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CONTINUING INVESTIGATION INTO THE U.S. ATTORNEYS CONTROVERSY AND RELATED MATTERS (PART IV) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

OCTOBER 3, 2008 

Serial No. 110–213 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OCTOBER 3, 2008 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................... 1 

The Honorable Linda T. Sa ́nchez, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ....................... 1 

The Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Utah, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary .......................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ............................. 3 

Letters submitted by the Honorable Darrell Issa, a Representative in Congress from California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ................... 23 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Response to Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Glenn A. 

Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice ....................................... 66 

OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD BUT NOT REPRINTED

Report from the U.S. Department of Justice entitled: An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, September 2008. This report is available at the Committee and can also be 

accessed at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf 

(1) 

CONTINUING INVESTIGATION INTO THE U.S. 

ATTORNEYS CONTROVERSY AND RELATED 

MATTERS (PART IV) 

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:55 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John Conyers, 

Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt, Lofgren, 

Delahunt, Wexler, Sa ́nchez, Cohen, Johnson, Davis, Cannon, and 

Issa. 

Staff Present: Sam Sokol, Majority Counsel; Daniel Flores, Minority Counsel; and Adam Russell, Majority Professional Staff 

Member. 

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning. Today we are pleased to welcome 

the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, Glenn Fine, to 

testify about the U.S. attorney firings. And let me recognize also 

two fine former United States attorneys who are with us today, 

Dan Bogden of Nevada and John McKay of Washington State. 

As we begin I would like to commend Mr. Fine for 8 years’ outstanding service as inspector general on a series of issues: national 

security letters, torture, improper politicization of the Department 

of Justice. Mr. Fine and his team have approached their work with 

the utmost independence and skill. And in so doing, they have not 

only bettered the Department and helped our government live up 

to its own ideals, they have encouraged all of us to do the same. 

And so today we will review the general’s findings on the U.S. attorney matter. 

And I want to begin by inviting the Chairperson of the Subcommittee that has had so much to do with this, who has done 

such an excellent job, to begin this discussion. And I would like to 

recognize Chairwoman Linda Sa ́nchez. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the first 6 

years of the Bush administration, Congress neglected one of its primary duties: to conduct rigorous oversight of the executive branch. 

After the Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives 

in 2006, the Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law devoted significant time to examining the Justice Department. Had previous Congresses devoted 

time to this essential function, I think the Department might not 

2 

have wandered so far from its core mission, which is to ensure he 

fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. 

We started the investigation into the firings of nine U.S. attorneys because of the troubling prospect that partisan politics had 

contaminated our system of justice. Despite mounting evidence uncovered in the Committee’s investigation that this was the case, the 

minority stubbornly defended unethical, incompetent and perhaps 

criminal conduct by the Department’s senior leadership, alleging 

that this was merely a fishing expedition. Despite acknowledging 

this Committee’s tremendous productivity during the 110th Congress, the minority consistently criticized our investigation as a 

partisan witch-hunt, a waste of time, and a fishing expedition that 

had caught no fish. Clearly the scathing 392-page report from the 

Justice Department Inspector General and Office of Professional 

Responsibility released on Monday vindicates the time and effort 

expended to try to get to the bottom of the U.S. attorney firing controversy. 

I was disturbed but not surprised that the report found improper 

political considerations to be an important factor in the removal of 

several of the fired U.S. attorneys. The report also determined that 

the firings severely damaged the credibility of the Department and 

raised doubts about the integrity of the Department’s prosecutorial 

decision-making. Furthermore, the report’s conclusion that Attorney General Gonzales and Deputy Attorney General McNulty’s lack 

of supervision and general lack of knowledge of the removal process 

showed that the top ranks of the Justice Department were asleep 

at the switch. 

Given the growing public record that the White House improperly injected partisan politics into our justice system, I was troubled by the White House’s brazen snub of its own Justice Department. Because of the White House’s refusal to cooperate with the 

IG OPR investigation, we still have major gaps in information as 

to why these U.S. attorneys were fired. 

That is why I support the report’s recommendation that a counsel be specifically appointed by the Attorney General to work with 

IG OPR to conduct further investigations and ultimately determine 

whether the evidence demonstrates that any criminal offense was 

committed with regard to U.S. attorney firings or the testimony of 

any witness related to the U.S. attorney firings. 

However, I am concerned that Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s appointment of Nora Dannehy, the acting U.S. attorney in 

Connecticut, may prevent the truth about the firings from ever 

being released. I am concerned that Ms. Dannehy’s findings will remain hidden because of criminal grand jury secrecy requirements 

and the absence of a public reporting requirement as part of her 

appointment. I am also troubled by the fact that Ms. Dannehy will 

lack much needed independence because she has been appointed as 

the acting U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia rather than 

as the special counsel under the Department’s regulations. 

Earlier this year Attorney General Mukasey refused to let the 

D.C. U.S. attorney prosecute contempt citations for Harriet Miers 

and Joshua Bolten. I am concerned that without appropriate safeguards, this or a future Attorney General could similarly intervene 

on Ms. Dannehy’s investigation. 

3 

Because the public deserves to know the full extent to which the 

Bush administration has undermined the independence and nonpartisan tradition of the Justice Department, the White House 

must immediately take steps to allow Congress to conclude our investigation into the firing of the U.S. attorneys and the 

politicization of the Justice Department. Instead of hiding behind 

specious claims of immunity and executive privilege, the White 

House should make Karl Rove and Harriet Miers available for onthe-record testimony and produce documents improperly withheld. 

Until and unless the White House cooperates with both the internal and congressional investigations, the Justice Department will 

not be able to remove the dark clouds of scandal that have devastated this once venerable institution. 

And with that, I would like to thank the Chairman for all of his 

hard work on this issue as well. And I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentlelady. I am pleased now to recognize Chris Cannon, our distinguished colleague from Utah. Who is 

Ranking Member on Chairwoman Sa ́nchez’s Subcommittee. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent to include the statement of the Ranking Member of the full 

Committee, Mr. Smith, in the record. 

Mr. CONYERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAMAR SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE

JUDICIARY

Following the release of the Inspector General’s report regarding the removal of 

several U.S. Attorneys, Judiciary Committee Democrats stated the report ‘‘confirmed’’ their ‘‘fears.’’ 

The report, if read objectively, should calm, not confirm those fears. In fact, it 

validates what Republicans on this Committee have expressed in our Minority 

Views. 

The Inspector General found no evidence to support claims of a ‘‘grand conspiracy.’’ White House and Department officials did not dismiss a host of U.S. Attorneys to favor Republicans and punish Democrats. 

In fact, according to the IG’s report, the White House itself was misled by the Justice Department’s Chief of Staff who was in charge of the removal process and led 

then-White House Counsel Harriet Miers to believe that the Department’s review 

of U.S. Attorneys had been ‘‘painstaking’’ and its results ‘‘deserved her confidence.’’ 

There is no evidence of a politically-motivated plot at the White House and no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of White House officials. 

The report found no ‘‘smoking gun’’ to support the supposed need for litigation to 

enforce subpoenas against Harriet Miers and Josh Bolten. On the IG’s recommendation, Attorney General Mukasey has appointed a federal prosecutor to continue the 

investigation. 

The Committee’s ‘‘need,’’ if any, to compel information from Ms. Miers and Mr. 

Bolten is therefore extinguished. If a grand jury subpoenas these officials, we expect 

they will appear and testify. The White House has already agreed to cooperate with 

the prosecutor. 

The appointment of a federal prosecutor also eliminates the Committee’s supposed 

need to pursue a contempt resolution against Karl Rove. The federal prosecutor 

should handle any additional questions for current or former Administration officials. 

As to the dismissal of David Iglesias, former U.S. Attorney for the District of New 

Mexico, that too is resolved by the naming of a federal prosecutor. 

The Inspector General was not able to talk with every witness or review every 

document he believed necessary. But the federal prosecutor has the legal tools to 

obtain that information if she chooses. I urge Committee members to let the prosecutor do her work without interference or partisan pressure. 

4 

While the IG’s report does not confirm House Democrats’ fears; it has, unfortunately, strengthened one of my own. 

That is, that the investigation of the U.S. Attorneys matter has contributed to the 

‘‘criminalization’’ of politics. For example, the IG concludes that it is improper for 

the Justice Department to consider whether a U.S. Attorney still has the confidence 

of their home state Senators. 

Unfortunately, the IG’s report goes further, saying that even the following can be 

‘‘improper’’ political considerations: 

• responding to constituent complaints over whether a U.S. Attorney is adequately pursuing important classes of cases; and 

• seeking to replace a U.S. Attorney who has served his term with a well qualified candidate known to and trusted by White House officials. 

‘‘Criminalizing’’ the consideration of these actions threatens to undermine our constitutional system. As Members of Congress, we must not assert political influence 

over prosecutions or investigations. However, that should not limit our ability to 

voice concerns. That’s part of our oversight authority and our responsibility to our 

constituents. 

I am disappointed by the findings in the report. I am also disappointed that so 

much time and effort has been spent investigating individuals who were guilty of 

no crime. We owe them an apology for unfairly damaging their reputations and for 

unnecessarily forcing them to spend personal funds. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. This has been a long journey. And in 

fact I have characterized it as a fishing expedition. There has been 

a great deal of rhetoric, things like whether or not the U.S. attorneys should have independence from partisan issues or the role of 

the Justice Department. 

I guess when President Clinton fires all the U.S. attorneys, that 

is not partisan. When the Department undertakes to look at who 

is doing what the Department wants, that becomes a different 

issue. 

Following the release of the inspector general’s report regarding 

the removal of several U.S. attorneys, Judiciary Committee Democrats stated the report confirmed their fears. The report if read objectively should calm, not confirm, those fears. It in fact validates 

what certain Republicans on this Committee have expressed and 

our minority views on many occasions. The inspector general found 

no evidence to support claims of a grand conspiracy. White House 

department officials did not dismiss a host of U.S. attorneys to 

favor Republicans and punish Democrats. In fact, according to the 

IG’s report, the White House itself was mislead by the Justice Department’s chief of staff who was in charge of the removal process 

and lead then White House counsel Harriet Miers to believe that 

the Department’s review of U.S. attorneys had been painstaking in 

its results and its results deserved her confidence. 

There is no evidence of a politically motivated plot at the White 

House and no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of White House 

officials. The report found no smoking gun to support the supposed 

need for litigation to enforce subpoenas against Harriet Miers and 

Josh Bolten. On the IG’s recommendation, Attorney General Mukasey has appointed a Federal prosecutor to continue the investigation. The Committee’s need, if any, to compel information from Ms. 

Miers and Mr. Bolten is therefore extinguished. If a grand jury 

subpoenas these officials, we expect they will appear and testify. 

The White House has already agreed to cooperate with the prosecutor, the appointment of a Federal prosecutor who also eliminates the Committee’s supposed need to pursue a contempt resoluVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:58 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\100308\44779.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44779
5 

* The report referred to is not reprinted here but is available at the Committee and can also 

be accessed at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf. 

tion against Karl Rove. The Federal prosecutor should handle any 

additional questions for current or former Administration officials. 

As to the dismissal of David Iglesias, you will recall that is the 

fellow who, instead of using the telephone or e-mail, used a press 

conference to inform his superiors in the Department of Justice of 

his communication months earlier with his Senator. As for him, 

former U.S. attorney for the District of New Mexico, that too was 

resolved by the naming of a Federal prosecutor. 

The inspector general was not able to talk with every witness or 

review every document he believed necessary. But the Federal 

prosecutor has the legal tools to obtain that information if she 

chooses. 

I urge Committee Members to let the prosecutor do her work 

without interference or, heaven help us, partisan pressure. While 

the IG’s report does not confirm House Democrats’ fears, it has unfortunately strengthened my own; that is, that the investigation of 

the U.S. attorneys matter has contributed to the criminalization of 

politics. For example, the IG concludes that improper political considerations can include the strength of support from home State 

senators. 

Unfortunately, the IG’s report goes further, saying that even the 

following can be improper political considerations: responding to 

constituent complaints over whether U.S. attorneys adequately 

pursuing important classes of cases and seeking to replace a U.S. 

attorney who has served his term with a well-qualified candidate, 

known and trusted by White House officials. 

Criminalizing the consideration of these actions threatens to undermine our constitutional system. As Members of Congress, we 

must not assert political influence over prosecutions and investigations. However, that should not limit our ability to voice concerns 

about who is appointed and what the issues are that have priority. 

That is part of our oversight authority and our responsibility to our 

constituents. 

I am disappointed by the findings in the report. I am also disappointed that so much time and effort has been spent investigating individuals who were guilty of no crime. We owe them an 

apology for unfairly damaging their reputations, for unnecessarily 

forcing them to spend personal funds, and for saying over and over 

and over again things that have proven not to be true. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I thank the gentleman from Utah. I would 

like to make available to him a copy of the inspector general’s report,* but we have him here with us, and we are delighted that he 

is here. All other statements will be put in the record at this time. 

This detailed report that was submitted by the Inspector General 

for the Department of Justice leaves very little dispute that the 

firings were improper, that false statements were made to Congress and that the Justice Department has been severely damaged 

as a result. And it includes, I think in a very persuasive way, that 

political partisan considerations unfortunately were an important 

factor in the removal of several of the United States attorneys. 

6 

David Iglesias was forced from office because New Mexico Republicans complained that he would not bring voter cases, and because 

he crossed two Members of Congress. Bud Cummins, forced out in 

Arkansas to make room for Karl Rove’s assistant Tim Griffin. Our 

investigation has suggested other examples such as Republican 

complaints about fired prosecutor John McKay which further IG investigation may corroborate. The report makes equally clear that 

Administration officials made false statements to this Committee 

and the Congress. 

But we welcome Mr. Glenn Fine to give us his explanation and 

summary of the very important work that he did. And on behalf 

of the Committee, we are pleased to welcome you here today, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE GLENN A. FINE, 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. FINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cannon, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the report—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Microphone. 

Mr. FINE. Thank you for inviting me to testify about the report 

by the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of Professional 

Responsibility into the removal of nine U.S. attorneys in 2006. The 

report we issued earlier this week describes how each of the nine 

U.S. attorneys were selected for removal and the process used to 

remove them. Our investigation focused on the reasons for the removals and whether the U.S. attorneys were removed for partisan 

political considerations. In addition, we investigated whether Department officials made false or misleading statements to Congress, the public, or to us concerning the removals. 

In my testimony today, I will briefly summarize the major findings from our report. Our investigation concluded that the process 

the Department used to select the U.S. attorneys for removal was 

fundamentally flawed and that Attorney General Gonzales delegated this entire project to his chief of staff, Kyle Sampson, with 

little direction or supervision. Gonzales eventually approved the removals of a group of U.S. attorneys without inquiring about the 

process Sampson had used to select them or why each name was 

on the removal list. 

Gonzales also claimed to us and to Congress an extraordinary 

lack of recollection about the removal process. For example, he testified that he did not remember the meeting in his conference room 

on November 27, 2006 when the plan was finalized and he approved the removals. This was not a minor personnel matter that 

should have been hard to remember. Rather, it related to an unprecedented removal of a group of high-level Presidential appointees. 

We also found that Deputy Attorney General McNulty had little 

involvement in or oversight of the removal process, despite his role 

as the immediate supervisor of U.S. attorneys. McNulty deferred to 

Sampson and did not raise concerns with regard to the plan itself 

or, except in a couple of cases, the evaluation of specific U.S. attorneys to be removed. Rather, McNulty distanced himself from the 

project both, while it was ongoing and after it was implemented. 

We also found no evidence that Gonzales, McNulty, Sampson or 

anyone else in the Department carefully evaluated the basis for 

7 

each U.S. attorney’s removal or attempted to ensure that there 

were no improper political reasons for their removals. 

Moreover we found conflicting testimony about the reasons most 

of the U.S. attorneys were recommended for removal. In some 

cases, neither Sampson nor any other Department official acknowledged recommending that the U.S. attorney be placed on the removal list. 

In other cases, the Department’s senior leaders did not even 

know why Sampson had placed the U.S. attorney on the list. The 

most serious allegations that arose in the aftermath of the removals were that several of the U.S. attorneys were forced to resign 

based on improper political consideration. Our investigation found 

substantial evidence that partisan political considerations did play 

a part in the removal of several of the U.S. attorneys. The most 

troubling example was the removal of David Iglesias, the U.S. attorney for New Mexico. As we described in detail in the report, we 

concluded that complaints from New Mexico Republican politicians 

and party activists to the White House and the Department of Justice about Iglesias’ handling of voting fraud and public corruption 

cases led to his removal. Yet the Department never objectively assessed these complaints. Rather, based upon these complaints and 

the resulting loss of confidence in Iglesias, his name was placed on 

the removal list, and in December 2006 he was told to resign. 

Sampson also acknowledged that he considered whether particular U.S. attorneys identified for removal had political support. 

For example, Sampson acknowledged the deleting from his removal 

list the names of several U.S. attorneys who he considered mediocre because he believed they had the political support of their 

home State senators, and he did not think the Administration 

would want to risk a fight with them over their removal. 

While U.S. attorneys are Presidential appointees who may be 

dismissed for any lawful reason, or no reason, they cannot be dismissed for an illegal or improper reason. U.S. attorneys should 

make their prosecutive decisions based on the Department’s priorities and the law and the facts of each case, not on a fear of being 

removed if they lose political support. 

If a U.S. attorney must maintain the confidence of home State 

political officials to avoid removal, regardless of the merits of the 

U.S. attorney’s prosecutorial decisions, respect for the Department 

of Justice’s independence and integrity will be severely damaged 

and every U.S. attorney’s prosecutorial decisions will be suspect. 

Our report found that senior Department officials, particularly 

Attorney General Gonzales and Deputy Attorney General McNulty, 

abdicated their responsibility to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Department by failing to ensure that the removal 

of U.S. attorneys was not based on improper political considerations. 

Our report devotes a separate chapter to each of the nine U.S. 

attorneys removed in 2006, describing in detail the reasons the Department offered for their removal and our analysis and conclusions regarding why each U.S. attorney was actually removed. 

Our report also analyzes the conduct of senior Department officials and their significant failings in designing, overseeing, and implementing a removal process that was fundamentally flawed from 

8 

start to finish. We also found that Department officials made misleading statements to the Congress and to the public about the removals. 

We believe our investigation was able to uncover most of the 

facts relating to the reasons for the removal of most of the U.S. attorneys. However, there are gaps in our investigation because of 

the refusal of key witnesses to be interviewed by us, including Karl 

Rove, Harriet Miers, and Monica Goodling. In addition, the White 

House declined to provide us internal documents related to the removals of U.S. attorneys. 

Our report therefore recommended that the Attorney General appoint a counsel to assess the facts we have uncovered, work with 

us to conduct further investigation, and ultimately determine 

where the evidence demonstrates if any criminal offense was committed with regard to the removal of Iglesias or any other U.S. attorney, or the testimony of any witness related to the U.S. attorney 

removals. We made this recommendation for several related reasons: 

First, we believe it is important to ascertain the full facts relating to why the U.S. attorneys were removed. 

Second, we believe such a counsel should consider whether any 

Department official made false statements to Congress or to us 

about the reasons for the removal of Iglesias or any other U.S. attorney. 

Third, we believe a full investigation is necessary to determine 

whether other Federal criminal statutes were violated with regard 

to the removal of Iglesias or any other U.S. attorney. 

It is important to note that our report did not conclude that the 

evidence establishes that a violation of any criminal statute has occurred. However, we believe that the evidence collected in this investigation is not complete. We believe that the matter should be 

fully investigated, the facts and conclusions fully developed, and 

final decisions made based on all the evidence. 

In response to our recommendation, Attorney General Mukasey 

appointed Nora Dannehy, a career Federal prosecutor who currently serves as acting U.S. attorney in Connecticut to pursue this 

investigation. I hope she moves forward aggressively and expeditiously to address the unanswered questions identified in our report. 

In conclusion, the Department’s removal of the U.S. attorneys 

and the controversy it created severely damaged the credibility of 

the Department. We believe that our investigation and the final 

resolution of issues raised in this report can help restore confidence 

in the Department by fully investigating and describing the serious 

failures in the process used to remove the U.S. attorneys and by 

providing lessons for the Department and how to avoid such failures in the future. 

That concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:] 

9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GLENN A. FINE

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the Committee on the Judiciary: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify at this hearing about the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) into the removal of nine U.S. Attorneys in 

2006. 

The 358-page report issued earlier this week described how each of the U.S. Attorneys was selected for removal and the process used to remove them. Our joint investigation also focused on the reasons for the removal of each of the U.S. Attorneys, 

and whether they were removed for partisan political considerations, to influence an 

investigation or prosecution, or to retaliate for their actions in any specific investigation or prosecution. In addition, we investigated whether Department officials made 

false or misleading statements to Congress, to the public, or to us concerning the 

removals. 

I. OVERVIEW

U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Like 

other presidential appointees, they can be removed by the President for any reason 

or for no reason, as long as it is not an illegal or improper reason. Historically, however, U.S. Attorneys generally have not been removed except in cases of misconduct 

or when there was a change in Administrations. Prior to the events described in this 

report, the Department had never removed a group of U.S. Attorneys at one time 

because of alleged performance issues. However, on December 7, 2006, seven U.S. 

Attorneys were told to resign from their positions: David Iglesias, Daniel Bogden, 

Paul Charlton, John McKay, Carol Lam, Margaret Chiara, and Kevin Ryan. In addition, two other U.S. Attorneys, Todd Graves and Bud Cummins, had been told to 

resign earlier in 2006. 

Our investigation concluded that the process that Department officials used to 

identify the U.S. Attorneys for removal was fundamentally flawed. In particular, we 

found that former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and former Deputy Attorney 

General Paul McNulty failed to adequately supervise or oversee the removal process. Instead, Kyle Sampson, Gonzales’s Chief of Staff, designed and implemented 

the process with virtually no oversight. 

We found that neither Gonzales, McNulty, Sampson, nor anyone else in the Department carefully evaluated the basis for each U.S. Attorney’s removal or attempted to ensure that there were no improper political reasons for the removals. 

Moreover, after the removals became public the statements provided by Gonzales, 

McNulty, Sampson, and other Department officials about the reasons for the removals were inconsistent, misleading, or inaccurate in many respects. 

We believe our investigation was able to uncover most of the facts relating to the 

reasons for the removal of most of the U.S. Attorneys. However, as described more 

fully in our report, there are gaps in our investigation because of the refusal of key 

witnesses to be interviewed by us, including former White House officials Karl Rove, 

Harriet Miers, and William Kelley; former Department of Justice White House Liaison Monica Gooding; Senator Pete Domenici; and Steve Bell, his Chief of Staff. In 

addition, the White House declined to provide us internal documents related to the 

removals of the U.S. Attorneys. 

Our report recommended that a counsel specially appointed by the Attorney General assess the facts we have uncovered, work with us to conduct further investigation, and ultimately determine whether the evidence demonstrates that any criminal offense was committed with regard to the removal of any U.S. Attorney or with 

regard to the testimony of any witness related to the removals. After issuance of 

our report, Attorney General Mukasey appointed Nora Dannehy, a career federal 

prosecutor who currently serves as Acting U.S. Attorney in Connecticut, to further 

pursue this investigation. 

A. Related Reports 

Our report on the removal of the nine U.S. Attorneys, issued on September 29, 

2008, was the third of four reports of joint investigations conducted by the OIG and 

OPR into the U.S. Attorney removals and allegations of politicized hiring at the Department. Our first report in June 2008 examined hiring practices in the Department’s Honors Program and Summer Law Intern Program and found that committees used by the Department to screen applications for the programs inappropriately 

used political or ideological affiliations to ‘‘deselect’’ candidates in 2006 and in 2002. 

In July 2008, we issued a second joint report that examined the actions of Monica 

Goodling, the Department’s former White House Liaison, and other staff in the AtVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:58 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\FULL\100308\44779.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44779
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torney General’s office regarding allegations that they inappropriately used political 

or ideological affiliations in the hiring process for career Department positions. Our 

investigation found that Goodling, Sampson, and other staff in the Office of the Attorney General improperly considered political or ideological affiliations in screening 

candidates for certain career positions at the Department, in violation of federal law 

and Department policy. 

The OIG and OPR also jointly investigated allegations that former Civil Rights 

Division Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradley Schlozman and others used political or ideological affiliations in hiring and personnel decisions in the Department’s Civil Rights Division. Because this investigation is ongoing, I should not 

comment on it at this time. However, I want to assure the Committee that this important investigation is being aggressively pursued, and we plan to report on this 

matter as soon as possible. 

B. Organization of the U.S. Attorney Removal Report 

The report we issued on September 29 is a detailed description of our investigation into the removal of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006. The 358-page report contains 

13 chapters. Chapter One provides an introduction and the scope and methodology 

of our investigation. Chapter Two provides background on the selection and evaluation of U.S. Attorneys, and background on the senior Department officials whose 

conduct was at issue in this investigation. 

Chapter Three contains a lengthy chronology of the removal process and the aftermath of the removals. It discusses the genesis of the plan to remove the U.S. Attorneys, how the U.S. Attorneys were selected for removal, the evolution of Sampson’s 

lists recommending which U.S. Attorneys should be removed, the approval and implementation of the final removal plan, and the aftermath of the removals, including 

statements by Department officials to Congress and the public about the reasons for 

the removals. 

Chapters Four through Twelve provide detailed descriptions of the removal of 

each of the nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, the reasons the Department offered for 

their removals, and our analysis and conclusions regarding why each U.S. Attorney 

was removed. 

Chapter Thirteen provides our overall conclusions, as well as our assessment of 

the conduct of the senior Department officials involved with the removals. 

In my testimony today, I will summarize the major findings from the report. The 

remainder of my statement is organized into three parts. The first part describes 

our findings on the removal process and the reasons for the removal of each of the 

U.S. Attorneys. The second part of my testimony analyzes the conduct of Department leaders. The final part discusses the basis for our recommendation—adopted 

by the Attorney General—that a prosecutor be appointed to assess the evidence and 

conduct additional investigation. 

II. THE U.S. ATTORNEY REMOVAL PROCESS

Our investigation concluded that the process the Department used to select the 

U.S. Attorneys for removal was fundamentally flawed, and that Attorney General 

Gonzales delegated the entire project to Sampson with little direction or supervision. 

We found that Gonzales eventually approved the removal of a group of U.S. Attorneys without inquiring about the process Sampson used to select them for removal, 

or why each name was on the removal list. Instead, Gonzales told us he ‘‘assumed’’ 

that Sampson engaged in an evaluation process, that the resulting recommendations 

were based on performance, and that the recommendations reflected the consensus 

of senior managers in the Department. Each of those assumptions was faulty. 

Gonzales also said he had little recollection of being briefed about Sampson’s review process as it progressed. He claimed to us and to Congress an extraordinary 

lack of recollection about the entire removal process. In his most remarkable claim, 

he testified that he did not remember the meeting in his conference room on November 27, 2006, when the plan was finalized and he approved the removals of the U.S. 

Attorneys, even though this important meeting occurred only a few months prior to 

his congressional testimony on the removals. 

This was not a minor personnel matter that should have been hard to remember. 

Rather, it related to an unprecedented removal of a group of high-level Presidential 

appointees, which Sampson and others recognized would result in significant controversy. Nonetheless, Gonzales conceded that he exercised virtually no oversight of 

the project, and his claim to have very little recollection of his role in the process 

is extraordinary and difficult to accept. 

We found that Deputy Attorney General McNulty had little involvement in or 

oversight of the removal process, despite his role as the immediate supervisor of 

U.S. Attorneys. McNulty was not even made aware of the removal plan until the 

11 

fall of 2006. When McNulty learned about the plan, he thought it was a bad idea. 

However, he deferred to Sampson and did not raise his concerns with regard to the 

plan itself or, except in a couple of cases, the evaluation of specific U.S. Attorneys 

to be removed. Rather, he distanced himself from the project, both while it was ongoing and after it was implemented. 

Moreover, we found that there was virtually no communication between Attorney 

General Gonzales and Deputy Attorney General McNulty about this important matter. Even when McNulty learned about the plan in the fall of 2006 (more than a 

year after Gonzales and Sampson initiated the removal process), he did not discuss 

any of his concerns with Sampson or Gonzales. 

We also found no evidence that Gonzales, McNulty, or anyone else in the Department carefully evaluated the basis for each U.S. Attorney’s removal or attempted 

to ensure that there were no improper political reasons for the removals. Neither 

Sampson nor anyone else involved in the removal process reviewed the performance 

evaluations of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices conducted by the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, except in the case of one U.S. Attorney, Kevin Ryan. 

Moreover, as discussed in detail in the chapters on the individual U.S. Attorneys, 

we found conflicting testimony about the reasons most of the U.S. Attorneys were 

recommended for removal. In some cases, neither Sampson nor any other Department official acknowledged recommending that the U.S. Attorney be placed on the 

removal list. In other cases, the Department’s senior leaders did not even know why 

Sampson placed the U.S. Attorney on the list. 

The most serious allegations that arose in the aftermath of the removals were 

that several of the U.S. Attorneys were forced to resign based on improper political 

considerations. Our investigation found substantial evidence that partisan political 

considerations did play a part in the removal of several of the U.S. Attorneys. The 

most troubling example was the removal of David Iglesias, the U.S. Attorney for 

New Mexico. As we describe in detail in the report, we concluded that complaints 

from New Mexico Republican politicians and party activists to the White House and 

the Department about Iglesias’s handling of voter fraud and public corruption cases 

led to his removal. 

Specifically, we found that New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici and other New 

Mexico Republican Party officials and activists complained to Iglesias, the Department, and the White House about Iglesias’s alleged failure to initiate voter fraud 

prosecutions and his alleged failure to aggressively prosecute public corruption cases 

prior to the November 2006 elections. Yet, the Department never objectively assessed these complaints. Rather, based upon these complaints and the resulting 

‘‘loss of confidence’’ in Iglesias, his name was placed on the removal list and in December 2006 he was told to resign along with six other U.S. Attorneys. 

With regard to several other removed U.S. Attorneys, we found that Department 

officials made misleading statements to Congress and the public by asserting that 

their removals were based on ‘‘performance.’’ In fact, Sampson acknowledged that 

he considered whether particular U.S. Attorneys identified for removal had political 

support. Sampson stated that a U.S. Attorney was considered for removal not if the 

U.S. Attorney was considered ‘‘mediocre,’’ but if the U.S. Attorney was perceived as 

both mediocre and lacking political support. Conversely, Sampson acknowledged deleting from his removal list the names of several U.S. Attorneys who he considered 

‘‘mediocre’’ because he believed they had the political support of their home-state 

Senators and he did not think the Administration would want to risk a fight with 

the Senators over their removal. 

While U.S. Attorneys are Presidential appointees who may be dismissed for any 

lawful reason or for no reason, they cannot be dismissed for an illegal or improper 

reason. U.S. Attorneys should make their prosecutive decisions based on the Department’s priorities and the law and the facts of each case, not on a fear of being removed if they lose political support. If a U.S. Attorney must maintain the confidence 

of home state political officials to avoid removal, regardless of the merits of the U.S. 

Attorney’s prosecutorial decisions, respect for the Department of Justice’s independence and integrity will be severely damaged and every U.S. Attorneys’ prosecutorial 

decisions will be suspect. Moreover, the longstanding tradition of integrity and independent judgments by Department prosecutors will be undermined, and confidence 

that the Department of Justice decides who to prosecute based solely on the evidence and the law, without regard to political factors, will disappear. 

In sum, our report found that senior Department officials—particularly Attorney 

General Gonzales and the Deputy Attorney McNulty—abdicated their responsibility 

to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Department by failing to ensure 

that the removal of U.S. Attorneys was not based on improper political considerations. 

12 

III. FINDINGS ON REASONS FOR REMOVAL OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS

Our report devotes a separate chapter to each of the nine U.S. Attorneys removed 

in 2006, describing in detail the reasons the Department offered for their removal 

and our analysis and conclusions regarding why each U.S. Attorney was removed. 

The first U.S. Attorney removed in 2006 was Todd Graves from the Western District of Missouri. The evidence indicates that, contrary to the Department’s stated 

reasons, the primary reason for Graves’s removal was complaints from the staff of 

Missouri Senator Christopher S. ‘‘Kit’’ Bond. Bond’s staff urged the White House 

Counsel’s Office to remove Graves because he had declined to intervene in a conflict 

between Senator Bond’s staff and the staff of Graves’s brother, a Republican congressman from Missouri. However, no Department official involved in the process 

could explain why Graves was forced to resign, and no Department official accepted 

responsibility for the decision to remove Graves. Each senior Department official we 

interviewed claimed that others must have made the decision. 

We believe the manner in which the Department handled Graves’s removal was 

inappropriate. Although U.S. Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President and 

can be removed for no reason, the Department should ensure that otherwise effective U.S. Attorneys are not removed because of an improper reason. While U.S. Attorneys are often sponsored by their state Senators, when they take office they must 

make decisions without regard to partisan political ramifications. To allow members 

of Congress or their staff to obtain the removal of U.S. Attorneys for political reasons, as apparently occurred with Graves, severely undermines the independence 

and non-partisan tradition of the Department of Justice. 

In June 2006, Arkansas U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins was the second U.S. Attorney instructed to resign. Contrary to Gonzales’s initial statement that the U.S. Attorneys were removed for performance reasons, the main reason Cummins was removed was to provide a U.S. Attorney position for Tim Griffin, the former White 

House Deputy Director of Political Affairs. 

The other seven U.S. Attorneys were all told to resign on December 7, 2006, and 

they were not given the reasons for their removal. The most controversial of these 

removals was Iglesias, the U.S. Attorney for New Mexico. As discussed previously, 

we were unable to uncover all the facts pertaining to his removal because of the 

refusal by key witnesses to be interviewed, including Rove, Miers, Goodling, Domenici, and Domenici’s Chief of Staff. However, the evidence we uncovered showed that 

Iglesias was removed because of complaints to the Department and the White House 

by Senator Domenici and other New Mexico Republican political officials and party 

activists about Iglesias’s handling of voter fraud and public corruption cases in New 

Mexico. 

We concluded that the other reasons proffered by the Department after Iglesias’s 

removal—that allegedly he was an ‘‘absentee landlord,’’ that allegedly he delegated 

too much authority to his First Assistant, and that allegedly he was an underperformer—were disingenuous after-the-fact rationalizations that did not actually contribute to his removal. 

We also found no evidence that anyone in the Department examined any of the 

complaints about Iglesias’s prosecutive decisions through any careful or objective 

analysis. Moreover, no one in the Department even asked Iglesias about these complaints, or why he had handled the cases the way he did. 

Rather, because of complaints by political officials who had a political interest in 

the outcome of voter fraud and public corruption cases, the Department removed 

Iglesias, an individual who had previously been viewed as a strong U.S. attorney. 

We believe that the actions by senior Department officials with regard to the removal of Iglesias—particularly Gonzales, McNulty, and Sampson—were a troubling 

dereliction of their responsibility to protect the integrity and independence of prosecutorial decisions by the Department. 

With regard to Nevada U.S. Attorney Daniel Bogden, we found that he first appeared on Sampson’s removal list in September 2006, shortly after Sampson received complaints from the head of the Department’s Obscenity Prosecution Task 

Force that Bogden would not assign a prosecutor to a Task Force obscenity case. 

However, neither Sampson nor any other senior Department official asked Bogden 

for his response to this complaint. Moreover, none of the senior Department officials 

we interviewed said they recommended that Bogden be removed, and Gonzales stated that he did not know why Bogden was removed. 

We found no evidence, as some speculated, that Arizona U.S. Attorney Paul 

Charlton was removed because of his office’s investigation of Arizona Congressman 

Rick Renzi. Rather, we found that the Department was unhappy with Charlton’s 

unilateral implementation of a policy in his district that required that interrogations 

be tape recorded. However, the most significant factor in Charlton’s removal was his 

13 

actions in a death penalty case in his district. Charlton advocated against the Department’s decision to seek the death penalty in a homicide case, and Department 

leaders were irritated when Charlton sought a meeting with the Attorney General 

to urge him to reconsider his decision. We believe an issue of this magnitude warrants full and vigorous examination and debate within the Department, and that 

Charlton’s request to speak directly to the Attorney General about this matter was 

neither insubordinate nor inappropriate. 

We had difficulty determining the real reason for the removal of John McKay, the 

U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington. While there is some evidence 

that McKay was placed on Sampson’s initial removal list because of complaints from 

Washington State Republicans about his handling of voter fraud investigations, 

based on the available evidence we believe the main reason McKay’s name was 

placed on the removal list was his clash with Deputy Attorney General McNulty 

over an information-sharing program that McKay advocated. However, the Department’s varying explanations for why McKay was removed severely undermined its 

credibility when it tried to explain its actions. 

McKay’s inclusion on the removal lists also underscores the fundamental problem 

with the entire removal process: the Department’s failure to use consistent or transparent standards to measure U.S. Attorney performance and to determine whether 

a U.S. Attorney should be recommended for replacement. Instead, Sampson talked 

to a few people about who they thought were strong or weak U.S. Attorneys, and 

he used their impressions and comments about various U.S. Attorneys, without any 

attempt to corroborate the comments, seek alternative views, systematically evaluate the U.S. Attorneys’ performance, or even allow the U.S. Attorneys to respond 

to any concerns about their actions. The ad hoc nature of Sampson’s lists of attorneys to be removed demonstrated the fundamentally flawed and subjective process 

he used to create these lists. 

We found no evidence to support speculation that Carol Lam, the U.S. Attorney 

for the Southern District of California, was removed in retaliation for her prosecution of certain public corruption cases. Rather, we found that she was placed on the 

removal list because of the Department’s concerns about the low number of gun and 

immigration prosecutions undertaken by her office. However, we also found that the 

Department removed her without implementing a plan outlined by Sampson, at the 

direction of the Attorney General, to address with Lam the Department’s concerns 

about her prosecutorial priorities. 

We recognize it is the President’s and the Department’s prerogative to remove a 

U.S. Attorney who they believe is not adhering to their priorities or not adequately 

prosecuting the types of cases that the President and the Department decide to emphasize. This is true for any U.S. Attorney, even one like Lam who was described 

as ‘‘outstanding,’’ ‘‘tough,’’ and ‘‘honest,’’ and whose office evaluation stated that she 

was ‘‘an effective manager . . . respected by the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, and the USAO staff.’’ However, what we found troubling about Lam’s case was 

that the Department removed her without ever seriously examining her explanations or even discussing with her, as the proposed plan had suggested, that she 

needed to improve her office’s statistics in gun and immigration cases or face removal. 

Finally, we concluded that the Department had reasonable concerns about the 

performance of U.S. Attorneys Margaret Chiara from the Western District of Michigan and Kevin Ryan from the Northern District of California and the management 

of their offices, and that they were removed for those reasons. 

IV. FINDINGS ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPARTMENT LEADERS

The final chapter in our report analyzes the conduct of senior Department officials 

in the removal of the U.S. Attorneys and its aftermath. 

A. Attorney General Gonzales 

We concluded that Gonzales bears primary responsibility for the flawed U.S. Attorney removal process and the resulting turmoil that it created. This was not a 

simple personnel matter that should have been delegated to subordinate officials. 

Rather, it was an unprecedented removal of a group of high-level Department officials that was certain to raise concerns if not handled properly. Such an undertaking warranted close supervision by the Attorney General, as well as the Deputy 

Attorney General. We found that Gonzales was remarkably unengaged in the process, did not provide adequate supervision, and did not ensure that Deputy Attorney 

General McNulty also provided necessary oversight. Moreover, Gonzales failed to 

take action even in the case of Iglesias when he had notice that partisan politics 

might be involved in the demand for Iglesias’s removal. We believe that Attorney 

General Gonzales abdicated his responsibility to safeguard the integrity and indeVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:58 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\FULL\100308\44779.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44779
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pendence of the Department by failing to ensure that the removal of the U.S. Attorneys was not based on improper political considerations. 

Gonzales also made a series of statements after the removals that we concluded 

were inaccurate and misleading, including his remarks at a March 13, 2007, press 

conference at which he said that he ‘‘was not involved in seeing any memos, was 

not involved in any discussions about what was going on’’ and ‘‘I never saw documents. We never had a discussion about where things stood.’’ In addition, Gonzales 

repeatedly claimed to us and to Congress an extraordinary lack of recollection about 

the entire removal process. 

B. Deputy Attorney General McNulty 

We found that McNulty had little involvement in the removal process and was 

not even informed about the removal plan until the fall of 2006. Although McNulty 

told us that he was surprised by the plan when he learned of it, he did not object 

to the plan and did not question the methodology used to identify U.S. Attorneys 

for removal. Instead, he deferred to the Attorney General’s office. We believe that 

the Deputy Attorney General, the second in command of the Department of Justice 

and the immediate supervisor of the U.S. Attorneys, should have raised his objections forcefully about the removal plan and should not have been so deferential 

about such a significant personnel action involving U.S. Attorneys under his supervision. Instead, McNulty distanced himself from the removals, both before and after 

they occurred, and treated it as a ‘‘personnel matter’’ outside of his ‘‘bailiwick.’’ As 

with Attorney General Gonzales, we believe that Deputy Attorney General McNulty 

abdicated his responsibility to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Department by failing to ensure that the removal of the U.S. Attorneys was not based 

on improper political considerations. 

C. Kyle Sampson 

We found that Sampson, Gonzales’s Chief of Staff, was the person most responsible for developing the removal plan, selecting the U.S. Attorneys to be removed, 

and implementing the plan. Yet, after the controversy over the removals erupted, 

Sampson attempted to downplay his role, describing himself as the ‘‘aggregator’’ of 

names for the removal list and denying responsibility for placing several of the U.S. 

Attorneys on the removal list. 

We believe that Sampson mishandled the removal process from start to finish. In 

addition, we found that he had inappropriately advocated bypassing the Senate confirmation process for replacing U.S. Attorneys by using the Attorney General’s authority to appoint Interim U.S. Attorneys and ‘‘run out the clock’’ while appearing 

to act in good faith to submit names through the regular Senate confirmation process. 

We also found that Sampson made various misleading statements about the U.S. 

Attorneys’ removals. We concluded that Sampson engaged in misconduct by making 

misleading statements and failing to disclose important information to the White 

House, members of Congress, congressional staff, and Department officials concerning the reasons for the removals of the U.S. Attorneys and the extent of White 

House involvement in the removal process. 

D. Monica Goodling 

Goodling’s refusal to be interviewed by us also created gaps in our investigation 

of the reasons for the removal of certain U.S. Attorneys. As the Department’s White 

House Liaison, Goodling had significant contact with White House officials about 

Department personnel matters, and the evidence shows that Goodling was involved 

to some extent in the selection of the U.S. Attorneys for removal. 

Based on our investigation, we found that Goodling, like Sampson, failed to fully 

disclose to Department officials what she knew about the White House’s involvement in the removals and that her failure to do so contributed to Department officials making inaccurate statements to Congress. We concluded that Goodling engaged in misconduct by failing to correct Department officials who were providing 

what she knew to be misleading information to Congress and the public concerning 

the extent and timing of White House involvement in the U.S. Attorney removal 

process. 

V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

Our report recommended that the Attorney General appoint a counsel to assess 

the facts we have uncovered, work with us to conduct further investigation, and ultimately determine whether the evidence demonstrates that any criminal offense was 

committed with regard to the removal of Iglesias or any other U.S. Attorney, or the 

testimony of any witness related to the U.S. Attorney removals. 

15 

We made this recommendation for several related reasons. First, we believe it is 

important to ascertain the full facts relating to why the U.S. Attorneys were removed. As we describe in the report, we were unable to fully develop all of the facts 

regarding the removal of Iglesias and several other U.S. Attorneys because of the 

refusal by certain key witnesses to be interviewed by us (including Rove, Miers, 

Goodling, Domenici, and Domenici’s Chief of Staff), as well as by the White House’s 

decision not to provide us with internal White House documents related to the removals. 

Second, we believe such a counsel should consider whether Department officials 

made false statements to Congress or to us about the reasons for the removal of 

Iglesias or other U.S. Attorneys. 

Third, we believe a full investigation is necessary to determine whether other federal criminal statutes were violated with regard to the removal of Iglesias or any 

other U.S. Attorney, including the obstruction of justice or wire fraud statutes. 

It is important to note that our report did not conclude that the evidence we have 

uncovered thus far establishes that a violation of any criminal statute has occurred. 

However, we believe that the evidence collected in this investigation is not complete 

and that serious allegations have not been fully investigated or resolved. We believe 

that this matter should be fully investigated, the facts and conclusions fully developed, and final decisions made based on all the evidence. 

As noted above, in response to our recommendation Attorney General Mukasey 

appointed a career prosecutor, the Acting U.S. Attorney for Connecticut, to pursue 

this investigation. We expect the Acting U.S. Attorney to move aggressively and expeditiously to obtain additional evidence and to make a determination as to whether 

any criminal offense was committed with regard to the removals or their aftermath. 

The Department’s removal of the U.S. Attorneys and the controversy it created 

severely damaged the credibility of the Department and raised doubts about the integrity of Department prosecutive decisions. We believe that our investigation, and 

final resolution of the issues raised in this report, can help restore confidence in the 

Department by fully investigating and describing the serious failures in the process 

used to remove the U.S. Attorneys and by providing lessons for the Department in 

how to avoid such failures in the future. 

This concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Chris Cannon, the Ranking Member, is recognized. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a long 

process. I wish it had come out more cleanly either way, but it really hasn’t. Mr. Fine, you have made a particular point of David 

Iglesias’ firing. I would like to pursue that a little bit. 

Are you familiar with the characterization by Mr. Margolis of the 

way David Iglesias reported his contact with Mr. Domenici? 

Mr. FINE. Yes, I am. He was concerned about that and upset that 

he did not report contact to the Department as he was required to 

do by the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. In fact, we point out in our report that that was improper and he should have, when he got that 

contact from Senator Domenici, reported it to the Department and 

it was misconduct for him not to. 

Mr. CANNON. David Margolis is the senior career employee at the 

Department; isn’t that correct? 

Mr. FINE. Yes. 

Mr. CANNON. He actually used the word ‘‘unforgivably.’’ He said 

that Iglesias ‘‘unforgivably’’ violated the Department policy in that 

instance. He actually said to this Committee—we had several people testify about how they contacted their superiors when contacted 

by Members of Congress, and they all pointed out that they had 

sent a letter or made a phone call immediately after the contact. 

I asked Mr. Iglesias if he had contacted the Department about 

the contact with Mr. Domenici. He acknowledged that he was intimidated. He waited some period of time but that he did in fact 

contact the Department of Justice. I was a little surprised. I asked 

him how he contacted the Department. He said through his press 

16 

conference. In other words, instead of using telephone or e-mail or 

flying out saying, ‘‘Look, I am concerned, I have got this horrible 

message,’’ he acknowledged that he had been cowed by what he 

said was the contact. I think that has been disputed. The content 

of what the contact was clearly disputed by Mr. Domenici who I 

have known for years and who I don’t believe would say the kinds 

of things that Mr. Iglesias said he said. But that is he said/she 

said. The unforgivable thing was to say that he used a press conference to communicate to his superiors in main Justice. Don’t you 

think that is like a little ridiculous? 

Mr. FINE. It was wrong. It was misconduct. We pointed that out. 

He should have contacted the Department when he got that call, 

as he was required to do by the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. And we 

think that that was not proper. 

Mr. CANNON. Do you also think it as ridiculous as I think it that 

he claimed to have done that, claimed to have complied with the 

rules, by talking at a press conference? 

Mr. FINE. Talking at a press conference does not comply with the 

rules. He should have contacted the Department at the time that 

it occurred. 

Mr. CANNON. This all suggests that in the mind of Mr. Iglesias 

at least—now there are many other people involved in this whole 

process, and I have great respect for many of them. But in this particular case, doesn’t that raise the specter of the usefulness of replacing the occasional U.S. attorney? 

Mr. FINE. I am not sure that that is the conclusion I would draw 

because Mr. Iglesias did not properly contact the Department. And 

we looked into Mr. Iglesias’ performance. This was something that 

was not correct and he should have done that. But that was not 

a reason why he was removed, and that had nothing to do with the 

reason for his removal. So I am not sure that that could have an 

impact. 

Mr. CANNON. Well I think that the reason he was removed was 

that he was not competent. There were many reports and many 

issues that related to his lack of prosecution of cases, not just those 

that related to the supposed phone calls from Members of Congress 

from New Mexico. 

So that the point here—I am not making the point that he was 

removed because he made the improper contact with the Justice 

Department. I am suggesting there was something missing in Mr. 

Iglesias that was reflected in his work. 

Mr. FINE. We didn’t find that that issue rose to the Department 

and that was the reason the Department removed him. The Department removed him, we determined, because of the loss of confidence that New Mexico political activists and officials had in him, 

and they relayed that to the Department, to the White House, to 

others. And as a result, the Department removed him. What our 

concern was, was the Department didn’t look into that, didn’t ask 

him about it, didn’t assess the actions that he had taken in those 

cases. 

Mr. CANNON. Pardon me, Mr. Fine. 

Mr. FINE. I am sorry. 

Mr. CANNON. It was a little more complicated than that. Mr. 

Iglesias actually said, Quite frankly, I wanted to run for office after 

17 

my term as U.S. attorney and I knew that if I reported them, there 

would be no chance I would get any support. I mean this is not a 

guy who just uses the press instead of a telephone. This is a guy 

who is himself posturing before he got squeezed and posturing 

after. 

Mr. FINE. Mr. Iglesias should have made that contact, there is 

no question. But that did not impact the removal. And from our determination, the Department didn’t even look into the allegations 

about his handling of the voter fraud cases or the public corruption 

case. They simply accepted that because there were these complaints, there was a loss of confidence and then he was removed. 

Mr. CANNON. But Mr. Fine, many people at main Justice knew 

Mr. Iglesias. Could they not just have said among themselves, 

‘‘This guy is weak. He is weak-minded. He is not a competent U.S. 

attorney. We think we can do better’’? 

Mr. FINE. That is not what they said though. That is not what 

we found that they said. We did not find that as the reason that 

was proffered by the Department for his removal. We didn’t find 

evidence that that was on their minds, and it just—we didn’t see 

the evidence for that. 

Mr. CANNON. Let’s shift gears to partisan and political and what 

is appropriate in that context. Clearly the U.S. attorneys are political. They are appointed by the President. They are confirmed by 

the Senate. And we have had from the very beginning, from the 

second Presidency in the United States, we have had a debate 

about what that means. Can a President remove an official that 

has been confirmed by the Senate? We have agreed entirely, consistently, and overwhelmingly ever since John Adams that it was 

appropriate for a President to replace political appointees. 

As we go after this issue here today, are we not—and I realize 

we don’t have lights on, Mr. Chairman. So let me just lay this 

question out and I think perhaps we can come back to it. Is it not 

appropriate for the President to fire a U.S. attorney for any reason 

he may deem or the Attorney General may deem sufficient? 

Mr. FINE. The President can fire a U.S. attorney for any reason, 

or no reason, but can’t do it for an illegal reason. The concern that 

we have about this—and as we state in the report—is that, yes, 

politics does affect who is appointed as U.S. attorney. They are considered when the home State senators and officials recommend, 

who gets appointed. But once you become the U.S. attorney, you 

leave your politics and your political considerations at the door. 

And if it were that you have to maintain political support to keep 

your job, every prosecutorial decision of the Department of Justice 

would be suspect. And people would believe that they are making 

these decisions in order to maintain political support, and if they 

don’t do it this way, they will be removed. 

It was unprecedented in the Department’s history to have this 

group of U.S. attorneys removed. And the reason that they were 

told—or that was said that they were removed—was for under performing. We didn’t find that to be the case for many of them. And 

therefore, we think that this is—it undermines the independence 

and integrity of the Department of Justice if you have to maintain 

political support as a way to keep your job. 

18 

Mr. CANNON. Let me say first of all, I think what you are saying 

is vitally important and I agree with what you have said. And it 

is without question improper for a Congressman or a Senator to 

call a U.S. attorney and intervene in the prosecution. And that is 

the kind of thing which I think you are really focusing on. 

On the other hand, while bungled, what we have here is an attempt to upgrade with all the cycle of discussions that we have had 

about that, and reasons which may not have proven out. I just 

don’t—I think that it is very important that we be clear about 

where we make that demarcation. 

A Congressman should not call and interfere in a case. But the 

President has the authority to say, I think somebody can do this 

job better, can fulfill my priorities better. And I think in many of 

the cases where U.S. attorneys were fired, that became clearly the 

case in the testimony we had here. 

I am going to yield back but I think that—— 

Mr. FINE. Can I respond to that? 

Mr. CANNON. Respond. 

Mr. FINE. I understand your point. I don’t think it was the case 

with many U.S. attorneys. And I also think that it is the Department’s responsibility, when they get those calls or when there is 

that concern, to actually look into it, to actually investigate it, to 

actually determine whether this U.S. attorney is making the appropriate prosecutorial decisions based on the Department’s priorities, 

the facts, and the law of each case. And if there is a problem, then 

they should inquire about that and take action, but not simply to 

accept these complaints and that is the basis for the removal of a 

U.S. attorney. It undermines the independence and integrity of the 

Department, I believe. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. Chairwoman Linda 

Sa ́nchez. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

you, Mr. Fine, for your testimony today and for the very thorough 

report. 

Is it fair to say that based on the information contained in that 

report you couldn’t completely investigate all of the issues because 

certain witnesses would not make themselves available to you? 

Mr. FINE. It is true that there were gaps in our investigation. We 

uncovered, I believe, most of the facts. We went a long, long way 

to uncovering then, but there were some gaps based on the refusal 

of certain witnesses to talk to us. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. And those witnesses that refused to cooperate with 

your investigation were Karl Rove, Harriet Miers, and Monica 

Goodling; is that correct? 

Mr. FINE. Among others. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. Obviously AG Mukasey has appointed Ms. 

Dannehy, and I am not here to question her qualifications. But I 

am a little concerned about the issue that she has not been appointed a special counsel. She has been appointed as the acting 

U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia. And I find that interesting, given that currently this Committee is challenging the Administration’s privilege and immunity claims in Federal court; and 

the Justice Department is defending those claims and asserting 

that White House documents should not be provided outside the 

19 

White House, and that Harriet Miers and Karl Rove cannot be 

compelled to provide on-the-record statements. 

My question to you is, how can a Justice Department prosecutor, 

under the supervision of the Attorney General, attack such claims 

to get access to White House information at the same time that the 

Department is in court defending the claims of immunity and privilege? Isn’t that a conflict of interest? 

Mr. FINE. Not necessarily. I think what the Department would 

say—and you have to talk to the Department about this—but those 

are different—separate issues, whether documents should be provided in connection with the Department of Justice criminal investigation, whether documents should be provided in connection with 

congressional inquiry. And there are different privileges and case 

law that applies to it. 

So it is not necessarily a conflict of interest to seek it in one, and 

have a different position in another. But that is for the Department 

to let you know its reasoning. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I just want to bring your attention to the fact that 

under DOJ special counsel regulations, the Attorney General 

should not appoint a special counsel who is not within—pardon 

me—should appoint a special counsel who is not within DOJ to 

pursue a matter when a criminal investigation is warranted, when 

DOJ pursuing the matter would present a conflict of interest, and 

what it would be in the public interest. In your opinion, are those 

criteria met in this particular case? 

Mr. FINE. It is a difficult question and a close question. There are 

pros and cons of appointing a special counsel under 28 CFR, part 

600, the Special Counsel Regulations of the Department. It would 

have to be someone from outside the Department. On the other 

hand, the report would still go to the Department and remain confidential. So the concerns that you had stated in your opening 

statement would also be in effect there. 

The issue is whether the Department is appointing—specially appointing Nora Dannehy as a counsel to look into this can get to the 

bottom of this, can aggressively, thoroughly, and expeditiously investigate this. I think that is possible. We will have to see whether 

she does that. But there are pros and cons of each way, and the 

Department has taken the position to appoint someone especially 

for this to move forward with our investigation, and we look forward to seeing what she does. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I understand your answer, and I respect it. I just 

am a little bit troubled by the fact that in your investigation, you 

were seeking documents and testimony that the White House was 

unwilling to provide, certain witnesses were unwilling to provide. 

We have tried in our oversight role as a Committee to receive those 

same documents and testimony from witnesses. And we are battling, in essence, the Attorney General who refuses to enforce our 

contempt request. And at the same time he is the person appointing the person who will be in charge of doing the full investigation 

and trying to get to the bottom of this. 

Doesn’t that inherently seem odd to you? Or don’t you think that 

the public might lose confidence or—I think better put, not regain 

their confidence in the Department of Justice if that is the case? 

20 

Mr. FINE. It is not necessarily odd. It is not necessarily in conflict. There are different forums and different considerations in obtaining the documents in the different ways that are being pursued. I think it is important that this go forward and go forward 

aggressively and expeditiously. And the ultimate judgment will be 

and should be how this happens and how she and the Department 

pursues this—whether they pursue it aggressively and seeks all 

the information that is necessary to fully explain what happened 

here. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Let me ask you this, Mr. Fine. Do you think that 

the findings in your report should preclude Congress from continuing its investigation and oversight into this matter? Or do you 

think that Congress has an appropriate role in continuing their investigation? 

Mr. FINE. Well, I am always cognizant of Congress’ appropriate 

role, and I think Congress ought to make that determination. I am 

not saying they should or shouldn’t. I don’t think it necessarily obviates the need for it, but that is your decision to make. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. And just two last questions. As this 

Administration leaves office, one of the concerns that I have is the 

potential for documents to disappear and witness intimidation to 

occur. And your report establishes ample evidence of this type of 

conduct having occurred. Department officials still don’t seem to 

understand some of the gravity of what has happened here. And 

even as recently as a week ago Monday, senior DOJ officials, specifically David Margolis, who has joked about the U.S. attorney 

firings as the quote-unquote ‘‘recent unpleasantness’’ and I would 

allege it is a little bit more than unpleasantness—was continuing 

to intimidate career employees by warning them that they should 

not communicate with the press if they are concerned about wrongdoing. 

I want to know what steps will you take as IG to ensure that 

all DOJ employees are aware of their rights as whistleblowers, including their rights to communicate with Congress, if they learn of 

documents being destroyed or other interference with the special 

prosecutor’s investigation. 

Mr. FINE. We have made clear that we are available for any complaints about that; that they have their rights. We do get complaints of whistleblowers. We take it very seriously. If there is such 

an allegation, we have a hotline on our Web site. We have a button 

on our Web site. People know who we are. We are very public 

about our role. And we take those responsibilities seriously. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. So you have already communicated that information to both political appointees and career officials? 

Mr. FINE. We haven’t given a separate document now. But we 

are regularly communicating our role in detecting and deterring 

waste, fraud and abuse, and receiving any complaints of misconduct and taking them seriously. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I would make a suggestion that it might behoove 

you to at least communicate to all employees within the Department that they have those rights as whistleblowers and what their 

rights are. I think that that would be most helpful. 

Finally, the last question that I have for you is, what would be 

the effect on the pending investigation if President Bush were to 

21 

grant a pardon to Karl Rove, Harriet Miers, or others who are 

being investigated in this matter? 

Mr. FINE. First of all, I have heard no indication or evidence of 

that. If he granted a pardon, it would prevent any criminal prosecution from going forward. But if one was warranted, a pardon 

would have that impact. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. If there were—if say they were called before the 

Committee to provide testimony after the Bush administration 

leaves office and they had been pardoned for any activity but refused to appear, would that preclude us finding them in contempt 

and ordering them to appear? 

Mr. FINE. I haven’t really analyzed that hypothetical scenario. So 

I am not sure what the answer to that one is. I would doubt it, but 

I am not in a position to make a legal judgment on that particular 

set of facts. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I will submit some additional written questions, 

and I thank the Chair and yield back my time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. The Chair is pleased to recognize the 

gentleman from California, an important Member on the Constitution Subcommittee, Darrell Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think bringing closure 

with this report is extremely important. 

And Mr. Fine, I commend you for a significant and sufficient report. When I read it, I have to tell you, I was only intimately familiar with one of the U.S. attorneys. And so today if you don’t mind, 

I am going to primarily focus on that. 

But before I do, I would like to follow up on Congresswoman 

Sa ́nchez’s line of questioning very, very quickly. 

As an independent investigator who looks for the ultimate right 

or wrongdoing of the actions of a bureaucracy, can you answer just 

a few questions related—if Karl Rove or anyone else were granted 

a pardon, by definition, wouldn’t that preclude any claim or resistance of—other than, you know, the White House asserting things 

which are undeniable in their authority—but wouldn’t that essentially cause them to have to tell us truthfully, without using the 

fifth as a claim, everything they did or knew? Wouldn’t it in a 

sense—although they couldn’t be prosecuted for it—by definition 

release them to have to answer fully and have no personal ability 

to escape answering the questions? 

Mr. FINE. Off the cuff, I would think so. If the pardon covered 

the full scope of their criminal exposure, then it would obviate any 

fifth amendment privilege that they would have. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. I wanted to establish that because some people 

want to make it seem like a pardon is inherently wrong; when, in 

fact, if all we are interested in is the nonpartisan truth of what occurred, then the seeking of the truth is often a plus by a pardon, 

not a negative. Or a limited immunity, as often happens in your 

investigations. 

You grant immunity as part of your investigations—the U.S. attorney’s office grants immunity as part of their investigations, don’t 

they? 

Mr. FINE. We can, in conjunction with U.S. attorney offices or 

prosecutors that we work with, grant use immunity for witnesses. 

But we only do it in certain circumstances. 

22 

Mr. ISSA. Sure. I understand that. I would hope that on both 

sides of the aisle if what we are seeking is the truth, we won’t fear 

any tool that ultimately enables us to get answers to questions that 

we might otherwise not get. 

Moving to Carol Lam, you know there is an old expression you 

know—at least in the Boy Scouts. And that is, if you light a fire, 

you have to take credit for lighting the fire. And you also have to 

put out the fire, tend the fire, and be responsible for it. 

Well, I am very, very, very proud that I saw Carol Lam as someone who is not working within the guidance of the U.S. attorneys 

guidance from the Administration, was inconsistent in her enforcement with the President’s stated public goal of enforcing the border, and ultimately leading to a successful guest worker program 

and the like. 

So let’s go through Carol Lam. Your report says that there was 

no evidence that Carol Lam was removed because of the investigation of former Congressman Duke Cunningham or a CIA official, 

Dusty Foggo, right? 

Mr. FINE. Correct. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And both of those people are currently convicted 

successfully, right? 

Mr. FINE. Correct. 

Mr. ISSA. And the investigation or the complaint about Carol 

Lam as to her enforcement on both immigration and firearms 

began before anyone here knew about Duke Cunningham; is that 

correct? 

Mr. FINE. I don’t know when people here knew about Duke 

Cunningham. They initially appeared in connection with an evaluation at an early stage, I would say. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to be able to 

put some of the letters I wrote concerning Carol Lam into the 

record at this time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And after Carol Lam’s removal did you find any indication from, 

I guess, yesterday or the day before when former CIA official Foggo 

was convicted, that there was any relief in the prosecution related 

to wrongdoing? 

Mr. FINE. We didn’t look into that specifically. We saw no evidence that the prosecution wasn’t handled in a normal and appropriate way. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And just for the record, I think Dusty is right 

now packing up his goods and reporting to prison, having pled 

guilty. 

The underlying claim for dismissal in one of your other paragraphs it says: Rather, the evidence in our investigation demonstrated that Lam was removed because of the Department’s concerns about her office’s gun and immigration prosecution statistics. 

And isn’t it true that those statistics, as compared to other border officials, were less? I mean, she simply underperformed or refused to bring as many people in. You don’t bring them in the front 

end, you don’t get them out the back end in prosecutions, right? 

Mr. FINE. Well, we did find the Department’s concerns about her 

immigration and gun prosecutions is what led to her removal. The 

concern that we had is that she had a response to that. She had 

reasons why in her district they weren’t at the same level, that she 

was bringing bigger cases, that there was enforcement of this on 

the local level. And the problem was, the Department never really 

seriously and objectively analyzed those concerns. And, in fact, they 

had outlined a plan to address it, a reasonable plan we thought to 

address it; that is, discuss it with her, come up with a plan to address these concerns, have a heart-to-heart talk with her. If she 

balks or if she doesn’t do it, we should remove her. 

Mr. ISSA. Isn’t it true that plan never actually got to her? 

Mr. FINE. That was the problem. That plan never actually happened and the Attorney General and Kyle Sampson said okay to 

the Deputy Attorney General’s Office, let’s implement that plan. 

She responded to a request about, are these statistics accurate? 

Yes, they are accurate, but explain why they occurred. And the 

Deputy Attorney General’s Office turned this over to an intern. The 

intern said, I don’t have the expertise to evaluate this. And then 

nobody evaluated it. And then she was removed. So we—— 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. But let’s go back again, because you mentioned 

the local control. I never wrote any letters about her enforcement 

of firearms. And firearms do have dual jurisdiction. But as to 

coyotes, human traffickers, bringing people over the border, that is 

an exclusive right of hers. There is no local remedy. 

Let’s just focus for a moment on her refusal to prosecute human 

traffickers who were bringing over illegals, even publishing a document that became known to coyotes; that if you didn’t basically 

shoot somebody, that you could come over and be caught month 

after month after month with a half a dozen illegals and you would 

be released. Now, you did find that, correct? 

Mr. FINE. We found that—there were concerns about her decisions. And then she would state that she prosecuted the most serious offenders with the longest sentences. And it took more reVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:58 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\100308\44779.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44779
42 

sources to do that. Now, what we didn’t do and it wasn’t our goal 

to say who is right or who is wrong. 

Mr. ISSA. Sure, I understand that. 

Mr. FINE. What our goal is, is to look at the process that they 

used, and they didn’t really analyze that. 

Mr. ISSA. Did you analyze the President’s stated policy? So you 

didn’t analyze whether or not there was a policy that she was flagrantly ignoring or disagreeing with? 

Mr. FINE. No. We did not do that. We did not make the underlying determination. We looked at the process that was used to address those concerns. 

Mr. ISSA. Switching back to Congress. At that time Jim Sensenbrenner was Chairman of this Committee. Were you made aware 

that both Congressman Sensenbrenner and myself both went down 

and held hearings and had a face-to-face meeting with Carol Lam? 

Mr. FINE. Yes. I think it is in the report. 

Mr. ISSA. I just wanted to make sure that it gets into this part 

of the record. 

So it is not going to surprise you that in that meeting, she told 

us about her early days as an assistant U.S. attorney and the fact 

that she thought these were pretty useless because she was forced 

to do these cases, actually personally have these coyotes come before her and get these de minimis sentences, as she viewed it. 

And even as we asked, well, if you do them multiple times you 

get stronger ultimate penalties, eventually you can get real penalties, she said, yeah, but that just takes too long and they usually 

get time served and it is 60 days the first few times and I have 

bigger fish to try. 

Does any of that surprise you based on your interview with her? 

Mr. FINE. Again, we did not look into the substance of the dispute that she was having with these issues. And the Department 

certainly has a right and an obligation to look into this and to assess this and to determine whether or not a U.S. attorney is adequately pursuing the Department’s priorities. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Fine—— 

Mr. FINE. The important point. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. As an IG, you look at two things. And I 

sit next door on Government Reform and Oversight. So nobody 

could respect not just your role, but the IGs in every part of the 

many bureaucracies of government. Ultimately when you have a 

political appointee who serves at the pleasure of—and you fill in 

the blanks—but ultimately the President, is there any reason at all 

as an IG that they cannot be terminated simply for saying, I disagree with that policy, and I will not enforce it or don’t believe I 

should or believe that my job says I should be able to ignore that 

polic? 

Is there any reason to believe that immediate termination is not 

appropriate based on that one statement by a political appointee 

who serves at the privilege—the pleasure of the President and who 

disagrees with stated policy and says they don’t believe they should 

enforce it? 

Mr. FINE. I think if a political appointee is insubordinate and 

says I am not going to enforce the policy, unless there is an illegal 

reason that is being stated why she should do it, but if it is not 

43 

an issue, it is simply I am not going to enforce a priority of the Department, then she can be terminated. Absolutely. 

Mr. ISSA. Finally, if—as I will assert here while taking your testimony—in front of Jim Sensenbrenner and myself she said exactly 

that; that she felt that she was an independent entity confirmed 

by the Senate and, as such, did not have to look at the policies ultimately of the President except as advisory, and that she made 

those independent decisions of her priorities and that she would 

continue to do so, would you say that since she said it to two Members of Congress, including the Chairman of the Committee of jurisdiction, that congressional activity making the Administration 

aware of that and of this inconsistency—at least in our understanding—of her freedom of movement within policy, would you say 

that was correct for us to convey that back to the Administration? 

Not what gets done with it. But is it appropriate when we hold a 

field hearing on this problem at the border and she tells us that, 

is it appropriate for us to inform the Administration and ask them 

to take what they think is an appropriate response? 

Mr. FINE. I think that is appropriate. I think that is fine for 

Members of Congress to relay that to the Administration and the 

Department and the President, and that the Department has an 

obligation to look into it and to assess this, and to ask her, what 

did you say and why are you doing this? And what is the situation 

here? So I don’t think there is anything wrong with bringing that 

information to the attention of Department of Justice. 

By the same token, the Department of Justice has an obligation 

to look into it and to assess it and to ask, in my view, ask her for 

her response to this. Did you actually say that and why? My problem with this is, that never happened at the Department of Justice 

level. 

Mr. ISSA. I certainly would—— 

Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ISSA. I would yield to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. CANNON. I think the gentleman knows, because we have 

talked about this—I have the greatest respect for U.S. Attorney 

Carol Lam. I think she was marvelous. She has gone on to do great 

things in her career. I don’t think she has been hurt by this process. So this is, in my mind, not so much about her as it is about 

your expectations. And you have been talking about, you know, 

maybe on guns there is dual jurisdiction, and maybe there is some 

reason not to fire her there; but maybe there was reason to fire her 

because she didn’t pursue immigration issues the way the Administration wanted to. Mr. Margolis indicated in his testimony that she 

was probably insubordinate. 

Those things are not important in my mind. What is important 

is you are holding the President to a standard that says that he 

needed to follow up with serious and objective review of her response to the shortcomings. So she is told, you are not doing these 

things. We are unhappy. She responds. And instead of being able 

to fire her, you expect to put on the President, or on the Administration, this standard. 

Where do you have imputed in the law a responsibility to review 

the performance of a political appointee on a serious and objective 

44 

standard instead of just saying, we don’t like what she is doing, we 

want to replace her? 

Mr. FINE. It is not illegal to do that. I will grant you that. But 

what the issue here is, if you are getting complaints about a U.S. 

attorney for a certain reason, we believe it is an appropriate practice and a better practice—and I believe the Department would 

even say this—that it makes sense to ask her about it, to assess 

this, not simply to accept as true something that is as common as 

a complaint with her. 

And as we talk about, the Department actually got this and put 

out a reasonable plan, in our view, that they thought should have 

been followed. And it wasn’t followed. And I will also point out that 

Deputy Attorney General Comey, when he was Deputy Attorney 

General, did talk to her about this and they did have a discussion. 

And he discussed the reasons why. And she told him the reasons 

why. And he did not say, you are being insubordinate. They moved 

forward. 

Now, is there a legal obligation to ask a U.S. attorney for a response to a serious complaint that will lead to her dismissal? I 

don’t think it is in the law. I certainly think it is appropriate management practice. 

Mr. CANNON. But I think that you have missed—you are talking 

not about asking her questions but about her response and explaining why she hasn’t done things, and then the response by the Administration to that. Does the Administration have to implement— 

with a political appointee—the same kind of activity that you 

would expect in a private company or at a lower level of employment? In other words, the biggest problem I have with your report 

is that it presumes, it creates a standard for the ability to dismiss 

someone. Granted, you can’t do it for improper reasons. But you 

are creating a standard that I think is out of whole cloth, it is not 

founded in law. 

Mr. FINE. We are not saying that this has to be done by law. We 

are saying that this is certainly a management practice that the 

Department of Justice should implement. And in fact the Department of Justice, even after this occurred, said they should have 

done it. 

Mr. CANNON. Before I yield back, let me just point out that there 

is good management practice and there is constraint on the political process in America. And I think that you are looking—you are 

overstepping the line by applying management practice to a political environment. And I yield. 

Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time. I want to follow up on that just 

very briefly. 

Mr. Fine, at the beginning of the Clinton administration and now 

next the Bush II administration, isn’t it true that basically virtually all U.S. attorneys were summarily dismissed. 

Mr. FINE. Yes—— 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And isn’t it true then that that doesn’t follow 

any good management practice that you know of? 

Mr. FINE. I think that is a separate issue—— 

Mr. ISSA. No. No. Wait a second. I apologize but let’s go back to 

management practice. You are making it a separate issue. If you 

are trying to change the direction of an organization, and you terVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:58 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\100308\44779.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44779
45 

minate everybody and for a period of time you have basically no 

U.S. attorneys, they are all acting, some subordinate that is elevated to acting, and you have to go through the process for several 

months to replace them, is that a good management practice as opposed to the pleasure of the President and a direction change that 

is political, not quote management? 

Mr. FINE. I think it is a fine management practice. It is not unprecedented. It happens all the time when an Administration 

changes for wholesale replacement of political appointees. 

Mr. ISSA. So if in fact a group of U.S. attorneys, 1, 2, 10, 12, cumulatively represent a group of people that for whatever reason by 

terminating them and replacing them with other people, would signal various changes in directions or emphasize certain policies, 

that would be equally reasonable if you are firing your own people 

as if you are firing the previous people because in both cases you 

are making a statement, potentially, with absolutely no reason 

whatsoever for the termination, simply wanting to make a statement because of what you are going to do going forward, isn’t that 

true? 

Mr. FINE. In my view, the problem is the statement that these 

were underperforming U.S. attorneys—— 

Mr. ISSA. No, I understand that. I’m not asking about these specific ones. I’m saying does the President through his Administration have the right to pick half a dozen, 20, 30 of anything and 

choose to make a termination, not were they muddied in—I think 

all us on both sides of the aisle can agree that this was pretty muddied and muddled as to why you are terminating people, what 

makes them different. I’m not going to talk about the communications here. It clearly was not good. Isn’t it true that just as when 

President Clinton fired all but one of Bush I’s U.S. attorneys summarily and then had a period of time with nobody and then put his 

people in, that he was making a policy statement, and it is common, as you said. 

At any time in the middle of an Administration if you ask Secretary Rumsfeld to leave and replace him with Secretary Gates or 

anything you don’t need a reason to terminate them. You only have 

to want to make a change for whatever your internal purposes are 

to make a statement. Isn’t that true within the political—I don’t 

want to confuse good management practices with the absolute right 

of this President and obviously the next President. 

Mr. FINE. There are two separate issues, one, can you do that? 

Yes, as long as there is not an illegal reason, and we talk about 

the issues related to that, whether—— 

Mr. ISSA. And you found no illegal issues? 

Mr. FINE. Well, we said our investigation is not complete and 

that the issues regarding David Iglesias need to be fully investigated and whether that was to interfere with a actual prosecution 

of a particular case, that is an issue. But as to your statement can 

you simply say I want 10 of them gone, you are out, without giving 

any reason without giving any notice, it is not illegal to do that. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have made the 

points that can be made once again, and I thank you for the leniency to make those points. 

Mr. CONYERS. I would usually thank you for that. 

46 

Mr. ISSA. And you are very welcome, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair is pleased to recognize the Chair of the 

Crime Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, 

Bobby Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fine, we have heard 

that the firings would be a function of who is doing what the Department wants. Could you remind me if there is any difference between the routine political replacements at the beginning of an Administration and firing U.S. attorneys for failing to file frivolous 

charges against Democrats to affect an upcoming election? 

Mr. FINE. That would be, in our view, a potentially illegal reason 

because it would potentially interfere with a prosecution of a particular case. 

Mr. SCOTT. And we were told at first that the reason this group 

of U.S. attorneys was fired was for cause and performance as a 

group. Are there any in that group for whom no credible case can 

be made that they were fired for performance? Were there any in 

the group? 

Mr. FINE. Were there any in the group? We looked at the situation of all of them and I think even the Department would admit 

now that Mr. Cummins had nothing to do with performance. It was 

to replace him to give someone else a chance to serve in that office. 

They made claims about performance issues with regard to several 

of the others. We didn’t find them to be accurate. And with regard 

to some, we did find performance issues. 

Mr. SCOTT. And you found statements not to be accurate. Were 

these misleading statements that were made crimes? Let me ask 

it another way. Could they be the basis of criminal investigations 

for which, if proven, could be crimes? 

Mr. FINE. If somebody makes a false statement with the intention, knowing that it is false and makes that false statement to a 

tribunal or investigator or Congress, that is a crime. We are not 

saying that that occurred here. We are simply—we haven’t established that. We described what we found in the report. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now you said that you could not fire them for illegal 

purposes. I assume you are talking about if someone was fired because they didn’t give a kickback, that would be an illegal purpose, 

is that right? 

Mr. FINE. That would be one illegal purpose. 

Mr. SCOTT. And obstruction of justice. What other allegations of 

crimes are you talking about, allegations that need to be investigated? 

Mr. FINE. We talk about this in the chapter on David Iglesias. 

We talk about the potential issue of false statements and we talk 

about the issue of his removal and whether that was intended to 

interfere with the prosecution of a particular case. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what kind of crime would be implicated in that 

case? 

Mr. FINE. Potentially we raised the obstruction of justice statute 

and a wire fraud statute. We are not saying it is. I want to be clear 

about that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. Did they cooperate? Did you get good cooperation from the Department of Justice in your investigation? 

Mr. FINE. Yes. 

47 

Mr. SCOTT. Did you get good cooperation from all of the witnesses in your investigation? 

Mr. FINE. Not all of them. 

Mr. SCOTT. Which ones did not cooperate? 

Mr. FINE. The main ones that we talk about are Harriet Miers, 

Karl Rove, Monica Goodling, Mr. Kelley at the White House, Mr. 

Klingler at the White House, Senator Domenici, his Chief of Staff. 

Those would be the main ones. 

Mr. SCOTT. And how did their failure to cooperate affect the investigation? 

Mr. FINE. It did not allow us to fully investigate all of the reasons for the removal of the U.S. attorneys and to fully develop all 

the facts. 

Mr. SCOTT. And with the potential criminal acts floating around, 

you were not able to get to the facts to ascertain whether or not 

crimes had been committed? 

Mr. FINE. We were not able to uncover all of the facts, and we 

believe that a prosecutor ought to look at them, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, a prosecutor has been appointed. What would 

be the difference between the appointment of an acting U.S. attorney and a special prosecutor not in the chain of command of the 

Department of Justice? Would there have been a difference? 

Mr. FINE. There would have been some differences. The regulations, 28 CFR, Part 600, describe what the duties are of a special 

counsel appointed under that special regulation as opposed to 

somebody appointed especially for this case within the Department 

of Justice as this attorney was. So there are differences in terms 

of who can be appointed and the reporting requirements of those 

two scenarios. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what are some of those differences? 

Mr. FINE. Part of the difference is who can be appointed. Under 

the special counsel regulations it could be only somebody outside 

the Department of Justice. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what is the disadvantage of appointing someone 

within the Department of Justice chain of command? Are there any 

conflict of interest potential or any other limitation that may occur 

if you are appointed from within the Department of Justice trying 

to investigate the Department of Justice? 

Mr. FINE. Well, from within the Department of Justice it would 

typically report in the typical chain through the Deputy Attorney 

General and the Attorney General. They have the authority of the 

Department of Justice and one of the benefits of it could be that 

you don’t start up a whole new investigative body but use the experience and the resources of the Department of Justice. With the 

special counsel provisions there are some restrictions on what can 

happen to the report and the confidentiality of the report. So there 

are pros and cons each way. The Department decided to appoint 

Nora Dannehy, the acting U.S. attorney in Connecticut. 

Mr. SCOTT. And does the prosecutor in this case have subpoena 

power? 

Mr. FINE. The Department of Justice has subpoena power. I 

would assume this prosecutor has the subpoena power based upon 

her judgment about where this evidence would lead her. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is she able toempanel a grand jury? 

48 

Mr. FINE. I would believe that she has full authority to investigate this as she deems fit. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can she immunize witnesses? 

Mr. FINE. I would believe she has the authority of the U.S. attorney in the District of Columbia, which would include that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can she subpoena documents from the White House? 

Mr. FINE. Same answer. I believe she has the full authority. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can a U.S. attorney subpoena documents from the 

White House? 

Mr. FINE. The Department of Justice can subpoena any documents that it believes is relevant to its investigation. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can they issue subpoenas to witnesses like Karl Rove 

and Harriet Miers and require testimony? 

Mr. FINE. The Department of Justice can do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Does she need approval to do any of those things and, 

if so, from whom? 

Mr. FINE. The precise direction and reporting requirements of 

this acting U.S. attorney I think are being developed. She has just 

been appointed. She was appointed on Monday, and I think she is 

getting her arms around this and will determine where to go and 

determine how this will be structured. 

Mr. SCOTT. If she decides that she wants to subpoena documents 

or subpoena witnesses, can the Attorney General overrule her. 

Mr. FINE. How this is structured within the Department I think 

is being assessed, and it is really not for me to describe at this 

stage and in this forum the exact reporting relationship. But I do 

believe that she needs to aggressively and thoroughly investigate 

this. 

Mr. SCOTT. What are the issues within the scope of her investigation? Is she limited at all in her scope by virtue of her appointment? 

Mr. FINE. Again, as to the scope of the investigation, I believe 

she will have full authority to take this where she believes it is appropriate. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so that would include all of the substantive 

crimes related to the firings, false statement, obstruction of Congress, obstruction of justice also? 

Mr. FINE. I believe she will have the authority to take this after 

her assessment of it in an appropriate fashion. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if she decided to prosecute someone could that 

be overruled by the Attorney General? 

Mr. FINE. The exact reporting relationship and scope of the authority and how that is structured I will just have to leave it for 

another day for them to discuss. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. The Chair is pleased to recognize the distinguished Member of the Committee, Mel Watt, who 

is a Subcommittee Chairman of the Finance Committee as well. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I think I will pass in favor of somebody who was here earlier than I, if you choose to pass over me. 

Mr. CONYERS. Do you care to name that person? 

Mr. WATT. Well, I don’t know who was here earlier than I. So 

I will let you make that choice. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, let them make the choice. 

49 

Mr. WATT. Were you here earlier than I? 

Ms. LOFGREN. I wasn’t taking attendance, but I will be happy to 

go. 

Mr. WATT. I will defer to the gentlelady from California. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes Zoe Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fine, we have gone 

through this looking at this U.S. attorney scandal for some time 

now and throughout this Republicans have been intoning, and we 

heard it here today, that because U.S. attorneys are political appointees who can be removed for any reason there is nothing wrong 

or remarkable with respect to these firings. But your report basically I think charges the Department of Justice for removing attorneys for improper political reasons. 

What makes a political motivation improper and what improper 

political motivations were at play in these firings? 

Mr. FINE. I think there were several instances of this that troubled us and caused us concern. First and probably most serious 

was David Iglesias, his removal and the allegation that it was intended to interfere with, or retaliation for, his prosecutive decision 

in a particular case and to influence that particular case. I think 

that would be improper. 

The second one we talked about, Mr. Graves, who was removed, 

based upon our investigation because he declined to get involved 

with a partisan political fight within the State of Missouri among 

political officials. He was told his job would be protected and then 

he was subsequently removed. 

We also saw that another official, Mr. Cummins, was removed to 

make a place for somebody else. 

And then the third and final thing that I would say is we talked 

to Mr. Sampson. Mr. Sampson said his analysis was not whether 

a U.S. attorney was mediocre, was simply mediocre. It was were 

they mediocre and didn’t have political support. And so he even 

said he took some of those off the list because of their lack of political support. That, as I stated earlier, troubled us, and in our view 

threatened to undermine the independence and integrity of the Department of Justice if the message is that in order to maintain 

your position as a U.S. attorney you have to maintain political support, regardless of whether you are making appropriate prosecutive 

decisions based on the Department’s priorities, the laws and the 

facts. If somebody, politically powerful people in your State, doesn’t 

like that, you are subject to being removed and the Department of 

Justice is not going to look into this, support you, if you have been 

following its priorities, if you have been making appropriate prosecutive decisions, then that is what troubled us. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Basically I think what you are saying is legally 

you could use a trivial reason. I don’t like the cut of your jib but 

you can’t use an improper reason that, you know, you are going to 

get fired unless you use the full weight of the Federal Government 

to prosecute my political enemies. 

Mr. FINE. You can’t use an illegal reason. 

Ms. LOFGREN. My understanding is that you are continuing the 

investigation in the Civil Rights Division, is that correct? 

Mr. FINE. That investigation is ongoing. 

50 

Ms. LOFGREN. So I imagine you are unable to comment on it at 

this time. 

Mr. FINE. That is correct. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So I won’t ask you to. But I am concerned that 

there is a cloud over the Civil Division especially as it relates to 

voting and we have a very important election coming up. It would 

be ideal if we could dissipate that cloud before Election Day. Do 

you anticipate the report being done before then? 

Mr. FINE. I don’t want to predict when it will be done. I have 

been here for 8 years. When I do that, I am often wrong. And we 

recognize the importance of this matter. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I don’t want to abuse the time, but I do have one 

final question. I have many questions. But I know other Members 

do as well. You have noted in your investigation in the firing of Mr. 

Iglesias that you were hampered by a lack of cooperation from key 

witnesses, and we are familiar with that obstacle in this Committee. With Miers and Rove that doesn’t surprise me, and we are 

pursuing their testimony here through contempt citations. But 

what surprised me was Senator Domenici and his Chief of Staff. It 

is my understanding they refused to be interviewed. And there is 

no executive privilege that they could assert. I am curious what the 

reasons were that they gave, if any, for refusing to cooperate. 

Mr. FINE. There was a series of reasons with Senator Domenici, 

through his counsel. Initially it was the pendency of the Senate 

ethics investigation and that they would cooperate with us after 

that. When the ethics investigation ended, we renewed our request, 

and then there were concerns expressed by the Senator’s counsel 

about whether they had oversight over the budget of the Department of Justice. We didn’t think that was a legitimate reason not 

to cooperate with us. And the other concern was about wanting to 

know the conditions of the interview. And we had done it a certain 

way with others. We were willing to discuss that and waive them. 

Eventually, they offered to provide responses to written questions 

through counsel which we declined to go forward with. We wanted 

to interview Senator Domenici and not ask written questions and 

receive written answers. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Of course not. I don’t think those are valid reasons 

personally. You don’t need to give your opinion, but certainly the 

U.S. attorney reviewing this will have her own opportunity to compel testimony next year. And I thank the Chairman for yielding. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, himself a State prosecutor for many years before coming 

to the Congress, Bill Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fine, once more 

an excellent piece of work. You are to be commended. You have 

made a significant contribution, I believe, to the Department of 

Justice and to the American people. This is all about restoring confidence in the integrity of the Department. 

And I also want to acknowledge the two U.S. attorneys that are 

here. Their reputations are superb. Their credentials are superb, 

and I think it is fair to say that they have been victims, and that 

is sad but their reputations I would suggest have been enhanced 

with the attention that this particular issue has received from this 

51 

Committee. So I think the truth is out, and I think the truth will 

continue to come out. 

I just want to make a comment. Maybe one question. As the 

Chair indicated, I was a State prosecutor. Grand juries in the 

States or at least in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts can issue 

a report if not an indictment. Is the same true in the Federal system? 

Mr. FINE. I believe it is possible in extraordinary circumstances. 

I think it is. I don’t know whether this actually happened. I know 

the Rocky Flats case is one that comes to mind. I don’t know the 

exact outcome of that, but I think in extraordinary cases that is 

permissible with permission of the court. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I see someone who has the answer. 

Mr. FINE. He says I am generally correct. It may have to be 

preapproved by a court. There has to be certain conditions. I am 

not saying it is a certainty or an easy thing to do. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. What I glean from your report and not just this 

report, I think what you have done is at least for me you have connected the dots by alluding to the other reports that you have 

issued. And the conclusion I reach is that the Department of Justice, this Department of Justice, particularly under the tutelage of 

Attorney General Gonzales, was permeated with crass partisan politics. And I am not naive. Obviously, U.S. attorneys secure their position because they are politically connected. I understand that. 

And I think you addressed that well. They are to leave the politics 

at the door after they take their oath. But that didn’t occur under 

the tutelage of that particular Attorney General. And because it became an order of magnitude that infected every single aspect of the 

Department of Justice, it wasn’t just about the removal of the U.S. 

attorneys about which we had hearings. The other report was the 

hiring practices for the honors program and summer internships 

also had a political filter, a program that is highly regarded and 

well respected and clearly something that most young law students 

or even young lawyers look at as a resume builder, as something 

to compete for, and yet even there it was about politics and whether you passed the political and ideological litmus test. 

And then it came to hiring practices, hiring practices for career 

prosecutors. Again your report corroborates that crass, ideological 

and partisan political considerations just infected the Department 

of the Attorney General under Alberto Gonzales. 

There was a test, a political test, it would appear to be, for every 

function within the Department of Justice, and I find that deplorable. And I think it is important that we speak to that issue because I know many of the career people in the Department of Justice were disappointed and were disgusted with what was happening. And I think it is important that the American people know 

that the career people that serve this country so well in the administration of justice as members of the Department of Justice had 

nothing to do with what was occurring at the political level and 

that their confidence in the Department should remain because of 

the career people that make it, I believe, something that is a shining example, if you will, particularly for young lawyers who are 

looking for a career of public service. 

52 

It is an excellent department, and under the tutelage of Alberto 

Gonzales, he undermined that reputation at every level for summer 

jobs, for hiring professionals, for the removal of U.S. attorneys. It 

is a legacy that is disgraceful, and I feel badly for the professionals 

in the Department of Justice. 

But I think you have connected the dots, because we take a look 

at each of these reports in a silo view, if you will, but with each 

report that is issued by your office it is the same story. There was 

a political and ideological aspect that just jumps out at you. It 

might have been true in other Administrations, but it would appear 

the arrogance of this particular Administration in their hubris 

didn’t even care, didn’t care. A lot is said here about Attorney General Gonzales and his Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, who 

many of us knew here and I found Paul McNulty to be a man of 

integrity, someone that worked well with Democrats on this side of 

the aisle. I think he, as far as I know, conducted himself very well 

as a U.S. attorney. But I had a sense when Monica Goodling testified here that there was testimony that Paul McNulty was—that 

she and others in the White House were instructed via e-mail to 

circumvent the Deputy Attorney General, to keep him out of the 

loop. It is as if they set up their own group, if you will, within the 

Department, to make sure that things were going well in their very 

narrow political and ideological view of how justice is administered. 

We have seen it elsewhere in this Administration. 

I think of the DOD, Department of Defense. They had their own 

intelligence shop that clearly found information or saw information 

vastly different than other agencies within the intelligence community, and it has led to disaster after disaster. 

But in any event I don’t have any questions, but I just wanted 

to make that observation because I think what you did in your 

opening remarks, in your written remarks, that you connected the 

dots. And what we have here is a mosaic that I think is sad and 

deplorable, and let me conclude by saying thank you for the work 

that you and the members of the inspector general’s staff have 

done for all of us. And with that I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. I hope you are feeling 

better. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Much better. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman 

from Georgia, himself a former magistrate in the court of that 

State, Hank Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fine, was there any evidence uncovered in your report or in 

your investigation indicating that any of the U.S. attorneys were 

pressured to investigate and/or prosecute public corruption cases 

involving Democrats? 

Mr. FINE. We talked about the allegation in regard to Mr. 

Iglesias, and the allegation was that he was pressured regarding 

the timing of a public corruption investigation called the Courthouse case in New Mexico which involved Democrats. 

Mr. JOHNSON. In my own State of Georgia, former State Senator 

Charles Walker may have been subjected to a selective prosecution. 

Mr. Walker was a high profile Democrat. He made history by being 

elected the first African American to become majority leader of the 

53 

Senate in the country. His efforts to change the Georgia State flag 

and success at beating the current Governor of Georgia, Sonny 

Perdue, for the position of Senate majority leader has led many to 

believe that those events led to his downfall. During the current 

Governor’s campaign he vowed to create an inspector general’s office to investigate corruption and cronyism. Concurrently the Georgia Republican leadership openly pressured former U.S. Attorney 

Richard Thompson to go after prominent Democrats, a fact which 

was confirmed through a subsequent internal investigation by the 

Department of Justice. The DOJ investigation ultimately concluded 

that U.S. Attorney Thompson, quote, abused his authority and violated the public trust for the purpose of benefiting a personal and 

political ally, unquote. After the internal investigation, U.S. Attorney Thompson resigned. Thompson’s successor continued the investigation against Senator Walker. The resulting investigation ended 

in the indictment filed against Senator Walker on 142 counts of 

mail fraud, tax fraud and conspiracy. Despite the pending indictment, Senator Walker was reelected but he was later convicted on 

127 counts and sentenced to serve 10 years and 1 month. He was 

also fined and assessed a $1 million fine. Mr. Walker currently sits 

in a medium security prison. There are real concerns that Senator 

Walker might have been prosecuted based primarily on politics 

rather than on misdeeds. Selective prosecution does not necessarily 

negate any crime that may have taken place, but it does bring into 

question why some may be pursued and others not. 

Did your investigation, sir, uncover any evidence that perhaps 

prosecutions or investigations involving Republicans as the target 

were—that any U.S. attorneys were pressured to end those investigations? 

Mr. FINE. No, we did not see that. Although our report addressed 

the removal of these nine U.S. attorneys, it was not an exhaustive 

review of prosecutorial decisions by the Department of Justice. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Switching directions now, I want to ask you some 

questions about Harriet Miers and her refusal to speak to your investigators. The report that you have issued says that the White 

House encouraged aides to speak to you. Is that correct? 

Mr. FINE. Yes, they did. The White House Counsel’s office, we 

had discussions with them, and they did encourage both current 

and informer White House officials to speak to us, and there were 

a number of current White House officials who did speak to us. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Was Harriet Miers one of those who the White 

House encouraged to speak to you? 

Mr. FINE. She was one who we requested to be interviewed, and 

my understanding is that all the witnesses were encouraged by the 

White House Counsel’s office to speak to us. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So am I correct that she said that she would not 

talk to your investigators because she did not want to risk having 

to appear before this Committee? 

Mr. FINE. The reason that she gave—at least her attorney gave— 

was that an interview might undermine her ability to rely on the 

instruction she had received from the White House directing her 

not to appear for congressional testimony. So it did have potentially, in her attorney’s view, an impact on that position. 

54 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now this is very confusing. Harriet Miers’ lawyer 

told us that she would be happy to testify but the President had 

ordered her not to. So it seems to me that they are playing games. 

To us, Ms. Miers says she is willing to testify but the White House 

won’t let her and to you she says that she won’t testify even though 

the White House says it is okay. What is your reaction to that? 

Mr. FINE. Well, I think the White House encouraged her to but 

her attorney believed it might have an impact on her ability to rely 

on instructions from the White House. So while the White House 

was saying we encourage current and former White House officials 

to talk, I think her attorney made an independent judgment about 

that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. I have no further questions. I will yield 

back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. The Chair recognizes Mr. 

Mel Watt. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the 

Chairman coming back to me in the rotation since I just arrived 

when my time first came up. I want to follow up on my good friend 

and colleague, Mr. Johnson’s, Representative Johnson’s questions 

in this way. There is an ongoing investigation that you are continuing to do and then there is the special prosecutor, is that correct? 

Mr. FINE. No. The special prosecutor has been assigned to pursue 

our investigation. So it is not an independent, or two different, investigations. She is, my understanding is, going to take what we 

have done, look at that, and pursue the investigation. 

Mr. WATT. So her, the parameters of her authority would be the 

things that you have already investigated or you have done some 

preliminary work on? 

Mr. FINE. I believe that she would, in the first instance, rely 

upon that and take it wherever it leads. 

Mr. WATT. And the scope of what you continue to do is what? 

Mr. FINE. We are not doing something separate and independent 

from what we have done and what the special prosecutor will continue to take. Our report is complete and we are not going forward 

with an alternative investigation to what the special prosecutor is 

pursuing. 

Mr. WATT. Would it be within your purview if additional allegations of politically motivated prosecutions were brought to your attention, or are you restricted to the cases that you have already 

done? 

Mr. FINE. No, we are not restricted. If we receive allegations that 

warrant investigation, we have the authority to do that. I will say, 

though, we do not have the authority to investigate prosecuted decisions made by Department of Justice prosecutors. That is within 

the jurisdiction of the Office of Professional Responsibility. As you 

probably know, we have restrictions on our jurisdiction within the 

Department of Justice. We can investigate everything except for attorneys in the exercise of their legal duties to investigate, litigate, 

and provide legal advice. That is for the Office of Professional Responsibility to investigate. That is the carve-out for our jurisdiction. 

And I have talked about that and suggested that it be amended, 

and that has not happened yet. 

55 

Mr. WATT. And who would have to amend that? 

Mr. FINE. The Congress of the United States. 

Mr. WATT. Let me be clear on what that dividing line is. Are you 

saying if there were other cases in which there was a likelihood 

that a prosecution was pursued, it is already done, prosecution was 

pursued for political reasons, regardless of the outcome, that would 

be outside of your jurisdiction to investigate or inside your jurisdiction? 

Mr. FINE. That would be outside. That would be within the jurisdiction of the Office of Professional Responsibility because it has to 

do with a decision by a prosecutor or an assistant U.S. attorney or 

U.S. attorney to make a prosecutive decision, and the basis for that 

would be within their jurisdiction to investigate. I do know, it has 

been publicly stated, they are investigating the Siegelman case, for 

example. That is within their investigation, not our jurisdiction. 

Mr. WATT. When you are talking about improper influence being 

brought on a prosecutor to prosecute, as opposed to the prosecution 

itself, where would that lie? Would it be within your jurisdiction or 

the other jurisdiction? 

Mr. FINE. Oh, I see. If the allegation was that there was improper pressure to bring a prosecution but the prosecution didn’t 

happen, the prosecutor resisted it, but you want to look at what 

the—— 

Mr. WATT. No, even if the prosecutor didn’t resist it, actually 

prosecuted the case, if there were improper pressures brought on 

that prosecutor to bring the case, whose jurisdiction would that be 

in? 

Mr. FINE. I would assume it would be within the Office of Professional Responsibility, but these are gray areas, and it seems to me 

that would be related to an exercise of a Department of Justice attorney’s legal responsibilities. So that is within their jurisdiction. 

Mr. WATT. That would be within their jurisdiction. Okay. So I 

guess what you are telling me is if this set of circumstances there 

was some reasonable belief that improper pressure was brought on 

a prosecutor, and that the prosecution did proceed, and I had 

knowledge of that, I should be bringing it to your attention and the 

ethics people or should I just be bringing it to the attention of the 

other side and tell me who that other side is, specifically? 

Mr. FINE. The other side is the Office of Professional Responsibility, led by Marshall Jarrett, whom we jointly investigated this 

matter with. There are times where people bring to both of our attention the allegation, and we sort it out, we communicate, and we 

determine which is—— 

Mr. WATT. So I would be safer to bring it to both of your attentions, that is what I hear you say? 

Mr. FINE. That would be fine to do. 

Mr. WATT. All right. A couple of people, and I pursue this right 

after Representative Johnson pursued his question because. There 

has been some speculation that outside the purview of all of these 

cases that you have investigated, there were a lot of very improper, 

improperly motivated investigations and prosecutions taking place 

in various jurisdictions. And at least one of those, or one or more 

of them actually, is—I have become aware of because it was raised 

with me by constituents of mine. And I am just trying to be transVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:58 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\100308\44779.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44779
56 

parent and clear on who I should be raising that with if, in fact, 

substantial enough evidence that seems to me to rise to a real concern about improper conduct, who I should pass that along to. 

So I appreciate that. I will let it lay there without even raising 

the context or the specific case, that case or cases that I am concerned about. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes Artur 

Davis of Alabama, himself a former Assistant United States Attorney. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, Mr. Fine, given 

the time constraints, we have a vote that is an important one as 

you know that will be called soon, try to hit three separate areas 

and get your reactions to them. 

The first one, and I want to finally sweep away some of these 

issues that have been raised by some on the minority side of the 

aisle. One of my colleagues on the minority side at one point refers 

to the U.S. attorneys as being a political appointment and talked 

about the President’s ultimate discretion to replace political appointments as he wishes. I hope no one listening in this hearing 

misses the obvious. A U.S. attorney is not a policy instrument. A 

U.S. attorney has discretion over whether or not to charge people 

which could lead to their freedom being taken away. A U.S. attorney has the discretion to launch an investigation which is something that could unravel someone’s political career or reputation regardless of what comes of those charges. It is not a policy making 

instrument. This isn’t your Assistant Secretary of HUD for Congressional Relations. That is an important point. I assume you 

would agree with that, Mr. Fine. 

Mr. FINE. I generally agree with it. It is a very important position and they affect the life and liberty of citizens in the United 

States. 

Mr. DAVIS. The second set of observations, you looked at the very 

specific and very important question of whether certain U.S. attorneys were removed because they lost political favor. That raises a 

corollary question that has come up in the course of this investigation over and over. If there were U.S. attorneys who got fired because they were making decisions that weren’t the best political decisions, it raises the obvious question, were there U.S. attorneys 

who were under performers who were unsuccessful who somehow 

stayed on because they made the right political decisions? Did you 

look at take parallel question? 

Mr. FINE. We raised that issue, and that is the harm of this 

issue; that is, if it is based upon political support, as opposed to an 

assessment are you making the appropriate prosecutive judgments 

based on the law of the facts and the Department priorities, that 

will inevitably be the concern and people may think that, and they 

will lose confidence in the Department of Justice that they are 

making decisions based solely on the law and the facts and will believe that they are U.S. attorneys who are doing something to stay 

off a list, or that a U.S. attorney did something that got them on 

the list, when in fact they are trying to do their best to assess the 

law and the facts. And that is the harm that we saw of assessing 

it based upon political support. 

57 

Mr. DAVIS. I was a Federal prosecutor for about 5 years and 

practiced criminal defense law after that. So I spent about 10 years 

in and around U.S. attorneys offices. And in my sense there is either a strict wall between politics and prosecutions or there is no 

wall at all. You can’t be a little bit pregnant. Either there is a 

strict wall that says politics has nothing to do with this or you 

have an environment in which God knows what comes over the 

transom. 

This is what I am trying to get my hands around, the notion of 

a United States Senator picking up the telephone and calling a 

United States attorney about ongoing cases. That would have been 

inconceivable to me when I was an assistant U.S. attorney. I am 

trying to get my hands around the idea of a Chief of Staff of a 

Member of Congress picking up the phone and calling a United 

States attorney to ask about the status of a case and then going 

on to say, John, this is important that you guys move on this. I 

can’t have imagined that having happened when I did the work 

that I did. 

I am trying to wrap my hands around the idea of a political 

party chairman raising questions about why certain cases weren’t 

brought and that person not being thrown out of the office of 

whomever he raised those concerns with. I am trying to get my 

hands around the notion of Members of Congress even thinking 

they could call U.S. attorneys to inquire about cases. Frankly, I am 

trying to get my hands around the concept of Members of Congress 

complaining about U.S. attorneys because I can’t imagine that. If 

my party wins in November I can’t imagine picking up the phone 

and calling the Department of Justice and saying you know this 

U.S. attorney kind of bugs me, I don’t like the people they are prosecuting, so that person needs to go. And I suspect if I did that I 

think it would not be very well received. 

Those things happened. Whether or not they influenced cases is 

an open question. Thankfully, it appears they didn’t influence 

Iglesias and McKay and Graves. That is why Iglesias and McKay 

and Graves don’t have jobs. But it raises the obvious question that 

so many people have raised in the context of Siegelman and these 

other cases that are floating around, is it conceivable that political 

partisans picked up some phone somewhere and called either influential people in DOJ or U.S. attorneys and said this is important 

to our agenda, go forward. 

It also raises a question of atmosphere. Could ambitious U.S. attorneys have thought, you know, what if I bring this particular 

case and I get this particular notch on my belt, maybe that will 

allow me to climb the career ladder. 

Can you react to how I am looking at that, Mr. Fine? 

Mr. FINE. I do think, as I stated earlier, the Department of Justice can’t control what everyone does. But if the Department of Justice gets a call like that, particularly an assistant U.S. attorney, 

needs to report it to the Department of Justice, then the Department of Justice has an obligation not to simply accept it and not 

to remove a U.S. attorney based upon complaints alone. And it does 

I think when the Department of Justice doesn’t have the responsibility and doesn’t take that responsibility to protect the independence and integrity of prosecutive decisions by simply accepting that 

58 

and removing U.S. attorneys without any inquiry whatsoever, I 

think that is harmful to the Department of Justice and the confidence in the Department of Justice. And I hope that through exposure of this, by sunlight on this, the Department of Justice can 

restore the confidence it has. And I think it will. And I think Mr. 

Delahunt talked about this. 

The career attorneys of the Department of Justice ought to be 

commended. They have worked hard, and they do tremendous 

work. But these problems are problems. The Department of Justice 

is a proud institution that has a longstanding history of impartial 

justice, and I believe it will get by, get through this, and get over 

this, and I think it is critical that it does. 

Mr. DAVIS. Another observation that flows out of that. You have 

identified and several questioners have identified various costs of 

this loss of credibility around the Department of Justice. There is 

another obvious cost. Virtually any defendant or any target who is 

a political figure is now able to stand on a soapbox somewhere and 

say, I was politically prosecuted. Possibly some more a target for 

political reasons, overwhelming majority probably were not. But 

what has happened, and this has happened to virtually every Member of this Committee. Almost every one on this side of the aisle 

has gotten phone calls since this investigation surfaced from someone who says, I am State Senator Smith, I think they got me because I was a Democrat, or I am mayor so-and-so, I think they are 

after me because I am a Democrat. And the next thing you know, 

that becomes a regular prevailing argument, and honestly it has 

more credibility than it would have had before because of these allegations, because the wall between politics and judgment collapsed. That is a cost that we should not lose sight of. It has now 

created a situation and an atmosphere in which all allegations of 

political misconduct take on a layer of plausibility. That is something we should worry about. 

So I would just simply end, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you. You 

made the decision which I think has been borne out by the facts 

to do an aggressive inquiry and investigation and to encourage an 

aggressive inquiry and investigation into these allegations. There 

were a number of people, frankly, particularly on the other side of 

the aisle, who argued that this was much ado about nothing or that 

when Gonzales left the Department there was no longer a cause 

clbre, so our interest in the subject should fade. And even now 

there are people who suggest to you that your interest in obtaining 

testimony from Rove and Miers and Bolten is, well, it is all spilled 

milk and a new Administration is coming in, we ought to move on. 

I thank the Chair for making the correct decision that if there is 

a taint around the Department of Justice and potential obstructive 

acts or politically influenced acts around this Department, there is 

not a statute of limitations around that as a practical matter, and 

it is something we ought to be concerned about until we ferret out 

all the facts regardless of what Administration is in power. And I 

thank you for that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman from Alabama. 

Mr. CANNON. Does the Chair know when the next vote is? 

Mr. CONYERS. Surely. It is almost pending. 

Mr. CANNON. I thank the Chair. 

59 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair is now pleased to recognize Bob Wexler 

of Florida, author and distinguished Member of the Intellectual 

Property Subcommittee. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the very 

kind introduction. I want to echo Mr. Davis’ comments in terms of 

your persistence, Mr. Chairman, with this topic and others. It is 

critically important, and I thank you. 

Mr. Fine, in reviewing the report, like many Americans, I would 

like to say I was surprised, but I can’t. I was more astonished, disgusted to see the results of the Department of Justice’s own Office 

of Inspector General, which essentially if I understand it correctly 

finds that firings of U.S. attorneys were done in an inappropriate 

manner and essentially fueled by politics. And I want to echo Mr. 

Davis and others’ comments regarding the essential role that U.S. 

attorneys have in our judicial system, the critical and serious role 

that they provide and the fact that Americans regardless of their 

political ideology must be able to trust that U.S. attorneys are free 

to prosecute cases in a free and impartial way, without fear, without fear of political retribution, particularly retribution from powerful political figures such as Mr. Rove or others. 

The Bush administration’s action in targeting U.S. attorneys for 

inappropriately political reasons clearly has undermined the American people’s faith and, as your report indicates, severely undermines the independence and nonpartisan tradition of the Department of Justice. It is clear, if I understand it correctly, that the 

firings of certain of these U.S. attorneys had a profoundly disruptive impact across the country, particularly Mr. Iglesias, for apparently not bringing up a politically based case in New Mexico, Mr. 

Charlton in Arizona for daring to question whether a case was 

strong enough to seek the death penalty. But for me the more I 

learned, the case that upsets me the most, that ought to send a 

chill up every American’s spine, is the case of former governor Don 

Siegelman of Alabama, who appeared to have been targeted by 

Karl Rove and others for what amount to base political and partisan reasons, and then he suffered greatly in the process. 

My question, Mr. Fine, to you, essentially is, where do we go 

from here? This Committee under the Chairman’s direction, excellent direction, we have conducted our investigation, we have been 

blocked too many times by a White House that refuses to allow essentially any oversight over its actions. I understand you had great 

difficulty getting cooperation from the White House as well. As has 

been rightfully pointed out, subpoenas for Mr. Rove and Ms. Miers, 

Mr. Bolten and others by the Judiciary Committee have been ignored. 

What do you suggest are the appropriate next steps? And I would 

also like to ask you, just because I remember so clearly when Mr. 

Gonzales was before this Committee as the Attorney General and 

he was asked by many people, including myself, about the case of 

Mr. Iglesias, and I remember him talking and referring to a report 

that gave a reason for his dismissal the fact that he allegedly was 

an absentee landlord, and I was hoping that you could specifically 

provide for the Committee your finding as to that allegation. 

Mr. FINE. We did not find that he was an absentee landlord. We 

did not find it was even raised prior to his removal. He did have 

60 

duties that he had to undertake with the Reserves that brought 

him out of the office a fair amount. But everyone knew about that 

and he was in contact with the office, and this was not a reason 

for his firing we determined. We determined that this was an after 

the fact rationalization for it, and that was not the reason that actually led to his firing. 

Mr. WEXLER. Did you find, I am curious, in terms of the Attorney 

General himself, Mr. Gonzales at the time, did you have a sense 

of what his understanding was with respect to the reasons in light 

of what he provided to this Committee? 

Mr. FINE. Our overall finding on that is that he was remarkably 

unengaged from the process. He had delegated it, with little supervision or oversight to Kyle Sampson. That he approved these removals without inquiring in detail why certain people were on the 

list and what process had been used. And he called himself the 

delegator. He delegated this and did not provide sufficient oversight or supervision over a very significant matter, the removal of 

a group of high-level appointees who had important jobs within the 

Department. And we thought that he abdicated his responsibilities 

to ensure that it was appropriate what was happening here. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fine. I also want to 

commend you and all the people that work with you. People like 

you are what allow the American people to have confidence again 

because you appear to be—and I have no doubt your purpose is to 

provide the truth to this Congress. And we greatly appreciate yours 

and the people who work with you, your efforts. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. 

I am pleased to introduce our Chairman of the Constitution Committee, Jerry Nadler, who has worked on many of these matters 

more than perhaps any other Member of the Judiciary Committee. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the Chairman. I thank the inspector general. 

Mr. Fine, it has been reported that Ms. Dannehy was appointed 

to the special counsel who will make a preliminary report to the 

Attorney General within the next 2 months. Do you know when 

this report will be made public? 

Mr. FINE. I think what it is, is the status of the investigation at 

that point to the Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney General to see where she is in the process. I don’t know if it is sort 

of a formal report. I think it is more of a status report. 

Mr. NADLER. So you are saying that will not be made public 

then? 

Mr. FINE. I don’t know what exactly is contemplated with that. 

So I can’t speak for that, other than my understanding is it is really a status report to the Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney 

General. 

Mr. NADLER. And let me ask you one other question on this same 

topic before turning to another one. Do you know whether she will 

be precluded by the Federal Rules Criminal Procedure 6(e) from 

sharing with your office and OPR or disclosing to the public or 

Congress information that she discovers through any grand jury 

proceedings? 

Mr. FINE. Disclosing to Congress or the public is—— 

61 

Mr. NADLER. Or to your office and the—— 

Mr. FINE. Let me address that one first, which is dealt with by 

rule 6(e). With regard to who is disclosed within the Department, 

people who are working on the investigation and are on the 6(e), 

they can have the information. 

Mr. NADLER. You are saying they can have the information? 

Mr. FINE. They can have the information if they are working on 

the investigation and put on the 6(e) list by leaders of the investigation. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Let me ask you one other question now about 

the U.S. Attorney Charlton. The report says he was—the most significant factor in his removal was his actions in a death penalty 

case. He consistently opposed the Department’s decision to seek the 

death penalty in a specific case. He irritated Department leaders 

by seeking a meeting with the Attorney General to urge him to reconsider his decision. 

We are troubled that Department officials considered Charlton’s 

action in the death penalty case, including requesting a meeting 

with the AG, to be inappropriate. We do not believe his actions 

were insubordinate or they justified his removal. In other words, 

you are saying that because—given the facts of a given case, whatever they were, and I will say I don’t know anything about the 

case—he thought the death penalty would be inappropriate, that 

they shouldn’t seek it. He was fired for energetically making that 

case within the Department. 

Mr. FINE. We think that that was the precipitating event. The 

Department had other concerns that they raised, the taping policy 

of interrogations, a claim that he wasn’t appropriately—— 

Mr. NADLER. But it was a precipitating—— 

Mr. FINE. We consider this the most significant. 

Mr. NADLER. Does not that send a message to other U.S. attorneys to say, regardless of your judgments in a given case, seek the 

death penalty when in doubt? 

Mr. FINE. I think the message it sends, which in my view not appropriate, is that vigorous and firm discussion and debate about a 

very significant issue had significant consequences for him. And 

that was—— 

Mr. NADLER. In other words, don’t protect—in other words, when 

someone higher than you says there should be a death penalty or 

perhaps something else, don’t—— 

Mr. FINE. I am not sure that is the message they were trying to 

send. 

Mr. NADLER. I didn’t say they were trying to send it. 

Mr. FINE. I understand that. But I think the message that it sent 

was, you are being too aggressive about this and you are being too 

pushy. And I don’t think that that was appropriate or right when 

we are talking about a death penalty case. 

Mr. NADLER. Exactly. Let me ask you a different question on a 

different subject, not this report, but you wrote a report on the 

politicization of hiring and firing decisions. We had testimony here 

a few months ago from Monica Goodling—maybe a year ago already, I suppose—from Monica Goodling about the improper and illegal use of political criteria to hire people. And it has been admitted that this happened, obviously. Tens, maybe hundreds, of people 

62 

were hired for positions on the basis of improper political—and people were not considered on the basis of improper political considerations. 

Well, why would it be wrong to suggest that in order for the consequences of these political hirings to be eliminated, everyone hired 

under these improper considerations should be subject to reconsideration and they should in effect all be unhired and asked to reapply along with other people, and let a proper and fair and legal 

hiring procedure in which they would be eligible, because maybe 

some people who were hired for political reasons were otherwise 

qualified? But why shouldn’t this be done over instead of freezing 

into place—many people were hired for improper reasons, some of 

whom may be qualified and some of whom may not be qualified. 

Mr. FINE. Let me separate that into two. Of the two reports we 

did, one was the politicized hiring in the honors program in the 

Justice Department, and the other was politicized hiring by Monica 

Goodling and others in the Office of the Attorney General, particularly with regard to immigration judges. 

With regard to the honors program, I think people who got 

through the process, they were qualified. The problem was, people 

who were deselected for liberal or Democratic indications on their 

resume were also qualified and didn’t get a chance to compete. And 

that was the problem. I know the Department has now offered 

them a chance to apply. And if they want to be considered now for 

an honors program slot, even though in they are more than a year 

out of law school, that would be considered. And I think that is the 

appropriate response. I don’t think the people who were hired were 

unqualified. So I think they shouldn’t be removed. 

With regard to the Monica Goodling case, the most troubling instance of this was immigration judges where Monica Goodling and 

Kyle Sampson used political considerations to hire them when it is 

a career slot. They claimed they didn’t know that it was a career 

slot. And they clearly used political considerations. 

I also believe it is not appropriate now to go back and strip these 

people of their civil service protections because they didn’t do anything wrong. Those people didn’t do anything wrong. And to go 

back and say whether they are or they are not qualified now, after 

the fact, is very difficult. I am not sure that is the appropriate 

thing to do. I think the appropriate thing to do is to supervise them 

and evaluate them the way you would anybody. And if they are not 

performing appropriately, they shouldn’t have the job. But if they 

are, I think they should. 

It is not hundreds of them. It is probably, I think, around 20 or 

30 of them over the course of the period that we had under review. 

So I think the message is to prevent this from happening again and 

not necessarily to go and fire people who are in the job if their evaluations show they are performing appropriately. 

Mr. NADLER. My last question is—and I hope no one asked this 

before. I was on the floor for the debate on the bailout bill. 

I assume from your report that you concluded that Harriet Miers 

and Karl Rove and others in the White House played a real role 

in all the decisions about the U.S. attorney firings. 

Mr. FINE. We didn’t make a judgment of what role—how big a 

role they played or what role. There were indications that they 

63 

were in communications with the Department of Justice, and that 

we were not able to uncover the exact role they played. 

Mr. NADLER. So we do not know how extensive their involvement 

was and what role partisan political considerations may have 

played in what they did? 

Mr. FINE. We do not know their precise role. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, let me ask you this last question then, although it might follow from the previous questions. Why is it important that on-the-record statements be obtained from the two of 

them, Ms. Miers and Mr. Rove and other White House officials, and 

that internal White House documents be reviewed which so far 

have been refused both to your office and to our Committee. I assume you think it is important that that be done. 

Mr. FINE. I think it is important to fully investigate the facts of 

this case, that we went a long way. We, I believe, uncovered most 

of the facts, but to determine fully exactly what happened, I think 

it is important to interview those witnesses. 

Mr. NADLER. And in your judgment, is there any valid legal reason which would excuse them from testifying pursuant to your request or subpoena pursuant to this Committee’s or a Senate Committee’s subpoena? 

Mr. FINE. Oh, I think those are two issues. One, is our investigation. The Congress’ investigation I am not going to analyze the 

privilege issues as it relates to Congress. With regard to us, I think 

that the prosecutor ought to determine whether testimony is appropriate and to seek to obtain it. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Inspector General, your stamina is as strong 

as the good work you have been doing across the years. We thank 

you and your staff. And we also thank Chris Cannon for joining us 

at what may be his last hearing before the Judiciary Committee. 

Mr. CANNON. One can only hope. 

Mr. CONYERS. Members will have a week to submit additional 

questions for you if they may. And the record will be open for another week for submission of additional materials. And we thank 

you so very much for the good work that you have been doing. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE GLENN A. 

FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


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