian labor unions, human rights organizations, and the specialized labor judges 

that handle the significant backlog of labor-homicide cases. I am sorry that your 

travel schedule and mine prevented us from meeting last January during my stay 

in Bogota ́, but I look forward to meeting with you and welcoming you to the United 

States. 

Since I visited your country, I have written two letters to the Colombian government and sent my Committee staff on a return trip to Colombia to further investigate various labor issues, including the still-unexplained decision to remove Judge 

Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez from his position as a specialized labor judge. I agree with the 

assessment of many Colombian observers—including your own Vice President Francisco Santos—that Sa ́nchez was an excellent judge who was diligently working on 

Colombia’s enormous backlog of labor-homicide cases. Nevertheless, in January 

2008, the Consejo Superior de la Judicatura decided by a contentious split vote of 

12 to 11 to remove Judge Sa ́nchez from his position in the middle of open criminal 

cases pending before him. Unfortunately, I do not think we will ever know whether 

Sa ́nchez was removed in retaliation for his politically-sensitive legal rulings that 

convicted high-profile defendants such as the violent right-wing paramilitary leader 

Salvatore Mancuso, several soldiers from the Colombian Army, and implicated the 

multinational Nestle Corporation in anti-labor killings. Because we may never know 

why Judge Sa ́nchez was removed from his position on the bench, I believe it is now 

time to look forward. Our two ally nations should work together to help Colombia 

improve its labor laws, decrease the ongoing violence, and finally put an end to the 

impunity enjoyed by those who have perpetrated thousands of anti-labor killings. 

These challenges have taken on heightened significance this year as the violence 

in Colombia has escalated. Even according to the statistics kept by the Government 

of Colombia, 2008 has already been a more violent year than all of 2007 in terms 

of labor-homicides. During only the first eight months of this year, the assassins 

have made more threats, caused more bloodshed, and taken more lives of labor leaders than they did in all twelve months of last year. Given this troubling context, 

I would like to discuss with you the urgent need for: 

1) an effective, sustainable, and transparent Colombian system of justice to protect the rights of working people and vindicate the lives of the victims of anti-labor 

violence; 

2) further investigation and prosecution of the intellectual authors who planned 

the attacks and killings of labor union leaders in Colombia; and 

3) additional reforms to bring Colombian labor laws up to the minimum core labor 

standards set by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and cited by both the 

U.S. State Department and U.S. Department of Labor. 

Indeed, the Democratic Majority in our Congress already recognized these exact 

challenges in Colombia by appropriating millions of dollars last year to help Colombia further develop the rule of law, prosecute human rights cases, and improve labor 

conditions. My colleagues in the Congress and I are quite proud that last year we 

improved on Plan Colombia by appropriating more funds to help Colombia address 

its very serious problems related to the issues of the ongoing anti-labor violence and 

weak labor standards. As you know, the ILO has issued repeated proclamations—

as recently as June 2008—expressing serious concern over various deficiencies in 

Colombian labor law. 

Thus, many members of our Congress are currently very disappointed that the 

Bush Administration has not yet even transferred to the Colombian Attorney General’s Office the funds that we appropriated last year. If the Bush Administration 

had not created these inexplicable delays, the Government of Colombia could have 

already hired even more investigators and prosecutors, and Colombia might by now 

be several steps closer to creating an effective and sustainable system of justice to 

address the grave problem of anti-labor violence. However, I am hopeful that the 

next Administration will work more closely with the Government of Colombia to 

bring about improvements in Colombian labor laws and human rights, increased 

trade, and an even stronger relationship between our two ally nations. 

In the meantime, I believe the United States Congress must continue to examine 

these issues and search for solutions. Indeed, one advantage stemming from our 

Congress’ decision to postpone the vote regarding the proposed Colombia Free Trade 

Agreement is that it has given my colleagues and me additional time needed to assess whether or not Colombia has in fact created an effective and sustainable system of justice to combat anti-labor violence. In my capacity as Chairman of the 

Committee on Education and Labor, my staff and I have taken advantage of that 
100

time by meeting regularly with Colombian human rights advocates and many Colombian government officials. I hope that this ongoing fact-finding work will allow 

Congress to provide helpful recommendations to the next Administration in the 

United States over how we can further strengthen our nation’s relationship with Colombia in such a way that promotes increased trade and higher labor standards. As 

a first step in this process, please consider the following concerns about labor rights 

in Colombia. 

I. The Need for an Effective, Sustainable, and Transparent System of Justice That 

Will Protect the Rights of Working People and Vindicate the Lives of Slain Labor 

Union Leaders in Colombia 

According to the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), almost 2,700 Colombian union 

leaders or union members have been murdered since 1986. The overwhelming majority of these killings remain uninvestigated and un-prosecuted by the Colombian 

Attorney General’s Office. Moreover, at Colombia’s current and disappointing pace 

of investigations and indictments, it would take the Attorney General’s Office several decades to get through its entire backlog. 

In the past months, various Colombian human rights attorneys have conveyed to 

me and my Committee staff the serious problems that still hinder Colombia’s judicial system for addressing anti-labor killings. I have not created an exhaustive list, 

but I do respectfully ask that you please consider addressing the following problems 

so that Colombia’s judicial system becomes more effective, sustainable, and transparent. 

A) The temporary nature of the specialized labor judges. 

Colombian Vice President Santos wrote to me on March 28, 2008, reporting that 

the Executive Branch had approved the budget for the Judicial Branch to create 

three permanent specialized courts to adjudicate the criminal cases stemming from 

anti-union homicides. However, in June and July 2008, the Colombian Judicial 

Branch approved two new decrees that still do not actually accomplish this goal. 

The first decree created three new permanent judicial positions, but without any 

mention of what type of cases those judges will hear. See Agreement No. 4924 

(dated June 25, 2008). The second decree assigned those three permanent judges to 

exclusively hear labor-homicide cases, but only for a one-year period. See Agreement 

No. 4959 (dated July 11, 2008). Thus, when read together, these two decrees clearly 

demonstrate that the three specialized judges’ assignments to hear labor-homicide 

cases will expire yet again in July 2009. 

The Colombian Judicial Branch has already once allowed the expiration of the 

mandate of these three judges to cause disruptions in ongoing legal proceedings. As 

you will remember, these three judicial positions were allowed to expire for the first 

time on December 31, 2007. By the time I met with the three judges in Bogota ́ on 

January 12, 2008, they had been out of work for almost two weeks, had been forced 

to cancel January hearings for pending criminal trials, and they did not even know 

whether they would be allowed to ever return to work on the labor-homicide cases. 

Two of the three judges were eventually reinstated, and I understand that many 

of the January hearings were eventually rescheduled for the following month. Nevertheless, the expiration of these three judicial positions caused unnecessary disruption and delay, and I imagine we can both agree that the repeat of such a scenario 

should be avoided if at all possible. 

Thus, I am reassured that some members of the Uribe Administration have recently expressed concern about the still-temporary nature of the position of the specialized labor judges. On August 23, 2008, the Colombian Ministry of Social Protection wrote informally to the Colombian Judicial Branch to inquire whether further 

changes would be made so that the three judicial slots would be guaranteed for 

labor-homicide cases not just through July 2009, but rather until the entire backlog 

of such cases has been fully adjudicated. (My Committee staff has a copy of the written inquiry on file). I ask that you please inform me of any response that the Ministry of Social Protection receives regarding its inquiry to the Judicial Branch. In 

addition, I would like to discuss with you whether the Government of Colombia will 

pledge publicly to continue the mandate for these three judicial slots to handle 

labor-homicide cases beyond July 2009 and until the entire backlog of labor-homicide cases has been completed. 

B) The fact that the written judicial opinions in labor-homicide cases are not easily 

accessible by the relatives of victims, human rights attorneys, or the public. 

When my Committee staff traveled to Colombia last month, we requested a copy 

of each of the 123 written judicial opinions corresponding to the 100 labor-homicide 

cases that have been adjudicated thus far. (Some murder cases result in more than 

one written sentence because the case may have multiple defendants). However, the 

Attorney General’s Office told my Committee staff that it would be exceedingly dif-
101

ficult to provide a copy of all 123 of the written opinions because they are not stored 

by the Colombian government in one central location, but rather scattered throughout many government buildings in several different cities. The Attorney General’s 

Office also explained that some of the 123 sentences may have gone missing due 

to bureaucratic complexities, and that in general, the Colombian government does 

not have sufficient resources to find and keep a central inventory of the written judicial opinions. 

My Committee staff also made the same request to the head administrator of the 

Consejo Superior de la Judicatura, who seemed slightly more optimistic that it 

might be possible to eventually provide a copy of each of the 123 written opinions. 

However, we are still waiting for the Judicial Branch to respond definitively. 

I imagine that you and I both agree on the importance of allowing the sons and 

daughters or spouses of slain labor leaders to easily access and read the judicial 

opinion that either convicts or acquits the person accused of killing their deceased 

family member. For those Colombians who have lost a loved-one to such senseless 

violence, the judicial record of the case against the killer is one small part of achieving justice. In addition, these written judicial opinions serve as important learning 

tools for human rights attorneys who plan on litigating similar labor rights cases 

in the future. While the decisions do not create binding legal precedent because they 

are issued by trial court judges rather than the Colombian Supreme Court, those 

written opinions nevertheless create a written record of an important and concerning part of Colombia’s history. For all of those reasons, Colombian human rights 

attorneys have asked my help in persuading the Government of Colombia to make 

public and easily accessible all of the written judicial opinions, including all new decisions that are issued going forward. 

Therefore, I would like to discuss with you whether the U.S. Congress should consider appropriating funds to help Colombia centralize and make public these judicial 

opinions as part of the next set of appropriations for Plan Colombia. As you know, 

under the leadership of Chairman David Obey and Chairwoman Nita Lowey of the 

Committee on Appropriations, last year the Democratic Majority improved on Plan 

Colombia by allocating greater amounts of funds dedicated to Colombia’s efforts to 

develop the rule of law and improve labor conditions. It strikes me that any efforts 

to make public the judicial opinions in Colombian labor-homicide cases falls squarely within that goal of promoting the rule of law. In fact, the federal trial courts in 

the United States often publish their written judicial opinions on the internet within 

hours of the judge’s final decision. Thus, I am interested in helping Colombia create 

such an internet-based system that will allow the Colombian public—and the families of victims in particular—to acquire easier access to the written judicial opinions 

in labor-homicide cases. 

C) The secrecy by the Attorney General’s Office as to the contents of its full backlog 

list of labor-homicide cases yet to be investigated and adjudicated. 

According to the Colombian Attorney General’s Office, approximately 1,300 union 

leaders or union members have been murdered or faced serious acts of violence in 

Colombia since the mid-1980’s. However, this figure is only half the number of the 

approximately 2,700 murders for the same time period as chronicled by the Escuela 

Nacional Sindical (ENS). The ENS is Colombia’s leading non-profit labor think-tank, 

and it has been cited by the U.S. State Department in its human rights reports related to labor violence. I am concerned that we cannot begin to compare and reconcile the names on the two lists because the Colombian Attorney General’s Office 

refuses to release its list of names. Indeed, it will be impossible to know the true 

scope of the killings, and thus the scope of the work that lies ahead, until this is 

done. Recently, the leading Colombian labor union federations submitted a petition 

to the ILO complaining over the fact that the Colombian government refuses to 

share this information with them. To the contrary, the ENS has proven willing to 

subject itself to transparency and public scrutiny, having published and shared its 

complete list of approximately 2,700 union killings with the Colombian government, 

labor unions, human rights attorneys, and even my Committee staff. I therefore respectfully encourage the Office of the Attorney General to make this information 

available as soon as practicable. 

D) The ongoing inaccuracies in the Attorney General’s published statistics about 

the defendants’ motives in completed judicial decisions in labor-homicide cases. 

Colombian human rights advocates have expressed their concern that the Attorney General’s Office may be publishing inaccurate summaries about the judicial determinations of the motives of the killers in labor-homicide cases. These summaries 

are created by the Attorney General’s Office once per month, and they tally how 

many fully-adjudicated cases to date were found by the judge to have had various 

different possible motives. For example, a judge may find that the assassin’s motive 

for killing the union leader was the deceased’s pro-union activity. In the alternative, 
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the judge may find that the motive of the assassin who murdered the union leader 

was not the deceased’s union-activity, but rather any number of other motives such 

as ‘‘personal issues’’ or ‘‘political activity.’’ In order to create these documents, the 

prosecutors in the Attorney General’s Office read each judicial opinion, decide what 

the prosecutors believe was the ruling of the judge, and then add up the number 

of cases that fall into each category. For example, the Attorney General’s summary 

for July 2008 states that 21 murders had ‘‘union activity’’ as the motive, as compared to 8 cases with ‘‘personal problems’’ and 1 case with ‘‘political activity’’ as the 

motive. 

The problem with these summaries, however, is that the statistics seem to fluctuate dramatically and illogically from month to month. For example, when I traveled to Colombia in early January 2008, the Attorney General’s Office gave me the 

summary for December 2007, which claimed that as of that time the judges had 

found the ‘‘personal problems’’ motive in 10 total cases since the prosecutions began. 

However, as I just noted above, the July 2008 summary claims that there now are 

only 8 total cases in which ‘‘personal problems’’ was the motive. It is simply illogical 

that as the total number of judicial decisions has increased from last December to 

this July, that somehow the number of those cases in which the motive was found 

by a judge to be ‘‘personal problems’’ has somehow decreased. This irregularity leads 

me to believe that either the prior statistics were inaccurate, or in the alternative, 

the current statistics are the problem. 

Unfortunately, because the Attorney General’s Office does not place footnotes in 

these summary documents in order to explain which specific cases it considers to 

fall into each category, the public cannot verify the claims made in those summaries. I hope that in the future the Attorney General’s Office will exhibit more precision when creating the summaries it distributes to members of the U.S. Congress 

and the public. 

Finally, I want to note how much personal anguish the misclassification of the 

motive in a labor-homicide case can cause to the families of the victims of that violence. Please consider the example of Colombian labor leader Jorge Dario Hoyos 

Franco, who was tragically gunned-down by two assassins in the year 2001. When 

the Attorney General’s Office began to investigate the case, the prosecutors’ original 

theory was that the defendant—a Colombian Police Officer named Monroy—had 

wanted to kill Hoyos Franco as a ‘‘crime of passion’’ due to an alleged adulterous 

affair in which Hoyos was supposedly engaged. However, after this case went to 

trial in 2007, Judge Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez rejected this original theory, finding that 

it had ‘‘fallen by its own weight’’ because the woman in question testified under oath 

that she did not even know Hoyos Franco. (Criminal Sentence against defendant 

Carlos Alberto Monroy, dated Aug. 14, 2007.) Therefore, Judge Sa ́nchez ruled that 

the evidence in the case: demonstrates that the motive of the HOYOS FRANCO 

murder was not about a love affair, as was the focus of the investigation in the beginning, but rather [as demonstrated] by the statement made by the defendant 

[Monroy] to the previously mentioned illegal armed organization [known as the 

AUC], which during that time * * * drew up a list of union, civic, popular and communal leaders that in their estimation were military targets * * * [and because the] 

activities [in favor of labor unions by] the murder victim [Hoyos Franco] had [been] 

undertaken for several years and for that precise reason he was killed. 

(Id.) This binding legal decision by a Colombian judge should have definitively settled the matter of the motive behind the killing of Jorge Dario Hoyos Franco. However, more than three months after the judicial opinion, the Attorney General’s Office released a November 2007 document that still listed the Hoyos Franco case as 

one with the ‘‘personal problems’’ motive. (This document is on file with my Committee staff.) I am told that the young daughters and widow of the deceased union 

leader were pained that their own government continued to publicize the lie that 

their father and husband had allegedly committed an adulterous affair even after 

that theory had been discredited in a Colombian court of law. I understand that the 

family repeatedly petitioned the Attorney General’s Office to revise the document 

and accurately classify the case, but that change was apparently not made until 

only recently. 

E) The fact that the Attorney General’s Office has not publicly committed to a 

work-plan for completing the entire backlog of the thousands of labor-homicide cases. 

The Colombian Office of the Attorney General has made some modest progress 

in the last year in securing convictions in labor-homicide cases, especially compared 

to the situation only a few years ago when there were hundreds of labor-homicides 

per year and virtually no convictions whatsoever. As I understand it, there are now 

convictions in 100 labor-murder cases, and a corresponding 123 judicial sentences 

because some of those 100 cases have more than one defendant. Thus, if one takes 

the Attorney General’s statistics of approximately 1,300 total cases, then Colombia 
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has secured convictions in only 7.6% of cases. If one takes the ENS statistics of approximately 2,700 murders, then Colombia has secured convictions in only 3.7 % of 

cases. In either event, the modest progress of the past year still leaves a highly 

troubling level of impunity for the perpetrators of these killings. Well over 90% of 

the murderers have escaped justice. 

The Bush Administration has done far too little to help Colombia improve its 

labor laws and combat anti-labor violence. In fact, it was not until the leadership 

of the Democratic Majority that last year our Congress significantly increased the 

funds in Plan Colombia that are dedicated specifically to fostering the rule of law 

and prosecuting human rights cases. Almost nine months have passed, and disappointingly the Bush Administration has still not actually transferred those funds 

to the Colombian Attorney General’s Office. I cannot think of a plausible reason for 

this delay, but I do wonder whether the Colombian Attorney General’s Office might 

have investigated and brought more killers to justice if the Bush Administration 

had only exercised greater diligence and concern for these important labor issues. 

I hope that the next Administration will work much more closely with the Government of Colombia to help implement a plan that will eventually investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate every last remaining labor-homicide case. The family members 

of the slain union leaders deserve nothing less. 

As I noted above, at Colombia’s current pace of investigations and indictments, 

it would take the Attorney General’s Office several decades to get through its backlog. Therefore, I urge the Government of Colombia—and the Attorney General’s Office in particular—to publicly commit to a plan that will dramatically improve the 

pace of investigations and indictments, and thus assure members of the U.S. Congress that Colombia will achieve the goal of prosecuting every murder on the entire 

backlog list of labor-homicide cases. 

II. The Need for Further Investigation and Prosecution of the Intellectual Authors 

Who Planned the Attacks and Killings of Labor Union Leaders in Colombia 

Of the modest number of convictions that the Attorney General’s Office has begun 

to win in the past few years, the vast majority of the cases have been against the 

‘‘material authors’’ of the crimes (i.e. the man who pulled the trigger of the gun, or 

the man who stabbed the union leader to death with a machete). Such convictions 

are, of course, extremely important. I commend the Attorney General’s Office for 

creating a special unit for prosecuting these labor cases, and I am hopeful that these 

specialized prosecutors will eventually bring indictments in the large number of 

murder cases that remain uninvestigated. 

However, impunity will persist unless the Government of Colombia does more to 

investigate and prosecute the ‘‘intellectual authors’’ who ordered, planned, or paid 

for the low-level assassin to perpetrate the killing. For example, serious allegations 

have been leveled against a cabinet-level official in the Uribe Administration, highlevel military officers in the Colombian Army, top right-wing paramilitary leaders, 

and even some multinational corporations. In some of these cases, the Colombian 

specialized labor judges have issued Court Orders requiring the Attorney General’s 

Office to investigate such alleged intellectual authors. But to this date, very few 

such investigations and prosecutions have gone forward. Therefore, I want to mention three emblematic cases in which the Colombian government’s efforts to investigate, prosecute, or imprison the alleged intellectual author of the anti-union homicides have thus far failed. 

A) Jorge Noguera of the Uribe Administration. 

As you know, Colombia’s former intelligence chief—Jorge Noguera—was arrested 

in February 2007 and indicted for helping violent right-wing paramilitaries to infiltrate the highest levels of the Colombian government. Mr. Noguera—who reported 

directly to the President as the director of the DAS (‘‘Departamento Administrativo 

de Seguridad’’)—allegedly facilitated Colombian government cooperation with several paramilitary groups, particularly the ‘‘Northern Block’’ led by the violent narcotrafficker ‘‘Jorge 40.’’ Sadly, Noguera is not the only high-level Colombian government official caught up in this ‘‘Para-Politics Scandal.’’ Indeed, the Colombian Supreme Court has recently indicted almost 30 members of the Colombian Congress 

for colluding with the right-wing ‘‘AUC’’ paramilitary organization, which the U.S. 

State Department has officially classified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The 

Colombian Supreme Court has also launched formal investigations into another 30 

members of the Colombian Congress. In response, the Uribe Administration has recently proposed stripping the Supreme Court of its long-standing jurisdiction on this 

matter, which would quash any further investigations. 

I raise this complicated and troubling issue because the allegations against 

Noguera are directly related to the labor issues that constitute the focus of this letter. Specifically, Noguera is accused of compiling lists of the union leaders under 
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government protection and then giving those lists to the paramilitaries so the union 

leaders could be targeted for death. Several of those very union leaders were reportedly threatened or killed. If the Colombian Attorney General eventually proves this 

allegation in court, the Noguera case will constitute perhaps the most dramatic of 

several examples of direct Colombian government participation in anti-labor violence and killings. 

Unfortunately, more than eighteen months have passed since the original indictment was filed in February 2007, and the case against Noguera has completely 

stalled due to procedural mistakes made by the Attorney General’s Office. The Colombian Supreme Court has found that the evidence and allegations against 

Noguera are legally valid, but the Court has rejected the case for procedural reasons 

on two consecutive occasions. As a result of these ongoing prosecutorial mistakes, 

Noguera was released from prison in June 2008 and he currently remains at large. 

I understand that the Attorney General is now preparing to re-file his case. 

Several Colombian human rights attorneys have expressed their concern to me 

and my Committee staff that the continual procedural defects and corresponding 

delays are not typical. Thus, these Colombian observers worry that the politicallyconnected Noguera will ultimately go free without even facing a trial. Therefore, I 

would like to discuss this case with you when we meet. In particular, I would like 

to hear your thoughts about whether your Attorney General’s Office will ever bring 

the Noguera case to trial. 

B) The murder of labor leader Luciano Enrique Romero Molina, and the Colombian Court Order to investigate the Nestle Corporation. 

In late 2007, Judge Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez issued a 110-page legal ruling in a case 

stemming from the brutal murder of a Colombian labor leader named Luciano 

Enrique Romero Molina. As Judge Sa ́nchez explained in his decision, in late 2005—

months after passage of the ‘‘Justice and Peace’’ Law—Molina was scheduled to testify before an international human rights tribunal in Switzerland regarding the 

labor conditions at a Colombian factory of the multinational Nestle Corporation. 

However, just weeks before his scheduled testimony, Molina was abducted and tortured by paramilitaries. When Molina refused to give them information about his 

complaints against the Nestle Corporation, the paramilitaries stabbed him to death 

with more than fifty strikes of a machete. 

Judge Sa ́nchez convicted the individual defendant who was directly responsible 

for the killing, but significantly, he also ordered an investigation into whether the 

Nestle Corporation was in any way responsible for ordering the killing. While courts 

outside of Colombia——such as the Inter-American Court for Justice and the federal 

courts in the United Status—have dealt with cases in which multinational corporations have been accused of playing a role in anti-union violence in Colombia, Judge 

Sa ́nchez’s ruling appears to be groundbreaking for the Colombian courts. According 

to human rights observers in Colombia, this was the first judicial decision since the 

backlog process began in which one of the three Colombian specialized labor judges 

called for an investigation of the possible role a multinational corporation in the assassination of a Colombian labor leader. 

Last month, my Committee staff inquired about the status of this investigation 

while visiting the Attorney General’s Office in Bogota ́. We were told that the prosecutor and investigator assigned to the Nestle case had not done anything whatsoever to advance the investigation because they did not feel there was sufficient evidence to warrant any further efforts. According to their own admission, the prosecutors in the Attorney General’s Office have apparently decided not even to interview 

or take the depositions of the management of the Nestle workplace or of any of the 

deceased’s former coworkers. I would like to discuss whether you believe the Attorney General’s Office should abide by the Court Order of the now-displaced Judge 

Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez and conduct an actual investigation into this serious matter. 

C) The Colombian Police Officer who planned the assassination of labor leader 

Jorge Dario Hoyos Franco has been convicted in absentia, and therefore has not 

served a single day of his 40-year sentence. 

As discussed in Section One of this letter, the well-known Colombian labor leader 

Jorge Dario Hoyos Franco was gunned-down by two young assassins who drove by 

him on a motorcycle late at night in March 2001. Prior to his murder, Hoyos Franco 

had been receiving regular death threats related to his union leadership. He had 

even faced several unsuccessful attempts to kidnap him. Within a few years of 

Hoyos Franco’s murder, the Attorney General’s Office had successfully convicted the 

two material authors who were paid to shoot him. However, the intellectual authors 

of this crime still remain at large to this day. 

Several years after the first trial convicting the two young assassins, the Attorney 

General’s Office began to investigate one of the alleged intellectual authors. The investigation focused on a man named Carlos Alberto Monroy, who had served as a 
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Colombian Police Officer at the time of Hoyos Franco’s assassination. The Attorney 

General’s Office decided to prosecute Monroy in absentia, as is allowed pursuant to 

Colombian law. Judge Jose ́ Nirio Sa ́nchez presided over the trial and heard testimony that Officer Monroy had provided the assassins with their motorcycle and firearms, and that he had paid and directed the young men to perpetrate the murder. 

Judge Sa ́nchez convicted Monroy and sentenced him to 40 years in prison. However, 

Monroy is still at large and has not served a single day of his prison sentence. 

The family of Jorge Dario Hoyos Franco has urged the Attorney General’s Office 

to find, capture, and incarcerate Monroy, but thus far these efforts have not proven 

successful. In addition, the family has urged the Attorney General’s Office to continue investigating the additional alleged intellectual authors of this one assassination. Until those two things happen in this case, impunity will persist. 

III. The Need to Reform Colombian Labor Laws to Reach the Minimum Core Labor 

Standards Set by the International Labor Organization and Cited by both the 

U.S. State Department and U.S. Department of Labor 

Before the U.S. Congress took up a vote on the Peru Free Trade Agreement last 

year, Peru undertook measures aimed at bringing its legal regime fully into compliance with the core international labor standards. In contrast, Colombia has still not 

completed such measures. Therefore, it is my sincere hope that the next Administration in the United States and the U.S. Congress will work cooperatively with the 

Government of Colombia to help further improve Colombian labor laws. 

Indeed, this work is critical because the ILO, the U.S. State Department, the U.S. 

Department of Labor, and other international labor advocates have all identified a 

large number of areas in which Colombia’s labor laws are non-compliant with the 

core international labor standards. I will not list all of them below, but I do want 

to mention at least some of the problematic areas of law that Colombian workers 

and labor advocates most often raised with me during my Committee trip to Bogota ́. 

A) ‘‘Workers’ Cooperatives’’ that create a legal fiction that misclassifies workers as 

‘‘self-employed’’ and thus robs them of their right to join unions and bargain collectively. 

When I was in Colombia earlier this year, I met with workers and labor advocates 

in numerous sectors of the economy—from the flower industry to manufacturing to 

health care—who told me that the legal arrangements called ‘‘Cooperativas de 

Trabajo Asociado’’—or ‘‘Workers’ Cooperatives’’—were preventing them from exercising their fundamental labor rights. Under this controversial labor arrangement, 

an employer can hire a worker, but nevertheless deem that worker to be ‘‘self-employed’’ so that the worker loses the legal right to join a union or bargain collectively. 

According to the most recent U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Colombia, ‘‘[t]he continued growth and prevalence of workers’ cooperatives further diminished collective bargaining.’’ (U.S. State Department Report, dated March 11, 

2008.) In fact, the State Department acknowledged that many Colombian employers 

inappropriately utilize Worker’s Cooperatives to create a legal fiction that harms 

workers: ‘‘Most cooperatives engaged in subcontracting, and in some cases, private 

sector employers forced workers to form cooperatives and were themselves managing the cooperatives’ daily operations.’’ (Id.) 

In July 2008, the Colombian Congress passed a modest reform that changes some 

small aspects of these legal arrangements known as Workers’ Cooperatives. For example, under the new law, Workers’ Cooperatives can no longer operate without 

making tax payments to the government for national programs for social services. 

However, it remains unclear whether the recent legislation actually addresses the 

real problem raised by the ILO, the U.S. State Department, and other labor organizations. 

In August 2008, Colombian labor law attorneys who represent the main Colombian labor federations submitted a legal petition regarding this and various other 

labor issues to the Committee of Experts at the ILO. According to the legal analysis 

of these attorneys, even after the recent reform, ‘‘the Workers’ Cooperatives that 

comply with this law will still be able to continue operating as tools to evade labor 

rights and prejudice the labor conditions of workers.’’ (Legal observations submitted 

by the Colombian Commission of Jurists, dated Aug. 25, 2008.) As I understand it, 

the Committee of Experts of the ILO will now review the recent Colombian labor 

law reforms over the period of months spanning from this fall to next spring. The 

ILO Committee of Experts will then report its findings in June 2009 to the full ILO. 

I look forward to reading the ILO’s findings. 

I have also instructed the attorneys on my Committee staff to remain in contact 

with other legal experts—from the U.S. Government as well as various Colombian 

human rights groups—to continue gathering information regarding the issue of 
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Workers’ Cooperatives so that we can eventually determine whether the recent reform brings Colombia into compliance with internationally-recognized core labor 

standards. In addition, I look forward to reading the conclusions of the Committee 

on Ways and Means, which is performing a comprehensive review of Colombia’s 

labor laws. 

B) Even considering the one other new Colombian labor law regarding judicial determinations for strikes, the recent reforms still leave unchanged entire areas of Colombian labor law that have been criticized by the ILO, the U.S. State Department, 

and other labor organizations. 

The Colombian Congress also recently passed a second labor law reform that 

moves the power to declare the legality or illegality of a strike from the Executive 

Branch to the Judicial Branch. Colombian labor attorneys have told my Committee 

staff that this one reform constitutes a step forward. However, much work remains. 

There are additional entire areas of law where Colombia has been criticized by the 

ILO and U.S. State Department, but Colombia still has not passed any labor law 

reforms whatsoever in those additional areas. 

These remaining issues range from Colombia’s overly broad list of ‘‘essential public services’’ to the problematic labor arrangements called ‘‘Pactos Colectivos.’’

In fact, my Committee staff has learned from employees of the U.S. State Department that the Colombian Ministry of Social Protection recently asked the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) to conduct a comprehensive study related to the additional improvements that Colombia could make to comply with the 

internationally recognized core labor standards. I understand this request to be—

at least implicitly—an admission by the Colombian government that even after the 

two most recent labor law reforms, Colombian law remains non-compliant with 

internationally recognized core labor standards. I am hopeful that the Government 

of Colombia’s request for this study signifies that Colombia is willing to eventually 

make the additional needed changes to bring its labor laws into compliance with 

international standards. I wish the Bush Administration would have begun the negotiations on these labor law reform issues years ago, and as stated above, I hope 

the next Administration in the United States will take these issues more seriously. 

C) Colombian legal procedures for union registration still have vague and subjective standards that lead to improper denials and delays in the recognition of labor 

unions. 

When I was in Colombia in January, I traveled outside of Bogota ́ to a small town 

called Facatativa ́, which is in the flower-producing region of the country. There I 

met with a group of Colombian workers who had been struggling to organize a 

union at the flower farm where they work so that they could improve their wages 

and working conditions. However, these workers had been waiting many months for 

the Ministry of Social Protection to merely register their union, whereas that process should only take a number of days. I have since learned that the delays experienced by these particular workers—unfortunately—are far too common in Colombia. 

In fact, the ILO has issued repeated proclamations expressing serious concern 

that Colombian workers have been improperly prevented from forming and joining 

labor unions because of the Ministry of Social Protection’s mandatory prior registration requirements that give undue discretion to the Ministry’s bureaucrats in charge 

of granting union recognition. For example, the ILO Committee of Experts released 

a 2008 report on the application of ILO Convention 87 in Colombia and noted: ‘‘[t]he 

arbitrary refusal to register new trade union organizations, new trade union rules 

or the executive committee of a trade union at the discretion of the authorities for 

reasons that go beyond the express provision of the legislation.’’ In addition, the 

ILO’s concerns over arbitrary denials of union registration in Colombia have also 

been cited in a recent report by the U.S. Department of Labor. (2008 U.S. DOL Bureau of International Labor Affairs Report on Colombia, at 11). The representatives 

of the ILO Office in Bogota ́ have told my Committee staff that the Government of 

Colombia could address this serious problem if it would only re-write its labor laws 

to replace the vague and subjective standards for union registration with more objective concrete rules. The ILO has also suggested that the Colombian government 

could better train the Ministry of Social Protection bureaucrats charged with applying those standards. Therefore, I hope that you and I can discuss the changes necessary to accomplish these goals. 

The issues raised above are numerous, though they are not exhaustive. These 

issues take on heightened urgency at this particular moment in Colombia’s history 

as the violence in 2008 has escalated above 2007 levels. Indeed, during only the first 

eight months of this year, the assassins have made more threats, caused more 

bloodshed, and taken more lives of labor leaders than they did in all twelve months 
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of last year. However, I remain optimistic that Colombia can overcome these significant problems. I am also hopeful that the next Administration in the United States 

will work more cooperatively with the Government of Colombia to bring about improvements in labor laws and human rights, increased trade, and an even stronger 

relationship between our two ally nations. I will continue to work on these issues 

in my capacity as the Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, and I 

look forward to working with you and your government to promote greater respect 

for labor rights. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, Chairman. 

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 

350 FIFTH AVENUE, 34TH FLOOR

New York, NY, November 20, 2008. 

Hon. NANCY PELOSI, Speaker, 

Hon. GEORGE MILLER, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, 

Hon. CHARLES RANGEL, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, 

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SPEAKER PELOSI, CHAIRMAN MILLER AND CHAIRMAN RANGEL: I write to 

thank you for the leadership you have shown on human rights in Colombia in connection with the debate over the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and 

to follow up on concerns you have raised about the plight of Colombian trade unionists. 

Human Rights Watch agrees with the position that the Speaker set out last year: 

before Congress considers the FTA, Colombia must show ‘‘concrete and sustained’’ 

results in addressing ongoing violence against trade unionists, impunity, and the 

role of paramilitary groups in that violence. 

Free trade should be premised on fundamental respect for human rights, especially the rights of the workers producing the goods to be traded. In Colombia, workers cannot exercise their rights without fear of being threatened or killed. Without 

concrete and sustained results in addressing this basic problem, ongoing anti-union 

violence and impunity would, as President-elect Barack Obama has noted, make a 

‘‘mockery’’ of labor protections in the agreement. We believe that Colombia should 

be in compliance with such protections before the accord takes effect, as has generally been demanded with FTA commercial provisions. 

In fact, under US pressure related to the FTA, Colombia has started to take some 

positive steps on impunity for anti-union violence. But those steps are limited and 

incomplete, and in other areas (such as the rate of violence), Colombia has been sliding back this year. Also, the progress made on impunity has been won only with 

the possibility of FTA rejection on the table. If Congress were to prematurely approve the FTA, the progress made could rapidly be undone. Nor would the threat 

of fines or sanctions for violating FTA labor requirements provide anywhere near 

the incentive for change as the fear of accord denial. 

In a September 12 letter to President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia, Chairman Miller 

highlighted a number of significant problems affecting Colombian trade unionists’ 

ability to exercise their rights. Yet, as explained below, more than two months later 

the Colombian government has yet to remedy many of those problems and continues 

to fall short in other areas that should be addressed before FTA ratification. 

1. Ongoing violence against trade unionists 

As you know, Colombia has the highest rate of trade unionist killings in the 

world. According to the National Labor School (Escuela Nacional Sindical or ENS), 

Colombia’s leading organization monitoring labor rights, 2,685 unionists have been 

killed since 1986. In addition, more than 3,700 unionists have reported receiving 

threats. 

The rate of yearly killings has fluctuated over time, dropping between 2001 and 

2006. This reduction may be explained by many factors, including the establishment 

of a protection program—partly funded and supported by the United States—for 

threatened union leaders. Nonetheless, even with the protection program in place, 

in 2006 the National Labor School registered 76 killings of unionists, adding up to 

more than half of the total number of unionists killed in the whole world that year. 

After dropping to 39 last year, the number of killings has increased once again 

in 2008. Through October, 41 trade unionists have been reported killed, compared 

with 33 through October 2007. More than 150 unionists have reported being threatened so far this year. 
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2. Widespread impunity for anti-union violence 

Last year Colombia’s Attorney General established a specialized group of prosecutors to reopen many of the uninvestigated cases of threats against and killing of 

trade unionists. Since then, the group reports that it has obtained 96 convictions. 

This is an important achievement that can be directly traced to US pressure in relation to the FTA. Yet, as Chairman Miller pointed out in September, at the current 

rate of convictions, it would take decades for the prosecutors to get through the 

backlog. Also, there are serious reasons to be concerned about the sustainability of 

this effort: • The specialized prosecutors are not investigating the majority of reported cases. 

The Office of the Attorney General reports that as of October 20, the specialized 

prosecutors unit is only reviewing a total of 1,272 cases involving anti-union violence—including both threats and killings (even though nearly all the 2,685 reported 

killings and more than 3,700 threats remain unsolved). When Human Rights Watch 

asked representatives of the Office of the Attorney General what they planned to 

do with the thousands of other reported cases of threats and killings, she gave multiple explanations: 

First, the Office said that the specialized group was only looking at the cases that 

had already been reported to the International Labor Organization (ILO) when the 

specialized group was created. But the ENS and trade unions later submitted all 

information they have on all 2,685 registered killings to the ILO. It makes no sense 

to exclude many cases from investigation just based on the date on which they were 

reported to the ILO. 

Second, the Office said they had decided not to expand the number of cases assigned to the specialized prosecutors simply because they do not have the resources 

to handle that many cases. Thus, the remaining cases would be assigned to ordinary 

prosecutors who may be spread out around the country, who will not be focused specifically on antiunion violence and are more vulnerable to pressure or threats. This 

explanation is surprising in light of the vast resources the US Congress has already 

assigned to the Human Rights Unit, precisely to strengthen these sorts of investigations. It is also not a good reason to simply exclude more than half the cases from 

the specialized prosecutors’ workload, rather than organizing and prioritizing them 

in a useful manner. 

Third, the Office said that many of the cases had been inaccurately reported as 

trade unionist killings, claiming that the victims were not union members or had 

been killed for non-union-related reasons. Yet when Human Rights Watch asked her 

for a list of all the cases that the specialized group was investigating, as well as 

the list of cases that they had decided not to investigate because they did not really 

involve unionist killings, she refused to provide such a list. The Office of the Attorney General has also refused to provide such lists to union representatives, making 

it impossible to have a meaningful discussion about the basis on which they are excluding many cases from investigation. • The specialized labor judges have only been appointed through July 2009. 

As Chairman Miller pointed out in September, the latest resolution of the Superior Council of the Magistracy (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura) naming three 

specialized judges to handle the trade unionist cases provides that their appointments expire in July 2009. There is no guarantee that the judges will have their 

appointments renewed. • Many convictions involve paramilitaries in the Justice and Peace process. 

An important factor that has led to the increase in convictions is that some paramilitary commanders participating in what is known as the ‘‘Justice and Peace’’ 

process have been taking responsibility for unionist killings. But this means that 

once the Justice and Peace process is over, the rate of convictions is likely to quickly 

drop off. Also, the convictions in these cases often do little to further truth or justice. 

Under the ‘‘Justice and Peace Law’’ paramilitaries known to be responsible for 

atrocities are given an opportunity to admit all their crimes. In exchange, they are 

set toreceive a single reduced sentence of five to eight years, rather than the much 

longer sentences—up to 40 years, in some cases—ordered in individual cases of 

trade unionist assassinations. 

The law began to be applied last year, around the same time as the convictions 

for unionist killings started to go up. Based on Human Rights Watch’s review of several of the rulings in these cases, as well as the statements of persons close to the 

investigations, a substantial share of the 96 convictions in unionist cases are based 

primarily on the statements given by paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace 

Law. 

The statements in these cases are often general, however, paramilitary commanders like Ever Veloza (also known as ‘‘HH’’) have admitted having command responsibility for thousands of killings, including unionist killings. But they often do 
109

not describe the circumstances surrounding the killings or identify other accomplices 

or participants in the crime. As a result, these convictions often do little to establish 

the truth about the killings. 

Finally, since the Colombian government extradited many of the most important 

paramilitary commanders to the United States, these commanders have ceased cooperating with the Colombian investigations. As a result, even the minimal statements of responsibility that might have been available under the Justice and Peace 

Law may now be out of reach in cases for which these commanders bear responsibility. • Lack of progress in high-profile cases 

In some of the most high-profile cases of unionist killings that Chairman Miller 

highlighted in his September letter there has been little progress. For example, in 

the case of intelligence chief Jorge Noguera, who allegedly gave sensitive information about trade unionists to the killers, investigations have moved inexplicably 

slowly or have been hampered by procedural errors. Similarly, in the murder of 

labor leader Luciano Romero, despite a court order to investigate potential involvement of Nestle Corporation in the killings, the Office of the Attorney General has 

failed to move any such investigation forward. And, as Chairman Miller noted in 

his letter, a Colombian Police officer who was convicted in absentia of the killing 

of labor leader Jorge Dario Hoyos has yet to be caught or arrested. 

In another significant case involving the military’s killing of three trade unionists 

in Arauca in 2003, while lower level soldiers have been convicted of the killings, 

prosecutors appear to have made little progress in investigating the potential responsibility of military officers up the chain of command. 

3. Stigmatization of unionists High-level officials continue to stigmatize legitimate 

union activity as a cover for the abusive left-wing guerrillas 

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe recently dismissed international concerns over 

the violence, describing the unionists as ‘‘a bunch of criminals dressed up as unionists.’’ Such statements put unionists at greater risk, suggesting that the violence 

against them might be justified and that accountability for the killings may not be 

a priority for the government. 

4. The rise of successor groups to the paramilitaries 

Because most trade unionist killings have never been investigated, it is impossible 

to know exactly who is responsible and why all the killings were committed. Nonetheless, it is clear that in many cases, the killers are paramilitaries, who have admitted to deliberately persecuting unions. In fact, as of March 2008, the Office of 

the Attorney General reported that of all the persons convicted in unionist killings, 

73 (the largest share) belonged to paramilitary groups. 

As a result, to address the violence against unionists in a sustained manner, it 

is crucial that the Colombian government effectively dismantle the paramilitary 

groups that pose the greatest threat to unions. 

The Uribe administration claims that paramilitaries no longer exist thanks to a 

demobilization program it has implemented in recent years. But while more than 

30,000 individuals supposedly demobilized, Colombian prosecutors have turned up 

evidence that many of them were not paramilitaries at all, but civilians recruited 

to pose as paramilitaries. Law enforcement authorities never investigated most of 

them. 

Meanwhile, new armed groups often led by mid-level paramilitary commanders 

have cropped up all over the country. The Organization of American States (OAS) 

Mission verifying the demobilizations has identified 22 such groups, totaling thousands of members. The groups are actively recruiting new troops and are committing widespread abuses, including extortion, threats, killings, and forced displacement. In Medellı ́n, for example, after a steady decline in official indicators of violence, there has been a surge in homicides, apparently committed by these groups. 

The bulk of the 150 threats received by unionists this year have been signed by 

groups purporting to be paramilitaries. 

5. Extrajudicial executions 

Another recent threat to unionists is posed by the Colombian Armed Forces. In 

recent years there has been a substantial rise in the number of extrajudicial killings 

of civilians attributed to the Colombian Army. Under pressure to demonstrate operational results by increasing their body count, army members apparently take civilians from their homes or workplaces, kill them, and then dress them up to claim 

them as combatants killed in action. The killings of the three trade unionists in 

Arauca in 2003 fit this general pattern. 

The Attorney General’s Office is currently investigating cases involving more than 

a thousand victims of extrajudicial executions dating back to mid-2003. The Defense 
110

Ministry has issued directives indicating that such killings are impermissible. But 

such directives have been regularly undermined by statements from high government officials, including President Uribe, who until recently accused human rights 

defenders who reported these killing of colluding with the guerrillas in an orchestrated campaign to discredit the military. 

Since October, the Uribe administration has started to more explicitly acknowledge the problem and has dismissed several soldiers and officers from some military 

units in connection with some of the most well known killings. However, it is crucial 

that these dismissals be followed by effective criminal investigations, prosecution, 

and punishment of those responsible for executions—including commanding officers 

who may have allowed or encouraged them—that have been reported on a regular 

basis all over the country. It is too early at this time to determine whether such 

punishment will occur. 

Once again, I would like to thank you for having taken a firm position in defense 

of human rights in connection with the FTA. As I hope this letter makes clear, Colombia still has a lot of work to do before the FTA should be considered. By continuing to delay the deal’s approval, the United States will show that human rights 

are not just words, but rather basic values that have real consequences for US policy. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of any assistance on this or 

other matters. 

Sincerely, 

KENNETH ROTH, 

Executive Director. 

Bogota ́, 10 de febrero de 2009. 

Sen ̃ or GEORGE MILLER, 

Congresista Ca ́mara Baja, Washington D.C., Estados Unidos. 

RESPETADO SEN ̃ OR MILLER: Hemos conocido de la celebracio ́n de una audiencia en 

el Congreso Norteamericano sobre derechos de los trabajadores y violencia contra 

sindicalistas en Colombia, ‘‘Examining Workers’ Rights and Violence against Labor 

Union Leaders in Colombia’’, que se llevara ́ a cabo la pro ́xima semana en la ciudad 

de Washington. Por esta razo ́n, la Comisio ́n Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ) que es 

una organizacio ́n de derechos humanos con estatus consultivo ante Naciones 

Unidas, quiere entregar a usted un informe sobre la situacio ́n de impunidad en la 

que se encuentran los casos en los que son vı ́ctimas las y los sindicalistas 

colombianos. La informacio ́n allı ́ contenida es producto del seguimiento que la CCJ 

hace a los informes de la Fiscalı ́a General de la Nacio ́n y los jueces de casos de 

sindicalistas. 

En esta ocasio ́n queremos resaltar para su consideracio ́n, tres aspectos 

importantes que encontrara ́ dentro del documento anunciado: 

1. El porcentaje de impunidad en los casos de homicidio contra sindicalistas sigue 

siendo del 96%. 

2. Un ana ́lisis cuantitativo del trabajo de la subunidad y de los jueces que nos 

permite concluir que al ritmo de unas 70 sentencias anuales emitidas por los jueces 

del paı ́s y los de descongestio ́n de OIT, en las que en cada una de ellas se refiriera 

a una vı ́ctima sindicalista, la justicia tomarı ́a 37 an ̃ os para superar la impunidad, 

bajo el supuesto de que no ocurran ma ́s asesinatos a partir de hoy, y se mantenga 

la unidad especial de investigacio ́n y juzgamiento. 

3. Siendo la violencia antisindical en Colombia es una violencia sistema ́tica, 

deliberada y selectiva, el me ́todo de investigacio ́n utilizado por la Fiscalı ́a no 

permite una investigacio ́n integral. 

4. Las razones de la violencia que, la Fiscalı ́a incluye en sus informes como 

supuestos resultados de las sentencias, denotan precipitacio ́n de la Fiscalı ́a por 

concluir que no se trata de casos de violencia antisindical. 

Quedamos atentos a cualquier inquietud o aclaracio ́n que usted tenga. 

Cordialmente, 

GUSTAVO GALLO ́ N GIRALDO, 

LINA PAOLA MALAGO ́ N D ́IAZ, 

Director Abogada Proteccio ́n Jurı ́dica Sistema Universal. 

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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