Convoy Ambush Case Studies

Volume I - Korea and Vietnam

Richard E. Killblane

Transportation Corps Historian

US Army Transportation School

Fort Lee, Virginia 

2013
Library of Congress Catalog-in- Publication Data

Killblane, Richard E., 1955 -

Convoy Ambush Case Studies, Volume I: Korea and Vietnam. 

/ Richard E. Killblane

p. cm.

1. Vietnam War. 2. Korean War – 1950. 3. United States Army – 

History – 20th century. I. 

Killblane, Richard E., 1955- II. Title.

DS

Editing: Gary D. Null

Map Illustration: Stephen A. Campbell

Book Design/Production: Enterprise Multimedia Center

Second Edition

The US Army Transportation School publications cover a variety 

of military history topics. The views expressed in this publication 

are those of the author and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of the Defense. 

ISBN: 978-0-9910108-0-6

Front cover photo: 2 1⁄2 - ton gun truck Highland Raiders 

and gun jeep from the 64th Transportation Company.

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Back cover photo: Rear view of 21⁄2 - ton gun truck 

Assassins from the 541st Transportation Company. 

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Title page photo: Convoy ambush of the 541st Transportation Company 

on QL19 near Bridge 5 on 20 June 1970. Assassins 

was the last of three gun trucks in the kill zone defending the 

disabled tractor and trailer. The road was littered with empty 

ammunition cans discarded from gun trucks. Photo courtesy of Larry Wolke

Contents page photo: Ambush of the 359th 

Transportation Company on 15 January 1968. 

Photo courtesy of Billy Rumbo
Contents

Introduction 

Korean War 

Convoy Ambush at Sudong 

Vietnam War

Northern II Corps Tactical Zone 

2 September 1967 

11 and 24 November 1967

Pre-Tet Offensive 

4 December 1967

15 January 1967

Tet Offensive and After

31 January 1968 - 14 August 1968

88th Transportation Company, 

128th Transportation Battalion

23 August 1968 - 03 January 1969

1969 Doctrine Change

523rd Transportation Company, Eve of Destruction

22 January 1969 - 22 February 1970 

New NCOIC

Hairpin

1 April 1970 - 15 June 1970

359th POL

9 June 1969 - 16 December 1970

Dahl Ambush, 23 February 1971

Recovery Mission, 16 December 1970

2. Southern II Corps Tactical Zone

1968 - 1970

3. I Corps Tactical Zone

12 April 1968

Lam Son 719, 523rd Transportation Company

8 February 1971 - 12 March 1971

4. III Corps Tactical Zone

25 August 1968

Conclusion

Appendices: Tactical SOPs

Bibliography

Index

4

6

12

16

16

20

30

34

35

38

47

48

58

58

61

62

65

74

76

77

88

88

94

104

107

111

117

118

121

123

136

136

143

147

149

152
4 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

When the enemy adopts a policy to attack convoys, truck drivers become front line combat troops. An 

ambush is an attack with the element of surprise and surprise provides the ambusher an uninterrupted 

shot and kill. The lethality of the opening volley depends upon the planning and employment of the 

weapon systems. Yet, no matter how well planned, something will generally survive the initiation of the ambush. After 

that first shot or volley, the element of surprise is lost and the convoy’s reaction creates chaos in the kill zone. It is in 

this chaos that the truck drivers can turn the fight back on the ambushers. To understand this, convoy commanders 

must then become tacticians. 

Tactics is not something a student of war can expect to learn by reading a manual. To follow a procedure or repeat 

a technique is to establish a pattern of predictability. There is no one right answer to every question. Each problem 

requires its own solution. Certain principles, however, remain consistent throughout each problem. The student of 

war must understand the difference. This concept of war is so vague and elusive that a great number of military 

philosophers have tried to articulate it into a concept that students can understand. 

Because it varies from situation to situation, tactics is not a doctrine. War is chaos. Simply put, in combat each 

side makes mistakes. The side that protects its weaknesses and exploits that of the enemy, wins. For the infantry, 

tactics is not a study of battlefield formations and maneuvers but doing whatever is necessary to bring all one’s 

weapons to bear against a weak spot in the enemy position and exploiting it. It should not be much different with 

convoys. Most victories are determined at one decisive point in the battle. The trick is finding that location that 

provides the tactical advantage at the decisive time. Winners train to make this a habit. 

Mission, enemy, (friendly) troops, and (weather and) terrain (METT) is probably the simplest way to understand 

tactics. While the mission of the infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy, the mission of the transportation 

corps is to deliver the cargo. The destruction of the enemy facilitates this mission but does not become the mission. 

A tactician has to think like a hunter. A successful hunter thinks like his prey. A tactician has to think like his enemy. 

Only by understanding how his enemy thinks can the tactician predict his enemy’s next moves. By anticipating what 

the enemy will do next, and then the tactician can plan to exploit the vulnerabilities of his enemy. In a convoy ambush, 

the convoy is the prey and the ambusher the hunter. Through thorough knowledge of his own troops, the tactician can 

defend his weaknesses and apply his strengths to the enemy weaknesses. The tactician must constantly be aware of 

the terrain and how it provides an advantage to the enemy and how he might use it to his advantage. 

However, there are too many uncertainties in combat. A tactician must be flexible just as a fighter. A fighter trains 

his body through repetition to instinctively move a certain way with maximum ease and power. These would be the 

equivalent of battle drills. He studies his opponent. He looks for patterns so he might predict where his opponent 

might leave himself open. He also looks at the opponent’s strength, which he then plans to nullify or avoid. The fighter 

studies his opponent’s strengths and weaknesses then plans to protect his weakness and match his own strength 

against his opponent’s weakness. If it was that simple the fight would be over quick. Combat is not that simple. The 

opponent has also done his own study. 

In an academic discussion with a martial artist, they can point out every counter that would defeat any technique 

one might use, but one does not defeat a martial artist in a discussion though. It is done in a fight. A boxer has only 

three punches, the straight, the hook or cross and the upper cut. With just these three punches, they win fights. The 

Introduction
Introduction 5

mixed martial arts employs a multitude of punches and kicks each designed to strike a specific weak spot on the body, 

but in a fairly even contest, the basic usually determine the outcome. Timing is what separates the winners from the 

losers. The fighter wins by instinctive feel. He throws out punches and kicks in combinations until in a flash he sees an 

opening and instinctively strikes at it with his strongest punch. The time that elapses between thought and action is 

almost instantaneous because of training, what is recognized as muscle memory. Connecting with the right strike and 

force determines a knockout. 

To master the art of war, the tactician must train his mind and body just as a fighter. The tactician trains his 

mind through an academic study. For a warrior leader, the commander represents the head and the organization 

represents the body. He should train his organization as a fighter trains his body. Battle drills or immediate reaction 

drills represents the building blocks of tactics. Like a fighter trains to perfect the punch or kick, the professional warrior 

trains his organization to perform its drill with the same level of perfection instantaneously. With the battle drills in 

place, the tactician then spars with an opponent in war games to bring the mind and body together.

How to study war? The student of tactics studies previous fights and mentally places himself in the position of the 

participants. Knowing what they knew, how would he have reacted? In hindsight, what was the best course of action, 

remembering that there is no one perfect solution? Any number of actions would have succeeded. The tactician must 

learn what would have worked best for him. 

For this reason, I have pulled together relevant examples of convoy ambushes. The 19th century, the Vietnam 

War and recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a wealth of examples of convoy ambushes from which to study. 

Unfortunately, the US Army did not record many good accounts of ambushes during the Vietnam War. Much of what is 

presented in this text is based upon oral interviews of the participants, sometimes backed by official record, citations 

or reports. For this reason, some of the ambush case studies present only the perspective of a crew member of a gun 

truck or the convoy commander. Since this academic study works best when one mentally takes the place of one of 

the participants, this view of the ambush serves a useful purpose. After my own review of the ambushes, I have added 

the lessons of the participants as well as drawn my own conclusion as to what principles apply to convoy ambushes. 
6 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Ebb And Flow, November 1950 - July 1951

Center of Military History, 1990

Map courtesy of Billy C. Mossman
Korean War 7

Korean War

Convoy Ambush at Sudong

10 December 1950, 52nd Transportation Battalion

uring its short history, the Transportation Corps claims three recipients of the Medal of Honor all for actions in 

convoy ambushes. When the lines between the enemy and friendly forces become fluid or non-existent, great 

acts of heroism are required of Transporters. In October 1950, 47-year old, Lieutenant Colonel John Upshur 

Dennis Page was assigned to the X Corps Artillery but his actions in the role of a Transporter would earn him the 

Medal of Honor. He had spent World War II training 

artillerymen at Fort Sill, Oklahoma and saw no service 

overseas but was eager to finally experience combat in 

Korea. On 27 November, Page arrived with the X Corps 

at Hamhung on the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. 

The 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions pushed north 

to the Chinese border.1

On 29 November 1950, the Chinese Communist 

Army (CCA) conducted a large scale infiltration attack 

across the Chinese border to cut off and destroy the 

1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division 

defending around the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea. 

The 377th Transportation Company had been attached 

to the 7th Infantry Division during this operation. The 

3rd Infantry Division was the X Corps reserve and 

defended the main supply route from below Chinhungni to the port of Hungnam. The Army’s Task Force Faith, 

organized around the 31st Infantry, fought desperately 

to link up with the 1st Marine Division at Hagaru -ri. 

The Marines absorbed what remained of the battered 

Task Force Faith and fought their way back to a near 

completed airstrip at Hagaru-ri. While the Marines 

evacuated their dead and wounded, the Chinese 

infiltrated past the force and established roadblocks along 

the route between it and Koto-ri. MG Oliver P. Smith, 

Commander of the 1st Marine Division, needed to keep the main supply route (MSR) from Hagaru-ri to the base of 

the mountain pass at Chinhung-ni secure, so he positioned a battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment at Koto -ri at the 

top of the mountain and another at Chinhung-ni at the bottom.2

The enemy tactics was to infiltrate behind the Americans and establish road blocks along the narrow mountain 

roads with fallen trees, piles of rocks or craters especially around curves. They would then wait until the lead elements 

of the retreating column had entered the kill zone then attack the column with mortars, automatic fire and small arms 

D

Hungnam to Chosin Reservoir Map.

Produced by the Center of Military History
8 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

fire from positions concealed in the ridges and defiles. 

The Chinese preferred to wait until darkness fell 

at 1745 hours.

The 5th and 7th Marine Regiments and the 

remnants of Task Force Faith arrived at Hagaru-ri 

to begin the air evacuation of their wounded. On 29 

November, LTC Page left X Corps headquarters and 

was attached to the 52nd Transportation Truck Battalion 

with the mission to establish traffic control on the main 

supply route to Marine 

positions and those of 

some Army elements 

on the Chosin Reservoir 

plateau. For the next 

11 days, Page would 

serve in the role of 

a Transportation 

Corps officer.

LTC Page and his 

jeep driver, CPL David 

E. Klepsig, fought their 

way past a Chinese 

machine gun position and 

reached Koto-ri. Having 

completed his initial 

mission, Page was free 

to return to the security 

of Hamhung but chose 

to remain on the plateau 

to aid an isolated signal 

station, thus cutting himself off with elements of the 

Marine division. After rescuing his jeep driver by breaking 

up an ambush near a destroyed bridge Page reached 

the lines of a surrounded Marine garrison at Koto - ri. He 

then voluntarily developed and trained a reserve force 

of assorted Army troops encircled with the Marines. By 

exemplary leadership and tireless devotion, he made an 

effective fighting unit available. In order that casualties 

might be evacuated, an airstrip was improvised on frozen 

ground partly outside the Koto-ri defense perimeter 

which was constantly under enemy attack. During two 

such attacks, Page exposed himself on the airstrip to 

direct fire on the enemy, and twice mounted the rear 

deck of a tank, manning the machine gun on the turret 

to drive the enemy back into a no man’s land.3

On 3 December while being flown low over 

enemy lines in a light plane, LTC Page dropped hand 

grenades on Chinese positions and sprayed foxholes 

with automatic weapons fire from his carbine. On 7 

December, the lead elements of 7th Marines arrived at 

the airfield at Koto-ri. There the rest of the Marines and 

Soldiers would gather for evacuation more than 500 

wounded accrued along that retreat and to assemble for 

the final retreat ten miles of treacherous winding road 

down the mountain.4 Once the Army and Marines arrived 

at Koto-ri, LTC Page flew 

to Hamhung to arrange 

for artillery support of 

the beleaguered troops 

attempting to break out. 

Again Page refused an 

opportunity to remain in 

safety and returned to 

assist his comrades.5

MG Smith needed a 

mobile force organized 

around a battalion of 

infantry to clear the ten 

miles between Kotori and Chinghung-ni. 

He asked LTG Edward M. Almond, X Corps Commander, 

to provide a relief force for his Chinghung-ni force. 

Almond tasked the 3rd Infantry Division with the mission. 

On 6 December, the 3rd Infantry Division formed 

Task Force Dog around the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry 

Regiment. The 52nd Transportation Truck Battalion, 

commanded by LTC Walden C. Winston, moved Task 

Force Dog into Chinhung-ni to replace the 1st Battalion, 

1st Marines on 7 December, so the latter could push up 

the mountain and secure the key terrain along the pass. 

The other two battalions of the 65th Infantry Regiment 

took positions to protect the road south of it, but did 

not have enough men to occupy all the key terrain and 

adequately defend the route. So on 8 December, the 

65th Infantry sent G Company to Sudong where one 

platoon occupied the north side of the road and the 

LTC John U.D. Page 

by his jeep in Korea.

Photo courtesy of Margaret S. 

W. Drew and American Battle 

Monuments Comission
Korean War 9

rest of the company 

occupied the hills west 

of the road about a 

mile south of Sudong. 

Likewise, the narrow 

roads and steep ridge 

made for poor radio 

communications 

between the two 

groups.6

On 9 December, 

the Marines secured 

the high ground 

along the route and 

the 1st Engineer 

Battalion had erected 

a Treadway Bridge 

over the blown bridge 

one-third of the way 

down the mountain. 

Smith planned to 

push the trains down 

first and then have 

the Marines leave the high ground and follow after the 

trains passed. MG Smith assigned the tank battalion 

to the rear of the column; because if an M-26 tank 

stalled or threw a tread along the one-lane mountain 

road, the rest of the vehicles could not drive around it. 

The 52nd Transportation Battalion arrived at Koto-ri 

on 9 December and the next day, the column of 1,400 

vehicles from the 7th Marine Motor Transport Battalion, 

the Division Trains and the 52nd Transportation Battalion 

started down the mountain from Koto-ri.7 

The road snaked through a valley and Sudong was a 

small village of houses that flanked the road. By the time 

the Army trucks approached Sudong, temperatures had 

dropped to below zero. The trucks were loaded to their 

full capacity with Marines and dead Marines were tied 

to the bumpers and fenders. Division Trains Number 1 

and 2 cleared Chinhung-ni and reached Hamhung that 

afternoon. The empty trucks then turned around to pick 

up troops.8

LTC Page had joined the rear guard and when the 

column neared the entrance to a narrow pass, it came 

under frequent attack on both flanks. As feared, a 

tank jammed into the bank blocking the road. Unable 

to extract it under 

fire, the tank crews 

disabled the six 

tanks behind it and 

proceeded down 

the mountain on 

foot. Meanwhile 

Page mounted an 

abandoned tank 

and provided heavy 

machine gun fire 

for passing vehicles 

until the danger 

diminished. Later 

when his section 

of the convoy was 

threatened in the 

middle of the pass, 

Page took a machine 

gun to the hillside 

and delivered 

effective suppressive 

fire while men and 

vehicles passed through the ambush.9

A force of Chinese from the 89th Division had 

infiltrated as far south as Sudong just south of Chinhungni. Fifty or more Chinese infiltrated the village of Sudong 

and set up ambush positions west of the road and 

neither element of G Company, 65th Infantry knew 

this. Just after dark on the night of 10 December, an 

estimated Chinese force of 200 attacked G Company 

positions south of Sudong but were repulsed with heavy 

losses. An approaching Marine column halted while 

the fight took place and upon the withdrawal of the 

Chinese, the Marine column continued unmolested. 

After the news of the attack reached Task Force Dog 

headquarters at Chinhung-ni, they halted all road traffic 

south of there. Shortly after dark the Marine Liaison 

Officer to Task Force Dog received word the road below 

Sudong was clear and reopened it for traffic. Nightlong 

155mm artillery fire on the enemy positions on the west 

side of the road missed their target by 250 -300 yards 

due to a meteorological error. So the barrage had no 

effect on the enemy.10

The 1st Marine Regimental Train reached the bottom 

of the pass just after it turned dark and as it entered 
10 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Sudong, Chinese soldiers rushed from around the huts 

firing their submachine guns and throwing grenades at 

the convoy. The lead M -39 armored utility vehicle of the 

anti-tank section rammed a truck the enemy had placed 

in the road to block the convoy, and then cleared the kill 

zone. A Chinese soldier tossed a grenade in the open 

compartment of another M -39 killing the passenger and 

severely wounding the driver. The attack killed several 

drivers and set at least five lead trucks ablaze thus 

halting the column. If the retreating column did not start 

moving soon, the enemy would slowly destroy it.11

LTC Page, his Marine jeep driver, PFC Marvin L. 

Wasson, and another Marine dismounted from their jeep 

and then ran up the road to the scene of the fighting. 

The Marine paused to fire at the enemy, while Page and 

Wasson ran past burning vehicles, stumbling over fallen 

Marines. Illuminated by the burning trucks in the kill 

zone, Page and Wasson charged into about 30 enemy 

soldiers firing as they ran. Their audacity surprised the 

Chinese, causing many of them to run away leaving 

several of their comrades. One threw a grenade which 

wounded Wasson in the head and arm. Page told 

Wasson to turn back and he would provide covering 

fire. Wasson staggered back and turned just in time to 

see Page charge after the fleeing Chinese. Page did not 

return, but his one-man attack bought enough time for 

LTC Winston, Commander of the 52nd Transportation 

Battalion, to organize the Marines and Army truck drivers 

for a counter-attack.12

 Wasson, bandaged by then, returned to the fight 

firing his 75mm recoilless rifle while a machine gun 

covered him. Wasson fired two white phosphorus 

rounds at a hut, which he felt was the enemy strong 

point. The hut erupted into flames while Chinese 

soldiers ran to escape a fiery death only to be met by 

machine gun fire. Wasson then helped push the burning 

trucks with ammunition off the road to clear a path for 

the convoy. The fight lasted for several hours and LTC 

Winston’s counter- attack drove off the last remnants 

of enemy resistance as the sun came up. The Chinese 

ambush at Sudong killed eight Americans and wounded 

81, destroyed nine Marine trucks and one M-39 

armored utility vehicle. As the convoy continued through 

Sudong, it came upon the body of Page in the road 

with 16 dead Chinese near him. When Task Force Dog 

passed through the village later that afternoon, they 

saw five trucks still smoldering beside the road and four 

American dead, three badly burnt that had not yet been 

carried away.13

The US Marine Corps initially rewarded LTC John U. 

D. Page posthumously with the Navy Cross, but when 

his full story became known in 1957, an act of Congress 

upgraded his award to the Medal of Honor. Although 

a Field Artillery officer, in his first time in combat, LTC 

Page served in the role of a Transportation Corps officer 

coordinating the withdrawal of the 1st Marine and 7th 

Infantry Divisions. Warriors do what they know is right 

without regard to the consequences. LTC Page always 

did what he saw was needed and never backed away 

from danger.14

LTC John U. D. Page during World War II.
Korean War 11

Lesson

Using the cover of darkness, the Chinese ambushed a 

convoy of Marine trucks passing through Sudong and 

successfully stopped the convoy by destroying between 

five and nine trucks. Without ring mounts and machine 

guns, the standard reaction to a convoy ambush was 

to dismount and fight through like infantry. During the 

ambush at Sudong, LTC Page led two men in a quick 

counter- attack that bought time for LTC Winston to 

lead truck drivers in attacks that successfully beat back 

the enemy until the sun came up and they could clear 

the road of disabled vehicles. Dismounting and fighting 

through the kill zone is an effective reaction if no other 

fire power is available.

Once the Korean War settled into static trench 

warfare, the Chinese continued to infiltrate behind UN 

lines and ambush convoys. The convoys then added ring 

mounts to every third truck for self protection and initially 

mounted .30 caliber machine guns on them, but found 

the M -2 .50 caliber machine gun intimidated the enemy 

more and became the preferred weapon. So a gun truck 

became any truck with a crew-served weapon mounted 

on it. Once armed in this manner, truck drivers did not 

have to dismount to defend the convoy, but could return 

fire and clear the kill zone. The US Marine Corps, even 

into Operation Iraqi Freedom, maintained the policy that 

all Marines were riflemen first and therefore drivers would 

dismount and attack through the enemy in the event of 

a convoy ambush. This happened to be the same policy 

when US Army truck units arrived in Vietnam.

If an ambush is planned well, the kill zone is not a 

place to remain and the advantage trucks have over 

dismounted infantry is mobility and speed. Since it was 

important to clear the kill zone, the dismounted infantry 

doctrine called for them to turn in the direction of fire and 

fight through the enemy; but if the road is not blocked, 

trucks can clear the kill zone faster by driving out of it. 

The Korean War set the weapon to task vehicle ratio 

at one-to-three. A gun truck was just another task vehicle 

armed with a machine gun, not a dedicated fighting 

platform, so it needed to clear the kill zone with the rest 

of the vehicles hauling cargo. However, if trapped in the 

kill zone, the truck drivers and in the case of any infantry 

passengers would have to dismount to fight. Not until the 

Vietnam War was a gun truck designed as a dedicated 

weapons platform.

1LTC Roy E. Appleman, Escaping the Trap; The US Army X Corps in 

Northeast Korea, 1950, College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University 

Press, 1990.

2Letter from MG Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine 

Division, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 17 December 1950.

3LTC John U. D. Page Medal of Honor Narration. 

4Smith letter.

5Page Medal of Honor Narration. 

6Appleman, Escaping the Trap; Smith letter; and Billy C. Mossman, Ebb 

and Flow; November 1950 -July 1951, Washington, DC: Center of Military 

History, 1990.

7Smith letter.

8Smith letter.

10 Appleman, Escaping the Trap. 11George E. Petro, Appendix 10 to Annex Peter Peter to 1st Marine 

Division Special Action Report, 30 December 1950.

12Appleman, Escaping the Trap. 13Page MOH Narration; Appleman, Escaping the Trap; “Springing the 

Chosin Reservoir Trap,” L. B. Puller, Annex Peter Peter to 1st Marine 

Division Special Action Report, Headquarters, 1st Marines (Reinf), 15 

January 1951; and LTC Roy E. Appleman Papers, US Army Historical and 

Education Center. 

14Appleman, Escaping the Trap.
12 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 
Vietnam War 13

Vietnam War

he US Army assumed a greater role in ground combat in South Vietnam in the summer of 1965, and there 

would be three incremental buildups of forces over the next three years. For command and control, Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) divided the country into four Corps Tactical Zone with I Corps in the 

north, II Corps in the Central Highlands, III Corps encompassing the plains around Saigon, and IV Corps in the Mekong 

Delta. To reduce the ground line of communication and vulnerability to convoy ambush, the logisticians chose sub 

ports versus a central hub and spoke operation originating out of the major commercial port at Saigon. The US Navy 

established beach ramps at Hue-Phu Bai and Dong Ha in I Corps. The 1st Logistics Command established two sub 

ports, Qui Nhon in Northern II Corps near the intersection of the coastal highway Highway 1 and Route or Quoc Lo 

(QL) 19 leading to Pleiku, and Cam Ranh Bay in Southern II Corps. The 1st Logistics Command also built Newport 

on the Saigon River just upriver from Saigon as the hub for logistics in III Corps. From the Saigon River into IV Corps, 

river and canal provided the best means of hauling cargo. The threat and solution to convoy ambush was different 

in each area.

The enemy was either the homegrown Viet Cong (VC) who lived in the area he fought. He was the farmer by day 

and guerrilla by night and usually not as well trained as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regular sent down from the 

North. The VC tended to operate in small guerrilla cells about squad size and more often conducted small ambushes. 

The more disciplined NVA operated in larger formations and had the time to plan and rehearse large scale combat 

operations. The Vietnamese had honed their guerrilla tactics fighting against the Japanese invaders in 1941-1945, 

and then as the Viet Minh against the French during the Indochina War, 1946 -1954. The new version of an old enemy 

sparred with the American’s air cavalry concept over the next two years only to learn the combat forces relied on truck 

convoys to get everything they needed to fight.

Coordinating the fires of men in a kill zone provided the greatest challenge so the ambushing forces rarely 

exceeded 50 men in a given kill zone. The NVA organized their ambushing force into security, support and assault; 

and employed a number of types of kill zones. The simplest kill zone was the linear kill zone which could hit a convoy 

heading either direction along the road. They would just fire at anything in front of them. An L-shaped kill zone usually 

placed a crew served weapon on the other side of the road or at the bend in the road. With support elements on the 

other side of the road allowed the ambusher to catch the convoy in the cross fire, but required greater fire control 

measures to prevent the ambushers from firing into each other. A limitation of the L- shaped kill zone was it was most 

effective catching a convoy heading in one direction – toward the base of the “L.” Z- shaped kill zone was merely two 

L-shaped kill zones linked together. They could catch a convoy coming either way. The V- shaped kill zone was most 

effective in a mountain pass, like Ban Me Thout in Southern II Corps. The support force with the crew served weapons 

was usually placed across the valley on opposite ridge and the assault force above on the road on the other side. 

The two ridges would link into a “V” while the two elements of the ambush appeared more parallel to each other. 

The enemy also learned to set up multiple kill zones, in what was called an area ambush. As compared with 

later wars, the NVA ambush tended to be more violent than those experienced by the US Army in Iraq or Afghanistan.

T
14 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 
Vietnam War 15

Top left: M-35 21⁄2 -ton 

Cargo Truck. Left Center: M-52 5-ton Tractor 

Refrigeration Van 

“Reefer.” Left bottom: 

M-54 5-ton Cargo 

Truck. Top: M-52 

5-ton Tractor, M-126 

Trailer, Stake and 

Platform (S&P). Center:

M-52 5 -ton Tractor, 

M131 5,000 - Gallon 

Fuel Tank Trailer. 

Bottom: The gun jeep 

of the 8th Group is the 

M-151, 1⁄4 - ton truck. 

A normal crew was 

a driver, and vehicle 

commander who 

also manned the 

machine gun.

Photos courtesy of the 

US Army Transportation 

Museum
16 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

1. Northern II Corps Tactical Zone

8th Transportation Group

he 8th Transportation Group had three truck 

battalions that hauled cargo back and forth along 

Route, or Quoc Lo (QL), 19 through the Central 

Highlands. The 27th Transportation Battalion, which 

arrived in the summer of 1965, consisted of primarily 

medium trucks, M52 tractors pulling M126 trailers. 

The 54th Transportation Battalion, which arrived the 

next summer, had the light trucks, M54 5-ton and M35 

21⁄2-ton cargo trucks. Both of these battalions were 

garrisoned in the vicinity of Qui Nhon and marshaled 

at Cha Rang Valley every morning for the long haul to 

Pleiku, 110 miles to the west. The 124th Transportation 

Battalion, which arrived during the summer of 1967, had 

both light and medium truck companies which picked 

up cargo at Qui Nhon or pushed it out to the camps 

along the Cambodian border. Generally, two convoy 

serials launched out of the marshalling yard near Qui 

Nhon every morning, one with light trucks (21⁄2 -ton and 

5-ton cargo) under the control of the 54th Battalion, 

and another of Stake and Platform (S&P) (5 -ton tractors 

and trailers) under the control of the 27th Battalion. The 

124th Battalion ran mixed convoys back to Qui Nhon 

in the morning or light trucks out to the camps. The 

westbound convoys along QL19 were called “Friscos,” 

and the eastbound convoys out of Pleiku were 

called “New Yorkers.” 

By September 1967, QL19 was a two -lane 

unimproved road that ran about 35 miles along the 

coastal plain then snaked up a mountain to the An Khe 

Pass. At one point below this pass, the road switched 

back on itself in a sharp turn the drivers called “The 

Devil’s Hairpin” or “Dead Man’s Curve” for short. Traffic 

generally slowed to a crawl of 4 miles per hour at that 

turn regardless of whether the convoys were heading up 

hill or down. Once over the pass, the road leveled out but 

pot holes as deep as a foot kept traffic to 15 miles per 

hour. Right before Pleiku, the road again rose up to meet 

Mang Giang Pass then leveled out onto the Highland 

Plateau where their destination awaited. 

For tracking the progress of the convoys, they 

reported the bridge numbers as check points. There 

were 36 bridges along the 110 miles of QL19 and tanks 

and APCs provided convoy security for all but bridges 

1, 6, and 9 along the coastal plain. Check points were 

referred to by their nearest mile marker. The Korean 

Tiger Division had responsibility for the first eight check 

points at the bridges from Qui Nhon to the base of 

mountain. All the Korean soldiers had lived through the 

Korean War, 1950 - 53, and hated communists. Some 

of the field grade officers even served in the Japanese 

army during WWII. They welcomed the opportunity to 

fight them anywhere. They were extremely professional 

and were proud to serve in Vietnam. Their method of 

responding to enemy resistance was brutal and often 

times involved civilians in the villages where the attacks 

occurred. Consequently, the enemy did not launch many 

attacks in the Republic of Korea (ROK) sector and the 

drivers felt safe. However, the Koreans did not initially 

guard the slope leading up to An Khe Pass.

T

This obelisk marks the location on Mang Giang Pass 

on QL19 where Groupemente Mobile 100 was ambushed 

leading to the complete and annihilation of this French 

Brigade in 1954. Photo courtesy of Bill Eichenberg
Vietnam War 17

Up until September 1967, there were no convoy 

ambushes other than occasional sniping or planting of 

mines in the road. For that reason, convoy commanders 

did not concern themselves with the interval between 

vehicles in the mountains. More often, the faster trucks 

pulled up bumper-to -bumper and pushed the slower 

trucks in front of them when going uphill. It was not 

uncommon to see a number of trucks driving in tandem. 

The 8th Group usually kicked out two convoy serials 

of 30 to 40 vehicles early in the morning. Convoys 

were generally grouped by type of trucks; light truck 

convoys fell under the control of a 54th Battalion convoy 

commander and the medium trucks fell under the 27th. 

Within each serial, trucks were generally arranged by 

load; the heavier or more explosive loads such as fuel 

and projectiles were in the rear. 

Convoys kicked out early in the morning usually 

reaching Pleiku by noon. After either unloading their 

cargo or switching trailers, they returned that afternoon 

reaching Cha Rang Valley by dark. Convoys did not 

run along QL19 at night, so there was only one 

run made per day.

The battalions had standard operation procedures 

(SOP) for reaction to ambushes but since they had not 

encountered any, most Soldiers did not even know 

their SOP. The 54th Battalion had been in Vietnam 

since October the year before. Major Nicholas Collins, 

54th Battalion S -3, had consulted with other truck 

and infantry units as to an appropriate reaction to any 

particular threat. The popular consensus that ended 

up in the SOP read, “If caught in an ambush, halt in the 

center of road (shoulders may be mined). Take cover and 

return fire in the direction of the enemy, and be prepared 

to assault the enemy position and to fight your way out.” 

This doctrine had not changed since the Korean War. 

At that time, the drivers of 8th Group were armed with 

the M-14 rifle instead of the shorter M-16. Since the 

doctrine was to dismount the vehicle and return fire, 

the length of the weapon was immaterial. The convoy 

commander and assistant convoy commanders usually 

rode in jeeps mounted with M - 60 machine guns. That 

would have been the only armed escort.

One of the companies of the 54th, the 666th Light 

Truck, had recently arrived that August. It had been 

assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia, where it supported 

the US Army Ranger School among other duties. The 

drivers were probably the only drivers in the 8th Group 

who had any reaction to ambush training.

5-ton cargo trucks of the 541st Transportation Company taking a bypass around a bridge. The soldiers standing behind 

the cab with M16s were pulling security. Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum
18 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Ambush Alley -

Portion of road 

between An 

Khe and Mang 

Giang Pass. 

In the 2 miles 

represented 

in this aerial 

photo there 

were 6 

ambushes on 

the 8th Group 

Convoys in 

11 months 

since the

first complex 

ambush in 

September 

1967. Note the 

area adjacent 

to the road 

which has 

been cleared 

by rome plow.
Vietnam War 19

Mang 

Giang Pass - 

This 3 mile 

stretch of road 

approaching 

the base of 

Mang Giang 

Pass, was the 

most dangerous portion of 

road from Qui 

Nhon to Pleiku. 

There were 11 

ambushes on 

the 8th Group 

convoys in the 

past 11 months 

since the first 

complex 

ambush in 

September 

1967.
20 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

The First Large Scale Convoy Ambush 

2 September 1967

54th Transportation Battalion

n 2 September, the North Vietnamese Army 

(NVA) changed their tactics. They found the 

weakness to the American air assault concept. 

Realizing that the mechanized infantry and air cavalry at 

An Khe and Pleiku were entirely dependent upon trucks 

for supplies, the NVA attacked the supply line. 

Convoys marshaled along QL1, the coastal highway 

near the intersection with QL19 for the run to Pleiku 

every morning. They lined up by type with the 54th 

Transportation Battalion in charge of light trucks, M54 

5-ton and M -35 2 1⁄2 -ton cargos, and the 27th Battalion 

in charge of the M-52 5-ton tractors and M126 trailers. 

The crews consisted of one driver each armed with an 

M -14 rifle and about four or five 20 - round magazines. 

O

A few truck companies had the new M-16 with four or 

five 20 -round magazines. The trucks came from any of 

the companies in each battalion. The two march units 

would lead out at separate times and would travel the 

110 miles to Pleiku by noon. If they could unload before 

the MPs closed the road, then they were free to return 

that day, otherwise they had to remain overnight at 

Pleiku. The trucks returning from Pleiku generally did not 

travel in convoys, but just as single vehicles. The road 

from Qui Nhon to An Khe was not dangerous, but the 

road from An Khe, especially once Mang Giang Pass 

was cleared, was dangerous and could not be traveled 

after nightfall. The truck drivers from Qui Nhon had two 

choices; drive to Pleiku and stay there over night, or drive 

to Pleiku and return to Qui Nhon in one day. The one-day 

trip was the preferred choice but the truck driver had 

to clear a checkpoint east of Pleiku by a certain time 

or he could not leave for Qui Nhon. As it got later in the 
Vietnam War 21

day drivers rushed to unload and take off to clear the 

checkpoint. This rush produced a high density of trucks 

late in the day and long line of trucks following each 

other slowly along QL19.15

An eastbound convoy of 90 trucks from both 

battalions was returning that afternoon from Pleiku 

under the protection of only two jeeps with M-60 

machine guns. CPT Paul Geise, Commander of the 523rd 

Transportation Company, was the convoy commander 

riding in the last vehicle in the convoy.16 SGT Leroy Collins 

rode in the lead gun jeep. The 54th Battalion had control 

of lead serial of 37 cargo trucks, which consisted of 

trucks from its different companies. The convoy had just 

descended the seven kilometers of Mang Giang Pass and 

picked up speed across the plateau heading toward An 

Khe. Because of mechanical problems, a 5,000 -gallon 

tanker created a 500 -meter gap between it and the lead 

29 vehicles as they approached the winding stretch of 

road between Check Points 96 and 89. At that time, the 

jungle grew up to about eight or ten feet from the road.17 

The standard operating procedure (SOP) for the 

highway patrol from C Company, 504th MP Battalion 

was to proceed west from An Khe to Check Point (CP) 

102 below Mang Giang Pass to link up with highway 

patrols from B Company each morning. The highway 

patrol consisted of two gun jeeps, standard jeeps 

modified with armor and a post for mounting an M-60 

machine gun. As they drove west toward CP 102, the 

gunners would fire into any locations along the road that 

might harbor enemy ambushers, a technique known as 

“recon by fire.” Upon arriving at CP 102 and linking up 

with the B Company highway patrol, C Company would 

radio back to Qui Nhon that the road was open and 

trucks could begin their drive to Pleiku. At the 

end of the day, B Company highway patrol jeeps would 

wait at the Pleiku checkpoint until the last truck was 

had passed. The MP jeeps followed the trucks to CP 

102 where the highway patrol jeeps of 3rd Platoon, C 

Company would wait at the end of the day for the last 

truck and then following them to An Khe. Any trucks 

that made it past the Pleiku checkpoint were allowed to 

continue from An Khe to Qui Nhon even after nightfall. 

1LT Thomas Briggs’ 3rd Platoon highway patrol’s day 

ended when it drove into An Khe behind the last truck.18

At 1855 hours that evening, as the convoy snaked 

around a series of curves, an NVA company struck the 

lead gun jeep with a 57mm recoilless rifle round killing 

SGT Leroy Collins and a claymore mine mounted on 

sticks level with the driver’s head detonated on the left 

front of the vehicle wounding the driver and gunner. 

Simultaneously, disabled the tanker in the convoy and 

trapped the lead convoy.19 The enemy pulled boards 

across the road with mines on them and detonated 

them in front of the next three trucks behind Collin’s.20 

The enemy also sprung a secondary ambush on the 

other half of the convoy setting the tanker on fire. An 

estimated 60 to 80 enemy soldiers were dug in about 

30 yards up the hill firing down on the trucks.21 

J.D. Calhoun, of the 666th, was driving his 21⁄2-ton 

truck eighth in line of march. He barely heard the firing 

A recoiless rifle made a direct hit on the passenger side 

of the jeep killing SGT Collins and a claymore detonated 

on the left front. Photos courtesy of Walter Medley
22 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

of small arms over the roar of his diesel engine. Calhoun 

did not realize he was in an ambush until he saw the 

impact of bullets on the truck ahead of him, which 

came to a halt. He thought, “Oh crap. I can’t sit in a 

truck. I’ve got to get out and get behind something.” The 

drivers were taken by surprise. Many did not know what 

to expect. The kill zone spread out over 700 to 1,000 

meters. Later investigation revealed the enemy had dug 

and camouflaged fighting about 50 positions along the 

high ground and, from fecal evidence, had occupied 

them for several days. The drivers did not know the 

54th Battalion had a policy at that time for reaction to 

a convoy ambush. The drivers of the “Triple - 6” (666th) 

had learned to get out of the trucks and return fire, but 

they had no other choice. The disabled trucks blocked 

the road ahead of them. Stopping turned out to be a bad 

idea. Drivers climbed out of their vehicles and returned 

fire while NVA swarmed down over at least three trucks 

placing satchel charges on the cabs.22 J.D. jumped 

out and took cover between his truck and the hill side. 

A convoy halted in the kill zone was exactly what the 

enemy wanted. Since the drivers were support troops, 

they did not carry much ammunition and it quickly ran 

out.23 Fortunately, someone drove along the line of 

damaged trucks and picked up wounded drivers.24

The highway patrol from 504th MP Battalion was 

notified and arrived on the scene while the ambush

 was still in progress. SGT Buford Cox, Jr., Woodell, 

Morin, Bledsoe and Phipps found the drivers stopped 

and milling around, blocking traffic.25 

CPT Geise called the 1st Air Cavalry for support. 

In ten minutes the enemy had destroyed or damaged 

30 vehicles, killing seven men and wounding 17. 

Helicopter gunships from A Troop, 1/7th Cavalry 

arrived and began searching for the enemy.

SGT Cox stopped an officer in a jeep and asked 

where he was heading. The officer said he was going 

back to Pleiku for help. Cox told him the best thing he 

could do was go to the front of the line of trucks and 

lead them out of the kill zone to An Khe. Cox “forcefully 

encouraged” the officer to do so and went with him. 

Cox found that the drivers had dismounted their trucks 

and were trying to return fire. He ordered every driver 

he could find to get back in their trucks and drive them 

through the kill zone. This probably saved a lot of lives. 

Once the drivers understood they needed to clear the 

These two trucks show damage by mines pulled 

across the road. Photos courtesy of Walter Medley
Vietnam War 23

kill zone, Cox and his men began to lay down suppressing 

fire with the machine guns, M-16s and the M-79 grenade 

launcher that Cox always carried in his jeep. 

At approximately 1930 hours, the 3rd Platoon, 

C Company sent reinforcements in two gun jeeps with 

SGT Tomlin, Midolo, Desena, Leclair, Carter and Palumbo. 

They arrived at the scene and established security and 

traffic control, and directed recovery vehicle operations. 

At 1940 hours a second reinforcement of two more 

gun jeeps with 1LT Thomas Briggs, Melnick, Young and 

Trumbo performed a recon to the west of the ambush 

site to determine the position of the last damaged 

vehicle. When they arrived at kill zone it was dark and the 

gunships had left. Wrecked trucks were everywhere as 

well as the bodies of dead. A Transportation Corps officer 

wanted to know if there were any other vehicles that 

needed recovered so Briggs took two jeeps and drove 

down the road. Damaged trucks were arrayed at a variety 

of angles to a straight line down the middle of the road. 

Briggs remembered the body of one American soldier, cut 

in half at the waist, draped over the hood of a truck. Most 

of the damage was to the lead vehicles in the convoy.26

LTC William K. Hunzeker, Commander of the 34th 

Supply and Service (S&S) Battalion, took charge of the 

recovery operations.27 2LT Burrell Welton was leading 

a fuel convoy of the 359th Transportation Company 

that came up and halted a couple miles behind the 8th 

Group convoy just as it had been ambushed. Helicopter 

gunships were already shooting up the hill side and it 

was getting dark. He learned some the drivers had either 

left their weapons in camp or wrapped them up under 

seat to keep them from getting dirty. So the enemy had 

stood on running boards shooting inside the cabs. The 

359th drove through the kill zone while the 34th S&S 

Battalion was cleaning up the mess. The trucks were 

stopped bumper to bumper. Either they had too tight an 

interval going into the kill zone or had bunched up when 

trucks stopped ahead of them, because many drivers 

would not drive in the dirt around the damaged truck 

for fear of driving over buried mines.28

The AC-47 gun ship, “Spooky,” arrived at 2020 

hours, but the enemy had long escaped under the 

cover of darkness.29 All Military Police remained on the 

scene until 0130 hours, when all vehicles except one 

were either removed to Camp Radcliff or to a position 

adjacent to an artillery firebase near CP 89. Afterwards, 

A convoy was late 

coming back from 

Pleiku and was 

attacked west of 

Ankhe by VC pulling boards in front 

of the trucks with 

anti-tank land 

mines on them.

Damage done by 

satchel charges.

Photos courtesy of 

Walter Medley
24 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

1LT Briggs received approval from LTC Hunzeker to 

send all MPs except two armored jeeps back to An Khe, 

since the 70th Engineer Battalion was on the scene 

with wreckers and gun jeeps. The last highway patrol 

remained until 0300 hours when the last vehicle was 

hauled to the artillery firebase. The 1st Cav pursued the 

enemy for about a week estimating their strength was 

around 60.30

Three of the killed, SSG Claude L. Collins, SP4 

Ronald W. Simmons and PFC Arthur W. Reinhart, were 

from the 512th Light Truck. PFC Roy L. Greenage and 

PVT Lloyd R. Hughey were from the 669th, PFC William 

A. Gunter was from the 523rd, PFC Robert L. Stebner 

was from the 57th Transportation Companies.31 Six of 

the 17 wounded came from the 669th and only one 

returned to duty. The others were evacuated to the 

United States for further treatment.

This ambush sent shock waves throughout the 

8th Group. For the truck drivers the nature of the war 

had changed significantly. They had become the primary 

objective of the enemy offensive and from then on when 

they drove out the gate the drivers expected that they 

could be killed. 

NVA Lessons

The NVA tactics had worked. Hitting an empty convoy 

returning from Pleiku did not shut down the supply line 

but only reduced the number of vehicles and drivers 

available for line haul. This had apparently been a 

rehearsal, as the NVA had deliberately planned the 

ambush for late that evening so they could escape 

under the cover of darkness. From their success and 

the US reaction, they developed their plans for future 

ambushes. For two years the NVA had sparred with the 

air cavalry only to learn to avoid American tactical air 

power. The speedy response of this tactical air power 

made the difference between the outcome of this 

ambush and the annihilation of French Mobile Group 

100. The NVA would limit the duration of their ambushes 

to about ten minutes which was short of the arrival of 

helicopters or the AC - 47. The NVA would take two months 

to plan, rehearse and execute their next convoy ambush.

Lesson

There was nothing obvious to predict that the enemy 

would change his tactics and target the convoys. An 

analyst might have drawn that conclusion by looking at 

the big picture. The insurgents had not any successes on 

the battlefield against the air assault units. He therefore 

had to find another weakness. The dependency on fuel 

hauled by trucks was a weakness. It was clearly known 

that this enemy was proficient at ambush tactics and 

had targeted convoys. 

Surprise gave the enemy the advantage in the 

initiation of the ambush and after that it became a 

contest of the employment of fire power but the drivers 

were outgunned. LTC Melvin M. Wolfe, 8th Group XO and 

former Commander of the 54th Battalion, came up with 

the idea in the summer of 1967 to experiment with gun 

trucks and LTC Philip N. Smiley, Commander of the 27th 

Battalion, built sandbag pill boxes on the back of two 

21⁄2-tons, which unfortunately were not in this convoy 

Detail of damaged trucks. Photos Courtesy of Walter Medley 
Vietnam War 25

when it was hit. The only alternative to gun trucks 

was training the drivers to fight as infantry. 

Since the enemy had begun targeting the convoys, 

they needed protection. The question was whether 

the protection was the responsibility of the combat 

unit which had responsibility for the area or the truck 

companies themselves. Complacency had set in. It was 

not a question of whether the SOP for reaction to an 

ambush was adequate as none of the drivers knew it. 

They had never had a need to. The 8th Transportation 

Group would have to look at both active and passive 

measures to protect the convoys.

These trucks show shrapnel damage from the left side of the road. Photos courtesy of Walter Medley

Doctrine Change

y US Army doctrine, the ground combat 

commander has responsibility for the routes the 

convoys pass through, which means the ground 

commander, or battle space owner, has responsibility to 

keep the roads safe and open. But no matter how the 

ground commander disperses his forces, they cannot 

cover everything, and the enemy will attack in the weak 

area. Military Police likewise have responsibility for 

route security, to patrol the roads looking for signs of kill 

zones, but in spite of their effort, ambushes still happen. 

B
26 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Both of these forces can 

provide a reaction force 

once a convoy is ambushes, 

but the immediate survival 

of the convoy depends upon 

internal security measures.

External Action Taken

Within a week, LTG Stanley 

R. Larsen, Commander of 

I Field Force, Vietnam, held 

an informal meeting at 

the 1st Cavalry Division’s 

Headquarters at An Khe. 

This was not to assess 

blame but to determine 

what measures should 

be taken to protect the 

convoys. Doctrinally, route 

security was the responsibility of the unit responsible 

for the area. As it turned out, everyone had become 

complacent. They reviewed each unit’s responsibilities 

in reference to convoy security. Since the 1st Cavalry 

Division had most of its units in the field, it could not 

guard the road. Larsen instead ordered the 4th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) at Pleiku to secure the road.32

They did so by setting up tanks and APCs at more 

check points along the road. These check points were 

usually located at bridges and culverts or likely trouble 

spots. There were bridges and culverts about every 

three US miles. 

From these check 

points the security 

forces could serve 

as reaction forces 

in the event of any 

nearby ambush. 

Neither the Koreans 

nor the Americans, 

however, could 

station mechanized 

troops in the most 

likely ambush 

locations in the 

mountain passes.33 

In the event 

of an ambush, 

someone with a 

radio would call, 

“Contact, Contact, Contact” and all combat units in the 

area would be at the convoy’s disposal. The 4th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) had tanks and M113 armored 

personnel carriers stationed at check points 

along QL19. 

Since the security forces had responsibility for their 

section of the road, they had command and control 

of the convoys entering into their area of operations. 

They could stop the convoys if they detected trouble up 

ahead. They also passed on current enemy intelligence 

about the road. If a conflict arose between the convoy 

and the security force then the highway coordinator of 

the Traffic Management Agency would resolve it. This 

command and control relied on radio communication. 

Convoy briefings every morning hopefully included 

the accurate radio frequencies of the security forces 

guarding the road. Convoy commanders had to call in 

and authenticate to the frequency of the next security 

force at the top of An Khe Pass. They soon ran out of 

range of their battalion headquarters when they passed 

over the mountains. They had to rely on the combat units 

to relay any messages back to battalion headquarters. 

They next authenticated to the frequency of the force 

at An Khe. There the convoy halted to drop of supplies 

destined for those units. The next frequency change 

was with the unit at Mang Giang and at last the convoy 

commander switched to the frequency of the force 

COL Joe Bellino examining battle damage. 

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

As a result of the convoy ambushes, the I Field Force 

Commander assigned tanks and armored personnel 

carriers at security check points along QL19. 

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum
Vietnam War 27

based at his destination at Pleiku.34 

Larsen felt that the trucks should not have been 

out on the road at night. He ordered the road closed 

at 1515 hours for eastbound traffic out of Pleiku and 

at 1700 hours in the evening out of An Khe instead of 

1900 hours. To depart on time, the convoys left Qui 

Nhon earlier. They rolled out the gate at 0300 hours. 

The 815th Engineer Battalion also began clearing away 

the vegetation back 1,000 meters on both sides of the 

road with heavy grading equipment called “Rome Plows.” 

This measure hoped to deny enemy the cover of the 

jungle to hide in. 

The Military Police also provided route security. 

B Company, 504th Military Police (MP) Battalion cleared 

the road with two gun jeeps armed with M-60 machine 

guns each morning from An Khe to Check Point 102 

below Mang Giang Pass, then the gun jeeps of C 

Company, 504th would escort the convoys the rest of 

the way into Pleiku. The MPs would send an escort off 

two gun jeeps out. One would lead ahead of the convoy 

and the other would follow behind at a distance. Other 

than that, no combat vehicles would escort the convoys. 

On occasion, convoys could have access to occasional 

air support. When intelligence reports indicated likely 

enemy activity, an L-19 “Birddog” observation plane 

would fly surveillance over the area. After that meeting, 

both LTC John Burke, Commander of the newly arrived 

124th Transportation Battalion and acting 8th Group 

Commander, and Wolfe realized that their convoys 

still had to defend themselves.35 

Internal Actions Taken

Internally, complacency had set in with the drivers of the 

8th Group since no convoy had been ambushed during 

the first two years of the ground war. The first thing that 

LTC John Burke, acting 8th Group Commander, did after 

the ambush was read the standard operating procedures 

(SOP) and make any needed changes. As engineers 

paved the road toward Pleiku, the trucks could drive 

faster than 35 miles per hour. The official 8th Group SOP 

required convoys to obey speed limits and reduce speeds 

commensurate with road, weather and traffic conditions. 

It stated, “Speed generates carelessness.” Speed limits 

through villages reduced to around 15 miles per hour. 

The truck drivers knew it was harder to hit a fast moving 

target. Some convoy commanders briefed that trucks 

should drive as fast as they could go.36 

It then became imperative that trucks maintain 

a 100 -meter interval between trucks. This interval 

limited the number of trucks in the kill zone. Under these 

conditions, the 1,000 meter kill zone of the ambush on 

2 September would have only caught ten trucks instead 

of 37. The ambushes occurred at places where traffic 

had to slow down. Drivers should also watch for changes 

in familiar scenes along the route. There were usually 

changes in behavior to indicate an ambush up ahead. 

The absence of people on the streets, the gathering of 

unusual looking people or even civilian vehicles parked 

alongside the road waiting for the convoy to pass 

indicated that there was danger ahead. The locals 

knew very well what the enemy was up to in their area.37 

In the event of an ambush, the thin skinned vehicles 

had to rapidly clear the kill zone. Truck drivers would 

not stop in an ambush for any reason even if wounded. 

Those that could drove out of the kill zone, those that 

could not turned around and drove back to the security 

of the nearest check point. If the vehicle was disabled 

then the driver should pull off to the side of the road, 

dismount and jump on a passing vehicle. If the disabled 

vehicle could not pull off to the side of the road, then 

the next vehicle would push it out of the way. If the task 

vehicles could not turn around then they would halt at 

100 -meter intervals, the drivers would dismount and 

provide security. From then on the convoy commander 

briefed these procedures every morning. However, 

these were just passive measures to limit vulnerability.38

Gun Trucks

LTC Burke then met with his battalion and company 

commanders to discuss what active measures the 

8th Group could do to protect their convoys. Since 

they could not count on the combat units to protect 

them, they needed their own offensive firepower. 

The 8th Group initially borrowed M-55s, Quad .50s 

mounted on M-35 21⁄2-ton trucks, from the local 

artillery unit. The Quad .50 was four synchronized .50 

caliber machine guns mounted on the bed of a 21⁄2-ton 

truck. The Quad .50 gun trucks, however, required a crew 

of six, one driver, one gunner and four men to reload 

each of the guns. The crews took their training from 

the artillery unit that provided the weapons.39 

Since each company had a few 21⁄2 - ton trucks for 
28 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

administrative duties, they converted them to gun trucks 

within weeks of the 2 September ambush. In World War 

II and Korean War, a gun truck was any truck with a ring 

mounted machine gun. As a task vehicle they could 

only return fire while fleeing the kill zone. The battalion 

commanders directed the construction of six gun trucks 

per company and the company commanders picked 

the crews. The crew generally consisted of a driver, 

NCO in charge (NCOIC) armed with an M -79 grenade 

launcher riding “shotgun” in the passenger seat of the 

cab and two gunners with handheld M -60 machine 

guns standing in the gun box. When ring mounts arrived, 

some crews added an M -2 .50 caliber to the cab. The 

new concept of a gun truck was a dedicated weapons 

platform which could maneuver to protect task vehicles. 

The gun trucks were integral to the companies and 

the leaders appointed the crew members. Only a few 

crews had named their gun trucks at that time. That 

early in their development, they were very generic and 

had not taken on any character. The new SOP called for 

a gun truck ratio of one for every ten task vehicles. Their 

mission was to move to the flank of the kill zone and 

return fire on the enemy. Up until 24 November, the gun 

truck doctrine had not been tested in an enemy ambush.

The limitation of the gun truck was the availability 

of radios. Few trucks had them and then only one. 

Usually just the convoy commander and the assistant 

convoy commanders had radios so the gun trucks 

without radios had to watch them for instructions. This 

required a gun jeep with a radio to drive nearby, either 

ahead or behind the gun truck. The key to a coordinated 

attack is communication and without radios, gun trucks’ 

actions were independent of each other. With the proper 

100 - meter intervals, long convoys could stretch over 

a mile and some gun trucks may not even hear the 

gun fire to respond.

The new 21⁄2 - ton gun trucks were initially hardened 

with sandbags and wood, which quickly fell apart from 

the beating they took on the rough road. Fortunately, 

precut steel plating that had been ordered during the 

summer arrived shortly after the 2 September ambush. 

The steel plates were rectangular in shape with a series 

of precut holes for bolting the plates together. The plates 

had small portals cut in them for gunners to shoot 

through, but most preferred to fire over the top of the 

box with an unobstructed field of vision. There were 

steel plates for the doors and shield with view portal 

that could be flipped up to protect the windshield in the 

event of ambush. The armor was painted OD to match 

the color of the trucks, and out of pride some crews 

named their trucks and stenciled the names on 

the sides.

First gun truck design with 

wood and sand bags. 6th Trans 

BN in Long Binh. Photo courtesy 

of the US Army Transportation Museum

Inside of gunbox created with 

sandbags and wood walls. 

M60s were hand held.

Photo courtesy of Ted Biggins
Clockwise: Bounty Hunter and Nancy were Quad 

.50 gun trucks. 21⁄4 -Ton M35A2 truck cargo, with quad 

50 machine gun. Brand new factory kits were added to 

trucks in Vietnam.

Photos courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Vietnam War 29
30 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Validation 

11 and 24 November 1967

54th Transportation Battalion

n 11 November 1967, 1LT John M. Arbuthnot II, 

of the 585th Transportation Company, led the 

lead serial of an eastbound convoy from Pleiku 

back to Qui Nhon. A gun truck led each serial of ten task 

vehicles. By this time each gun truck had a minimum of 

two handheld M- 60 machine guns in the gun box and 

possibly a ring-mounted .50 caliber machine gun over 

the cab. Most 21⁄2 -ton gun trucks had a single wall of 

plate armor around the bed of the truck as a gun box. 

Some gun trucks were Quad .50s. The drivers were 

armed mostly with M-14s and a few units with M-16 

rifles with four or five 20 -round magazines. SPC Brown, 

a driver on a gun truck of the 666th, initially carried only 

twelve 40mm rounds until he learned how fast he could 

expend them in a fire fight. So this early, the crews were 

not carrying a lot of ammunition.40

O

About two miles west of the 1st Cavalry Division 

Check Point 89 in the same area as the 2 September 

ambush, Arbuthnot’s convoy came under fire at 

approximately 1515 hours. The enemy initiated the 

ambush with two to three command detonated mines 

planted on the south (driver’s) side of the road, which 

did no damage, and was followed by 100 rounds of 

small arms fire from between 10 to 15 guerrillas also 

concealed on the south side of the road. As soon as 

the call, “Contact, Contact, Contact,” went out the 1st 

Cavalry Division launched three helicopter gunships 

and a reaction force. Since the mines failed to stop 

any vehicles, the fire fight lasted for about 30 seconds, 

concentrated on the last vehicles of the serial. The 

drivers did as taught, drove through the kill zone and 

assembled at Check Point 89, where they realized the 

damaged vehicle had five rounds in the radiator, one 

in the right front tire, and one hit the armor plating on 

the driver’s door. The damaged vehicle was taken to 

An Khe for repair overnight while the rest of the convoy 
Vietnam War 31

continued on to Qui Nhon. The helicopters arrived within 

five minutes and the 1st Cav troops arrived in ten to 

conduct a sweep of the area. The enemy was 

just warming up.41

On 24 November 1967, approximately 70 NVA 

launched its next large scale ambush on a 54th Battalion 

westbound convoy. 1LT James P. Purvis, of the 666th, led 

a westbound convoy of forty-three 5 -ton cargo trucks, 

fifteen 21⁄2 -ton trucks and a maintenance truck under 

the protection of six gun trucks and three gun jeeps. It 

was divided into six serials of about ten task vehicles and 

one gun truck per serial. The M35 21⁄2-ton gun truck and 

M35 2 1⁄2 -ton cargo trucks of the lead serial belonged 

to the 666th Transportation Company.42 

Jerry Christopher, of the 666th Transportation 

Company, rode shotgun in the cab of the lead 21⁄2-ton 

gun truck, which traveled 20 miles per hour up QL19 

toward bridge over the dry creek bed about 19 kilometers 

east of Pleiku. Tall grass covered the ground to the edge 

of the wood line 50 to 100 meters from the road. About 

1000 hours, the third gun truck of the 666th, 17th in 

line of march, the driver, SP4 Gipsey B. Ball, Jr., pulled 

out of line because a tire was going flat. Acting sergeant, 

SP4 Arthur J. Hensinger drove up in his gun jeep and 

told them to get back in line since the tire was not that 

bad and they were almost at Camp Wilson. SP4 Roy A. 

Sanders and PFC Robert L. Sas were standing up 

behind the cab looking around with their handheld 

M-60s when Sas tapped Sanders on the shoulder and 

suggested they sit down since the convoy neared its 

destination. As soon as they took their seats, they 

heard an explosion.43

At 1005 hours, Christopher spotted ten paper bags 

spaced across the road and recognized them as fertilizer 

mines. He shouted to his driver, Bob Logston, “We’re 

in the kill zone! “What?” Logston shouted over the roar 

of the engine. “We’re in an ambush!” Logston floored 

the gas pedal and grabbed his rifle. The two machine 

gunners in the box opened fire with their M-60s. A B-40 

rocket then slammed into the front end blowing off the 

left tire and part of the wheel. The gun truck slid to a halt 

25 yards short of the mines. Christopher yelled into the 

radio, “Contact! Contact! Contact!” He tumbled out of 

the vehicle with Logston behind him and started firing 

his M-79 grenade launcher. Enemy fire ripped through 

the windshield, the engine block and into the armor 

plating on the side of the cab.44 

The SOP for an ambush was for those vehicles in 

the 300 -meter long kill zone to not stop but drive out. 

The next 5 -ton loaded with small arms ammunition, 

down shifted, pulled out of line and roared around the 

damaged gun truck unaware of the daisy chain ahead. 

The mines blew off the front end and the truck swerved 

out of control off to the right side of the road. The third 

driver also accelerated his rig and ran over the remaining 

mines losing both front wheels. His truck slid 75 yards 

down the road and ended up in a ditch across the road 

with his load of 155mm high explosive projectiles on 

fire. SP4 Dick Dominquez, of the 512th Transportation 

Company, revved his engine and raced for the gap in 

View of kill zone as convoy entered it and disabled vehicles on right side of the road several days later.

Photo courtesy of Bill Eichenberg
32 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

the road. Carrying a load of CS gas, he safely squeezed 

through the gap and headed on to Pleiku. His was the 

only truck to escape the kill zone. The enemy hit the 

next truck loaded 155mm projectiles with a B-40 

rocket and set it on fire. It slid to a halt 50 yards from 

Christopher’s gun truck. QL19 was completely blocked 

by damaged vehicles.45

Christopher began firing his grenade launcher 

at the suspected position of the B-40. The artillery 

ammunition load began to cook off. Each blast rocked 

the corpse of the gun truck near it. Christopher crawled 

to the front of the vehicle looking for his driver. Logston 

had been hit by machine gun fire below the waist and 

was a bloody mess. He was trying to crawl out of the 

firing line. Christopher called out, “Bob! Y’all right, Bob?” 

Christopher then pulled his driver into the elephant 

grass. Jerry asked, “What’re we gonna do now, Jerry?” 

He looked up and saw helicopters circling high above. 

“Why don’t they do something? Why don’t they help 

us?” These were command and control birds with senior 

officers. Christopher pulled Jerry under the gun truck 

and bandaged his wounds. “Hang on – we’ll make it OK.” 

That was as much his wish as reassurance.46

Another rocket hit the tail gate above Christopher 

sending a shower of fragments all over SP4 Czerwinsky, 

a machine gunner. The other machine gunner, Jim Boyd, 

was hit in the arm. Both M-60 machine guns were 

smashed. While Christopher tried to save Czerwinsky’s 

life, Boyd searched for a rifle and started firing away 

with his good arm. Christopher then saw an NVA 

sapper in the grass across the road. He fired with his 

M-79 not sure if there was enough distance for the 

round to arm. The round exploded on target.47 

 Sas and Sanders had heard explosions followed 

by gun fire up ahead and then around them. They saw 

enemy soldiers popping up and shooting at them from 

the left side of the road so Sanders and Sas then 

returned fire. Suddenly they heard a loud explosion 

on the passenger side door and then their gun truck 

started slowing down as cargo trucks began to pass 

them. Sanders shouted at Ball, but he did not answer, 

so Roy pulled back the canvas flap on the back of the 

cab and did not see his driver behind the steering wheel. 

He looked down and saw Ball lying on the floor on the 

passenger side. Ball yelled that he was wounded. When 

the ambush began, a B-40 rocket had passed just 

inches behind the second gun truck. The next rocket 

hit the cab, wounding Ball and throwing him to the floor 

boards. Sanders helped Ball back up behind the wheel. 

Both were scared and Ball wanted to turn the gun truck 

around, but Sanders told him they could make it through 

the kill zone. So Ball put pedal to the metal and Sanders 

returned to his duties on the M -60.48 

Ball was racing through the kill zone and about to 

change gears when an RPG hit his driver’s side door. The 

truck lumbered out of control to the left side of the road 

knocking Sas and Sanders to the bed of the truck. When 

the truck hit the ditch it flipped over throwing the crew 

around inside the box. The truck stopped upside down 

in the grass right next to the enemy. When Sanders 

regained his senses, he looked up at the spinning rear 

wheels of the truck. The gun truck armor was pressing 

Disabled trucks on the right side of the road. Photo courtesy of Bill Eichenberg
Vietnam War 33

down on his left thigh and he had no weapon, so he 

began clawing the ground to dig his leg out while the 

enemy shot out the tires above him. Sanders dug himself 

free with his hands only to find that his leg was broken 

and he had no weapon. He could hear his driver trapped 

in the cab crying for help and told him to be quiet since 

he heard enemy on the other side of the truck. Sanders 

saw Sas pinned under the door armor and crawled 

over to him only to discover he was dead. Looking for 

a weapon, he crawled to the front of the truck and saw 

an M -60 inches away, but an NVA machine gunner on 

the other side kept him from reaching the machine gun. 

He then picked up two fist- sized rocks and threw them 

hoping the enemy would think they were hand grenades 

giving him just enough time to reach the M-60. No 

sooner had he started crawling to the M-60 he heard a 

“plop” beside him. He then rolled away from the grenade 

when it exploded and threw him ten feet away. With 

fragments in his legs, he staggered to his feet and tried 

to get back to the truck when he blacked out.49

 5,000 -gallon fuel tankers in the first serial had burst 

into flames spilling their flaming contents down the road 

for 700 yards. Pallets of ammunition on the backs of the 

other trucks began to cook off. NVA sappers ran up to 

the vehicles, climbed atop and placed demolition charges 

on the cargo then fired down on the drivers hiding in the 

grass along the side of the road. Drivers returned fire 

knocking the enemy off of their trucks into the 

wreckage littering the road.50

 Enemy fire also 

hit the gun truck 

in the third serial 

and damaged it. 

Ted Ballard, of the 

523rd Transportation 

Company, was assigned 

to ride shotgun with a 

replacement and rode 

with his M -14 between 

his knees. Up ahead 

he heard what he 

thought was the sound of artillery then saw big clouds 

of smoke from behind a little rise of ground. He had 

never seen black smoke in that area before which raised 

his suspicions. Then the trucks ahead of his began to 

stop and the drivers jumped out on the right side of the 

road. Ballard realized he was in an ambush and jumped 

out on the right side. His driver jumped out on the left 

side and Ballard never saw him again.51

Ballard then heard small arms fire. The side of 

the road had been cleared of all vegetation to include 

grass by engineer bulldozers but the dirt and brush was 

dozed into small piles that offered cover for the enemy. 

Ballard saw what he thought were ARVN soldiers just 

walking toward the convoy, and then the other drivers 

started firing at them. When the Vietnamese returned 

fire, Ballard started firing at them and emptied two 

magazines. He carried 200 rounds, all tracers. The 

Vietnamese then ran into the convoy. The gun truck 

was up ahead and killed most of the enemy. When 

the ambush was over, Ballard’s driver never returned,

so he climbed in another truck. When they drove down 

the road, he saw about a half a dozen dead enemy 

by the side of the road where the gun truck had been. 

Further down, he saw that the black smoke was 

from burning tires.52

Further back down the road, a grenade had 

damaged the gun truck in the fourth serial leaving only 

the last two gun trucks undamaged. Meanwhile a tank 

and two APCs from 1st Platoon, C Troop, 2/1st Cavalry 

Gun truck driven by SP4 

Gipsey Ball after it had 

been rolled right side up.

Photo by courtesy of Geroge 

Marquez and James Lyles 
34 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

of the 4th Infantry Division guarding a bridge at Check 

Point 91, about a mile away, raced into the kill zone 

as soon as they heard shooting. Upon their arrival, the 

cavalry men saw burning trucks along the road with NVA 

soldiers climbing on them and hurriedly unloading the 

cargo. Upon seeing the approaching tracked vehicles, 

the enemy started to run but the cavalry men opened 

fire. The subsequent heavy fighting raged for another 

20 minutes before the helicopters and jets arrived, 

while pallets of ammunition on the trucks exploded. 

The troopers loaded Sanders and Ball into their APC 

and then drove them to an awaiting medevac helicopter. 

One helicopter landed and General Creighton Abrams 

stepped out. The combined gun trucks, cavalry and 

air support concluded the fight after another hour and 

Thomas Weston’s APC had fired off nearly all 30,000 

rounds of ammunition. A sweep of the battlefield 

counted 41 enemy dead and captured four wounded. 

The convoy had 14 trucks and four gun trucks damaged 

and six to nine trucks completely destroyed. 17 drivers 

were wounded and three were killed, SP4 Arthur J. 

Hensinger, SP4 Charles E. Metcalf, and PFC Robert Sas. 

General Abrams, an old WWII tanker who had been 

watching the battle from above, praised the truck 

drivers for fighting like tankers.53 

Lesson

Clearly the fire power of the gun trucks caught the 

enemy by surprise. Assaulting the convoy as they had 

before made them pay a high price, yet the convoy also 

sustained high losses. The NVA would not be so reckless 

the next time. They would conduct convoy ambushes 

nearly every week and test the capabilities of the gun 

trucks. With a limited arsenal of weapons available, the 

enemy would vary his tactics trying to determine what 

weapons to initiate with, how large should the kill zone 

be and what vehicles to destroy first. In spite of tanks 

and mechanized infantry at check points, the enemy 

would conduct ambushes at the areas not covered, 

most likely in the mountain passes. A short stretch of 

road below Mang Giang Pass would become known over 

the next few months as “Ambush Alley.” An Khe Pass 

would be the next favorite ambush area. During the last 

two convoy ambushes, he had initiated the ambush on 

the lead vehicles. The 8th Group, however, was on the 

right path to a solution. An ambush is a quick and violent 

attack that relies on surprise to be effective. The gun 

trucks would learn that they needed to turn the fight 

around fast with greater violence. The gun trucks needed 

more fire power. While the Quad .50s had far superior 

fire power, each of the four guns required a loader. 

This required a crew of six; a driver, a gunner and 

four loaders, far more than the truck companies 

could afford. The Quad .50s would soon fall from the 

inventory. The box style gun trucks began to mount M -2 

.50 caliber machine guns either on ring mounts over the 

cab or on pedestals in the gun box. The 7.62mm rounds 

of the M-60 did not have the penetrating ability of the 

.50 caliber. Eventually, three machine guns became 

standard for each gun truck. 

Not having radios in each truck prevented the lead gun 

truck from warning the others of the mines across the road. 

Pre-Tet Offensive

he NVA commanding general, Vo Nguyen Giap, 

was confident that the conditions were ripe for 

the Viet Cong to rise up and join the invading

NVA in the final phase of his insurgency strategy. The 

official commencement of offensive operations began 

on the night of 31 January 1968, the Vietnamese 

Lunar New Year celebration known as Tet. The NVA 

had agreed to a cease fire during the holiday so that 

the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers 

could go home for the holidays. In effect, the NVA 

hoped to catch the ARVN completely off guard. The only 

force that could seriously contend his operations was 

the Americans. Giap clearly understood the American 

dependence on supplies and knew that he had to sever 

the American supply line hoping to starve the combat 

units spread throughout the Central Highlands and 

Highland Plateau. For the 8th Transportation Group, 

the Tet Offensive began with a convoy ambush on 

24 November 1967. From then on large scale convoy 

ambushes would become weekly occurrences with 

mining and sniping taking place daily. The objective 

of the enemy convoy attacks was to completely 

shut down the supply line.

It took the enemy usually a week to plan and 

rehearse large scale ambushes, so with the greater 

frequency of ambushes, the gun trucks and enemy 

sparred with each other to find what worked. The 

T
Vietnam War 35

enemy experimented with the size of the kill zone 

and proper weapon to initiate with, while the gun 

trucks and crews developed their tactics and 

proper way to react to contact.

4 December 1967

54th Transportation Battalion

he 669th Transportation Company had built 

three gun trucks after the September ambush. 

1st and 3rd Platoon bolted or welded the precut 

1⁄4 - inch steel plates to the beds and doors of 21⁄2 -ton 

administrative vehicles, while the 2nd Platoon mounted 

their armor on what was probably the first 5 -ton gun 

truck. SGT Dennis J. Belcastro was the NCOIC of the 1st 

Platoon gun truck and called it, “Bel and the Cheese 

Eaters,” and 3rd Platoon called theirs “Steel’s Wheels” 

after their platoon leader, 1LT James R. Steel. The 2nd 

Platoon gun truck had no name yet.54

SGT Belcastro was supposed to have 4 December 

off, but early in the morning someone woke him up to 

fill in for the NCOIC of the 3rd Platoon gun truck. SP4 

Harold Cummings was the driver. According to the new 

policy, Belcastro would ride in the gun box with the two 

M-60 gunners, Frank W. Giroux II and Joseph Foster. 

That was the first week NCOICs rode in the gun box, so 

they could augment and direct the gunners’ fire power. 

Belcastro was armed with an M-79 grenade launcher, 

.45 Colt semi-automatic pistol and M -14. They carried 

30 100 -round cans of M- 60 ammo, two dozen 40mm 

rounds, and Belcastro had four 20-round magazines 

taped together in tandem so he could quickly change 

magazines. They stored the extra ammunition in a metal 

box, three feet tall, four feet wide and three feet deep. 

To access it, one had to lift the lid. Sandbags lined the 

T

Steel’s Wheel as it looked when the name was painted 

on it after the ambush. Photo courtesy of James Lyles 
36 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

floor of the gun truck to protect from mine blasts and 

sandbags were stacked up about two feet along the 

inside of the gun box.55

Six gun trucks, four gun jeeps escorted this convoy 

of 58 M-54 5-ton trucks, 11 M-35 21⁄2 -ton trucks and 

a maintenance truck. Belcastro’s gun truck would lead 

the convoy. 1LT Jerry L. Todd, whose 2nd Platoon, 57th 

Transportation Company was attached to the 669th 

was the assistant convoy commander and would follow 

behind Belcastro’s gun truck. One commercial truck and 

10 M-54 5- ton cargo trucks of the 669th followed with 

SP5 Dennis Cappolloni’s 2nd Platoon 5-ton gun truck 

leading the second serial. The other gun trucks were 

evenly spaced throughout the rest of the convoy.

There was only one driver per truck and each was 

armed with either an M-14 or M-16 with four to 

five 20 -round magazines.56 

At 0815 hours, the convoy snaked through the 

winding road of the 2 September kill zone, passed the 

security force at Check Point 92 and approached the 

base of Mang Giang Pass. The ground was hilly covered 

with two -foot high grass with dirt mounds 100 yards on 

each side of the road. A dense jungle flanked the grassy 

field. As Belcastro’s gun truck rounded a bend, the road 

was cut through hill with a 15 to 20 -foot embankment 

on right side and 25 -30 - foot embankment on the left 

side. Small arms fire came the driver’s side (south) of 

the road and about 30 seconds into the fire, Cummings, 

slammed on the brakes and yelled back the enemy was 

dragging a board with three mines pulled across the 

road. Belcastro told him to keep going and drive around 

it. No sooner had Dennis finished the sentence when an 

RPG fired from the edge of road hit where the door met 

the windshield killing Cummings and stopped the gun 

truck in the road.57

The ambush opened up from the left side of the 

road but after the ambush, the infantry found satchels 

on right side indicating the enemy was set up to hit the 

convoy from both sides, but the convoy was 15 minutes 

early. So the NVA only hit the convoy from the port side.58

Belcastro called “Ambush, Ambush, Ambush,” on 

the PRC-25 radio and also fired off a red flare to alert 

the trucks that did not have radios. The gunners laid 

down suppressive fire with the two M-60s and M-79 

through the portholes and the enemy was right on top 

of them. After the ambush, they found one dead enemy 

soldier with an unexploded 40mm round in him that had 

not time to arm because he was so close. The drivers 

in the cargo trucks behind them jumped out of their 

vehicles and also returned fire.59 

SGT Belcastro was hit when he exposed himself to 

open the box to get more ammunition. Giroux and Foster 

SGT Belcastro’s gun truck. Photo courtesy of Dennis Belcastro
Vietnam War 37

were also wounded during the fight. In spite of their 

wounds, the crew of the gun truck and Todd’s gun jeep 

crew returned immediate suppressive fire. The enemy 

was a company - sized force and five minutes into the 

ambush, the enemy conducted two simultaneous attacks 

against the lead and second gun truck. Steel’s Wheels 

was 200 -300 meters behind the lead gun truck. Most 

of the damage was in the second part of ambush. The 

suppressive fire from Dennis’ gun truck kept the enemy 

away from the trucks in his serial. Four cargo trucks 

received flat tires but the drivers returned fire breaking off 

the assault. Three minutes later the enemy made another 

assault, which the drivers also beat back.60 Meanwhile 

the other four gun trucks raced into the 3,000 -meter 

long kill zone kill zone multiplying the suppressive fire on 

the enemy. Gradually the enemy fire tapered off and the 

gunners kept the enemy at bay. Belcastro had run out of 

40mm rounds and had to fire his M-14 and .45. Girouz 

and Foster had burned up three M-60 barrels firing off 

nearly all their ammunition.61

The helicopter gunships arrived at 0827 hours, 

12 minutes after the call, “Ambush, Ambush, Ambush” 

went out. As soon as the reaction force heard the call 

of contact, it left Check Point 92 and arrived at 0830 

hours. By that time the intense fire from the gun trucks 

had broken up the enemy ambush, killing 13 enemy 

soldiers and capturing one wounded at a loss of only 

one American killed and eight wounded. Besides the 

crew of the lead gun truck, SP4 Dennis Cappolloni and 

SP5 Robert Dillahay in Steel’s Wheels were wounded 

along with the following soldiers attached to the 669th; 

PFC Gerald T. Hyatt, Ray E. Gordon and Terrance N. 

Maddox. All returned to duty. The loss of vehicles was 

one gun truck destroyed and one jeep and four trucks 

slightly damaged. The EOD teams found seven satchel 

charges on the bodies indicated they had planned to 

stop the convoy and place the charges on the vehicles 

as they had during the 2 September 1967 ambush. LTC 

Robert L. Runkle, Commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th 

Cavalry commended the officers and men of the 669th 

for the outstanding part they played in the ambush. SGT 

Belcastro received the Bronze Star Medal with V device 

for his actions. 1LT Tillotson, 1LT Steel, and the crew of 

Belcastro’s gun truck earned the Army Commendation 

Medal (ARCOM) with V devices for their role.62 1LT Todd 

received the ARCOM with V devices for his coolness 

under fire and the way he directed the helicopter 

gunship. His M -60 gunner, SP5 Stanley A. Runnas, 

also received the ARCOM with V device for his deadly 

and accurate suppressive fire.63

Lesson

The enemy prepared what looked like a linear kill zone 

and wanted to stop then overrun the convoy as it had 

on 2 September. For some reason the satchel charges 

were found on the opposite side of the road from the 

assault force. Belcastro believed the enemy had no time 

to complete their kill zone. Again the enemy picked a 

bend in the road a safe distance from the security check 

point. The enemy had initiated the last two ambushes 

with a daisy chain of mines pulled across the road 

instead of destroying the lead vehicle with rockets. 

The truck companies had not anticipated this. Clearly 

the mines had prevented the drivers from clearing the 

kill zone as their SOP called for. Later, the gunners of the 

gun trucks learned to fire their machine guns at anything 

suspicious along the road. They preferred this to firing 

the grenade launcher or rocket from the Light Anti-tank 

Weapon (LAW) as the latter would definitely set off an 

explosion but not always detonate the mines. The tracer 

rounds of the machine guns could set off the mines 

and the secondary explosions would let the drivers 

know the path was clear.

Once the lead gun truck was stopped in the kill 

zone, the gunners and drivers of the cargo trucks 

managed to lay down enough fire to beat back two 

enemy assaults until the gun trucks from behind came 

up to increase the fire power. Suppressive fire power 

reduced the number of vehicles destroyed or damaged 

and increased the number of enemy casualties until 

the armored and air cavalry arrived to take 

over the fight.

From the point of view of the convoy, the 12 -minute 

reaction time of the air support and 15-minute reaction 

time for the security force was too long. The gun trucks 

definitely needed to carry more ammunition. After that 

ambush, the crew of the 3rd Platoon gun truck arranged 

the ammunition box where it opened down into bed so 

no one would get exposed when he opened it. Because 

the enemy got so close the grenade rounds did not arm, 

Belcastro felt he should have had some 40mm 

buckshot rounds.
38 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

15 January 1968

359th Transportation Company 

(Petroleum, Oil and Lubericants)

he 359th Transportation Company (POL) was 

based out of Camp Ratcliffe at the top of the 

An Khe Pass. The fuel pipeline ended at An 

Khe where the fuel tankers of the 359th pushed the 

fuel to military camps at Pleiku and beyond. The M54 

5-ton tractors hauled M131 5,000 -gallon fuel tank 

trailers. As a POL Transportation Company, the 359th 

T

fell under the command of the 240th Quartermaster 

Battalion, but with the recent increase in ambushes 

of 8th Transportation Group convoys along QL19, the 

359th likewise built one 21⁄2 -ton gun truck. They welded 

and bolted 1⁄4-inch steel plate to the side and back of 

the bed, and on the doors of the cab. The armor plates 

had firing ports cut in them, but one plate was factory 

cut shorter than the other offering only protection up to 

the waist. They lined the floor of the bed and cab with 

sandbags and welded two pedestals in the back for 

M -60 machine guns. The pedestals allowed the gunner 

to swing the machine 

gun a full 360 

degrees and freed 

one hand to feed the 

belt of ammunition. 

Although the M-60 

was designed as a 

light machine gun, 

firing the machine 

gun in a standing 

handheld position 

would physically 

wear out the gunner. 

The company also 

armored a one 

3⁄4 -ton truck with a 

pedestal mounted 

M-60 machine 

gun. The company 

experimented with a 

Quad .50 on the back 

of a 21⁄2-ton truck on 

loan from Qui Nhon. 

Four .50 caliber 

machine guns firing 

in one direction would 

prove intimidating, 

but the requirement 

for four loaders in 

addition to the gunner 

took five drivers off 

driving trucks, and 

the fact the loaders 

had no protection 

from enemy fire 
Vietnam War 39

motivated the 359th to return their Quad .50. Similar to 

8th Group, each truck had only one driver each armed 

with an M-14.64

The company commander had asked SP4 Ron 

Kendal to drive the gun truck and SP4 Timothy Wheat 

manned one of the two M-60s. Tim had enlisted at the 

age of 17 and once he turned 18, he volunteered for 

Vietnam. He joined the 359th POL in March 1967 as 

a replacement for the original members who deployed 

with the company. Ron arrived the next month. The other 

M-60 gunner position was rotated by different truck 

drivers each mission. Each person carried his M-14 

and spare magazines in a footlocker. The footlocker also 

contained two 4,000-round cans of 7.62mm ammunition 

linked in a continuous belt for a mini-gun, which worked 

fine for an M - 60. Up until then the 359th had only 

received harassing fire so that was considered more 

than enough ammunition.

On 15 January 1968, the 21⁄2 -ton gun truck led a 

fuel convoy of 40 to 50 fuel tankers to Pleiku. 2LT Burrell 

Welton, 3rd Platoon Leader, was the convoy commander. 

The skinny OCS graduate did not look impressive, but all 

the Soldiers liked him and wanted Welton as their convoy 

commander. 19-year old Welton had dropped out of 

college and enlisted to be a helicopter crew chief until 

he realized he could make more money as an officer so 

he applied for Armor OCS and Ranger School and was 

accepted to both. He unfortunately lost hearing in one of 

his ears when he was shot in head while home on leave 

at Los Cruces, New Mexico, so he could not go combat 

arms. He then asked to transfer to Transportation Corps 

OCS at Fort Eustis, Virginia. He had volunteered for 

Vietnam to get out of Fort Hood, Texas and arrived in 

June 1967. The men liked Welton because he treated 

them like people and not enlisted. Welton got along with 

the men because he came from the same background 

and was the same age. He felt as long as they did 

what he told them he did not have to get the company 

commander involved. He liked going out on the road 

and the men trusted his judgment.65 

SP4 George Anderson, fresh out of the motor pool, 

drove the lead truck for the convoy that morning. He 

had 75 days left in country and never let the new guys 

forget it. SP4 Robert Dye would leave soon after him with 

89 days left in country. They lined up first but George 

confessed to Bob he was having mechanical problems 

Typical design of 21⁄2-ton gun trucks in the 359th

Transportation Company with one plate shorter than 

the others. M-60s were mounted on pedestals.

Above: 2nd Platoon’s gun truck would later be named 

“War Wagon.” Bottom: War wagon stopped on the side 

of the road with VN kids selling Cokes.

Photos courtesy of the 359th TC Vietnam Association
40 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

with his truck. The 359th POL liked to get on the road for 

Pleiku early in the morning before the 8th Group convoys 

reached the top of the pass.66

Paul Marcum and then Vernon Bush were supply 

specialists on temporary duty from the 304th Service 

and Supply (S&S) Company. The 304th had arrived 

on 5 October and was tasked to send ten soldiers to 

the 359th to fill in until replacements could backfill 

the original drivers of the 359th that had arrived the 

previous year. Marcum and Bush had been friends 

since they joined the 304th when it formed at Fort 

Devens, Massachusetts about four months before 

their deployment. When Bush heard Marcum was one 

of the ten going to the 359th, he volunteered to trade 

places with another soldier to join his buddy. That day 

they wanted to get in the front of the line so they could 

drop their load first and get something to eat at Pleiku. 

When they inspected their trucks in the motor pool that 

morning, Paul’s truck had a flat, so Vernon saved a 

place for him up front, right behind Dye’s truck. Unknown 

to them, this would give them a front row seat to the 

ambush. Paul had a pet German Sheppard he let ride 

with him in the cab.67

The 359th staged outside the back gate at An Khe 

for about 10 to 15 minutes then took off for Pleiku as 

soon as the sun came up to get ahead of the convoys of 

the 8th Transportation Group coming up from Qui Nhon. 

8th Group convoys ran slow so 2LT Welton would tell 

the lead gun truck, “As long as you can see a tanker in 

your rear view mirror keep hauling ass.” The MPs set up 

check points at An Khe and Pleiku to time the passing 

convoys and calculate their speed. If it appeared they 

had violated the 35 mph speed limit, then they issued 

the convoy commander a speeding ticket. Welton 

usually placed the slowest vehicle up front to regulate 

the speed, but he received lots of speeding tickets. 

Fortunately, this did not worry his commander.68

Before reaching Mang Giang Pass, Anderson’s 

truck was having difficulty and slowing down the convoy 

so Dye’s truck passed him. For the first time in 250 

convoys, Bob Dye’s truck was the lead truck in the 

convoy. The convoy climbed up the steep mountains 

of the pass about 15 to 20 mph. Around 0900 hours, 

the lead element of the convoy had just cleared the 

top of the Pass. Because the trucks usually spread out 

climbing up the Pass they usually slowed down at the 

top to regroup the convoy. They did not expect trouble 

because the 173rd Airborne Brigade manned a security 

check point at the bridge a few miles away with a tank 

and infantry. The convoy rounded a curve to the left 

and then passed through the village of Phu Yen. The 

Americans had bad relations with village of Phu Yen 

because a driver ran over and killed a young child in 

that village a few weeks before. The driver had not seen 

the child because of the dust, but a village unfriendly 

to Americans usually became an ally to the NVA 

or Viet Cong.69

Official policy did not allow anyone to fire his weapon 

Two views of 

the security 

check point at 

bridge over Dak 

Oreno manned 

by the 173rd 

Airborne 

Brigade.

Photos courtesy 

of Bill Yates
Vietnam War 41

at the Vietnamese unless fired upon.70 So gunners 

normally kept their weapons on safe for fear of shooting 

an innocent Vietnamese who wore black pajamas like 

the Viet Cong guerrillas. Tim Wheat, however, expected 

trouble because his convoy had received sniper fire in 

that same area the day before, so when his gun truck 

crawled up the slight grade and rounded the bend to 

the right, he had his safety off. They were about a mile 

west of Phu Yen and two miles east of the check point 

and bridge over Dak Oreno when he saw seven khakiclad Vietnamese (the uniform of North Vietnamese Army 

regulars) in the road. Ron Kendal called this in to 2LT 

Welton who told them to go ahead and fire. Tim clearly 

saw the expression of surprise of one Vietnamese looking 

at him. He then saw the muzzle of an AK47 sticking up 

behind one Vietnamese when he turned around and then 

he fired. The whole process took about 30 seconds and 

Tim never heard Ron say he had permission to fire.71

Ron Kendal saw them drop what he thought was 

a bundle of straw and instead of driving around it, he 

straddled it. Dye, driving the fuel tanker behind the gun 

truck, also noticed two black-clad Vietnamese peasants 

ahead walking alongside the road carrying rolled up 

bamboo. As the gun truck came alongside the peasants, 

Dye saw two Vietnamese toss the bamboo under gun 

truck, which exploded. They then jumped in the ditch 

beside the road. As soon as Wheat opened fire with his 

M-60 an explosion lifted the gun truck several feet in 

the air and blew out all eight rear duals on the gun truck. 

The blast threw Wheat back against the tailgate. He then 

picked up his M-14 and emptied a full magazine through 

the porthole at the Vietnamese alongside his gun truck.72 

Welton generally rode in the jeep between the 

middle and rear of the convoy and was toward the back 

of convoy because a couple trucks had been hit between 

An Khe and Mang Giang Pass. He was half way up Mang 

Giang Pass when he received Kendal’s call, “There’s 

gooks in the road setting satchel charges.” Welton 

told them to open fire and raced up the Pass.73

The convoy was running 15 minutes ahead of 

schedule and Kendal and Wheat believed they caught 

the NVA in the road by surprise, but the NVA concealed 

in the high ground on the passenger side of the road 

(north side) were waiting for them. There was an 

embankment about the height of the top of the gun 

truck armor on the right side of the road and the ground 

gradually sloped uphill across cleared field 30 to 40 

yards to the tree line. The open area was covered by 

brush and trees bulldozed by the Army engineers into 

piles parallel to the road. The enemy had the high 

ground, which took away the advantage of the armor 

plating. After the gun truck opened fire then all hell broke 

loose. Kendal radioed back they were under attack and 

Welton told them to go ahead and return fire.74

Bobby Dye gunned his truck, drove around the gun 

truck and then was shot through both knees. An RPG hit 

Anderson’s fuel truck mortally wounding him and setting 

it on fire. Dye drove to two miles to the check point and 

the tank and paratroopers at the bridge over Dak Oreno 

had already heard the ambush. Dye stopped his truck, 

jumped out and fell, because he did not know he had 

been shot. Those vehicles not in the kill zone halted 

where they were and waited for the fight to end.75 

Paul Marcum saw a flash in front of him and then 

shreds of rubber tires flying out. He then saw Dye’s 

truck drive on past the gun truck. Anderson stopped 

his truck, got out and took cover on the downhill side of 

the road. Marcum stopped his truck 75 meters behind 

Anderson’s on left hand side of road, also got out and 

then slammed the door to keep his dog in the cab. Then 

all hell broke loose and he knew they were in trouble. He 

then jumped down in the ditch in front of his truck while 

bullets pummeled his truck. Fuel was spilling out on the 

road and in the ditch and road. The enemy was so close 

he could hear them jabbering on top of the hill above 

the ten-foot embankment just across the road. Paul 

was firing his M -14 and when Paul came running up his 

weapon jammed. Bush’s M -14 also jammed, so Paul 
42 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

took his friend’s ammunition. They carried four to five 

20 -round magazines apiece. Paul sprayed bullets at the 

hill to keep enemy down and told Bush to watch behind 

them. Bush then saw two black- clad Vietnamese come 

around behind them. When Marcum turned around, they 

threw their hands up 

and he shot them. For 

years he wondered why 

they were there in the 

middle of the ambush 

and years later 

when Dye told him 

about seeing the two 

Vietnamese peasants 

toss the bundle of 

bamboo under the 

truck, he figured they 

were the same two.76

An 8th Group 

convoy halted behind 

them and their gun 

trucks came up and 

entered into kill zone. 

Mike Buirge was 

driving a truck in the 

rear of the convoy so 

he was on the other 

side of the Pass and 

did not even see 

the smoke from the 

burning tanker. The 

3⁄4 - ton gun truck 

was in the back and 

2LT Welton told them 

to stay back.77 

After Marcum looked 

back around to the hill, 

the enemy tossed a lit torch that hit the tanker, bounced 

off and landed in the ditch, then caught the fuel on fire. 

The fire was spreading towards him and he knew he had 

to get to other side of road. He tossed a grenade, then 

ran across road with bullets hitting around him. He rolled 

over a metal gas line and busted up his knuckles. He 

thought he had been hit. He then watched for Bush to 

join him, but as the fuel in the tanker heated up, the four 

manholes on his tanker blew fire 50 feet in air. The heat 

scorched his neck. Looking back across the road, 

a grenade exploded and he thought they got Bush.78

 From where the gun truck halted, it had a long 

field of fire along the convoy and tree line. The enemy 

was as close as the brush piles alongside the road 

and in the tree line. 

So Wheat burnt out the 

barrel of his M-60 with 

continuous spraying 

fire holding the enemy 

back from the tankers. 

Several tankers were 

hit by RPGs and set 

afire. The other gunner 

claimed his M-60 

was jammed so he 

took cover in the right 

corner of the gun 

box and pointed out 

targets. Wheat finally 

convinced him to feed 

the ammunition belt to 

his gun. The barrel got 

so hot the bolt stripped 

the rim off a cartridge 

leaving the shell casing 

in the barrel. Wheat 

then pulled off the hot 

barrel with his bare 

hand and replaced it 

with the barrel from 

the other M -60. It 

did not leave a mark 

on his hand though. 

Meanwhile Kendal 

climbed into the gun 

box to provide covering 

fire with his M-14. After Wheat got the M-60 working, 

the other gunner fired an M-14. In the kill zone, the gun 

truck crew put up a fight against a hail of small arms, 

rockets and grenades from their disabled vehicle against 

an estimated 150 enemy soldiers. About ten minutes 

into the fight, Kendal said they were drawing fire from the 

left. Wheat lifted his M-60 off the mount and threw a 

heavy volume of fire down in that direction until that side 

quieted down. He then went back to suppressing the 

This would have been the scene LT Welton would have seen 

coming into the kill zone from the rear. Enemy fire was coming 

from the high ground to the right. Photo courtesy of Billy Rumbo
Vietnam War 43

enemy fire from the right side of the road. After a while, 

the bolt overheated and Wheat broke the two M-60s 

down and exchanged bolts while Kendal again laid down 

covering fire. Ron soon fired off all his magazines and 

asked what to do next. Wheat told him to start breaking 

down the M-60 belt and load rounds from it.79

Meanwhile, 2LT Welton raced up fast with his jeep 

and stopped inside the kill zone. He later remembered 

he had about eight tankers still in the kill zone and 

the rest behind him were not. One burning tanker had 

driven past the gun truck and stopped by a 30 -foot 

embankment. The driver abandoned the truck. The 

30 -foot embankment concealed his truck from enemy 

observation and fire. Most of the drivers froze inside 

their trucks. Welton then stepped out of his jeep and 

ran along trucks with his M-79 grenade launcher while 

his gunner opened fire with his M-60. Some were 

burning when he arrived and others began burning after 

he reached them. If the trucks in the kill zone could 

drive he then instructed the drivers to drive on around 

the burning trucks to Pleiku and two to three did. Five 

tankers were on fire so Welton had to get the drivers out 

and have them return fire to keep enemy away from the 

trucks. Welton talked to drivers on the passenger side 

and only heard small arms and machine gun fire. He 

did not hear any RPG fire.80

Welton returned to his jeep to get ammunition for the 

gun truck when the gun trucks of the 8th Group convoy 

behind his asked permission to come up. The Lieutenant 

said they did not need them since they had the tank 

coming from the check point. One 8th Group gun truck 

entered the kill zone anyway and threw grenades. When 

they later found Anderson, he had small shrapnel holes 

in his head. Anderson may have been mortally wounded 

by friendly fire.81

From his position below the embankment, Paul 

Marcum kept looking back through the truck and saw 

something stand up, and then here came Bush. 

By then the smoke obscured his approach from the 

enemy and as soon as he arrived he said, “They got 

you, didn’t they?” Paul replied, “I don’t know.” Then 

Bush said, “They got me.” He was hit three times in 

the shoulder and arm. About that time the helicopter 

gunships arrived overhead and flew in so close Marcum 

could see the gunners. He thought they would hit them. 

A tank pulled up beside them, aimed its barrel up the 

The low ground to the right of the photo was where 

Wheat received some small arms fire.

Jacknifed fuel tanker. Photos courtesy of Billy Rumbo
44 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

road and fired. Bush wanted to get in the tank, but they 

laid there until the infantry finally arrived.82

About 15 to 20 minutes into the ambush, an 

M-60 tank rolled into the kill zone. An NVA soldier 

stepped around a tree to fire an RPG and the tank blew 

him in half. By then Tim had fired off all 8,000 rounds 

of M-60 ammunition, so he climbed out of his truck, 

ran over to the tank and borrowed another can of 

ammunition. By that time Kendal was totally exhausted 

from the fight. Welton also arrived with two cans of 

M -60 ammunition.83

A bunch of infantry hollered if anybody was 

wounded. Marcum answered, “Yes,” and they then took 

Bush out. They collected dead enemy bodies and Paul 

went out to help. The tank had torn the body of the 

NVA soldier in two with the hind end resting on a stump. 

There was a machine gun laying there with roll of ammo. 

Paul came upon the enemy dead and they were young 

with cut clean jet black hair.84

After the ambush Welton loaded the drivers of the 

burning trucks in the other trucks. The remainder of the 

convoy had waited for what seemed hours, and then it 

just started moving. Welton led the convoy on to Pleiku 

without the gun truck. When Mike Buirge drove by the 

smoldering trucks, he saw half an NVA soldier on the 

road that had been hit by the M-60 tank. One fuel 

truck had jackknifed trying to get out of the kill zone.85

Upon inspection, the damaged gun truck had 

shrapnel in the gas tanks and the air lines were blown 

out so it had no brakes. Someone brought up four spare 

tires from An Khe to replace the duals on the gun truck. 

Kendal stuffed sticks in the fuel tank to stop the leaks 

and drove back to An Khe with a handful of damaged 

trucks. Tim rode back in another truck. The rest of the 

convoy continued to Pleiku. Kendal did not find out 

about the hole in the drive shaft until someone checked 

his truck out at An Khe. Upon return, Ron counted over 

200 hits just on the driver’s side door. He did not bother 

to count the number of hits on the right side. After the 

debriefing, Wheat was sent out on the 3⁄4 - ton the next 

day and then sent on R&R. Meanwhile, Ron Kendal 

rebuilt the gun truck and received permission to 

name it, War Wagon.86

Dye’s wounds were treated at the check point and 

he and the other wounded were medevaced to 71st 

EVAC. While at Pleiku, Welton visited Anderson in the 

hospital, but Anderson never regained consciousness 

and died ten days later.87

They returned to their barracks at An Khe that night. 

Paul took his flak jacket and clothes off to take a shower. 

He tossed his billfold on the cot and it flared open. 

He picked it up and found shrapnel halfway through it. 

The supply specialists returned to the 304th the end 

of that month.88

Lesson

Like the previous ambushes, the enemy initiated with 

explosives, but this time thrown under the trucks. It was 

also the first large scale ambush on a fuel convoy. It 

appeared as if the enemy laid an L-shaped kill zone but 

the base of the L was not ready when the convoy arrived. 

As usual, the enemy tried to destroy the lead gun truck 

first. The kill zone stretched over a mile in length and 

destroyed one gun truck and 10 tankers.89 Again the 

gun trucks converged in the kill zone, increasing the fire 

power. This was becoming the pattern of 8th Group 

gun trucks, to rush into the kill zone and suppress the 

enemy until the nearest security force arrived.

Like the 4 December ambush, the crew of the 

gun truck realized they also needed to carry more 

Medevac site further up the road. Photo courtesy of Billy Rumbo ammunition. They added two more 4,000 -round cans 
Vietnam War 45

of M-60 ammunition bringing the count up to 16,000 

rounds, plus more M-14 magazines. They also added 

two spare M-60 barrels and carried an M-79 

grenade launcher.

When Ron Kendal and Tim Wheat discussed the 

ambush, they agreed the driver needed to focus on 

the road and the gunners needed to focus on the 

surroundings. After Wheat left Vietnam in March, they 

added a third gunner to the gun box.

The location of the gun truck in the kill zone was 

fortunate as it allowed an 18-year old kid with an M - 60 

and 8,000 rounds of ammunition to lay down suppressive 

fire between the enemy and the trucks thus preventing 

greater disaster. The 359th realized it needed more 

gun trucks and built its second 21⁄2-ton gun truck 

after this ambush.

Because the trucks usually spread out going up 

Mang Giang Pass, they regrouped above the Pass 

because they had encountered no enemy threat up 

there and it was close to bridge guarded by a tank 

platoon. The 1st Cav had previously secured the area, 

but moved north to I Corps Tactical Zone that January 

turning responsibility for the area over to the 173rd 

Airborne Brigade. A brigade then had responsibility for 

the same area previously defended by a division so it 

could not provide the same level of security. The convoy 

had evidently established a pattern with regrouping 

above the Pass, but never did that again.90

Welton felt there should not have been more than 

three trucks in kill zone. Because of regrouping, too 

many trucks were in the kill zone. Maintaining convoy 

interval of 100 meters would reduce the number of 

vehicles in the kill zone.91

In a guerrilla war the guerrillas often dress as 

civilians or even friendly troops. Senior commanders 

see the bigger picture of the war and have to make 

rules that protect the very people the war is fought to 

protect or defend. However, these rules as general as 

they are written do not always apply to every situation 

and the strict interpretation of them can put soldiers 

at risk. When Welton reported to his commander what 

happened, word came down from higher that they 

would either give him a medal or court-martial. He 

had instructed the gunner to fire even though he 

had not been fired upon. They were not even allowed 

to load a magazine in their weapons. 2LT Welton and 

Kendal were awarded the Bronze Star Medals with V 

device, Dye was awarded the Army Commendation 

Medal with V device, and Wheat received the 

Silver Star Medal.

The enemy attacks on convoys increased 

leading up to the commencement of the Tet Offensive 

on 31 January 1968, but failed to close down the 

QL19. The truck drivers and convoy commanders 

learned a lot from the previous ambushes and the 

gun trucks clearly bought time for the convoy until 

the nearest security force could arrive and take over 

the fight. The convoys learned the importance of 

maintaining proper interval to limit the number of trucks 

in the kill zone. Those in the kill zone that could drive 

should clear the kill zone and drive to the safety of the 

nearest security check point. Those not in the kill zone 

should not drive into it. The gun truck crews also 

realized they needed more weapons and more 

ammunition. So while the convoys implemented 

these lessons over the next couple months, the 

enemy would continue to experiment with different 

ways to counter the suppressive fire power of 

the gun trucks.

Anderson being treated for his wounds. 

Photo courtesy of Billy Rumbo
46 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

15Thomas Briggs email to Richard Killblane, July 16, 2009.

16LTC (R) Nicholas Collins telephone interview by Richard Killblane 

on 29 April and 18 June 2004.

17 Colonel Joe O. Bellino, “8th Transportation Group; Sep 1967 – 

Sep 1968.” n.d; and Interview with Phillip C. Brown and J.D. Calhoun 

by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 13 June 2003.

18Thomas Briggs email to Richard Killblane, July 16, 2009.

19Bellino, “8th Transportation;” Nichols interview; Walter Dan Medley 

interview by Richard Killblane at Pigeon Forge, TN, 6 August 2009. 

LTC Nick Collins, the S-3 during the ambush, remembered the claymore 

mine detonating next to SGT Collins’ jeep and also remembered enemy 

detonated explosives in a culvert on the 19th vehicle, but Medley heard 

the mine was in a culvert and the tanker was the 19th vehicle in line 

of march, but the sketch map in the Bellino Report has it as 

the 12th vehicle.

20Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Medley interview.

21Bellino, “8th Transportation;” Wolfe Interview; and Thomas Briggs, 

After Action Report to Commander C Company, 504th MP Battalion 

estimated 80 enemy.

22Medley interview; and evidence from photos taken of the damaged trucks. 

23Brown and Calhoun interview.

24Medley heard it was a soldier in the 523rd named Jarmilio, but the 

Thomas Briggs claimed MP SGT Cox did the same thing.

25Briggs, After Action Report.

26Briggs, After Action Report; and Briggs email.

27Briggs, After Action Report.

28Burrell Welton telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 23 April 2013.

29Bellino, “8th Transportation.”

30Briggs, After Action Report.

31The list of names came from the 512th TC Historical Supplement, 1967, 

and Memorial Service, 54th Transportation Battalion, 

Camp Addison, Republic of Vietnam, 6 September 1967.

32COL (R) John Burke telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 30 March 

2004; and COL (R) Melvin M. Wolfe telephone interview by Richard E. 

Killblane, 31 March and 14 April 2004.

33Ibid.

34Bellino, “8th Transportation.”

35Burke and Wolfe interviews.

36MAJ Nicholas H. Collins, “Battalion S-3 Notes,” Headquarters, 

54th Transportation Battalion, 5 March 1967; Burke interview, 

and Collins interview.

37Bellino, “ 8th Transportation.”

38Ibid. 

39Burke interview.

40Bellino, “8th Transportation.” 41Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and CPT Phillip T. Hall, Jr., 585th 

Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) APO 96238, 

After Action Report, 11 November 1968.

42Ibid.

43Bellino, “8th Transportation;”and James Lyles, Gun Trucks 

in Vietnam; Have Guns – Will Travel, Wheaton, ILL: Rhame House 

Publishers Inc., 2012.

44Bellino, “8th Transportation.”

45Ibid.

46Ibid.

47Ibid.

48Bellino, “8th Transportation;”and Lyles, Gun Trucks in Vietnam.

49Ibid.

50Bellino, “8th Transportation.”

51Larry “Ted” Ballard interview by Richard Killblane, 6 August 2008.

52Ballard interview.

53Bellino, “8th Transportation;”and Lyles, Gun Trucks in Vietnam.

54Dennis Belcastro telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 12 April 2013.

55Ibid.

56Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Dennis Belcastro claimed only 

1LT Todd was the convoy commander, but the Unit History, 669th 

Transportation Company (Light Truck), 1 January 1967 – 31 December 

1967 stated 1LT Richard J. Tillotson, 2nd Platoon Leader of the 669th 

Transportation Company, was the convoy commander, and was assisted 

by 1LT James R. Steel, 3rd Platoon Leader and 1LT Jerry L. Todd. 

The 1968 57th Unit History Report confirmed Todd was the 

assistant convoy commander.

57Belcastro telephone interview; and Dennis Belcastro, Narrative, “Living 

History Reenactment at Jamestown March 2000,” Army Transportation 

Association Vietnam, http://grambo.us/belcastro/54guntruck.htm. 

58Belcastro telephone interview.

59Belcastro telephone interview; and Belcastro, 

“Living History Reenactment.” 

60Bellino, “8th Transportation;” Belcastro interview; and 669th 

Transportation Company Unit History Report 1967.

61Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Belcastro interview.

62Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and 669th Transportation 

Company Unit History Report 1967.

631LT Peter C. Thomas, Unit History Report, 57th Transportation 

Company, 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968, 24 March 1969.

64Robert Dye email to Richard Killblane, December 9-11, 2009; 

Ron Kendal telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 15 April 2013;

Timothy Wheat telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 16 April 2013; 

and Burrell Welton telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

65Michael Buirge telephone interview summary by Richard Killblane, 

9 December 2009; Wheat interview; Kendal interview; 

and Welton interview.

66Dye email; and Award Citations for SP4 Ronald M. Kendall and 

SP4 Timothy Wheat, 7 February 1968.

67Paul Marcum telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 22 April 2013.

68Buirge interview, and Welton interview.

69Dye email.

70“Convoy personnel will not fire their weapons unless under attack. 

Rounds will not be chambered unless attack is imminent.” COL Arthur 

B. Busbey, Jr., Subject: Hwy 19 SOP for Logistical and Security Elements, 

Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96350, 

17 July 1968.

71Dye email, Kendal interview, and Wheat interview.

72Dye email, Kendal interview, and Wheat interview.

73Welton’s interview.

74Dye email, Kendal interview, and Wheat interview.

75Buirge interview, Dye email.

76Marcum interview.

77Buirge interview.

78Marcum interview.

79Kendal interview, and Wheat interview.

80Welton interview, and Welton Bronze Star Medal Award 

General Orders Number 102.

81Welton interview.

82Marcum interview.

83Kendal interview, and Wheat interview.

84Marcum interview.

85Welton interview, and Buirge interview.

86Kendal interview, and Wheat interview.

87Gress email. 

88Marcum interview.

89John Gress email to Richard Killblane, December 7, 2009. 

90Welton interview.

91Welton interview.
Vietnam War 47

Tet Offensive and After

he enemy attacks on convoys with mines, sniper 

fire and ambushes increased with frequency 

leading up to the commencement of the Tet 

Offensive on 31 January 1968, and through the next 

three months the enemy made a determined attempt 

to close down the flow of supplies to Pleiku along the 

QL19. Most of the attacks took place west of An Khe. 

In some cases the enemy planted as many as 30 mines 

in one night along that stretch of road. The truck drivers 

and convoy commanders learned a lot from the previous 

ambushes and the gun trucks clearly bought time for the 

convoy until the nearest security force could arrive and 

take over the fight. The convoys learned the importance 

of maintaining proper interval to limit the number of 

trucks in the kill zone. Those in the kill zone that could 

drive should clear the kill zone and drive to the safety 

of the nearest security check point. Those not in the 

kill zone should not drive into it. The gun truck crews 

also realized they needed more weapons and more 

ammunition. So while the convoys implemented these 

lessons over the next couple months, the enemy would 

continue to experiment with different ways to counter 

the suppressive fire power of the gun trucks.92

21 January 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

t approximately 0615 hours on 21 January 1968, 

a westbound convoy of 60 cargo trucks, four gun 

trucks and four gun jeeps under the control of 

the 54th Battalion departed Qui Nhon for Pleiku on QL 

19. The 21⁄2-ton gun trucks were still early designs with 

single steel walls and two M-60 machine guns, or Quad 

.50 gun trucks. A gun truck led each convoy march unit 

with gun trucks evenly spread throughout the convoy. 

Because of a shortage of radios on gun trucks, a gun 

jeep with a radio usually accompanied the gun truck. 

Each task vehicle only had one driver.93 

As they had in the previous ambushes, again the 

enemy had placed mines in the road, and the convoy 

halted at Check Point 96 East for 30 minutes while EOD 

cleared the road. M48 tanks and M113 APCs manned 

the security check points along the route as the quick 

reaction force. At 1000 hours, approximately 500 yards 

T

east of Check Point 102, below Mang Giang Pass, the 

lead element of the convoy came upon a 5-ton tractor, 

which was attempting to hook up to a 5,000 -gallon fuel 

trailer. Because this operation blocked the flow of traffic, 

the convoy commander drove forward and directed the 

clearance of the road. Once the road was open again, 

he then instructed his convoy to continue. By that time, 

the enemy opened with automatic and small arms fire 

on the driver’s (south) side of the road. Gun trucks and 

gun jeeps immediately returned fire while the rest of the 

convoy continued to drive through the kill zone. Within 

five to ten minutes APCs from the road security element 

at Check Point 102 arrived and engaged the enemy. 

Tanks from Check Point 98 also arrived within ten 

minutes. Rear elements of the convoy approaching the 

area received between 40 and 50 rounds of automatic 

fire. Both APCs and tanks at the kill zone fired in the 

direction of the hostile fire.94 

With only small arms fire this was more likely a hasty 

ambush taking advantage of the blocked traffic. Here the 

SOPs again worked. The gun trucks placed suppressive 

fire on the enemy so the convoy could clear the kill zone. 

Because the ambush did not stop any vehicles, the 

convoy drove through the kill zone as policy. The security 

force then responded to the kill zone but after the 

trucks had cleared it.

25 January 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

t 0600 hours on 25 January 1968, a westbound 

convoy under the control of the 54th Battalion 

consisting of 95 vehicles destined for Pleiku 

and 23 for An Khe departed the marshalling area at Cha 

Rang Valley. The 95 vehicles bound for Pleiku consisted 

of 65 M52 5-ton cargo trucks; 19 M35 21⁄2 - ton cargo 

trucks; five 21⁄2 -ton gun trucks, radio-equipped radio 

gun jeeps and two 5 -ton maintenance trucks. A gun 

truck led each convoy march serial with gun trucks 

accompanied by radio-equipped gun jeeps evenly 

spread throughout the convoy. Each task vehicle only 

had one driver. M48 tanks and M113 APCs manned 

the security check points along the route as the 

quick reaction force.95

At approximately, 1015 hours, the convoy received 

automatic and small arms fire from both sides of the 

A A
48 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

road about 12 kilometers west of Mang Giang Pass. 

The gun trucks and convoy personnel returned fire 

and within 10 minutes elements of the 2/1st Cavalry 

arrived with APCs and tanks. This ended the enemy fire 

for a while; and after all the firing stopped, the convoy 

proceeded west for approximately 500 yards when 

the convoy again came under fire. The two kill zones 

spanned 1,000 meters. The NVA opened fire on the 

second and third vehicles in the convoy with rockets, 

heavy machine guns, grenades and small arms fire from 

both sides of the road. A machine gun position was later 

discovered approximately 25 yards from the passenger 

(north) side of the road. One 21⁄2 - ton gun truck and 

one 21⁄2 - ton cargo truck were damaged, and a Pacific 

Architects & Engineers (PAE) commercial tractor was 

destroyed. Two drivers were killed and one wounded. 

The reaction force immediately left their previous 

location and raced to the new kill zone where the 

fire again ended. Three armed helicopters arrived at 

approximately 1045 hours. Two medevac helicopters 

arrived within 10 minutes after receiving the request. 

Two officers, members of the engineer team, were 

wounded, one fatally, while clearing explosive 

ordnance from the site.96

The enemy had changed its tactics again. Evidently 

the enemy had studied the gun trucks and noticed 

they stayed in the kill zone while the task vehicles 

escaped. Consequently, the enemy planned two kill 

zones possibly to see how the convoy and security force 

would react. The enemy may have planned the first 

ambush as a decoy to draw off the gun trucks hoping 

that the unprotected trucks escaping the first kill zone 

would drive into the main kill zone. In this case, the gun 

trucks defended the halted convoy long enough for the 

reaction force to arrive and then left. This placed the 

reaction force only a short distance behind the convoy 

when it drove through the next kill zone. This allowed the 

armored cavalry to respond rapidly and turn the fire back 

on the enemy. At this time the enemy feared the fire 

power of the tanks and APCs over the gun trucks. 

The enemy watches for patterns. So varying procedures can keep the enemy off balance. Some gun trucks 

should remain with the vehicles that escape the kill zone 

and having a combat arms force following a close distance 

behind but out of sight of the convoy provides a great 

tactical surprise for the enemy that ambushes the convoy.

30 January 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

n 30 January 1968, a westbound convoy 

under the control of the 54th Battalion departed 

for Pleiku on QL19 at approximately 0600 

hours that morning. The convoy consisted of 80 cargo 

trucks, seven gun trucks, eight gun jeeps and three 

Quad .50s. This exceeded the 1:10 ratio of gun 

trucks to prime movers.97 

Upon arrival in An Khe, the convoy was joined by 

three APCs and one tank from the security force of 

the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The additional security 

element was dispersed toward the front of the convoy. 

Since the convoy was about to pass out of the area of 

operation of the 173rd, the additional security element 

pulled out of the convoy and stopped at Check Point 

102. Approximately one mile west of Check Point 

102, the convoy came under enemy fire initially from 

mortars followed by small arms and automatic fire 

from a platoon-size enemy force. The convoy personnel 

immediately returned fire. In addition, the 173rd Airborne 

Brigade security element advanced from Check Point 

102 and an element for the 4th Infantry Division security 

element moved west to engage the enemy. F111As, 

F104s and helicopter gunships made air strikes. Two US 

personnel were slightly injured; one 5 -ton tractor and 

reefer (refrigeration van) were damaged. No enemy 

dead or wounded was found.98

This time the NVA initiated with mortars, which 

proved inaccurate for initiating an ambush. In this case 

the role of the security force was much more proactive. 

Their presence along with the high number of gun trucks 

suppressed the enemy attack minimizing any 

damage to vehicles or casualties.

31 January 1968

124th Transportation Battalion

February was the Lunar New Year or Tet, one 

of the most popular holidays in Vietnam. It was 

like Christmas and New Years rolled into one 

holiday. The insurgents had agreed to a ceasefire so 

that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers 

could go home for the holidays. On 31 January 1968, 

the enemy launched a nationwide offensive.99

O

1
Vietnam War 49

That afternoon, 1LT David R. Wilson, 64th Medium 

Truck Company, led an eastbound convoy returning from 

Pleiku on QL 19. The convoy consisted of twenty-four 

5 -ton tractor-trailer combinations, two radio-equipped 

gun jeeps and three 21⁄2-ton gun trucks from the 124th 

Battalion. Seven 5-ton cargo trucks, with a lead 21⁄2 -

ton gun truck and trail radio equipped gun jeep from the 

54th Battalion made up the rear of the convoy. Two Quad 

.50 gun trucks attached from B Battery, 4th Battalion, 

60th Field Artillery accompanied the convoy. The loads 

consisted of four 5,000 -gallon fuel tankers, two Class 

II (individual equipment) and IV (construction material) 

loads, five Class IV loads and eight Class V (ammunition) 

loads. The trucks from the 54th Battalion hauled 

engineer Class IV loads. Wilson employed a convoy line 

up of gun jeeps front and rear with gun trucks evenly 

spaced throughout the convoy. He placed the Quad 

.50s in the middle of the convoy. At that time convoy 

commanders rode in the front of the convoy either in 

front of or behind the lead gun truck.100

The convoy made it safely to An Khe and departed 

for Pleiku at 1430 hours and reached the base of the 

Mang Giang Pass. Where the road grade started to raise 

slightly, the area was cleared for approximately 100 yards 

on both sides of the road. This was the stretch of road 

where the French Mobile Group 100 was destroyed and 

the site of recent ambushes became known as “Ambush 

Alley.” At 1520 hours, the lead vehicles started up the 

Pass when the enemy hidden the wood line initiated 

the ambush with mortars on the middle of the convoy, 

in the vicinity of Check Point 102.101 

The lead gun truck escorted the lead elements of the 

convoy to the top of the Pass in accordance with the SOP. 

However, many of the vehicles behind it had halted in the 

kill zone and were subject to an intense enemy mortar 

and small arms fire. Upon hearing the firing behind him, 

1LT Wilson, immediately ordered his driver, SP4 Brammer, 

to turn the jeep around and reenter the kill zone to make 

an estimate of the situation and so he could insure the 

safe passage of the rear element of the convoy. Wilson’s 

gunner, SP4 Earnest W. Fowlke, blazed away with the 

M-60. Upon reaching the edge of the kill zone, he saw 

that the enemy fired small arms, automatic weapons, 

60mm and 82mm mortars into a 400 yard long kill zone. 

Wilson then turned the jeep around and headed back 

up the Pass. The jeep had traveled 50 meters when a 

mortar round hit it causing it to burst into flames, killing 

Wilson instantly and mortally wounding Fowlke. Brammer 

was only slightly wounded and the burning jeep rolled 

into a ditch.102 

The lead gun truck escorted the convoy safely to 

the top of the Pass and then returned to the kill zone to 

escort the rest of the convoy out. As it came down the 

Pass, the two machine gunners, SP4 Howell and SP4 

Bushong, saw the two Quad .50s racing up the Pass to 

safety. One driver said they only saw one return fire as 

it beat other trucks out of the kill zone. The 21⁄2-ton gun 

truck stopped at the edge of the kill zone 100 meters 

east of the Pass. The middle gun truck raced up to a 

position about 50 meters from the first. To obtain better 

fields of fire and maximum coverage, the gun trucks 

remained in the kill zone.103 

The last gun truck of the 124th Battalion headed up 

the road but was stopped by MPs at Check Point 102. 

Evidently unaware of the ambush the driver, SP5 Jimmie 

Jackson, jumped out to find out why the convoy had 

stopped. None of the gun trucks had radios. Then the 

rear gun jeep arrived with SGT Welch, PFC Jimmy Tidwell 

and PFC Cansans. PFC Tidwell informed Jackson and the 

security force that the convoy up ahead was ambushed. 

Tidwell jumped into the driver’s seat of the gun truck and 

Jackson climbed in the gun box to man a machine gun. 

They drove up to Wilson’s burning jeep and returned fire 

on the enemy. They remained in position until the MPs 

instructed the convoy to move forward. Jackson and SP4 

Green were wounded in the fight. Only Wilson’s jeep was 

destroyed. There were two APCs and one tank in the 

area. Helicopter support did not arrive for 20 minutes.104

The enemy was experimenting with mortars in a 

convoy ambush and this time launched the attack on 

the middle of the convoy instead of the front as it had in 

the past. This allowed the convoy commander and lead 

gun truck to escape. However, at great risk to life, 1LT 

Wilson and his crew drove back into the kill zone to save 

the lives of their drivers. For their personal bravery and 

sacrifice, 1LT Wilson and SP4 Fowlke were posthumously 

awarded the Silver Star Medals. The 124th Battalion 

named their camp after Wilson. While extremely brave, 

driving into a kill zone in an unarmored vehicle 

was dangerous. 

1LT John M. Arbuthnot II wrote the following 

as lessons:
50 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Quick reaction is required of all individuals in 

determining the type of attack and the limits of the 

kill zone. When small arms fire is combined with a 

mortar attack the driver must do more than return 

heavy volume of fire. Personnel must get out of 

the kill zone, preferably, and/or obtain overhead 

cover. Air cover should be immediately available to 

locate the mortar positions and then silence these 

positions or request artillery support. It is highly 

desirable for the aircraft to provide continuous 

overhead cover for the convoy and not just be 

on call. The five or ten minutes lost waiting for 

the aircraft to arrive often means the difference 

between a few casualties or a large number and 

minor or major damage to vehicles and equipment.

Since an ambush is generally of limited duration, 

drivers must be constantly alert and capable of 

reacting instantly with a heavy volume of effective 

fire when fired upon. Simultaneously the personel 

must move quickly through the kill zone and direct 

maximum fire at the most logical vantage points. 

The convoy commander must immediately identify 

his location, notify the road security forces, request 

air and/or artillery support and proceed to facilitate 

movement of his convoy through the kill zone.105

By attacking the middle of the convoy, this split 

the convoy in half. The lead vehicles drove on to 

safety while the vehicles behind the kill zone halted 

awaiting a decision. As the enemy increasingly began 

to attack the middle or rear of the convoys, convoy 

commanders realized the front was not the place 

to be if they wanted to influence the action. The key 

decisions had to be made either in or behind the kill 

zone. For that reason, convoy commanders would 

learn to ride in the rear of the convoys. 

The lack of radios in the gun trucks also caused 

confusion in the rear when the MPs stopped the last 

gun truck. Without knowing what was happening 

ahead of them and with no communication with the 

convoy commander, the last gun truck was unable to 

respond in a timely manner. 

Everyone needed to know what to do in an ambush, 

especially attachments. Besides being critical of the 

performance of the artillerymen in the Quad .50s, 

the truck drivers were disappointed with the delayed 

arrival of the helicopters. The machine guns on the 

gun trucks were effective weapons against other 

direct fire weapons but not against mortars hidden 

in the woods. Helicopters could more effectively spot 

the mortars which either they or artillery could then 

destroy. Similarly the MPs at the check point only 

knew to prevent vehicles from entering the kill zone. 

While it may have seemed obvious that the gun trucks 

should have been allowed through, fear causes a form 

of paralysis and soldiers do only what they know.

As 1LT Arbuthnot clearly realized, if air cover 

ended the ambush, its presence would most likely 

prevent it; but unfortunately it would take a few more 

years before air cover became required for convoys.

7 February 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

n 7 February 1968, a westbound convoy 

on QL19 of 67 cargo trucks, six gun trucks, 

four gun jeeps and one maintenance truck 

under the control of the 54th Battalion departed Cha 

Rang Valley at 0630 hours. Each 21⁄2 - ton gun truck 

escorted a march serial of around ten task vehicles 

and the maintenance truck brought up the rear. Each 

gun truck had at least two M -60 machine guns and 

possibly one M -2 .50 caliber machine gun. The gun 

jeeps were armed with M- 60s and radios with one 

gun jeep up front and another in the rear.

At approximately 1010 hours, after passing 

Check Point 92, the convoy came under small arms 

and automatic fire from 50 to 60 enemy soldiers hidden 

in the tree line south of the road. The enemy fired two 

rockets at the convoy from a mound halfway between 

the road and the tree line. One rocket hit a 5 -ton cargo 

truck carrying a load of mortar ammunition, which was 

destroyed. The exploding rounds also damaged the 

next vehicle in the convoy. The enemy force then began 

to advance from the tree line but was driven back by 

the fire power of the gun trucks. The gun trucks, which 

had cleared the 200 meter long kill zone, returned to 

fire on the enemy positions. Within 15 minutes, six to 

eight APCs and two to three tanks arrived on the scene 

to engage the enemy. The helicopter gunships arrived 

within 15 to 20 minutes.106

The enemy laid a linear kill zone and initiated 

O
Vietnam War 51

with rockets. The Americans only had four men slightly 

wounded, but the enemy lost six killed and one wounded. 

One truck was destroyed by the rocket, the next 5-ton 

cargo truck had its gas tank damaged by the exploding 

mortar rounds and many of the vehicles including the 

gun trucks received flat tires from enemy fire. The gun 

trucks provided immediate security until the tanks and 

APCs arrived to take over the fight, and then the convoy 

continued on to Pleiku.

107 

In February, the M -16s and M -2 .50 caliber machine 

guns began to arrive. The three companies attached to 

the 54th Battalion traded in their M -14 rifles for M -16s 

and conducted training on handling, cleaning and firing 

from 9 to 21 February. The battalion trained the unit 

armorers on M-16 maintenance from 12 to 14 February. 

Similarly the battalion conducted a class on the M -2 .50 

caliber from 21 to 24 February.108

13 February 1968

124th Transportation Battalion

n 13 February, a westbound convoy on QL19 

of 28 task vehicles, one maintenance vehicle, 

two gun jeeps, three 21⁄2 - ton gun trucks 

and three Quad .50s under the control of the 124th 

Battalion departed An Khe at 1335 hours for a return 

trip to Pleiku. This convoy had a gun truck ratio of 1:5 

just counting the gun trucks. By policy, a gun truck 

would lead the convoy followed by a radio - equipped 

gun jeep and likewise another pair would bring up 

the rear with the remaining gun truck and Quad .50s 

evenly distributed throughout the convoy.

Around 1500 hours, 200 yards west of the base of 

the Mang Giang Pass, the enemy ambushed the lead 

elements of the convoy with mortars and small arms. 

The convoy personnel and gun trucks immediately 

returned fire. The convoy commander urged one of the 

Quad .50s from the 4th Battalion, 60 Field Artillery to 

fire on the suspected enemy mortar position while the 

convoy drove through the kill zone. The security forces 

of the 173rd Airborne Division arrived and attacked the 

enemy within 10 minutes. Air strikes were conducted 

against the suspected mortar positions. The enemy 

had only fired seven mortar rounds and caused no 

vehicle damage or wounded any drivers.109

The enemy seemed to experiment with different 

O

types of casualty producing weapons to initiate the 

ambush with and seemed focused on mortars. Again 

mortars proved an inaccurate weapon to initiate the 

ambush. So with the mortars not stopping the convoy, 

the Quad .50 laid down suppressive fire while the rest 

of the convoy continued through the kill zone. 

21 February 1968

27th Transportation Battalion

t approximately 0715 hours, 21 February, 

a westbound convoy on QL19 under the 

control of the 27th Battalion departed the 

marshalling yard at Cha Rang Valley for Pleiku. The 

convoy consisted of 54 task vehicles, four 21⁄2 -ton 

gun trucks, four gun jeeps and a Quad .50 evenly 

spaced throughout the convoy. So the five gun trucks 

gave the convoy the desired 1:10 gun truck ratio. 

There were just about enough radio - equipped gun 

jeeps for each gun truck. The Quad .50s were usually 

placed somewhere in the middle of the convoy.110 

At approximately 0950 hours, the convoy came 

under fire from automatic and small arms fire and 

B-40 rockets in approximately 300 to 400 meter 

kill zone in Ambush Alley between Check Points 89 

and 96. Because the convoy maintained the proper 

100 -meter interval, only three cargo trucks, two from 

the 58th and one from the 444th Truck Companies, 

were inthe kill zone. The convoy personnel returned 

fire in the direction of an estimated 10 to 12 NVA 

south of the highway. The Quad .50 moved into 

the small kill zone and was credited with killing at 

least one NVA soldier. APCs from the 173rd Airborne 

Brigade arrived approximately five to ten minutes after 

the call and engaged the enemy force. The tactical 

force also called in artillery. Three vehicles including 

a task vehicle and the Quad .50 were damaged and 

three personnel were wounded. One enemy was killed 

and another wounded was recovered along with the 

discovery of numerous foxholes.111

This was a linear ambush and the enemy 

was setting up smaller kill zones. Consequently, 

the 100 -meter interval limited only three task 

vehicles and one gun truck in the 300 to 400 

meter long kill zone, thus reducing the amount 

of damage to vehicles.

A
52 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

4 March 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

n 4 March, a westbound convoy under the 

control of the 54th Battalion departed Cha 

Rang Valley for Pleiku at approximately 0600 

hours. The convoy consisted of 104 task vehicles, 

eight gun trucks and four gun jeeps. The gun truck 

ratio without the gun jeeps was 1:14, but the limited 

fire power of the additional four gun jeeps brought 

the gun truck ratio down below 1:10. As standard 

procedure, a gun truck would lead the convoy followed 

by a radio - equipped gun jeep and a similar pair in 

the rear of the convoy. The remaining four gun trucks 

would be evenly spaced throughout the convoy.112

At approximately 0900 hours, the convoy was 

held up at Check Point 89 by the tactical security 

force due to enemy activity ahead in Mang Giang Pass. 

The convoy was allowed to proceed at approximately 

1130 hours with the escort of one tank and two APCs 

from the 173rd Airborne Brigade. At approximately 

1145 hours, the enemy initiated the attack with three 

mortar rounds followed by 20 minutes of heavy small 

arms and automatic fire. Convoy security immediately 

opened fire in the direction of the enemy which was 

well entrenched in the tree line on the north side of 

the road. The convoy also received sporadic fire from 

the south side of the road. The enemy force was 

estimated at about 50 personnel. Two Quad .50s from 

the 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, which were traveling 

with the convoy and one from the 27th Transportation 

Battalion convoy serial, which followed behind 

the 54th convoy, fired upon the enemy positions 

throughout the kill zone, estimated to be between 

500 and a 1,000 meter long. A reaction force of 

one tank, four APCs and four gunships arrived 

within five minutes.113 

Eight convoy personnel were wounded, three 

from the artillery unit. One wounded soldier died on 

6 March, from wounds received in the battle. One 

vehicle was destroyed and five vehicles and two 

trailers were damaged. The convoy remained in place 

on the highway until 1430, at which time they turned 

around under the escort of MPs and returned 

to An Khe.114

O

8 March 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

n 8 March, another 54th Battalion westbound 

convoy had departed from Cha Rang Valley 

on QL19 for Pleiku at approximately 0600 

hours. The convoy consisted of 79 task vehicles, four 

gun jeeps and five gun trucks. This convoy did not 

have the required 1:10 ratio of gun trucks to task 

vehicles unless one counted the gun jeeps.115 

At approximately 0830 hours, the third gun truck 

of the first serial was hit with a captured claymore 

mine that destroyed the vehicle. The explosion was 

followed by heavy small arms and automatic fire from 

both sides of the road. Three Quad .50s from the 

4th Battalion, 60th Artillery traveling with the convoy, 

joined by a company of tanks and APCs of the 173rd 

Airborne Brigade, which was in the area, engaged 

the enemy. The company size NVA force attempted 

to repel the flanking action of the tactical security 

force but was driven back after 15 minutes of heavy 

contact. The enemy had destroyed one gun truck and 

four cargo trucks in that kill zone. The first ambush 

wounded six truck drivers and two soldiers from 

another company and killed the company commander 

of the 173rd. The convoy reformed and was allowed 

to proceed after a 20 - minute delay.116 

At approximately 0915 hours, two kilometers 

west of Check Point 102 in Mang Giang Pass and 

ten miles past the first kill zone, a task vehicle in the 

first serial hit a mine then small arms fire hit the cab 

of the disabled vehicle wounding the driver. B -40 

rockets then ignited the JP4 that the 5 -ton cargo 

truck hauled. A reinforced enemy platoon opened 

fire with small arms, automatic fire and rockets on 

the convoy in a kill zone of approximately 300 - 500 

meters in length. The convoy security element fired 

in the direction of the enemy positions as the convoy 

maneuvered around the burning vehicle. Tactical 

security forces from the 173rd and the 4th ID arrived 

within five minutes and engaged the enemy. Only four 

truck drivers were wounded with two trucks damaged 

and another destroyed. One MP company commander 

was killed in this second kill zone. No enemy dead or 

wounded was recovered.117

O
Vietnam War 53

Again the enemy employed two kill zones. They 

also initiated the ambush on the gun trucks. The 

casualties were inflicted by the initiation of the 

ambush but the quick reaction by the gun trucks and 

security force reduced further casualties. Because of 

the additional fire power of the 173rd Airborne escort, 

the convoy continued to drive through the kill zone.

16 March 1968

124th Transportation Battalion

n 16 March 1968, a convoy of 17 cargo 

trucks, three gun trucks, one gun jeep and 

a 3⁄4-ton maintenance truck with an M - 60 

machine gun, under the control of 124th Battalion, 

departed Dak To for Pleiku on QL14 at approximately 

1430 hours. 1LT Jimmie W. Reed, of the 64th Medium 

Truck Company, was the convoy commander. MPs from 

the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) escorted the 

convoy. The 124th Battalion pushed convoys of 21⁄2 -

ton and 5 -ton cargo trucks to the smaller base camps 

along the Cambodian border. QL14 cut through dense 

jungle. The jungle provided adequate concealment 

for the enemy.118

At approximately 1800 hours the rear element 

of the convoy came under heavy small arms and 

automatic fire from a platoon size enemy force 

12 miles south of Kontum. The convoy personnel 

immediately returned fire in the direction of the 

enemy and moved rapidly out of the estimated 100 

to 150 meter long kill zone. Tanks from the nearest 

tactical force arrived within three to five minutes and 

gunships arrived within five to ten minutes. Only the 

maintenance vehicle in the rear was damaged and the 

machine gunner, SP4 Robert W. Hardesty of the 64th, 

was killed.119

As a result of the ambush, the 64th recommended 

the maintenance gun truck have more protection 

against small arms and the crew came up with the 

idea of slanting the armor so bullets would glance off. 

8th Group approved the design. They also replaced the 

M-60 with a .50 caliber machine gun for greater range 

and firepower.120

O

23 March 1968

Night Shuttle

hile the day drivers slept, the night shuttle 

drivers drove empty trucks 8 miles to the 

supply yards at Qui Nhon to pick up loads 

and then drove the trucks back to the marshalling 

yard where they were staged for the convoys the next 

morning. On 23 March, a night shuttle convoy from 

the port of Qui Nhon was proceeding west on Highway 

1 toward loading sites in Cha Rang Valley. Highway 1 

was heavily trafficked by civilian traffic during the day 

and normally considered safe. At approximately 0015 

hours, the convoy consisting of five task vehicles, one 

gun truck and one gun jeep, approached the bridge 

guarded by the Koreans. The convoy commander, 

1LT Paul J. Stegmayer, of 2nd Medium Truck, 

observed a pipe line fire in the vicinity of Tuy Phovc. 

After reporting the same, 1LT Stegmayer proceeded 

with his column. As the convoy reached the site of the 

fire, an explosion occurred on the north side of the 

road near 1LT Stegmayer’s jeep, followed by heavy 

small arms and automatic weapons fire. Although both 

1LT Stegmayer and his driver received wounds from 

flying glass and shrapnel, they were able to cross over 

the bridge at the site of the pipe line fire. Due to the 

intense enemy fire, only the jeep and one task vehicle 

were able to clear the kill zone. Despite great personal 

danger, 1LT Stegmayer, braving a withering hail of 

bullets, crossed back over to bridge on foot to take 

control of the drivers and insure that they could clear 

the scene. Moving from vehicle to vehicle, Stegmayer 

assured himself that all drivers were out of their 

vehicles and had taken up positions to engage the 

enemy. He crossed back to his jeep to radio reports 

to Battalion and adjust illuminating artillery rounds.121

With arrival of a reaction force of three gun trucks, 

one gun jeep and a Quad .50, 1LT Stegmayer again 

crossed over the bridge to direct flanking fire into 

the suspected enemy positions. The enemy force 

estimated at 15 broke contact and fled the area. 

All six vehicles in the convoy received small arms 

and automatic weapons fire. Four personnel 

were wounded.122

Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy’s 

mission was to destroy the dual bridges (railroad and 

W
54 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

2 April 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

hile most ambushes on QL19 occurred 

west of An Khe, the enemy conducted a 

small ambush against a convoy of the 54th 

Battalion in the lowlands area east of An Khe Pass on 

2 April. The Korean Tiger Division patrolled the rice 

paddies below An Khe Pass and up until this time, 

the enemy only planted mines and sniped on passing 

convoys. A reinforced squad ambushed the convoy 

with intensive automatic fire wounding four truck 

drivers and damaging seven trucks. The gun trucks 

forced the enemy to withdraw after only eight 

minutes of fighting.123

Like the 2 September 1967 ambush, this ambush 

may have been a dress rehearsal to test the success 

of ambushing in this area. The Koreans would brutally 

punish the locals in the area and as one driver 

remembered, “There was a My Lai massacre in 

the Korean sector every week.” So the drivers 

felt relatively safe in the lowlands.

End of the Tet Offensive

he enemy’s Tet Offensive had ran its course 

and turned into a bitter military defeat. The Viet 

Cong had been all but wiped out and all that 

was left to fight was the NVA. The NVA retreated back 

across the border to their sanctuaries to refit, rebuild 

and plan for their next offensive. Consequently, the 

8th Transportation Group had won its campaign to 

keep the supply line open. With the end of the Tet 

W

T

Offensive, ambushes on convoys also died down. 

The NVA would launch a couple more offensives in 

May and August but with none of the violence of the 

Tet Offensive. As the enemy took more time to plan, 

convoy ambushes would become less frequent but in 

some cases more deadly. The randomness of these 

ambushes indicated that the enemy only hoped 

to inflict casualties to wear down American moral 

and will to continue the war. 

Kill zones were becoming smaller concentrating 

fire into approximately 300 meters. The enemy had 

tried every type of weapon system but found mines 

and RPGs the most lethal to initiate an ambush. 

Likewise, 8th Group learned overwhelming firepower 

won the fight and all gun trucks were racing into the 

kill zone. Although they could not see the muzzle flash 

of enemy weapons during the day, the gunners had 

learned to fire in every direction. This caused them to 

expend ammunition fast so they began to fill the bed 

of the gun truck with as many ammunition cans as it 

would hold. The fight usually ended when either the 

air support or ground support arrived, which the truck 

drivers considered was too slow. They wanted the 

air support to accompany the convoys rather 

than wait for the call.

12 May 1968

27th and 54th Transportation Battalion

L1, the coastal highway, was heavily trafficked 

by civilians as well as military and aside from 

the attack on the night shuttle run, daytime 

traffic on the coastal highway seemed relatively 

safe. At 1000 hours on 12 May 1968, two convoys 

approached Bridge 329 (vicinity BR 985856) along 

the coastal highway. The southbound convoy of 17 

task vehicles under the control of the 27th Battalion 

came under M -79 and automatic fire 200 meters 

south of the bridge from a squad size enemy force 

hidden in a tree line 150 to 200 meters on the west 

side of the road. A northbound convoy of 31 task 

vehicles plus security, under the control of the 54th 

Battalion was also approaching the same location 

when the fire began. Both convoys increased speed 

to clear the 200 meter long kill zone.124

The 27th Battalion convoy managed to clear the 

Q

highway) at the site of the pipe line fire thus cutting 

a vital link on the only main highway between Qui 

Nhon and major tactical forces to the north and 

west. This was probably not a planned ambush. 

With the arrival of the shuttle convoy, the enemy, 

for reasons unknown, fired on the column. It has been 

recommended that the enemy may have mistaken 

the convoy as a reaction force investigating the pipe 

line fire. The action by 1LT Stegmayer and his men 

contributed to the failure of the enemy to 

accomplish their mission of interdiction of lines 

of communication to the north and west.
Vietnam War 55

Lesson

The enemy again set up two kill zones, both on a 

heavily trafficked highway that convoys did not expect 

any trouble. Speed was security in both cases, so the 

vehicles not in the kill zone raced through it. The gun 

trucks and gun jeeps concentrated around the 2 1⁄2 -

ton truck and medevaced the driver. The role of gun 

trucks was to not leave any drivers in the kill zone, 

and because of the threat of a second kill zone, at 

least one gun truck needed to escort the remainder 

of the convoy out of the kill zone.

14 August 1968

54th Transportation Battalion

t approximately 1215 hours, 14 August 1968, 

a convoy under the control of 54th Battalion 

departed Cha Rang Valley on QL19 for a line 

haul trip to Pleiku. The convoy consisted of 68 task 

vehicles, seven gun trucks, five gun jeeps armed with 

M - 60 machine guns, and one Quad .50 gun truck.127

This convoy had well over the desired 1:10 ration of 

gun truck to task vehicles even without counting the 

gun jeeps. The gun trucks in the kill zone came from 

the 512th and 523rd Transportation Companies. The 

523rd had constructed five M54 5 -ton gun trucks 

with steel plate reinforced with sandbags. Each crew 

consisted of a driver, grenadier with the M -79, and 

two machine gunners.128 The 512th had authorized 

the construction of five M35 21⁄2 -ton armor- plated 

gun trucks with crews of two to five personnel.129

By then the drivers had M -16 rifles.

At 1545 hours, at the first serial of the convoy 

proceeded west past an area approximately two 

miles west of Bridge 34, an enemy force dressed 

in ARVN Marine uniforms attacked the convoy with 

small arms and B - 40 rocket fire. The enemy force 

was estimated at between a platoon and a company. 

The first ambush opened fire with a 250 to 300 meter 

kill zone. Four gun trucks, one Quad .50 gun truck 

and one gun jeep immediately returned fire then 

rolled into an 800 to 1,000 meter kill zone a couple 

kilometers down the road. A reaction force of six 

APCs and three helicopter gunships arrived within 

five minutes after contact. All task vehicles cleared 

the kill zone, but four of those vehicles suffered 

minor damage and one was heavily damaged. The 

convoy had four men wounded and one driver from 

the 1/69th Armor was killed. The convoy commander 

reported 12 enemy troops hit by return fire. After 

the security forces swept the area of contact, they 

discovered four enemy dead. The five wounded 

US Soldiers were medevaced to the 71st Medical 

Evacuation Hospital. Of those, two were treated 

and released to duty.130

Lesson

The enemy again varied his tactics by disguising his 

forces as friendly ARVN troops. Convoy personnel 

should be suspicious of everyone and everything. Be 

aware of anything unfamiliar and look for clues. While 

the enemy may be able to dress like friendly soldiers, 

they make mistakes in dress and behavior. The NVA 

also employed two kill zones, one a diversionary 

possibly an attempt to draw off the gun trucks 

while the secondary kill zone caught the rest 

of the convoy defenseless. 

A

kill zone with only minor damage to the vehicles but 

the 54th Battalion convoy suffered one driver killed 

in action and the 240th Quartermaster Battalion had 

one POL tanker driver wounded. The driver of a 21⁄2 -

ton cargo truck was killed and ran off the road onto 

a small bank. A gun jeep and two gun trucks 

rendered immediate assistance while directing the 

convoy through the kill zone. They evacuated the 

casualties and the convoy continued north without 

further incident.125

The 27th Battalion convoy continued south and 

reached Bridge 376 (BR 930779) at approximately 

1010 hours. There it came under automatic and 

M -79 fire from a platoon- size enemy force 200 

meters from the east side of the road. Upon 

receiving enemy fire the lead gun truck pulled over 

and engaged the enemy while the convoy raced 

through the kill zone. Only one driver was wounded 

and four trucks damaged with bullet holes 

from both ambushes.126
56 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Big Kahuna - Because 

of the shortage of armor 

kits, 8th Transportation 

Group truck companies 

experimented with 

sliding M113 Armored 

Personnel Carrier (APC) 

hulls on the beds of

5-ton cargo trucks. The 

APC mounted gun truckwas born out of the 

necessity of finding 

a way to replace the 

armor destroyed during 

a period in which there 

was a shortage of steel 

plating in the supply 

system. Big Kahuna 

was armed with two 

M-60 machine guns, 

one .50 caliber machine 

gun and one M-79 

grenade launcher.

Gambler - Typical 8th Group 21⁄2 - ton gun truck with armored plating. This vehicle had sandbagged floors, 2 pedestalmounted M-60 machine guns with sandbagged emplacements for added protection, and a M-79 grenadier. The vehicle 

was controlled from ring-mounted .50 cal machine gun. Photos courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum
Vietnam War 57

The Hawk - Another version of the versatile gun truck was this M-54A2, 5-ton truck with armored plated cargo bed and 

cab. The floors and walls had additional sandbag protection. This vehicle was mounted with two M-60 machine guns, 

a M-79 grenade launcher and .50 cal machine gun. Also, the crew was armed with M-16 rifles and a M-79 grenade 

launcher. Photo courtesty of the US Army Transportation Museum

92LTC Jack C. Utley, Operational Report – Lessons learned, Headquarters, 

54th Transportation Battalion (Trk), Period Ending 30 April 1968, 

17 July 1968.

93Bellino, “8th Transportation.”

94Ibid.

95Ibid.

96Ibid.

97Ibid.

98Ibid.

99Ibid.

100Ibid. 101Ibid. 102Ibid. 103Ibid. 104Ibid. 105Ibid. 106Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Utley, Operational Report. 107Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Utley, Operational Report. 108Utley, Operational Report. 109Ibid. 110Ibid. 111Ibid. 112Ibid. 113Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Utley, Operational Report. 114Ibid. 115Bellino, “8th Transportation.”

116Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and Utley, Operational Report. 117Bellino, “8th Transportation,” reported one truck damaged and one 

destroyed, with one soldier wounded in the second kill zone. Utley, 

Operational Report claimed two trucks damaged and one destroyed, 

and four truck drivers wounded and one MP company commander 

killed in the second ambush.

118Bellino, “8th Transportation.” 119Ibid. 1201LT William J. Wilkins, Unit History Report, 64th Transportation 

Company (Medium Truck), 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968, 

7 April 1969.

121Bellino, “8th Transportation.” 122Ibid. 122Utley, Operational Report. 123Bellino, “8th Transportation.” 124Ibid. 125Ibid. 126Ibid. 127Ibid. 1281LT Harris T. Johnson III, Unit History, 523rd Transportation Company 

(LT TRK), 1 January to 31 December 1968, 31 January 1969.

129CPT Paul Forster, Unit History, Annual Supplement, 512th 

Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January to 31 December 1967,

18 March 1968.

130Bellino, “8th Transportation.”
58 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

88th Transportation Company, 

124th Transportation Battalion

he 88th Transportation Company had arrived in 

Vietnam in August 1966. It was originally a light 

truck company and was the first truck company 

that located at An Khe. It would push cargo out to the 

smaller camps along the Cambodian border. Its runs 

usually began with pushing to Pleiku in the morning then 

going to Qui Nhon in the afternoon to pick up another 

load. Because it was the only line haul truck company 

at An Khe, all the trucks in its convoys belonged to 

its company its convoys were generally smaller than 

those originating from Qui Nhon. When the 124th 

Battalion arrived in the summer of 1967, the 88th 

Medium Truck fell under its control. After the September 

ambush, CPT Terrance J. McGinty personally supervised 

marksmanship training for his drivers to include onehanded firing positions from the cab of trucks. In April 

1968, the 88th traded in its 5-ton cargo trucks for 

12-ton tractors and trailers and became a 

medium truck company.131

23 August 1968

t 0815 hours on 23 August 1968, three 

gun trucks and two gun jeeps of the 88th 

Transportation Company escorted a convoy 

of 30 trucks from An Khe to Pleiku along QL19. Many 

of the trucks were commercial contract tractor-trailer 

combination from the Korean Han Jin Company. As 

contract drivers, they were not allowed to carry weapons. 

A 21⁄2 -ton gun truck led the convoy with the convoy 

commander, 1LT Dennis C. Mack, riding in the gun jeep 

which was the third vehicle in the line of march. The 

second gun truck rode in the middle of the convoy and 

the last gun truck picked up the rear with the second 

gun jeep behind it. Besides the gun jeeps, only the 

last gun truck had a radio.132

At 0900 hours, an enemy force estimated at two 

rifle companies attacked the convoy 300 meters west 

of a Bridge 27 just as it was passing by Pump Station 

#3 at the base of Mang Giang Pass. The enemy fired 

rockets, mortars and automatic weapons into a kill zone 

that extended the length of the entire convoy. The lead 

gun truck and convoy commander in the gun jeep raced 

back into the kill zone while the rear gun truck and gun 

jeep raced forward to provide cover for the stopped 

vehicles. Those vehicles that could drove through the 

kill zone. A mortar round destroyed one tractor-trailer 

combination and its cargo of construction material, while 

six other tractor-trailer combinations were damaged and 

abandoned in the kill zone. Four others were damaged. 

1LT Mack exposed himself to enemy fire and moved 

along the convoy urging the drivers to keep moving out 

of the kill zone to the top of the Mang Giang Pass where 

emergency repairs were made and they proceeded on 

to Pleiku. The rear gun jeep was hit, killing PFC Earl C. 

Wilson and wounding SGT Nicholas Capizola and one 

other passenger. The other three wounded were drivers 

of task vehicles. Mack provided aid and comfort to the 

wounded and personally supervised their evacuation.133 

Three APCs between Bridges 27 and 29 returned 

fire, but it took 10 to 15 minutes for the reaction force 

to arrive. Two M42 dusters with twin 40mm cannons 

were the first reaction force on the scene. No gunships 

arrived during the ambush since they were refueling 

at An Khe. A platoon of APCs which was behind the 

88th Transportation Company convoy came up, swept 

the area and found five enemy dead. Three of the five 

American wounded were medevaced to An Khe while 

the other two, who were slightly wounded, continued 

on with the convoy. The six vehicles abandoned in the 

kill zone were later policed up by the commander of the 

88th Transportation Company in An Khe.134 LT Mack 

received the Silver Star Medal for his actions.

31 August 1968

t 0900 hours on 31 August 1968, a convoy 

of 33 tractor–trailer combinations under the 

control of the 88th Transportation Company 

departed An Khe for Pleiku along QL19. Similar to the 

last convoy ambush, three gun trucks and two gun 

jeeps escorted the convoy. At 0945 hours, an estimated 

enemy force of 100 NVA attacked the convoy with 

mortars, rockets, automatic weapons, small arms 

and hand grenades below Mang Giang Pass.135

There were two APCs in the vicinity of the ambush 

site and artillery fire was on target in approximately one 

minute. It took approximately 10 to 15 minutes for a 

reaction force of five APCs and six helicopter gunships 

T

A

A
Vietnam War 59

to arrive. The two gunships normally over the column 

were on the ground in An Khe being refueled. The force 

was in contact for approximately 30 minutes. They 

discovered six enemy soldiers killed.136

The convoy had one driver killed and six wounded. 

Four of the six wounded were medevaced to An Khe 

while the other two, with minor wounds, continued 

with the convoy. One gun truck and seven task vehicles 

became damaged and abandoned in the kill zone. 

Another task vehicle was badly damaged but able to 

proceed through the kill zone to a secure area at the top 

of the Mang Giang Pass. The eight vehicles abandoned 

in the kill zone were later recovered by the 88th 

Transportation Company from An Khe.137 

The engines overheated on ten 5-ton tractors 

hauling trailers that had cleared the two kill zones while 

waiting because small arms fire had punctured their 

radiators. The 88th requested assistance from the 

560th Maintenance Company (Direct Support) to 

develop a device to protect radiators from small arms 

fire. The mechanics constructed an armored grill that 

held up against M -16 and M -14 fire.138 

Pandamonium as it looked around late 1970. It was one of several gun trucks built by the 88th Transportation Company.

Photo courtesy of John Brown and James Lyles
60 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

3 January 1969

n 3 January 1969, LT Frank, 88th Transportation 

Company, 27th Transportation Battalion led a 

convoy west from Qui Nhon to An Khe in the 

afternoon. The convoy consisted of nine 5-ton tractors 

and trailers one low boy, a 5-ton bobtail tractor and 

seven Han Jin (Korean) cargo trucks which fell in at 

the end of the convoy. The escort consisted of two 

gun trucks and the convoy commander’s gun jeep in 

the rear. The convoy was ambushed at 1725 hours 

approximately one kilometer west of Bridge 19. The 

enemy had laid an L- shaped ambush with approximately 

eight soldiers on one side and three on the other firing 

rockets and automatic weapons. The kill zone stretched 

approximately 500 meters long. The American drivers 

drove out of the kill zone with only five 5-ton tractors 

and one gun truck damaged by fire. On the other hand, 

the enemy hit three Han Jin trucks killing one driver and 

seriously wounding the other two. Frank’s gun jeep drove 

up to render aid to the Han Jin trucks and was hit by 

a B-40 rocket fired from an RPG, killing the driver and 

wounding LT Frank and his machine gunner. A gun truck 

drove into the kill zone and laid down suppressive fire. 

Three of the gunners were slightly wounded and an APC 

from Bridge 19 came up and fired at the enemy position 

on the south side of the road. A gun truck and Quad .50 

from the lead half of the convoy that cleared the kill zone 

also drove back and suppressed the automatic weapons 

and rockets on the south side of the road. MPs sent a 

gun jeep and a V100 armored car into the kill zone. The 

gun truck with the three wounded gunners then turned 

its fire against the small arms fire on the north side of 

the road. Within 20 minutes, gunships arrived. Artillery 

was also called in on the enemy positions. The dust-off 

arrived and evacuated the most seriously wounded. In 

total, one US driver was killed and five wounded, one 

Han Jin driver was killed and two wounded.139

Lesson

The enemy had varied their tactics in terms of what 

weapons they initiated with, but they usually initiated 

the ambush with the most lethal weapon whether it 

was a mine, rocket or mortar to stop the lead vehicle 

then followed up with small arms and automatic fire to 

destroy the rest of the trapped vehicles. The ambushes 

1311LT Roland E. Descoteau, Unit History, 88th Transportation Company, 1 

January to 31 December 1967, 25 March 1968; and Bellino, “

8th Transportation.”

132Bellino, “8th Transportation;” and COL Garland A. Ludy, 

“8th Transportation Group, Sep 1968 - Sep 1969,” n.p., n.d.

133Bellino, “8th Transportation.” 134Ibid. 135Ibid. 136Ibid. 137Ibid. 138COL Albert J. Brown, Trip Report (8-69). Convoy Security, US Army 

Combat Deveopments Command, Liaison Detachment, HQ USARV, APO 

San Francisco, 96375, 20 January 1969.

139COL Garland A. Ludy, 8th Transportation Group.”

were primarily linear ambushes with forces dug in on 

both sides of the road. They primarily attacked on the 

slopes of the mountain passes where vehicles had 

to slow down. The ambushes rarely lasted more than 

15 minutes since the arrival of the tanks, APCs and 

helicopter gunships tipped the balance of fire power 

on the side of the Americans. 

The enemy began to reduce the length of their kill 

zones to 200 to 300 meters in length. This reduction 

and the 100 -meter interval between vehicles reduced 

the number of vehicles in the kill zone and the gun 

trucks, while in their infancy, bought time for the reaction 

forces to arrive. Few gun trucks had radios and the 

convoys still had maintenance vehicles bring up the rear.

Because the 88th Transportation Company ran 

convoys by itself, it ran with an average of 30 task 

vehicles escorted by three gun trucks and two gun 

jeeps used for command and control by the convoy 

commander and assistant convoy commander. The 

smaller convoys provided easier command and control 

as compared to the 60 to 70 vehicle convoys of the 

27th and 54th Transportation Battalions. Two to three 

gun trucks seemed the right number to defend the 

convoy in the kill zone. This would become the new 

policy for all of 8th Transportation Group.

O
Vietnam War 61

1969 Doctrine Change

OL Garland Ludy had assumed command of 

the 8th Transportation Group from Joe Bellino 

in September 1968 and commanded it until 

September 1969. He further refined the convoy doctrine. 

Knowing that air support or reaction force would arrive 

within ten minutes, the enemy would hit fast and hard 

then withdrawal before the air support would arrive. 

Kill zones became smaller, from 300 to 400 meters 

long so the enemy watched for trucks bunching up. 

Consequently, Ludy would fly over the convoys in his 

helicopter looking for flagrant violations of convoy 

interval. He also required that all convoy commanders be 

officers so if he found any bunching up, he would find the 

officer at his company the next morning and chew him 

out in such a way that he would not forget.140

Not only did the enemy tend to reduce the size 

and increase the intensity of the kill zones but they also 

began attacking the rear half of the convoy. Ludy also 

came up with a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 

for reaction to contact. Any trucks caught in the kill zone 

were to clear it as before. Those trucks ahead of the 

kill zone were to keep driving to the next security check 

point. However, all trucks behind the kill zone should 

stop and not drive through the kill zone in order to avoid 

creating a bottleneck. In the past the bottleneck effect 

resulted in more damage because more trucks entered 

and became disabled in the kill zone.141

By this time, 8th Transportation Group had also 

changed its convoy SOP to restrict the size of convoy 

serials to no more than 30 task vehicles which resulted 

in two convoy serials leaving with a 20 -minute interval 

between them. The gun truck ratio of 1:10 required three 

gun trucks for a serial of 30 vehicles, but the shortage 

of gun trucks caused some convoy serials to run with 

only two. By then all gun trucks had radios so they 

could communicate with each other and the 

convoy commanders. This allowed them to operate 

more independent of the convoy commander.142 

The procedure for reaction to contact required gun 

trucks to enter the kill zone and turn the fight back on 

the enemy as fast as they could. If any task vehicles 

were disabled, then the gun trucks would enter the kill 

zone and protect the vehicles and rescue any wounded 

or stranded drivers. The gun trucks remained in the 

companies and were more often assigned to platoons 

so that the élan of the crews did not cause them to 

lose their identification with the men they protected. 

The gun truck crews knew at the end of the day, they 

had to return barracks and face the men they escorted.

SP5 Steve Calibro, 523rd Transportation Company, 

1968 -1969, had trouble with new lieutenants as convoy 

commanders. They came in with little to no experience 

and took charge of soldiers who had been there for six 

or eight months and had survived numerous ambushes. 

These convoy commanders wanted to position a gun 

truck. Calibro reflected, “When shit is flying, you ain’t 

worried about positioning the son of a bitch.” Many 

gun truck crews felt that because each ambush was 

different, fights were not won by tactics, but superior 

fire power. “You just went in there and open fire on 

everything you can see or cannot see. You want to throw 

as much lead as you can. Half the time we did not see 

them. We wanted to unleash with everything we had and 

as much as we could put out there at one time.” They 

used spraying fire to suppress the enemy because half 

the time they could not see the enemy, which fired from 

the tree line, from behind rocks or even behind a water 

buffalo. Once after an ambush had ended, Steve looked 

over and saw a water buffalo with six legs and realized 

a Viet Cong soldier was hunched over walking behind it. 

The convoy commander was telling them to move on. 

Calibro said, “If you move on, somebody is going to get 

shot.” The gun truck crews felt the lieutenants did not 

always know what was going on and their tactics 

did not match the situation.143

All the gun truck crews interviewed felt the same 

way as Calibro about tactics. Officers wanting to discuss 

tactics offended most gun truck crew members. In the 

Second Golf War, 2003-2011, however, major emphasis 

was later placed on the development of tactics and 

the placement of gun trucks in the convoy and kill zone 

by the officers. LTC Edward McGinley, commander of 

the 24th Transportation during a tour in Kuwait, 2005-

2006, explained that the gun truck crews in Vietnam 

had to face every kind of threat, whether mines, small 

ambushes or large complex ambushes. Having to face 

every kind of threat, they could not study or develop 

tactics for everything, but the convoys driving in Iraq 

after 2005 faced primarily one type of attack – mines 

then better known as improvised explosive devices (IED). 

C
62 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

With one primary threat to contend with, the leaders 

could analyze patterns and develop tactics accordingly. 

This was not the case during the Vietnam War though.

When COL Ludy assumed command of the 8th 

Group, most gun trucks were 21⁄2 - ton trucks, some 

armed with a ring-mounted M -2 .50 caliber machine 

gun on the cab and two handheld or pedestal-mounted 

M-60s in the gun box. There were a few 5 -ton gun 

trucks with APC hulls added to the bed of the trucks. 

By then all gun trucks also had names and seemed to 

take on personalities as the design of each gun truck 

was left to the original crews. Each gun truck had a 

different configuration of armor. The gun truck’s name 

reflected the character of the crew and the truck. The 

crews were all volunteers selected by the former crews 

from among the best drivers. The crews began to 

improve their gun trucks like an infantryman improved 

his fighting position. They switched from 21⁄2-ton trucks 

to 5-tons which would allow for more armor, and they 

began to replace the M-60s with heavier machine guns. 

Ludy also had armor plating added to the doors of 

task vehicles.

Ludy, however, did not allow any elaborate 

decoration of the gun trucks. All had to be painted olive 

drab so they would blend in with the other task vehicles 

but he allowed the crews to stencil the names of their 

gun trucks on the side of the gun box, but some went 

a little further. Some cheated and added elaborate art 

work but it was rare. After COL Ludy gave up command 

of the 8th Group in Serptember 1969, the crews painted 

elaborate art work on the sides of their gun boxes and 

added varnish to the olive drab paint to make the color 

darker until they just painted the gun trucks black. From 

then on, ambushes would be described in terms of the 

gun trucks as if they were living things.

523rd Light Truck Company, 

Eve of Destruction and the  ́elan 

of the Vietnam Gun Truck

he names reflected the spirit of the crews and 

as the art work became fancier, it reflected 

their élan. The crews accepted greater risk 

in that when other drivers wanted to escape the kill 

zone, the gun trucks had to drive into the kill zone. 

Fortunately, every company had men who measured 

up to that challenge. Many of them had just finished 

light vehicle operator course and joined their company 

in Vietnam with less than a year in the Army. At that 

time promotions came fast and in a year, a 19 - year 

old kid could be an NCO in charge (NCOIC) of a gun 

truck making life and death decisions for his 

crew and the rest of the convoy.

SP4 Steve Calibro arrived in the 523rd 

Transportation Company in June 1968 and picked 

up a 21⁄2 -ton gun truck with no name. By then the 

523rd had already encountered ten major convoy 

ambushes that year. Deuce - and- a-halfs loaded 

with armor plates and sandbags, however, were very 

slow going up the mountain passes and could not 

keep up with the prime movers. As the new gun truck 

NCOIC, Steve wanted a more powerful 5 - ton gun 

truck. The company had 5 - ton cargo trucks and the 

few 21⁄2 - tons were administrative vehicles. So Steve 

supervised the building of the new gun truck. He had 

the original gun box lifted off the deuce - and- a-half 

and put on the bed of a 5 -ton. They then stacked 

up a single row of sandbags about two feet or knee 

high along the inside of the box with perforated steel 

planking (PSP) welded at the corners into an interior 

wall to hold the sandbags in place. Essentially the 

gun truck had a single wall of 1⁄4-inch steel plate 

that would only stop AK rounds except if they hit at 

an angle. The crew then placed the M -134 mini-gun 

ammunition cans along the walls on the sandbags 

and then surrounded them with sandbags. The cans 

held 4,000 rounds of 7.62mm for the M - 60, which at 

that time were still handheld since they did not have 

any pedestal mounts for them.144

Barry McGuire’s antiwar song, “Eve of 

Destruction,” was very popular at that time and 

Calibro named his new gun truck after it. A guy in the 

motor pool painted the name on the OD gun box in 

Old English style white letters with the red shadow. 

The same guy also painted Corps Revenge. Although 

COL Garland Ludy, who took command of 8th Group 

in September, did not like elaborate art work the Eve 

had no complaints from higher. They put the Eve of 

Destruction on the road 4 July 1968. At that time 

QL19 was still a dirt road all the way up An Khe Pass 

and Pleiku so trucks were still hitting mines. Gun 

trucks would have to pull over and secure the 

T
Vietnam War 63

damaged vehicle until a wrecker came up to recover it. 

 By that time, Calibro remembered the 523rd only 

had three gun trucks; Grim Reaper, Eve of Destruction 

and King Kong. King Kong was an APC gun truck. The 

APC gun truck was a death trap. There was no access 

from the cab to the APC hull as with a gun box so if 

the driver was wounded, no one could get to him. He 

would be helpless and no one could take over the 

driving. Initially the APC had only one .50 on the turret 

and the other guy in the hull was an ammo bearer.145

SGT John Burnell later rebuilt the Grim Reaper in 

December 1968 after it was destroyed in an ambush. 

He named it Corps Revenge after Ray “Corps” Hastings 

who was severely wounded on the gun truck, 54th 

Best (formerly the Gamblers), in the 13 November 

1968 ambush. A single layer of steel was bolted to the 

outside of an M - 54A1 5 - ton cargo truck with sandbags built up to the height of the bed of the truck.146

After a couple weeks, Calibro found a tripod on 

a jeep in the motor pool and decided to put a .50 cal 

on it in the middle rear of the gun box so he could fire 

rearwards, forward and to the sides. He set the tripod 

up and somehow found two .50s (that he was not 

supposed to have). Steve then took them down 

to the motor pool and had a guy weld a mount that 

would hold two .50s. Jerry L. Bailey was the driver 

and the gun truck still only had two gunners, newly 

promoted SP5 Calibro on the twin .50s and another 

M - 60 gunner. 

By the end of 1968, the 523rd had a total of 

five gun trucks, Eve of Destruction, King Kong, Corps 

Revenge, Ace of Spades and The Filthy Four. The 

5 - ton gun truck, Ace of Spades, was an identical twin 

of Eve with the same gun box design except it did not 

carry spare tires. Each had a driver, two gunners and 

a grenadier.147

COL Ludy felt the placement of the gun truck in 

the lead made it more vulnerable to land mines and 

the enemy usually initiated the ambush on the gun 

tuck. So in November 1968, he replaced the lead gun 

truck with a reconnaissance jeep, which would scout 

the terrain ahead of the convoy for signs of enemy 

and obstacles. A task vehicle then led the convoy 

serial and the gun truck varied its position in the 

march serial daily so the enemy could not anticipate 

its location in the convoy.148

A staff sergeant had been bugging SP5 Calibro to 

go out on the Eve for a ride. Steve did not remember 

what his job was, just that he always walked around 

the company area. On 13 November 1968, Calibro 

Corps Revenge parked next to Eve of Destruction.

Photo courtesy of James Lyles

True Grit was later renamed Black Widow.

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

King Kong. Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum
64 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

finally told him he could go as a “ride - along” on the 

run to An Khe. Steve warned him, “You’re an E6 and 

I’m an E5; before you get on you need to understand 

who is in charge of this truck. I’m taking no shit from 

you. It’s my truck. I’m in charge.” He acknowledged, 

“Okay, fine.”149

The convoy made it to An Khe without any 

problems. They went up with about 40 trucks but 

picked up more that had been waiting there over 

night. They may have had trouble unloading and were 

stuck overnight. The convoys to An Khe often returned 

with more trucks than they started. Calibro’s convoy 

was returning empty with about a hundred trucks and 

was almost at the bottom of the Pass, when the staff 

sergeant tapped the driver on the top of the head and 

told him, “You must be getting tired. Let me drive for 

a little bit.” They switched and the staff sergeant was 

not in the driver’s seat for five minutes when a rocket 

hit from the left - hand side right between the box 

and the cab. The explosion tore the staff sergeant’s 

legs up with shrapnel, blew the armor off the door, 

scattered the driver’s seat, blew the glass out and 

blew the 2X6 - inch wooden plank that went around 

the top and held the armor plating together back into 

the crew in the box. The truck drove off the road down 

into the grass on the right - hand side. Calibro yelled 

at the driver to get the truck out of there, but the staff 

sergeant was seriously wounded. The truck came to 

a stop in the grass about ten feet from a culvert that 

ran underneath the road near the Korean fire base on 

the right-hand side. As Calibro stood up and turned 

around, he saw about 60 to 70 NVA pouring out of the 

culvert. They approached to within a couple of feet 

of the Eve and then the crew started firing as fast as 

they could. It looked as if the NVA were going to come 

over the top of the truck when Steve heard gun fire. 

He looked up and saw a Quad .50 (possibly Bounty 

Hunter) come up and NVA scattered. The fight lasted 

so long that the whole bottom of truck was ankle deep 

in brass. He had even melted the barrel of the .50. 

and at that time he had no idea what it looked like 

when a barrel melted. He saw the red tracers floated 

up and down like a feather instead of flying straight. 

He thought that was weird, and wondered what was 

causing it to happen. He also double loaded an M -79. 

He fired a round and then heard “bloop,” loaded 

another round and heard “bloop,” then shoved third 

round in and it would not fit. He had two rounds stuck 

in the barrel.150

Steve did not see or remember what other gun 

trucks came into the kill zone because of the intensity 

of the fight and he was calling for “Dust off” on the 

radio at the same time. Calibro and his driver were 

wounded and the staff sergeant was killed. Only 

one gunner on the Eve was not hit. A helicopter 

medevaced the wounded out.151

The company motor sergeant worked all night 

to rebuild the Eve. He lifted box off with a crane and 

put it on another 5 -ton, put the armor on the doors 

and painted the same bumper number as the original 

truck. He wanted to put it back out on the road as if 

nothing had ever happened to it. Calibro was off duty 

for a week before he returned to his gun truck.152

After COL Ludy left in September 1969, the art work 

on the gun trucks became more elaborate. 

Ace of Spades had the same rear gun mount configuration 

as Eve of Destruction. Photos courtesy of the US Army 

Transportation Museum
Vietnam War 65

22 January 1969153

n 22 January 1969, the Eve of Destruction 

was escorting an empty convoy back. They 

had just cleared the bottom of the Pass and 

were about a mile down the road. The Eve was the tail 

gun truck and had a radio. SP5 Calibro heard another 

convoy behind his get hit at bottom of An Khe Pass. 

The Eve was the only gun truck from the lead convoy 

to go back to the kill zone. He saw four cargo trucks 

burning and four or five drivers laying on the road 

bleeding. There were also three to four gun 

trucks from that convoy. The ambush lasted a long 

time and Calibro had fired so many rounds through 

his twin .50s the barrels were hot. After the fight he 

pointed the barrels skyward and slipped in the pin to 

hold them up and the weapons kept firing. An officer 

(possibly a captain) who was the convoy commander 

yelled up at him, “I said cease fire!” Steve could not do 

anything about it because the rounds were cooking off. 

O

The officer wanted him to open the feed tray 

and pull out the belt. That could have caused a 

round to explode in his face so he told the officer, 

“Fuck you, if you want to open it up come up here 

and open it up, but I’m not going to.” Meanwhile, 

fighter jets then flew in. For entering the kill zone, 

SP5 Calibro and his crew, SP4 James E. Pulley 

and PFC Jackie W. Witten, earned ARCOMs with 

V device.154

14 February 1969

convoy of thirty -four 5 - ton cargo trucks, 

seven 21⁄2 - ton cargo trucks, five Han Jin 

(Korean contract) reefers, three Han Jin 

dry goods vans led by 1LT Jay M. Shelley, 512th 

Transportation Company, headed west from Qui Nhon 

toward Pleiku. The convoy was escorted by four gun 

jeeps and five gun trucks of the 523rd spaced evenly 

throughout the convoy. Eve of Destruction was the 

A
66 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

first gun truck and at 0925 hours, SP5 Calibro saw 

the smoke trail of a rocket coming at him from the 

left front, but at first did not know what it was. It flew 

over the driver side fender as if the enemy was trying 

to hit the front of the truck. It missed the cab, cleared 

the door and hit the steel plating on box right behind 

the driver’s head, and exploded in the box. The rocket 

surprisingly did not wound Calibro. The lead 5 -ton 

cargo truck, driven by SP4 Gary C. Mintz, came 

to a stop, causing the next 5 -ton and the Eve 

of Destruction behind it to stop. The gunners in 

the Eve swung their weapons around and engaged 

the enemy.155

The convoy was attacked from both sides of 

the road in an L- shaped ambush with rockets, 

satchel charges, automatic weapons and small 

arms by approximately 50 NVA soldiers along a 

400 -meter kill zone a half mile from Bridge 19. 

The enemy damaged the 5 -ton cargo truck with 

either a satchel charge or rocket. Immediately two 

gun trucks, Iron Butterfly and Ace of Spades, and two 

gun jeeps, one with 1LT Shelley, raced into kill zone 

and laid down suppressive fire to the south side of the 

road where the main enemy force was.156

An AK-47 round came across the left .50, nicked 

wooden hand grip and wounded Calibro in the arm. 

Cobra gunships arrived within 10 minutes and 1LT 

Shelley came, put Steve in his jeep and then hauled 

him to fire base where he waited for a helicopter while 

the ambush was still going on. The other gunner’s 

wounds were not very serious so he stayed in the 

Eve. The nearest infantry arrived with three APCs 

15 minutes after the ambush began and the enemy 

broke contact 25 minutes later at 1005 hours. The 

ambush lasted 40 minutes with one US driver, SP4 

David Leroy Bell, killed from the 512th, eight wounded 

(five from the 523rd, two from the 669th and one 

from the 512th) and five confirmed enemy killed. In 

addition to the initial damage to the 5 -ton cargo and 

Eve of Destruction, two 5- ton cargo, one 21⁄2 - ton 

cargo trucks, a gun jeep and one other gun 

truck were damaged.157

Calibro earned the Bronze Star Medal with V 

device for his actions during this ambush. One of the 

wounded was SP4 Bobby Newman and in less than 

a month he would be hit again.158

Iron Butterfly with two rear side mounted .50s and two forward side mounted M-60 machine guns. 

Photo courtesy of James Lyles
Vietnam War 67

4 March 1969

T Hutchins, of the 512th Transportation 

Company, led a 54th Transportation Battalion 

convoy to Pleiku and back. The convoy 

consisted of twenty- seven 5 -ton cargo trucks, ten 

21⁄2 -ton cargo trucks, three 5 -ton tractors and trailers, 

and one maintenance truck. Because this serial 

contained 41 task vehicles, it was escorted by four gun 

trucks and one gun jeep. On the return trip, Hutchin’s 

convoy march serial followed behind a convoy of 

28 cargo trucks led by LT Shelley of the 523rd.159

Hutchins’ convoy had just come down An Khe 

Pass and then turned north just before the turn 

onto the coastal plain. The road leveled out with the 

mountain on the west side of the road and a river 

following it on the east side. At 1730 hours, the 

enemy was concealed on both sides of the road and 

initiated the ambush with a B - 40 rocket fired at the 

lead cargo truck, which missed. This truck and the 

next four cargo trucks received small arms fire while 

they cleared the kill zone. The sixth vehicle, a gun 

truck, stopped in the kill zone to return fire and two 

additional gun trucks drove forward to assist in the kill 

zone while the remainder of the convoy did not enter 

the kill zone. Helicopter gunships arrived overhead 

within minutes and gun trucks from lead convoy 

serial also joined the fight. A total of five vehicles were 

damage and ten soldiers wounded. A sweep of the 

kill zone produced three enemy killed in action.160

The new convoy organization reduced the size of 

the convoy serial but gave each serial at least two gun 

trucks and a gun jeep for protection. So once the call 

for contact went out, gun trucks from other serials 

would race into the kill zone to assist. Eight gun trucks 

eventually converged in the kill zone looking for a 

piece of the action. While the convoys may have been 

strict about the interval while traveling, the gun trucks 

did not worry about it when they 

converged in the kill zone. Eight 

gun trucks occupied a space of 

300 meters less than 40 meters 

between gun trucks - a lot of fire 

power in a small space.

 The Eve of Destruction was 

rocketed four different times 

and had to be rebuilt each time. 

Steve never thought about it at 

the time but remembered years 

later, the convoy would pull over 

for a break, and the Vietnamese 

would walk up and down selling 

sodas. A few times they took 

pictures of the Eve and then the 

next day it would be hit about the 

same place they had stopped. 

Veterans told Steve that the Eve 

was almost always in the middle 

of the ambushes and never 

pulled away. 

SGT John D. Burnell, NCOIC 

of Corps Revenge, remembered 

his convoy passed the old 

petroleum pumping station at the 

bottom of An Khe Pass, which 

L
68 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

was guarded by four or five M42 Dusters 

of the 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery. The 

Eve of Destruction was the first gun 

truck and Corps Revenge was second in 

the middle. Burnell noticed something 

about 200 yards to his left and looked. 

A group of VC charged out of the tree 

line straight at the Dusters so fast the 

tracked vehicles did not have time to turn 

their twin 40mm anti- aircraft cannons on 

them. Burnell also saw the Eve halfway 

up the pass disappear over the crest the 

hill. Burnell popped a red flare and then 

told his driver to turn into the attack. The 

gunners fired at the VC while some of the 

Duster crews ran toward the gun truck. 

The fight was getting desperate when all 

of a sudden, Burnell saw the Eve heading 

toward the fight and he knew everything 

was going to be all right. The combined 

firepower of the two gun trucks drove 

the enemy back into the trees. The crew 

of the Eve had been watching for Corps 

Revenge to crest the hill, but when they 

saw the flare and heard the gun fire, 

they raced to the sound of the guns. 

The Eve had a reputation of being in 

all the fights.161

Corps Revenge was destroyed by an RPG in 

an ambush that killed its driver, Robert C. “Herm” 

Herman on 18 April 1969. The crew then renamed 

the gun truck, Herm’s Revenge.162

24 May 1969

n 24 May 1969, the Eve of Destruction 

escorted a convoy with some fuel tankers 

near “VC Village” almost into Pleiku. Eve was 

the first truck hit with a rocket and it coasted off to 

the side of road. The NVA then hit about four or five 

cargo trucks in front of Eve and the convoy came to 

a dead stop in the middle of the road. The drivers 

got out and returned fire with their M -16s. When the 

Eve rolled off the side of the road, Steve saw a driver 

lying in the ditch firing his M-16. The NVA fired tracers 

into fuel pipeline and caused it to leak burning fuel 

like a flame thrower right into a couple cargo trucks 

parked nearby, which set those trucks on fire. The 

NVA then came out and ran across the road in front 

of the Eve and one threw a satchel in another truck. 

The driver had already gotten out and the cab of the 

truck exploded. Because the NVA swarmed over the 

road in front of them from the driver’s side to the 

passenger side, the gunners of the Eve had to swing 

their guns around and fire into the trucks and then 

fired off of both sides of truck after some enemy ran 

across the road. With enemy on both sides of the road 

they had the convoy in a cross fire. Some were even 

hiding behind the cargo trucks up front. No other gun 

truck was hit except the Eve. Firing the .50s exposed 

him from the waist up, and Steve was hit three times 

in shoulder and chest by AK rounds but stayed in the 

fight. None of the other crew was hit.

The 8th Group Commander would fly overhead in 

a helicopter inspecting convoy interval, so high that 

Corp’s Revenge was renamed Herm’s Revenge.

Photos courtesy of John Burnell and James Lyles

O
Vietnam War 69

the drivers could only hear the rotor wash but not see 

the bird. During the ambush they had wounded and 

burning vehicles and the colonel was talking to them 

like he was on the ground. This pissed Calibro off and 

he thought, “I could shoot this fucker down with these 

.50s if he would just get close enough.” Five minutes 

after the kill zone was secured the colonel landed. 

After the ambush Calibro was medevaced to Pleiku 

earning his third Purple Heart Medal. His driver, PFC 

Thomas G. “Tom” Johnson, later told Steve he thought 

he was dead. The driver had not seen so much blood 

in the truck. 1LT Ronald C. Loveall and SP4 Vernon L. 

Branham received Bronze Star Medals with V Device 

for that ambush.163

On 28 May 1969, Steve Calibro was sent home 

due to wounds. He had 11 days left in country. He 

was flown into Japan, then Travis, and finally Letterman 

Army Hospital in San Francisco because he was 

from Concord, California. 

In June 1969, CPT Joseph McCarthy II assumed 

command of the 523rd Light Truck Company in a state 

of low morale. He only had about a platoon’s worth of 

drivers available for the road since the rest had less 

than 30 days to rotate home. He had to relieve his 

First Sergeant within the first two weeks and picked 

up 80 new Soldiers which he assigned to 2nd and 

3rd Platoons. He dumped all his bad apples in the 

1st Platoon.164

By then, SP4 Roger D. Champ had arrived in 

Vietnam but was initially assigned as COL Garland 

Ludy’s clerk typist but did not like the job, so after 

a couple weeks, he was transferred to the 523rd 

Transportation Company. He impressed CPT McCarthy 

as an ass -kicker and was assigned as platoon 

sergeant of 1st Platoon and promoted to acting 

sergeant. McCarthy assigned SGT Larry Cole, who 

arrived in September, as 2nd Platoon Sergeant and 

SSG Lee as the 3rd Platoon Sergeant, and tasked 

both to built gun trucks. The Eve of Destruction was 

about the only functioning gun truck left in the 523rd 

and had to cannibalize other trucks to stay on the 

road. Champ became the NCOIC of the Eve. McCarthy 

named Cole’s gun truck, True Grit, after a John Wayne 

movie, and Lee’s gun truck, Uncle Meat, named after 

a rock album by Frank Zappa of the underground blues 

band, “Mothers of Invention.” It was a kind of a head 

CPT Joseph McCarthy, was a fan of Frank Zappa’s 

underground blues band and named this gun truck 

after Zappa’s Album. 

Eve of Destruction.

Photos courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Black Widow with early art work. Photo courtesy of James Lyles
70 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

group and McCarthy did like his parties, but none 

of the upper brass ever made the connection. 

Uncle Meat was a brand new gun truck and True Grit 

was renamed Black Widow shortly after McCarthy 

left January 1970.165

4 January 1970

westbound convoy left the marshalling yard 

at Cha Rang Valley on the morning of 4 

January 1970 bound for An Khe and Pleiku 

along QL19. The convoy was divided into two serials 

of no more than 30 vehicles. Most ambushes took 

place in either of the two passes, An Khe or Mang 

Giang. Drivers felt rather safe in the coastal plain 

since the Republic of Korea (ROK) Tiger Division 

secured the area.166 

Three gun trucks escorted the lead serial of a 

27th Transportation Battalion westbound convoy. 

The convoy commander, LT James Himburg, rode in 

the front of the convoy jeep had twin 7.62 mm M73s 

machine gun. SGT Terrance Van Brocklin was the 

NCOIC of the 512th Transportation Company 5 -ton 

gun truck, Lady Be Good (former Sergeant Pepper II), 

which was lead gun truck. The middle gun truck came 

from the 27th Battalion with a crew thrown together 

for that mission. SGT Terrance Van Brocklin knew the 

NCOIC because he had ridden with the 27th before. 

Cold Sweat, from 669th Transportation Company, 

was the last gun truck with Parson as the NCOIC 

and the gunner was Pennington.167

The second serial of the 54th Battalion escorted 

by two gun trucks and one gun jeep followed 20 

minutes behind the first. SGT Champ was the NCOIC 

of the Eve of Destruction in the following serial. The 

Eve was a double -walled 5 - ton gun truck with two 

forward left and right .50s and dual-mounted .50s 

on a single pedestal in the rear. SSG Lee, 3rd Platoon 

Sergeant, was the NCOIC of Uncle Meat, which 

brought up the rear. Uncle Meat was also a standard 

5-ton gun truck but with three .50s, two forward and 

one rear.168 The weather was clear which would not 

impede aerial support or medevac.

The lead serial reached Hogson village south of 

Bridge 10 just below An Khe Pass. A couple hundred 

yards away on the south (left) side of the road was a 

small ridge surmounted with a Buddhist temple. The 

ridge dropped off into a rice paddy that stretched 

north of the road.169 This area secured by the Koreans 

where they never expected to be attacked. The enemy 

let the first part of the convoy pass and then someone 

in the village fired an RPG and hitting a glancing blow 

A

Rear view of gunbox of Eve of Destruction showing double 

wall and dual .50s. By this time, gun trucks carried as 

many ammo cans as would fill bed of the truck.

Forward view of the gun box of Eve of Destruction 

showing radio and side mounted .50s. Cold drinks 

were kept in the marmite can.

Photos courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum
Vietnam War 71

off the driver’s door of the middle gun truck; 

but it blew the hood half way off hanging on only 

by one of the hinges on windshield. Shrapnel also 

peppered the fender. It was followed by small arms 

fire. Van Brocklin did not remember the middle gun 

truck calling “Contact,” but the driver kept driving 

out of the kill zone.170

Cold Sweat then moved up from the rear and 

probably called “Contact.” Himburg was ahead of 

Lady Be Good when Van Brocklin heard the firing 

and told his driver to turn around go back into kill zone. 

Lady Be Good then met the gun truck from the 27th 

and blocked the road to stop them. The driver of the 

second gun truck had been a cargo driver for the last 

11 months and never been ambushed. He told the 

crew of Lady Be Good the VC were all over the place. 

Lady Be Good then drove ahead into the kill zone.171

As Lady Be Good came around corner, Van Brocklin 

could see Cold Sweat firing and there were bodies on 

the road. Lady Be Good then fired at an extreme angle. 

They fired at everything not seeing any enemy or where 

the firing came from. The enemy fired no more rockets 

but lots of small arms fire. Lady Be Good then focused 

its fire at a brick building in the village. Van 

Brocklin could then recognize the bodies 

on the road were Vietnamese civilians not 

Lady Be Good. Photo courtesy of James Lyles Cold Sweat - In 1969, COL Ludy had the yellow strip painted on the nose as recognition of 8th Group trucks. The 

523rd added the extra stripe after it went north in 1971.

Photos courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum and James Lyles

dressed like Viet Cong. There were only two gun trucks 

in kill zone at that time and they fired off more than a 

couple boxes of ammo before they lifted (ceased) their 

fire to listen. At that point LT Himburg’s jeep drove 

down into the kill zone. It seemed to be quiet for a 

moment and then Van Brocklin saw a man in black 

PJs run to the right from the edge of the village across 

an opening to the hill behind it. That was the only 

VC Van Brocklin identified and hit him while he 

was still in the grass.172

As LT Himburg continued into the kill zone small 

arms fire opened up on his gun jeep. The enemy 

fire knocked out his radio and machine guns, but 

miraculously did not hit Himburg or his driver, Rippee.173

At that moment the gun truck from the 27th 

returned. Everyone continued firing, which ended the 

fight pretty quickly. SSG Ronald Britton, the NCOIC 

of convoy, escorted the lead part of the convoy that 

was ahead of the kill zone on up the Pass. The gun 

truck crews discovered the wounded civilians on the 

road were women and LT Himburg gave Van Brocklin 

the frequency to call in a dustoff for the civilians. By 

policy, the American helicopters did not medevac 
72 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Vietnamese civilians, but Himburg ordered it anyway. 

Van Brocklin respected the Lieutenant for that 

decision. Van Brocklin called in the dustoff, and 

they asked where they were, were there any NVA, 

and asked if they had smoke to mark the landing 

zone. Van Brocklin threw a smoke grenade and 

the medevac helicopter landed.174

Van Brocklin had previously acquired three 

stretchers to sleep on if they had to rest over night 

(RON) at their destination. LT Himburg and Van 

Brocklin carried both women to the chopper on the 

stretchers. As the helicopter lifted off, they were 

This 20 November 1970 ambush occurred near Bridge 5 on the Coastal Plain, but the terrain closely resembled the 

ambush Bridge 10 on 4 January 1970. Photos courtesy of Larry Wolke
Vietnam War 73

immediately mortared from the hill. Once they had 

everyone accounted for, Himburg climbed on Lady 

Be Good to call in the preliminary report. The gun 

trucks then drove up the Pass to An Khe. At that 

point they switched frequencies since another 

unit had responsibility for securing that part of 

the road. The lead serial had no wounded.175

At that time they had no contact with the convoy 

serial behind them. Van Brocklin’s convoy had not 

called for help and did not know they were coming, 

so they knew nothing of what happened when that 

convoy entered the kill zone. They did not remember 

seeing the other two gun trucks when they arrived 

and considered the ambush over.176

Upon hearing “Contact,” the Eve of Destruction 

and Uncle Meat raced full throttle toward the kill zone. 

By the time they arrived the fight had gone on for 

half an hour or more. SGT Roger Champ remembered 

seeing several task vehicles, both gun trucks and 

the gun jeep were shot up. The two new gun trucks 

maneuvered around the disabled vehicles. Evidently 

the ambush started over again because mortar and 

rocket fire fell like rain drops but fell short in the rice 

paddy. This was the worst ambush that SGT Champ 

had ever seen. As soon as he reached the kill zone, 

he called in helicopter gunships from An Khe, but 

they reported that they were “socked in” by weather. 

Champs saw no clouds in the sky.177 

The Eve nosed itself into position at a 45 degree 

angle in the kill zone and stopped behind a disabled 

vehicle. This allowed all machine guns to fire forward. 

SGT Champ saw puffs of smoke in the temple and 

fired at it. A 21⁄2 - ton truck from the 4th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized), which had infiltrated the 

convoy, tried to run the kill zone. As it maneuvered 

around the Eve off the road on the north side, 

a B - 40 rocket disabled it wounding the driver. 

The gunners fired continuously.178 

They had been in the kill zone for about an hour 

when a mortar round hit near the edge of Champ’s 

gun truck and shrapnel blew a gunner, Tony Inuchi, 

out of the gun box onto the pavement between 

the gun truck and disabled truck in front of them. 

Champ jumped down to rescue him and examined 

the gunner’s wounds. The gunner had worn his flak 

vest open and received a sucking chest wound. As 

Champ bent over to administer first aid, pieces of 

asphalt began hitting him in his face. For the first 

time he realized that they were also receiving small 

arms fire. When he looked up he assumed that the 

only place the small arms fire could come from was 

the banana grove that ran along the irrigation ditch a 

couple hundred yards away. Champ then dragged the 

wounded gunner around to safety behind the truck. 

He also dragged a wounded Vietnamese man who 

unfortunately was caught in the kill zone. He then 

climbed back into the gun box and directed the 

other gunners to fire into the banana grove. Suddenly 

enemy soldiers rose up and began running away. 

To their shock, the Koreans had secretly positioned 

themselves behind the enemy and cut them down. 

This broke the enemy attack. According to his award 

citation the ambush had lasted three hours.179 

A Huey gun ship finally arrived at 1000 hours 

after the fighting died down. He had put in a call for 

a medevac but none would respond. He then called 

down the Huey gunship and loaded the wounded 

gunner, a Vietnamese man, and the wounded 4th 

Infantry Division soldier in the Huey. The Infantry 

driver told Champ that he had just reenlisted. Since 

all the tires of the Eve were shot out, a tire tire truck 

came up and the crew of the Eve replaced the tires. 

Any trucks that could not be repaired on the road 

were hooked up to a bobtail (tractor without 

a trailer) and towed.180 

When the lead serial arrived at Pleiku, LT Himburg 

had Parsons and Van Brocklin accompany him to fill 

out supplements to his official ambush report. They 

reported to an underground bunker. Someone must 

have closed the road that day so his convoy returned 

to Qui Nhon the next day.181 When the convoy rode 

past the same area, the Koreans had stacked all the 

enemy dead alongside the road to show the truck 

drivers, a common practice of the Koreans. They 

were proud and liked to show the Americans their kills 

before they burned them. There were so many dead 

that it took a truck load of fuel to later burn them.182

CPT Joseph McCarthy II, Commander of the 523rd 

Transportation Company, submitted SSG Lee and SGT 

Champ for the Silver Star Medals mainly for picking 

up Vietnamese rice farmers and loading them into the 

gun trucks to prevent them from getting killed by VC 
74 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

crossfire during the ambush. Very rarely did 

truck drivers receive valor awards, so CPT McCarthy 

wrote a six-inch or thicker award packet to 

compensate for this drawback and both received 

the valor medals.183

Lesson

The enemy had taken advantage of attacking in an area 

where the drivers relaxed their guard. The availability 

of air support and response time of the local combat 

arms usually limited most ambushes to no more than 

15 minutes. The delayed response by attack helicopters 

and apparent absence of the Korean Tiger Division 

inspired the enemy to fight longer. 

Since the enemy reduced the size of the kill 

zones they tended to let the lead trucks pass 

and attack the middle or rear of the convoy. The 

organization of the convoy into serials of 20 to 30 

vehicles kept at least two gun trucks within supporting 

distance. In most of the ambushes the gunners rarely 

could identify from where the enemy small arms fire 

came, so they employed spraying fire in every direction 

hoping to hit the enemy. Fortunately, SGT Champ 

was able to make positive identification of the enemy 

location and directed the fire of the other gunners 

onto that location. It was a question of superior and 

accurate fire of .50 caliber machine guns that turned 

back the enemy and the Korean soldiers that were 

maneuvering to flank the enemy were in position 

prevented the enemy from escaping.184

New NCOIC

n February 1969, Harrison “Bud” Whitehead 

arrived in Qui Nhon and started out as a stevedore 

in the 205th Transportation Company, but the call 

went out for volunteers for gun trucks so he joined 

the 523rd about the time Champ left and became the 

NCOIC of the Eve of Destruction. The chassis of the 

Eve had been destroyed by a RPG so they put the gun 

box on a brand new 5 - ton chassis. Lulu’s song, “To Sir 

with love,” had been a big hit in 1967, and Bud liked it, 

so he had “To Charles (revering to the VC) with Love” 

painted on the bumper as a joke and fastened 

a rubber hand raising the middle finger on the bumper. 

By that time, the Eve gun box had two front left and 

right .50 caliber machine guns as well as the twin .50s 

mounted on the back. While other gun trucks had three 

gunners, the Eve still only had two. The front gunner 

switched between the right and left gun. It mounted an 

AN/VRC -12185 radio for communication. While on the 

Eve, Bud participated in at most three ambushes. 

About this time the rumor spread that the enemy 

had a bounty on gun trucks, probably because they 

targeted gun trucks first. The kill zones were smaller 

and more lethal, so only three vehicles might enter 

a 300 -meter kill zone. Therefore it made sense for 

the enemy to disable a gun truck first, since the next 

gun truck was probably ten vehicles away. Because 

some gun trucks like the Eve were hit more often 

than others, the crews believed some had higher 

bounties. In response, the crews wanted their trucks 

to stand out from the rest. Consequently, the artwork 

became bolder and nearly every truck driver wanted 

to take a picture of them, which added to the 

élan of the crews. 

In November 1969, Bud Whitehead recruited 

Gerald Merdutt as a gunner on the Eve. Bud wanted 

some seasoned veterans on his gun truck, and 

Gerald had been in the 523rd since September and 

was slightly wounded in an ambush. After Bud left in 

February 1970, Merdutt became the NCOIC of the Eve 

and left Vietnam in September 1970. The next crew 

of the Eve of Destruction took it north to I Corps in 

January 1971 for Operation Lam Son 719.

While every other driver’s job was to escape 

the kill zone, the job of the gun truck crews was 

to race into it. This required a special type of man 

willing to accept risk to save fellow drivers. They 

received no extra pay or benefits, only the pride 

of serving on a gun truck. Consequently they 

expressed that pride in the name and artwork 

on the side of their gun truck. Knowing the enemy 

had a bounty on their gun trucks, they had a sense 

of bravado and wanted their truck to stand out in 

defiance of the enemy. The gun truck reflected the 

crew, so the NCOIC ran the gun truck and picked 

his crew. If anyone did not measure up or hid from 

a fight, he was removed from the gun truck. So 

only the best drivers aspired to and manned gun 

trucks. They had an élan that would stay with 

them for the rest of their lives.

I
Vietnam War 75

The quote “To Charles with Love” was a twist on the popular 1967 movie titled, “To Sir with Love.” Charles in this case 

referred to the Viet Cong, commonly referred to us as “VC” or “Victor Charlie” or just “Charlie.” Just above the quote 

was placed a rubber hand raising the middle finger. Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportion Museum

140Joseph McCarthy email to Richard Killblane, June 27, 2007. 141Ibid. 142Ludy, “8th Transportation Group.” 143Steve Calibro telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

14 February 2008.

144Calibro interview. 145The 1968 unit history report stated the 523rd had five gun trucks with 

a crew of four. The 1969 History Report mentioned their names: King 

Kong, Ace of Spades, Uncle Meat, Eve of Destruction, and True Grit. 

1LT Robert M. Wills, Unit History, 523rd Transportation Company (Lt Trk), 

1 January 1969 to 31 December 1969, 23 March 1970.

146James Lyles, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks, Quezon City, 

Philippines: Planet Art, 2002.

1471LT Harris T. Johnson III, Unit History, 523rd Transportation Company 

(Lt Trk), 1 January 1968 to 31 December 1968, 31 January 1969.

148Ludy, “8th Transportation Group.” 149Calibro interview. 150Ibid. 151Ibid. 152Ibid. 153Based upon the date on SGT Steve Calibro’s award citation, and 

1969 523rd Unit History Report.

154Calibro interview. Date and award verified in the 1969 523rd Unit 

History Report. The report also listed two other soldiers, SP4 James E. 

Pulley and PFC Jackie W. Witten, as having earned the ARCOM with 

V that same day. They were probably on Calibro’s crew. 1969 

523rd Unit History Report.

155Calibro interview; and Ludy, “8th Transportation Group.” 156Calibro interview, Ludy, “8th Transportation Group;” and LTC William R. 

Saber, Operational Report of the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck), 

WFR6AA, for Period Ending 30 April 1969, 5 May 1969. 157Calibro interview, and Ludy, “8th Transportation Group.” The 1969 

523rd Unit History listed five wounded in action during this ambush 

but not Calibro.

1581969 523rd Unit History. 159Ludy, “8th Transportation Group;” and Saber, Operational Report. 160Ludy, “8th Transportation Group;” and Saber, Operational Report. 161James Lyles, The Hard Ride: Vietnam Gun Trucks; Part Two, n.p., 

2011; and Calibro interview.

162Lyles, The Hard Ride. 1631969 523rd Unit History. 164Joseph McCarthy II email to Richard Killblane, June 20-27, 2007. 165McCarthy interview; and Roger D. Champ interview by Richard 

Killblane, at Branson, MO, 18 June 2005.

166Champ interview. 167Terrance Van Brocklin telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

3 May 2011.

168Champ interview. 169Ibid. 170Van Brocklin interview. 171Ibid. 172Ibid. 173Ibid. 174Ibid. 175Ibid. 176Ibid. 177Champ interview, 18 June 2005 and telephone interview 

1 September 2005.

178Champ telephone interview. 179Champ interview 18 June 2005 and telephone interview 

1 September 2005.

180Ibid. 181Van Brocklin interview. 182Champ interview 18 June 2005 and telephone interview 

1 September 2005.

183Joseph McCarthy email to Richard Killblane, June 27, 2007. 184Champ telephone interview. 185Army Navy/Vehicle Radio Communications (two way). 
76 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Hairpin

ight before reaching the crest of An Khe Pass 

the incline steepened requiring the road to 

snake into a hairpin turn that slowed traffic 

to a crawl of about 4 mph whether climbing up hill 

or even going downhill and 2 mph negotiating the 

turn itself. After negotiating the hairpin turn the road 

straightened out and then curved to the left as it 

crested the Pass. Even after negotiating the hairpin 

convoys could not speed up for fear of creating too 

much of a gap between vehicles still crawling up 

the mountain side. Consequently, the convoys had 

to continue the slow speed above the Pass making 

them very vulnerable to attack going into the hairpin 

and coming out. For this reason the turn was called 

the Devil’s Hairpin and Dead Man’s Curve.186

A Republic of Korea (ROK) reinforced company 

had responsibility for the sector and established 

QL19 looking west up An Khe Pass. Devil’s Hairpin is on the top left corner before the road passed over the mountain. 

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

R

security check points throughout the pass. The 

next three examples show how the enemy tried 

to ambush convoys in that small area, all within 

a couple of months.187

During 1969, COL Ludy had most of the mountain 

side defoliated leaving only scattered trees near the 

hairpin to deny the enemy concealment. The steep 

slope was strewn with boulders and by the next 

year patches of brush and elephant grass grew 

back that hid the enemy from observation making 

An Khe Pass dangerous place for ambushes. 

In spite of the defoliation, the enemy still 

conducted ambushes.

Fortunately by January 1970, all task vehicles of 

the 8th Transportation Group had a sheet of armor 

plating placed in the window wall and under the 

driver’s seat to protect them from small arms fire. 

This allowed drivers to remain in their trucks when 

halted in the kill zone and move immediately upon 
Vietnam War 77

the direction of the convoy commander. Without the 

armor plating, the drivers had to exit their vehicles and 

take cover. This improvement enabled the trucks to 

exit the kill zone faster.188

During 1969, the enemy ambushed nine 

convoys in and around the Hairpin, and the next year 

ambushed five convoys in that same area. A convoy 

of the 54th Transportation Battalion was hit on 

1 April 1970, and convoys of the 27th Transportation 

Battalion were ambushed on 10 January, 6 May, 10 

and 15 June 1970. By this time, the convoy SOPs 

and gun truck tactics 

were well tested, so 

the following three 

ambushes illustrate 

the different ways the 

enemy used that terrain 

to ambush convoys.189

1 April 1970

54th Transportation 

Battalion

y 1970, the 

523rd had five 

gun trucks; Eve 

of Destruction, King 

Kong, Uncle Meat, Ace 

of Spades, Black Widow 

and the Matchbox. 

The Matchbox began 

construction in January 

1970 and was finished 

in February. It had 

armor plating 18 inches 

higher than average 

inside the bed of the 

5 - ton cargo truck 

and PSP inside armor. 

The gun box also had 

room for extra tires 

in the back. It initially 

mounted two M - 60s in the front corners and a single 

M -2 .50 caliber machine gun center rear. It later 

ended up with three .50s, one forward behind the 

cab and two mounted on the side gun walls.190

On 1 April 1970, two westbound convoy serials 

headed up towards An Khe Pass. The gun trucks of 

the 512th escorted the lead serial that morning and 

Iron Butterfly was the rear gun truck of the first serial. 

It was the standard double walled 5 - ton gun truck 

with a left rear side mounted .50 instead and two 

forward mounted M - 60s. Matchbox and Uncle Meat 

of the 523rd escorted the second serial. They liked 

to work together, and the Matchbox liked to ride in 

the middle while Uncle Meat brought up the rear. The 

driver of Matchbox carried an M -79 grenade launcher 

and the crew had M -16s and fragmentary grenades. 

Uncle Meat also had three .50 cals, two front right 

and left and one rear pedestal mounted. Uncle Meat 

was also a maintenance gun truck with spare tires. 

B
78 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Both gun trucks had 

RT- 524/VRC vehicle 

radios. The convoy 

commander drove up 

and down the convoy 

serial in his gun jeep to 

supervise the interval. 

All were standard 5 -ton 

gun trucks and carried as 

much ammunition as 

would fit in the bed of 

the gun box.191

As the second convoy 

serial approached the 

Hairpin, the gun truck 

crews were alert as they 

always expected trouble there. As Iron Butterfly 

made the turn into the Hairpin in An Khe Pass, an 

enemy soldier directly ahead fired an RPG and hit Iron 

Butterfly right in the hood. Iron Butterfly then rolled 

into ditch where it remained and put up a fight. The 

enemy was directly above the Hairpin turn and along 

the high ground to its right. They shot up four to five 

5 -ton cargo trucks but only wounded one driver. 

The vehicles that could drove through the kill zone 

to camp at An Khe under the escort of the lead 

512th gun truck.192

 As soon they saw Iron Butterfly laying down heavy 

machine gun fire, the crew of Matchbox called in, 

“Contact, Contact, Contact!” Matchbox then drove 

up to assist the trucks left in the kill zone. Someone 

made the decision for 

the trucks behind the kill 

zone to turn around and 

head back down to Cha 

Rang Valley. When some 

of the 5 -ton tractors 

towing 105 howitzers 

on trailers turned around, 

they backed the tubes 

into the side of the 

mountain causing them 

to flip upside down. The 

Matchbox had a hard 

time dodging the trucks 

and bouncing 105s to 

get up into the kill zone. 

When it did the crew of the Matchbox asked the crew 

of the disabled Iron Butterfly if they wanted to leave 

their truck. They did not, but had fired off almost all 

their ammunition. So the Matchbox crew gave them 

some .50 ammunition and proceeded on up around 

the Hairpin sticking close to the left side of the road 

in order to make the turn as quickly as possible. As 

they cleared the Hairpin turn, three mortar rounds 

hit near them, but just over the edge of the drop -

off. A wounded driver waved the Matchbox down. He 

had been peppered by shrapnel across his left side 

from the leg to his head by an RPG that hit the cargo 

bed just behind his cab. The gunners continued to 

exchange fire with the enemy while he climbed in the 

gun truck. The Matchbox then took him to the top of 

The Match Box had front right and left .50s and one rear 

.50 caliber machine gun.

Space for spare tires made The Match Box or maintenance gun truck which usually brought up the rear of the 

convoy. Photos courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Iron Butterfly with four .50 caliber machine guns.
Vietnam War 79

the Pass for a medevac then returned to clean up the 

ambush site. By then the enemy had broken contact 

and the gunners in Matchbox were completely out 

of ammunition.193

Uncle Meat drove up with the Korean reaction 

force walking in behind it. Uncle Meat then gave Iron 

Butterfly a push and it started. Iron Butterfly then 

drove up the Pass on its own power. Surprisingly, 

Koreans soldiers climbed out of the ditch where 

the ambush had taken place and used Uncle Meat 

for cover as they accompanied it up the Pass.194

View of the Hairpin from above.

Approaching the hairpin turn from below revealing the 

absence of trees. Photos courtesy of Ron Voithritter

Lesson

The enemy had initiated the ambush with an RPG 

on the gun truck in the rear of the convoy following by 

small arms and automatic fire. They had selected the 

Hairpin where the traffic had to slow down to 4 mph 

and had trouble not bunching up. The high ground 

above the road leading up over the Pass also allowed 

the enemy to shoot right down on the convoys and 

Larry Fiandt, driver of Matchbox during the ambush, 

always felt vulnerable making that turn.

Since the element of surprise allowed the enemy 

to destroy at least one vehicle, the NVA soon learned 

to take out the gun truck first. Dividing convoys into 

serials of 20 to 30 vehicles driving within supporting 

distance proved to be a wise decision. This allowed 

the Matchbox from the next serial to reinforce Iron 

Butterfly in the kill zone until Uncle Meat brought 

up the Korean infantry.

10 June 1970

54th Transportation Battalion

t 0845 hours on 10 June 1970, the lead 

element of a 17- vehicle westbound convoy 

reached the Hairpin just below the An 

Khe Pass and traffic slowed to a crawl. About 200 

meters below the hairpin turn to the east, a low ridge 

extended southward that caused the road to curve 

at that location. The ground then rose slightly on 

the south side of the road.

The lead vehicle reached the Hairpin as the 

convoy crawled at about three to five miles per hour. 

An NVA soldier stood up on a slight rise to the south 

side of the road further back and opened fire with his 

AK- 47 from approximately 25 meters away hitting the 

engine and shooting out several tires a refrigeration 

(reefer) van. Regardless, the driver continued to drive 

his rig for about 100 meters when another enemy 

soldier fired a B-40 rocket into the rear of his van. The 

driver still managed to drive his rig out of the kill zone. 

The convoy then came under enemy fire with small 

arms and automatic weapons from both sides of the 

road along a 200 -meter kill zone and upon hearing 

the initial firing, the convoy commander led the first 

half of the convoy to the top of the pass. A gun truck 

and armored maintenance truck headed for the kill 

A
80 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

zone to lay down suppressive fire.195

The enemy had a heavy machine gun on a small 

knoll 200 meters south of the curve and the rest fired 

small arms and RPGs from 25 meters from the road. 

The enemy on a slight rise on the south side of the 

road poured heavy volume of small arms fire into the 

40-foot Low Boy trailer, of the 444th Medium Truck 

Company, that was following directly behind the reefer 

van and disabled it. PFC Billy D. Wehunt, of the 444th 

Medium Truck Company, then drove his 5 - ton tractor 

into the kill zone in an attempt to clear drivers out of 

the kill zone. As he approached the disabled Low Boy, 

the enemy fired into his cab killing him and his tractor 

drove off the side of the road.196

 At the same time, a 444th gun truck drove into 

the kill zone to recover Wehunt from his vehicle, and 

came under intense small arms fire from above. Two 

MP V100 armored cars arrived and the gun truck crew 

again tried to recover the body of their fellow driver, 

but intense enemy fire forced the men back into 

their vehicles. Finally, two more gun trucks from the 

following convoy arrived and the combined fire power 

of five gun platforms provided enough covering fire for 

the recovery of PFC Wehunt’s body. The enemy broke 

contact at 0945 hours, an hour after the ambush had 

started. The gun trucks checked all areas of the kill 
Vietnam War 81

View of the kill zone above the hairpin where the reefer 

van was hit. Defoliation had killed off almost all the trees.

Photo courtesy of Ron Voithritter

zone for more personnel then proceeded to the top of 

the Pass. Helicopter gunships arrived after the convoy 

cleared the kill zone and worked the area. Korean 

soldiers conducted a sweep of the area after the 

gunships completed their runs. The Americans

 had lost one man killed, four wounded with three 

vehicles damaged.197

Lesson

The enemy selected a kill zone that provided elevation 

on both sides of the road where the convoy would slow 

down as the lead element entered the hairpin turn. The 

intensity of the small arms fire down into road on the 

north side took away the advantage of the steel wall 

of the gun box so the gun truck could not enter the kill 

zone without tremendous risk. It took the combined 

fire power of three gun trucks and two V100 armored 

cars to turn the fight back on the enemy or possibly 

the enemy just ran out of ammunition after an hour 

of fighting. The Koreans tried to deter further 

ambushes by establishing a prepared position 

near the hairpin curve.198

15 June 1970

27th Transportation Battalion

PT Ronald Voightritter had been detailed to 

the Infantry for two years prior to changing 

to the Transportation Corps. He arrived in 

Qui Nhon in September 1969 and was initially 

assigned to the S -3 shop of the 27th Transportation 

Battalion. Around February 1970, he was given 

command of the 597th Transportation Company 

(Reefer). The 597th handled all the Reefer 

commitments for 8th Group and any tractor that 

did not have a reefer van hauled a regular cargo 

trailer. The company was short officers so he rode on 

convoys as the convoy commander about every three 

days and had never seen any contact prior to this 

ambush. The 597th had four gun trucks: King Cobra, 

Sir Charles, Poison Ivy, Blood Sweat and Tires. 

 15 June 1970, CPT Voightritter was assigned 

the convoy commander of a 39 -vehicle convoy to An 

Khe and Pleiku. The task vehicles consisted of four 

lowboys, four reefers, seven roll- on/roll- off vehicles 

(commercial Sealand vans) off Landing Ships, Tank 

(LST), four Express vans with high priority cargo, and 

19 flat beds from the 2nd, 444th and 597th Medium 

Truck Companies. He had no particular line up for 

the tucks other than the order they were lined up by 

the night shift at the marshalling yard. For escort he 

had two gun jeeps, the APC gun truck King Cobra 

with three .50s from his company and the 5 - ton 

maintenance gun truck, The Saint, from the 444th. 

The Saint had a forward M -134 mini-gun, and two 

left and right front M - 60s. He also had one wrecker 

and bobtail from his company. He placed the gun 

jeep with the NCO up front, King Cobra in the middle, 

The Saint in the rear behind a bobtail and the 21⁄2 -

ton maintenance truck loaded with tires since it was 

a maintenance gun truck. As the convoy commander, 

Voightritter always rode in the rear from where he 

could drive up and down the convoy to control 

the convoy.199

Unfortunately, his regular gun jeep was with a 

convoy that had remained overnight at Pleiku and he 

was assigned gun jeep #66, which they kept off the 

road because it had maintenance problems. In fact, 

it broke down soon after the convoy cleared the gate; 

C
82 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

so he went back and borrowed 

the S -3’s jeep. It had no 

pedestal mount for the M - 60, 

so Voightritter tossed the M - 60 

in the back seat with three to 

four cans of ammunition. His gun 

jeep only had him and the driver, 

SP4 Calvin Wood, both with their 

M -16s in the gun racks and an 

extra M -79 grenade launcher.200

Since Voightritter’s regular 

assigned jeep and driver were 

up at Pleiku, he asked for Calvin 

Wood as his driver that day. 

Wood was the 3rd Platoon jeep 

driver. Voightritter had ridden 

with him several times 

in the past and considered 

him one of the best drivers 

in the company.201

 Voightritter had called 

in the check points but heard 

no acknowledgement on the 

radio, which caused him to fear 

the radio on the S -3 jeep did 

not work. Prior to reaching the 

Hairpin, he drove up the convoy 

ensuring everyone had the proper 100 -meter interval 

and their flak jackets and helmets on. He then fell 

back to the rear of the convoy. He was about 200 

meters from the turn when he heard a boom directly 

above him followed by small arms fire. Thinking it 

was a mortar round, he immediately called, “Contact, 

Contact, Contact!” on the radio, then placed the M -79 

in Wood’s lap, and climbed into the back seat to fire 

the M - 60. He then yelled at Wood, “Go,” but Wood, 

who had been in several ambushes, had already hit 

the accelerator and raced into the kill zone propelling 

the captain into the back seat against the radio. As 

they came around the turn, Voightritter fired off one 

burst of the M - 60 at the hill above him and the hot 

spent cartridges hit Wood’s helmet and bounced down 

into the collar of his flak jacket causing him to yell in 

pain. Voightritter fired off three more bursts from the 

M - 60 then it jammed so he climbed back into the 

passenger’s seat, grabbed his M -16 from the rack 

View showing gun and crew postitions on King Cobra.

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum
Vietnam War 83

and squeezed the trigger. Voightritter had never been 

in contact before nor fired a round in his nine months 

in Vietnam, so there was no round in the chamber. Not 

sure of why the M-16 failed to fire, he then grabbed 

Wood’s M -16 and fired it.202 

The explosion had been an RPG that hit the 

second to last reefer and stopped it in the road. 

The last reefer was passing it when Wood and 

Voightritter rounded the turn. The Korean soldiers in 

the sandbagged check point in the turn were firing up 

the hill above them. Wood drove the gun jeep between 

the two trucks and as he did the driver of the truck 

passing was hit by small arms fire and went in the 

ditch up against the embankment. Four rounds of 

automatic fire had hit the cab of PFC Ronald Manning’s 

truck; the armor plate in the door stopped three but 

one had come through the canvas top and hit him. 

Those that could drove up to the top of An Khe Pass. 

The Saint entered the kill zone and stopped next 

to the first disabled reefer while King Cobra was 

backing down into the kill zone both laying down 

suppressive fire.203

All the task vehicles made it to the top of the 

Pass except two trucks, so CPT Voightritter had Wood 

drive them back down into the kill zone looking for 

the drivers of the two trucks. Wood stopped his jeep 

behind Manning’s rig in the ditch. While still under 

fire, Voightritter got out and ran to the passenger 

side door but it was locked, so he ran around to 

the driver’s side and opened the door. Manning 

was slumped over and showed no signs of life. About 

that time, Wood climbed up over the armor plate 

and opened the passenger door from the inside. 

Voightritter then laid Manning down in the seat and 

slid him over so Wood could pull him out. They loaded 

him in the back seat of the jeep and then Voightritter 

ran down to the second truck. He slipped on the 

asphalt, slid down to the truck and grabbed the door 

handle. He then opened the door and saw no one 

was there. Wood yelled he had already checked the 

cab. They drove back up the pass to the check point 

at the bridge to evacuate the driver. When Wood had 

exited his jeep, he did not know the M -79 fell in the 

road so he left it. The infantry that swept the kill zone 

later found it. Driving they saw an M -16 in the road, 

so Voightritter told Wood to stop. Voightritter picked 

up the M -16 and fired it from the kneeling position in 

the passenger seat in his jeep. A helicopter happened 

to fly by and see the ambush. It then landed in front 

of the jeep at the top of the pass and they loaded up 

Manning for a flight to An Khe.204

While all this was going on at least one gun 

truck and one gun jeep from an eastbound convoy 

Voightritter’s had passed at the bottom of the Pass 

had come up to help. The crew of the jeep was 

already talking to battalion so Voightritter used their 

radio to talk to battalion. The first thing Battalion said 

was, “Where to hell have you been?” Voightritter took 

this as an offense as if he had not been doing his job. 

He then explained he had one KIA and one MIA, and 

two gun trucks still in the pass. They told him to go 

back, find the missing driver, break contact and get 

the gun trucks out of the kill zone. He and Wood then 

King Cobra and crew of the 597th Transportation 

Company. Photo courtesy of Ted Biggins

The Saint was maintence truck from the 444th Transportation Company. It brought up the rear of the convoy.

Photo courtesy of James Lyles
84 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

made a third pass through the kill zone to get the gun 

trucks to break contact. At the top of the pass they 

recieved some additional fire from the VC but the 

gun trucks suppressed it.205

Voightritter then led his convoy to An Khe. At 

the next bridge he discovered one of his reefers. 

A rocket had ripped open the cab and it was hit by 

11 automatic rounds wounding the driver in the leg, 

but he had driven to the top of the pass where a 

“shot gun” riding in an engineer low boy that had 

tagged alone with their convoy, got out and drove 

the wounded driver’s rig up to the bridge. The 

infantry at the bridge treated the wounded driver 

and had called in a medevac for him.206

Coincidently, the NCO in the lead gun jeep had 

crossed over the top of the Pass and switched his 

radio frequency to the next security net before the 

ambush started so he had no knowledge of the 

ambush behind him. So the 88th Transportation 

Company sent gun trucks out of An Khe to chase 

down the front half of the convoy down and bring it 

back to An Khe. The convoy spent a couple of hours 

getting reorganized and taking care of things regarding 

the wounded. Voightritter found the missing driver 

was at the hospital with minor wounds. A rocket had 

disabled his truck and wounded him with shrapnel,so 

he jumped on one of the passing trucks. Manning, on 

the other hand, was pronounced dead and the medics 

asked Voightritter to identify the body.207 

The convoy reorganized in the motor pool of 

the 88th Transportation Company and continued its 

mission to Pleiku. It received some mortar rounds in 

the Mang Giang Pass, which did not hit anything so 

the convoy kept moving on. It did not arrive at Pleiku 

until about 1500 hours so the drivers remained 

overnight (RON) there and returned to Phu Tai 

the next morning.208 

Two vehicles were damaged with one soldier 

killed and three wounded in the ambush that lasted 

35 minutes. The two damaged vehicles were left in 

the pass to be recovered later. It took place above 

the Hairpin where the last ambush occurred five days 

earlier. CPT Voightritter received the Silver Star Medal 

for his actions and SP4 Wood was awarded the 

Bronze Star Medal with V device.
Vietnam War 85

Top left: CPT Ron Voightritter, Commander of the 597th Transportation Company. Left center: SP4 Calvin Wood one of 

the best drivers in the company. Left bottom: Damage done to the reefer van by the RGP. Top: CPT Voightritter’s gun jeep 

was on another convoy 15 June so he had to use another jeep with no pedestal mount for the M-60. Above left: View 

of last turn before the Hairpin showing QL 19 above turning back to cross over the mountain. Above right: This was the 

view CPT Voightritter would have seen of the kill zone above him.

Photos courtesy of Ron Voithritter
86 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Lesson 

Voightritter believed the armor plating of drivers’ 

doors and the action of the gun trucks were a major 

life saver for 8th Group truckers. He felt the interval 

reduced the number of vehicles in the kill zone and 

limited the casualties. Because of the problem with 

the radio in the S -3’s jeep, he felt he should have 

had redundant communications.

These three ambushes occurred in the vicinity of 

the Hairpin and the last two were within days of each 

other. The enemy hoped to take advantage of the 

slow traffic caused by negotiating the Hairpin.

Since it was difficult to concentrate a lot of fire 

power into the Hairpin, the key to survival was not 

bunching up. The convoy interval of 100 meters 

reduced the number of vehicles in the kill zone, so 

the enemy could only expect to damage or destroy 

a few vehicles at best. The enemy usually ambushed 

the middle or rear of the lead convoy. This split the 

convoy. The lead element automatically continued 

to safety with one gun truck as escort. That way, the 

enemy only had to contend with the rear gun truck, 

before the others from the next convoy could arrive. 

If the convoy commander was at the head of his 

convoy when the ambush split it, he was not in a 

position where the decisions needed to be made. 

The rear of the convoy increasingly became the 

location where critical decisions had to be made. 

US Army Vietnam (USAV) published a monthly 

Combat Lessons Bulletin and in the October 1970 

issue selected the 10 and 15 June ambushes for 

its issue on Convoy Operations. It identified the 

following lesson:

Both convoys were well organized and cleared 

the kill zone quickly. Gun trucks, and in the case 

of the second convoy, manned armored cars, 

moved in quickly to employ suppressive fires. 

Communications within the convoys and with 

supporting forces were excellent. Personnel 

in the convoys responded to the ambush 

with remarkable courage, professionalism, 

CPT Voightritter and SP4 Wood receiving Silver Star Medal and Bronze Star Medal for their valor during the ambush.

Photo courtesy of Ron Voithritter
Vietnam War 87

186“Ambushes in the An Khe Pass” is a study of the last four ambushes in 

the Pass written by an unknown author in 27th Transportation Battalion. 

187“Ambushes in the An Khe Pass.” 188COL Alex T. Langston, Jr., Operational Report of the 8th Transportation 

Group (Motor Transport) period ending 31 January 1970, 

15 February 1970

189“Ambushes in the An Khe Pass.” 190Larry Fiandt interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA, 

14 September 2005.

191Fiandt interview, and James Lyles, The Hard Ride; Gun Trucks in 

Vietnam, Part Two, n.p. 2011. 192Fiandt interview, and James Lyles, The Hard Ride; Gun Trucks in 

Vietnam, Part Two, n.p. 2011. 192Fiandt interview, and Lyles, The Hard Ride, Part Two. 194Fiandt interview. 195COL David H. Thomas, “Vehicle Convoy Security Operations in the 

Republic of Vietnam,” Active Project No. ACG-78F, US Army Contact Team 

in Vietnam, APO San Francisco, CA 96384, 30 Sep 71; and “Ambushes 

in the An Khe Pass.”

196“Ambushes in the An Khe Pass.” 197Thomas, “Convoy Security Operations.” 198“Ambushes in the An Khe Pass.” 199Ronald Voightritter telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

and 10, 12, and 15 May 2013; and Convoy Clearance # DW-166106, 

15 June 1970.

200Voightritter interview. 201Voightritter interview. 202LTC (R) Ronald Voightritter email to Richard Killblane, 

25 November 2003; and Voightritter interview.

203Ibid. 204Ibid. 205Ibid. 206Ibid. 207Ibid. 208Ibid. 209BG A. G. Hume, Deputy Chief of Staff (P&O), Combat Lessons Bulletin 

Number 14, Headquarters, US Army Vietnam, 20 October 1970.

210LTC Walter C. Daniels, Operational Report-Lessons Learned 

(Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion, Truck), for Period 

ending 31 July 1970, 13 August 1970.

and responsiveness. In spite of the friendly 

counteraction, the enemy was able to inflict 

casualties to men and damage to materiel with 

a minimum cost to himself. This was primarily 

because the enemy gained the element of 

surprise. It is not possible to completely deny 

the enemy the element of surprise, but it is 

possible to reduce his opportunities to use 

surprise to his advantage.209

The convoy organization and procedures seemed 

sound and no one could see any change that would 

lessen the threat. So if the solution was not improving 

the convoy then they had to change something 

else. LTC Walter C. Daniels, the 27th Transportation 

Battalion Commander, summed up what his battalion 

learned from the three ambushes in his Operational 

Report of 13 August 1970: 

During the report period, the enemy ambushed 

the battalion’s convoys three times. All ambushes 

took place in the An Khe Pass in the area of 

the “hairpin curve”. The enemy has an excellent 

vantage point in the “hairpin curve” area and is 

assisted in his endeavors by the fact the steep 

winding grade at this particular point has slowed 

the convoy’s task vehicles to approximately 2 mph. 

In each ambush the enemy was believed to be in 

platoon to company size strengths and they fired 

small arms, automatic weapons, B - 40 rockets 

and 60 mm mortars at the convoys. The battalion 

suffered 2 KIA’s and 10 WIA’s in the 3 actions. 

Following the last ambush, the battalion was given 

permission to burn the elephant grass in the area 

all three of the ambushes had taken place. The 

area was quickly burned to stubble and the enemy 

was no longer afforded the excellent concealment 

they had formerly enjoyed.210

The employment of convoy serials proved over 

and again the best method for mutual support. The 

gun trucks of the next serial could always seem to 

respond quicker than any combat arms reaction force. 

These ambushes set the stage for an ambush that 

would lead to the greatest act of courage among 

gun truck crews.
88 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

359th Transportation Company (POL)

Brutus, The Misfits, The Boss, Woom Doom 

and Ball of Confusion (later The Untouchable)

f all the dangerous cargo to haul, fuel was the 

worst. It burned and every driver feared the 

slow painful death of burning to any other kind 

of death in combat. So the 359th Petroleum Truck 

Company was one of the more dangerous convoy units 

to serve in. SGT John Dodd was a career soldier and had 

begun his second tour in Vietnam in December 1968 

where he was assigned to the 359th Petroleum Truck 

Company. The 359th had just transferred from Phu Tai 

to Pleiku in November 1968 and was attached to 

the 124th Transportation Battalion from the 240th 

Quartermaster Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) 

Battalion on 1 January 1969. Once the 240th 

Quartermaster POL Battalion had connected the pipeline 

all the way to Pleiku, this discontinued the need for fuel 

trucks to drive QL19. However, constant pilferage and 

interdiction by the enemy forced the Quartermaster 

battalion to shut down the pipeline. From then on fuel 

trucks had to drive the most deadly road in Vietnam. 211

By the time Dodd arrived, the 359th had only 

constructed two gun trucks, Brutus and The Misfits, 

and a gun jeep. The new gun box design of the 359th 

was a smaller gun box of welded sheets of steel that fit 

inside the bed of the truck instead of the steel plates 

bolted on the outside. SGT Wayne Prescott helped build 

and became the first NCOIC of the Brutus, a 5 -ton gun 

truck with two forward .50s and initially rear twin .50s. 

These were later replaced with a 7.62mm mini-gun in an 

armored gun box. The mini-gun’s rate of fire instilled fear 

O

in the enemy. This six-barrel Gatling gun fired 7.62mm 

rounds at awesome speed, but was prone to misfiring. 

Dodd became the NCOIC of The Misfits, a 21⁄2 - ton gun 

truck with an M - 60 and .50 caliber machine gun on a 

pedestal in the middle of the gun box. His crew consisted 

of a driver, John Hodges, and gunner, Bill Ward.212

Escorting fuel convoys with each tractor hauling 

5,000 gallons of highly flammable jet fuel was probably 

the most dangerous mission for gun trucks. The enemy 

preferred to hit fuel tankers because the resulting fire 

usually blocked the road, trapped and destroyed the 

other trucks.

9 June 1969213

n 9 June, the Brutus, The Misfits and the gun 

jeep escorted a convoy of 30 fuel tankers on a 

return trip from Qui Nhon to An Khe. On the way 

down, SGT Barrowcliff had seen a uniformed VC carrying 

a LAW who escaped into the jungle. SSG Hutcherson 

rode in the lead gun jeep as the convoy commander 

with Roger Blink as his M-60 gunner and Jerry Usher as 

his driver. The Misfits drove in the middle of the convoy 

while Brutus brought up the rear. Peter Hish and Alan 

Wernstrum substituted in as gunners on The Misfits 

that day with Dodd, Hodges and Ward. Alan Wilson 

drove Brutus with Merton Barrowcliff on the M-60 and 

Prescott on the mini-gun. Barrowcliff was on his second 

tour in Vietnam. The convoy unfortunately had no air 

support that day. Once they reached An Khe, they would 

pick up the rest of the tankers from the 359th.214

Around 1600 hours,215 the convoy had passed the 

Korean compound at the base of the An Khe Pass. 

Hauling fuel was the most dangerous cargo. 

359th POL convoy staging. Photos courtesy of 359th 

Transportation Company Vietnam

O
Vietnam War 89

Barrowcliff standing in the right rear corner of Brutus 

looked down as it approached the last bridge and saw 

20 to 30 VC lying along the road. Mert turned and 

screamed at Prescott, “Ambush!” then started for his 

M-60. Simultaneously, Dodd heard several rounds hit 

The Misfits’ armor plating and heard Prescott, back 

on Brutus, scream over the radio, “Contact, Contact, 

Contact!” Dodd then spotted enemy movement 

about a hundred yards out in the field and returned 

fire. Barrowcliff looked to his left and saw the Korean 

compound getting mortared. From the trees, he then 

saw two rockets heading straight toward his gun truck. 

He then shoved Prescott’s head down as the two rounds 

narrowly missed them and detonated on the other side 

of the gun truck. Barrowcliff again started firing his M- 60, 

as the enemy walked mortar rounds down the road and 

two exploded in front of the truck ahead of his. Another 

landed right in front of his. He fired 2,000 rounds and 

then told Prescott to get off the radio and get on the 

mini-gun. In doing so he cleared a path. Meanwhile, The 

Misfits had cleared the kill zone and continued up An 

Khe Pass. Dodd then radioed back to Prescott and asked 

how he was doing. Prescott answered that Brutus had 

engaged about 40 enemy and the mini-gun was working 

fine. This was unusual as mini -guns were not designed 

for the road and the bumpy ride tended to knock out the 

timing mechanism. To keep the mini-gun operational, 

Prescott had to spend a lot of time working on it.216

As the road leveled out at the top of the Pass, The 

Misfits picked up speed again and led the convoy toward 

An Khe. It received some small arms fire but Dodd did not 

see anything to shoot at. The excitement passed as they 

left the danger behind them and the crew of The Misfits 

returned to their normal “chit chat” talking mostly about 

drinking a cold beer when they reached the security of An 

Khe. Dodd joked with the others while he kicked the .50 

caliber brass around with his feet. The Dodd then called 

in the check point as The Misfits crossed a bridge about 

three miles from An Khe. In a few minutes they would be 

safe inside the security of the compound.217

A few seconds later he heard an explosion behind 

him followed by the sound of AK - 47 fire. He turned to 

see where a mortar round had landed and the security 

force on the bridge was under fire. It was Dodd’s turn 

to scream into the radio, “Contact, Contact, Contact!” 

He saw Viet Cong running around in the field to his left 

(south side of road) and opened fire with the .50 caliber. 

Hish and Ward worked as a team firing the M-60 while 

Wernstrum fired his M -16. Suddenly, someone on the 

radio asked for their location and size of the enemy 

force. This struck Dodd odd since he had just called in 

his location a few seconds before. Right after that an 

RPG slammed into the front portion of the gun box. The 

impact from the explosion knocked Dodd’s feet out from 

under him but he did not let go of the machine gun. 

Wernstrum was lifting up another box of ammunition 

from the floor for the .50 caliber. Dodd then had Hodges 

pull the gun truck over and stop so they could provide 

suppressive fire while the rest of the tankers passed.218

A voice on the radio let him know that air support 

was on the way. Dodd was thinking short bursts with 

the .50 but his fingers called for long bursts. Suddenly 

a second RPG exploded on the gun box and blood 

splattered in Dodd’s eyes. He looked down and realized 

he had been hit in the leg, chest and face but with the 

adrenaline pumping, he felt no pain. Looking around, he 

saw the blast had also blown Hish and Wernstrum out 

of the gun box and Ward lay on the floor clutching his 

stomach. Dodd realized in a flash all his gunners were 

wounded. He then called on the radio that he had three 

men badly wounded and needed a medevac.219

Climbing out of the cab and up on the corner of the 

gun box, Hodges checked on the crew. He then pointed 

to some water buffalo where he saw enemy movement. 

Dodd saw Viet Cong hiding behind the animals, which 

caused an elderly Vietnamese man to throw a fit 

knowing he was about to lose his work animals. Dodd 

told Hodges to get back in the cab and get ready to 

move out. Dodd then heard over the radio the medevac 

Misfits on the back of a 21⁄2 - ton truck.

Photo courtesy of 359th Transportation Company Vietnam
90 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

was on its way. He then picked up another box of 

ammunition and loaded it. Still conscious, Hish and 

Wernstrum crawled into the ditch on the side of the road, 

and Hish grabbed the tailgate to pull himself up when a 

third RPG hit the rear of the gun box knocking him back 

to the ground. Viet Cong then ran across the road and 

shot Hish twice as the M-60 tank and M-113 Armored 

Personnel Carrier (APC) drove up from the check point. 

The enemy then began engaging the tank and APC. 

This fire fortunately turned the enemy’s attention away 

from overrunning the gun truck. Dodd realized he and 

Ward were wounded too badly to climb out and rescue 

the other two crew members. Ward needed immediate 

medical attention. Dodd slapped the top of the canvas 

with his hand signaling Hodges to drive off. When Hish 

saw the truck pull away he thought, “Oh hell, what am I 

gonna do now?” He then crawled back into the ditch. In 

half a minute The Misfits had cleared the kill zone and 

Dodd saw the medevac heading their way. By then Ward 

was sitting on an ammunition can clutching a one inch 

hole in his stomach. Dodd grabbed a large bandage 

and told Bill to hold it against the wound.220

Dodd then radioed back for Prescott to look for his 

two missing crew members. Prescott answered that the 

Brutus had tangled with some NVA after crossing the 

top of the An Khe Pass. The mini-gun had misfired but 

the crew managed to fight off an enemy rush on their 

gun truck.221

 As his gun truck disappeared from view, Hish looked 

up and saw the welcome sight of a medevac helicopter. 

As it prepared to land, the pilot and crew saw the enemy 

dragging their wounded off into the jungle. They almost 

did not see Wernstrum.222

Down at the bottom of the pass, the convoy 

commander had driven back to the Brutus after it left 

the kill zone and asked the crew if they were okay. The 

crew signaled thumbs up. As they drove up the pass, 

the crew checked their guns and remained alert. About 

300 or 400 yards from the hairpin curve, Barrowcliff 

looked up and saw around four unarmed NVA officers in 

the saddle on the west side of the road not 100 yards 

away. He started to shake since that was the third time 

in one day he had encountered the enemy. As Brutus 

approached, the enemy waved at them. Barrowcliff told 

Prescott who replied, “I don’t believe it.” He tried to call 

Road Runner on the radio but to no avail, then switched 

to An Khe Control and asked what was going on over the 

top of the pass because they heard a tank firing. Brutus 

then came upon three fuel tankers stopped on the right 

side of the road. The middle one was leaking fuel out of 

a hole in the right rear. The rear tractor also had blood 

in the cab. While still receiving small arms fire, Prescott 

searched for the drivers but could not find them. So he 

climbed in the leaking fuel tanker and pushed the truck 

in front out of the way, then drove it all the way to An 

Khe. Barrowcliff later asked him why he did that. He said 

“It was DF2,” When Barrowcliff told him it was highly 

flammable aviation gas, Prescott turned a little white and 

said “It was not his day!” The battalion operations officer 

was mad at Barrowcliff because he had not found the 

two gunners blown out of The Misfits, but someone else 

picked them up.223

Meanwhile, The Misfits pulled into An Khe where 

the trucks had assembled. Hodges stopped the 

gun truck long enough to tell the drivers to let SSG 

Hutcherson know they had driven to the field hospital. 

As the gun truck drove 30 miles per hour though the 

Brutus was first built in 1969.

The Misfits had two twin .50s and side mounts for M60s.

Photos courtesy of 359th Transportation Company Vietnam
Vietnam War 91

gate of Camp Radcliffe, the MPs realized they were in 

trouble. Then two MPs jumped in their jeep and led them 

to the hospital. Dodd was looking after Ward’s wounds 

when he saw that Hodges had the front bumper trailing 

just about two inches behind the lead jeep. An MP looked 

back and Dodd motioned for the MPs to either speed up 

or get out of the way.224

Once at the hospital, the medics helped the two 

wounded soldiers from the gun truck and put them onto 

tables in the receiving area. The nurses informed them 

both Hish and Wernstrum were already in X- ray and the 

medics then rushed Bill Ward straight to the X- ray room. 

The medics cut Dodd’s clothes off and the doctor began 

pulling pieces of metal out of his legs. He informed Dodd 

the blood on his face came from the missing tip of his 

nose. Dodd’s real concern was further down his anatomy. 

He kept trying to lift himself up to see what the doctor 

was doing to his legs, but the nurse kept pushing him 

back down. Because Dodd persisted in trying to rise up, 

she took her hands from his chest, then grabbed his 

“family jewels” and told him not to worry, everything is 

okay. Dodd fell back and relaxed. 

While the doctors worked on Dodd, the medics 

brought in a wounded Viet Cong and laid him on the table 

next to him. In a loud voice, Dodd told them to move 

that SOB away a few more feet. Another nurse came in 

and told Dodd that his two missing crew members had 

been brought in. Pete Hish had fragmentary wounds 

and had been shot. Alan Wernstrum also suffered from 

fragmentary wounds and lost part of his hand. The 

four wounded crew members had a short reunion in 

the medical ward that evening and the EOD presented 

Brutus initially had twin .50s on back and later they were 

replaced with a .50 amd a MI34 minigun. 

Photos courtesy of 359th Transportation Company Vietnam

them the rocket section of an RPG that had it their gun 

truck, which Dodd later donated to the Transportation 

Museum. Because of the seriousness of their wounds, 

Ward, Hish and Wernstrum were medevaced to Japan 

that evening. 

Since the hospital at An Khe had become crowded, 

Dodd was flown to Pleiku where he hitchhiked back 

to his company area. He did light work supervising the 

Vietnamese labor around the company for about 30 

days until his wounds healed and then he rode on 

South Vietnamese convoys calling in check points 

until he left Vietnam on 4 November 1969. SGT Prescott 

received the Silver Star Medal for his actions and Wilson 

the Bronze Star. Dodd received an Army Commendation 

Medal with V device but he threw it away.

Lesson

The enemy employed two kill zones, the first most likely 

hoped to draw off the gun trucks so the next ambush 

would catch the convoy of fuel tankers unprotected. 

Probably one of the boldest moves the enemy had made 

yet, in their effort at unpredictability, they had launched 

the main ambush right outside the compound at An Khe 

where most drivers felt relatively safe. 

Radios in each of the gun trucks made them more 

responsive to enemy action and allowed them to act 

independent of the convoy commander. However, this 

placed greater decision making responsibility on the 

crews of the gun trucks. 

The Misfits’ gun box took three hits from RPGs, yet 

one gunner still continued to put up a fight. The enemy 

had to choose between a mobility kill which still allowed 

the gun truck to fight, but not maneuver, or go for the 

crew kill, which often failed because of the open design 

of the gun box. The open gun box allowed for the blast 

of an RPG to escape without killing the entire crew. 

The gun trucks could take great punishment and still 

continue to fight due to the dedication of the crews.

21 November 1970

y 1970, the 359th Medium Petroleum Truck 

Company had a total of five gun trucks; The 

Misfits, Brutus, Outlaws, Woom Doom and Ball 

of Confusion. The crew of Brutus consisted of William 

“Bill” Kagel, Ernest “Ernie” Quintana, and SGT Jimmy 

B
92 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Ray Callison. Brutus was still a 5 -ton gun truck with 

two forward left and right M -2 .50s and a rear M -134 

7.62mm mini-gun. The six-barreled M -134 mini-gun 

could fire at a rate of 4,000 rounds per minute. 

On the morning of 21 November 1970, a jeep 

with radio led the 27th Battalion convoy serial of 

thickets bordered both sides of the road with the 

tree line 250 meters from the road.225

At 1105 hours, the middle of the convoy came 

under rocket, automatic and small- arms fire from 

the south side of the road. The 800 -meter kill zone 

caught Brutus and six fuel tankers. The crew of Brutus 

called “Contact, Contact, Contact” over the radio 

and immediately returned fire with a .50 caliber and 

mini-gun. B- 40 rockets ignited two of the tankers and 

another jackknifed partially blocking the road. Smallarms fire punctured the tanks and flattened the tires 

on the three other tankers but they managed to drive 

out of the kill zone, pick up the drivers of the burning 

tankers while leaving a trail of leaking fuel on the 

road. Brutus then joined the lead vehicles at the top 

of the pass and halted. The vehicles behind Brutus 

had halted, turned around and driven back down the 

road. Ball of Confusion and the convoy commander’s 

jeep were two miles back down the road assisting a 

broken down vehicle. For the first few minutes of the 

ambush, Brutus bore the brunt of the fight.226

Upon hearing “Contact,” the convoy commander 

and three gun trucks of the 597th Medium Truck in the 

eastbound convoy; Sir Charles, King Cobra, and Poison 

Ivy, turned around and raced back to the kill zone. 

Sir Charles was an APC gun truck with a forward .50 

mounted on the track commander’s hatch and two left 

and right rear M - 60s on the troop hatch. King Cobra 

was also an APC gun truck but had three .50s. Poison 

Ivy was a standard 5 -ton gun truck with a forward 

M - 60, and right, left and rear .50 caliber machine 

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Photo courtesy of Rumbo

Photo courtesy of the US Army Transportation Museum

Freeman firing mini-gun on The Untouchable. 
Vietnam War 93

Jacknifed fuel tanker blocking the road. Brutus halted in 

the background. 

Brutus halted with tanker blocking the road ahead. A crater in front of disabled Brutus was most likely 

caused by a rocket. 

Ball of Confusion halted two miles behind Brutus. Photos courtesy of Tim Sewell

guns. By the time they reached the kill zone, Ball of 

Confusion had preceded them. Because the jackknifed 

tanker blocked the road, the gun trucks bunched up on 

the east end of the kill zone and placed suppressive 

fire with all their weapons into the enemy positions. 

A rocket hit Brutus on the driver’s side above the tire, 

wounding Kagel and Quintana and killing Callison. 

Ball of Confusion also had one man wounded during 

the ambush.227 

This ambush was timed with an enemy attack on 

Landing Zone Attack, just three miles down the road. 

Within 15 minutes of the first call, six APCs and one 
94 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Dahl Ambush, 23 February 1971

n 23 February 1971, Creeper, The Boss and 

Playboys of the 545th Light Truck Company 

escorted a fuel convoy under the control of the 

27th Transportation Battalion heading west to Pleiku. 

The convoy commander rode in a gun jeep. They left 

the staging area at the Ponderosa right after the roads 

were opened just after daybreak and operated under 

the call sign “Challenger.” Creeper was the lead 5-ton 

gun truck with call sign, “Challenger Six.” It had four 

corner mounted .50s so the forward and rear gunners 

could switch from left to right depending upon which 

side the attack came from. SGT Ellis “Mac” McEarchen 

was the NCOIC and operated the two forward .50s. 

Barry Montgomery was the rear gunner and William 

Mongle was the driver. Twin M-60s were mounted on 

O

tank from the 1st Squadron, 10th ARVN Cavalry 

arrived in the kill zone. The majority of the ARVN 

Cavalry Squadron, which had responsibility for this 

area, had been pulled up to Pleiku several days 

before for operations in that area. After another 

five minutes of fighting, the enemy withdrew and 

only sporadic firing continued for another 15 

minutes when two gunships arrived.228 

Ronald Mallory, Richard Bond, Larry Dahl 

and Charles Huser had previously become 

friends with the crew of the Brutus. Every time 

the Brutus returned from a convoy, Mallory and 

his friends liked to help take the weapons off 

and clean them. They were curious and wanted 

to know everything about the gun truck. One 

day the crew told their friends, “If anything ever 

happens to us, we’d like you all to take over 

the gun truck.” In that manner the crew of the 

Brutus had chosen their replacements. Ron 

Mallory, Chuck Huser, Larry Dahl and Richard 

Bond replaced the crew of Brutus. Because 

Mallory was one of the best drivers at split 

shifting, he naturally became the driver. Bond 

assumed the responsibility as the NCOIC with 

Huser and Dahl the gunners. As the new crew 

set about cleaning and repairing the gun truck, 

the loss of their friends saddened them. To give 

the truck a new look, they completely repainted 

Brutus. They thought this would make the old 

crew proud of what they had done. It took about a 

week to put Brutus back on the road, but took almost 

a month for the smell of blood to leave.229

Lesson

It was possible the enemy had hoped the attack on the 

landing zone would have drawn off the reaction force, 

however, the gun trucks held their own in this fight and 

the reaction force arrived. The gun trucks with their 

wild names and fancy artwork had added to the élan 

of the gun truck crews. This élan made them more 

independent of command and caused them to react 

without hesitation. The crews knew the key to turning 

the fight back on the enemy was to mass greater fire 

power against the enemy. As soon as the call, “contact,” 

went out, all available gun trucks would rush into the kill 

zone. This would prove critical during the next ambush.
Vietnam War 95

a pedestal over the passenger side of the cab for the 

driver. Mongle was also armed with an M -79 grenade 

launcher and had a cut- down 55 -gallon drum filled with 

40mm rounds. The cab also had 1,600 - round boxes of 

M-60 ammo. The gun box was a double wall design with 

steel outside and PSP on the inner wall holding double 

rows of sandbags. The inner wall was about ten inches 

lower than the outer wall and had a plywood lid over it 

with room to store extra M-60s, .50s and Thompson 

submachine guns. The spare .50s were worn out and 

required four clicks to adjust the timing, which made 

the barrels loose. The forward .50s 

had aviation barrels that would not 

overhead and require changing during 

a fight. The crew lined the bed of the 

gun box with two layers of 100 -round 

ammo cans so they hopefully would 

not run out of .50 caliber ammunition. 

The rear of the gun box also had room 

for spare tires. When Creeper rolled 

down the road, the crew kept the 

barrels strapped down because the 

weight of the gun made it want to tip 

the barrel up. They had a quick release 

on the straps so they could quickly free 

the gun and place it in action.230

 The Boss followed about seven to ten 

trucks behind Creeper. The Boss was a 

5- ton gun truck with front right and left 

.50 caliber machine guns and one rear center mounted .50. 

As the NCOIC of the gun truck, SP5 John Chapman, was the 

forward gunner and operated the radio. Paul “Pineapple” 

Mauricio was the rear gunner. Walter Deeks was the 

regularly assigned driver but had the day off. Neither Paul 

nor John remembered who their replacement driver was 

that day, but as the driver he manned twin M-60s mounted 

on a pedestal over the passenger seat of the cab during 

an ambush. The Boss had the same double wall gun box 

design but no spare tires. It carried three M-79 grenade 

launchers stored in the wall compartment.231

Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum

Photo courtesy of James Lyles
96 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Playboys, call sign “Challenger Eight,” followed seven 

to ten tankers behind The Boss. The regular assigned 

driver of Playboys, Danny Cochran, had gone on sick 

call so the NCOIC, SGT Grailin Weeks, asked Walter 

Deeks to fill in for him. Walter did not like escorting fuel 

tankers because they tended to catch fire when hit by 

rockets; but since gun truck crews were considered 

the elite of truck drivers, he could not turn down the 

request. Gun truck crews did not turn down missions 

and many drove right up to the day they had to leave 

for the United States. Playboys was a 5 -ton gun truck 

with a double wall design same as The Boss and armed 

with two forward and one rear .50 caliber machine gun 

and an M-60 over the cab. Garry Looney manned the 

rear .50, with Ronnie Louden on the right front .50 and 

SGT Weeks on the left gun so he could also operate the 

radio. Their lieutenant liked to ride in the last gun truck. 

The crews also had their M-16s and 

the driver was armed with an M -79 

grenade launcher. Because he was a 

grenadier/driver on this convoy, Walter 

did not check out his M -16 that day. 

The standard basic load for all gun 

trucks was about eighty 100 - round 

cans of .50 caliber ammunition, or 

about as many as would fit on the floor. 

40mm grenade rounds in Playboys 

were stored in a footlocker between 

the cab and gun box.232

 The 545th Light Truck had originally 

operated out of Tuy Hoa but recently 

moved north to Cha Rang Valley in 

December 1970. All the gun truck 

crews had experienced numerous 

small arms fire, mines and RPGs but 

no ambush on the intensity of the one 

they were about to drive into that day.

 The second serial departed the 

staging area around 0800 hours with 

the 5 - ton gun trucks, The Misfits, 

Brutus, and The Untouchable, and 

the gun jeep, Little Brutus, as escorts. 

The Misfits, call sign “Sugar Bear Two,” 

led the convoy armed with two right 

and left forward .50s and pedestal 

mounted twin .50s in the rear. The 

crew that day consisted of Harold Shartle as the driver, 

Glen Kunston as the NCOIC, Kenneth Sheck as a gunner, 

and another gunner who was picked for the day but no 

one remembered.

Brutus, call sign “Sugar Bear One,” followed in the 

middle. It was a 5 -ton gun truck with two forward right 

and left .50 caliber machine guns and a rear pedestal 

mounted 7.62mm mini -gun. Mini- guns put out a lot 

of firepower but required lots of maintenance to keep 

the timing right. SP4 Richard Bond had the day off to 

go before the E- 5 promotion board, so SSG Hector J. 

Diaz filled in as the NCOIC of the Brutus that fateful 

day. Although SP4 Charles L. “Chuck” Huser was not the 

NCOIC, he operated the radio since he knew how his and 

the other gun trucks operated. Ronald “Ron” Mallory was 

the driver and SP4 Larry Dahl was one .50 gunner. The 

main crew had only served on Brutus for the last three 

Photos courtesy of 359th Transportation Company Vietnam
Vietnam War 97

months. The Untouchable, call sign “Sugar Bear Three,” 

followed behind it with SP5 Erik Freeman as 

the NCOIC.233

After the previous ambush that killed Callison, 

“Filthy Fred” Freeman replaced a wounded man on Ball 

of Confusion and became the NCOIC. He had reenlisted 

for a second tour in Vietnam just to be an NCOIC of a gun 

truck in the 8th Transportation Group. Freeman replaced 

the 21⁄2 -ton with a brand new 5- ton cargo truck and 

replaced the two M-60s with forward and rear mounted 

M -2 .50 caliber machine guns and left and right M-134 

7.62mm mini- guns. Since mini - guns were not issued to 

truck units they were hard to get, so Freeman acquired 

enough damaged or worn- out parts until he could 

assemble two complete mini-guns and then turned 

them in for a direct exchange with an Ordnance unit for 

two brand new functional M -134 mini-guns. Because of 

the problems with timing, Freeman never let anyone else 

touch the mini-guns. Because he wanted to build the 

most powerful gun truck in Vietnam, he named his new 

gun truck, The Untouchable, after actor Robert Stack’s 

popular TV series, “The Untouchables,” that ran from 

1959 to 1963. Freeman dropped the plurality of the 

name because he did not want the name to reflect the 

crew but instead the gun truck. The rest of the original 

crew was due to rotate home so Freeman recruited 

a whole new crew. He had no hesitation getting rid of 

anyone who did not measure up to his high standards 

and he did not tolerate drug use or heavy drinking. So 

his crew was very well disciplined. Baylon Braswell was 

the driver, and Robert Logan and John Ross were the 

.50 gunners. The Untouchable was a maintenance gun 

truck loaded with spare tires so it usually followed in 

the rear of the convoy.234

The convoy commander, LT Porter, rode in the 

armored gun jeep, Little Brutus, somewhere near the 

rear of the convoy. Little Brutus, call sign “Little Bear 

One,” had armored doors and gun box with twin M - 60s 

mounted on a pedestal. After he took over the gun jeep 

in January, the NCOIC and gunner, SP5 William Fred 

Carter, had replaced the single M - 60 with twins because 

of the tendency of M -60s to jam. If 

that happened, one M60 would still 

fire. He had ten 100 - round 7.62mm 

ammo cans, a LAW and several hand 

grenades. The driver, Edward “Ed” 

Bonner, was armed with his M-16 

and an M -79 grenade launcher 

and had a .50 caliber ammo box 

full of 40mm rounds. Porter liked 

to ride behind either Brutus or 

The Untouchable. The radio had 

two headsets so both the convoy 

commander and NCOIC could listen 

to it, because SGT Carter did not 

trust green lieutenants. 

The second convoy serial left 

around 0800 hours and traveled 

at 25 mph.

235 

Photo courtesy of Fred Carter

Brutus in April 1971. Photo courtesy of 359th Transportation Company Vietnam
98 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

As the lead convoy serial winded around Devil’s 

Hairpin and approached the top of An Khe Pass it 

slowed down to a crawl, which stretched out the interval. 

The high ground sloping upward to the left side of the 

road was covered with brush while the right side had 

been defoliated. As it drove left around the second 

bend and crossed over the Pass, Creeper maintained 

the slow speed to allow the rest of the convoy catch up. 

A cutaway embankment dominated the south side of 

the bend. The level ground further down the left side 

of the road had scattered vegetation, but the wood line 

had been cut back between 200 and 300 meters to the 

right. A small bridge crossed a narrow stream about 300 

meters ahead of the Pass. Up until then, convoys had 

been hit coming up the pass and not near the 

security check point.236 

About 1045 hours, Creeper had just crossed over 

An Khe Pass where the ground leveled out and neared 

the bridge. Barry Montgomery in the back looked down 

to his left and saw what he thought were three ARVN 

soldiers. They suddenly stood up and pointed their 

weapons at his gun truck causing Barry to ask, “Mac, 

why are those ARVN pointing their weapons at us?” Mac 

quickly shouted, “Get down!” and then 7.62mm rounds 

started hitting the side of the gun truck. Barry then 

unhooked his .50s and fired back killing two or three 

of them. Suddenly the whole jungle 200 to 300 meters 

to their right opened up with what they estimated must 

have been an NVA battalion. It was the worst ambush 

they had ever been in and it scared the hell out of 

them. SGT McEarchen quickly called, “Contact, Contact, 

Contact! We need help, they shot my tires out!” The gun 

truck stopped and the crew returned fire. The tank on 

the other side of the bridge also opened fire and the 

concussion ruptured Barry’s ear drums causing them 

to bleed. They were in the worst fight for their lives.237

Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum

Photo courtesy of 359th Transportation Company Vietnam
Vietnam War 99

The Boss was coming up the Pass when its crew 

heard “contact” over the radio. Chapman tapped his 

driver to enter the kill zone and advised Mauricio to get 

ready with the red smoke to mark the enemy position. 

They passed a disabled tanker and then several more. 

As the road leveled out to a field or rice paddy on the 

right flanked by jungle, a few grass huts dotted the hill 

to their left. As soon as The Boss approached, an RPG 

or mine exploded on the left side of the road. The gun 

truck then drew fire from that direction and the gunners 

saw dozens of villagers running for cover. They could see 

Creeper taking fire from the jungle to the right. Paul threw 

the red smoke on the left side of the gun truck and they 

immediately returned fire, Mauricio firing to the left and 

Chapman to the right. Chapman took one earphone off 

an ear so he could hear what was going on around him, 

but it was hard to hear the radio traffic with the other 

ear because of the loud booming sound of the .50s. 

The Boss came to a stop behind Creeper and a burning 

tanker, another gun truck came up from the west and 

stopped on the other side of the tank and bridge. 

About this time, an RPG hit the right front tire 

and fender of Creeper.238

SGT Weeks also heard McEarchin calling for help and 

told Deeks to get the truck in position to protect Creeper. 

Playboys likewise raced into the kill zone. The tankers 

not in the kill zone stopped and waited while Playboys 

drove past them. As Playboys rounded the embankment 

on the left side of the road right, an enemy soldier stood 

up in the ditch on the left to fire his B -40 rocket at the 

cab of Playboys. Walter Deeks stopped the gun truck 

and the rocket climbed passing overhead, while a .50 

gunner fired right directly over Deeks’ head killing the 

enemy soldier, but hurting Walter’s ears. Playboys then 

proceeded around the bend into the kill zone passing 

a fuel tanker jackknifed on the right side of the road. 

The driver had evidently abandoned it. As Playboys 

came up on the level ground, Weeks and Deeks could 

see a 5,000 - gallon fuel tanker on the right side of the 

road leaking fuel from bullet holes behind The Boss. 

Other tankers had evidently cleared the kill zone. They 

saw the immobilized Creeper a short distance ahead 

still placing suppressive fire on the enemy.239

SGT Weeks directed his gun truck pull up next to a 

disabled fuel truck on the right and then the crew placed 

suppressive fire on the enemy to the left that were very 

close to the road hiding behind rocks and even in the 

ditch. They were so close Weeks could see how young 

they were. After Looney fired off his first 100 rounds, he 

jerked the empty ammo can out of the feed tray and his 

steel pot fell off onto the road. He then loaded a second 

ammo can and something caught his eye. He turned 

and saw a truck driver sitting in the road about 50 yards 

behind Playboys waving at him. His legs were wounded 

so he could not get up. Looney hollered at Grailin and 

then pointed at the guy. Looney then climbed over the 

back of the truck, ran back to the wounded driver. The 

driver was a lot bigger than him so Looney grabbed the 

driver by his brown leather belt and dragged him behind 

the rear dual axel of the disabled truck.240

Looney then stood up and took two or three steps 

backwards to catch his breath, and then three NVA came 

from around the right side of truck. One pointed an AK47 

at him. Looney sprinted as fast as could to his gun truck 

picking up his helmet on the way. When he got back up 

on truck, Louden was on Grailin’s .50 shooting to the left 

and Grailin was on Looney’s rear .50 shooting to right. 

So Looney got on right front .50. About that time Deeks 

looked out through the armor plating and saw about 

15 soldiers to his right either running away from the fire 

or moving to better cover in the wood line. Looney shot 

them and Grailin yelled, “You son of a bitch; those are 

ARVN!” Gary replied, “No, they’re not. They’re NVA! I saw 

them close up.” So they continued to fire. The gunners 

did not fire three to six round bursts but employed 

spraying fire. Not knowing exactly where the enemy was, 

they depressed the butterfly triggers on the .50s and 

did not let up until they burned off a 100 - round belt of 

ammunition. Weeks called for air support and handed 

Deeks two six-round bandoliers of 40mm grenades. 

The viciously intense exchange of gun fire continued 

for about 15 minutes, which seemed like an eternity to 

those in it, until the Cobras arrived and started tearing 

up the tree line.241

When the Cobras, call sign “Shamrock,” arrived, 

they asked the gun trucks to mark their positions with 

smoke grenades and Looney popped purple smoke. 

The pilot warned them, “Y’all get your asses down. I’m 

coming to purple haze.”242 The gun ship fired mini - guns 

and rockets very close to Playboys on the high ground 

to the left side of the road. It made at least two strafing 

runs and then hovered and fired.243
100 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

The crew of The Boss did not wear their flak 

jackets or helmets and blazed away at the enemy. The 

gunners poured oil on their barrels after every 200 to 

300 rounds to keep the barrels from overheating and 

Mauricio changed barrels only when his turned red, so 

he had to use the glove. He did not use a timing gage, 

but just spun the barrel in tight then backed off three 

clicks, fired and added another click until the weapon 

fired as it should. John Chapman on The Boss heard an 

eastbound convoy from An Khe ask if they needed any 

help and John told them, most likely Sir Charles from 

the 597th Transportation Company, to go to the next 

gun truck, Playboys. By the time the Cobras arrived, the 

right front .50 on Creeper had jammed but the gunners 

were so scared they forgot they had spare barrels in 

the wall compartment. After the Cobras arrived the 

enemy fire died down, but whenever there would be a 

lull in the fighting, more enemy soldiers would move to 

a better position and the fighting would intensify again. 

About half an hour into the ambush, everyone heard the 

approaching sound of mini-gun of Brutus and felt safer. 244

The second serial was about a mile from the check 

point at the base of An Khe Pass when they heard over 

the radio, “Contact, contact, contact!” LT Porter then 

instructed the lead truck to throw a smoke grenade to 

mark its position and stop. Little Brutus then drove up 

the road directing the tankers to pull over to the side 

of the road. The drivers could see the two columns of 

smoke from the burning tankers rising at the top of the 

Pass. Someone on a gun truck asked over the radio if 

they should go help and Porter thought about it for a 

while. Little Brutus then pulled up and Porter got out 

to talk with the NCOICs of the gun trucks. He decided 

they would go help the convoy in the kill zone, and 

The Misfits, Brutus, The Untouchable, and Little 

Brutus drove up the Pass into harm’s way.245 

The Misfits cleared the bend and Brutus stopped 

halfway around the bend near a burning tanker and 

the embankment where the NVA soldier had fired the 

B-40 rocket at the Playboys. The Misfits, Brutus, and 

The Untouchable stopped about 100 yards apart. The 

ambush then had seven gun trucks (over 21 machine 

guns) and at least one tank engaging the enemy. SSG 

Diaz and Dahl fired their .50s to the right side of their 

gun truck while Huser fired the mini-gun. After a while, 

the mini-gun quit firing and Diaz and Huser quickly went 

to work to get it back in action. The bouncing of the road 

often threw the timing off. Freeman in The Untouchable 

could not see Brutus in front of him due to the hill 

between them but could hear everyone yelling on the 

radio. In their excitement, they forgot radio discipline. 

Suddenly, he heard, “They’re on the left; they’re on the 

Two columns smoke rising from burning tankers in the kill zone. Photo courtesy of Timothy Sewell

Brutus heading up An Khe Pass into the kill zone. 

Photo courtesy of Tim Sewell
Vietnam War 101

left!” So Freeman moved to the left mini - gun. He could 

see a little bank that sloped uphill to a mound.246 

About 15 minutes after the 359th gun trucks had 

entered the kill zone the fighting died down and someone 

called for a cease fire. Many assumed the fight was over 

while others scanned for targets. Freeman dismounted 

to talk with SGT McQuellen, the lead wrecker operator, 

and the lead convoy commander. After five minutes of 

the cease fire, someone told Ron Mallory, “Okay, we can 

go back and pick up our convoy. Turn around right here.” 

Ron then backed Brutus up to turn around and suddenly 

three to five enemy soldiers charged Brutus from the high 

ground on the south side of the road.247 

Diaz heard Dahl yell, “Frag!” An NVA soldier had 

lobbed a grenade into the Brutus. Diaz then turned and 

saw Dahl drop to his 

knees and cover the 

grenade with his body 

saving the lives of the 

rest of the crew. The 

explosion threw Dahl 

into Huser knocking 

him down. Shrapnel 

bounced off the inside 

walls of the gun box and 

hit Diaz in the back and 

legs also knocking him 

down. The other crews 

saw the explosion in the gun 

box and knew the crew was seriously hurt but not how 

bad. Ron Mallory heard the explosion looked down and 

saw he was covered with blood. He thought, “Lord, I’ve 

been hit.” Since he had to drive them to safety, he had 

no idea what happened in the back.248

The crews of the gun trucks had developed a special 

bond of friendship. Many gun truck members expressed 

the same opinion that any crew member would have 

done the same thing to save the lives of their crew. Larry 

Dahl just saw the grenade first. Diaz saw Dahl try to get 

up and then fall back down into Huser’s lap. Diaz asked 

how they were. Huser said Dahl was dead and he was 

wounded in the arm and legs. Huser then tried to call 

for help over the radio but it would not work. So he then 

yelled at Ron Mallory to drive them out of there. Brutus 

then made a hard left hand turn, backed up again and 

pushed the burning tanker out of the way, then raced his 

gun truck west through the smoke of the burning tanker 

to the nearest friendly check point at the bridge where a 

medevac awaited for the wounded.249 

About that time the tank from the bridge drove over 

and stopped behind Playboys then fired its main gun two 

or three times. The blast ruptured Looney’s ear drums. 

The enemy fire then died down again so someone told 

Deeks to get out and look for the driver of the disabled 

truck. A premonition told Deeks not to check the driver’s 

door but to run around to the passenger’s side. As he 

rounded the front of the truck, he saw a scared young 

NVA soldier staring up at him from under the wheel 

well. The kid did not look older than 14 years of age. 

Deeks did not have his M-79 with him and both he and 

the kid had a look of shock on their faces. So Deeks 

spun around and 

ran back the way 

he came shouting to 

the gunners, “There’s 

one under that truck, 

there’s one under that 

truck.” Louden yelled, 

“There he goes.” He 

then shot and killed 

the enemy soldier. 

Paul Mauricio on The 

Boss saw the fear 

on Walter’s face and 

claimed he also blew 

the enemy soldier away. Deeks admitted he was 

shaking like a leaf.250 

Someone yelled they saw the driver behind the truck. 

The blast had evidently blown him out of the truck. A tall, 

former high school basketball player, Deeks ran over and 

picked the wounded driver up in his arms. The bloody 

and unconscious driver was peppered with shrapnel. 

Deeks carried him over to the gun truck and the crew 

tossed down a first aid kit. He patched the worst wounds 

while the crew called for a medevac. Deeks told the 

gunners the wounded driver needed a stretcher, but the 

gun truck did not have one. They told him to ask the tank 

crew if they had one. Deeks felt terrified approaching 

the tank that was buttoned up and firing at the enemy. 

He jogged over while yelling at the crew not to shoot 

him. They said they did not have a stretcher so Deeks 

returned to his gun truck. After the helicopter landed, 

Burning tanker which Brutus pulled up to next to. 

Photo courtesy of Tim Sewell
102 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Deeks carried the driver over to it. Covered in the driver’s 

blood, he returned to the cab of his gun truck and by that 

time the fight had quieted down again.251

About the same time Deeks went after the driver, 

SGT Weeks saw trucks trying to drive around the tanker 

directly behind Playboys, but it blocked the road. Without 

anyone telling him, he got out and climbed in the tractor. 

He did not remember the 5,000 -gallon fuel tank was 

leaking fuel but Deeks did. They were still under fire and 

SGT Weeks knew someone had to get that tanker out 

of the way. He just focused on driving it off the road. He 

drove it into the field to the right, jumped out and let it 

come to a stop by itself. He then quickly climbed back in 

his gun truck. After that the ambush ended. The enemy 

had been dug in and seemed hell bent on destroying the 

convoy. The ambush had lasted for over an hour, a lot 

longer than the usual 10 to 15 minutes.252

About that time, The Untouchable and Little Brutus 

turned around and rejoined their convoy on bottom of An 

Khe Pass. The Misfits remained with Brutus at An Khe. 

Once at the bottom of the pass, The Untouchable and 

Little Brutus escorted their convoy all the way to Pleiku. 

Meanwhile, The Boss at the top of the Pass pulled 

over to the left side of the road to let its convoy pass 

and fell back into its original position. Creeper had all 

but one tire shot out and had to roll on rims. The convoy 

passed the infantry on their way to mop up the ambush 

site. The convoy then stopped at the check point and the 

convoy commander told Deeks to get a count of trucks 

and drivers. He was still shaking from the ambush. Once 

out of harm’s way, they could relax a little. The shock of 

the event finally caught up with Deeks. As he was trying 

to get a count he fell on his knees and started vomiting. 

The other drivers finished the head count for him. 

Mauricio was so shook up he could not even drink 

a cup of water, but grateful drivers came up and 

thanked him for saving their lives. John Chapman 

remembered everyone was shaking, but Weeks began 

shaking uncontrollably and went into spasms. Weeks 

remembered he was scared like everyone else but when 

he jumped down out of the gun truck, he was hurting. 

The convoy commander called for a medevac to take 

him back to the hospital at An Khe where they sedated 

him. His crew picked him up on the return trip that 

afternoon. Freeman had lost his hearing for 

three days.253 

Because the enemy targeted gun trucks, the 

truckers believed the enemy had bounties on them, 

and since Brutus had lost two crews in the last two 

ambushes, they believe it had the highest bounty. 

Grailin Weeks received the Silver Star Medal and the 

rest of the crew of the Playboys earned Bronze Stars 

with V device. The entire crew of Creeper was submitted 

for Silver Star Medals but received no awards. Larry Dahl 

was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Dahl’s 

Medal of Honor proved that even truck drivers could 

be heroes too.

Nearly everyone was shaken up from the ambush. 

Barry Montgomery got off the road and pulled details 

around the camp. After a month, he joined the crew of 

Damage caused by shrapnel bounding off the wall. 

Photo courtesy of Timothy Sewell

Freeman talking to LT Porter and SGT McQuellen with 

Brutus in the background next to the burning tanker 

seconds before it was attacked. Photo courtesy of Fred Carter
Vietnam War 103

the gun truck, Bad Hombre. 

With most of his crew in the 

hospital, the loss of his friends 

caused Ron Mallory to quit 

driving and he worked in the 

motor pool until he rotated 

back to the United States. 

Hector Diaz went through 

extensive medical treatment 

and died in 2003 of Hepatitis, 

which he picked up in a blood 

transfusion. Chuck Huser 

returned from the hospital to 

join the crew of The Misfits. 

Walter Deeks stayed on The 

Boss until a home town friend 

was killed on Cold Sweat with 

20 days left in country. This 

broke his heart so he got off 

the road ten days later when 

he had 30 days left in country. 

Fred Carter and John Chapman remained on their gun 

jeep and gun truck until a couple weeks out from going 

home. Paul Mauricio took Chapman’s place as the NCOIC 

of The Boss until it was his time to return home. The 

crew of Playboys remained on it and survived two more 

ambushes. Freeman extended for six months to stay on 

The Untouchable but his first sergeant would not let him 

extend any more after that. Having to leave the gun truck 

he built broke his heart. Of all the ambushes and enemy 

contact they had encountered in Vietnam, none had ever 

experienced an ambush as long or as intense as the one 

on 23 February 1971.254

Lessons

The Size of the enemy forcer and the terrain lent itself 

to a Z- shaped kill zone with part of the force on the 

high ground on the south side of the road and the 

rest in the jungle on the north side of the road.

The enemy continued to initiate ambushes by 

attacking the gun trucks first. The enemy was either 

determined to destroy the remaining trucks in the kill

zone but the quick arrival of The Boss and Playboys

prevented them. The crew could not determine if the

enemy was maneuvering to attack or escape. The 

arrival of the four additional gun trucks from the 

 other serials turned the 

 tide of the battle.

 Against a determined

 enemy, it took as 

 many as five gun

 trucks with three

 machine guns

 each to beat back

 their assault. 

 Even then, this

 was just enough 

 to defend the disabled 

 vehicles and rescue drivers. 

The determining factor in the 

ambush was fire power – 

the number of machine 

guns in the kill zone.

 One big difference from 

the convergence of gun trucks 

in the kill zone the year before, 

this time the gun trucks 

maintained their 50 - to 100 - meter interval between 

gun trucks. This interval, unfortunately, placed Brutus 

next to the embankment where the enemy would attack.

The death of Larry Dahl taught everyone the 

importance of never letting their guard down even 

when it seemed like the ambush was over. Fred 

Carter warned, “Never drop your guard at any time. 

Always expect the unexpected, and when in convoy, 

always be in the defensive mode of operation.”

Action Taken

After that ambush, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry 

was required to low and slow over the convoys.

At first they flew around the country side but that 

did not deter the enemy from ambushing the convoys. 

The helicopters were directed to fly low and slow along 

the roads looking for wires and enemy spider holes. 

They flew so low that the drivers could reach up and 

touch the skids. This was boring duty for the pilots 

but they challenged their flying skills by landing on 

the back of moving trailers or flying between the 

trucks in the convoy.255

SP4 Larry Dahl.
104 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Recovery Mission, 16 December 1970

n 16 December 1970, in a westbound convoy, 

Satan’s Chariot passed a broken - down tractor 

and trailer and two gun trucks from an earlier 

convoy at An Khe Pass. Satan’s Chariot was a 5 -ton 

gun truck with three .50s, one forward and two rear. 

The convoy arrived at the 54th Transportation Battalion 

base camp just an hour before dark. SGT Charles Sims, 

the NCOIC of Satan’s Chariot, had his men take off the 

weapons and start cleaning them when the commander 

of the 88th Light Truck arrived and told him to have 

his gun truck escort a spare tractor back up to retrieve 

the disabled vehicle. Sims challenged the decision. At 

that hour they would reach the pass after dark. Nothing 

traveled on the roads at night. He felt the gun truck 

should just pick up the driver, abandon the truck, and 

return, but the battalion commander issued Sims a 

direct order to recover the vehicle. The commander 

knew that if the tractor was left unattended on the road 

overnight was the Explosive Ordinance Demolitions 

(EOD) men would have to clear the vehicle the next day 

before a convoy could pass. Any vehicle left unattended 

on the road overnight was automatically considered 

mined. This would delay the departure of the convoys

by an hour. Sims departed with a wrecker and 

spare tractor.256

When they arrived, Sims saw that the MP V-100 

armored car that closed down the road each night was 

providing security for the broken- down tractor. 

Sir Charles also arrived. Once they recovered the tractor 

and trailer, Satan’s Chariot led the way followed by the 

wrecker towing the tractor and trailer, Sir Charles and 

then the armored car. When they reached the base of 

the mountain, they found that the Koreans had strung 

a concertina barricade across the road closing Bridge 

Number 8. Sims radioed their situation to the road 

controller. The controller, in turn, called the American 

liaison officer with the Koreans to have them open 

the bridges. After waiting 20 minutes, the Koreans 

received instructions to open the bridge.257

Sims had driven the road so many times he 

thought he could have done it blindfolded, but it did 

not look the same in the dark. He did not remember 

the small village located on the north side of the road 

near the next bridge. Since there were no lights, he 

did not have visual cues to remind him of his location. 

To Sims’ surprise, the next bridge was also closed. 

They waited for another ten minutes for the Koreans 

to open the barricades but these delays made them 

a target for a hasty ambush. They slowly negotiated 

around the barricades and all but the last gun truck and 

armored car had crossed the bridge when an explosion 

hit Sir Charles. The convoy then started receiving smallarms fire from the village on the north side of the road. 

Somebody screamed over the radio, “Contact!” 

Then the gun trucks, the armored car, and the 

Koreans immediately returned fire. 

Air cover proved to be the best deterrent against ambushes. Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum

O
Vietnam War 105

Earlier the maintenance gun truck, The Untouchable, 

had towed a vehicle back to Cha Rang Valley. On his way 

back to camp, SGT Erik Freeman passed Satan’s Chariot 

and the wrecker heading back up to the Pass. Freeman 

became concerned that two trucks up on An Khe Pass 

might have to remain there over night. He had a policy 

that he would never leave any of the vehicles or drivers 

behind if at all possible.258 

Upon dropping off the tractor, Freeman’s crew 

changed a flat and refueled while he monitored the 

radio. He could hear the recovery team was having 

trouble hooking up the broken- down tractor and worried 

the Koreans would close the bridges on them when it 

became dark. Fearing his commanding officer would 

not let him back out on the road at night, Freeman and 

his crew loaded up in The Untouchable and left without 

permission. According to policy, MPs at the gate were 

not allowed to stop a gun truck. Fortunately, The 

Untouchable found all the bridges open except Bridge 

Number 7. The Koreans let The Untouchable onto the 

bridge but would not let it cross. When Freeman saw 

the recovery convoy approaching, he convinced the 

Koreans to let his truck drive off the west end of the 

bridge to turn around. The Untouchable backed up and 

turned around then pulled up alongside the bridge so it 

would be ready to fall in with the convoy when it passed. 

Just as the wrecker crossed the bridge, The Untouchable 

pulled into the convoy and then small -arms fire broke out 

from the village lasting about a minute. The rocket 

blast had mortally wounded the NCOIC of Sir Charles.259

When the ambush started, the Koreans quickly 

closed all the bridge barricades. Freeman had just 

told his driver to back up when he heard the ambush, 

but The Untouchable was trapped on the bridge with 

Sir Charles and the armored car behind the bridge. 

Satan’s Chariot could not reenter the bridge, so Sims 

led the wrecker back to Cha Rang. The rest of the 

bridges were open and he received a flare ship to 

escort his convoy back. Meanwhile, one of the gunners 

on The Untouchable pointed his .50 caliber machine 

gun at the Koreans, forcing them to open the bridge’s 

west end. The Untouchable then turned around and 

pulled up next to Sir Charles. Freeman then raked the 

tree line with the mini gun for about 10 to 15 seconds 

and the other vehicles got under way and crossed the 

bridge. A medevac picked up the NCOIC, but he was 

already dead. An attack helicopter and flare ship then

escorted Freeman’s convoy back. This verified that any 

prolonged halt made vehicles a target of opportunity 

since local Viet Cong lived in the area.260 

A local Vietnamese who lived in the village was killed 

in cross fire so the next day, the Vietnamese had painted 

a message on the road claiming that the Americans had 

killed her. This became an international incident, but the 

chain of command backed their gun truck crews.

Lesson

This was a hasty ambush by a small enemy force 

that took advantage of the delay in recovering the 

broken down tractor. The enemy also liked to fire 

on the Americans from villages so that some of the 

noncombatant villagers might be killed by the return 

fire. They could use this as part of their propaganda.

Well intended plans resulted in a series of delays 

in recovery and for whatever reason; there was a 

serious break down in coordination with the Koreans 

on opening the bridges after dark. Murphy’s Law 

trapped these vehicles out on QL19 after dark, a 

dangerous place to be. In spite of these mistakes, 

the dedication of the gun truck crews to not leave 

anyone behind brought several gun trucks to the 

aid of one disabled tractor and trailer. In an ambush, 

the side with the superior fire power usually wins.

Escorting convoys was boring so pilots would fly along 

the road in convoys like trucks or even land in the back 

of empty flatbed trailers. Photo courtesy of US Army 

Transportation Museum
106 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

211John Dodd wrote up an account of the 9 June 1969 ambush and 

brought it to the 2004 Gathering. 1LT Alvin L. Preble, Unit History, 359th 

Transportation Company (Medium Truck Petroleum), 1 January to 31 

December 1968, 6 April 1969.

212Dodd, Story. 213LTC John C. Kramer, Operational Report 124th Transportation Battalion 

(Truck) for period Ending 31 July 1969, 8 August 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) 

(R-1) stated the date of the ambush was 9 June while Dodd’s 

documentation stated 8 June.

214Dodd, Story. 215124th History Report recorded the ambush taking place between 

Bridges 15 and 16 between 1530 and 1630 hours.

216Merton Barrowcliff, Story unpublished account sent to the 359th 

Transportation Company Vietnam, and Dodd, Story.

217Ibid. 218Ibid. 219Ibid. 220Ibid. 221Ibid. 222Ibid. 223Barrowcliff, Story. 224This and the next two paragraphs taken from Dodd’s Story. 225Ronald Mallory interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 

14 June 2004 and Thomas, “Vehicle Convoy Security,” p. B-1-4.

226Thomas, “Vehicle Convoy Security,” p. B-1-4. 227Thomas, “Vehicle Convoy Security,” p. B-1-4, Mallory and Freeman 

interviews.

228Thomas, “Vehicle Convoy Security,” p. B-1-4. 229Mallory interview. 230Barry Montgomery telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

4 September 2013.

231John Chapman telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 5 September 

2013; and Paul Mauricio telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 5 

September 2013.

232Walter Deeks interview, July 2000 and 29 March 2013; and Grailn 

Weeks telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 10 October 2013. 

233Fred Carter had just stood before the promotion board the week 

before, which was why he remembered Bond had the day off to go 

before it that day. Fred Carter telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

20 September 2013; Gary Looney telephone interview by Richard 

Killblane, 25 February 2014.

234Erik Freeman interview by Richard Killblane at New Orleans, LA, 

11 July 2002.

235Carter interview. 236Erik Freeman interview by Richard Killblane at New Orleans, LA, 

11 July 2002.

237Deeks remembered hearing, “Help, help, help,” Chapman remembered 

hearing, “ambush, ambush, ambush,” but Fred Carter remembered 

hearing, “Contact, contact, contact!” followed by, “We need help,” 

and then something about the gun truck being disabled. 

Montgomery interview.

238Mauricio and Chapman interviews.

239Deeks interview, July 2000 and 29 March 2013; and Weeks interview. 240Deeks interview, July 2000 and 29 March 2013; and Weeks interview. 241Looney interview, and Weeks interview. 242With a little play on words, “Purple Haze” happened to be a 1967 

song by Jimmy Hendrix.

243Weeks interview. 244Montgomery, Chapman, and Mauricio interviews. 245Fred Carter telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 20 September 

2013. SSG Hector J. Diaz statement after the ambush said the gun 

truck, The Untouchable bolted past us and the burning tanker entering 

the kill-zone.” Erik Freeman, NCOIC of The Untouchable remembered he 

stopped behind Brutus, but a photo taken by Fred Carter, showed 

Freeman talking with the lead convoy commander and wrecker 

operator with Brutus behind them.

246Deeks interview, Freeman interview; and Diaz Statement, no date. 247Not everyone was in agreement how soon after its arrival was Dahl 

killed. Diaz Statement claimed 15 minutes after its arrival. Fred Carter 

remembered the fighting had died down after they arrived, Deeks and 

Montgomery remembered hearing the sound of the mini-guns firing when 

Brutus arrived in the kill zone. Most agreed the entire ambush lasted 

an hour or more, so 45 minutes into the ambush seemed a reasonable 

estimate of when Dahl was killed. Carter and Mallory interviews; 

and Diaz Statement.

248Freeman, Deeks, and Mallory interviews; and Diaz Statement. 249There are differing opinions on which direction Ron drove. Fred Carter 

remembered Mallory drove Brutus back down the pass rather than try to 

negotiate the kill zone. The gun trucks crews ahead remembered Brutus 

driving past them in the kill zone heading west. Mallory said he was in 

shock but thinks he drove westward to the nearest check point manned 

by an Infantry unit at the bridge. He remembered driving through the 

smoke of the burning tanker. Diaz Statement also recorded they drove to 

Bridge 19, which was past the bridge where Creeper was hit.

250Deeks, Chapman and Mauricio interviews. Mauricio remembered this 

incident took place ten minutes after their arrival, but Deeks remembered it took place after Brutus was attacked. 

251Deeks interview. 252Deeks interview, and Weeks interview. Mauricio remembered Chapman told him at the end of the ambush it had lasted an hour and 25 minutes. Over 40 years later, Chapman remembered it lasted over an hour.

253Chapman, Deeks, Mauricio, Montgomery, and Weeks interviews. 254Carter, Chapman, Deeks, Freeman , Mallory, Mauricio, Montgomery 

and Weeks interviews.

255Paul Blosser interview by Richard Killblane, 9 June 2002 and 

LTC Alvin C. Ellis, “Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 39th 

Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS 

CSFOR-65 (R2),” Headquarters, 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck), 

APO San Francisco 96308, 4 May 1971.

256Email correspondence between Erik Freeman and Charles Sims, 

15 – 21 February 1998.

257Ibid. 258Freeman-Sims email and Freeman interview. 259Freeman interview. 260Freeman-Sims email, and Freeman interview.
Vietnam War 107

2. Southern II Corps Tactical Zone

500th Transportation Group, Cam Ranh Bay

n spite of the losses incurred in the northern II Corps 

Tactical Zone by 8th Group convoys in 1967 and 

1968, the 500th Group down in Cam Ranh Bay had 

not lost anyone to an ambush until late 1969, almost two 

years after the ambushes began along QL19. The threat 

level was not nearly as dangerous as it was on QL19 

although enemy attacks on convoys in the southern II 

Corps Zone began to increase in the summer and fall 

of 1968. Of the two truck battalions under the 500th 

Group, the 24th Transportation Battalion conducted 

port clearance and local haul in the Cam Ranh Bay area 

while the 36th Transportation Battalion conducted line 

haul to the different camps. To accomplish this, the 36th 

Transportation Battalion had three truck companies: 

the 172nd, 442nd, 566th and the 670th Medium Truck 

Companies. The 172th was an Army Reserve Company 

from Nebraska that served in Vietnam from 1968 to 

1969. Just as the 8th Group prior to COL Ludy, the 36th 

Transportation Battalion ran with long consolidated 

convoys of 80 to 150 vehicles divided into serials of 

I

20 to 30 vehicles with a 5 to 10 minute gap between 

them and its gun truck development followed the same 

process of experimentation.

Between August and October 1968, the 36th 

Transportation Battalion converted 5- ton cargo trucks 

to hardened trucks just as the 8th Transportation Group 

had the previous year. Initially, the 5- ton cargo gun 

trucks added the cab armor kits and constructed double 

wall gun boxes out of lumber with the air gap filled with 

sandbags, with three gunners in the gun box. Each gun 

truck had two pedestal-mounted M -60s and one M -79 

grenade launcher with a basic load of two 400 - round 

cases of M - 60 ammunition and one case of 40mm 

grenades. Like the 8th Group experience, these wooden 

gun boxes turned out to be too heavy resulting in poor 

handling, excessive wear on the tires and continuous 

brake failures and resulted in the death of one driver. 

To decrease the weight and still provide best protection, 

the battalion discovered a 3⁄8 -inch rolled steel plate set 

two to three inches in front of a 1⁄4- steel plate worked 

better. This reduced the weight to less than four and a 

half short tons. The battalion initially placed one gun 

truck in each convoy. The 36th Transportation Battalion 

Ban Me Thout Pass. Photo courtesy of Wayne Patrick
108 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I

The Mortician. The first design of the guntruck in 500th Transportation Group were contruction of either 2 X 8 or 2 X 10 

inch wood walls reinforced with two layers of sandbags. Photo courtesy of James Bambenk

Rear view of Ejaculator. Photo courtesy of James Bambenk
Vietnam War 109

Above: The Flying Dutchman 

was one more plank taller. 

Photo courtesy 

of James Bambenk

Left: Front view of 

The Flying Dutchman. 

Photo courtesy of James Bambenk

Below: The 360th 

Transportation Company slid 

APC hulls in backwards to 

better distrute the weight 

for stability. Photo by Tom Berry 

courtesy of James Lyles
110 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

learned the hardened trucks deterred enemy ambushes 

and after January 1969 increased the number of gun 

trucks from one to two per convoy, but recommended 

increasing the number of hardened gun trucks to six 

per medium truck company so each super convoy 

would have six gun trucks.261 

Gun truck training in the 566th was learned on 

the job. Initially the gunners test fired their M-60s the 

night before the convoy at the post range, but often 

the gunner who fired the M-60 the night before was 

not assigned to the gun truck the next day. So the 36th 

Battalion wanted a test fire range next to the convoy 

assembly area.262 Crews learned fields of fire and how to 

control fire while ensuring that the convoy drove through 

the kill zone. SGT Rich Cahill, who joined the 566th in 

January 1969, developed the tactic of having the gun 

truck in contact pull out to the contact side to make 

room for the convoy to pass then wait for the next gun 

truck to come up and take its place. Then the first gun 

truck would escort the convoy out of the kill zone. The 

M -2 .50 caliber machine guns did not arrive until around 

March 1969 and the crews initially mounted one in each 

gun truck. If the barrels of the .50 had to be changed out 

in the fight, the crews used the timing gauge to ensure 

that the new barrel had proper headspace even under 

fire. One unwritten SOP was that whichever side the 

convoy received contact, the gunner on the unengaged 

side would become an ammo man. Each sergeant ran 

his gun truck differently but typically when engaged, the 

driver stopped and fired the M -79 grenade launcher, the 

NCOIC fired the .50, another gunner fired the M-60, and 

the other gunner would serve as the ammo man. The 

rules of engagement still only allowed the gunners to 

return fire when fired upon and the mission of the 

566th gun trucks was not to attack the Viet Cong but 

to defend the convoy to prevent causalities.263

In April 1969, SGT Rich Cahill’s gun truck #363 

followed right behind the lead gun jeep a large convoy 

heading up to Ban Me Thout. The road followed a 

northerly path up the ridge on the east side of the 

pass with the low ground on the west side. Like Mang 

Giang and An Khe Passes, the enemy liked to ambush 

convoys heading up this pass. On this mission, Cahill’s 

convoy was hit by small arms fire from the woods. SGT 

Cahill drove up there to provide suppressive fire while 

the convoy raced past him. When the second gun truck 

came up, it laid down suppressive fire and Cahill’s gun 

truck was supposed to pull out and keep going. Instead 

it remained in place because enemy fire came from 

one small area and Cahill wanted to make sure the 

rear elements caught up since they had the 

maintenance personnel.264

In late April 1969, a convoy from the 36th Battalion 

was bound for the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry base 

camp at Phan Rang south along the coastal highway 

(QL1). This was a short run that only took half a day to 

reach the destination and then return by the end of the 

day. The convoys ran with 70 to 80 trucks with three 

to five gun trucks. They usually had an MP gun jeep or 

V100 armored car in the lead and gun trucks spaced 

evenly throughout the convoy with one in the trail party. 

The line up consisted of the MP gun jeep, the convoy 

commander’s gun jeep, Rick “Snuffy” Smith’s gun jeep, 

then the cargo trucks.265 

The coastal highway, QL1, ran north and south along 

the flat coastal plain. The “Coconut Grove,” was about 

halfway between Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang to the 

south. It was a rubber plantation on the west side of the 

road and a field of elephant grass on the east. Smith 

claimed that a million monkeys must have lived in the 

grove and swarmed the trucks whenever they passed, 

which was why they called it the “Coconut Grove.” The 

coastal highway was a heavily trafficked highway by both 

military and civilian traffic. For this reason, no one ever 

expected to get hit along this route. So the drivers did 

not even wear their flak vests.266 

When the convoy reached the “Coconut Grove,” the 

enemy initiated the ambush with small arms fire on the 

lead and middle vehicles creating two kill zones. The 

APC gun truck, “USA,” and one gun jeep were caught 

off guard. There was one gun truck and one gun jeep for 

every 30 vehicles. The vehicles were typically bunched 

up with no more than 20 feet between vehicles. The 

lead kill zone caught 16 to 20 vehicles. Gun trucks did 

their normal routine. Rick Smith fired his M -79 grenade 

launcher from the hip as fast as could. The enemy fired 

a few mortars but missed because they overshot. The 

fire fight lasted about 15 minutes.267

In spite of the number of trucks shot up, no one 

in the convoy was killed or wounded. Most of the 

trucks had flat tires, but all were able to drive to their 

destination. Rick Smith learned never to take his eyes 
Vietnam War 111

off Coconut Grove again. The lesson was to expect 

an ambush where one least expected it. The enemy 

watched the convoy behavior and looked for signs 

of weakness.268 

Meanwhile, through February and April, the 500th 

Transportation Group tested the concept of using the 

V100 Commando armored car as a security and control 

vehicle and liked it, especially because of the shortage 

of steel. It had better protection and fire power than the 

gun jeeps. The V100 had twin .30 caliber machine guns 

in a turret, which was far superior to an M- 60 mounted 

in the back of an M-151. The V100 could attain the 

same speed as the M-151. So by November 1969, all 

convoys of the 36th Battalion were escorted by internal 

hardened gun trucks and MP V100s.269

In May of 1969, the 566th switched over from 

wooden gun boxes to steel. The US Navy provided 

sheets of steel in addition to the gun box kits. Gun boxes 

were made of 5/8-inch steel, wood inside the steel box, 

and two layers of sandbags for protection. By then, the 

crews of the 566th began naming their gun trucks. Jim 

Darby received The Mortician form the 172nd, Cliff Taylor 

named his The Gambler, and Walter Robertson named 

his Cobra’s Den. The first gun truck to construct a steel 

box was The Mortician. Eventually the other five gun 

trucks received steel boxes, the Gambler and Cobra’s 

Den being the last two. 

The 360th Transportation Company (POL), although 

belonging to the Quartermaster battalion, rode in the 

36th Battalion convoys. The 360th Medium Truck 

Company had built three gun trucks: USA in the 1st 

Platoon, Roach Coach in the 2nd Platoon and Grogin’s 

Heroes in the 3rd Platoon. The 442nd Medium 

Truck built the Flying Dutchman, Widow Maker and 

Ejaculator.270 The one difference between 8th Group 

APC gun trucks and those of the 36th Battalion; the 

Cam Ranh Bay crews slide their APC hulls in backwards 

which more evenly distributed the weight across the 

front and rear wheels. Even by January 1970, the three 

companies in the battalion had not replaced all the wood 

and sandbag gun trucks with steel boxes on account of 

the shortage of 5⁄8 - inch steel sheets. The battalion also 

requested radios for each gun truck.271

The 36th Transportation Battalion did not have 

enough men to man all the machine guns in the gun 

truck, so LTC Edward Honor, 36th Transportation 

Battalion Commander from July through December 

1969, circumvented that problem by borrowing fill-in 

gunners and volunteers from Finance, Admin, supply 

depot, and even Navy units around Cam Ranh Bay. Thus, 

only the NCOIC and driver were actually permanent crew 

members of the gun truck. The temporary gunners were 

taught to fire the machine guns on the range before 

going out on one convoy and then returned to their 

regular duties.272 John Jacobs was one of the exceptions. 

He arrived in the 557th Maintenance Company in 

December 1969 and after seeing the gun trucks tear up 

a hill side at the range a week later, he signed up as a 

gunner and rode with SGT Cahill. After that Jacobs was 

hooked and signed up every day he returned to go out 

the next day. He rode a couple times with the 360th 

and 442nd, but mostly with the 566th. Otherwise, 

these temporary gunners provided no consistency.273

24 November 1969

36th Transportation Battalion

an Me Thuot was a routine destination for 

convoys of the 36th Battalion. The terrain 

between Nha Trang and Ban Me Thuot was 

mountainous jungle with some open areas where the 

jungle had been cleared or defoliated. The road was 

so narrow that trucks could not pass. The run to Ban 

Me Thuot took most of the day so the convoys usually 

had to rest over night at the camp and return the next 

day. The convoys to Ban Me Thout ran with anywhere 

from 80 to 150 vehicles divided into serials of 20 to 

30 vehicles with a 5 to 10 minute gap between them. 

An MP with a V100 armored car usually led each serial 

followed by a lieutenant or NCO in a gun jeep with radio 

communications and an M-60 mounted on a pedestal. 

Each serial had a gun truck with an NCO, radio and one 

.50 caliber machine gun and two M- 60s. The gun trucks 

carried twelve 100 -round cans of M-60 ammunition 

and a like number of .50 caliber ammunition. The trail 

party made up the last serial and included a gun jeep, 

wrecker, ambulance, tire truck, 10 to 20 bob tails and 

a gun truck. The number of extra bob tails depended 

on the size of the convoy. Because of the rapid 

promotion from second lieutenant to captain in two 

years, LTC Honor had a policy that captains had to 

be the convoy commanders.274 

B
112 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

On 24 November 1969, CPT Wayne Patrick, 

Commander of the 442nd Medium Truck Company, was 

the convoy commander. On a return trip from Ban Me 

Thuot, the convoy was delayed on account of the poor 

weather conditions and low clouds prevented helicopters 

from flying. Normally the convoys departed between 

0700 and 0800 hours depending on mechanical 

problems. After line-up for the return trip they waited 

around an hour or more for the weather to improve. LTC 

Honor also had a policy that no convoy would run without 

air cover. It would have been normal procedure to radio 

battalion headquarters and inform them of the situation 

then get approval. Air cover would normally have joined 

them before they had gone far outside Ban Me Thuot. 

CPT Patrick made the decision to depart without air 

cover since road security in the mountain pass was 

considered adequate.275 

The 101st Airborne Division and ROK Army provided 

security in the area. The Koreans had a base at the top 

of the Pass and the ARVN had a training base at the 

bottom. CPT Patrick had radio contact with security 

operations when entering their area of operation and 

Ban Me Thuot Pass. The enemy usually fired down on 

passing convoys with small arms from the high ground 

and crew-served weapons from across the valley. 

Photo courtesy of Wayne Patrick

there had been no reports of any 

significant enemy activity. It was 

not unusual to receive sporadic 

small arms fire from time to 

time but no convoy had been 

ambushed on this route before. 

Another factor in making the 

decision to depart was to return to 

Cam Ranh Bay before dark. It was 

not unusual to delay departure 

for various reasons but it was 

unusual to cancel a return trip.276

 An MP V100 armored car and 

a gun jeep led the convoy. The 

convoy had between 80 and 100 

vehicles divided into serials. CPT 

Patrick kept a gun truck at the 

rear of the first serial, another 

in the trail party, and the others 

space evenly though the middle 

of the convoy. He often rode either 

in the rear of the first serial or the 

middle of the convoy. This day he 

rode in the middle. This allowed 

him to drive up and down the convoy to respond better 

to problems. It also kept him in radio range with the lead 

and rear of his convoy. As the convoy commander, CPT 

Patrick’s jeep had three radios to coordinate with air, 

ground and artillery support.277 

Ban Me Thuot Pass. Photo courtesy of Wayne Patrick
Vietnam War 113

Peacemaker waiting to escort a convoy of the 442nd 

Transportation Company. Photo courtesy of Wayne Patrick

Convoys to Ban Me Thuot usually waited at the bottom of the pass for air support. Photo courtesy of Wayne Patrick

About two hours after departure, the convoy was 

halfway down the mountain pass in the area secured 

by the 101st Airborne Division. The mountain rose 

above them on the north side of the road, to their left, 

and leveled out into a flat cleared zone to the south 

(passenger side) with a tree line around 100 yards away. 

That section of paved road had multiple curves that 

caused the trucks to slow down. CPT Patrick heard a 

boom up ahead followed by the report of “Contact” 

on the radio.278

The enemy in the wood line fired three to five B-40 

rockets (RPGs) at one of the gun trucks in the middle of 

the convoy and hit the top corner of the passenger side 

of gun box. The blast wounded three crew members 

and cut SP4 Larry E. Collins in half. The lead part of the 

convoy continued on while the trucks behind stopped. 

Another gun truck pulled security on the disabled gun 

truck. The fight lasted five minutes.279 

CPT Patrick was a quarter to a half a mile behind it 

and raced up to the rear of the disabled gun truck. He 

reached the scene a few minutes later. He was on the 

radio with the 101st. A couple of 101st paratroopers 

were nearby and were firing on the tree line for another 

15 to 20 minutes. In just a few minutes there was a call 

on his radio from a Cobra gunship, with the call sign 

“Undertaker.” He reported his position and three Cobras 

came in and worked the area over for about ten minutes. 

During that time, a Huey from the 101st Airborne 

Division came in and extracted the wounded. The rest 

of the convoy continued on. The trail party recovered 

the disabled gun truck.280 

The rest of the convoy moved up while the area 

was secure and the trail party secured the disabled gun 

truck. The rear half of the convoy regrouped with the lead 

half at the normal rest stop in a safe area. The convoy 

returned to Cam Ranh Bay without further incident.281 
114 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Lesssons

Wayne Patrick drew these lessons: It was standard 

operating procedure to have air cover. Although we had 

sporadic enemy contact when air cover was in the area it 

was a deterrent to enemy activity. Radio communications 

within the convoy and with area security forces were 

extremely important. Quick response from area security 

forces limited the enemy’s ability to continue with the 

attack. The Convoy Commander needs to be in the middle 

of the convoy to be able to respond quickly. The convoy 

maintained security and cleared the kill zone as per normal 

instructions. Clearing the contact/kill zone was always 

covered in briefings with convoy officers and NCO’s. Drivers 

and others on the convoy knew to clear contact/kill zone.282

Patrick added these lessons:

(1) Have air cover up or very close by 

(2) Have security forces on notice for quick 

 response, make radio contact 

(3) The Convoy Commander should have more than

 one radio, one to run the convoy and one for air 

support or security forces. 

(4) You should have multiple gun trucks or armored 

vehicles per convoy in order to protect and secure 

the convoy in the event of attack or multiple attacks. 

(5) Briefings should be held prior to departing 

to ensure that all personnel are aware of critical 

instructions to follow in the event of an attack. 

(6) Make sure your weapons work prior to departure,

test fire your weapons. This wasn’t a problem 

for the 442.283

On 17 January 1970, COL Hank DelMar, Commander 

of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, zeroed out the 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 36th 

Transportation Battalion and attached its truck 

companies to the 24th Transportation Battalion, 

which picked up the line haul mission in addition 

to the port clearance and short haul. 

26 June 1970

360th Transportation Company (POL)

normal line haul mission to Ban Me Thuot had 

80 to 120 vehicles. Ronald Smith remembered 

the convoy on 26 June 1970 had 12 gun trucks; 

four from the 360th POL Company, four from the 670th 

Medium Truck Company and four from the 442nd Medium 

Truck. The reefers were in front, followed by the flat beds 

with projectiles (projos) and food, then POL tankers and 

Photo courtesy of Wayne Patrick

A
Vietnam War 115

the trail party. Convoys were organized by type of truck 

then by company. This would have placed the 360th 

POL tankers in the last march unit of the convoy.284

SSG Jack Buckwalter was the NCOIC of the 360th 

march unit. It started out with 21 vehicles. The platoon 

leader was the convoy serial commander and rode in 

a gun jeep at the head of the serial with a MP V100 

and a gun truck. Another gun truck rode closer to the 

rear. A gun truck and three more gun jeeps were even 

distributed through the serial. Cliff Taylor’s gun truck, 

The Gambler from the 566th, brought up the rear of that 

march unit. Walter Robertson’s Cobra’s Den also of the 

566th was the rear gun truck and SSG Buckwalter rode 

in the trail gun jeep at the end of the convoy. This was 

the policy of 500th Group convoys at the time. Ten 

10 -ton tractor and trailers loaded with petaprime were 

waiting for them at the bottom of the Ban Me Thuot 

Pass so they could have air cover going up the Pass. 

The convoy had an L-19 Bird Dog for air cover. The 

ten tractors and trailers fell in the last serial.285

On its way up the Ban Me Thuot Pass, an enemy 

soldier fired an RPG at one of the lead POL tankers 

driven by SP4 Charles Pedigo. The rocket flew at an 

angle through the cab and hit the fuel tank. Pedigo 

safely jumped out of the cab but the truck started to 

roll forward. So he jumped back in the cab to set the 

hand brake then the fuel tanker blew up killing him. 

That act prevented the truck from rolling back down 

the steep grade into the other trucks. The burning 

truck melted to the asphalt and blocked the narrow 

mountain road stopping the convoy.286

The convoy commander and the vehicles ahead 

of the burning fuel tanker continued to Engineer Hill at 

the top of the Pass. He radioed back to his NCOIC that 

they were receiving small arms fire. They received small 

arms fire from the ridge across the valley to the north 

and down from the ridge above to the south. The enemy 

on the ridge across the valley had 81mm mortars and 

12.7mm machine guns firing green tracers. All the gun 

trucks entered the kill zone, pulled off to the side of the 

road and fired at the enemy on the opposite ridge. The 

air cover left because there was too much ground fire. 

One gun truck pulled up to right next to the burning 

tanker, the USA pulled over to the right side of the 

road about 300 meters below the burning tanker 

returned fire.287 

SSG Buckwalter only heard the muffled explosion 

of the rocket. He did not hear the small arms fires that 

far back in the convoy. He immediately raced his gun 

jeep to the front of the convoy. As he rounded the jungle 

road, he saw two MP gun jeeps halted on the left side 

of the road. He ordered them to drive up to the fight but 

they refused. Buckwater told his gunner to shoot them 

if they did not move. The MPs then did as instructed. 

When the SSG reached the scene, there was no longer 

any enemy fire. He told the crews in the gun trucks to 

open fire anyway on the ridge across the valley. During 

the process, a major kept calling on the radio wanting 

to know about his petaprime.288

The gun trucks returned fire for 35 minutes until 

the firing quieted down. SSG Buckwalter then made 

the decision for the trucks behind Pedigo’s burning 

truck had to turn around and return down the mountain. 

The mountain road was narrow so the gun truck USA 

had to back up to a place where the tractors could 

turn around. Smith could see the smoke for 35 miles. 

They found an American unit at the base of the hill and 

waited for two and a half hours until the lieutenant 

called that they had air cover again. The drivers did not 

like the idea of driving back up the hill but Buckwalter 

made them. On the trip up, he stopped to recover 

Pedigo’s body from the burning truck. The body had 

been burnt into a small ball and a few bones. He could 

not find the skull. The next day he stopped again but 

none of the body remained. Around 200 yards past 

the burned out tanker, the convoy was hit again by 

small arms fire but the gun trucks returned fire and 

the convoy kept going. The last gun truck dropped 

back to make sure that SSG Buckwalter was safe. 

It drove just ahead of the trial gun jeep the rest 

of the trip down the mountain.289 

Lesson

This was one time that air cover did not discourage the 

enemy from attacking. The enemy attacked from the 

ridge across the valley. SSG Buckwalter thought the 

initial RPG round was fired from the gully below the road. 

That was why it hit its target. The small arms fire may 

have been ineffective because of the range. Convoys 

had been hit several times in this location and the

enemy appeared to have tried attacking from 

different locations. 
116 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

261LTC Paul E. Reise, Operational Report of the 36th Transportation 

Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 17 October 1968, 31 October 1968, 

RCS CSFOR-65 (RI). MAJ Jonathan R. Barrett, Operational Report of the 

36th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 31 January 1969, 

12 February 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI).

262Reise, Operational Report of the 36th. 263Interview by Richard Killblane of Clifford Wesley Taylor, Jim Darby, Ron 

Owens, Walter Robertson, Richard Cahill, John Jacobs, Harold Marshall, 

Alford Hatton, and Manny Tellez, veterans of the 566th Transportation 

Company at Pigeon Forge, TN, 7 August 2009. Barrett, Operational 

Report of the 36th.

264566th TC veteran interviews. 265Rick Smith telephone interview by Richard Killblane at Branson, MO, 

22 August 2005.

266Ronald Smith interview by Richard Killblane at Branson, MO, 17 June 

2005; and Rick Smith interviews.

267Ronald Smith and Rick Smith interviews. 268Rick Smith Interview. 2691LT James F. Hunt, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 

Headquarters, 500th Transportation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1969, 

5 September 1969; MAJ John F. Nantroup, Operational Report of the 

500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period ending 31 July 

1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI), 8 December 1969; and LTC Edward Honor, 

Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th 

Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969, 

25 February 1970.

270Ronald Smith interview; and Wayne Patrick interview by 

Richard Killblane at New Orleans, LA, 12 July 2002.

271MAJ Thomas P. Storey, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 

Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 17 January 

1970. Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck) APO 96312, 

17 January 1970.

Since the enemy destroyed a fuel truck in the front 

part of the convoy, only the convoy commander and few 

vehicles were able to continue to safety. Fortunately, 

the most experienced leader was in the rear. SSG 

Buckwalter had already completed a couple tours in 

Vietnam. He was probably the most experienced soldier 

in the convoy serial. In this case placing the NCOIC in the 

rear of the convoy and the lieutenant at the head was a 

good idea. From atop the Pass, the lieutenant was able 

to coordinate the air cover for the convoy to return.

272Richard Killblane, Mentoring and Leading; The Career of Lieutenant 

General Edward Honor, Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Transportation School, 

2003.

273566th group interview. 274Wayne Patrick interview by Richard Killblane at New Orleans, LA, 

12 July 2002; Wayne Patrick email to Richard Killblane, August 29, 2005. 

LTG (R) Edward Honor remembered the gap between serials was 10-15 

minutes. Edward Honor email to Richard Killblane, August 31, 2005. 

Wayne Patrick remembered that the gap was 4-6 minutes, 

Wayne Patrick email to Richard Killblane, September 1, 2005.

275Patrick email. 276Patrick interview, 12 July 2002 and 17 June 2005 and email 

August 29, 2005.

277Patrick interview, 12 July 2002 and 17 June 2005. 278Patrick email, August 29, 2005. 279Patrick interview, 12 July 2002 and 17 June 2005. 280Patrick interview, 12 July 2002 and 17 June 2005 and email, 

August 29, 2005.

281Patrick email, August 29, 2005. 282Patrick email, August 29, 2005. 283Ibid. 284Ronald Smith interview by Richard Killblane, 17 June 2005; 

Robert Dalton email to Richard Killblane, September 6, 2005; 

and 566th group interview.

285Jack Buckwalter telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 

7 September 2005; and 566th TC interviews.

286566th group interview, Ronald Smith and Buckwalter interviews. 287Ronald Smith interview. 288Smith interview and Dalton email. 289Buckwalter interview.
Vietnam War 117

Robert Fromm next to convoy of the 585th Transportation Company prior to its move to Phu Bai. Photo courtesy of Robert Fromm

3. I Corps Tactical Zone

n December 1967, US Army Vietnam (USARV) sent 

two truck companies north into I Corps Tactical Zone 

to support the recent movement of the 1st Cavalry 

Division into that area. The 57th Transportation Battalion 

arrived in February 1968 and set up headquarters 

at Gai Le Combat Base in Phu Bai on 9 February and 

then Dong Ha Combat Base on 23 February to support 

the 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions just 

ten miles south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The 

battalion initially provided command and control over 

the 57th Light Truck, 61st Medium Truck Petroleum, 

446th Medium Truck, and 585th Medium Truck 

Companies with a platoon each from the 360th and 

538th Medium Truck Petroleum Companies. The 63rd 

Light Truck, 363rd Light Truck, 572nd Medium Truck, 

and 863rd Light Truck arrived in March. The battalion 

received seven armored M35A2 21⁄2 - tons, which 

it issued to the 57th, 446th and 572nd 

Transportation Companies.290 

The 2nd Platoon, Headquarters and Maintenance 

Sections of the 585th Transportation Company had 

relocated to Da Nang on 14 January 1968 and then 

further to Gai Le on 19 January where it conducted 

port and beach clearance at Hue and Tan My. In 

March, the rest of the Company joined it in Gai Le.291 

The truck companies in I Corps Tactical Zone 

would develop their escort procedures differently than 

8th Transportation Group in Northern II Corps. Unlike 

8th Group, the truck units did not build gun trucks but 

relied upon tanks and infantry for escort like the US 

Marines. When the Marine convoys expected enemy 

contact, they assigned either a Marine company or 

platoon to escort the convoy. They loaded the Marines

 in three separate trucks interspersed through the 

convoy front, middle and rear just like COL Ludy did 

with his gun trucks. The purpose of the Marines was 

to dismount and engage the enemy while the convoy 

cleared the kill zone. If they anticipated the worst, 

the Marines integrated tanks in the convoy. 

Wayne Chalker described a convoy of the 585th 

Transportation Company that also used tanks 

as escorts.

I
118 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

12 April 1968

585th Transportation Company

“The Fire Base Bastogne Convoy 4/68” 292

Wayne Chalker

uring the week of April 12, 1968 eight members 

of the 585th Transportation Co. (Medium 

Truck Cargo) 39th Transportation Battalion, 

volunteered for a mission to bring much needed 

ammunition and gun barrels into FB Bastogne from 

their base camp at Phu Bai. This is the story from three 

of the eight who took part in this convoy.

On January 14, 1968, Headquarters, Maintenance, 

and 2nd Platoon of the 585th were loaded onto LST 551 

in Qui Nhon harbor and sailed for Da Nang for ultimate 

relocation to Camp Eagle, 101st AB base camp, Phu Bai. 

The remainder of the 585th would join the lead elements 

sometime in March 1968 following the same procedure.

Prior to the 585th’s redeployment to Phu Bai in 

I Corps, the 585th was part of the 27th Trans Battalion 

running convoys to exotic places like An Khe, Pleiku, 

Dak To, Bong Son, Phu Cat, etc from their base camp 

at Phu Tai in II Corps.

The 585th was a 5 -ton tractor-trailer unit. Like 

most transportation companies in Vietnam, we were 

self sufficient and very mobile. We were a very close 

company and depended on each other very much.

In mid-April 1968, SGT Edwards, our 1st Platoon SGT, 

asked for volunteers for a convoy. Eight members 

volunteered to the best of our knowledge. Six of these 

volunteers were Wayne C Chalker, Marion Amos, Steve

Plummer, Neil Maas, Ernie Monaghan, and James McGrath. 

SGT Edwards would not tell us where we were going, 

but told us to be ready the next morning. “Never before 

had we ever been asked to volunteer.”293 “We were 

loaded with artillery projectiles and black powder at the 

Phu Bai ammo dump.”294 At least two of us, Marion Amos 

and me, were loaded with 175mm howitzer barrels.

“The 101st guys seemed surprised that none of us 

had assistant drivers with us. I stated that our company 

was always under strength and that we always drove by 

ourselves. He told me that where you guys are going, 

you need to have someone riding shotgun with you, 

especially with black powder because ‘Charlie’ gets 

nervous when he sees this ammo coming toward him. 

I really didn’t know what he meant at the time.”295 

D

We were going to Fire Base Bastogne which was at 

the mouth of the A Shau Valley. FB Bastogne conducted 

fire support missions for units operating mostly in and 

around the A Shau Valley. FB Bastogne was located west 

of Phu Bai in Thua Thien Province. We were going to be 

the first convoy from our company to attempt a resupply 

of FB Bastogne.

“The eight tractor-trailers were led from the ammo 

dump through Camp Eagle and into the countryside 

by a 101st AB jeep. The farther we drove, the heavier 

the jungle became. I thought it was unusual that there 

were no civilians in the area. We went around a bend 

in the road and met up with tanks and APC’s that were 

interspersed with our trucks. I started to worry and put 

on my helmet and flak jacket.”296 

The OIC of the armor advised us that we would have 

escort for the last mile or so into FB Bastogne. He stated 

the left side of the road was under 101st control, while 

the right side was not. The OIC also told us NOT to stop 

under any circumstances or we would simply be pushed 

off the road by the armor in back of that truck.

“The road was turning into a steep narrow path with 

jungle growing up to the edge of this so called road. In 

II Corp convoys through ‘Ambush Alley’, we were told 

to keep lots of space between trucks so to lessen the 

effects of an ambush. With this in mind, I dropped back 

from the APC in front of me. A soldier from the armor 

behind me ran up and said I was going to get all of our 

asses shot off if I didn’t stay close to the other APC. It 

then struck me that our survival depended on firepower 

from the armor.”297 This so - called road, which turned into 

a path through the jungle, had several steep hills before 

ending at Bastogne. “Because of the steepness on one hill 

and my overloaded trailer, I was pushed by an APC.”298

“Suddenly, all hell broke loose.”299 The armor 

opened up with everything they had on the ride side of 

the road. “The noise was incredible. I started seeing red 

flashes flying over the hood of my truck and exploding on 

the other side of the road. I could also see small arms 

fire hitting hear me. I panicked and almost jumped from 

my truck into the jungle for cover. I’m sure this would 

have ended everything for those and me in the armor 

and trucks behind. The Army taught us that you always 

try and drive through an ambush. Somehow, I got down 

as low as I could behind the wheel and kept driving. 

Believing that I was about to die, I remember thinking 
Vietnam War 119

about how bad my parents were going to feel, and I 

started to pray.”300 

In my truck, I remember the intense firing, but I also 

remember that I had to get my truck up and over each 

hill in front of me. Survival, in my mind, was to stay close 

to the tank in front of me. As mentioned before, I was 

carrying 175mm howitzer barrels. The weight was far too 

heavy for my 5-ton tractor. While going up one steep hill, 

I reached ‘1st under’ in a very short time. Even at 1st 

under, I felt my Rpm’s drop. 

As I neared the crest of this hill, even over the firing, 

I knew something happened to my engine. The thought 

of being pushed off the road by the APC behind me was 

frightening. I said a prayer and miraculously my engine 

held out to the top of the hill.

Not long after, all our trucks made it safety into 

FB Bastogne. “The guys who unloaded us at Bastogne 

seemed surprised we arrived intact. One asked me if 

I had any RPG’s fired at me. I said I don’t know, what 

are those? He said they would have been red flashes 

and explosions after they hit. I said yes, several and I 

wondered what those were. They also asked which side 

of the road the incoming fire came from. I said the left. 

They told me that the left side was supposed 

to be secure.”301

Having never been to a firebase like Bastogne before, 

I got a bad feeling about this place and was very anxious 

to get unloaded and back on the road again. The jungle 

came right up to the perimeter of the base. Sort of like 

an island in the middle of the Pacific.

We were hurrying to get unloaded and regroup for 

our fun drive back, when the Major (OIC) informed us 

the road back has been closed. Just prior to this, Steve 

remembered a small convoy of duce and a half’s leaving 

Bastogne just after we arrived and escorted by the same 

armor that brought us in. It was rumored that this convoy 

was hit hard going down the same road we just came up.

The OIC told us to spread out our trucks in the 

firebase so we would be a smaller target. The Major also 

advised us to be ready to move out on 15-minute notice. 

We were to remain at Bastogne for the next six days 

waiting for the road to be re -secured by the 101st.

We were obviously unprepared for our unscheduled 

stopover at Bastogne. None of us had any change 

of clothes, food, personal hygiene items, or extra 

ammunition. During the week, we experienced what 

life was really like at a firebase. “Sitting and waiting 

all those days, I’d see jets dive and drop napalm 

near the perimeter or on the hillsides.”

We caught up on much needed sleep during this 

week. I remember pulling guard duty with a 101st 

guy and trading hand grenades with him. I had the 

newer, baseball type and he had the older oval style. 

(In addition to our personal issued weapons, 585th 

members carried hand grenades in their trucks). During 

the week, the base ammo dump blew. “We jumped into 

bunkers with the 101st people. The ammo was still 

going off when I saw at least four medics with stretchers 

running towards it. I think that was the bravest thing 

I ever saw. No one must have been hurt because 

when it was all over, they walked back.”302 

On or about April 24th, the Major told us to pack 

up and get ready to move out in 15 minutes. Our stay 

at Bastogne was ending. We were happy to be leaving 

and getting back to base camp, but were fearful of what 

lie ahead. “Many of us were worried about the road 

back, and I remember some of us were saying 

good bye to our friends just in case.”303

The return convoy was set up similar to the one we 

came in with a week earlier, tank, truck, APC, truck, etc. 

I remember the Major asking us if we could assist his 

armor with suppression fire on the left side of the road. 

I thought this odd, as all of us know it is hard to shoot 

and drive at the same time.

Soon after leaving Bastogne, the firing commenced 

again. The intensity was the same as coming in the week 

before. I remember several explosions on the edge of 

the road to our left. I was doing my best to fire out the 

window and steer at the same time. I remember shell 

casings from my M-14 burning my left arm. 

“We left the fire base and started driving down 

the mountain when all hell broke loose. The tanks and 

APC’s opened fire and we started shooting to the left 

of the road. I had my rifle cradled in my left arm and I 

was shooting out the driver’s side window. It was a real 

challenge shifting gears and shooting out the window 

and not running into the back of the APC in front of me. 

When one magazine emptied, I would put in another 

and keep firing.”304

“After checking my forward movement, I looked to 

the left, and continued to fire my weapon. This is when 

I thought the devil himself had just hit me between the 
120 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

eyes with his fist. My head jolted and snapped back. 

My black plastic rim glasses were shoved back and 

down into my nose. The pain of being hit between the 

eyes was excruciating. I thought my nose was broke. I 

wasn’t sure what happened. So many things run through 

your mind. First, I thought I must have hit a pothole 

and bumped my head on the steering wheel. When I 

looked up, everything was black. I looked around and 

saw nothing but darkness. A few seconds passed and 

my vision returned. Everything happened so fast that I 

was in a state of confusion for a moment. After realizing 

I didn’t hit a pothole, I gathered my thoughts, pushed 

my glasses back up on my nose and kept shooting and 

driving. The only thing on my mind again was to get out 

of that area as quick as we could.”305 

Marion’s truck was ahead of mine in the convoy 

back. As I previously mentioned, I remember several 

explosions just in front of my truck on the left edge of 

the road. One of these explosions would have been in 

line with the driver’s side of Marion’s truck. When we 

cleared the fire zone area, the armor pulled out and we 

pulled off and stopped to regroup. Marion came walking 

back to me and had blood streaming down his face from 

a hole in his forehead just above the rim of his glasses.

He had obviously been hit with shrapnel and it had 

been deflected off the center portion of his glasses. 

This may have saved his live or at least prevented a 

more serious wound. I knew we had to get out of this 

area as quickly as possible. We were still in hostile 

territory without any armor or convoy protection. 

I sat Marion down and bandaged him as best I could 

and asked him if he could drive. He said he could. I told him 

to stay in front of me so I could watch him until we arrived 

back at Phu Bai which was 10 -15 miles away. In addition 

to no convoy protection, we had no radio and no OIC.

The convoy into Bastogne the week before began 

to take its toll on our trucks. “We all knew that this area 

was unsafe and everyone wanted out of there as fast as 

possible, but more trucks started breaking down. I think 

we may have had up to four trucks no longer running by 

the time we got back to Phu Bai. We came in pushing 

and pulling each other at about 5 miles per hour. No 

one was left behind. We all came back together.”306 

When we arrived back at Phu Bai, I escorted Marion 

to an aid station. The medic examined him, re-bandaged 

him and told him to go back to work. Several days later, 

Marion experienced severe headaches and returned to 

a Marine aid station. There he was re-examined and 

some shrapnel was removed from his forehead.

Marion, to this day, carries a small piece of shrapnel 

in his head from that day. Nothing more was ever said to 

the eight from that convoy. We all went back to work the 

next day hauling to Camp Evans, Quang Tri, Dong Ha etc. 

No one, to our knowledge, ever received any award or 

commendation for our volunteer mission into Bastogne. 

Marion did not even receive a Purple Heart for his wound.

Lesson

This was one of the rare cases where tanks escorted 

a convoy. The important factor was that the tanks and 

APCs remained with the convoy and did not abandon it 

to chase after the enemy. The steep jungle terrain gave 

them no other choice. One might also notice there was a 

tank or APC between each truck. That provided enough 

fire power to beat back even the most determined 

attack. This type of escort was only practical because 

of the high probability of enemy ambush and importance 

of the cargo. With enough fire power a convoy can travel 

down any road regardless of the threat.

39th Transportation Battalion

he number of truck companies required 

a second truck battalion and the 39th 

Transportation Battalion assumed control of all 

the truck companies except the 63rd Light Truck in May 

1968. The 57th Battalion would support US Army units 

in the southern part of the I Corps Tactical Zone and the 

39th Battalion would support the US Army units in the 

northern half of the I Corps Tactical Zone. In early 1970, 

the battalion commander of the 39th Transportation 

Battalion required the truck companies to construct gun 

trucks, but they built only one per company probably 

because the small convoys of 10 to 15 vehicles did not 

require more gun trucks. Most convoys were escorted by 

gun jeeps and a gun truck and gun jeep was assigned to 

the convoy routes where they expected contact. For the 

most part ambushes were small in comparison to those 

along QL19 and most were restricted to Hai Van Pass or 

heading out to the remote fire bases. So one gun truck 

per company proved sufficient until Operation Lam Son 

719 in January 1971.

T
Vietnam War 121

Lam Son 719

y 1970, the gun truck design and doctrine had 

reached fruition. Experimentation had ended. 

The 523rd Transportation Company (Medium 

Truck) had six gun trucks; Satan’s Lil’ Angel, Ace of 

Spades, Black Widow, Uncle Meat, King Kong and Eve 

of Destruction. Each of the three platoons had two gun 

trucks. By then, new crew members were volunteers 

selected by consensus of the other crew members. The 

gun truck crews felt elite but the 523rd believed that by 

assigning two gun trucks to each platoon, rather than 

to their own platoon, they felt more like members of the 

company. They lived with the drivers who they had to 

protect. Since they were the best, much was expected 

of them and if they failed to defend the trucks then they 

would have to face their brothers when they returned 

B

to the barracks at night. 

This late in the war, 

there was a shortage 

of Transportation 

Corps officers. Second 

lieutenants made first 

lieutenant in one year 

then captain in the next. 

The rapid promotion and 

other duties caused a 

shortage of lieutenants in 

the truck companies, but 

the drawdown of Infantry 

divisions created an excess 

of infantry officers. So the 

burden of leading convoys 

fell heavily on the NCOs. 

However, during 1970, 

the Army assigned three 

infantry officers to the 

523rd. Ranger qualified, 

1LT Ralph Fuller had 

recently served in the 25th 

Infantry Division but when 

it was inactivated, he still 

had part of his one -year 

tour to complete, so he 

was assigned to the 523rd. 

M54 5 -ton cargo trucks of the 523d Transportation 

Company lined up at the unimproved portion of the QL9 

heading from Camp Vandergrift to Khe Sanh. 

Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran
122 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

2LTs Jim Baird and Tom Callahan had both graduated 

from the same Officer Candidate School (OCS) Class 

2 - 70 and were assigned directly to the 523rd. The only 

logical reason they could conclude why US Army Vietnam 

assigned Infantry officers to truck companies were the 

gun trucks. This hinted that the Army felt that gun trucks 

were a combat arms mission. For whatever reason they 

were assigned there, the officers identified with the gun 

trucks and loved the men who crewed them. As combat 

arms officers they felt their place was on the road. Many 

preferred to ride in the gun trucks, endearing them with 

the crews. The 523rd had a special bond between its 

officers and enlisted.307

CPT Donald Voightritter commanded the company. 

CPT V was a fair and respected officer. His brother 

Ronald, another Transportation Corps officer, had 

already earned the Silver Star Medal for valor in the 

The paved portion of QL9 with a Rock Pile in the distance, 

as seen from the back of King Kong. Photo courtesy of 

Danny Cochran

Unimproved portion of QL9. Photo courtesy of the US Army 

Transportation Museum

15 June 1970 ambush. The personality of commanders 

defines the character of their commands. Voightritter 

created an atmosphere of mutual respect and 

camaraderie. This was the strongest asset of the 

company. The officers would discuss informally with the 

gun truck crews what they had done during ambushes. 

No two ambushes were the same and the gun truck 

crews reacted differently to each one. These discussions 

inspired confidence with the lieutenants in their crews. 

Feeling his company was different than the others in 

8th Group, he added an extra thin yellow stripe to the 

yellow noses of their trucks so everyone would know 

they were the 523rd.

In January 1971, the 523rd was sent north from its 

home in Cha Rang Valley to Phu Bai along the coastal 

Highway 1 in the I Corps Tactical Zone in preparation for 

Operation Lam Son 719. Gathered intelligence indicated 

that the North Vietnamese Army was building up their 

logistic bases across the Laotian border in preparation 

for an offensive. MACV felt that by attacking the logistic 

base closest to the North Vietnam would disrupt the 

preparations and delay or discourage the attack. 

Congress had passed a law after the US Cambodian 

incursion that prevented US ground troops from 

crossing the border again. The Army of the Republic 

of Vietnamese (ARVN) would cross the border with the 

support of US helicopters and artillery. The artillery 

set up their fire base at the abandoned Marine camp, 

Khe Sanh. The 39th Transportation Battalion had the 

responsibility to supply the forward deployed troops. The 

east-west, QL9 was the supply route and the battalion 

Officers of the 523d Transportation Company: 

1LT Daugherty, 2LT Jim Baird, 1LT Ralph Fuller, 

CPT Don Voightritter, and 1LT Tom Callahan. 
Vietnam War 123

posted two 5 - ton cargo truck companies, the 515th and 

523rd, at the previously abandoned Camp Vandergrift.308 

To weaken American support to the ARVN drive into 

Laos, the NVA likewise struck the American supply line 

with the intent to completely shut it down. Two areas 

lent themselves to ideal ambush areas, QL9 and Hai Van 

Pass along Highway 1. During the two and a half month 

operation, the NVA conducted 23 convoy ambushes 

along QL9. Three of the ambushes exceeded the others 

in ferocity and casualties.

The road to Vandergrift was a two-lane paved road 

through a valley of tall elephant grass up to the Rock 

Pile, a rocky outcrop that rose 210 meters above the 

surrounding terrain. From there, a narrow, single lane, 

unimproved dirt road snaked along the ridge with a river 

50 to 100 feet below. The rains could cause the clay road 

to cave way down the steep embankment below it. The 

demand for supplies required the two truck companies to 

deliver cargo around the clock, day and night. To prevent 

driving off the road at night, the trucks rolled with their 

lights on giving the enemy ample warning of their arrival. 

The steep slopes with thick jungle vegetation growing 

right up to the road made this ideal ambush terrain. 

With the commencement of Lam Son 719, the guerrillas 

stepped up the frequency and ferocity of their ambushes 

hoping to starve off the American support.

8 February 1971

585th Transportation Company

n 3 February, ARVN units finally arrived at 

Khe Sanh and the next day, American infantry 

and artillery occupied the abandoned border 

village of Tabat. On 8 February, ARVN troops would 

cross the border and invade Laos. Their objective was 

to advance in a series of air assaults by the 1st ARVN 

Airborne Division and three ARVN Ranger battalions 

with ground pushes by the 1st ARVN Armored Division 

to the Tchepone with QL9 as their supply route. To stall 

the offensive, the NVA stepped up their attacks on the 

American convoys along QL9. Bad weather, however, 

prevented C -130s from flying desperately needed 

JP4 aviation fuel bladders into Khe Sanh for the start 

of the offensive.309

On 7 February, the 57th Transportation Company 

(POL) sent a small convoy of tractors hauling empty 

M49C 5,000 -gallon fuel trailers to see if they could 

negotiate the narrow road to Khe Sanh. The captain 

arrived enthusiastic that the test worked.310 Later that 

day three gun trucks and an M113 escorted a convoy 

of fifteen to twenty-four 5,000 -gallon fuel trailers of 

the 3rd Platoon of the 57th Transportation Company 

to Vandergrift. The convoy departed Quang Tri at dusk. 

O

Eve of Destruction of the 523d Transportation Company as it looked during Lam Son 719. Photo courtesty of Fred Teneyck
124 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

The gun trucks came from three different companies. 

The lead truck was a regular cargo truck that knew 

the route followed by four fuel tankers and then a 

gun truck and five more tankers. 1LT Roger Maloney 

remembered the Eve of Destruction from the 523rd 

Light Truck Company was in the convoy. The Eve had 

both right and left front mounted .50s and rear twin .50s 

mounted on a pedestal. It had the unique double steel 

wall design with filler material in between the walls to 

reduce the blast effect of an RPG. The entire bed of the 

gun box was covered with M-2 .50 caliber ammunition. 

Coming up from QL19 in the Central Highlands, the 

crew of the Eve had plenty of combat experience. These 

gunners from 8th Transportation 

Group used spraying fire instead 

of short three to six-round 

bursts. So they would easily 

run out of ammunition in ten 

minutes of steady firing.

The Protector belonged to 

the POL platoon of the 57th 

Transportation Company and 

was the second gun truck in 

line of march. It had two side 

mounted M- 60s and a rear 

pedestal-mounted M-2 .50 

caliber machine gun. SGT 

Healy’s crew of The Protector 

consisted of Sam Bass manned 

the .50, Kurtz was the driver. SP4 

Charles H. Soule was not a regular crew member, but 

had wanted to go out on a gun truck so an M60 gunner 

allowed him to take his place. LT Sam Hoskins was riding 

as the officer in charge of the gun truck and LT Lee 

Stafford, of the 572nd “Gypsy Bandits,” was just hitching 

a ride. The next gun truck in line was The Baby Sitters, 

which belonged to the 515th Light Truck Company.311

The 515th only had one gun truck, The Baby Sitters, 

armed with a forward and rear pedestal-mounted M-2 

.50 caliber machine gun and two side-mounted M-60s. 

SGT Roger Brittner had been the NCOIC of the gun truck 

since his arrival in Vietnam last June. Brittner’s crew had 

joined about the same time he had, which consisted of 

Gene Jones as the driver, Walter Crow from Texas was 

an M-60 gunner, Keith Shed the other M-60 gunner 

and Pete Aragon had the rear .50. Brittner manned the 

forward .50. The gun truck also carried a couple M-79s 

and LAWs, and about 10,000 to 15,000 rounds per 

machine gun. The gunners either fired short bursts or 

spraying fire depending upon the situation or how the 

gunner felt at the time. They had just rebuilt the gun 

truck in December with a new 5-ton, ballistic glass, single 

wall of 1⁄2-inch armor plating and added the rear .50. Most 

of their previous enemy contact had occurred in Hai Van 

Pass but nothing like what they would experience that 

night. Brittner did not have much use for officers, but 

hit it off with 1LT Roger Maloney who had joined the 

company in September. Maloney liked riding in gun 

trucks and was riding in The Baby Sitters that night.

312

The Baby Sitters belonged to the 515th Transportation Company. 

Photo courtesy of Mike Lavin

The Protector belonged to the 57th Transportation 

Company. Photo courtesy of Jose Garcia and James Lyles 
Vietnam War 125

Maloney remembered The Baby Sitters was up front 

that night but Brittner remembered it was behind The 

Protector with ten trucks and two gun trucks ahead of it. 

There were five tankers between each gun truck with an 

APC in the rear.

Because the 57th Transportation Company only had 

three gun trucks, The Protector, Justifier and Assassins, 

the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division loaned 

it an M113 armored personnel carrier (APC) with a turretmounted .50 on front and two left and right M-60s in 

the open hatch in the back. SGT Michael “Mike” McBride, 

former NCOIC of The Protector, was assigned to it, and 

picked Leroy Sherrill and another kid named, Spears, 

as his gunners. Since the convoys ran at about 25 mph 

due to the condition of QL9, the APC had no problem 

keeping up.313 

With gun trucks from three different companies, each 

had different policies for reaction to contact. The 515th 

policy was for every truck to clear the kill zone; even the 

vehicles not in the kill zone were going to drive through 

it. The 523rd policy was for only the vehicles in the kill 

zone to clear it, and the gun trucks would remain in the 

kill zone to protect any drivers in the kill zone. That night 

the convoy halted by the Rock Pile to reestablish their 

interval. Not too far away parked a couple M113 scouts 

from the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor of the 5th Mechanized 

Infantry Division. Suddenly the convoy received a couple 

mortar rounds and Maloney saw the muzzle flash from 

the back side of the hill, so he moved the convoy further 

down the road. The Rock Pile was on the right side of the 

road and there was a bend in the road that took a sharp 

turn to the left. The convoy continued down into a draw, 

crossed the bridge and staged up again near a 

short bridge with embankments on both sides. As 

the convoy slowed down to negotiate the sharp bend 

in the road at 0115 hours, it was then hit by intense 

small arms fire from tall grass mostly on the right 

(passenger) side.314 

The enemy hit the front of the column as if they 

knew what the convoy was hauling. The enemy hit a 

couple tankers from the right (passenger) side of the 

road and they exploded. The kill zone contained the 

vehicles between the lead truck and The Baby Sitters. 

In the dark the gunners could see the muzzle flash and 

green tracers. Maloney fired M -79 grenades as fast as 

he could while everyone else blasted away. So Brittner 

swung his .50 around while firing and shot out the 

antenna causing him to lose radio communication 

with everyone else.315

An RPG slammed into driver’s side of The Protector 

killing Soule, blew the rest of the crew out and blinded LT 

Stafford in back. The enemy poured small arms, rockets 

and mortars into three different parts of the convoy 

setting three tankers on fire. Brittner saw a lieutenant in 

The Protector stand up when the second or third tanker 

was hit; he then fell down as if he had melted. Brittner 

did not like lieutenants on gun trucks, because he did 

not trust them to keep their heads down.316 

The enemy destroyed The Protector and three 

fuel tankers behind it had exploded. The Baby Sitters, 

however, cleared the kill zone with 10 -12 holes and 

a couple tires flat on the right side. The one-way road 

was so narrow there was no place anyone could drive 

past the tankers except a place next to the bridge wide 

QL9 leading west to Rock Pile. Photos courtesy of Mike Lavin QL9 heading south from the Rock Pile where 8 February 

ambush took place.
126 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

enough for a truck to park. McBride’s APC in the rear 

was undamaged. The sound of explosions startled the 

1/77 scouts at the security check point by the Rock Pile. 

The scouts looked to their west and saw a ball of fire 

illuminate the area followed by the sound of small arms 

fire. They cranked up their APCs and saw a lone APC 

speeding away from the kill zone. McBride said he was 

leading trucks out of the kill zone. LT Revelak ordered 

his APC into the kill zone where they saw three burning 

fuel tankers, one which had run over the embankment. 

SP4 Harold Spurgeon saw figures moving in the brush 

but could not distinguish friend from foe so he held his 

fire. The tracks advanced further into the kill zone and 

Spurgeon looked down and saw a soldier wearing a 

helmet running alongside yelling at him, but could not 

hear what he was saying. He later learned the guy was 

warning them not to enter the kill zone. Revelak yelled at 

his scouts to open fire and they sprayed the sides of the 

road. They drove past burning trucks and across a bridge 

then saw a burning gun truck ahead of them. Spurgeon 

saw what he thought was a baldheaded NVA soldier 

crawling in a ditch ten feet from his APC and was about 

to shoot him with his M-60 when he realized it was an 

African-American soldier.317

As the APC rolled further into the kill zone, another 

soldier emerged from the shadows and ran at a crouch 

beside his APC yelling something up at the crew, which 

they could not hear. When the track pulled up next to the 

gun truck, its machineguns hung down and the gun truck 

appeared empty and lifeless. They saw nothing past this 

point, so the APC pivot steered in the road and headed 

back. The lieutenant yelled at his crew to open fire again. 

They then stopped and dismounted in the kill zone next 

to one burnt out truck and four others riddled with bullet 

holes. All the drivers were missing.318 

The Baby Sitters sat at the bridge letting the other 

trucks pass. Brittner remembered guilt took over so he 

wanted to go back in because it was the right thing to 

do. Maloney remembered telling Brittner and the driver, 

Gene Jones, they had to go back and help the others 

because the trucks were getting hammered. They then 

had to figure out how to turn around on a narrow road 

in the dark and get back in the kill zone. By the time 

The Baby Sitters returned the enemy had broken 

contact. The Baby Sitters found five or six wounded 

drivers in a ditch beside the road and could hear 

enemy voices out in the bush.319

Meanwhile, the lead element of the convoy 

Photo courtesy of Mike Lavin
Vietnam War 127

continued to Vandergrift and the medevac came in to 

take away the wounded. It seemed like it took forever 

for the medevac to come in because the area still 

received sporadic small arms fire. After they loaded 

the wounded in the helicopter, the rest of the convoy 

continued on to Vandergrift.320 

The Baby Sitters had to figure out how to get a 

burning tanker off the road because the road was so 

narrow; there was no room to pass for drivers to jump 

on passing vehicles. The rest of the trucks picked up 

drivers from five damaged trucks and drove in reverse 

back to Quang Tri.321 

Maloney remembered CPT Cluchi, of the 585th 

Transportation Company at Vandergrift, came to Maloney 

and said he had one driver missing – unaccounted for. 

So Maloney and CPT Cluchi took The Baby Sitters back 

into the kill zone. There were at least two burning tankers 

maybe three still in the kill zone. Maloney jumped up on 

the running board of one and swears he saw the driver 

in there. However he was not. The injured driver had 

escaped the vehicle and another truck drove him to the 

medevac station at Vandergrift. The convoy delayed at 

Vandergrift for a couple days then continued on to Khe 

Sanh delivering its load a vital aviation fuel. BG Arthur H. 

Sweeney, Jr., Commander of US Army Support Command, 

Da Nang was waiting for them at the gate.322

The convoy had nine wounded and Charles H. Soule 

killed. One gun truck was destroyed, and three tankers 

and two other gun trucks were damaged. The Protector 

was repaired and renamed the Executioner. The 57th 

Award ceremony for 8 February 1971 ambush. Photo courtesy of Mike Lavin

POL never tried to go back to Khe Sanh because the 

road did not allow for vehicles to pass in the event of 

an ambush. From then on the 57th POL ran day convoys 

from Quang Tri to Da Nang.323

Lesson

This ambush hinted at the increasing danger that 

awaited the truck drivers for the rest of the operation. 

The elephant grass provided the enemy ample 

concealment so they could approach right up to the side 

of the road. As the convoys of the 8th Transportation 

Group had learned in An Khe Pass, areas flanked by 

tall elephant grass where convoys had to slow down 

made good kill zones. Deliberately stopping in an area 

that provided similar concealment for the enemy invited 

trouble. While the interval at the time of the halt was 

not known, the initial kill zone included four vehicles. 

Because the 515th had never faced an ambush on 

this scale before the policy of clearing the kill zone left 

disabled trucks and their drivers undefended in the kill 

zone for a short period. Fortunately, the APC of a nearby 

check point arrived in short order to defend the truck 

drivers of the damaged vehicles. The crew of The Baby 

Sitters made the right decision to turn back into the kill 

zone but passing trucks escaping the kill zone on that 

narrow road delayed its return. This same stretch of dirt 

road between the Rock Pile and Vandergrift, however, 

would be the scene of another costly convoy ambush. 

The next time the enemy would attack a convoy of the 

523rd, a hardened veteran of QL19 ambushes.
128 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

20 February 1971 

523rd Transportation Company, 

39th Transportation Battalion

LT Baird had been sent 

back to Phu Bai to pick 

up 17 brand new 5 - ton 

trucks. They returned after dark. 

The convoy doctrine at the time 

was to limit convoys to no more 

than 30 trucks with a gun truck 

ratio of 1:10. Uncle Meat and King 

Kong had escorted his convoy and 

both gun trucks had three M -2 

.50 caliber machine guns. The 

M-2 .50 was the most successful 

design in American weapons and 

had seen very little change in its 

design since its original issue in 

1919. This time Baird rode close to 

the rear in a 3⁄4-ton gun “beep”324 

with twin M -60 machine guns. He 

noticed that some Transportation 

Corps officers preferred to ride up 

front. He knew that if there was 

trouble it would invariably occur in 

Uncle Meat. Photo courtesy of US Transportation Museum

2
Vietnam War 129

the rear and that is where the key decisions would have 

to be made. If an ambush split the convoy, by doctrine 

the trucks out of the kill zone would continue to roll on 

to the next security check point or camp. If the convoy 

commander was in the lead then he would be unable 

to make the key decisions for the rest of the convoy 

either trapped in the kill zone or behind. 1LT David R. 

Wilson was killed trying to reenter the kill zone in 

an unprotected jeep.325

 Satan’s Lil’ Angel had escorted a convoy that had 

delivered ARVN soldiers to Laos. The crew had been on 

the road for 36 hours when they pulled into Dong Ha 

that night. They planned to RON because their convoy 

could not unload until morning, then 2LT Baird called 

them on the radio, “Hey Red, I’m a little light on security 

and expect some movement.” They had received a lot 

of reports of enemy movement along the route and SGT 

Chester Israel had seen movement on the way down. 

Baird only had two gun trucks and his 3⁄4-ton at Dong Ha. 

He needed some “heavy hitters” in the rear and asked 

Chester if he would go back with him. Chester asked his 

crew and they volunteered to go back to Vandergrift.326 

Uncle Meat led with King Kong in the middle, with 

Satan’s Lil’ Angel followed by Baird’s 3⁄4-ton in the rear. 

It was dark on 20 February as the convoy neared Camp 

Vandergrift. The mountain ridge to the east came within 

yards of Highway 9 and a valley of tall elephant grass 

covered the valley to the ridge line to the west. Around 

midnight a mile and a half from their destination, Baird 

heard an explosion followed by an intense volume of 

small arms fire from the jungle on the ridge to his left.327 

An RPG fired from the right (west) side of the road 

struck Satan’s Lil’ Angel’s gun box right under SP4 

Richard B. Frazier’s gun killing him instantly. Shrapnel and 

concussion of the blast knocked Israel to the side of the 

wall wounding him. The initial blast was followed by 

small arms fire from both sides of the road, but Satan 

did not stop. Israel climbed over and checked Frazier 

but already knew he was dead. He then rose up and 

looked out at the tracer fire. Calvin Bennett was 

firing to the right side.328

A second RPG came through the right front wheel, 

slammed into the engine and took out a piston. The 

engine locked up and the truck lurched into a nose 

dive, then smoke boiled out the hood and cab. SGT 

Israel was again thrown down. He stood back up and 

saw small arms fire from both sides of the road. They 

were right in the middle of the kill zone. Bennett fired 

his left rear .50 until it jammed. Frazier’s .50 was hit 

by shrapnel and did not work. Israel’s .50 would only 

fire single shots. Small arms fire shot out the tires of 

the gun truck. The NVA had learned to take out the gun 

trucks first before they went after the rest of the trucks 

so they concentrated their fire on Satan.329 

Baird’s 3⁄4- ton raced ahead and passed a disabled 

King Kong. Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran

Satan’s Lil Angel next to Black Widow. Photo courtesy of 

US Transportation Museum

Baird’s 3⁄4 - ton. Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran
130 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

5- ton cargo truck in the ditch. He ordered his driver 

to stop so they could check on the driver. They came 

to a halt a hundred feet ahead of the truck. He did not 

want to leave the disabled truck until he was sure that 

its driver was safe. To do so required him to wait in the 

middle of the kill zone. As soon as his gunner tried to 

return fire, both M - 60s failed to fire. Evidently, he had 

put the gas plugs in backwards when he reassembled 

them. The three men only had one M -79 grenade 

launcher and their M-16s to defend against an NVA 

company. Baird immediately radioed the two lead gun 

trucks and told them to come back. The one thing that 

Baird could depend on was the loyalty of his gun trucks 

to rescue him or any other truck in trouble.330 

SGT Israel looked back at Baird’s 3⁄4-ton and saw it 

had stopped and was taking fire. It was sitting cockeyed 

with the wheel in the road. Chester could not see any 

fire coming from Baird’s vehicle. SP4 Robert W. Thorne 

climbed into the gun box from the cab and asked, 

“Chester, are you hit?” Israel answered, “I’m fine. The 

only hope we got is for you to get this started and get 

us out of here!” Thorne climbed back into the driver’s 

seat and started up the engine. It clanged and another 

RPG hit the right front rear duals and the truck bounced. 

Thorne kept that truck going and it crawled about 25 

yards, enough to clear the kill zone, before the engine 

shut down. They continued to return fire.331

Neither the crew of Uncle Meat nor King Kong 

had heard the gun fire behind them. The majority of 

the convoy had continued to Vandergrift as if nothing 

had happened. Uncle Meat had already entered the 

compound and King Kong had just made the right hand 

turn into Vandergrift when they heard Baird’s call for 

help. They immediately backed up, turned around and 

raced as fast as their trucks would let them back 

to the kill zone.332 

Baird knew his gun truck crews and had confidence 

in their judgment. He also knew that too much jabber 

on the radio would cause confusion and tie up the radio 

net. He quickly and precisely informed the gun trucks 

of the situation. Satan’s Lil’ Angel had been hit, his gun 

Damage to Baird’s 3⁄4-ton. Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran

Where RPG hit gun box on Satan’s 

Lil’Angel. Photos courtesy of Logan Werth
Vietnam War 131

beep and one 5 -ton were still in the kill zone. The crews 

asked which side of the road the enemy was on and 

Baird informed them that he was taking small arms fire 

from the ridge to his left and the field of elephant grass 

to his right. The enemy was close enough to throw hand 

grenades at his vehicle. He then quit talking. He would 

count on their judgment as what to do.333

Ten minutes of steady small arms fire had elapsed 

since the beginning of the ambush. By then Baird was 

taking fire from both sides of the road. The enemy was 

closing in from the elephant grass while others fired 

down on them from the ridge to the east. His gunner, 

Downer, tapped him on the shoulder and said, “I see 

one. What do I do?” Baird turned, looked back down the 

road and saw an enemy soldier about 15 meters away 

on a berm alongside the road loading an RPG. He told his 

gunner to shoot him. The gunner fired his M -79 grenade 

launcher at him. The enemy soldier was too close for the 

40mm grenade to arm in flight. It struck him with enough 

velocity to either kill or incapacitate him, because he did 

not fire his rocket.334

 Around ten minutes after the initiation of the 

ambush, King Kong raced past Satan and up to their 

convoy commander’s 3⁄4-ton, parking right in front of 

it at an angle facing to the west. Uncle Meat similarly 

parked near Satan’s Lil’ Angel. Baird was never as glad 

as when he saw the tracers of those .50s. There was a 

reassurance that everything would turn out alright. Baird 

knew his gun truck crews knew what to do and called on 

the radio, “They’re in the ditches. They’re in the ditches.” 

The gunners on the Kong swung their .50s around and 

sprayed the ditches. Kong and Uncle Meat took the 

pressure off of Satan as the enemy concentrated their 

fire on the two new gun trucks.335 

The success of an ambush depended upon surprise 

and extreme violence. The gun truck crews had learned 

to turn the fight back on the enemy as fast as they 

could with even more violence. This would take the 

psychological advantage away from the enemy forcing 

them to break contact. The .50s blazed away in four to 

six round bursts at the muzzle flashes to their left and 

right. The gunners poured 30 -weight oil from plastic 

canteens to help cool the barrels and ensure the 

smooth function of their breaches after firing off 

about three to four boxes of ammunition.336 

An RPG hit the left rear duals and exploded in all 

the colors of the rainbow under left rear gunner, Danny 

Cochran, knocking him backwards on Larson manning 

the right .50. Cochran then jumped back up, grabbed 

his .50 and went back to work. King Kong was an APC 

gun truck. Large chunks of hot shrapnel had come up 

through the aluminum floor of the hull and lodged in the 

top of the box right under his machine gun. One piece 

of shrapnel had burnt a hole in the charging handle and 

others had left five or six holes in the 

barrel, but it still fired.337

The barrels turned red and as soon as the gunners 

saw the rounds curve after they left the barrel they knew 

it was time to change them. Each time Emery, manning 

the turret gun, swung his barrel toward Cochran, 

Cochran grabbed the asbestos glove, spun the barrel 

off then picked up a new barrel and spun it on tight, by 

feel counted three clicks back and let go. Gunners had 

different methods of setting the headspace and timing 

and none used the timing gauge during an ambush. 

They knew their guns. Some memorized the number of 

clicks for each breach. Others wrote the number of clicks 

needed on each barrel. Cochran did it by feel. He backed 

off the three clicks and depending upon the rate of fire 

of his .50 he added more clicks. He knew his .50. He 

changed three barrels for the truck commander and 

a similar number for himself that night.338

The one advantage to fighting at night, the gunners 

fired in the direction of the enemy muzzle flashes, which 

betrayed their positions. There was no concealment in 

the dark once one fired his weapon.

Where the second RPG hit the front of Satans Lil’ Angel. 

Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran
132 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

The tactic worked. After about ten minutes of firing, 

Uncle Meat and King Kong had turned the fight back 

on the enemy and they broke contact. During the fight, 

the driver of the disabled 5-ton had run to his convoy 

commander’s vehicle. 

The medic from Baird’s 3⁄4-ton ran up and stopped in 

front of Satan. Bennett remembered the dustoff hovered 

over the road ahead of their gun truck and threw down 

a stretcher out one end. SGT Israel and the medic lifted 

Frazier’s body over the cab onto the hood. Blood was 

everywhere in the truck and they were slipping and 

stumbling, but got Frazier’s body on the stretcher. Israel 

had several wounds and did not want to leave when the 

dustoff helicopter landed. The medic hit Chester with a 

shot of morphine as soon as he got on the ground, and 

then put him on the dustoff.339

That close to Vandergrift, Uncle Meat loaded the rest 

of the crew from Satan’s Lil’ Angel into their gun truck 

then drove off the road and backed up to Baird’s vehicle. 

The drive shaft had broken and the vehicle could not 

drive. The crew of Uncle Meat hooked up the 3⁄4 - ton to 

Uncle Meat, which towed it into Vandergrift. The two gun 

trucks that came to the rescue also received damage 

but could roll under their own power. After the initial 

volley of fire, no other casualties were taken. King 

Kong limped back to Vandergrift on its rims.

The sweep of the area the next day discovered four 

enemy dead and one wounded NVA soldier 25 meters 

from the road. The enemy usually made great effort to 

recover their dead and conceal their losses, so no one 

could accurately determine the total enemy losses. 

These were the only confirmed enemy kills by the 39th 

Transportation Battalion Soldiers during Lam Son 719.

Lesson

The success of the ambush depended upon a number 

of factors. First and foremost, the dedication and 

determination of the gun truck crews. Without hesitation 

the two lead gun trucks raced back into the kill zone. 

The convoy commanders knew their men and trusted in 

their judgment to do the right thing in an ambush. This 

allowed Baird to keep his radio transmission short and 

to the point, keeping the net free for more important 

traffic. Too much chatter would prevent someone from 

interjecting important information at the critical time. 

Each of the gun trucks instinctively raced to a disabled 

vehicle to provide covering fire. Failure to test fire the 

M-60s, however, failed to warn the gunner of the 3⁄4-

ton that he had reassembled them wrong. On the other 

hand, the intimate knowledge of the gunners with 

their .50s caused them to fire nonstop for ten minutes. 

The .50 caliber round could penetrate through most 

trees and bunkers and cut a man in half if it struck him. 

The hail of six .50s inspired fear in the NVA and caused 

the enemy to break contact.

Since there was a rumor the enemy had a bounty 

on gun trucks, the company mechanics repaired Satan’s 

Lil’ Angel to get it back out on the road as soon as they 

could. Bob Thorne and Calvin Bennett remained on the 

gun truck and the new crew felt the name Satan’s Lil’ 

Angel was jinxed, so they repainted it and renamed it 

Proud American, but it was hit in an ambush before 

they had time to paint the name on it.

Oil down the side of King Kong. Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran

Award ceremony for ambush 20 February 1971. 

Photo courtesy of Logan Werth
Vietnam War 133

12 March 1971

39th Transportation Battalion

ecause the road past Vandergrift could only 

support 21⁄2 and 5-ton cargo trucks, the 39th 

Battalion would need another light truck company 

to push from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh. The thick jungle 

that grew right up to the road made it ideal for ambushes 

and the fact that convoys had to run both day and night 

made ambushes easier. The 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized 

Infantry Division had responsibility for the security of that 

section of the road. 

On 12 March, 2LT Tom Callahan, 1st Platoon Leader 

of 523rd Transportation Company had returned on a 

convoy from Khe Sanh and informed LTC Alvin C. “Big Al” 

Ellis, Commander of the 39th Transportation Battalion, 

his convoy had received enemy fire and thought that it 

was not safe to take another convoy up there especially 

since it was going to be dark by the time they returned 

to Khe Sanh. Regardless, the convoy kicked out from 

Vandergrift to Khe Sanh with 2LT Jim Baird, 3rd Platoon 

Leader, as the convoy commander. Just in case the 

enemy tried to ambush a convoy, the detail left behind 

kept a reaction force. 1LT Ralph Fuller had all the 

remaining gun trucks lined up ready to go while he 

monitored the radio for contact.340 

2LT Baird led a convoy from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh. 

On the Proud American, Robert Thorne was the driver, 

Calvin Bennett was the rear gunner, McDonald was the 

right gunner, and Nelson Allen was the NCOIC. Both CPT 

“V” and LT Baird rode on the gun truck. A B-40 rocket 

hit the gun truck, Proud America, between the cab and 

the gun box on the driver’s side mortally wounding the 

driver, SP4 Thorne. Thorne steered Proud American 

into the hillside instead of down the steep cliff into the 

creek. This saved the rest of the crew. Unfortunately, 

Baird had been kneeling by the radio mounted in the left 

front corner of the box when the rocket hit and received 

multiple fragmentary wounds to his left arm. McDonald, 

the right front gunner, received a facial wound. Two 

tankers were immobilized.341 

Fuller heard the call, “Contact, contact, contact,” 

on the radio and led his convoy of gun trucks. Riding 

in Daughter of Darkness, an engineer stopped Fuller, 

“Don’t go up there! They’re having an ambush! They’re 

having an ambush!” To which Fuller replied, “That’s what 

we’re going up there for.” About six gun trucks rolled in 

B

Damage to Proud American. Photos courtesy of Logan Werth

Photo courtesy of Danny Cochran
134 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

and laid down suppressive fire which quickly ended the 

enemy fire. Fuller saw that Baird was badly wounded, 

and Baird said Thorne was dead. Callahan laid Baird on 

a stretcher and Fuller called for a medevac then looked 

around for a good place for the dustoff helicopter to 

land. He found an opening by a bridge and Uncle Meat 

drove Baird to the bridge. The helicopter arrived but was 

afraid to land; instead, the men lifted the stretcher up 

to the bird. Fuller told the medevac crew, “Take care of 

him. He was a good one.” They placed Thorne’s body in 

the Black Widow and took it back to Vandergrift. A squad 

from the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry went out to search 

for the enemy but found no enemy killed or wounded.342

Lesson

Anticipating trouble, the 523rd Transportation Company 

assembled all its gun trucks as a reaction force rather 

than wait upon the infantry to arrive. Again and again, 

quick reaction and overwhelming fire power seemed to 

bring an end to any ambush or buy enough time for the 

infantry and armor to arrive and take over the fight. 

Calvin Bennett had survived two bad ambushes 

and lost three crew members. Normally one devastating 

loss like this would justify getting off a gun truck and 

Proud American was renamed Ace of Spades in memory 

of the Ace of Spades that rolled down into the river bed. 

Photo courtesy of Fred Teneyck

Photo courtesy of US Transportation Museum

pulling camp duties until the end of one’s tour, but 

Calvin Bennett remained on his gun truck. Trusting in 

his instincts, he just did not feel it was his time to die. 

The new crew, however, decided to name their gun truck 

Ace of Spades in respect for the Ace of Spades that had 

been destroyed when the road gave way and it rolled 

down into the river bottom. 
Vietnam War 135

290LTC Chester T. Henderson, Operational Report of the 57th 

Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Quarterly period Ending 30 April 

1968, 30 April 1968. Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R-1).

2911LT Thomas L. Tish, Annual Historical Summary, 585th Transportation 

Company (Medium Truck Cargo), 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968.

292Wayne Chalker, “The Fire Base Bastogne Convoy 4/68,” Army 

Transportation Association Vietnam, 134.198.33.115/atav/default.html.

293Steve Plummer, personal account. 294Ibid. 295Ibid. 296Ibid. 297Ibid. 298Ibid. 299Ibid. 300Ibid. 301Ibid. 302Ibid. 303Ibid. 304Marion Amos, personal account. 305Ibid. 306Ibid. 307Jeffrey Fuller interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, June 2004, 

Jim Baird interview by Richard Killblane at Branson, MO, 20 June 2005.

308LTC Alvin C. Ellis, “Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 39th 

Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS 

CS FOR-65 (R2),” Headquarters, 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck), 

APO San Francisco 96308, 4 May 1971.

309Robert Cody Phillips, Operation Lamson 719; The Laotian Incursion 

During the War in Vietnam, Masters Thesis, May 1979.

310Keith William Nolan, Into Laos; The Story of Dewey Canyon II/

Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. 311The Protector, 57th Transportation Co Nam Nomads, http://nam_nomads.tripod.com/TheProtector/protector.html; and Claude Roberson 

telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 22 July 2013.

312Roger Maloney interview by Richard Killblane at Kirkland. MO, 

28 June 2013; and Roger Brittner interview by Richard Killblane 

at Kirkland. MO, 28 June 2013.

313Michael McBride interview by Richard Killblane, 9 July 2004. 314Maloney interview, and Roberson interview. 315Brittner interview, and Maloney interview. 316Brittner interview; and Bill Hampton, “Gypsy Bandits Move to 

Quang Tri,” ATAV, http://grambo.us/atav/hampton.htm. 317Nolan, Into Laos. 318Nolan, Into Laos. 319Brittner and Maloney interview. 320Maloney interview. 321Brittner interview; and McBride interview; 322Maloney interview. 323The 5th ID(M) After Action Report stated one vehicle destroyed, 

five damaged, one driver killed and nine wounded.

324The slang term for a 3⁄4-ton gun truck was gun beep because 

it was bigger than a jeep.

325Jim Baird interview, and Danny Cochran interview by Richard Killblane 

at Branson, MO, 18 June 2005.

326Chester Israel and Calvin Bennett interview by Richard Killblane, 

at Pigeon Forge, TN, 8 August 2008.

327The 504th MP Bn Forward Log recorded the ambush at 

0015 hours on 21 February 1971, but Baird and Israel remembered 

it at 2355 or midnight.

328Israel and Bennett interview. 329Israel and Bennett interview. 330Baird interview. 331Israel and Bennett interview. 332Baird and Cochran interviews. 333Ibid. 334Ibid. 335Ibid. 336Cochran interview. 337Ibid. 338Ibid. 339Israel and Bennett interview. 340Fuller interview, and Baird interview. 341Fuller interview, Bennett interview, and Baird interview. 342Fuller interview.
136 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

4. III Corps Tactical Zone

25 August 1968

7th Transportation Battalion, 

48th Transportation Group

The 48th Transportation Group consisted of 

two battalions stationed at Long Binh in III Corps 

Tactical Zone. The 6th Battalion had all light truck 

companies and the 7th Battalion had all the medium 

truck companies. Long Binh cleared cargo from Saigon 

and the military terminal at Newport and then delivered 

to base camps throughout the region. This southern part 

of the country gently sloped downward toward the Saigon 

and Mekong Rivers. Consequently, the unimproved roads 

that spread out from Long Binh and Saigon like the 

spokes of a wheel were flat and filled with pot holes. 

Late summer was the monsoon season, so low 

cloud ceiling with intermittent rain impeded air support 

the day of the ambush. On 25 August 1968, 81 trucks 

from the 48th Transportation Group departed Long 

Binh in three serials with six refrigeration (reefer) trucks 

in the front, followed by general cargo trucks, then fuel 

and ammunition in the rear. 11 of the trucks belonged 

to the 6th Battalion and the rest to the 7th. If the enemy 

disabled a fuel tanker or ammunition trailer, the first 

half of the convoy could still escape. C Company, 720th 

MP Battalion provided six and the 25th MP Company 

provided two gun jeeps with M-60 machine guns as 

escorts. The truck drivers carried a basic load of 100 

rounds for their M-16s. This convoy was destined to 

resupply the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Tay 

Ninh 45 miles north of Saigon and the short trip normally 

took six hours to complete because of the mandated 

convoy speed limit of 20 miles per hour.343 

The convoy proceeded west along QL1 from Saigon 

past the 25th Infantry Division base camp at Cu Chi. 

There, the convoy divided into two serials and proceeded 

Convoy of the 7th Transportation Battalion. Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum

T
Vietnam War 137

on to Go Dau Ha at the intersection of QL1 and QL22. 

The convoy then turned northwest on QL22 to the 

village of Ap Nhi just 20 miles short of its destination 

at Tay Ninh.344 

SP4 David M. Sellman, of the 62nd Transportation 

Company, was delayed at Cu Chi due to a flat tire and 

his convoy left without him. After changing the tire, he 

convinced his superiors he could catch up and raced 

to join his convoy just before it reached Ap Nhi. As the 

convoy approached within a mile of the village, the 

drivers saw many villagers heading south with their 

possessions and many shouted, “VC.” Since the 

convoy had never faced a large ambush, it took 

no additional precautions.345 

The 1st and 3rd Brigades of the 25th Infantry 

Division normally provided security along the main supply 

route, but the new division commander, MG Ellis W. 

Williamson, had ordered the 3rd Brigade back to Saigon. 

The reduction in force resulted from the anticipated 

third phase of the Tet Offensive. From 17 to 24 August, 

the 1st Brigade had fought off 13 enemy battalion or 

regimental attacks, including seven attacks on the 1st 

Brigade’s bases. The 1st Brigade’s Intelligence Officer 

had determined that 16,000 combat-ready troops of 

the 5th and 9th NVA Divisions accompanied by an antiaircraft battalion and two attached VC battalions would 

mass against it. The division’s intelligence officer, on 

the other hand, believed Saigon was the main target. 

MG Williamson then moved the 2nd Battalion, 34th 

Armor back to Cu Chi, while still ordering the 1st Brigade 

to secure the main supply route. This proved a fatal 

mistake. The brigade commander, COL Duquesne “Duke” 

Wolf, doubted whether he could defend his six bases, 

let alone the main supply 

route with his meager 

force. His brigade only 

had three understrength 

rifle companies, three 

understrength mechanized 

infantry companies, two 

105mm artillery batteries, 

and two medium batteries 

of 155mm with no 

armored cavalry units 

attached. Wolf challenged 

Williamson’s decision, to 

no avail. Although convoy security was a high priority, 

MACV respected the commander’s decision. So just C 

Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry provided security 

along the route around Ap Nhi and the Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) had an outpost also 

at the entrance to the village.346

The village of Ap Nhi and the Ben Cui Rubber 

Plantation, known locally as Little Rubber, flanked QL22 

for about a mile. The village of Ap Nhi on the southwest 

side was mostly farm land while the rubber trees on the 

northeast side grew to within 15 feet of the road with a 

drainage ditch and an earthen berm paralleling the road 

inside the tree line. About four companies of the 88th 

NVA Regiment had moved into the Little Rubber and 

another into the village the evening prior to the ambush. 

About 1145 hours the convoy entered the quiet village 

of Ap Nhi. It was misting and raining and the ceiling hung 

about 200 feet above the ground. The convoy passed 

what looked like a group of Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers in camouflage jungle fatigues 

and jungle boots armed with M-16 rifles along the north 

side of the road adjacent the Little Rubber firing into 

the village. The lead vehicles of the convoy started 

to leave the village and the ammo and fuel vehicles 

were alongside the column when the supposed ARVN 

soldiers opened fire on the convoy. They turned out 

to be Viet Cong.347 

The enemy hidden in the rubber plantation then 

initiated the ambush with an intense barrage of rocket, 

mortars, and automatic small arms fire on the convoy. 

The enemy first targeted the eight gun jeeps and then 

fired at the lead fuel trucks setting two on fire hoping to 

block that part of the convoy. 30 trucks in front of them 

sped away, following 

policy, leaving 51 trucks 

stranded in the milelong kill zone. The enemy 

then set two ammunition 

trailers hauling 105mm 

rounds on fire at the rear 

of the convoy sealing 

the trucks in place. The 

drivers climbed out of 

their vehicles and took 

up defensive positions 

SGT William Seay. either behind their 
138 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

trucks or in the ditch along the southwest side of the 

road. In their haste to exit their vehicles, some found 

themselves without weapons or radios. Others had no 

water or ammunition since they neglected to wear their 

pistol belts. The enemy had thoroughly planned the 

ambush and it occurred well beyond the range of the 

1st Brigade’s artillery. Likewise, the low ceiling initially 

prevented the use of air support. With the convoy 

trapped, the enemy left their cover and made 

a rush on the column of trucks.348

MPs, SSG Charles H. Frazier and SP4 Albert Murphy, 

dismounted their gun jeep in the first march serial and 

picking up another wounded MP, dragged him toward 

a small hut just off the road. Enemy then rushed them 

from front and rear but the two MPs turned back the 

assault with their M -16s and defended their position 

for 30 minutes despite their wounds received until 

MPs from the 25th MP Company reinforced them.349

When the convoy stopped, SP4 William W. Seay, 

from the 62nd Transportation Company, immediately 

dismounted and took cover behind the left rear dual 

wheels of his truck. Seay’s trailer carried high -explosive 

artillery powder charges. SP4 Sellman, in the truck 

behind Seay, did likewise. Another driver joined him and 

the three fought about 20 feet apart. When the initial 

assault reached within ten meters of the road, Seay, 

who was the closest, opened fire, killing two of the 

enemy. Sellman shot one just 15 meters in front of him, 

then his M -16 jammed. Fortunately, the three drivers 

had successfully turned back the first enemy assault.350 

The beleaguered drivers then came under automatic 

fire from the berm and sniper fire from the trees. Seay 

spotted a sniper in a tree approximately 75 meters to 

his right front and killed him. Within minutes an enemy 

grenade rolled under the trailer within a few feet of 

Sellman. Without hesitation, Seay ran from his covered 

position while under intense enemy fire, picked up the 

grenade and threw it back to the enemy position. Four 

enemy soldiers jumped up from their covered position 

and tried to run when the grenade explosion killed them. 

Minutes later another enemy grenade rolled near the 

group of drivers. Sellman kicked it off the road behind 

him. After it exploded, another enemy grenade rolled 

under Seay’s trailer approximately three meters from his 

position. Again Seay left his covered position and threw 

the armed grenade back at the enemy. At the same time 

Sellman shot an enemy soldier crawling through the 

fence. After returning to his position, Seay and Sellman 

killed two more enemy soldiers trying to crawl through 

the fence. Suddenly a bullet shattered Seay’s right wrist 

and he told Sellman to cover 

him while he ran back 

to the rear of the convoy 

looking for someone to 

treat his wound.351 

 Seay located LT Howard 

Brockbank, SP4 William 

Hinote, and four other drivers 

gathered together. Hinote saw 

Seay had lost much blood 

and was in pain. One man 

applied a sterile dressing on 

the wound, but it did not stop 

the bleeding. Hinote then tied 

a tourniquet around Seay’s 

wrist with his shirt. In spite of 

his wounds, Seay continued 

to give encouragement and 

direction to his fellow soldiers. 

Hinote mentioned his concern 

about Seay’s shattered wrist. 

LT Larry Ondic on the 48th Group’s first experiment with gun trucks prior to the 

ambush that killed Seay. Photo courtesy of Larry Ondic
Vietnam War 139

Seay told him to stay alive and not worry about him. 

One soldier fired a full clip of his M-16 in one burst and 

Seay admonished him, “Take it easy! Don’t waste your 

ammo - we may run out. What will we do then, stand up 

and fight them with our fists? I wouldn’t be any good at 

that!” Weak from the loss of blood, Seay moved to the 

relative cover of a shallow ditch to rest.352 

For 30 minutes the ambush continued without 

reinforcement until at 1215 hours, when an MP in the 

second serial located an undamaged vehicle - mounted 

radio and called for support. C Company, 4/23rd Infantry 

immediately notified their brigade headquarters of the 

ambush. One platoon with two APCs guarding the road 

one kilometer to the south hurried to the kill zone as soon 

as they heard the ambush, and was halted by enemy fire 

from the length of the ditch and a farmhouse 200 meters 

away. Another platoon of four APCs five kilometers north 

likewise raced to the kill zone and also came under 

intense rocket and small arms fire from a Buddhist 

temple. The enemy made another rush and began 

crawling over the trucks unloading its cargo. About 1220 

hours, COL Wolf arrived over the ambush area in his 

command helicopter, “Little Bear” 120 from A Company, 

25th Aviation; and lacking an immediate reaction force, 

he ordered C Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 

which was involved in a search and attack mission, 

to air assault into the northern end of the kill zone. 

At 1235 hours, ten helicopters lifted the infantry company 

and delivered it five kilometers north of the Buddhist 

temple at around 1300 hours. The dismounted infantry 

then accompanied the four APCs toward the village. 

They encountered civilians fleeing the village, and then 

discovered dead civilians caught in the crossfire and 

drivers killed in their cabs. They reached the ARVN 

compound where they came under mortar fire. Medics, 

SP4 Ivan Kratzenmeier and Daniel Orozco, quickly 

established a casualty collection point where they 

treated wounded flooding into their location.353 

A squad from the 65th Engineer Battalion, led 

by SGT Gregory Haley and accompanied by two APCs 

from the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, happened to be 

sweeping the road for mines and came upon the rear 

of the convoy. The APCs could not drive past the burning 

ammunition trailers so SP4 Sellman and other drivers 

took up a fighting position behind the APC. One of the .50 

caliber machine guns on their APC was burned out from 

previous fighting and the other jammed continually. So 

the squad engaged the enemy with M- 60s, M -16s and 

grenades. As ammunition began to run low, SGT Haley 

maneuvered to the rear of one of the APCs and secured 

more ammunition and another M-60. He jumped 

down from the APC only to realize his weapon had no 

trigger. He returned and grabbed another, fed a belt of 

ammunition into the M-60, and opened fire. The weapon 

jammed. He pulled the charging handle and it broke off 

in his hand. As the battle progressed, Sellman was also 

wounded by shrapnel.354

Both ends of the kill zone became casualty 

collection points, and as the battle raged drivers 

worked their way to casualty collection points at either 

end of the convoy. The north end came under mortar fire 

and Kratzenmeier had the wounded moved further away 

until he too was wounded by shrapnel. The APCs served 

as ambulances taking wounded back to the landing 

zone where helicopters evacuated wounded throughout 

the afternoon.355

After another half hour of fighting, Hinote brought 

Seay some water. They occasionally fired at enemy 

positions while waiting for the next attack. Seay noticed 

three enemy soldiers who had crossed the road to fire 

at his comrades. Seay raised to a half crouch and fired 

his rifle with his left hand, killing all three. Suddenly, 

a sniper’s bullet struck Seay in the head, killing him 

instantly. He only had 60 days left in country.356

At 1305 hours, Division G-3 offered an infantry 

battalion and COL Wolf released ten helicopters to pick 

them up, but for some unexplained reason the infantry 

never arrived and the helicopters were not released by 

Division. At 1310 hours, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 4th 

Cavalry landed on the south end of the kill zone and 

was directed to attack the enemy in the farmhouse 

200 meters south of the rubber plantation. During the 

20 -minute fight, the commander and four men were 

killed and 11 wounded, but they drove back the enemy. 

COL Wolf then directed the acting commander to leave 

one platoon in place and pursue the enemy into the 

rubber plantation. Taking the farmhouse had freed the 

two APCs from C, 4/23rd to join the platoon while the 

rest of Troop B maneuvered to 100 meters east of the 

Buddhist temple. By 1430 hours, Division moved the 

155mm battery within range to provide fire support, 

which began to turn the tide of the battle. Five tractors 
140 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

and a gun jeep that had reached Tay Ninh dropped their 

trailers and returned by a back road to help recover 

damaged vehicles and trailers.357

By 1450 hours, the ceiling lifted marginally and 

two Huey UH-1C helicopters, equipped with two door 

gunners, 14 rockets, and a mini-gun, from B Company, 

25th Aviation Battalion, “Diamondhead,” responded first. 

CWO Robert J. “Bob” Spitler was one of the first to arrive. 

The commander on the ground informed him the enemy 

was in the rubber plantation bordering the road. Spitler 

identified Americans in the ditch and enemy soldiers 

unloading the trucks. They carried the supplies into the 

tree line where they were loaded onto their own trucks. 

The low ceiling, however, prevented the helicopters from 

attacking at regular angles. The Hueys normally rolled in 

on the target from a steep dive from about 1,500 feet. 

The pilots instead had to fly in above the tree tops and 

fire their rockets on a flat trajectory at point-blank range, 

all the while receiving enemy ground fire. After expending 

most of their fuel and ammunition, they hovered low 

over the tree line to save fuel and simultaneously fired 

rockets, door guns and mini-guns at the enemy. The 

enemy was everywhere. Soon, the pilots ran out of 

ammunition and called for the next “Diamondhead” 

light-fire team to replace them. Spitler briefed them 

in the air and the transition of battle went seamlessly. 

The two Hueys flew back to Cu Chi to refuel, rearm, 

and wait for the next mission. Those gunships 

kept the enemy at bay.358

By 1500 hours, C Company, 3/22nd Infantry and 

4th Platoon, C Company, 4/23rd Infantry were in position 

to the north to suppress the Buddhist temple while 

Troop B assaulted it from the rear driving away over 

100 enemy into the trench line. By 1530 hours, 

COL Wolf ordered the forces to roll up the enemy in 

both the village and rubber plantation, but even with the 

help of gunships from Diamondhead, the two depleted 

companies reported the enemy too strong to drive 

out of the trench. By 1700 hours, the two company 

commanders were low on ammunition and requested 

permission to withdraw and resupply for another attack. 

As the force withdrew a storm hit grounding all the 

helicopters. About 1830 hours, the defenders developed 

a plan to drive vehicles out of the kill zone, but the 

intensity of enemy fire prevented that. So between 

1900 and 2300 hours APCs ferried drivers, the wounded 

and the dead south to the ARVN compound at Go Dau 

Ha. Those MPs and drivers who had not reached the 

7th Transportation Battalion tractors with a fabricated machinegun mount. Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum
Vietnam War 141

safety of the APCs 

defended in small 

pockets scattered 

along the convoy.359

By 2205 hours, 

the defenders sent 

an emergency call for 

ammunition,and a 

helicopter from 

A Company, 25th 

Aviation decided to 

attempt the resupply 

and came in low under 

the ceiling to deliver 

the needed 

ammunition. It took 

out more wounded 

and then the weather 

began to clear, so 

helicopters continued 

missions throughout 

the night. By the next 

morning, the relief 

column finally arrived 

and the clear sky 

allowed air support, which drove the enemy away 

by 1000 hours.360

Out of 51 drivers caught in the kill zone, seven 

lost their lives, ten more were wounded and two, 

SSG Kenneth R. Gregory and SP4 Bobby L. Johnson 

both of the 62nd Transportation Company, were taken 

prisoner. Gregory later escaped and wondered around 

the jungle for four days before being rescued. Johnson 

was released five years later in February 1973. The 

720th MP Battalion had one man killed, six wounded, 

lost all six gun jeeps and radios, and had five M-60s 

destroyed. The relief force lost 23 killed and 35 wounded. 

SP4 Seay posthumously received the Medal of Honor 

and was promoted to sergeant. SP4 Sellman received the 

Bronze Star Medal with V device for his valor. SSG Frazier

and SP4 Murphy, 720th MP Battalion, both received

Silver Star Medals and SGT Raymond H. Tate the Bronze 

Star Medal. SP4 Guy A. Davison, of the 720th MP 

Battalion, posthumously received the Silver Star Medal. 

SP4 Kratzmeier received the Bronze Star Medal for his 

bravery in treating and evacuating wounded under fire.361

 Lesson

 The unusual aspect 

 of this ambush was the 

 size of the ambushing

 force and the effort the

 enemy made to unload

 cargo from the vehicles.

 Normally the enemy just 

 wanted to inflict damage in 

the convoy, but in this case 

they seemed very interested 

in the cargo, so they brought a 

large enough force that could 

beat back the local security 

forces. MG Williamson’s 

decision to pull the 3rd 

Brigade back to Saigon 

allowed the 88th 

NVA Regiment greater 

freedom of movement.

 This was the first major 

convoy ambush for the 48th 

Group in the III Corps Tactical 

Zone and it had relied entirely 

on the combat arms units 

for protection. This external support was subject to 

the decision of the commander based on competing 

priorities. The arbitrary decision of the area commander 

to defend Saigon stripped the area of combat arms 

support and required the reaction force to come from a 

greater distance. In the absence of gun trucks or combat 

arms, the drivers had to fight as infantry men. They 

needed to know all the skills for setting up a defense 

and coordinating fire support. 

Since the small security forces could not fight 

through the kill zone, they established defensive 

positions on both ends of the kill zone and these 

became the casualty evacuation sites and rallying 

points for drivers who worked their way to them. 

Action

Having faced a devastating convoy ambush similar 

to what 8th Group experienced on 2 September, the 

48th Transportation Group came up with a different 

solution to ambushes than the 8th Group. The 48th 

Group started by making everyone wear their helmets 

SGT William Seay. 
142 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

343Stephen C. Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush at Ap Nhi,” Vietnam, April 1999; 

and August 1968 Battalion Time Line, 720th Military Police Battalion 

Reunion Association Vietnam History Project, http://720mpreunion.org/

history/time_line/1968/08_1968.html. 

344Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush.” 345COL Frank B. Case, Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 

31 October 1968, Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor 

Transport), 8 November 1968; and Ivan Katzenmeier, “A Combat Medic’s 

Vietnam Experience,” Katzenmeier’s Weblog, A Journey in Words and 

Photos, http://katzenmeier.wordpress.com/. 346Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush;” Ron Leonard, “The Ambush At Ap Nhi,” 

http://25thaviation.org/id804.htm; and narrative by Marvin E. Branch, 

Katzenmeier’s Weblog. 347Case, Operational Report; Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush;” Leonard, “The 

Ambush At Ap Nhi;” and 720th MP time Line.

348Case, Operational Report; Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush;” and Katzenmeier, “A Combat Medic’s Vietnam Experience.”

3493720th MP time Line. 350Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush at Ap Nhi;” and Katzenmeier, “A Combat 

Medic’s Vietnam Experience.”

351Tunnell, “Ambush at Ap Nhi;” and SGT William Seay Medal of Honor 

Citation.

352Tunnell, “Ambush at Ap Nhi.” 353Case, Operational Report; Katzenmeier’s “A Combat Medic’s Vietnam 

Experience.”

354Tunnell, “Convoy Ambush;” and narrative by Marvin E. Branch, Katzenmeier’s “A Combat Medic’s Vietnam Experience.”

355Katzenmeier’s “A Combat Medic’s Vietnam Experience.” 356Tunnell, “Ambush at Ap Nhi;” and Seay Medal of Honor Citation. 357Tunnell, “Ambush at Ap Nhi;” and Leonard, “The Ambush At Ap Nhi.” 358Leonard, “The Ambush At Ap Nhi..” 359Case, Operational Report; and Leonard, “The Ambush At Ap Nhi..” 360Leonard, “The Ambush At Ap Nhi..” 361720th MP Battalion Time Line. 362BG Orvil C. Metheny Interview by CPT Louis C. Johnson, 22 November 

1985; BG (R) Orvil Metheny summary of telephone interview by Richard 

Killblane, 19 March 2004; and LTC Orvil Metheny, Operational Report 

– Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), 

Period Ending 31 October 1968, 20 February 1969.

363Metheny interviews and Thomas, Vehicle Convoy Security,” p. II-32. 364Discussion with LTC (R) Larry Ondic. 365Metheny interviews.

and protective vests. Not suffering anyone killed in an 

ambush since 22 November 1966, the drivers had 

become complacent and quit wearing protective gear 

because of the heat. The 48th Group also required that 

trucks include assistant drivers as “shotguns.” This 

added extra riflemen in a fight. In previous ambushes, 

they had followed the SOP to not stop in the kill zone, 

but they had no choice if vehicles blocked the narrow 

roads as on 25 August. They could not turn around and 

drive out of the kill zone. In this case, the drivers had to 

fight as infantry until the nearest reaction force arrived. 

The slow response by the reaction force on 25 August 

was an embarrassment for the 25th Infantry Division, 

so the soldiers set out to resolve the problem.362

In August 1968, representatives from the MP, division, 

and transportation units held several conferences to 

define relationships. According to a report in 1971, the 

Provost Marshal of the 25th Infantry Division assumed 

responsibility for convoy security for the 48th Group 

convoys. He flew overhead in an aircraft and shared 

control of the convoy with the convoy commander on the 

ground. In the event of an ambush, infantry or cavalry 

commanders assumed control of the convoy.363 

COL Paul Swanson assumed command of the 

48th Group in November 1968 and opposed the use of 

gun trucks. This was surprising since the 6th Battalion 

had previously built gun trucks to conduct a night convoy 

south to support the 9th Infantry Division in the fall of 

1967. Anticipating ambushes, the 6th Battalion welded 

steel plates to the doors of 20 light trucks and two jeeps. 

They also fabricated machine gun mounts and welded 

them to the right side of the cab so that the assistant 

drivers could fire them while standing. The convoy was 

ambushed and the gun trucks successfully repelled 

the attackers. The battalion conducted no more night 

convoys and the idea of gun trucks spread no further 

through the 48th Group.364 

Instead, Swanson believed the combat commander 

had the responsibility for convoy security. The ambushes 

usually ended when the infantry and tanks arrived and 

swept through the area. He did not want to crowd into 

the infantry’s mission or take task vehicles off the road. 

Swanson did, however, allow drivers to put steel plating 

on the sides of their cabs for individual protection. The 

main issue with the ambush at Ap Nhi was that the field 

commander arbitrarily pulled the infantry from defending 

the road to defending Saigon leaving the convoys 

vulnerable. The trucks needed some guarantee the 

combat arms would not leave them unprotected again. 

So Swanson told the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions that 

if they wanted their beer and soda, they needed to keep 

the enemy off of his convoys. It helped that the G-3 of 

the 25th Infantry Division was a classmate of his from 

the Army War College. For the next year, the 25th Infantry 

Division provided excellent support. This relationship 

was all personality-driven though.365
Vietnam War 143

Check Point 88, intersection of QL19 and the Pleiku bypass, where convoys dropped off their gun trucks and headed to 

their destinations. An MP V100 is in the foreground. The photo was taken in late 1969 since True Grit is parked on the 

right and Cold Sweat above it has the second paint scheme. Photo courtesy of US Army Transportation Museum

onvoy operations during the Korean and Vietnam 

Wars revealed certain lessons. When stopped 

in a kill zone without the benefit of gun trucks, 

the only recourse is to dismount and return fire. The 

aggressive response would also include fighting through 

the enemy as infantry. This is supposing the truck drivers 

have been trained adequately as infantry. An inherent 

problem is the spacing of the vehicles even when 

bunched up probably does not allow a concentration 

of truck drivers for a successful assault thus violating 

the principle of mass. So truck drivers came up with 

a different response.

Truck drivers during both the Korean and Vietnam 

War realized the truck, if mounted with a crew-served 

weapon, provided both maneuverability and firepower 

for the fight inside the kill zone. The kill zone is a place 

if planned properly of death and destruction, so it is 

imperative to exit it as fast as possible. The infantry and 

armor option is to fight through the enemy, but truck 

C drivers can drive out. Wheeled vehicles provide the 

advantage of speed and can also serve as a weapons 

platform. During the Korean War, the gun truck ratio was 

1:3, but the ring-mounted cargo trucks hauled cargo 

like any other truck in the convoy so they employed the 

passive tactics of returning fire and clearing the kill zone. 

During the Vietnam War, the truck drivers added armor 

to the trucks making them dedicated fighting platforms 

thus allowing them the freedom to maneuver inside the 

kill zone to defend disabled vehicles and rescue any 

drivers. The gun truck ratio during the Vietnam War was 

one gun truck per ten task vehicles, but each gun truck 

carried at least three crew- served weapons resulting in 

a weapon ratio of nearly 1:3 as during the Korean War. 

Over time, the gun truck crews learned to add a variety 

of weapons for contingencies such as the enemy getting 

right up next to the gun truck. The gun truck of the 

Vietnam War was a true fighting platform capable 

of maneuvering throughout the kill zone.

Conclusion
144 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Another lesson learned, forgotten and relearned 

during the 19th century and Vietnam War was a convoy 

march serial should not exceed 30 vehicles. 30 vehicles 

with a 100 -meter interval stretches out to three 

kilometers, or a mile. Convoy commanders admit it is 

much easier to control smaller convoys of this size and 

the gun truck ratio of 1:10 allows for two to three gun 

trucks in the convoy serial. 

The mission of the convoy is to deliver the goods 

to the customer and the mission of the gun trucks is 

to deter enemy attacks, but if attacked to defend the 

convoy until the nearest combat force can arrive and 

finish the fight. During the Vietnam War, the arrival of 

helicopter gunships usually ended any ambush, and 

it did not take long to learn the presence of gunships 

likewise deterred enemy ambushes. 

For a gun truck to coordinate its maneuver and 

those of other gun trucks, the ground combatants 

and close air support, it needed radios – one of 

the three tenants of ground combat; shoot, move 

and communicate. Radios allow the participants to 

synchronize the battle. While the addition of any crewserved weapon turned a truck into a gun truck, the 

feature that made Vietnam gun trucks stand out was 

its armor and configuration of weapons. The Vietnam 

gun truck became dedicated fighting platform.

As much as was learned, the Vietnam War left three 

unresolved issues concerning convoy security. The first 

of which dealt with the type of escort platform. The 8th 

Transportation Group experimented with different types 

of armor and armament on nearly every type of wheeled 

vehicle in its inventory. The initial escort platform was 

the gun jeep with the single M-60 machine gun. The 

M151 1⁄4-ton trucks did not have the power to carry 

much armor and were too small to mount more than 

one machine gun, but had room for several sets of 

radios. The M37 3⁄4-ton could carry the armor and also 

mount two M-60s. Consequently, these two vehicles 

made ideal command and control vehicles for convoy 

and assistant convoy commanders. 

During the first attempt to convert cargo trucks into 

gun trucks, the crews constructed protective walls of 

sandbag and wood but realized the rough conditions 

of the road beat the sandbags apart, additionally they 

were heavy and in a firefight, sandbags tended to leak 

out their contents when hit. 1⁄4-inch steel plates around 

the bed and on the doors of 21⁄2 -ton trucks turned them 

into more effective fighting platforms, but single walls 

only stopped small arms fire, not 12.7mm or RPGs. The 

M35 21⁄2-ton truck did not have the power to hold more 

weight and keep up with the task vehicles. The M54 

5-ton cargo truck not only had the power to accelerate 

past the task vehicles but could do so with a second 

steel wall. By the end of the war, the 5-ton with double 

steel wall became the preferred choice for gun truck. 

Due to the shortage of steel plates, both the 8th 

Transportation Group out of Qui Nhon and the 500th 

Group down in Cam Ranh Bay experimented with 

mounting M113 APC hulls on the backs of 5-ton cargo 

trucks. These types of gun trucks proved top heavy and 

dangerous to drive especially when making turns. The 

8th Group crews slid their APC hulls in front forward 

which placed most of the weight over the back wheels, 

but the 500th Group crews slide their APC hulls in 

backwards which centered the weight better between 

the front and rear wheels. 

During the Korean War, the truck drivers mounted 

machine guns on ring mounts and found the M-2 .50 

caliber was more intimidating than the .30, just as the 

Vietnam veterans learned the superior fire power of the 

.50 over the 7.62mm M-60. The 21⁄2-ton gun trucks 

started out with two M-60 machine guns but graduated 

to three to four .50 caliber machine guns arrayed 

around the gun box so they could provide spraying fire 

across 360 degrees. Some gun trucks even acquired 

M-134 mini -guns, which put out tremendous fire power 

but the rough road could knock the timing off. During 

the first year of experimentation, the 8th Transportation 

Group borrowed Quad .50s mounted on 21⁄2 - ton trucks. 

They threw out a lot of lead, but required a crew of 

six; driver, gunner and four loaders. Since the table of 

organization and equipment (TOE) did not authorize 

gun trucks, it did not provide the additional personnel 

to man them; so the truck companies had to take 

drivers off task vehicles to man the gun trucks. Each 

crew member of a gun truck represented a task vehicle 

that did not have a driver. The Quad .50s were not cost 

effective and did not provide any armor for the loaders. 

The Quad .50s could not depress to engage enemy on 

the sloping terrain in most mountain passes and did not 

offer 360 degrees of fire since the cab of the truck got 

in the way. Consequently, the M-2 .50 caliber machine 
Vietnam War 145

gun designed by John Browning in 1918 proved the 

preferred weapon of choice and only the number and 

location on the gun truck differed.

Even COL Bellino considered the gun truck a 

field expedient until enough Cadillac Gage V100 four 

wheeled armored cars arrived to replace them. The 

delay in Transportation units receiving the V100 was 

MPs had priority for issue of the V100. Even MG Joseph 

M. Heiser, Jr., Commander of 1st Logistics Command, 

considered the V100 a more effective escort vehicle 

and forwarded his recommendations in a report to the 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development in August 

1969. Every senior officer in the chain of command 

concurred; however, the gun truck crews knew its 

weaknesses. While the senior officers saw the V100 

fully enclosed armored car as offering 360 degrees of 

armor protection, the gun truckers realized there was no 

place for the blast of an RPG to escape if it penetrated 

the armor. Unless the RPG penetrated right where the 

gunner in a gun box was standing he would live, but the 

armored car trapped the blast inside which would kill 

or seriously wound the entire crew. These case studies 

presented several cases where gunners such as John 

Dodd or Chester Israel survived RPG hits in 5 -ton gun 

boxes and continued to fight. The V100 only had a single 

cupola with two M -73 7.62mm machine guns that could 

only fire in one direction, where the 5-ton gun truck 

could fire in three directions at once. Not only that but 

the V100 did not have the power train that could keep 

up with the convoy. A later report by an Army concept 

team conducted from December 1970 to March 1971 

agreed with the truck drivers.366

8th Transportation Group agreed that gun truck 

crews should remain within their assigned companies 

so at the end of the day they had to bunk with the men 

they were charged to protect. The role of the gun trucks 

was to go into the kill zone while everyone else was 

trying to get out of it, so not every truck driver rose to 

that challenge. In the beginning, commanders appointed 

their best drivers to the gun trucks but over time, the 

gun truck gained an élan, mostly due to the elaborate 

art work, and the crews selected their replacements. 

The 500th Group in Cam Ranh Bay did likewise but only 

assigned a permanent crew of two, driver and gunner, to 

minimize the reduction of drivers of cargo trucks. They 

pulled the other two gunners from a pool of volunteers 

drawn from the depot units at Cam Ranh Bay. This left 

no continuity unless the gunner volunteered every day. 

The 48th Group down in Long Binh avoided gun trucks 

up until end of the war, and then consolidated all their 

gun trucks into a single truck company. The advantage 

of consolidating the gun trucks in one company is 

simplicity in mission, training and maintenance. Both 

gun trucks internal and external to the truck companies 

offered advantages and disadvantages that would 

resurface during the next war requiring gun trucks.

Tactics describes the way battles are fought. The 

gun truck crews of the 8th Group had only one tactic – 

to drive into the kill zone spraying in every direction until 

either they ran out of ammunition or the ground security 

force or helicopter gunships arrived. The 8th Group 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) called for the gun 

trucks to move to the edge of the kill zone to lay down 

suppressive fire, but most gun trucks drove into the kill 

zone especially where any disabled cargo trucks might 

be. The edge of the kill zone provided a safe distance 

from enemy fire while their .50s could still lay down 

effective suppressive fire. Since the muzzle flash did not 

betray the enemy’s position during the day, the gun truck 

gunners fired in any direction hoping for chance to hit the 

enemy. A study of the history of infantry tactics reveals 

that ground is controlled by a given amount ammunition 

expended in a specific amount of time. For example 

a Civil War rifle company of a hundred men could fire 

two to three rounds per minute, but a rifle squad during 

World War I occupied the same about of ground. The bolt 

action rifle increased the rate of fire for ten riflemen to 

10 to 15 rounds per minute and the addition of either 

250 rounds per minute of the Chauchat or 500 to 650 

rounds per minute of the Browning Automatic Rifle 

(BAR). The actual rate of fire of the BAR was significantly 

reduced by the fact the gunner and assistant gunner 

only carried 12 20 -round magazines each. So without 

accurate fire, 200 to 300 rounds controlled the same 

amount of ground by the random probability of hitting 

something. Without knowing exactly where the enemy 

was hidden, the M-2 .50 caliber machine gun could 

send 450 to 550 rounds down range in one minute and 

over time the gun trucks carried enough ammunition 

cans to fire the full capability of the weapons. 

The gun truck crews of the 500th Group employed 

a technique of what Iraqi gun truck crews would call 
146 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

“bumping.” They ran with long convoys and the gun truck 

in the kill zone would lay down a base of fire employing 

four to six round bursts until the next gun truck arrived. 

The next gun truck would take the first’s place and it 

would then continue with the convoy out of the kill zone. 

Each successive gun truck would come up and take the 

place of the one before it until every cargo truck had 

cleared the kill zone. 

Another unresolved issue was whether the 

aggressive tactics of 8th Group or the passive tactics 

of the 500th Group worked best. The passive tactics 

referred to returning fire and clearing the kill zone. The 

aggressive tactics of the 8th Group called for every gun 

truck that could reach the kill zone to concentrate in it 

and tear up anything within range of their weapons. 

The First World War heralded the beginning of 

366Richard E. Killblane, Circle the Wagons; The History of US Army Convoy 

Security, Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005.

the broad front concept of war that did not end until 

Operation Desert Storm. During World War I the Allies 

dug trenches that connected the English Channel with 

the Swiss Alps creating a front line with the enemy 

before it and a safe rear behind it. The lack of a front line 

during the Vietnam War made this conflict seem as an 

anomaly of the 20th century rather than the rule, so the 

lessons of convoy security were forgotten as the Army 

tried to distance itself from the loss and refocus 

on Fulda Gap and the possible war with the Soviet Union. 

Not until the war in Iraq in 2003 would the US Army 

realize convoy security needed to be a permanent 

part of doctrine.

Logan Werth and Mike Cameric on Uncle Meat giving the thumbs up because they had survived another ambush. 

Besides covering the floor with ammunition cans, they had stacked more in the corners because the increase in 

ambushes during Lam Son. Photo courtesy of Logan Werth
Apendices: Tactical SOPs 147

8th Transportation Group SOP Annex A 1968 and 1969:

8. Action to be taken in the event of ambush, sniper fire or mines:

a. Ambushes:

When a convoy encounters sniper fire, an ambush or mines it should KEEP MOVING if at all possible.

 The security forces will be contacted by radio immediately.

 All vehicles which are beyond the kill zone will continue moving toward their destination.

 If unavoidably stopped in the kill zone, personnel must dismount, take up covered and concealed positions, 

and lay down a heavy volume of return fire only on active enemy targets, staying in close proximity of their 

 vehicles. In no case will convoy personnel close with or attempt to pursue the enemy as this will interfere with 

the tactical reaction plan. Convoy personnel will cease fire upon arrival of tactical security elements to allow 

 tactical vehicles and personnel freedom of movement against enemy forces. Convoy control personnel will 

insure that traffic begins to move as soon as the tactical situation permits.

 Those vehicles which have not yet entered the kill zone will halt at 100 meter intervals, dismount and defend 

as described in the preceding paragraph, firing only if the enemy targets are visible. 

 If the tactical situation permits move disabled vehicles off the road.

b. Mining Incidents:

If mines are encountered, the convoy commander must, in conjunction with the tactical commander, quickly 

 determine a course of action. While a single mine should not delay an entire convoy, vehicles must not enter 

 an area known to be heavily mined.

 If the convoy is halted by mines, the convoy commander will immediately alert the security forces and disperse 

 his personnel around the vehicles in preparation for an attack.

	 c.	 Sniper fire:

If the convoy or a segment of the convoy receives sniper fire, fire should be returned and 

 vehicles will continue moving.

 The convoy commander will attempt to determine the location of the sniper and report it to the 

 tactical forces securing that portion of the route.

9. General Precautionary Measures:

 Good convoy discipline and continuous driver training will reduce the possibility and/or effectiveness 

 of enemy action against convoys.

 Drivers should track the vehicle ahead when these vehicles are in sight. This will reduce the possibility of 

 detonating a pressure-activated mine which the vehicle ahead may have missed. Conversely, old tracks 

 should be avoided because Viet Cong commonly places mines in old tracks.
148 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

 Speed generates carelessness. The enemy relies on careless drivers in his employment of mines.

 Key personnel, who are prime targets for command detonated mines, must avoid congregating in one vehicle 

 or location within the convoy.

 Drivers should avoid carelessly driving over wooden sticks or other debris on the road. Pieces of wood 

 (board or bamboo) on a roadway may indicate the presence of pressure activated mines 

 or other explosive devices.

Vehicle operators should be alert for changes in familiar scenes, evidence of apparent road repairs, new fill 

 or paving, road patches, mud smears, grass, dirt, dung or other substance on roads. Such areas could be 

 evidence of enemy 

 Each convoy commander will make such coordination as necessary with escorts or at critical points in

sufficient time to prevent any delay of the convoy. Where unforeseen delays or route changes occur, the 

 convoy commander will expeditiously notify his Battalion headquarters which will pass this information to 

 the Group Operations section.

 Information will include the cause, location (grid coordinates), alternate routes available and 

 other pertinent data.

8th Transportation Group Tactical Convoy Operations, 1969:

14 points of ambush:

Keep weapon ready to fire.

Be alert for changes in familiar scenes along route.

Use your weapon, return fire immediately.

Notify security forces by radio, call – contact, contact, contact.

Continue moving, maintaining interval if possible.

Track vehicles ahead to prevent further detonation of mine.

Don’t enter kill zone if possible. 

If disabled and convoy is moving through kill zone, mount a passing vehicle.

Provide flanking support fire into kill zone.

Gun trucks apply maximum base of fire. Fight as a team. Deploy upon command.

Prime targets are: enemy automatic weapons positions, enemy mortar, rocket positions and 

assaulting ground troops.

Stay on hard surfaces.

Cease fire on signal.

Remember details.
Bibliography 149

Bibliography

Interviews

Baird, James 

Ballard, Larry “Ted” 

Barrowcliff, Merton

Belcastro, Dennis 

Bennett, Calvin

Blosser, Paul 

Briggs, Thomas 

Brown Phillip C. 

Buckwalter, Jack 

Buirge, Michael 

Burke, COL (R) John 

Cahill, Richard

Calhoun, J.D. 

Calibro, Steve 

Carter, Fred

Champ, Roger D. 

Chapman, John

Chalker, Wayne C.

Cochran, Danny 

Collins, LTC (R) Nicholas 

Darby, Jim

Deeks, Walter 

Dalton, Robert

Dobos, Wayne 

Dodd, John

Dye, Robert 

Eichenberg, LTC (R) William L.

Fiandt, Larry 

Freeman, Erik 

Fuller, CPT (R) Ralph 

Gress, John

Hatton, Alford

Honor, LTG (R) Edward 

Israel, Chester 

Jacobs, John

Kendal, Ron

Looney, Gary 

Lyles, James

Mallory, Ronald 

Marcum, Paul

Marshall, Harold

Mauricio, Paul

McCarthy, Joseph 

Medley, Walter Dan 

Metheny, BG (R) Orvil C. 

Montgomery, Barry

Ondic, LTC (R) Larry 

Owens, Ron

Patrick, Wayne

Robertson, Walter

Seay, Sammy

Sims, Charles

Smiley, COL (R) Philip N.

Smith, Rick

Smith, Ronald 

Swanson, COL (R) Paul

Taylor, Clifford Wesley 

Tellez, Manny

Van Brocklin, Terrance 

Voightritter, LTC (R) Ronald 

Weeks, Grailin

Welton, Burrell 

Wheat, Timothy 

Wolfe, COL (R) Melvin M. 
150 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

Papers and Reports

1st Marine Division Fleet Marine Force Special Action Report for the Wonsan – Hamhung – Chosin Reservoir Operation; 8 October – 15 December 1950, 

Volume One, May 21, 1951.

After Action Report to Commander C Company, 504th MP Battalion.

“Ambushes in the An Khe Pass,” unknown author of the 27th Transportation Battalion, 1970.

Appleman, LTC Roy E. Papers, US Army Historical and Education Center.

Award Citations for SP4 Ronald M. Kendall and SP4 Timothy Wheat, 7 February 1968.

Barrett, MAJ Jonathan R., Operational Report of the 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 31 January 1969, 12 February 1969, 

RCS CSFOR- 65 (RI).

Bing, LTC Tom L., Operational Report of the 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, 

4 February 1969 CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

____, Operational Report of the 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, 8 May 1969 CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Bozeman, LTC Wallace B., Operational Report of the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Quarterly period Ending 31 October 1969, 9 November 1969. 

Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R-1).

Brown, COL Albert J., Trip Report (8- 69). Convoy Security, US Army Combat Developments Command, Liaison Detachment, HQ USARV, APO San Francisco, 

96375, 20 January 1969.

Busbey, COL Arthur B., Jr., Subject: Hwy 19 SOP for Logistical and Security Elements, Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96350, 

17 July 1968.

Case , COL Frank B., Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968, Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), 

8 November 1968.

Collins, MAJ Nicholas H., “Battalion S -3 Notes,” Headquarters, 54th Transportation Battalion, APO 96238, 5 March 1967.

Daniels, LTC Walter C., Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion, Truck), for Period Ending 31 October 1969, 

13 November 1969.

_____, Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion, Truck), for Period Ending 30 April 1970, 13 May 1970.

_____, Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion, Truck), for Period Ending 31 July 1970, 13 August 1970.

Department of the Army, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, General Order Number 102, Award of the Bronze Start Medal for Heroism, 

2LT Burrell Welton, 7 February 1968.

Descoteau, 1LT Roland E., Unit History, 88th Transportation Company, 1 January to 31 December 1967, 25 March 1968.

Durant, LTC John J., Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion, Truck), for Period Ending 31 October 1970, 

14 November 1971.

Edmiston, MAJ Charles H., Operational Report of the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Quarterly period Ending 30 April 1969, 3 May 1969. 

Report Control Symbol CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Ellis, LTC Alvin C., “Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR- 65 (R2),” 

Headquarters, 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck), APO San Francisco 96308, 4 May 1971.

Fitzgibbons, LTC Eugene T., Operational Report of the 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, 31 July 1968, 

RCS CSFOR- 65 (RI).

Forster, CPT Paul, Unit History, Annual Supplement, 512th Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January to 31 December 1967, 18 March 1968.

Freeman, Erik and Charles Sims email correspondence, 15 – 21 February 1998.

Freeman, LTC William C., Operational Report of the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the Period Ending 30 April 1970, 6 May 1969.

______, Operational Report of the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, 1 August 1969.

Gaudio, 1LT Alan N., Operational Report 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for period Ending 31 October 1969, 11 November 1970, 

RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Grabia, 1LT Stanley, Unit History, 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck), C.Y. 1970, 15 April 1971.

Hall, CPT Phillip T., Jr., 585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) APO 96238, After Action Report, 11 November 1968.

Hammel, 1LT William C., Unit History, 669th Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968, 11 March 1969.

Henderson, LTC Chester T., Operational Report of the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Quarterly period Ending 30 April 1968, 30 April 1968. 

Report Control Symbol CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Honor, LTC Edward, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969, 

25 February 1970.

Hume, BG A. G., Deputy Chief of Staff (P&O), Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 14, Headquarters, US Army Vietnam, 20 October 1970.

Hunt, 1LT James F., Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 500th Transportation Group, Period Ending 30 April 1969, 5 September 1969.

Jenkins, 1LT J. S. B., Unit History Annual Historical Supplement, 512th Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1966, 21 July 1967.

Johnson III, 1LT Harris T., Unit History, 523rd Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January to 31 December 1968, 31 January 1969.

Klein, 1LT Ronald F., Unit History, 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck), C.Y. 1968, 15 March 1969.

Kramer, LTC John C., Operational Report 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for period Ending 31 July 1969, 8 August 1969 (RCS CSFOR- 65) (R-1).

______, Operational Report 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for period Ending 31 October 1969, 8 November 1969 RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Langston, COL Alex T., Jr., Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 January 1970, 

15 February 1970 RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

_______, Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 30 April 1970, 22 May 1970 RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

_______, Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 July 1970, 19 August 1970 RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Little, LTC C. D. M., Operational Report of the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1970, 6 August 1970. 

Report Control Symbol CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Ludy, COL Garland A., Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) period ending 31 July 1969, 10 August 1969.

_____, Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 July 1969, 10 August 1969 RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).
Bibliography 151

_____, Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the period ending 31 January 1969, 

7 February 1969 RCS CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Memorial Service, 54th Transportation Battalion, Camp Addison, Republic of Vietnam, 6 September 1967.

Metheny, LTC Orvil, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1968, 

20 February 1969.

Nantroup, MAJ John F., Operational Report of the 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR- 65 (RI), 

8 December 1969.

Petro, George E., Appendix 10 to Annex Peter Peter to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report, 30 December 1950.

Preble, 1LT Alvin L., Unit History, 359th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Petroleum), 1 January to 31 December 1968, 6 April 1969.

Puller, L. B., Annex Peter Peter to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report, HQ 1st Marines (Reinf), 15 January 1951.

Rackley, LTC Jerry D., Operational Report of the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck), WFR6AA, for the Period Ending 31 October 1970, 5 November 1969.

______, Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion, Truck), for Period Ending 31 January 1970, 

18 February 1970.

______, Operational Report 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for period Ending 30 April 1969, 14 May 1970 (RCS CSFOR- 65) (R-1).

Ratcliff, LTC R. H., Operational Report of the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Quarterly period Ending 30 April 1970, 7 May 1970. 

Report Control Symbol CSFOR- 65 (R-1).

Reise, LTC Paul E., Operational Report of the 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, 31 October 1968, 

RCS CSFOR- 65 (RI).

Sarber, LTC William R., Operational Report of the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck), WFR6AA, for Period Ending 30 April 1969, 5 May 1969.

_____, Operational Report of the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck), WFR6AA, for Period Ending 31 July 1969, 8 August 1969.

Shelley, 1LT Jay N., Unit History, 512th Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968, 11 March 1968.

Smith, MG Oliver P., Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 17 December 1950.

Spain, 1LT Donald L., Unit History, 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck), C.Y. 1969, 25 March 1970.

Storey, MAJ Thomas P., Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970, 

Headquarters, 36th Transportation Battalion (Truck), 10 January 1970.

_____, MAJ Thomas P., “Operational Report – Lessons Learned 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), Period Ending 31 January 1970, 

17 February 1970, RCS CSFOR- 65 (R2).

Thomas, COL David H., “Vehicle Convoy Security Operations in the Republic of Vietnam,” Active Project No. ACG-78F, US Army Contact Team in Vietnam, 

APO San Francisco, CA 96384, 30 Sep 71.

Thomas, 1LT Peter C., Unit History Report, 57th Transportation Company, 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968, 24 March 1969.

Tish, 1LT Thomas L., Annual Historical Summary, 585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo), 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968.

Unit History, 523rd Transportation Company (Light Truck), 1 January 1967 – 31 December 1967.

Unit History, 669th Transportation Company (Light Truck), 1 January 1967 – 31 December 1967.

Utley, LTC Jack C., Operational Report – Lessons learned, Headquarters, 54th Transportation Battalion (Trk), Period Ending 30 April 1968, 17 July 1968.

Vitellaro, 1LT John J., Unit History, 669th Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January 1969 – 31 December 1969, 25 March 1970.

Weston, Thomas, letter to parents, November 29, 1967 and letter to Squadron Press, August 29, 1996.

Whalen, 1LT Thomas F., Unit History, 512th Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January 1969 – 31 December 1969, 1 February 1969.

Wilkins, 1LT William J., Unit History Report, 64th Transportation Company (Medium Truck), 1 January 1968 – 31 December 1968, 7 April 1969.

Wills, 1LT Robert M., Unit History, 523rd Transportation Company (LT TRK), 1 January 1969 to 31 December 1969, 23 March 1970.

Womack, MAJ Daniel, Jr., Operational Report of the 57th Transportation Battalion (Trk) for quarterly period Ending 31 January 1970, 5 February 1970. 

Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R-1).

Wright, LTC Louie E., Operational Report of the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the Period Ending 31 January 1970, 3 February 1969.

Books and Articles

Appleman, LTC Roy E., Escaping the Trap; The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950, College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1990.

August 1968 Battalion Time Line, 720th Military Police Battalion Reunion Association Vietnam History Project, http://720mpreunion.org/history/ 

time_line/1968/08_1968.html Belcastro, Dennis, Narrative, “Living History Reenactment at Jamestown March 2000,” Army Transportation 

Association Vietnam, http://grambo.us/belcastro/54guntruck.htm.

Barrowcliff, Merton, “Story,” unpublished account of ambush submitted to 359th Transportation Company Vietnam.

Bellino, Colonel Joe O., “8th Transportation Group; Sep 1967 – Sep 1968.” n.d.

Chalker, Wayne C., “The Fire Base Bastogne Convoy 4/68,” Army Transportation Association Vietnam, 134.198.33.115/atav/default.html.

Dodd, John, “Story,” unpublished account of the ambush.

Katzenmeier, Ivan, “A Combat Medic’s Vietnam Experience,” Katzenmeier’s Weblog, A Journey in Words and Photos, http://katzenmeier.wordpress.com/. 

Killblane, Richard, Mentoring and Leading;The Career of Lieutenant General Edward Honor, Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Transportation School, 2003.

______, Circle the Wagons The History of US Army Convoy Security, Global War on Terrorism: Occasional Paper 13, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

Leonard, Ron, “The Ambush At Ap Nhi,” http://25thaviation.org/id804.htm.

Lyles, James, Gun Trucks in Vietnam; Have Guns – Will Travel, Wheaton, ILL: Rhame House Publishers Inc., 2012.

______, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks, Part 2, Quezon City, Philippines: Planet Art, 2003.

______, The Hard Ride: Vietnam Gun Trucks; Part Two, n.p., 2011.

______, The Hard Ride; Vietnam Gun Trucks, Quezon City, Philippines: Planet Art, 2002.

Ludy, COL Garland A., “8th Transportation Group, Sep 1968 – Sep 1969.”

McAdams, Frank, Vietnam Rough Riders; A Convoy Commander’s Memoirs, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2013.

Nolan, Keith William, Into Laos; The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986.

Tunnell, Stephen C., “Convoy Ambush at Ap Nhi,” Vietnam, April 1999.
152 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

A

Abrams, GEN Creighton, 34

Amos, Marion, 118 

Anderson, SP4 George, 39- 41, 43-45

Arbuthnot, 1LT John M. II, 30, 49, 50

ARVN units

1st Squadron, 10th ARVN Cavalry, 92

1st ARVN Airborne Division, 123

1st ARVN Armored Division, 123

Almond, LTG Edward M., 8

Aragon, Pete, 124

B

Bailey, Jerry L., 63

Baird, 2LT Jim, 122, 128-134

Ball, SP4 Gipsey, B., Jr., 31-34

Ballard, Ted, 33

Barrowcliff, Merton, 88

Bass, Sam, 124

Belcastro, SGT Dennis J., 35-37

Bell, SP4 David Leroy, 66

Bellino, COL Joseph O. “Joe,” 26, 145

Bennett, Calvin, 129, 132-134

Briggs, 1LT Thomas, 23, 24

Bledsoe, 22

Blink, Roger, 88

Bond, SGT Richard, 92, 94, 96

Bonner, Edward “Ed,” 98

Boyd, Jim, 32

Brammer, SP4, 49

Branham, SP4 Vernon L., 69

Braswell, Baylon, 97

Brittner, SGT Roger, 124-126

Britton, SSG Ronald, 71

Brockbank, LT Howard, 138

Buckwalter, SSG Jack, 115, 116

Buirge, Mike, 42, 44

Burke, LTC John, 27

Burnell, SGT John D., 63, 67, 68

Bush, Vernon, 40-44

Bushong, SP4, 49

C

Cahill, SGT Richard, 110, 111

Calhoun, J. D., 21, 22

Calibro, SP5 Steve, 61-66, 69

Callahan, 2LT Tom, 122, 133, 134

Callison, Jimmy Ray, 91, 92, 97

Cameric, Mike, 146

Cansans, PFC, 49

Capizola, SGT Nicholas, 58

Cappolloni, SP5 Dennis, 36, 37

Carter, 23

Carter, SP5 William Fred, 97, 98, 102, 103, 106

Chalker, Wayne, 117, 118

Champ, SGT Roger D., 69, 70, 73, 74

Chapman, SP5 John, 95, 99, 100, 102, 103

Christopher, Jerry, 31, 32

Cluchi, CPT, 127

Cochran, 96

Cochran, Danny, 131

Cole, SGT Larry, 69

Collins, SSG Claude L., 24

Collins, SP4 Larry E., 113

Collins, SGT Leroy, 21, 24

Collins, MAJ Nicholas, 17

Cox, SGT Buford, Jr., 22, 23

Crow, Walter, 124

Cummings, SP4 Harold, 35, 36

Czerwinsky, SP4, 32

D

Dahl, SP4 Larry, 92, 94, 96, 100 -103

Daniels, LTC Walter C., 87

Darby, Jim, 111

Davison, SP4 Guy A., 141

Deeks, Walter, 95, 96, 99, 101-103, 106

Delmar, COL Henry “Hank,” 114

Desena, 23

Diaz, SSG Hector J., 96, 100, 101, 103, 106

Dillahay, SP5 Robert, 37

Dodd, SGT John, 88-91, 143

Dominquez, SP4 Dick, 31

Dougherty, 1LT, 122

Downer, 131

Dye, SP4 Robert, 39-43

E

Edwards, SGT, 118

Ellis, LTC Alvin C. “Big Al,” 133

Emery, 131

F

Fiandt, Larry, 79

Foster, Joseph, 35-37

Fowlke, SP4 Earnest W., 49

Frank, LT, 60

Frazier, SSG Charles H., 138, 141

Frazier, SP4 Richard B., 129, 132

Freeman, SP5 Erik, 91, 97, 100-103, 105

Fromm, Robert, 117

Fuller, 1LT Ralph, 121, 122, 133, 134

G

Giroux, Frank W., II, 35, 36

Geise, CPT Paul, 21, 23

Giap, Vo Nguyen, 34

Gordon, Ray E., 37

Green, SP4, 49

Greenage, PFC Roy L., 24

Gregory, SSG Kenneth R., 141

Gun Trucks

54th Best, 63

Ace of Spades, 63, 64, 66, 75, 77, 

 121, 134

Assassins, 3, 125

Baby Sitters, 124-127

Bad Hombre, 103

Ball of Confusion, 88, 91- 93, 97

Bel and the Cheese Eaters, 35

Big Kahuna, 56

Black Widow, 63, 69, 70, 77, 121, 129, 134

Blood, Sweat and Tires, 81

Boss, 89, 94-96, 99 -103

Brutus, 88 - 94, 96 -98, 100 -103, 106

Cobra’s Den, 111, 115

Cold Sweat, 70, 71, 103, 141

Corps Revenge, 62, 63, 67, 68

Creeper, 94, 95, 98 -100, 102, 106

Ejaculator, 108, 111

Eve of Destruction, 62-70, 73 -75, 121, 

 123, 124

Filthy Four, 63

Flying Dutchman, 109, 111

Gambler, 56, 63, 111, 115

Grim Reaper, 63

Grogin’s Heroes, 111

Hawk, 57

Herm’s Revenge, 68

Iron Butterfly, 66, 67, 77-79

Justifier, 125

King Cobra, 81-83, 92

King Kong, 63, 75, 77, 121, 122, 128 -132

Lady Be Good, 70, 71, 73

Little Brutus, 96, 97, 100, 102

Matchbox, 77-79

Misfits, 88 - 91, 96, 100, 102, 103

Mortician, 109, 111

Outlaws, 91

Peacemaker, 113

Playboys, 94, 96, 99 -103

Poison Ivy, 81, 92

Protector, 124, 125, 127

Proud American, 132-134

Roach Coach, 111

Satan’s Chariot, 104, 105

Satan’s Lil’ Angel, 121, 128-132

Sergeant Pepper II, 70

Sir Charles, 81, 92, 100, 104, 105

Steel’s Wheels, 35, 37

The Saint, 81, 83

True Grit, 63, 69, 70, 75, 141

Uncle Meat, 69, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79, 121, 

 128 -132, 134, 146

Untouchable, 91, 96-98, 100, 102, 103, 

 105, 106

USA, 110, 111, 115

War Wagon, 39, 44

Widow Maker, 111

Woom Doom, 91

Gunter, PFC William A., 24
Index 153

H

Haley, SGT Gregory, 139

Han Jin Company, 58, 60, 65

Hardesty, SP4 Robert W., 53

Hastings, Ray “Corps,” 63

Healy, SGT, 124

Heiser, MG Joseph M., Jr., 145

Hensinger, SP4 Arthur J., 31

Herman, Robert C. “Herm,” 68

Himburg, LT James, 70 -73

Hinote, SP4 William, 138, 139

Hish, Peter, 88 - 91

Hodges, John, 88 - 90

Honor, LTC Edward, 111, 112

Hoskins, LT Sam, 124

Howell, SP4, 49

Hughey, Lloyd R., 24

Huser, Charles L. “Chuck,” 92, 94, 96, 

100, 101, 103

Hunzeker, LTC William K., 23, 24

Hutcherson, SSG, 88, 90

Hutchins, LT, 67

Hyatt, PFC Gerald T., 37

I

Inuchi, Tony, 73

Israel, SGT Chester, 129, 130, 132, 143

J

Jackson, SP5 Jimmie, 49

Jacobs, John, 111

Johnson, PFC Bobby L., 141

Johnson, PFC Thomas G. “Tom,” 69

Jones, Gene, 124, 126

K

Kagel, William “Bill,” 91, 92 

Kendal, SP4 Ron, 39, 41- 45

Klepsig, CPL David E., 8

Kratzenmeier, SP4 Ivan, 139

Kunston, Glen, 97 

Kurtz, 124

L

Larsen, LTG Stanley R., 26, 27

Larson, 131

Leclair, 23

Lee, SSG, 69, 70

Logan, Robert, 97, 146

Logston, Bob, 31, 32

Looney, Gary, 96, 99

Louden, 96, 99, 101

Loveall, 1LT Ronald C., 69 

Ludy, COL Garland, 61- 64, 69, 71, 76, 107, 117

M

Mack, 1LT Dennis C., 58

Maddox, Terrance N., 37

Mallory, Ronald “Ron,” 92, 94, 96, 101, 103, 106

Maloney, 1LT Roger, 124-127

Manning, PFC Ronald, 83, 84

Marcum, Paul, 40-44

Mauricio, Paul, 95, 99-103, 106 

McBride, SGT Michael “Mike,” 125

McCarthy, CPT Joseph II, 69, 70, 73, 74

McDonald, 133

McEarchen, SGT Ellis “Mac,” 94, 99

McGinley, LTC Edward, 61

McGinty, CPT Terrance J., 58

McGrath, James, 119

McGuire, Barry, 62

McQuellen, SGT, 101, 102

Melnick, 23

Merdutt, Gerald, 74

Metcalf, SP4 Charles E., 34

Midolo, 23

Mintz, SP4 Gary C., 66

Mongle, William, 94, 95

Montgomery, Barry, 94, 99, 103, 106 

Morin, 22 

Murphy, SP4 Albert, 138, 141

N

Newman, SP4 Bobby, 66

O

Ondic, Larry, 138

Orozco, Daniel, 139

P

Pacific & Atlantic Engineers, 48

Page, LTC John U. D. 7-11

Palumbo, 23

Parson, 70, 73

Patrick, CPT Wayne, 111-114, 116

Pedigo, SP4 Charles, 115

Pennington, 70

Phipps, 22 

Plummer, Steve, 118

Porter, LT, 97, 98, 100, 102

Prescott, SGT Wayne, 88 - 90

Pulley, SP4 James E., 65, 75

Purvis, 1LT James P., 31

Q

Quintana, Ernest “Ernie,” 91, 92

R

Reinhart, PFC Arthur W., 24

Republic of Korea Tiger Division, 16, 54, 70, 74

Revelak, LT, 126

Rippee, 71

Robertson, Walter, 111, 115

Ross, John, 97

Runkle, LTC Robert L., 37 

Runnas, SP5 Stanley A., 37

S

Sanders, SP4 Roy A., 31- 34 

Sas, PFC Robert L., 31- 34

Seay, SP4 William W., 138,139, 141

Sellman, SP4 David M., 136, 138, 139, 141

Shartle, Harold, 96 

Sheck, Kenneth, 96 

Shed, Keith, 124

Shelley, 1LT Jay M., 65-67

Sherrill, Leroy, Jr., 125

Simmons, SP4 Ronald W., 24

Sims, SGT Charles, 104, 105

Smiley, LTC Philip N., 24

Smith, MG Oliver P., 7-9

Smith, Rick “Snuffy,” 110

Smith, Ronald, 114, 115

Soule, SP4 Charles H., 124, 125, 127

Spears, 125

Spitler, CWO Robert J. “Bob,” 139, 140

Spurgeon, SP4 Harold, 126

Stack, Robert, 97

Stafford, LT Lee, 124, 125

Stebner, PFC Robert L., 24

Stegmayer, 1LT Paul J., 53, 54 

Steel, 1LT James R., 35, 37, 46

Swanson, COL Paul, 142

Sweeney, BG Arthur H. Jr., 127

T

Tate, Raymond H., 141

Taylor, Clifford W., 111

Thorne, SP4 Robert W. “Bob,” 130, 132 -134

Tidwell, PFC Jimmy, 49

Tillotson, 1LT, 37, 46

Tomlin, SGT, 23

Todd, 1LT Jerry L., 36, 37, 46

Trumbo, 23
154 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I 

U

US Army

I Field Force, 26

X Corps, 7, 8

US Army Divisions

1st Cavalry Division, 22, 26, 30, 110, 117

1st Infantry Division 140

3rd Infantry Division, 7, 8

4th Infantry Division, 26, 34, 48, 53, 73

5th Infantry Division, 125, 133

7th Infantry Division, 7, 10

25th Infantry Division, 121, 136, 142

101st Airborne Division, 112, 113, 117

US Army Regiments and Brigades

1st Cavalry Regiment 33, 34, 48

3rd Infantry Regiment, 134

4th Cavalry Regiment, 139, 140

5th Cavalry Regiment, 37

5th Infantry Regiment, 37

7th Cavalry Regiment, 22

7th Infantry Regiment, 8

17th Cavalry Regiment, 103

22nd Infantry Regiment, 139, 140

23rd Infantry Regiment, 137, 139, 140

34th Armor Regiment, 137

65th Infantry Regiment, 8, 9

69th Armor Regiment, 55

77th Armor Regiment, 125

173rd Airborne Brigade, 40, 45, 48, 51- 53

US Army Battalions

1st Engineer Battalion, 9

4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, 49, 52, 68

25th Aviation Battalion, 139-141

34th Supply and Service Battalion, 23

65th Engineer Battalion, 139

70th Engineer Battalion, 24

240th Quartermaster Battalion, 38, 55, 88

504th MP Battalion, 21, 22, 27

720th MP Battalion, 136, 141

815th Engineer Battalion, 27

Task Force Faith, 7, 8

Task Force Dog, 8 -10

US Army Companies

25th MP Company, 136, 138

304th Supply and Service Company, 40, 44

557th Maintenance Company, 111

560th Maintenance Company (DS), 59

US Army Transportation Corps Groups

8th Transportation Group, 15-19, 23-25, 

 27, 34, 38-40, 42-44, 53, 54, 56, 60-

 62, 68, 70, 71, 76, 81, 86, 97, 107, 

 111, 117, 122, 124, 127, 139, 

 144-148

48th Transportation Group, 136, 138,

 141, 142

500th Transportation Group, 107, 108, 

 111, 115, 144-146

US Army Transportation Corps Battalions

6th Transportation Battalion, 28, 136, 139

 142, 145

7th Transportation Battalion, 136

24th Transportation Battalion, 107, 114

27th Transportation Battalion, 16, 20, 24, 

 51, 52, 54, 55, 60, 70, 77, 

 81, 87, 91, 94, 118

36th Transportation Battalion, 107, 110, 

 111, 114 

39th Transportation Battalion, 118, 120, 

 122, 128, 132, 133

52nd Transportation Truck Battalion, 7-10

54th Transportation Battalion, 16, 17, 

 20-22, 24, 30, 31, 35, 47, 48 -52, 54, 

 55, 60, 67, 70, 77, 79, 104

57th Transportation Battalion, 117, 120

124th Transportation Battalion, 16, 27, 

 48, 49, 51, 53, 58, 88

US Army Transportation Corps Companies

2nd Transportation Company, 53, 81 

57th Transportation Company, 24, 36, 

 117, 123-125, 127

58th Transportation Company, 51

61st Transportation Company, 117

62nd Transportation Company, 137, 

 138, 141

63rd Transportation Company, 117, 120

64th Transportation Company, 1, 49, 53

88th Transportation Company, 58 - 60, 

 84, 104

172nd Transportation Company, 107

205th Transportation Company, 74

359th Transportation Company, 1, 23, 

 38-45, 88 -103

360th Transportation Company, 109, 

 111, 114, 115, 117

363rd Transportation Company, 117

377th Transportation Company, 7

442nd Transportation Company, 107, 

 111, 112, 114

444th Transportation Company, 51, 80, 

 81, 83

446th Transportation Company, 117

512th Transportation Company, 24, 31, 

 55, 65 - 67, 70, 77, 78

515th Transportation Company, 123 -125, 

 127

523rd Transportation Company, 21, 24, 33, 

 55, 61-75, 77, 121-125, 127-134

538th Transportation Company, 117

545th Transportation Company, 94

566th Transportation Company, 107, 110, 

 111, 115

572nd Transportation Company, 117, 124

585th Transportation Company, 30, 117, 

 118, 119, 123, 127

597th Transportation Company, 81, 83, 85, 

 92, 100

666th Transportation Company, 17, 21, 22, 

 30, 31

669th Transportation Company, 24, 35 -37, 

 66, 70

670th Transportation Company, 107, 114

863rd Transportation Company, 117

US Marine Corps

1st Marine Division, 7, 8, 10

1st Marine Regiment, 7, 8

5th Marine Regiment, 8

7th Marine Regiment, 8, 9

1st Marine Regimental Train, 9

7th Marine Motor Transport Battalion, 9

Usher, Jerry, 88

V

Van Brocklin, SGT Terrance, 70-73

Voightritter, CPT Donald “CPT V,” 122, 133

Voightritter, CPT Ronald, 81-86

W

Winston, LTC Walden C., 8

Ward, Bill, 88-91

Wasson, PFC Marvin L., 10

Wayne, John, 69

Weeks, SGT Grailin, 96, 99, 102, 103

Wehunt, Billy D., 80

Welch, SGT, 49

Weston, Thomas, 34

Welton, 2LT Burrell, 23, 39-45

Wernstrum, Alan, 88-91

Werth, 146

Wheat, SP4 Timothy, 39, 41-44

Whitehead, Harrison “Bud,” 74

Williamson, MG Ellis W., 137, 141

Wilson, Alan, 88

Wilson, 1LT David R., 49, 129

Wilson, PFC Earl C., 58

Witten, PFC Jackie W., 65

Wolf, COL Duquesne “Duke,” 137, 139, 140

Wolfe, LTC Melvin M., 24, 27

Wood, SP4 Calvin, 82-86

Woodell, 22

Y

Young, 23 
Index 155
152 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume I