UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

)

ZIAD AKL, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1449 (ABJ)

)

VIRGINIA HOSPITAL CENTER, )

)

Appellee. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Dr. Ziad Akl brings this appeal from a final judgment in the United States 

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia. Akl has filed twelve unsuccessful actions against 

appellee Virginia Hospital Center (“VHC,” “hospital”), and individuals associated with it, in 

state and federal courts in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. stemming from his loss of 

medical privileges at the hospital. In three of those cases, which were consolidated before the 

Arlington Circuit Court, the court awarded VHC costs and attorneys’ fees. Part 1 of Bankr.

Record (“BR I”) [Dkt. # 2] at 558–81. Akl subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and 

VHC filed an action in the bankruptcy court alleging that the fee award constituted an award of 

sanctions that should not be automatically discharged in Akl’s bankruptcy proceedings under the 

United States Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court denied VHC’s motion for summary 

judgment on its complaint, and VHC subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss its action.

However, shortly after the court dismissed the case, Akl filed a motion in the bankruptcy court

requesting sanctions against the hospital and its attorneys for filing the complaint and the motion 

for summary judgment in the first place. After granting in part and denying in part a motion to 
2

“dismiss, strike, or otherwise deny” the sanctions motion, the bankruptcy court ultimately 

granted summary judgment for the hospital as to sanctions and denied the sanctions motion in 

full. Part 4 of Bankr. Record (“BR IV”) [Dkt. # 2-3] at 975.

Akl now appeals the bankruptcy court’s orders granting summary judgment and denying 

the motion for sanctions. He also appeals a separate order of the bankruptcy court granting 

appellee’s motion for protective order and denying Akl’s motion to compel discovery in 

connection with the sanctions motion. Because the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that appellee’s conduct did not warrant sanctions and in 

denying discovery, the Court will deny Akl’s appeal.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Ziad Akl was a physician at VHC until 2004, when his medical staff 

appointment was revoked. Appellant’s Brief (“Appellant’s Br.”) at 2. Since that time, Akl has 

filed twelve actions against the hospital, and individuals associated with the hospital, as well as

judges and court staff who played roles in those cases. See Appellee’s Brief (“Appellee’s Br.”) 

at 4–5, 5 n.4. The motion underlying this appeal arose out of the resolution of three of those 

cases, which Akl refers to as “Akl I–III.” See Appellant’s Br. at 3–4; accord Appellee’s Br. at 4–

5. These cases were all filed in the Arlington Circuit Court and consolidated before Judge Alfred 

Swersky, and later Judge Benjamin Kendrick. See BR I at 250–51. The complaint in Akl I

named as defendants VHC, its CEO, and six physicians involved in the hospital’s peer review 

process, and it alleged denial of due process, breach of contract, tortious interference with 

economic relationships, defamation and civil conspiracy arising from the termination of his

hospital privileges. Id. at 189–206. The complaint in Akl II named as defendants two nurses who 

had filed complaints against Akl that led to the termination of his hospital privileges, and it 
3

alleged defamation, tortious interference with economic relationships, and civil conspiracy. Id.

at 211–26. The complaint in Akl III named as a defendant the president of the firm with which 

Akl was previously employed, and it alleged similar claims. Id. at 231–45.

The Arlington Circuit Court dismissed all of Akl’s claims except for breach of contract 

and defamation. After a period of discovery during which Akl took nineteen depositions and 

obtained extensive document production, Appellant’s Br. at 5, and after several unfavorable 

rulings, Akl voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims. Id. at 5; accord Appellee’s Br. at 5;

BR I at 139–41.1

The defendants in those cases subsequently filed a motion to recover the legal fees and 

costs incurred in the defense of the actions and certain others that Akl had filed arising from the 

same series of events. BR I at 67–68. The motion advanced two grounds for VHC’s entitlement 

to fees: (1) Virginia Code 8.01-271.1 – which authorizes the imposition of sanctions for 

frivolous submissions to the court made with an improper purpose; and (2) the terms of the 

contract between Dr. Akl and the hospital. At an oral hearing on the motion, Judge Kendrick of 

the Arlington Circuit Court stated on the record:

The contract that Dr. Akl entered into with Virginia Hospital Center is a legal and 

sufficient basis for the attorneys to seek sanctions against the doctor. Virginia 

Code [8.01-271.1], which was designed to protect litigants from the mental 

anguish and the expense of frivolous assertions of unfounded factual and legal 

claims[,] against the assertions of claims for improper purposes, and to protect 

courts against those who would abuse the judicial process, is also a legal and 

sufficient and legitimate basis to award sanctions against this litigant [Akl]. The 

Court finds after an exhaust[ive] review of this record that he [Akl], in fact, has 

violated the very nature and basis for which this code section was designed and 

implemented . . . .

 

1 Those claims were subsequently re-filed in the Virginia federal court and were dismissed 

on the merits. Part 2 of Bankr. Record (“BR II”) [Dkt. # 2-1] at 855–58; see also Part 3 of 

Bankr. Record (“BR III”) [Dkt. # 2-2] at 564–65 (statement by appellee’s counsel at motions 

hearing on motion to quash protective order in bankruptcy proceeding).
4

BR I at 70–71. However, the written order signed by the court made no mention of Virginia 

Code 8.01-271.1 or sanctions, and it stated that defendants’ motion for costs and reasonable 

attorney’s fees was granted “pursuant to the contract entered into between Plaintiff and 

Defendant Virginia Hospital Center-Arlington.” BR I at 34–35, 133–35.2

Approximately seven months after the Arlington court issued this Order, Akl filed a 

Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 

Columbia. VHC proceeded to file a complaint with the bankruptcy court pursuant to section 

523(a)(6) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., seeking to prevent Akl from 

receiving an automatic discharge of the fees and costs award. The hospital moved for summary 

judgment, arguing that the Arlington Circuit Court’s award constituted a sanctions judgment, that 

the bankruptcy court should apply collateral estoppel to the judgment to prevent re-litigation of 

the issues giving rise to it, and that the bankruptcy court should except the judgment from Akl’s 

bankruptcy discharge under the bankruptcy code and applicable case law. See BR I at 178–86.

The bankruptcy court denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. BR IV at 912.

It found that notwithstanding the Judge Kendrick’s comments on the record, the fee award was

based on Akl’s contract, and therefore, it was not an award of sanctions. Id. at 64–65. It

therefore declined to find that the hospital was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 67.

The hospital then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its action, which the bankruptcy court 

 

2 The order was amended on May 18, 2007 – a day after Akl filed for Chapter 7

bankruptcy – to correct a clerical mistake. BR I at 136–38.
5

granted.3 Part 2 of Bankr. Record (“BR II”) [Dkt. # 2-1] at 541. That was the end of the 

hospital’s participation in the bankruptcy proceeding.

Shortly after the bankruptcy court dismissed the hospital’s action, Akl filed a motion for 

sanctions invoking 28 U.S.C. section 1927 and the court’s inherent power to sanction the 

hospital and its counsel.4 Id. at 545. Akl argued that the nondischargeability action and the 

motions filed in furtherance of it were without merit and intended to harass him. Id. at 1–2. He 

asserted that the filing of the complaint, motion for summary judgment, and motion to quash 

were each sanctionable conduct by the hospital and its attorneys. Id.

VHC filed a motion to “strike, dismiss, and otherwise deny” the motion, BR II at 869,

which the court granted as to one attorney for the hospital, but denied as to the hospital and its 

other attorneys. Part 3 of Bankr. Record (“BR III”) [Dkt. # 2-2] at 182–95.5 The court also 

ordered the hospital to file an opposition to Akl’s motion for sanctions. Id. at 194. While the 

hospital did eventually file an opposition, id. at 297–311, it first filed a motion to partially 

reconsider, alter, amend, and alternatively clarify the Court’s memorandum decision and order. 

Id. at 196–218.

The bankruptcy court granted the motion for reconsideration in part and denied it in part. 

BR III at 586–606. It modified its original order to dismiss the claims against another of the 

 

3 Akl also moved to defer ruling on the motion to dismiss until he had an opportunity to 

file a counterclaim, moved for leave to file a counterclaim, and moved to have the court issue an 

order to show cause why the plaintiff should not be held in criminal contempt. The bankruptcy 

court denied all three motions. BR I at 542; BR II at 542–43; see also BR III at 587–88.

4 Akl also filed separate actions in another court in this district as well as in the D.C. 

Superior Court challenging appellee for having filed the complaint and summary judgment 

motion in the bankruptcy court. See BR III at 400–01.

5 Akl also filed at least three supplements to the motion for sanctions. See Supps. To 

Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions, Va. Hosp. Ctr. v. Akl, No. 07-20026 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2007) [Dkt. # 

132, 134, 179].
6

hospital’s attorneys, dismiss Akl’s section 1927 claim for the filing of the complaint, and dismiss 

Akl’s section 1927 and inherent authority sanctions claims for the motion to quash. Id. at 604–

05. It identified the remaining issues as:

(1) sanctions under the court’s inherent authority for the filing of the complaint 

against Potter [VHC’s attorney] and Virginia Hospital; (2) sanctions under § 1927 

against Potter for the filing of the motion for summary judgment, except to the 

extent Akl argues the motion is sanctionable merely because it was in furtherance 

of the adversary proceeding; and (3) sanctions under the court’s inherent authority 

against Potter and Virginia Hospital for the filing of the motion for summary 

judgment.

Id. at 605.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Akl attempted to initiate discovery.

BR III at 401–02. In response, VHC moved for a protective order preventing Akl from 

conducting discovery pending further order of the court. Id. at 398–454. Akl opposed VHC’s

motion and filed a motion to compel discovery. Id. at 472. The bankruptcy court granted the 

motion for protective order and denied Akl’s motion to compel discovery. Id. at 950–51; BR IV

at 149–150.

VHC next filed what it labeled a motion for summary judgment as to sanctions. BR III at 

739. Once the motion was fully briefed, the bankruptcy court issued an order granting VHC’s

motion in full, accompanied by a 55-page memorandum opinion explaining its decision. BR IV

at 922–80. It subsequently issued an order denying Akl’s motion for sanctions. It is those
7

orders, as well as the order denying Akl discovery on the sanctions issue, that Akl now appeals.

Akl filed this appeal on August 10, 2011, and the Court held oral argument on May 16, 2012.6

The appeal presents the questions whether the bankruptcy court erred in: 1) denying 

appellant’s motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent authority; 

 

6 The Court began the oral argument, as it often does, with an introductory statement 

summarizing the procedural posture of the case, enumerating the issues before the Court to 

resolve and the standards governing those issues, and identifying certain issues that were not 

properly for the Court. Transcript of Oral Argument (“Tr.”) at 1:15–7:5 (May 16, 2012). Akl 

filed a supplemental memorandum the next day, arguing that at the oral argument the Court 

unfairly framed the issues that were before it and therefore denied him the opportunity to “delve 

into” relevant issues and parts of the record. [Dkt. # 15]. Notwithstanding the fact that the 

memorandum was filed without leave of the Court, in violation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 

Procedure 8009(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), the Court did not strike it, but 

considered it in connection with all of the other pleadings in the matter. See Minute Order (May 

17, 2012). In connection with the complaints voiced in the memorandum, though, the Court 

notes the following: First, appellant was not automatically entitled to an oral hearing in this case 

at all. See LCvR 78.1 (The allowance of an oral hearing “shall be within the discretion of the 

court.”). Second, appellant has filed a brief and a reply brief, both of which the Court had 

thoroughly read and considered in advance of the hearing. Third, at the hearing, the Court 

specifically invited the parties to weigh in if they believed that the Court had not accurately 

framed the issues. Tr. at 7:1–5 (Court: “Obviously, if I have incorrectly framed the issues, you 

should let me know that . . . .”). Counsel for appellee accepted this invitation and offered a 

minor correction to the Court’s framing of the issues. Id. at 21:12–16 (Ms. Baum: “I had one 

minor observation with respect to Your Honor’s framing of the issues . . . . The Court: Feel free 

to correct me, it’s okay.”). But appellant’s counsel did not dispute the Court’s framing of the 

issues, either during his argument or his rebuttal. Indeed, he thanked the Court. Id. at 7:7–8 (Mr. 

Troy: “Thank you for that. It will save a lot of time.”). Finally, after the Court finished asking 

its prepared questions, it gave appellant’s counsel an opportunity to go back to his notes and 

raise any issues that he had not yet had an opportunity to address. Still, appellant’s counsel did 

not raise the issues that he complains the Court denied him the opportunity to discuss. Id. at 

16:14–16 (The Court: “Okay. All right. I’ve asked you a lot of questions. So if there’s things 

on your outline that you wanted to cover, I want to make sure that I hear them.”); id. at 20:4 (The 

Court: “Okay. All right. Is there anything else that you need to tell me that we haven’t 

covered? Mr. Troy: Not at this time.”). Nonetheless, the Court will address the issues Akl 

raises in his supplemental memorandum, most of which repeat arguments that appellant already 

made in his brief and reply.
8

2) granting appellee’s motion for protective order and denying appellant’s motion to compel 

discovery.7

ORDER GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 

SANCTIONS AND DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

I. Standard of Review

On appeal, a court reviews the decision whether to award sanctions under an abuse of 

discretion standard. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(section 1927); In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The standard of review 

concerning a Bankruptcy Court’s denial of sanctions is abuse of discretion.”); see also In re 

Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 1996) (district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s sanctions

decision under a “clear abuse of discretion” standard). Orders on motions for summary 

judgment, however, are reviewed de novo. United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1159 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995). Here, while the appeal is taken on the bankruptcy court’s decision regarding a 

motion for sanctions, the parties briefed, and the court decided, the sanctions issue on a motion 

for summary judgment.8 So the parties now disagree on what level of deference the Court 

should accord the bankruptcy court’s decision.

While neither side has provided the Court with any precedent that is squarely on point, 

the Court finds the bankruptcy court’s decision to be more akin to an order on a motion for 

 

7 Appellant frames the appeal as raising a separate issue of whether the bankruptcy court 

erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment as to sanctions, but this Court will 

treat the summary judgment order as a sub-issue under the first question presented.

8 Although the bankruptcy court disposed of parts of Akl’s motion for sanctions on VHC’s 

motion to dismiss, strike, or otherwise dispose of the motion for sanctions, and on VHC’s motion 

to reconsider the court’s order on the motion to dismiss, Akl appeals only the order on VHC’s 

motion for summary judgment and the order denying defendant’s motion for sanctions, not the 

order on the motion to dismiss. Notice of Appeal [Dkt. # 1] at 5.
9

sanctions than on a motion for summary judgment. The issue that the bankruptcy court was 

considering was not dispositive, but was merely collateral to the claims raised in the complaint. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has found that appellate courts must defer to the trial court’s 

legal findings in proceedings for sanctions, not just their factual findings. Cooter & Gell v. 

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399–405 (1990) (Rule 11 sanctions);9 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (inherent authority sanctions); Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Cos., 

Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (inherent authority sanctions). Therefore, the Court 

will review the bankruptcy court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard.10

A. Abuse of Discretion

A trial court has abused its discretion if it “did not apply the correct legal standard or 

misapprehended the underlying substantive law” or if its ruling was not “within the scope of 

permissible alternatives in light of the relevant factors and the reasons given to support it.” 

Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The court “necessarily abuse[s] its 

 

9 The Court finds it irrelevant that the Cooter decision concerned Rule 11 sanctions while

this case concerns Section 1927 and inherent authority sanctions. In Cooter, the Court put 

significant emphasis on considerations that apply equally to the section 1927 and inherent 

authority sanction context: the legal questions rely heavily on the factual circumstances of the 

case; the court must make determinations about whether particular legal arguments appeared 

“plausible” or were “reasonable” at the time they were made; the legal questions presented are 

not easily generalizeable to other factual scenarios; deference to the determination of courts “on 

the front lines of litigation” will enhance those courts’ ability to control the litigants before them 

and deter baseless filings before them. Id. at 401–04. In addition, the Court emphasized the 

significance that an abuse of discretion standard would not preclude an appellate court from 

correcting a district court’s legal errors since a trial court “would necessarily abuse its discretion 

if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

evidence.” Id. at 405. Also, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled that sanctions under the 

court’s inherent power are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 

32, 55 (1991) (“We review a court’s imposition of sanctions under its inherent power for abuse 

of discretion.”).

10 The Court notes, however, that even if it were to review the bankruptcy court’s decision 

de novo, it would reach the same decision.
10

discretion if it base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405. 

However, “[i]f the court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 

entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as 

the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson v. Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).

B. Summary Judgment

As discussed above, this Court must determine whether the lower court applied the 

correct legal standard. And since the bankruptcy court decided the sanctions motion on 

summary judgment, it is appropriate at this juncture to set out the standard for summary 

judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat 

summary judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts showing there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual 

dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the 

non-moving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the 

litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 
11

addition, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when “the nonmoving 

party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to 

which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In assessing a party’s motion, 

“[a]ll underlying facts and inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.” N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2010), citing 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.

II. Analysis

At the outset, the Court observes that appellant challenges “every aspect” of the 

bankruptcy court’s memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment for VHC as to 

sanctions. Appellant’s Supp. Mem. [Dkt. # 15] at 7; Tr. at 14:17–15:4.11 In his briefs and at the 

oral argument, counsel for Akl urged the Court to overturn every single legal and factual 

determination in the bankruptcy court’s fifty-five page opinion. Id.

Since many of Akl’s arguments rely on the assumption that appellee was engaged in 

fraud, the Court will address Akl’s fraud allegations before turning to his specific arguments.12

Akl asserts throughout his brief and supplemental memorandum that in the sanctions 

 

11 The Court: Is there anything that you think [the bankruptcy judge] was right about? You 

have said that he was wrong about every single thing.

Mr. Troy: No, I don’t think he was right about one thing.

The Court: You don’t think he was right about one thing?

Mr. Troy: No.

12 In addition, this is one of the issues that appellant argues the Court denied him the 

opportunity to address at the oral argument. Again, the Court notes that the decision whether to 

hold an oral argument was entirely within the discretion of the Court, and the Court was 

similarly entitled to limit arguments to whichever issues it was most concerned with. 

Nonetheless, the Court will consider the additional arguments that he provides on this point in 

his supplemental memorandum.
12

proceedings, he presented evidence that appellee perpetrated fraud on the courts by submitting 

falsified documents, and that the hospital and its attorneys fraudulently colluded with the judges 

on the Arlington Circuit Court – Judges Swersky and Kendrick. However, the bankruptcy court 

rejected Akl’s allegations of fraud, finding that Akl presented nothing more than mere 

conclusory assertions, and that the issue of fraud was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in 

any event. BR IV at 945–46.

This Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not err in rejecting Akl’s allegations of 

fraud. Like the bankruptcy court, this Court has gone through the entire record in this case and 

found no facts that would suggest that appellee engaged in collusion with judges on the 

Arlington Circuit Court or submitted anything fraudulent to the Arlington court. The only 

specific evidence that Akl submitted to the bankruptcy court in his opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment as to sanctions – invoices submitted by hospital counsel to the court – do not 

support Akl’s claims of fraud. See BR IV at 81–83.13 Furthermore, appellant’s brief, reply brief,

and supplemental memorandum in this case all fail to point to any facts in the record that could 

be construed as evidence of fraud, even giving Akl the benefit of all inferences in his favor. The 

pleadings frequently refer to Akl’s “evidence” of fraud, but nowhere does he actually identify 

 

13 Akl argues that redactions in the invoices show evidence of fraud and ex parte

communications between the hospital or its attorneys and the Arlington Circuit Court. However, 

the bankruptcy court found no evidence of fraud in the record, and this Court cannot find that its 

determination was in error, let alone an abuse of discretion, based on the hospital invoices that 

are attached as appendices to Akl’s opposition.
13

what that evidence is.14 Moreover, Akl’s conspiracy allegations are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine.15 Therefore, this Court agrees with the bankruptcy court that Akl failed to 

 

14 See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 19 (“Even worse, basing a complaint on what a judge said 

with the knowledge that the statement was extracted through corruption and conspiracy with the 

judge is actually criminal contempt.”); id. at 21 (“In its motion for sanctions, Akl argued that 

Judge Alfred Swersky, who presided over Akl I, II, and III, was clearly in league with the 

defendants in the actions and was intent on dismissing the case on summary judgment. . . . Akl 

also argued that VHC, along with Judge Swersky, corrupted Judge Kendrick who entered the 

monetary judgment against Akl. Akl offered substantial evidence to that effect.” The evidence 

that Akl submitted in support of his allegations that VHC, its counsel, and Judges Swersky and 

Kendrick were in cahoots with each other is extensive and damning . . . .”); id. at 22 (the 

bankruptcy court’s ruling was made “in the face of allegations and evidence of misconduct by 

that Judge with VHC’s and its counsel’s knowledge.” “[T]here are two aspects to Akl’s 

allegations of fraud. Allegations of fraud by VHC and its counsel upon the Arlington Court, and 

allegations of fraud through a conspiracy with the court. The former was accomplished through 

the submission of fabricated documents and through false representations to the Arlington 

Court.” “VHC and its counsel committed fraud upon the Arlington Court and caused it, by 

submitting false documents to it and making misrepresentations to it that the peer-review process 

was spotless, to reach a conclusion that Akl violated Va. Code § 8.01-271.1 . . . .”); id. at 23 

(“Appellees knew that Judge Kendrick’s statement was made pursuant to an extra-judicial 

agreement with VHC and its counsel, . . . they knew that Judge Kendrick did not believe what he 

said when he said it, and they knew that Judge Kendrick was merely stating what he and his coconspirators had agreed upon.”); id. at 29 (“[VHC and its counsel] knew that the judgment they 

obtained from the Arlington Court was fraudulent.”); id. at 34 (“Appellant provided ample 

evidence that the Arlington Court proceedings were corrupted, Opp. at 65–70 . . . .”); id. at 35 

(“As stated above, the Appellees corrupted the Arlington Court . . . .”); id. at 36–37

(“[Appellees] were the ones who corrupted the Arlington Court . . . .”); id. at 37 (“It is as if the 

Bk. Court has hard time (sic) believing that a judge could be corrupt or be corrupted. This was 

evidenced by the Bk. Court’s clear irritation when Akl mentioned the issue at the January 11, 

2011 hearing on the motion for protective order.”); id. at 41 (“The mere fact that he issued the 

Judgment Order in violation of the stay supports the evidence presented by Akl that he was in 

league with VHC . . . .”); id. at 49 (“Akl alleged that the judgment used to initiate this suit was 

obtained through fraud – thus, the filing of the Complaint constitutes fraud upon the Bk. 

Court.”); Appellant’s Reply at 5 (“It is further clear from the large amount of evidence that Akl, 

contrary to what Appellees assert, did submit in conjunction with his opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment as to sanctions.”); Appellant’s Supp. Mem. at 3 (“The Court seemed 

unconcerned with Appellant’s allegations of fraud in previous proceedings and the use in this 

Court of a judgment obtained by fraud).
14

present any evidence of fraud that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Accordingly, 

in the following discussion of Akl’s arguments for why the bankruptcy court erred by finding no 

evidence of bad faith, the Court will not further consider any basis sounding in fraud.

A. Sanctions under the court’s inherent authority for the filing of the complaint

Courts have an inherent power “to protect their integrity and prevent abuses of the 

judicial process.” Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), citing 

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. This includes the authority to assess attorney’s fees against a party 

who has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Alyeska Pipeline 

Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975). The bankruptcy court correctly 

recited the standard for imposing sanctions under the court’s inherent authority: First, the court 

“‘must find some connection between the sanctioned conduct and a process of the court in the

litigation before it.’ . . . Second, the court ‘must make an explicit finding that [the target of the 

 

15 Akl passionately asserts that his claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

because Akl did not ask the bankruptcy court to reject the Arlington Circuit Court’s judgment, 

but only “to examine the process by which it was obtained.” Appellant’s Br. at 25; Appellant’s 

Reply at 8–10; Appellant’s Supp. Mem. at 3–4. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal 

court from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The bankruptcy court cited Akl v. 

Swersky, No. 1:06-cv00964 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2006) as support for the applicability of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. BR IV at 946. In that case, a court in the Eastern District of Virginia 

held that Akl’s section 1983 due process and equal protection claims, which asserted the same 

fraud and conspiracy allegations that Akl asserts here, were barred by Rooker-Feldman. The 

court noted that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable if the people involved in the state court decision 

violated some independent right of the litigant, but it found that “Akl’s conclusory allegations 

simply do not articulate an independent right, nor do they constitute an independent claim, 

capable of being redressed by this court. In the end, his allegations before this court equate to an 

attack on the decisions of the state court.” Mem. Op., No. 1:06cv00964 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 

2006). It was not an abuse of the bankruptcy court’s discretion to find that Akl’s allegations in 

the case before it were similarly mere attempts to invite federal court review and rejection of the 

Arlington Circuit Court’s judgments against him and that they were similarly barred by RookerFeldman. See also Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia, 711 F. Supp. 2d 115, 120–23 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(explaining how Rooker-Feldman applies after the Exxon Mobil decision).
15

sanctions] acted in bad faith.’” BR IV at 933 (alterations in original), citing Alexander v. FBI,

541 F. Supp. 2d 274, 303 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 

767 (1980) (the court must make a specific finding of bad faith before imposing any sanction 

under its inherent powers); United States v. Wallace, 964 F.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(same). Only the second part – the showing of bad faith – is at issue here.

The bankruptcy court looked for bad faith both “indirectly through evidence of objective 

actions that lead to an inference of subjective [improper motive] – such as filing a document with 

the court that is plainly frivolous, lacking even a colorable basis in law or fact,” and “directly 

through evidence of subjective [improper motive].” BR IV at 935, citing In re Greater Se. Cmty.

Hosp. Corp., I, No. 02-02250, 2010 WL 3123086, at *3 (Bankr. D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2010); see also 

Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]here must be clear evidence that the 

challenged actions are entirely without color and are taken for reasons of harassment or delay or 

for other improper purposes.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It found no objective or 

subjective indications of bad faith. Rather it found that Judge Kendrick’s ruling alone provided a

colorable basis for appellee’s nondischargeability arguments, and that Akl presented no evidence 

of subjective bad faith other than conclusory statements. Akl’s arguments in the instant case all 

seek to persuade the Court that Akl presented enough evidence to at least create a genuine factual 

dispute over whether appellee was aware that Akl had not actually injured it willfully and with 

malice, and was thereby aware that its fees and costs award did not satisfy the conditions for 

nondischargeability. But since this Court cannot find any evidence to support Akl’s contention, 

the Court declines to overturn the bankruptcy court’s well-reasoned decision.
16

i. Appellee was not required to foreclose the possibility that Akl’s 

allegations were true or that Akl acted without malice in his previous 

suits.

Akl first argues that the bankruptcy court erred because VHC failed to foreclose the 

possibilities that his allegations were true and that he did not act with the malice required for an 

award to be nondischargeable. But the bankruptcy court did not need to foreclose those

possibilities. Under section 523(a)(6) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, an award incurred 

by willful and malicious injury by the debtor is nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 

proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Therefore, the bankruptcy court simply needed to find that 

appellee had a colorable basis for thinking that its fees and costs award in the Arlington Circuit 

Court was granted based on that court’s finding that Akl engaged in willful and malicious 

actions.

The bankruptcy court found that the mere fact that “an independent trier of fact found 

Akl’s conduct in the Circuit Court sanctionable and was a basis for banning him from filing 

further suits in that court” provided the lawyers with a good faith factual basis for instituting the

lawsuit in the bankruptcy court. It also provided a good faith basis for “having the bankruptcy 

court determine whether Akl’s actions in those proceedings warranted a finding that the 

attorneys’ fee award was nondischargeable on a broader evidentiary basis than just Judge 

Kendrick’s oral ruling and order.”16 BR IV at 940. The bankruptcy court rightfully 

distinguished between a colorable argument and a winning argument. Id. In other words, Judge 

Kendrick’s ruling provided a sufficient basis for appellee to think that sufficient evidence existed 

 

16 Akl also argues that appellee knew that it did not meet the standard for 

nondischargeability because it provided false information to the court and colluded with the 

Court, but the Court has already rejected Akl’s allegations of fraud and conspiracy and will not 

take them up again here.
17

on which the bankruptcy court could find that Akl engaged in willful and malicious conduct, 

even if the court ultimately were to find that he did not. In making that determination, the 

bankruptcy court did not have to decide whether Akl’s allegations against appellee in the 

Virginia Courts were actually false or whether Akl actually acted with malice when he brought 

his lawsuits there, so this Court cannot find that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 

failing to foreclose the possibility that Akl’s allegations were true or that he did not act with 

malice.

ii. The bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that if the complaint were 

limited solely to Judge Kendrick’s ruling, it would still be colorable.

Akl next argues that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that even if the complaint were 

limited solely to Judge Kendrick’s ruling, it would still be colorable; but this Court cannot find 

that determination to be in error either. In appellee’s motion for summary judgment on

nondischargeability, appellee cited several cases applying collateral estoppel to state-court 

sanction determinations made under rules or statutes similar to Va. Code § 8.01-271.1, and 

thereby finding the award to be nondischargeable without re-litigating the merits of whether 

there was actual willful and malicious injury.17 BR I at 182. So it was reasonable for appellee to 

argue that the bankruptcy court should do the same, even though it ultimately did not prevail on 

that point. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court correctly found that it was reasonable for appellee

to have believed, based on the combination of Judge Kendrick’s oral statements and the wording 

 

17 Akl argues that “a lawsuit cannot be brought based on what another judge said, but [must 

be based] on what the plaintiff actually believed . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 19; see also 

Appellant’s Supp. Mem. at 4–5. While the Court does not disagree in principle, the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel requires a court to adopt the final judgment of another court on the same 

issue. See Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992). So 

appellee could have reasonably brought its nondischargeability claim based solely on Judge 

Kendrick’s ruling alone. Akl is correct that if appellee had known that Judge Kendrick’s ruling 

was tainted by fraud, then appellee could be sanctioned for filing the nondischargeability 

complaint; however, this Court already considered and rejected Akl’s fraud allegations.
18

of the written order, that its award of fees and costs was a sanctions award. See BR IV at 939–

40.

iii. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that appellee’s stance that 

in suing others Akl intended to injure VHC does not create a material 

factual dispute as to appellee’s motives for filing its complaint.

Akl next argues that the fact that the hospital sought to have all of the fees it paid 

declared nondischargeable – including fees incurred defending agents and contractors it was not 

legally obligated to defend – is evidence of the hospital’s bad faith, and a circumstance that 

creates a factual dispute. See Appellant’s Br. at 39. The bankruptcy court rejected this 

contention. It found, and this Court agrees, that the hospital had both ethical and economic 

reasons for defending those parties, and that the fact that it chose to do so does not taint the 

complaint filed in the bankruptcy court in any way.18

The Court further notes that to the extent that VHC was planning to rely on collateral 

estoppel as the basis for nondischargeability, it had good faith grounds to ask for all of the fees 

that Judge Kendrick awarded. Since Judge Kendrick awarded appellee costs and fees for the 

cases that it paid to defend – even the ones in which it was not a party – the Court cannot find 

that its request that those fees be nondischargeable indicated bad faith.

 

18 Akl makes a further unavailing argument that the bankruptcy court wrongly raised these 

arguments sua sponte. However, this argument misconstrues the burdens on a motion for 

summary judgment. Once the moving party sets out the basis for its motion, the non-moving 

party bears the burden of “designat[ing] specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial” 

in order to defeat the motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, it was Akl’s burden to present evidence that would establish a material factual 

dispute, so the bankruptcy court was free to explain why it found Akl’s evidence insufficient. In 

addition, the bankruptcy court found, and this Court agrees, that appellee’s general denials of 

Akl’s allegations coupled with several defenses was sufficient, particularly given the length of 

Akl’s pleadings. See BR IV at 956; see also BR IV at 752 (“[Akl’s] efforts to manufacture 

material disputes by making wild and unsupported accusations that have already been rejected by 

other courts over and again, must be rejected by the Court.”). BR IV at 752.
19

iv. The bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that there were no 

inconsistencies in what appellee indicated to be the basis for its action,

and that even if there were inconsistencies, they do not create a 

material factual dispute as to appellee’s motives for filing its

complaint.

At the oral argument on this appeal, Akl asserted that an alleged change of position was 

the strongest “evidence” he presented of the hospital’s and its attorneys’ bad faith. Tr. at 15:5–6.

He argued that the hospital’s attorneys originally stated in the bankruptcy complaint that the 

claim that Dr. Akl acted with malice (giving rise to the debt – the attorneys fee award – that 

should therefore be non-dischargeable) was based on the “entire record.” But later, according to 

Akl, they took the contrary position that they were relying solely on Judge Kendrick’s ruling.

See Appellant’s Br. at 29–35 (describing what Akl calls the “empty head/pure heart defense”).

At the oral argument, Akl’s counsel pointed out that by filing the complaint in the bankruptcy 

court, which was subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, counsel “certified” that the 

factual contentions had evidentiary support. Tr. at 7:15–23, 8:19–9:7, 18:2–14. But since the 

entire record included some lawsuits in which VHC allegedly knew that Dr. Akl had not acted 

with malice, then VHC’s attorneys must have acted with malice in predicating their action that 

record. Id. at 29:9–20. And, to follow his logic, the fact that the hospital’s attorneys retreated 

from that allegation shows that they knew it was flawed all along.

The bankruptcy court found that appellee had never actually changed its position 

regarding the basis for its action. BR IV at 937–38. Moreover, it found that even if appellee had 

shifted positions, that shift would not lead to a reasonable inference of bad faith. Id. at 938. This 

Court agrees with both determinations.

As to the claimed change of position, the Court notes that from the start, the hospital

clearly indicated that Judge Kendrick’s statements were the centerpiece of the complaint and that 
20

the hospital was not alleging that every single thing Dr. Akl had ever done was activated by 

malice. BR I at 1–4. The complaint is only three pages long.19 It sets out the background facts 

– that Dr. Akl had filed eight lawsuits in connection with the medical privileges, id. at 1 ¶ 6; that 

all seven in Virginia were dismissed and the one in Maryland was still pending, id. at 1 ¶ 7; that 

Dr. Akl was enjoined from filing any more lawsuits in Virginia, id. at 1 ¶ 8; that “in most of 

these cases,” the hospital was forced to defend against baseless and malicious allegations, id. at 1

¶ 9; that “in one of the actions,” the hospital sought to recover the fees it paid for the defense of 

“various baseless and harassing lawsuits, id. at 1 ¶¶ 10–11; and that the court granted the motion, 

id. at 1 ¶ 12, making the comments quoted in paragraph 13 (emphasis added). There is nothing 

about the complaint that is not fairly based on the record the attorneys were summarizing at the 

time.

In other words, from the moment it filed its action, appellee intended to rely primarily on 

Judge Kendrick’s ruling, but it was ready to rely on the entire record if its collateral estoppel 

argument were rejected. This is also supported by the Rule 26 disclosures, which Akl cited 

before the bankruptcy court and cites again here. See BR IV at 67 (quoting from appellee’s Rule 

26 disclosure: “This case is predicated upon a multitude of final, non-appealable orders from 

various state and federal courts, including a Virginia Circuit Court order and transcript awarding 

sanctions in favor of the Hospital and against Dr. Akl”; “This case is predicated upon a multitude 

of final, non-appealable orders from various state and federal courts, including a Virginia Circuit 

Court order and transcript awarding sanctions in favor of the Hospital and against Dr. Akl.”). 

In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment as to sanctions filed in the 

bankruptcy court, Akl did not identify any evidence of the hospital’s alleged “amended 

 

19 The fourth page just contains a signature.
21

position.” See id. at 51–56. Now, Akl identifies statements by the hospital’s attorneys, made in 

pleadings and hearings, as his evidence. First, Akl asserts that counsel for the hospital admitted,

after the bankruptcy court denied his motion for summary judgment on nondischargeability, that 

he needed time to “regroup” before he could identify the underlying evidence that he would rely 

on at an evidentiary hearing on sanctions. Akl argues that is proof that counsel had never 

intended to rely on the entire record. However, Akl fails to acknowledge that when the attorney 

made those statements, he had been preparing for a hearing that was to focus solely on the legal 

issue of collateral estoppel. So it was reasonable for him to request additional time to review the 

factual evidence. The fact that he was unable to identify the factual evidence underlying his case 

at that exact moment is not the same as a concession that the action had no basis in fact. 20

Similarly, the statement Akl quotes from the hospital’s opposition to Akl’s motion to defer ruling 

on defendant’s pending motions pending discovery does not show a change in appellee’s

position. The hospital clearly explained its theory that: “[A] substantial body of case law stands 

for the proposition that a sanctions judgment can be excepted from discharge in bankruptcy [and] 

the record supported a finding that Arlington County Circuit Judge Kendrick entered a sanctions 

judgment against Akl.” BR III at 398–99. This statement makes clear that appellee believed that 

the entire record supported its action.

Furthermore, even if appellee did shift positions, Akl has presented nothing that indicates

that the reason for the shift was bad faith. The refinement of a litigation position from broad to 

narrow is not evidence of bad faith and neither is an argument “in the alternative,” which is a 

 

20 Indeed, the Court agrees with the observation of the bankruptcy court that if statements 

made by VHC counsel at the sanctions hearing – which occurred three years after the complaint 

was filed – were inconsistent with the complaint, “[a]t most, it shows that this proceeding has 

wound on for too long.” BR IV at 939.
22

formulation that attorneys use frequently in litigation. Accordingly, the Court does not find 

sufficient grounds to reverse the bankruptcy court’s decision.

v. The bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that a statement in 

appellee’s Rule 26 disclosure stating that “there are no fact issues” 

does not create a material factual dispute as to appellee’s motives for 

filing its complaint

Akl quotes a statement in appellee’s Rule 26 disclosure to the bankruptcy court:

Because . . . this case involves a question of law, the Hospital believes that there 

are no fact issues. If, however, the Hospital is required to go beyond the court’s 

above-referenced rulings to prove anything, then the public record alone in this 

litigation with Dr. Akl would demonstrate that he acted maliciously in prosecuting 

his claims against the hospital.

Appellant’s Br. at 39. The bankruptcy court rightfully rejected Akl’s arguments that this 

statement (1) contradicts itself, and (2) shows that appellee filed the complaint intending to reach 

only the summary judgment stage because, contrary to its claims, it knew it had no factual 

evidence. As the bankruptcy court clearly explained, the statement leads to exactly the opposite 

conclusion: it shows that appellee intended to rely primarily on Judge Kendrick’s ruling using 

its theory of collateral estoppel, but that it believed it could win even if the court determined that 

it had to look beyond Judge Kendrick’s ruling. See BR IV at 947. Appellee believed that the 

totality of the proceedings presented a sufficient basis on which to find that Dr. Akl acted 

maliciously. The Court cannot find anything in that statement that would give reason to think 

that it believed otherwise. Nor has Akl presented the Court with any additional evidence that 

would suggest appellee did not believe that it had sufficient support for its claim, other than his 

theories of fraud, which the Court has already rejected.

It is entirely unexceptional that litigants would advance the position that a matter can be 

resolved on legal grounds alone, while being prepared to pursue an action on the merits if 

summary disposition fails. It is also unremarkable that a party might elect to abandon an action 
23

altogether once it has seen the reasons why the court denied the motion for summary judgment. 

There is nothing about the motion for voluntary dismissal in and of itself that suggests that 

VHC’s attorneys acted in bad faith when they filed their complaint in bankruptcy court to begin 

with.

vi. The bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that the Arlington Court’s 

issuance of judgment despite an automatic stay does not create a 

material factual dispute as to appellee’s motives for filing its

complaint

Akl next argues that the bankruptcy court should have found a material factual dispute as 

to appellee’s motives for filing the complaint based on evidence he presented showing that the 

Arlington Circuit Court issued a clerical order in the matter there even though the proceedings 

had been stayed due to the commencement of Akl’s bankruptcy proceedings the day before. The 

bankruptcy court found that the issuance of the order did not reflect bad faith on the part of 

VHC’s attorneys because Akl made no showing that the clerical order “was signed at the 

Hospital’s urging.” BR IV at 949. Akl now argues that the bankruptcy erred because his 

conspiracy allegations establish the link between the Arlington court’s action and the hospital. 

However, since the Court already found that Akl failed to present any evidence that would 

support his conclusory allegations of a conspiracy, the Court rejects this argument.

vii. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the events that 

preceded the filing of the adversary proceeding do not create a 

material factual dispute as to appellee’s motives for filing its complaint

Akl also claims that the bankruptcy court should have found a material factual dispute as 

to appellee’s motives for filing the complaint because he recalls his attorney reporting that VHC 

requested his consent to an extension of time before the filing of the nondischargeability 

complaint. Akl insists that the extension request was designed to coerce him to drop his pending 

actions by threatening him with legal action. But a mere request from one attorney to another for 
24

an extension of time is not evidence of bad faith. In fact, it is required by the local rules. LCvR 

7(m) (“before filing any nondispositive motion in a civil action, counsel shall discuss the 

anticipated motion with opposing counsel . . . .”). In addition, Akl provides no evidence of 

improper motive for the extension request, and, as the bankruptcy court noted, he provides no 

evidence from a person with knowledge that the request was actually made. See BR IV at 950.

Therefore, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not err in rejecting this argument.

viii. The bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that VHC’s failure to submit 

a declaration with the summary judgment motion as to sanctions does 

not create a material factual dispute as to appellee’s motives for filing 

its complaint

Before the bankruptcy court, Akl argued that the fact that the hospital did not submit a 

declaration denying Akl’s allegations with its summary judgment motion was evidence of the 

hospital’s bad faith. He now argues that the bankruptcy court erred in rejecting that theory. But 

because Akl misconstrues the burdens on the parties, this Court must again uphold the 

bankruptcy court’s ruling.

To defeat the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, Akl bore the burden of coming 

forth with specific evidence showing that the hospital’s nondischargeability complaint was filed

in bad faith. That is why, for example, the Court found that Akl failed to support his assertion 

regarding the request for an extension of time between counsel for appellee and his own counsel. 

Conversely, to succeed on its motion for summary judgment, the hospital needed only to point 

out where Akl failed to meet his burden, an effort that did not require the support of affidavits.21

 

21 As the bankruptcy court noted, even if Akl was correct that no hospital agent was willing 

to serve as the responsible spokesperson for the hospital’s actions, that does not show that the 

action was commenced in bad faith. Given the long list of actions that Akl had filed against 

hospital agents, the agents of the hospital were most likely trying to protect them themselves 

from becoming the next defendant.
25

B. Sanctions under the court’s inherent authority for the filing of the motion for 

summary judgment

In challenging the bankruptcy court’s ruling that Akl failed to raise any genuine dispute 

of material fact regarding whether appellee filed their motion for summary judgment in bad faith, 

Akl merely repeats his argument that appellee’s collateral estoppel argument was so “tortuous” 

as to constitute bad faith. Appellant’s Br. at 44. This Court has already rejected that argument 

as to the filing of appellee’s complaint, and it rejects it here for the same reasons.

C. Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927 for the filing of the motion for 

summary judgment

28 U.S.C. section 1927 states: 

Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 

expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

Thus, sanctions should be assessed against an attorney only when he (1) has multiplied the 

proceedings, and (2) the multiplication of proceedings was unreasonable and vexatious. “A 

showing that counsel’s behavior has been unreasonable and vexatious requires more than a 

showing of negligence. Instead, it requires a showing of deliberate action in the face of a known 

risk, the likelihood or impact of which the actor inexcusably underestimates or ignores.” Healey 

v. Labgold, 231 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2002), citing United States v. Wallace, 964 F.2d

1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Although there is some controversy over whether section 1927 

sanctions require a showing of deliberate intent or whether recklessness is sufficient, the D.C. 

Circuit requires a showing that the attorney’s conduct that was “at least reckless.” Wallace, 964 

F.2d at 1217.

VHC filed a single complaint in the bankruptcy court, moved for summary judgment on 

the complaint, and then dismissed it. At the oral argument in this appeal, when the Court asked 
26

counsel for Akl how it could find that the hospital and its counsel thus “multiplied” pleadings 

unreasonably and vexatiously, he said he had no answer.22 Tr. at 16:6–9 (The Court: “So how 

does that so multiply the pleadings unreasonably and vexatiously? Mr. Troy: Your Honor, I 

don’t have an answer for that question.”). Even when he explained the vexatiousness prong 

during his rebuttal, counsel could not come up with a single argument that supported a finding 

that VHC “multiplied” the proceedings. Tr. at 17:15–18:1.23 In the statute, the adverbs 

“unreasonably” and “vexatiously” modify the verb “multiply,” so in the absence of some 

“multiplication,” the statute has no application.24

In any event, Akl has also failed to show that the hospital’s filings were unreasonable or 

vexatious. Akl’s only arguments on this point are the same ones that he made in attempting to 

demonstrate appellee’s “bad faith” for inherent authority sanctions. The court rejects those 

 

22 Counsel was clear, however, that Akl was not “conceding” the lack of a statutory basis 

for sanctions. Tr. at 16:10–13 (“The Court: All right. So are you conceding that the statutory 

basis for sanctions really doesn’t apply? Mr. Troy: No, I won’t concede it. I don’t have an 

answer to your question.”)

23 Mr. Troy: . . . [W]ith respect to the multiple and vexatious filings, they shouldn’t have 

brought the case in the first part, so the first one becomes vexatious

The Court: But how does that – I realize that one times one is one, but how do we get to 

multiplication –

Mr. Troy: Well, there were more –

The Court: – out of filing a complaint –

Mr. Troy: There were more – that’s the argument I’m going to make, Your Honor.

24 Moreover, as counsel for appellee pointed out at the same oral argument, it seems ironic 

that Akl accuses the hospital of “multiplying” the proceedings when the hospital’s motion for 

summary judgment was docket number thirteen in the early phases of the bankruptcy proceeding, 

and their motion to voluntarily dismiss the case was docket number twenty eight, yet Akl’s 

motion for sanctions dragged the proceeding on for three years and a total of 212 docket entries

(fifteen additional docket entries are attributable to Akl’s appeal). U.S. Bankr. Ct. for the Dist. 

of Columbia, No. 07-100256.
27

arguments here for the same reasons that it rejected them earlier. Since Akl presented no 

evidence that the summary judgment motion was unreasonable or vexatious, the section 1927 

sanction standard cannot be satisfied, even under the subjective recklessness standard.

Because the bankruptcy court was correct in finding no genuine disputes of material fact 

as to Akl’s motion for sanctions, it did not abuse its discretion by finding that the motion fails as 

a matter of law. Its decision denying the sanctions motion will therefore be affirmed.

ORDER GRANTING VHC’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND DENYING 

AKL’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY REGARDING THE SANCTIONS 

MOTION

I. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision whether to permit discovery under an 

abuse of discretion standard. See United Presbyterian Church in the USA v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 

1375, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (A trial court’s “discovery rulings are reversed only on a clear 

showing of abuse, and it is unusual to find abuse of discretion in these matters.”); Porter v. Shah,

606 F.3d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[The plaintiff] was not entitled to discovery or an 

evidentiary hearing as a matter of right; whether to afford him either one was a matter within the 

trial court’s discretion.”); Ikossi v. Dept. of Navy, 516 F.3d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (denial 

of discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City 

Council of Balt., 775 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying abuse of discretion standard to 

review district court decision denying discovery in connection with a motion for sanctions under 

Rule 11 and section 1927).

II. Analysis

The protective order that the bankruptcy court issued stated: 

Pursuant to the hearing of January 11, 2011, the motion for a protective order will 

be granted. The discovery sought in this proceeding will be moot if the court 
28

grants the motion for summary judgment to be filed by this date. Even if a trial 

proves necessary, the defendant’s sanctions motions are satellite litigation that 

ought not be allowed to require great time and effort. Factual inquiries if any are 

needed, can more efficiently be kept within appropriate limits by requiring such 

inquiries to be made at trial.

Order Granting Mot. for Protective Order at 1, Va. Hosp. Ctr. v. Akl, No. 07-10026 (Bankr. 

D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2011) [Dkt. # 194].25 Given: (1) that Akl sought discovery primarily to 

vindicate his theories of fraud and conspiracy, see Appellant’s Br. at 48–49; Def.’s Opp. to Mot. 

for Protective Order/ Mot. to Compel Disc. and to Declare the Peer-Review Process NonPrivileged at 6–7, 10–11, 13–14, Va. Hosp. Ctr. v. Akl, No. 07-10026 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan 15, 

2010) [Dkt. # 156]; (2) that another court had already found those allegations meritless and 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see BR I at 352–90; and (3) that two additional courts 

had already held that he was barred from reasserting those allegations by the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine, see id. at 396–497, 499–530, the bankruptcy court correctly found that the motion for 

summary judgment might render the discovery requests moot. The other information Akl sought 

through discovery – information about the peer-review process that led to his discharge from the 

hospital – was irrelevant for purposes of his motion for sanctions. See Def.’s Opp. to Mot. for 

Protective Order/ Mot. to Compel Disc. and to Declare the Peer-Review Process Non-Privileged

at 15–20, Va. Hosp. Ctr. v. Akl, No. 07-10026 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2010). Finally, the 

 

25 Akl argues that the bankruptcy court relied on an incorrect standard in deciding to grant 

the motion for protective order. According to Akl, the bankruptcy court found that discovery in 

connection with satellite litigation should be permitted only in “extraordinary circumstances.” 

This, Akl argues, is the standard for granting discovery in connection with Rule 11 sanctions, but 

not, he argues, for inherent authority sanctions. Tr. Hearing on Mot. for Protective Order 

(“Protective Order Tr.”) at 62, Va. Hosp. Ctr. v. Akl, No. 07-10026 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 11, 

2011) [Dkt. # 201]. Although at the hearing on the protective order, the Court did indicate that it 

believed “the principles applicable to Rule 11, and also to Section 1927, apply as well to inherent 

authority sanctions,” this Court will review the reasons that the Court gave for denying discovery 

in its written order granting the motion for protective order and denying defendant’s motion to 

compel discovery. And it finds those reasons alone provided an appropriate basis for the court to 

deny discovery.
29

bankruptcy court did not block Akl from making relevant factual inquiries, it simply required 

that those inquiries be made at trial, if the litigation advanced that far, rather than through 

discovery.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in 

granting the hospital’s motion for a protective order and denying Akl’s motion to compel 

discovery and to declare the peer-review process non-privileged.

CONCLUSION

Because the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by granting appellee’s motion 

for summary judgment as to sanctions, denying appellant’s motion for sanctions, granting 

appellee’s motion for protective order, and denying appellant’s motion to compel discovery and 

to declare the peer-review process non-privileged, the Court will affirm all three of the 

bankruptcy court’s rulings. A separate order will issue.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON

United States District Judge

DATE: May 25, 2012