United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-3159

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Douglas Trong Tran

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport

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 Submitted: September 27, 2019

Filed: November 12, 2019

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Douglas Trong Tran pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture

and distribute at least 100 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing marijuana

and at least 100 marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(B), 846, and 851. The district court1

sentenced Tran to the statutory

mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(B). Tran appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in

denying him safety-valve relief and in calculating his offense level. We affirm.

Tran established a successful marijuana grow operation in Colorado Springs,

Colorado. He rented or purchased several residences, where he cultivated marijuana

plantsindoors. Tran enlisted the help of his sons and othersto maintain the Colorado

operation. 

Thy Hoang contacted Tran in 2016 about a struggling marijuana grow

operation in Asbury, Iowa. Individuals involved in the Iowa operation traveled to

Colorado to see Tran’s operation there and to sample his marijuana. Tran later agreed

to cultivate marijuana in Iowa, and he frequently traveled between Colorado Springs

and Asbury to tend to the grow operations. Tran also traveled to Henderson, Nevada,

where his wife lived. When Tran was away from the Iowa operation, Hoang cared

for the marijuana plants, relying on the detailed instructionsthat Tran had left for her. 

In July 2017, law enforcement officerssearched the residences associated with

Tran in all three states. They discovered marijuana at each location, multiple firearms

in Nevada, and grow operations in Colorado and Iowa. 

After Tran pleaded guilty, he sought relief from the statutory mandatory

minimum sentence under the safety-valve provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines § 5C1.2(a). Tran refused to discuss the Colorado operation

during his proffer, however, claiming that it was not relevant to the Iowa conspiracy. 

The district court found that Tran did not qualify for safety-valve relief because,

1The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

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among other things, he had not “truthfully provided to the Government all

information and evidence [he had] concerning the offense or offenses that were part

of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). 

Tran argues that the district court clearly erred in denying safety-valve relief. 

See United States v. Valquier, 934 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard of review). 

He asserts that the Iowa conspirators employed him as a mere contractor, hired to

address problems with the Iowa grow operation. He contrasts his limited role in the

struggling Iowa operation with his leadership role in his own successful Colorado

operation, which he established and maintained without the help of any members of

the Iowa conspiracy. He thus claimsthat he wasinvolved in at least two conspiracies

and that he provided a truthful and complete proffer in this case, because he divulged

all information he had about the Iowa offense. 

A defendant is not entitled to safety-valve relief when he conveys only the

basic facts of his crime. United States v. Soto, 448 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2006). He 

must provide all information and evidence he has about offenses that were “part of

the same course of conduct” or “common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5);

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). The record here amply supportsthe finding that the Colorado

grow operation was “part of the same course of conduct” or “common scheme or

plan” asthe Iowa operation, even if there were multiple conspiracies. Tran’s conduct

with respect to both operations was similar in nature and overlapped in time. See

United States v. West, 612 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the district

court “should consider the similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the

conduct” to determine whether it is part of the same course of conduct or common

scheme or plan (quoting United States v. Geralds, 158 F.3d 977, 979 (8th Cir.

1998))). Members of the Iowa conspiracy approached Tran because they knew of his

successful grow operation and his expertise in cultivating marijuana. After visiting

the Colorado operation and sampling the marijuana grown there, they entered into an

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agreement with Tran, in which he agreed to help the floundering operation in Iowa. 

Tran essentially used hissuccessin Colorado to show that he could establish a similar

operation in Iowa, and he thereafter maintained the grow operations in both states,

traveled frequently between the two, and instructed others how to care for the plants

in his absence. We thus find no clear error in the district court’s determination that

Tran’s refusal to discuss his Colorado operation rendered him ineligible for safetyvalve relief because he failed to provide a complete and truthful proffer. See United

States v. Rojas-Coria, 401 F.3d 871, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district

court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant’s proffer was incomplete when

the defendant refused to discuss his “involvement in other drug activity, occurring

during the same time period” as his offense of conviction).

We decline to address Tran’s arguments that the district court erred in

calculating his offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Because the

district court correctly imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, any error in

calculating the offense level would be harmless. See United States v. Morales, 813

F.3d 1058, 1069 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that any miscalculation of the defendant’s

offense level was harmless, in light of the application of a statutory mandatory

minimum sentence); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum

sentence is greater than the maximumofthe applicable guideline range, the statutorily

required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).

The sentence is affirmed. 

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