29 JANUARY 2019

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT

of the 

US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

January 29, 2019

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to 

offer the United States Intelligence Community’s 2019 assessment of threats to US national security. 

My statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community’s extraordinary women 

and men, whom I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are 

committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that 

policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives 

and America’s interests anywhere in the world.

The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate the relative 

importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of the Intelligence Community.

Information available as of 17 January 2019 was used in the preparation of this assessment.

ATTENTION: This product contains US persons information, which has been included consistent with applicable laws, directives, and 

policies. Handle in accordance with recipient’s intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................2

CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................3

FOREWORD ..........................................................................................................................4

GLOBAL THREATS...............................................................................................................5

CYBER............................................................................................................................5

ONLINE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND ELECTION INTERFERENCE................7

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION.................................8

TERRORISM ................................................................................................................10

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE........................................................................................13

EMERGING AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THREATS TO 

ECONOMICCOMPETITIVENESS...............................................................................15

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE..................................................................................16

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME.................................................................18

ECONOMICS AND ENERGY .....................................................................................19

HUMAN SECURITY....................................................................................................21

REGIONAL THREATS.........................................................................................................24

CHINA AND RUSSIA ..................................................................................................24

EAST ASIA...................................................................................................................24

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA......................................................................29

SOUTH ASIA................................................................................................................35

RUSSIA AND EURASIA..............................................................................................36

EUROPE.......................................................................................................................38

AFRICA........................................................................................................................39

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE...................................................................................40
4

FOREWORD

Threats to US national security will expand and diversify in the coming year, driven in part by 

China and Russia as they respectively compete more intensely with the United States and its 

traditional allies and partners. This competition cuts across all domains, involves a race for 

technological and military superiority, and is increasingly about values. Russia and China seek to 

shape the international system and regional security dynamics and exert influence over the politics 

and economies of states in all regions of the world and especially in their respective backyards.

 China and Russia are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s, and the relationship 

is likely to strengthen in the coming year as some of their interests and threat perceptions 

converge, particularly regarding perceived US unilateralism and interventionism and Western 

promotion of democratic values and human rights.

 As China and Russia seek to expand their global influence, they are eroding once wellestablished security norms and increasing the risk of regional conflicts, particularly in the 

Middle East and East Asia.

 At the same time, some US allies and partners are seeking greater independence from 

Washington in response to their perceptions of changing US policies on security and trade and 

are becoming more open to new bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

The post-World War II international system is coming under increasing strain amid continuing 

cyber and WMD proliferation threats, competition in space, and regional conflicts. Among the 

disturbing trends are hostile states and actors’ intensifying online efforts to influence and interfere 

with elections here and abroad and their use of chemical weapons. Terrorism too will continue to be 

a top threat to US and partner interests worldwide, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle 

East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The development and application of new technologies will 

introduce both risks and opportunities, and the US economy will be challenged by slower global 

economic growth and growing threats to US economic competitiveness.

 Migration is likely to continue to fuel social and interstate tensions globally, while drugs and 

transnational organized crime take a toll on US public health and safety. Political turbulence is 

rising in many regions as governance erodes and states confront growing public health and 

environmental threats.

 Issues as diverse as Iran’s adversarial behavior, deepening turbulence in Afghanistan, and the 

rise of nationalism in Europe all will stoke tensions.
5

GLOBAL THREATS

CYBER

Our adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber capabilities—including cyber 

espionage, attack, and influence—to seek political, economic, and military advantage over the United 

States and its allies and partners. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea increasingly use cyber 

operations to threaten both minds and machines in an expanding number of ways—to steal 

information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.

At present, China and Russia pose the greatest espionage and cyber attack threats, but we anticipate that 

all our adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly build and integrate cyber espionage, attack, 

and influence capabilities into their efforts to influence US policies and advance their own national security 

interests. In the last decade, our adversaries and strategic competitors have developed and 

experimented with a growing capability to shape and alter the information and systems on which we 

rely. For years, they have conducted cyber espionage to collect intelligence and targeted our critical 

infrastructure to hold it at risk. They are now becoming more adept at using social media to alter 

how we think, behave, and decide. As we connect and integrate billions of new digital devices into 

our lives and business processes, adversaries and strategic competitors almost certainly will gain 

greater insight into and access to our protected information.

China

China presents a persistent cyber espionage threat and a growing attack threat to our core military and 

critical infrastructure systems. China remains the most active strategic competitor responsible for 

cyber espionage against the US Government, corporations, and allies. It is improving its cyber 

attack capabilities and altering information online, shaping Chinese views and potentially the views 

of US citizens—an issue we discuss in greater detail in the Online Influence Operations and Election 

Interference section of this report.

 Beijing will authorize cyber espionage against key US technology sectors when doing so 

addresses a significant national security or economic goal not achievable through other means. 

We are also concerned about the potential for Chinese intelligence and security services to use

Chinese information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms against the 

United States and allies.

 China has the ability to launch cyber attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects 

on critical infrastructure—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the 

United States.

Russia

We assess that Russia poses a cyber espionage, influence, and attack threat to the United States and our 

allies. Moscow continues to be a highly capable and effective adversary, integrating cyber espionage, 

attack, and influence operations to achieve its political and military objectives. Moscow is now 

staging cyber attack assets to allow it to disrupt or damage US civilian and military infrastructure 

during a crisis and poses a significant cyber influence threat—an issue discussed in the Online 

Influence Operations and Election Interference section of this report.
6

 Russian intelligence and security services will continue targeting US information systems, as 

well as the networks of our NATO and Five Eyes partners, for technical information, military 

plans, and insight into our governments’ policies.

 Russia has the ability to execute cyber attacks in the United States that generate localized, 

temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as disrupting an electrical 

distribution network for at least a few hours—similar to those demonstrated in Ukraine in 2015 

and 2016. Moscow is mapping our critical infrastructure with the long-term goal of being able 

to cause substantial damage.

Iran

Iran continues to present a cyber espionage and attack threat. Iran uses increasingly sophisticated cyber 

techniques to conduct espionage; it is also attempting to deploy cyber attack capabilities that would 

enable attacks against critical infrastructure in the United States and allied countries. Tehran also 

uses social media platforms to target US and allied audiences, an issue discussed in the Online 

Influence Operations and Election Interference section of this report.

 Iranian cyber actors are targeting US Government officials, government organizations, and 

companies to gain intelligence and position themselves for future cyber operations.

 Iran has been preparing for cyber attacks against the United States and our allies. It is capable 

of causing localized, temporary disruptive effects—such as disrupting a large company’s 

corporate networks for days to weeks—similar to its data deletion attacks against dozens of 

Saudi governmental and private-sector networks in late 2016 and early 2017.

North Korea

North Korea poses a significant cyber threat to financial institutions, remains a cyber espionage threat, and 

retains the ability to conduct disruptive cyber attacks. North Korea continues to use cyber capabilities 

to steal from financial institutions to generate revenue. Pyongyang’s cybercrime operations include 

attempts to steal more than $1.1 billion from financial institutions across the world—including a 

successful cyber heist of an estimated $81 million from the New York Federal Reserve account of 

Bangladesh’s central bank.

Nonstate and Unattributed Actors

Foreign cyber criminals will continue to conduct for-profit, cyber-enabled theft and extortion against US 

networks. We anticipate that financially motivated cyber criminals very likely will expand their 

targets in the United States in the next few years. Their actions could increasingly disrupt US 

critical infrastructure in the health care, financial, government, and emergency service sectors, based 

on the patterns of activities against these sectors in the last few years.

Terrorists could obtain and disclose compromising or personally identifiable information through cyber 

operations, and they may use such disclosures to coerce, extort, or to inspire and enable physical attacks 

against their victims. Terrorist groups could cause some disruptive effects—defacing websites or 

executing denial-of-service attacks against poorly protected networks—with little to no warning.
7

The growing availability and use of publicly and commercially available cyber tools is increasing the 

overall volume of unattributed cyber activity around the world. The use of these tools increases the risk 

of misattributions and misdirected responses by both governments and the private sector.

ONLINE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND ELECTION

INTERFERENCE

Our adversaries and strategic competitors probably already are looking to the 2020 US elections as an 

opportunity to advance their interests. More broadly, US adversaries and strategic competitors almost 

certainly will use online influence operations to try to weaken democratic institutions, undermine US 

alliances and partnerships, and shape policy outcomes in the United States and elsewhere. We expect our 

adversaries and strategic competitors to refine their capabilities and add new tactics as they learn 

from each other’s experiences, suggesting the threat landscape could look very different in 2020 and 

future elections.

 Russia’s social media efforts will continue to focus on aggravating social and racial tensions, 

undermining trust in authorities, and criticizing perceived anti-Russia politicians. Moscow may 

employ additional influence toolkits—such as spreading disinformation, conducting hack-andleak operations, or manipulating data—in a more targeted fashion to influence US policy, 

actions, and elections.

 Beijing already controls the information environment inside China, and it is expanding its 

ability to shape information and discourse relating to China abroad, especially on issues that 

Beijing views as core to party legitimacy, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. China will 

continue to use legal, political, and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese markets —to 

shape the information environment. It is also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in 

the United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.

 Iran, which has used social media campaigns to target audiences in both the United States and 

allied nations with messages aligned with Iranian interests, will continue to use online influence 

operations to try to advance its interests.

 Adversaries and strategic competitors probably will attempt to use deep fakes or similar 

machine-learning technologies to create convincing—but false—image, audio, and video files to 

augment influence campaigns directed against the United States and our allies and partners.

Adversaries and strategic competitors also may seek to use cyber means to directly manipulate or 

disrupt election systems—such as by tampering with voter registration or disrupting the vote tallying 

process—either to alter data or to call into question our voting process. Russia in 2016 and 

unidentified actors as recently as 2018 have already conducted cyber activity that has targeted US 

election infrastructure, but we do not have any intelligence reporting to indicate any compromise of 

our nation’s election infrastructure that would have prevented voting, changed vote counts, or 

disrupted the ability to tally votes.
8

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION

We expect the overall threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to continue to grow during 2019, 

and we note in particular the threat posed by chemical warfare (CW) following the most significant and 

sustained use of chemical weapons in decades. This trend erodes international norms against CW 

programs and shifts the cost-benefit analysis such that more actors might consider developing or 

using chemical weapons.

We assess that North Korea, Russia, Syria, and ISIS have used chemical weapons on the battlefield 

or in assassination operations during the past two years. These attacks have included traditional 

CW agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and the first known use of a Novichok nerve agent.

The threat from biological weapons has also become more diverse as BW agents can be employed in 

a variety of ways and their development is made easier by dual-use technologies.

North Korea

Pyongyang has not conducted any nuclear-capable missile or nuclear tests in more than a year, has 

declared its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and has reversibly dismantled 

portions of its WMD infrastructure. However, North Korea retains its WMD capabilities, and the 

IC continues to assess that it is unlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles, delivery systems, and 

production capabilities. North Korean leaders view nuclear arms as critical to regime survival. For 

more explanation of the North Korea-WMD issue, see the Regional Threats section of this report.
9

 In his 2019 New Year’s address, Kim Jong 

Un pledged North Korea would “go 

toward” complete denuclearization and 

promised not to make, test, use, or 

proliferate nuclear weapons. However, he 

conditioned progress on US “practical 

actions.” The regime tied the idea of 

denuclearization in the past to changes in 

diplomatic ties, economic sanctions, and 

military activities.

 We continue to observe activity 

inconsistent with full denuclearization. In 

addition, North Korea has for years 

underscored its commitment to nuclear 

arms, including through an order in 2018 

to mass-produce weapons and an earlier 

law—and constitutional change—affirming the country’s nuclear status.

Russia

We assess that Russia will remain the most capable WMD adversary through 2019 and beyond, developing 

new strategic and nonstrategic weapons systems.

 Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual address in March 2018 to publicly 

acknowledge several of these weapons programs, including a new ICBM designed to penetrate 

US missile defense systems; an intercontinental-range, hypersonic glide vehicle; a 

maneuverable, air-launched missile to strike regional targets; a long-range, nuclear-powered 

cruise missile; and a nuclear-powered, transoceanic underwater vehicle.

 Russia has also developed and fielded a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the 

United States has determined violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

 Moscow probably believes that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to make 

it worth the risk of political repercussions from a violation.

China

We assess that China will continue to expand and diversify its WMD capabilities.

 China continues its multiyear effort to modernize its nuclear missile forces, including deploying 

sea-based weapons, improving its road-mobile and silo-based weapons, and testing hypersonic 

glide vehicles. These new capabilities are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic 

deterrent by providing a second-strike capability and a way to overcome missile defenses. The 

Chinese have also publicized their intent to form a nuclear triad by developing a nuclearcapable, next-generation bomber.
10

Iran

We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development 

activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device. However, Iranian officials have publicly 

threatened to reverse some of Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments—and 

resume nuclear activities that the JCPOA limits—if Iran does not gain the tangible trade and investment 

benefits it expected from the deal.

 In June 2018, Iranian officials started preparations, allowable under the JCPOA, to expand 

their capability to manufacture advanced centrifuges.

 Also in June 2018, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced its intent to 

resume producing natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and prepare the necessary infrastructure

to expand its enrichment capacity within the limits of the JCPOA.

 Iran continues to work with other JCPOA participants—China, the European Union, France, 

Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—to find ways to salvage economic benefits from it. 

Iran’s continued implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would 

need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one 

year.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, 

continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran’s work on a space launch vehicle 

(SLV)—including on its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM because SLVs and ICBMs use 

similar technologies.

The United States determined in 2018 that Iran is in noncompliance with its obligations under the 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and we remain concerned that Iran is developing agents 

intended to incapacitate for offensive purposes and did not declare all of its traditional CW agent 

capabilities when it ratified the CWC.

South Asia

The continued growth and development of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons programs increase the risk 

of a nuclear security incident in South Asia, and the new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks 

for escalation dynamics and security in the region. Pakistan continues to develop new types of nuclear 

weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise 

missiles, and longer range ballistic missiles. India this year conducted its first deployment of a 

nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear missiles.

TERRORISM

Sunni Violent Extremists

Global jihadists in dozens of groups and countries threaten local and regional US interests, despite having 

experienced some significant setbacks in recent years, and some of these groups will remain intent on 

striking the US homeland. Prominent jihadist ideologues and media platforms continue to call for and 

justify efforts to attack the US homeland.
11

 Global jihadist groups in parts of Africa and Asia in the last year have expanded their abilities

to strike local US interests, stoke insurgencies, and foster like-minded networks in neighboring 

countries.

 The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have generated a large pool of battle-hardened fighters with the 

skills to conduct attacks and bolster terrorist groups’ capabilities.

ISIS

ISIS still commands thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it maintains eight branches, more than a 

dozen networks, and thousands of dispersed supporters around the world, despite significant leadership and 

territorial losses. The group will exploit any reduction in CT pressure to strengthen its clandestine presence 

and accelerate rebuilding key capabilities, such as media production and external operations. ISIS very 

likely will continue to pursue external attacks from Iraq and Syria against regional and Western 

adversaries, including the United States.

 ISIS is perpetrating attacks in Iraq and Syria to undermine stabilization efforts and retaliate 

against its enemies, exploiting sectarian tensions in both countries. ISIS probably realizes that 

controlling new territory is not sustainable in the near term. We assess that ISIS will seek to 

exploit Sunni grievances, societal instability, and stretched security forces to regain territory in 

Iraq and Syria in the long term.
12

Al-Qa‘ida

Al-Qa‘ida senior leaders are strengthening the network’s global command structure and continuing to 

encourage attacks against the West, including the United States, although most al-Qa‘ida affiliates’ attacks 

to date have been small scale and limited to their regional areas. We expect that al-Qa‘ida’s global 

network will remain a CT challenge for the United States and its allies during the next year.

 Al-Qa‘ida media continues to call for attacks against the United States, including in statements 

from regional al-Qa‘ida leaders, reflecting the network’s enduring efforts to pursue or inspire 

attacks in the West.

 All al-Qa‘ida affiliates are involved in insurgencies and maintain safe havens, resources, and the 

intent to strike local and regional US interests in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

 Al-Qa‘ida affiliates in East and North Africa, the Sahel, and Yemen remain the largest and 

most capable terrorist groups in their regions. All have maintained a high pace of operations 

during the past year, despite setbacks in Yemen, and some have expanded their areas of 

influence. Al-Qa‘ida elements in Syria, meanwhile, continue to undermine efforts to resolve 

that conflict, while the network’s affiliate in South Asia provides support to the Taliban.

Homegrown Violent Extremists

Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) are likely to present the most acute Sunni terrorist threat to the 

United States, and HVE activity almost certainly will have societal effects disproportionate to the casualties 

and damage it causes.

 The United States’ well-integrated Muslim population, fragmented HVE population, and high 

level of vigilance will ensure the United States remains a generally inhospitable operating 

environment for HVEs compared to many other Western countries. The isolated nature of selfradicalizing individuals, however, poses a continual challenge to law enforcement to identify 

them before they engage in violence. The frequency of attacks most likely will be very low 

compared to most other forms of criminal violence in the US, as long as US CT and law 

enforcement efforts remain constant.

 Despite territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, ISIS’s past actions and propaganda probably will 

inspire future HVE attacks, similar to the enduring influence of deceased al-Qa‘ida ideologues, 

especially if ISIS can retain its prominence among global jihadist movements and continue to 

promote its violent message via social and mainstream media.

Shia Actors

Iran

Iran almost certainly will continue to develop and maintain terrorist capabilities as an option to deter or 

retaliate against its perceived adversaries.

 In mid-2018, Belgium and Germany foiled a probable Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security (MOIS) plot to set off an explosive device at an Iranian opposition group gathering in 

Paris—an event that included prominent European and US attendees.
13

Lebanese Hizballah

During the next year, Hizballah most likely will continue to develop its terrorist capabilities, which the 

group views as a valuable tool and one it can maintain with plausible deniability.

 Hizballah most likely maintains the capability to execute a range of attack options against US 

interests worldwide.

Violent Ethno-supremacist and Ultranationalist Groups

Some violent ethno-supremacist and ultranationalist groups in Europe will employ violent tactics as they 

seek ways to cooperate against immigration and the perceived Islamization of Europe, posing a potential 

threat to US and allied interests.

 In the past two years, individuals with ties to violent ethno-supremacist groups in France, 

Sweden, and the United Kingdom have either carried out attacks on minorities and politicians 

or had their plots disrupted by authorities.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The United States faces a complex global foreign intelligence threat environment in 2019. Russia and 

China will continue to be the leading state intelligence threats to US interests, based on their services’ 

capabilities, intent, and broad operational scopes. Other states also pose persistent threats, notably Iran 

and Cuba. Geopolitical, societal, and technological changes will increase opportunities for foreign 
14

intelligence services and other entities—such as terrorists, criminals, and cyber actors—to collect on US 

activities and information to the detriment of US interests.

 Penetrating the US national decisionmaking apparatus and the Intelligence Community will 

remain a key objective for numerous foreign intelligence services and other entities. In 

addition, targeting of national security information and proprietary technology from US 

companies and research institutions will remain a sophisticated and persistent threat.

Russia

We expect that Russia’s intelligence services will

target the United States, seeking to collect 

intelligence, erode US democracy, undermine US

national policies and foreign relationships, and 

increase Moscow’s global position and influence.

China

We assess that China’s intelligence services will 

exploit the openness of American society, 

especially academia and the scientific 

community, using a variety of means.

Iran and Cuba

We assess that Iran and Cuba’s intelligence 

services will continue to target the United States, 

which they see as a primary threat. Iran 

continues to unjustly detain US citizens and 

has not been forthcoming about the case of 

former FBI agent Robert Levinson (USPER).

Nonstate Actors

We assess that nonstate actors—including hacktivist groups, transnational criminals, and terrorist 

groups—will attempt to gain access to classified information to support their objectives. They are likely to 

improve their intelligence capabilities—to include recruiting sources and performing physical and 

technical surveillance—and they will use human, technical, and cyber means to perform their illicit 

activities and avoid detection and capture.
15

EMERGING AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THREATS 

TO ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS

Strategic Outlook

For 2019 and beyond, the innovations that drive military and economic competitiveness will increasingly 

originate outside the United States, as the overall US lead in science and technology (S&T) shrinks; the 

capability gap between commercial and military technologies evaporates; and foreign actors increase their 

efforts to acquire top talent, companies, data, and intellectual property via licit and illicit means. Many 

foreign leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, view 

strong indigenous science and technology capabilities as key to their country’s sovereignty, 

economic outlook, and national power.

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy

The global race to develop artificial intelligence (AI)—systems that imitate aspects of human cognition—is 

likely to accelerate the development of highly capable, application-specific AI systems with national security 

implications. As academia, major companies, and large government programs continue to develop 

and deploy AI capabilities, AI-enhanced systems are likely to be trusted with increasing levels of 

autonomy and decisionmaking, presenting the world with a host of economic, military, ethical, and 
16

privacy challenges. Furthermore, interactions between multiple advanced AI systems could lead to 

unexpected outcomes that increase the risk of economic miscalculation or battlefield surprise.

Information and Communications

Foreign production and adoption of advanced communication technologies, such as fifth-generation (5G) 

wireless networks, most likely will challenge US competitiveness and data security, while advances in 

quantum computing foreshadow challenges to current methods of protecting data and transactions. US 

data will increasingly flow across foreign-produced equipment and foreign-controlled networks, 

raising the risk of foreign access and denial of service. Foreign deployment of a large-scale quantum 

computer, even 10 or more years in the future, would put sensitive information encrypted with 

today’s most widely used algorithms at greatly increased risk of decryption.

Biotechnology

Rapid advances in biotechnology, including gene editing, synthetic biology, and neuroscience, are likely to 

present new economic, military, ethical, and regulatory challenges worldwide as governments struggle to 

keep pace. These technologies hold great promise for advances in precision medicine, agriculture, 

and manufacturing, but they also introduce risks, such as the potential for adversaries to develop 

novel biological warfare agents, threaten food security, and enhance or degrade human 

performance.

Materials and Manufacturing

A global resurgence in materials science and manufacturing technology is likely to enable advanced states 

to create materials with novel properties and engineer structures not previously possible, while placing highend manufacturing capabilities within reach of small groups and individuals. These developments are 

already supplementing or displacing traditional methods in most areas of manufacturing, from 

complex rocket-engine components to plastic desktop-printed toys, and they are enabling the 

development of a new generation of engineered materials that combine different materials in 

complex geometries to alter the overall material properties.

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE

We assess that commercial space services will continue to expand; countries—including US adversaries and 

strategic competitors—will become more reliant on space services for civil and military needs, and China 

and Russia will field new counterspace weapons intended to target US and allied space capabilities.

Evolving, Accessible Space Capabilities

We continue to assess that the expansion of the global space industry will further extend space-enabled 

capabilities and space situational awareness to government, nonstate, and commercial actors in the next 

several years. All actors will increasingly have access to space-derived information services, such as 

imagery; weather; communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).
17

 Global access to space services has 

expanded for civil, commercial, 

intelligence, and military purposes, in part

because of technological innovation, 

private-sector investment, international 

partnerships, and demand from emerging 

markets.

Adversary Use of Space

We expect foreign governments will continue efforts 

to expand their use of space-based reconnaissance, 

communications, and navigation systems—

including by increasing the number of satellites, 

quality of capabilities, and applications for use. 

China and Russia are seeking to expand the full 

spectrum of their space capabilities, as 

exemplified by China’s launch of its highestresolution imagery satellite, Gaofen-11, in July 

2018.

Space Warfare and Counterspace Weapons

We assess that China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new 

antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold US and allied space services at risk, even as they push for 

international agreements on the nonweaponization of space.

 Both countries recognize the world’s growing reliance on space and view the capability to 

attack space services as a part of their broader efforts to deter an adversary from or defeat one in 

combat.

 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has an operational ground-based ASAT missile intended 

to target low-Earth-orbit satellites, and China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT 

weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.

 Russia is developing a similar ground-launched ASAT missile system for targeting low-Earth 

orbit that is likely to be operational within the next several years. It has fielded a ground-based 

laser weapon, probably intended to blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors, such 

as those used for remote sensing.

 China’s and Russia’s proposals for international agreements on the nonweaponization of space 

do not cover multiple issues connected to the ASAT weapons they are developing and 

deploying, which has allowed them to pursue space warfare capabilities while maintaining the 

position that space must remain weapons free.
18

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Global transnational criminal organizations and networks will threaten US interests and allies by 

trafficking drugs, exerting malign influence in weak states, threatening critical infrastructure, orchestrating 

human trafficking, and undermining legitimate economic activity.

Drug Trafficking

The foreign drug threat will pose continued risks to 

US public health and safety and will present a 

range of threats to US national security interests in 

the coming year. Violent Mexican traffickers, 

such as members of the Sinaloa Cartel and New 

Generation Jalisco Cartel, remain key to the 

movement of illicit drugs to the United States, 

including heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, 

and cannabis from Mexico, as well as cocaine 

from Colombia. Chinese synthetic drug 

suppliers dominate US-bound movements of socalled designer drugs, including synthetic 

marijuana, and probably ship the majority of 

US fentanyl, when adjusted for purity.

 Approximately 70,000 Americans died 

from drug overdoses in 2017, a record high 

and a 10-percent increase from 2016, 

although the rate of growth probably 

slowed in early 2018, based on Centers for 

Disease Control (CDC) data.

 Increased drug fatalities are largely a consequence of surging production of the synthetic opioid 

fentanyl; in 2017, more than 28,000 Americans died from synthetic opioids other than 

methadone, including illicitly manufactured fentanyl. The CDC reports synthetic opioidrelated deaths rose 846 percent between 2010 and 2017, while DHS reports that US seizures of 

the drug increased 313 percent from 2016 to 2017.

Other Organized Crime Activities

Transnational criminal organizations and their affiliates are likely to expand their influence over some 

weak states, collaborate with US adversaries, and possibly threaten critical infrastructure.

 Mexican criminals use bribery, intimidation, and violence to protect their drug trafficking, 

kidnapping-for-ransom, fuel-theft, gunrunning, extortion, and alien-smuggling enterprises.

 Gangs based in Central America, such as MS-13, continue to direct some criminal activities 

beyond the region, including in the United States.
19

Transnational organized crime almost certainly will continue to inflict human suffering, deplete natural 

resources, degrade fragile ecosystems, drive migration, and drain income from the productive—and 

taxable—economy.

 Human trafficking generates an estimated $150 billion annually for illicit actors and 

governments that engage in forced labor, according to the UN’s International Labor 

Organization.

 Wildlife poaching and trafficking; illegal, unregulated, unlicensed fishing; illicit mining; timber 

pilfering; and drug-crop cultivation harm biodiversity, as well as the security of the food supply, 

water quality and availability, and animal and human health.

 One think tank study estimates that cybercrime, often facilitated by cryptocurrencies, and 

intellectual property theft resulted in $600 million in losses in 2017; such crimes threaten 

privacy, harm economic safety, and sap intellectual capital.

ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

Global growth—projected by the IMF to remain 

steady in 2019—faces downside risks as global 

trade tensions persist, many countries contend 

with high debt levels, and geopolitical tensions 

continue. Average real growth in advanced 

economies, operating at close to full 

capacity, is projected by the IMF to slow in 

2019, while emerging markets, key US 

trading partners, and China’s growth face 

headwinds.

Emerging Markets

Uncertainty about global economic growth will 

challenge emerging markets—such as 

Argentina, Brazil, China, Mexico, South 

Africa, and Turkey—and especially those with 

weak fundamentals, heavy foreign financing, or 

close trade linkages with advanced economies. 

Commodity exporters will remain particularly 

vulnerable to downward pressure on prices from 

dampened demand.

 Since early 2018, investors have pulled capital out of Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey, 

among others, exacerbating large currency depreciations in those countries and making it more 

difficult for them to service their US-dollar-denominated debt during the next year.

 Austerity measures imposed by countries to offset budget deficits could prove to be politically 

difficult to maintain, leading to risks of destabilizing protests, such as occurred in July 2018,

when Haiti attempted to comply with an IMF program by reducing fuel subsidies and set off 
20

nationwide protests that forced the Prime Minister and his cabinet to resign. Argentina has 

agreed to IMF recommendations for austerity, reducing the risk to investors, and Turkey is 

pursuing its own austerity measures.

Key US Trading Partners

Among major US trading partners the outlook is mixed, with progress being made on US-Canada-Mexico 

trade discussions but US-China trade frictions and Brexit posing risks to European growth and US-EU 

trade.

 Mexico and Canada, whose economic prospects are tied closely to the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA), remain concerned about steel and aluminum tariffs and may 

delay ratifying the USMCA until those concerns are addressed.

 US-EU trade, valued at $1.2 trillion in 2017, would almost certainly suffer disruptions from a 

no-deal Brexit, which would further dampen UK—and to a lesser extent EU—economic 

growth. Uncertainty stemming from London’s pending exit from the EU is already hurting UK 

economic growth and the strength of the pound sterling.

 Financial conditions and economic performance generally remain favorable in both Japan and 

South Korea. However, both countries' economies are dependent on exports, which puts them 

at continued risk of downward pressure from China's economic slowdown.

China’s Economy

China’s economic growth is likely to slow in 2019, and a worse-than-expected slowdown could exacerbate 

trade and budget pressures in emerging-market countries and key commodity exporters, who rely on 

Chinese demand.

 Since 2017, Beijing has been largely focused on stemming risks in China’s financial system, 

reducing bank credit growth to the lowest rate in a decade, while trying to bolster growth by 

cutting taxes, calling on banks to lend to private firms, and requiring local governments to plan 

measures to sustain employment.

 US-China trade tensions had not significantly affected China’s total exports as of late 2018, but 

firms in China have reported a slowdown in new export orders, suggesting China’s export 

sector will suffer in 2019. Some multinational companies are wary of bilateral tensions and 

have begun to move production to other countries, especially in Southeast Asia, for lowervalue-added goods.

Energy and Commodities

Slower economic growth combined with a rising US dollar could lower demand for energy and other 

commodities, hurting exporters. However, low global spare capacity or a supply disruption might still put 

upward pressure on oil prices in the coming year, which would further slow overall global economic growth.

 As of December 2018, the US Energy Information Administration forecast that 2019 oil prices 

would decline 17 percent and 15 percent for West Texas Intermediate and Brent, respectively.

Prices for other key commodities declined in 2018. Food prices decreased 6.4 percent in 2018, 
21

and metals prices decreased 11.7 percent, according to the IMF’s primary commodities index,

reflecting tariffs, sanctions on the Russian company Rusal, and increasing uncertainty about

trade policy.

 Production challenges in some oil-exporting countries—notably Libya, Nigeria, and 

Venezuela—as well as export losses from Iran, would the limit benefits of increased oil prices to 

those countries. Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf oil exporters, and Russia could enjoy 

increased revenues, but they might also backtrack on the economic reforms they began during 

periods of lower oil prices.

 In the past year, strong demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in China and India, as well as 

higher oil prices, kept the spot price for LNG close to its highest level in three years, according 

to the IMF, despite new supplies from the United States and Australia.

HUMAN SECURITY

The United States will probably have to manage the impact of global human security challenges, such as 

threats to public health, historic levels of human displacement, assaults on religious freedom, and the 

negative effects of environmental degradation and climate change.

Global Health

We assess that the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or largescale outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely 

affect the world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on the United States for support. 

Although the international community has made tenuous improvements to global health security, 

these gains may be inadequate to address the challenge of what we anticipate will be more frequent

outbreaks of infectious diseases because of rapid unplanned urbanization, prolonged humanitarian 

crises, human incursion into previously unsettled land, expansion of international travel and trade, 

and regional climate change.

 The ongoing crisis in Venezuela has reversed gains in controlling infectious diseases, such as 

diphtheria, malaria, measles, and tuberculosis, increasing the risk that these diseases could 

spread to neighboring countries, particularly Brazil, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago. 

Similarly, the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—the country’s 

largest ever—underscores the risks posed by the nexus of infectious disease outbreaks, violent 

conflict, and high population density, including large numbers of internally displaced person 

(IDPs).

 In the past two years, progress against malaria has halted after more than 15 years of steady 

reductions, in part because mosquitos and the pathogen have developed a resistance to 

insecticides and to antimalarial drugs, respectively, while global funding to combat the disease 

has plateaued.

 The growing proximity of humans and animals has increased the risk of disease transmission. 

The number of outbreaks has increased in part because pathogens originally found in animals

have spread to human populations.
22

Human Displacement

Global displacement almost certainly will remain near record highs, and host countries are unlikely to see 

many refugees or internally displaced persons return home, increasing humanitarian needs and the risk of 

political upheaval, health crises, and recruitment and radicalization by militant groups. The number of 

people becoming displaced within their own national borders continues to increase, according to the 

United Nations, placing fiscal and political strain on governments’ ability to care for their domestic 

populations and mitigate local discontent.

Religious Freedom

Violations of religious freedom by governments and nonstate actors—particularly in the Middle East, 

China, and North Korea—will fuel the growth of violent extremist groups and lead to societal tensions, 

protests, or political turmoil.

 According to the Pew Research Center’s global indexes, the average score for government 

restrictions on religion rose 39 percent from 2007 to 2016, and the number of states with high or 

very high government restrictions grew from 40 to 55.

 Since 2017, Chinese authorities have detained hundreds of thousands and possibly millions of 

Turkic Muslim Uighurs in extrajudicial detainment centers. Beijing has also reached beyond its 

borders to pursue this campaign, including by pressuring ethnic Uighurs overseas, some of 

whom are American citizens, to return to China so it can more easily control them. Chinese 

security services have contacted Uighurs abroad and coerced them to act as informants by 

threatening to keep Xinjiang-based family members in detention.
23

Environment and Climate Change

Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition 

for resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond. Climate hazards such as 

extreme weather, higher temperatures, droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea level rise, soil 

degradation, and acidifying oceans are intensifying, threatening infrastructure, health, and water and 

food security. Irreversible damage to ecosystems and habitats will undermine the economic benefits 

they provide, worsened by air, soil, water, and marine pollution.

 Extreme weather events, many worsened by accelerating sea level rise, will particularly affect 

urban coastal areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Damage to 

communication, energy, and transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military bases, 

inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and loss of life.

 Changes in the frequency and variability of heat waves, droughts, and floods—combined with 

poor governance practices—are increasing water and food insecurity around the world, 

increasing the risk of social unrest, migration, and interstate tension in countries such as Egypt, 

Ethiopia, Iraq, and Jordan.

 Diminishing Arctic sea ice may increase competition—particularly with Russia and China—

over access to sea routes and natural resources. Nonetheless, Arctic states have maintained 

mostly positive cooperation in the region through the Arctic Council and other multilateral 

mechanisms, a trend we do not expect to change in the near term. Warmer temperatures and 

diminishing sea ice are reducing the high cost and risks of some commercial activities and are 

attracting new players to the resource-rich region. In 2018, the minimum sea ice extent in the 

Arctic was 25 percent below the 30-year average from 1980 to 2010.
24

REGIONAL THREATS

CHINA AND RUSSIA

China and Russia will present a wide variety of economic, political, counterintelligence, military, and 

diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies. We anticipate that they will collaborate to counter 

US objectives, taking advantage of rising doubts in some places about the liberal democratic model.

Chinese-Russian Relations

China and Russia are expanding cooperation with each other and through international bodies to shape 

global rules and standards to their benefit and present a counterweight to the United States and other 

Western countries.

 The two countries have significantly expanded their cooperation, especially in the energy, 

military, and technology spheres, since 2014.

 China has become the second-largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and the thirdlargest contributor to the UN regular budget. It is successfully lobbying for its nationals to 

obtain senior posts in the UN Secretariat and associated organizations, and it is using its 

influence to press the UN and member states to acquiesce in China’s preferences on issues such 

as human rights and Taiwan.

 Russia is working to consolidate the UN’s counterterrorism structures under the UN Under 

Secretary General for Counterterrorism, who is Russian.

 Both countries probably will use the UN as a platform to emphasize sovereignty narratives that 

reflect their interests and redirect discussions away from human rights, democracy, and good 

governance.

 China and Russia also have increased their sway in the International Telecommunication 

Union through key leadership appointments and financial and technical assistance. They seek 

to use the organization to gain advantage for their national industries and move toward more 

state-controlled Internet governance.

EAST ASIA

The United States will see mounting threats in Asia, including a variety of challenges from China and 

North Korea, and rising authoritarianism in the region.

China

The Chinese Communist Party’s Concentration of Power

China is deepening its authoritarian turn under President Xi Jinping, and the resulting hardening of 

Chinese politics and governance probably will make it more difficult for the leadership to recognize and 

correct policy errors, including in relations with the United States and our allies and partners.
25

 President Xi removed one of the few remaining checks on his authority when he eliminated 

presidential term limits in March 2018, and the Chinese Communist Party has reasserted 

control over the economy and society, tightened legal and media controls, marginalized 

independent voices, and intensified repression of Chinese Muslims, Christians, and other 

religious minorities.

 The Chinese Government also is harnessing technology, including facial recognition, 

biometrics, and vehicle GPS tracking, to bolster its apparatus of domestic monitoring and 

control.

 Beijing’s increasing restrictions on scholars’ and researchers’ freedom of movement and 

communication with US counterparts may increase the prospects for misunderstanding and 

misinterpretation of US policies.

Expanding Global Reach

We assess that China’s leaders will try to extend the country’s global economic, political, and military 

reach while using China’s military capabilities and overseas infrastructure and energy investments under 

the Belt and Road Initiative to diminish US influence. However, Beijing is likely to face political pushback 

from host governments in many locations, and the overall threat to US and partner interests will depend on 

the size, locations, and offensive military capabilities of the eventual Chinese presence.

 China has built its first overseas military facility in Djibouti and probably is exploring bases, 

support facilities, or access agreements in Africa, Europe, Oceania, Southeast Asia, and South 

Asia.

 In most instances, China has not secured explicit permanent basing rights but is using 

commercial development and military ties to lay the groundwork for gaining future military 

access.

 Successful implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative could facilitate PLA access to dozens 

of additional ports and airports and significantly expand China’s penetration of the economies 

and political systems of participating countries.

The Coming Ideological Battle

Chinese leaders will increasingly seek to assert China’s model of authoritarian capitalism as an 

alternative—and implicitly superior—development path abroad, exacerbating great-power competition that 

could threaten international support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

 The actions of Xi and his advisers—doubling down on authoritarianism at home and showing 

they are comfortable with authoritarian regimes abroad—along with China’s opaque 

commercial and development practices, reward compliant foreign leaders and can be corrosive 

to civil society and the rule of law.

 At the 2018 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Xi stated his desire to lead the reform of 

the global governance system, driving a period of increased Chinese foreign policy activism and 

a Chinese worldview that links China’s domestic vision to its international vision.
26

 Beijing has stepped up efforts to reshape the international discourse around human rights, 

especially within the UN system. Beijing has sought not only to block criticism of its own 

system but also to erode norms, such as the notion that the international community has a 

legitimate role in scrutinizing other countries’ behavior on human rights (e.g., initiatives to 

proscribe country-specific resolutions), and to advance narrow definitions of human rights 

based on economic standards.

South China Sea and Taiwan

We assess that China will continue increasing its maritime presence in the South China Sea and building 

military and dual-use infrastructure in the Spratly Islands to improve its ability to control access, project 

power, and undermine US influence in the area. A body of open-source reporting shows that China 

seeks to achieve effective control over its claimed waters with a whole-of-government strategy, 

compel Southeast Asian claimants to acquiesce in China’s claims—at least tacitly—and bolster 

Beijing’s narrative in the region that the United States is in decline and China’s preeminence is 

inevitable.

 Meanwhile, Beijing almost certainly will continue using pressure and incentives to try to force 

Taipei to accept the One China framework and ultimately Chinese control, and it will monitor 

the US reaction as an indicator of US resolve in the region.

 Since 2016, Beijing has persuaded six of Taiwan’s 23 diplomatic partners, most recently 

Burkina Faso and El Salvador, to recognize China instead of Taiwan.

Military Capabilities

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to develop and field advanced weapons and hardware while 

honing its ability to fight in all military domains. The force is undergoing its most comprehensive 

restructuring ever to realize China’s long-held goal of being able to conduct modern, rapid military 

operations based on high technology to assert and defend China’s regional and growing global interests.

 PLA reforms seek to reinforce the Chinese Communist Party’s control of the military, improve 

the PLA’s ability to perform joint operations, increase combat effectiveness, and curb 

corruption.

 As China’s global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization 

program has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of 

missions beyond China’s periphery, including a growing emphasis on the maritime domains, 

offensive air operations, and long-distance mobility operations.
27

North Korea

Nuclear Ambitions

Pyongyang has not conducted any nuclearcapable missile or nuclear tests in more than a 

year, has declared its support for the 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 

and has reversibly dismantled portions of its 

WMD infrastructure. However, we continue

to assess that North Korea is unlikely to give up 

all of its nuclear weapons and production 

capabilities, even as it seeks to negotiate partial 

denuclearization steps to obtain key US and 

international concessions. North Korean 

leaders view nuclear arms as critical to regime 

survival, according to official statements and 

regime-controlled media.

 In his 2019 New Year’s address, North 

Korean President Kim Jong Un pledged 

that North Korea would “go toward” 

complete denuclearization and promised 

not to make, test, use, or proliferate 

nuclear weapons. However, he 

conditioned progress on US “practical 

actions.” The regime tied the idea of 

denuclearization in the past to changes 

in diplomatic ties, economic sanctions, 

and military activities.

 In Singapore in June 2018, Kim said he sought the “complete denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula”—a formulation linked to past demands that include an end to US military 

deployments and exercises involving advanced US capabilities.

 We continue to observe activity inconsistent with full denuclearization. North Korea has 

underscored its commitment to nuclear arms for years, including through an order to massproduce weapons in 2018 and an earlier law—and constitutional change—that affirmed the 

country’s nuclear status.

Foreign Engagement

North Korea will continue its efforts to mitigate the effects of the US-led pressure campaign, most notably 

through diplomatic engagement, counterpressure against the sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion.

 Kim Jong Un has sought sanctions relief through a campaign of diplomatic engagement that 

included his first summits with foreign leaders since taking power in 2011. He met with South 

Korean President Moon Jae-in three times in 2018, leading to agreements to reconnect roads 
28

and rail lines, establish new military parameters, promote reforestation, and facilitate cultural 

exchanges.

 Kim has also sought to align the region against the US-led pressure campaign in order to gain 

incremental sanctions relief, and North Korean statements have repeatedly indicated that some 

sanctions relief is necessary for additional diplomacy to occur. In his annual New Year’s 

address, Kim linked US sanctions to diplomatic progress and threatened to resume nuclear and 

missile testing.

Sanctions Evasion

We assess that sanctions continue to pressure the North Korean regime, despite North Korean sanctions 

evasion efforts. By late 2018, the enforcement of new UN sanctions had led to a precipitous decline

in North Korea’s monthly export revenue compared with 2017, a change that also reduced imports.

 North Korea generates revenue through overseas labor, cyber-theft operations, and illicit 

commercial exports of UN Security Council-prohibited goods.

 Throughout 2018, the United States and its allies observed North Korean maritime vessels 

using at-sea, ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum from third-country tankers to acquire additional 

refined petroleum as a way to mitigate the effects of UNSC sanctions.

Conventional Military Capabilities

North Korea’s conventional capabilities continue to pose a threat to South Korea, Japan, and US forces in 

the region. As a way to offset adversary military advantages, Kim Jong Un continues to pursue 

advanced conventional weapon programs and capabilities, including more accurate artillery and 

ballistic missile strike capabilities and UAVs.

Southeast Asia and the Pacific

We expect democracy and civil liberties in many Southeast Asian countries to remain fragile and China to 

increase its engagement in the region to build its influence while diminishing the influence of the United 

States and US allies. Russia may also continue its diplomatic and military cultivation of Southeast 

Asian partners, and some countries will be receptive to Moscow as a balance against China’s push 

for hegemony.

 In the wake of Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China is 

promoting a unified stance with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 

defense of multilateralism and the WTO reform process, while also fostering a shared 

perception of US freedom of navigation operations through Chinese-claimed waters in the 

South China Sea as threats to regional stability.

 China is currying favor with numerous Pacific Island nations through bribery, infrastructure 

investments, and diplomatic engagement with local leaders while intervening in Burma—

including by shielding Burma from UNSC sanctions in response to the humanitarian crisis and 

alleged ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.
29

 Russia, too, has been increasing its diplomatic and military cultivation of Southeast Asian 

partners, some of which have been receptive to Moscow as a power capable of diluting China’s 

nascent hegemony and helping them diversify their hedging options.

 Cambodia’s slide toward autocracy, which culminated in the Cambodian People’s Party’s 

retention of power and complete dominance of the national legislature, opens the way for a 

constitutional amendment that could lead to a Chinese military presence in the country. 

Thailand’s coup-installed regime has promised elections in 2019 but appears set to help ensure 

that its proxy party retains power by tightly controlling the political space ahead of the vote. 

Burma’s civilian authorities continue to make scant progress toward resolving the crisis in 

Rakhine State, advancing economic reforms, or ending longstanding insurgencies by ethnic

minority groups.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Political turmoil, economic fragility, and civil and proxy wars are likely to characterize the Middle East 

and North Africa in the coming year, as the region undergoes a realignment of the balance of regional 

power, wealth and resource management, and the relationships among governments, nonstate political 

groups, and wider populations.

Iran

Iran’s regional ambitions and improved military capabilities almost certainly will threaten US interests in 

the coming year, driven by Tehran’s perception of increasing US, Saudi, and Israeli hostility, as well as 

continuing border insecurity, and the influence of hardliners.

Iran’s Objectives in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen 

We assess that Iran will attempt to translate battlefield gains in Iraq and Syria into long-term political, 

security, social, and economic influence while continuing to press Saudi Arabia and the UAE by supporting 

the Huthis in Yemen.

In Iraq, Iran-supported Popular Mobilization Committee-affiliated Shia militias remain the primary 

threat to US personnel, and we expect that threat to increase as the threat ISIS poses to the militias 

recedes, Iraqi Government formation concludes, some Iran-backed groups call for the United States 

to withdraw, and tension between Iran and the United States grows. We continue to watch for signs 

that the regime might direct its proxies and partners in Iraq to attack US interests.

Iran’s efforts to consolidate its influence in Syria and arm Hizballah have prompted Israeli airstrikes as 

recently as January 2019 against Iranian positions within Syria and underscore our growing concern about 

the long-term trajectory of Iranian influence in the region and the risk that conflict will escalate.

 Iran’s retaliatory missile and UAV strikes on ISIS targets in Syria following the attack on an 

Iranian military parade in Ahvaz in September were most likely intended to send a message to 

potential adversaries, showing Tehran’s resolve to retaliate when attacked and demonstrating

Iran’s improving military capabilities and ability to project force.

 Iran continues to pursue permanent military bases and economic deals in Syria and probably 

wants to maintain a network of Shia foreign fighters there despite Israeli attacks on Iranian 
30

positions in Syria. We assess that Iran seeks to avoid a major armed conflict with Israel.

However, Israeli strikes that result in Iranian casualties increase the likelihood of Iranian 

conventional retaliation against Israel, judging from Syrian-based Iranian forces’ firing of 

rockets into the Golan Heights in May 2018 following an Israeli attack the previous month on 

Iranians at Tiyas Airbase in Syria.

In Yemen, Iran’s support to the Huthis, including supplying ballistic missiles, risks escalating the conflict 

and poses a serious threat to US partners and interests in the region. Iran continues to provide support 

that enables Huthi attacks against shipping near the Bab el Mandeb Strait and land-based targets 

deep inside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, using ballistic missiles and UAVs.

Domestic Politics

Regime hardliners will be more emboldened to challenge rival centrists by undermining their domestic 

reform efforts and pushing a more confrontational posture toward the United States and its allies. Centrist 

President Hasan Ruhani has garnered praise from hardliners with his more hostile posture toward 

Washington but will still struggle to address ongoing popular discontent.

Nationwide protests, mostly focused on economic grievances, have continued to draw attention to 

the need for major economic reforms and unmet expectations for most Iranians. We expect more 

unrest in the months ahead, although the protests are likely to remain uncoordinated and lacking 

central leadership or broad support from major ethnic and political groups. We assess that Tehran is 

prepared to take more aggressive security measures in response to renewed unrest while preferring to 

use nonlethal force.

 Ruhani’s ability to reform the economy remains limited, given pervasive corruption, a weak 

banking sector, and a business climate that discourages foreign investment and trade.

Military Modernization and Behavior

Iran will continue to develop military capabilities that threaten US forces and US allies in the region. It 

also may increase harassment of US and allied warships and merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of 

Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman.

 Iran continues to develop, improve, and field a range of military capabilities that enable it to 

target US and allied military assets in the region and disrupt traffic through the Strait of 

Hormuz. These systems include ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive boats, naval mines, 

submarines and advanced torpedoes, armed and attack UAVs, antiship and land-attack cruise 

missiles, antiship ballistic missiles, and air defenses. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in 

the Middle East and can strike targets as far as 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders. Russia’s 

delivery of the SA-20c SAM system in 2016 provided Iran with its most advanced long-range 

air defense system. Iran is also domestically producing medium-range SAM systems and 

developing a long-range SAM.

 In September 2018, Iran struck Kurdish groups in Iraq and ISIS in Syria with ballistic missiles 

in response to attacks inside Iran, demonstrating the increasing precision of Iran’s missiles, as 

well as Iran’s ability to use UAVs in conjunction with ballistic missiles.
31

 We assess that unprofessional interactions conducted by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 

Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy against US ships in the Persian Gulf, which have been less 

frequent during the past year, could resume should Iran seek to project an image of strength in 

response to US pressure. Most IRGC interactions with US ships are professional, but in recent 

years the IRGC Navy has challenged US ships in the Persian Gulf and flown UAVs close to US 

aircraft carriers during flight operations. Moreover, Iranian leaders since July have threatened 

to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman continues to control the key levers of power in Saudi 

Arabia, but his simultaneous push for economic and social reform creates potential flashpoints for 

internal opposition. Saudi public support for the royal family appears to remain high, even in the 

wake of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Moreover, we assess that the Saudi Government 

remains well positioned to stifle small-scale protests and discontent; it has preemptively arrested or 

forcibly detained clerics, business leaders, and civil society activists who could be nodes for 

discontent.

The Kingdom will seek to make progress on its Vision 2030 plan of structural reforms, spearheaded 

by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and aimed at reducing dependence on oil revenues. The 

plan’s initiatives include reducing subsidies, building a robust private sector, and instituting taxes, all 

of which upend the longstanding social contract. Some of these reforms have aggravated segments 

of the Saudi public, including government workers religious conservatives.

Iraq

Iraq is facing an increasingly disenchanted public. The underlying political and economic factors that 

facilitated the rise of ISIS persist, and Iraqi Shia militias’ attempts to further entrench their role in the 

state increase the threat to US personnel.

 The Iraqi Government will confront a high level of societal discontent, institutional weakness, 

and deep-seated divisions, as well as protests over a lack of services, high unemployment, and 

political corruption. Baghdad lacks the resources or institutional capacity to address 

longstanding economic development and basic services challenges, and it faces reconstruction 

costs in the aftermath of the counter-ISIS campaign, estimated by the World Bank at $88 

billion. Iraq’s Kurdistan region is still dealing with political discontent over economic and 

territorial losses to Baghdad last year.

 ISIS remains a terrorist and insurgent threat and will seek to exploit Sunni grievances with 

Baghdad and societal instability to eventually regain Iraqi territory against Iraqi security forces 

that are stretched thin.
32

Iraqi Shia militants conducted several attacks against US diplomatic facilities in Iraq in September 

and December 2018. Militias—some of which are also part of the Iraqi Government Popular 

Mobilization Committee—plan to use newfound political power gained through positions in the 

new government to reduce or remove the US military presence while competing with the Iraqi 

security forces for state resources.

Syria

As the Syrian regime consolidates control, the country is likely to experience continued violence. We expect 

the regime to focus on taking control of the remaining rebel-held territory and reestablishing control of 

eastern Syria, consolidating gains, rebuilding regime-loyal areas, and increasing its diplomatic ties 

through 2019 while seeking to avoid conflicts with Israel and Turkey. Russia and Iran probably will 

attempt to further entrench themselves in Syria.

 The regime’s momentum, combined with continued support from Russia and Iran, almost 

certainly has given Syrian President Bashar al-Asad little incentive to make anything more than 

token concessions to the opposition or to adhere to UN resolutions on constitutional changes 

that Asad perceives would hurt his regime.

 Opposition groups, which rely on Turkey for continued support, probably are not capable of 

repelling a regime military operation to retake Idlib Province but may retain enough resources 

to foment a low-level insurgency in areas the regime recaptures in the coming year.

 The regime probably will focus increasingly on reasserting control over Kurdish-held areas. 

Damascus probably will seek to exploit any security vacuum and Turkish pressure on the Kurds 

in order to strike a favorable deal with the Kurds while also seeking to limit Turkey’s presence 

and influence in Syria and reclaim territory in northwestern Syria held by Turkey.

 The regime is unlikely to immediately focus on clearing ISIS from remote areas that do not 

threaten key military, economic, and transportation infrastructure, judging from previous 

regime counter-ISIS efforts.

 Damage to the Syrian economy and its infrastructure has reached almost $400 billion, 

according to UN estimates, and reconstruction could take at least a decade to complete. The 

effects of the Syrian civil war will continue to be felt by its neighbors, with approximately 5.6 

million Syrian refugees registered in neighboring countries as of October 2018. Russia and Iran 

will try to secure rights to postwar contracts to rebuild Syria’s battered infrastructure and 

industry in exchange for sustained military and economic support.
33

Yemen

The Huthi movement in Yemen and the Saudi-led coalition, which supports the Yemeni Government, 

remain far apart in negotiating an end to the conflict, and neither side seems prepared for the kind of 

compromise needed to end the fighting, suggesting the humanitarian crisis will continue. The coalition, 

buoyed by military gains in the past year, seems fixed on a Huthi withdrawal from Sanaa and 

significant Huthi disarmament. These terms remain unacceptable to the Huthis, who believe they 

can use external attacks to threaten Saudi Arabia and the UAE, undercut Saudi and UAE public 

support for the conflict, and draw international condemnation of the coalition’s intervention in 

Yemen.
34

 The humanitarian impacts of the conflict in Yemen—including, famine, disease, and internal 

displacement—will be acute in 2019 and could easily worsen if the coalition cuts key supply 

lines to Sanaa. The fighting has left more than 22 million people, or approximately 75 percent 

of the population, in need of assistance, with millions of people at severe risk of famine by the 

UN definition—numbers that are likely to rise quickly if disruptions to aid access continue.

Libya

Libya is poised to remain unstable into 2019, with poor prospects for reconciliation between competing 

factions and ongoing threats from ISIS-Libya. Militias aligned with Libya’s key political factions fight 

intermittently for influence and control of resources, resulting in a high-risk security environment 

that threatens both rival governments and Western interests. The UN-backed, Tripoli-based 

Government of National Accord (GNA) and eastern-based House of Representatives (House) 

remain unable to agree on key posts and government structure. ISIS-Libya’s capabilities have been 

degraded, but it is still capable of conducting attacks on local and Western targets in Libya and 

possibly elsewhere in the region.
35

SOUTH ASIA

The challenges facing South Asian states will grow in 2019 because of Afghanistan’s presidential election in 

mid-July and the Taliban’s large-scale attacks, Pakistan’s recalcitrance in dealing with militant groups, 

and Indian elections that risk communal violence.

Afghanistan Stalemate

We assess that neither the Afghan Government nor the Taliban will be able to gain a strategic military 

advantage in the Afghan war in the coming year if coalition support remains at current levels. Afghan 

forces generally have secured cities and other government strongholds, but the Taliban has increased

large-scale attacks, and Afghan security suffers from a large number of forces being tied down in 

defensive missions, mobility shortfalls, and a lack of reliable forces to hold recaptured territory.

Pakistan Recalcitrance

Militant groups supported by Pakistan will continue to take advantage of their safe haven in Pakistan to 

plan and conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan, including against US interests. Islamabad’s narrow 

approach to counterterrorism cooperation—using some groups as policy tools and confronting only 

the militant groups that directly threaten Pakistan—almost certainly will frustrate US 

counterterrorism efforts against the Taliban.

Indian Elections and Ethnic Tensions

Parliamentary elections in India increase the possibility of communal violence if Indian Prime Minister 

Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stresses Hindu nationalist themes. BJP policies during 

Modi’s first term have deepened communal tensions in some BJP-governed states, and Hindu 

nationalist state leaders might view a Hindu-nationalist campaign as a signal to incite low-level 

violence to animate their supporters. Increasing communal clashes could alienate Indian Muslims 

and allow Islamist terrorist groups in India to expand their influence.

India-Pakistan Tensions

We judge that cross-border terrorism, firing across the Line of Control (LoC), divisive national elections in 

India, and Islamabad’s perception of its position with the United States relative to India will contribute to 

strained India-Pakistan relations at least through May 2019, the deadline for the Indian election, and 

probably beyond. Despite limited confidence-building measures—such as both countries 

recommitting in May 2018 to the 2003 cease-fire along the disputed Kashmir border—continued 

terrorist attacks and cross-border firing in Kashmir have hardened each country’s position and 

reduced their political will to seek rapprochement. Political maneuvering resulting from the Indian 

national elections probably will further constrain near-term opportunities for improving ties.

India-China Tensions

We expect relations between India and China to remain tense, despite efforts on both sides to manage 

tensions since the border standoff in 2017, elevating the risk of unintentional escalation. Chinese 

President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held an informal summit in April 

2018 to defuse tension and normalize relations, but they did not address border issues. 

Misperceptions of military movements or construction might result in tensions escalating into armed 

conflict.
36

RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Russian President Vladimir Putin has the tools to navigate challenges to his rule, and he is likely to sustain 

an assertive, opportunistic foreign policy to advance Russia’s interests beyond its borders and contest US 

influence.

Russia’s Domestic Politics

The Russian economy’s slow growth and most Russians’ disapproval of government officials’ performance 

will foster a more challenging political environment for the Kremlin, although its centralized power 

structure and the resonance of anti-American themes will buoy Putin, sustaining his push for international 

stature and challenging US global leadership.

We assess that slow growth and depressed 

wages are eroding the higher living standards 

that many Russians once saw as Putin’s 

greatest accomplishment, and corruption is a 

major issue that Putin cannot attack because 

his political system rests on it. Following his 

support for an unpopular pension reform in 

2018, Putin’s public approval fell to levels not 

seen since before Russia’s illegal annexation of 

Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless, the Kremlin 

can rely on its traditional instruments of 

persuasion to navigate challenges to Putin’s 

control—including the media and the 

distribution of financial benefits—and it can 

turn to its security services to impede protests, 

crack down on the opposition, and intimidate 

elites.

Although we judge that Putin and other elites would like to see cooperation with the United States 

where US and Russian interests overlap, they view publicly blaming the United States for internal 

challenges as good politics. Moscow believes it can weather the impact of sanctions, and we expect 

Putin to remain active on the international stage because the public narrative that he has restored 

Russia’s great-power status remains a pillar of his domestic support.
37

Global Ambitions

Russia’s efforts to expand its global military, 

commercial, and energy footprint and build 

partnerships with US allies and adversaries 

alike are likely to pose increasing challenges. 

Moscow will continue to emphasize its strategic 

relationship with Beijing, while also pursuing a 

higher profile in the Middle East, Southeast 

Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

We assess that Moscow will continue 

pursuing a range of objectives to expand its 

reach, including undermining the US-led 

liberal international order, dividing Western 

political and security institutions, 

demonstrating Russia’s ability to shape 

global issues, and bolstering Putin’s 

domestic legitimacy. Russia seeks to 

capitalize on perceptions of US 

retrenchment and power vacuums, which it 

views the United States is unwilling or 

unable to fill, by pursuing relatively low-cost 

options, including influence campaigns, 

cyber tools, and limited military 

interventions.

 We assess that Moscow has heightened confidence, based on its success in helping restore 

the Asad regime’s territorial control in Syria, but translating what have largely been military 

wins into a workable settlement in Syria will be one of Moscow’s key challenges in the years 

ahead. 

 Russia seeks to boost its military presence and political influence in the Mediterranean and 

Red Seas, increase its arms sales, expand information operations in Europe, and mediate 

conflicts, including engaging in the Middle East Peace Process and Afghanistan 

reconciliation.

Military Capabilities

Moscow views military force as key to safeguarding its vital interests and supporting its foreign policy; it is 

becoming more modernized and capable across all military domains and maintains the world’s largest 

operational nuclear stockpile.

 After decades of increased spending to support modernization, Russia’s defense budget is 

decreasing to about 3.8 percent of GDP in 2019, from a peak of about 5.4 percent in 2016. 

Because of momentum in military acquisitions, we judge that the budget is normalizing to prepeak spending levels.
38

 In 2019, we assess that Russia will continue to modernize the entire military but particularly 

will make progress in its air defense, submarine, and electronic warfare capabilities.

Russia and Its Neighbors

The Kremlin will seek to maintain and, where possible, expand its influence throughout the former Soviet 

Union countries, which it asserts are within its sphere of influence.

We assess that a major offensive by either Ukraine or Russian proxy forces is operationally feasible 

but unlikely in 2019, unless one side perceives the other is seriously challenging the status quo. 

Bilateral tensions will continue to rise in the Black and Azov Seas as each side asserts its sovereignty 

and naval capabilities. Russia will continue its military, political, and economic destabilization 

campaign against Ukraine to try to stymie Kyiv’s efforts to integrate with the EU and strengthen ties 

to NATO. Russia’s interception of Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait and detention of the ships’ 

sailors in November 2018 demonstrates Russia’s willingness to limit Ukrainian freedom of 

navigation in the area and exert political pressure on the country’s leadership, particularly in 

advance of Ukraine’s elections this year.

 Ukraine will hold a presidential election in March 2019 and legislative elections in the fall. The 

large field of presidential candidates, high levels of distrust in political elites, and lack of a clear 

frontrunner may provide Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s rivals, as well as lesser

known candidates and political newcomers, an opportunity to appeal to the largely undecided 

Ukrainian electorate.

 Russia is taking steps to influence these elections, applying a range of tools to exert influence 

and exploit Kyiv’s fragile economy, widespread corruption, cyber vulnerabilities, and public 

discontent in hopes of ousting Poroshenko and bringing to power a less anti-Russia parliament.

The ruling coalition of Moldova, Ukaraine’s neighbor, is focused on maintaining power in the 

legislative election planned for February 2019 and probably will seek to limit Russian influence and 

preserve a veneer of commitment to EU integration.

Tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains a potential 

source for a large-scale military conflict that might draw in Russia.

Russia will continue pressing Central Asia’s leaders to support Russian-led economic and security 

initiatives and reduce engagement with Washington. At the same time, China probably will 

continue to expand its outreach to Central Asia, largely to promote economic initiatives because of 

Beijing’s concern that regional instability could undermine China’s economic interests and create a 

permissive environment for extremists. Uzbekistan’s political opening under President Shavkat 

Mirziyoyev will improve prospects for intraregional cooperation, but poor governance and 

vulnerable economics will raise the risk of radicalization.

EUROPE

The United Kingdom’s scheduled exit from the EU on 29 March 2019, European Parliament elections in 

late May, and the subsequent turnover in EU institutional leadership will limit the ability of EU and 
39

national leaders to contend with increased Russian and Chinese efforts to divide them from one another and 

from the United States.

 If the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU takes place as scheduled, it would remove one of the 

institution’s key voices for strong sanctions policy toward Russia and market liberalism, as well 

as one of its most capable foreign and security policy actors.

 Russia and China are likely to intensify efforts to build influence in Europe at the expense of 

US interests, benefiting from the economic fragility of some countries, transatlantic 

disagreements, and a probable strong showing by anti-establishment parties in the European 

Parliament elections in late May 2019. Some member states favor a softening of Russian 

sanctions and probably will resist efforts to tighten investment screening.

Turkey

Turkey’s regional ambitions, a distrust of the United 

States, and the growing authoritarianism of 

Turkey’s leaders are complicating bilateral relations 

and making Ankara more willing to challenge US 

regional goals. Turkey will continue to view as 

existential threats the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 

(PKK), including its People’s Protection Units 

(YPG) militia in Syria, and the movement led by 

Fethullah Gulen (USPER), a former AKP ally 

who Turkish leaders claim is responsible for the 

failed coup of 2016.

Balkans

The Western Balkans almost certainly will 

remain at some risk of low-level violence and 

possibly open military conflict throughout 2019. 

Russia will seek to exploit ethnic tensions and 

high levels of corruption to hinder the ability of 

countries in this region to move toward the EU and NATO.

AFRICA

Several countries and regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to face significant security, 

counterterrorism, democratization, economic, and humanitarian challenges. Recent political unrest in 

countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan highlight the ongoing challenges facing many governments across 

the continent. African countries’ outreach and cooperation with external actors—such as China and 

Russia—will increase this year.

The Sahel

Countries in the Sahel—particularly Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—almost certainly 

will be vulnerable to an increase in terrorist attacks in 2019 as they struggle to contain terrorist groups and 

improve governance and security. Al-Qa‘ida-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) 
40

and its extremist allies present a growing threat, with attacks increasing during the past year. 

Implementation of Mali’s peace accord—an essential step for extending governance into terrorist 

safe havens in northern and central Mali—probably will be difficult because remaining steps are 

politically and financially sensitive.

Nigeria

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the largest economy, probably will face a contentious 

presidential election in February 2019 and sustained attacks from Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa 

(ISIS-WA). Abuja is also facing continued violence in the politically sensitive Middle Belt region. .

Sudan and South Sudan

Violence and the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan are likely to persist this year, while Sudan probably 

wants to improve relations with the United States but will continue reaching out to other partners to boost 

its economy. In South Sudan, the peace agreement signed between the government and opposition 

groups in September 2017 faces delays and implementation difficulties. Acute food insecurity and 

constraints on aid access—resulting from poor infrastructure, seasonal rains, active hostilities, and 

government- and opposition-imposed impediments—are likely to contribute to an ongoing

humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile, Khartoum, despite facing antigovernment protests over its poor 

economic situation, is committed to pursuing efforts to improve its relationship with the United 

States and wants to be removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Sudan also will 

strengthen ties to other partners—including Russia and Turkey—in an effort to diversify its 

partnerships and improve its economic situation.

Horn of Africa

The states of East Africa will confront internal tension and a continuing threat from al-Shabaab, despite 

improved intergovernmental relations and Ethiopian-Eritrean rapprochement. Elite competition, 

corruption, and poor coordination among security services in Somalia will hamper efforts to tamp 

down violence. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is unlikely to engage in 

aggressive offensive operations against al-Shabaab in advance of the mission’s scheduled withdrawal 

from Somalia by 2021. Ethiopia and Eritrea will struggle to balance political control with demands 

for reform from domestic constituencies.

Central Africa

Political unrest across Central Africa is likely to persist through 2019, compounding humanitarian 

challenges and armed conflict. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is recovering from its

contentious presidential election in December 2018, as well as dealing with an ongoing Ebola 

outbreak and internal displacement crisis. Meanwhile, violence among armed groups in several 

regions of the DRC threatens regional and national stability, and violence in eastern DRC impedes 

efforts to respond to the Ebola outbreak. The Central African Republic (CAR) is struggling to make 

progress toward a peace agreement between the government and multiple armed groups.

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Flagging economies, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and anti-US autocrats will present 

continuing challenges to US interests, as US adversaries and strategic competitors seek greater influence in 

the region. The hemisphere will see several presidential elections this year, including in Argentina, 
41

Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Uruguay, providing opportunities for outside 

candidates to exploit public frustration with stagnant economic growth, high crime, and corruption.

China and Russia will pursue efforts to gain economic and security influence in the region.

Mexico

Newly inaugurated Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador almost certainly will focus on 

meeting steep public expectations for improvements on anticorruption and security following his landslide 

electoral victory in July. He is likely to pursue mostly practical approaches to US cooperation that 

complement his ambitious domestic agenda. Lopez Obrador has promised to reduce violence, in 

part by addressing socioeconomic causes, but he has publicly conceded that Mexico’s military must 

keep up its public security role in the near term, despite his initial preference to end it. Lopez 

Obrador has supported the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade deal, probably hoping 

to reduce trade-related uncertainty, allowing him to focus on his domestic economic agenda.

However, Mexico’s $1.15 trillion economy remains vulnerable to investor uncertainty that could 

weaken the export sector and slow economic growth, which was just 2 percent in 2017. Declining 

oil revenue will limit the Mexican Government’s ability to fund Lopez Obrador’s ambitious social 

programs and infrastructure projects.

Central America

We assess that high crime rates and weak job markets will spur additional US-bound migrants from the 

Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—while a political crackdown in Nicaragua 

dims that country’s already bleak economic outlook. Illicit migration northward from the region shows 

no signs of abating, despite increased messaging by governments to dissuade potential migrants and 

stepped-up immigration enforcement by Mexico. Many migrants apparently perceive that traveling 

in caravans on the journey north affords a certain level of security, and the decision to do so appears 

to result from a combination of individual motivation, encouragement from social media postings, 

and politically motivated efforts by some individuals and organizations.

 Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s refusal to heed calls for negotiation amid his political 

crackdown, which has left more than 300 people dead and contributed to allegations of human 

rights abuses, threatens to deepen a recession in one of the region’s weakest economies.
42

Venezuela

Although the regime of Nicolas Maduro will 

continue to try to maintain power, he is facing 

persistent opposition. Falling oil production, 

economic mismanagement, and legal challenges 

almost certainly will compound the worsening 

economic pressure on the country. Living 

standards have collapsed, and hyperinflation and 

shortages in basic goods have gripped the 

country. Since 2014, the UN International 

Organization for Migration estimates that 2-3 

million Venezuelans have left the country. 

Maduro continues to crack down on the political 

and military opposition after a failed 

assassination attempt against him in August 

2018 and disrupted coup plots in the past 12 

months, but the opposition has shown resilience,

as indicated by its challenge to Maduro’s rule 

emerging in late January 2019.

Colombia

Colombian President Ivan Duque faces a fraying 

peace accord with the former Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (FARC) while he is working to 

stem violence in Colombia’s rural departments, 

carry out his coca eradication ambitions, and 

manage growing tensions with Caracas. Duque has 

ordered increased security operations to curb common crime, threats from Colombia’s insurgent and 

criminal groups, and address coca cultivation and trafficking. Coca cultivation in Colombia was at a 

record 209,000 hectares in 2017, and crop substitution and eradication programs face coordination 

challenges and local resistance.

Cuba

Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel will adhere to former President Raul Castro’s blueprint for

institutionalizing one-party rule and socialism in Cuba through constitutional reforms. Diaz-Canel has 

acknowledged that Raul Castro, who still commands the ruling Communist Party, remains the 

dominant voice on public policy.