MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 103 Docket: Kno

- 17

- 51 Argued : March	6,	201 8 Decided: July 24 ,	2018 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR , and HUMPHREY, JJ.

CHARLES	M.	MARTIN

v. DEPARTMENT	OF	CORRECTIONS
JABAR ,	J. [¶1] This	case	calls	for	us	to consider w hether in	Maine ,	pursuant	to	the “prisoner	 mailbox	 r ule,” a	 pro	 se prisoner’s civil	 petition for	 review	 of a decision by	 the	 Department	 of	 Corrections should	 be deemed “filed” on	 the date it	 is	 delivered	 to prison	 officials to	 be	 forwarded	 to	 the	 clerk	 of	 court rather	 than the	date it	is	received	by	 the	clerk	of	court.		We	conclude	 that in
circumstances where,	 as	 here, (1) a	 prisoner	 is	 forced	 to	 rely	 on	 the Department	of	Corrections to	ensure	 that	his Rule	80C	petition

— challenging the	Department’s	administrative action against	him

— is filed ;	(2) that prisoner places	 the	 petition	 into	 the	 “control”	 of	 the	 Department;	 and (3) the Department fails	 to	 timely	del iver his petition to	 the	clerk	of	court, the open
courts provision and	due	process	clause of the	Maine	Constitution	require that2 the	 prisoner	 mailbox	 r ule	 apply	 and	 the	 petition	 be	 deemed	 timely	 filed. Accordingly,	we vacate	the	judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	 following	 facts	 are	 undisputed

. See Ewing	 v.	Me.	Dist.	 Court , 2009	ME	16,	¶	3 & n.2,	964	A.2d	644

. On	May	16,	2016, Charles	M. Martin,	a prisoner	incarcerated	at	the	Maine	State	Prison,	signed	a	petition	pur suant	to 5	M.R.S.	§	11002 (2017)	 for	judicial	review	of	a	Department	decision	 finding that	he	had	committed	a	 disciplinary	infraction. Two	days	later, on	May	18, 2016, he	 submitted	 that	 petition	 to	 prison	 authorities	 for forwarding	 to	 the Superior	Court .		However,	the	clerk	of	court	did	not	receive	the	petition	until May	26,	2016. [¶ 3 ] After	accepting	service	of	the	petition,	the	State	moved	to	dismiss
it for	 failure	 to	 state	 a	 claim	 upon	 which	 relief	 may	 be	 granted. See M.R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accor ding	 to	 the	 State ,	 because	 Martin ’s	 petition did	 not specify	 “ any	 date	 related	 to	 the	 action	 being	 challenged,”	 he	 failed	 to	 “make the	factual	allegations	necessary”	to	show	that	he	filed	the	petition	within	the thirty

- day	period prescribed by 5	M.R.S.	§	1 1002 (3) .		Martin responded	with a motion	to	amend	the	petition, a supporting	affidavit ,	and a proposed	amended petition specifying that	 he	 was	 notified	 of	 the	 Department decision	 on3 April 25,	 2016. The	 Superior	 Court	 ( Knox County, Stokes,	 J. ) granted	 that
motion. 1 [¶ 4 ] Consequently,	 the	State	 filed	a	second	motion	 to	dismiss, arguing that	because	 the	clerk	of	court	received	Martin’s	petition	on	May	26,	2016

— thirty

- one	 days	 after	 Martin	 was	 notified	 of	 the	 Department’s	 decision	 and therefore	 one	 day	 outs ide	 the	 thirty

- day	 statutory	 window

— the	 Superior Court	lacked	jurisdiction	 over	 the	 matter. See M.R.	 Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Martin opposed	the	State’s	motion	to	dismiss,	submitting	an	affidavit	averring	that	he signed	 the	 petition	 on	May	 16,	 2016,	 and that	 he gave	 the	 petition	 to	 a	 unit sergeant	 to	mail	 on	May	18,	2016. Citing	 the United	States Supreme	Court’s decision	in Houston	 v.	 Lack ,	 487	U.S.	 266	 (1988) ,	 Martin urged	 the	 Superior Court	to	apply	the “ p risoner mailbox	r ule, ” whereby	the court	would	consider his	 petition	 filed on	 the	 date he	 deposited	 it	 with prison	 officials for forwarding	to	the	clerk	of	court , May	18,	rather	than	when	it	was	received by the	clerk	of	court , May	26. [¶ 5 ] The	 court	 granted	 the	 State’s	motion	 to	 dismiss,	 concluding	 that the	 thirty

- day	 time	 limit pursuant	 to	 section	 11002(3) is “jurisdictional	 and mandatory”	and	that	“Maine	has	not	yet	adopted	the	so

- called	federal	mailbox

1 The	court	did	not	explicitly	rule	on	the	State’s	motion	to	dismiss.		However, we	infer	that the court	did	so	by	granting	Martin’s	motion	to	amend.4 rule.”		Martin	 then	 filed	a M.R.	Civ .	P.	60(b) motion	 for	 relief	 from	judgment, which	the	court	denied. This	appeal	followed. See 5	M.R.S.	§	11008(1) (2017); M.R.	App.	P.	2(b)(3) (Tower	2016)

. 2
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 6 ] Citing Houston	 v.	 Lack , Martin	 argues	 that the court’s	 failure to apply	the	prisoner	mailbox	r ule violated	his constitutional	right	to	meaningful access	 to	 the judicial	 process because he “had no	 opportunity	 to	 bypass	 the prison	 personnel	 and	 ensure	 that	 his	 petition	was	 mail ed	in	 a	more	 reliable fashion.”		According to Martin,	his	“only	option,	beyond	breaking	out	of	jail	to hand	 deliver	 the	 package	 himself,	 was	 to	 give	 his	 mail	 to	 the	 prison authorities,	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 very	 agency	 against	 whom	 he	 was seeking	 an	 appeal.” In	 response,	 the	 State	 contends t hat	 Martin	 was	 not denied	 access	 to	 the	 courts because even accounting	 for the	 jail’s	 delay	 in delivering	his	petition	for	review	to	the	court,	he	was	still provided the	“ample time”	of	23	days	to prepare	his	petition	and	ensure	that	it	was timely received. [¶ 7 ]		We	 review	de	novo	a	court’s	denial	 of	a	motion	pursuant	 to	M.R. Civ.	P.	60(b)(4) 3 to	set	aside	a	judgment	because	of	a constitutional violation.
See Reliable	Copy	Serv. ,	Inc. v.	Liberty ,	2011	ME	127,	¶	8,	32	A.3d	1041

.

2 The	restyled	Maine	Rules	of	Appellate	Procedure	do	not	apply	because	this	appeal	was	 filed before	Septem ber	1,	2017. See M.R.	App.	P.	1	(restyled	Rules).5 A. Statutory Provisions [¶ 8 ]	 	 The	 Administrative	 Procedure	 Act (APA) and	 the	Maine	 Rules	 of Civil	Procedure	govern	the	commencement	of	an	appeal	from	a	state	agency’s 4 decision. See 5	 M.R.S.	 §§	 11001

- 11008 (20 17);	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80C(b). Rule 80C (b)	provides,	“The time within	which	a	review	of final	agency	action or	the	failure	or	refusal	of	an	agency	to	act	may	be	sought	shall	be as provi ded by	 5	 M.R.S.A.	 §	 11002(3).”	 	 S ection	 11002(3)	 of	 the	 APA	 provides,	 “The petition	for	review	shall	be	filed	within	30	days	after	rec eipt	of	notice	if	taken by	 a	 party	 to the proceeding of which	 review	is	 sought.” Although	 t he	 APA does	 not	 define	 the	 term	 “filed, ” section	 11002(1)	 specifies	 that	 the	 petition for	review	must	be	filed	“in	the	Superior Court.”		5	M.R.S.	§	11002(1).
B. Houston	v.	Lack [¶ 9 ] In Houston	 v.	 Lack , the	 Supreme	 Court articulated	 the	 unique obstacles facing pro	se	prisoners in exercising their	right	to	access	the	courts.
487	 U.S.	 at	 270

- 71. There, the	 Court considered	 whether a prisoner’s civil appeal	 was	 tim ely	 filed	 where	 it	 was	 delivered	 to	 prison	 authori ties	 three

3 Although	Martin	specified	M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(b)(1)	and	M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(b)(6)	as	the	grounds	for the motion,	his	argument

— that	“[i]t	was	a	mistake	 to	believe	 that	 I	could	c ount	on	 the	respondent[s]

. . . to take	 responsible	 and	 prompt	 action , in	 regards	 to	 the	 actual	 mailing	 of	 the	 petition	 for review”

— can	reasonably	be	read	as	a	contention	that	the	Department	violated	his	right	of	access	to the	courts	by	failing	to	deliver	his	petition	to	the	clerk	of	court in	a	timely	manner.

4 As	used	here,	“agency”	includes	the	Department	of	Corrections. 5	M.R.S.	§	8002 (2) (2017)

.6 days before	 the	 expiration	 of the thirty

- day filing period established by Federal	Rule	of	Appellate	Procedure	4(a)(1), 5 but was received	by	the	clerk of court	one	day	after	the filing	period	expired. Houston ,	487	U.S.	at 268

- 69.		The Court	concluded	that for	purposes	of then Rule	4(a)(1), the petitioner’s appeal was	filed at	the	moment	it	was	delivered	to	prison	authorities,	and	the	Court’s reasoning in so creating	 this	 prisoner m ailbox	 r ule warrants	 quotation	 at some	length

— The	 situation	 of	 prisoners	 seeking	 to	 appeal	 without	 the	 aid	 of counsel	 is	 unique.	 	 Such	 prisoners	 cannot	 take	 the	 steps	 other litigants	 can	 take	 to	 monitor	 the	 processing	 of	 their	 notices	 of appeal	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 court	 clerk	 receives	 and	 stamps th eir	 notices	 of	 appeal	 before	 the	 30

- day	 deadline.	 	Unlike	 other litigants, pro	 se prisoners	 cannot	 personally	 travel	 to	 the courthouse	to	see that the	notice	is	stamped	“filed”	or	to	establish the	 date	 on	 which	 the	 court	 received	 the	 notice.	 	 Other	 litigan ts may	choose	to	entrust	their	appeals	to	the	vagaries	of	the	mail	and the	clerk’s	process	for s tamping	incoming	papers,	but	only	the pro se prisoner	is	for ced	to	do	so	by	his	situation.	.	.	.		Worse,	the pro se prisoner	 has	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 entrust	 the	 fo rwarding	 of	 his notice	of	appeal	 to	prison	authorities	whom	he	cannot	control	or supervise	and who may	have	every	incentive	to	delay.		No	matter how	 far	in	 advance	 the pro	 se prisoner	 delivers	his	notice	 to	 the

5 When	the	Supreme	Court decided Houston	v.	Lack ,	Federal Rule	of	Appellate	Procedure	4(a)(1) provided, In	a	civil	case	in	which	an	appeal is	permitted	by	law	as	of	right	from	a	district	court to	a	court	of	appeals	the	notice	of	appeal	required	by Rule 3 shall	be	 filed	with	the clerk	of	 the	district	court	within	30	days	after	 the	date	of	entry	of	 the	judgment	or order	appealed	from	.	.	.	.
F ed.	R.	App.	P. 4(a)(1) (1992)	(amended	1993).7 prison	authorities,	he	can	never	be sure that it	will	ultimately	get stamped	“filed”	on	time.
Id. at 270

- 71. [¶1 0 ] Because Houston	v.	Lack involved	 the	interpretation	of a	 federal rule of	 procedure and did	 not	 invoke	 the United	 States	 Constitution, the Supreme	Court’s	decision is not	binding	on	the	states. See	State	ex	rel.	Tyler	v. Alexander ,	 555	 N.E.2d	 966,	 967	 (Ohio	 1990). However,	 s ince Houston ,

numerous states	have	addressed	the	issue

— twenty
- two	states	have	adopted a variation	of the	prisoner	mailbox	r ule	through	court decision, 6 and	two	states have	 adopted	 the	 Rule	 through state rule s	 of	 procedure

. 7 Although many
states ,	 following Houston ’s	 example , have	 adopted	 the	 Rule	 by	 interpreting

state statutes	 and/or	 court	 rules, see ,	 e.g. , Warner	 v.	 Glass ,	 135 S.W.3d	 681,

6 These	 states are Alabama, Ex	 parte	Williams ,	 651	 So.	 2d	569	 (Ala.	 1992) ;	Arizona, Mayer	 v. State ,	908	P.2d	56	(Ariz.	Ct.	App.	1995) ;	California, In	re	Jordan ,	840	P.2d	983	(Cal.	1992) ;	Florida, Haag	v.	State ,	591	So.	2d	614	(Fla.	1992) ;	Georgia, Massaline	v.	Williams ,	554	S.E.2d	720	(Ga.	2001) ; Hawaii, Setala	 v.	J.C.	 Penney	 Co. ,	 40	 P.3d	 886 (Haw.	 2002);	 Idaho, Munson	 v.	 State , 917	 P.2d	 796 (Idaho	 1996) ;	 Indiana, Dowell	 v.	 State ,	 922	 N.E.2d	 605	 (Ind.	 2010) ;	 Kansas, Taylor	 v.	 McKune , 962 P.2d	566	(Kan.	Ct.	App.	1998) ;	Kentucky, Hallum	v.	Commonwealth ,	347	S.W.3d	55	(Ky.	2011) ; Louisiana, Tatum	 v.	 Lynn ,	 637	 So.	 2d	 796	 (La.	 Ct.	 App.	 1994) ;	 Massachusetts, Commonwealth	 v. Hartsgrove ,	553	N.E.2d	1299	(Mass.	1990) ;	Mississippi, Sykes	v.	State ,	757	So.	2d	997	(Miss.	2000) ; Nevada, Kellogg	 v.	 Journal	 Commc’ns ,	 835	 P.2d	 12	 (Nev.	 1992) ;	 Oklahoma, Woody	 v. State ex	 rel. Dep’t	 of	 Corr s . ,	 833	 P.2d	 257	 (Okla.	 1992) ;	Oregon, Hickey	 v.	 Or.	 State	 Penitentiary ,	 874	 P.2d	102 (O r. Ct.	App.	1994) ;	Pennsylvania, Smith	v.	Pa.	Bd.	o f	Prob.	&	Parole ,	683	A.2d	278	(Pa.	1996) ;	South Carolina, Mose	 v.	 State ,	 803	 S.E.2d	 718	 (S.C.	 2017) ;	 Texas, Warner	 v.	 Glass ,	 135	 S.W.3d	 681 (Tex. 2004) ;	 Vermont, In	 re	 Bruyette ,	 136	 A.3d	 575	 (Vt.	 2016) ;	 Washington, State	 v.	 Hurt , 27 P.3d 1276	 (Wash.	 Ct.	 App.	 2001) ;	 and	 Wisconsin, State	 ex	 rel.	 Shimkus	 v.	 Sondalle , 620 N.W.2d 409	(Wis.	Ct.	App.	2000)

.
7 These	states are Colorado, Colo.	R.	Civ.	P.	5(f) ;	and	Tennessee, Tenn.	R.	Civ.	P.	5.06.8 682 (Tex.	 2004) ; State	 v.	 Hurt ,	 27	 P.3d	 1276 ,	 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) , other	 states have	 adopted	 the	 Rule	 by tolling the	 applicable	 statutes	 of limitations, see Taylor	v.	McKune ,	9 62	P.2d	566,	570	(Kan.	Ct. App. 1998) ; Mose
v.	 State ,	 803	 S.E.2d	 718,	 721

- 23 (S.C.	 2017) ; State ex rel.	 Shimkus	 v.	 Sondalle , 620	N.W.2d	409,	412	(Wis.	Ct.	App.	2000)

. [¶1 1 ] The	 circumstances of	 this	 case,	 however,	 preclude us	 from following either approach. I n Houston , as	 here,	 the	 prisoner’s	 appeal	 was subject	 to	 both	 a	 rule	 of	 procedure and	 a	 statute	 es tablishing	 the	 filing deadline. S ee Fed.	 R.	 App.	 P. 4(a)(1) ; 28	 U.S.C. S. §	 210 7(a)	 (LEXIS	 through Pub. L. No. 115

- 196 )

. Nevertheless ,	 unlike	 this	 case, the	 statutory	 filing deadline in Houston did	not	specify where a	notice	of	appeal	was	required	 to be	 filed. Compare 28	 U.S.C.	 §	 2107 (providing a deadline	 to	 file	 but	 not specifying	which	court	to	file	in) , with 5	M.R.S.	§	11002(1)	(2017) ( specifying that petitions	 for	 review	 must	 be	 filed	 “in	 t he	 Superior	 Court”). As	 such , whereas	 the Houston Court	 held	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 a	 specification permitted	its interpretation	that	a	different	meaning	of	the word	“filed”	could apply	 to	 pro se	 prisoners, 487	 U.S.	 266	 at 272 ,	 we	 are	 unable	 to	 reach	 the same	conclusion	here	due	to	section	11002(1)’s	clear	directive	that	filing	must occur	 “in	 the	 Superior	 Court,” see Darling’s	 v.	 Ford	 Motor	 Co. ,	 1998	 ME	 232,9 ¶ 5,	719	A.2d	111 (“When	interpreting	a	statute,	we	seek	to	give	effec t	to	the intent	 of	 the	 Legislature	 by	 examining	 the	 plain	 meaning	 of	 the	 statutory language	.	.	.	.”). Accordingly ,	we	cannot	consider	this	case	in	the	same	manner as	did	the Houston Court. [¶1 2 ] Nor can	we ,	as	other	states	have	done,	permit	Martin’s	petition	to proceed	 by	 tolling	 the thirty

- day	 filing	 deadline	 provided	 in	 5	 M.R.S. § 11002(3)

. Although “[s]tatutory	 filing	deadlines	are	presumptive ly	 subject to	 equitable	 tolling, ” that	 pre s umption	 is	 rebutte d	 when those deadlines

“ define	the	court’ s	jurisdiction, ” Neverson	v.	Farquharson ,	366	F.3d	32,	40	(1st Cir.	2004) ,	and	we	have	previously	held	 that	 the	 time	limits	contained	in	 the
APA	are jurisdictional, s ee Brown	v.	State,	Dep't	of	Manpower	Affairs , 426 A.2d 880,	888	(Me.	1981) ( “ We	n ow	state	expressly	that	the	Act’ s	time limitations are	 jurisdictional.” ); see	 also Reed	 v.	 Halperin ,	 393	 A.2d	 160,	 162	 & n.6 (Me. 1978) ( explaining	 that the	APA	does	not	permit	judicial

- enlargement	 of time	limitations	for judicial	review)

. As	such , this	appeal	must	be	considered on	constitutional	grounds.
C. Constitutional	Considerations [¶1 3 ] P articular ly relevant here , of	 the	 twenty

- four	 states	 that	 have adopted	 the	 Rule, two	 states

— Florida	 and	 Oklahoma

— have done	 so on10 constitutional	 grounds,	 holding	 that failure to	 adopt	 the	 Rule would violate the	 principles	 of	 fundamental	 fairness contained	 in	 their	 respective
constitutions. See Haag	v.	State ,	591	So.	2d	614,	616

- 17	(Fla.	1992) ; Woody	v.
State ex	rel.	Dep’t	of	Corr s

. , 833	P.2d	257,	259

- 60	(Okla.	1992)

. Indeed, relying

on Houston ,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Oklahoma	 in Woody concluded	 that pursuant	to the	provision	of	its	state	constitution	analogous	to	our	own	open courts	provision, “the	courts	must	be	 open	 to	all	 on	 the same	 terms	without prejudice.	 	 The	 framers	 of	 the	 Constitution	 intended	 that	 all	 individuals without	partiality	could	pursue	an	effective	remedy	designed	to	protect	their basic	and	fundamental	rights.	.	.	.		The	constitutional	guarantee	of	access	to	the

co urts	is	not	an	empty	formality.”		833	P.2d	at	260. [¶1 4 ] The	same	reasoning	applies	with	equal	force in	this	case ,	and we therefore conclude that	t he Supreme Court’s	rationale in Houston rings	of	the fundamental fairness required by both	 the	 open	 courts provision	 and	 due process	clause	of	the	Maine	Constitution. See Me.	Const. art. I,	§§	6

- A , 19

. [¶1 5 ]	 	 The	 open	 courts	 provision	 states	 that	 “[e]very	 person,	 for	 an injury	 inflicted	 .	 .	 .	 shall	 have	 remedy	 by	 due	 course	 of	 law;	 and	 right	 and justice	shall	be	administered	freely	and	without	sale,	completely	and	without11 denial,	promptly	and	without	delay.” Me.	Const.	art.	I,	§	19. 8 Pursuant	to	this provision,	 courts	 are	 required	 to	 “be	 accessible	 to	 all	 persons	 alike	 without discrimination	 .	 .	 .	 for	 every	 wrong	 recognized	 by	 law	 as remediable in	 a court.” Me.	Med.	 Ctr.	v.	 Cote ,	577	A.2d	1173,	1176	 (Me.	1 990) .		Although	 the Legislature	“may	erect	reasonable	procedural	requirements	for	exercising	the right	to	an	adjudication,” Irish	v.	Gimbel ,	1997	ME	50,	¶	16,	691	A.2d	664 ,	such requirements	 may	 not	 “absolutely	 deprive [a citizen ]	 of	 his	 remedy	 under color of	 regulating	 it,” Sampson	 v.	 Sampson ,	 63	 Me.	 328,	 333	 (1874) .	 	 Thus, “[w]e	do	not	construe	section	19	as	prohibiting	reasonable	limits	on	the	time
within	which	a	claimant	must	seek	redress	in	the	courts

.	.	.	. The	only	issue	of constitutional	significan ce	is	whether	such	time	limits	are so	unreasonable	as to	 deny	 meaningful	 access	 to	 the	 judicial	 process .” Cote ,	 577 A.2d	 at	 1176 (emphasis	added). [¶1 6 ]		Likewise,	the	due	process	clauses	of	the	Maine	and	United	States Constitutions	 also	 establish	 a	 right to	 meaningful access to	 the	 judicial

8 This	“swee ping	guarantee”	is	derived	from	Part	I,	Article	XI,	of	the	Massachusetts	Constitution of	 1780,	 and	 “[i]ts	 roots	 are	 in	 Magna	 Carta,	 chapter	 29,	 as	 inter preted	 by	 the	 great seventeenth

- century	 jurist	 Lord	 Coke.”	 	 Marshall	 Tinkle, The	 Maine	 State	 Constitutio n 58 (2d ed. 2013)	(citing	Cary	L.	Fleisher,	Comment, Article	1,	Section	19	of	the	Maine	Constitution:	The Forgotten	Mandate ,	21 Me.	L.	Rev.	83,	84

- 85	(1969)). The	Magna	Carta	provides,	in	pertinent	part, “We	will	sell	 to	no	man,	we	will	not	deny	or	defer to	any	man	either	justice	or	right,” which	Lord Coke	interpreted	to	mean	that	“e very	subject	of	this realm ,	for	injury	done	to	him	.	.	.	may	take	his remedy	 by	 the	 course	 of	 the	 law , and	 have	 justice,	 and	 right	 for the injury	 done	 to	 him,	 freely without	sale,	fully	without any deni all,	and	speedily	without	delay, ” 1 E.	Coke, The	Second	Part	of	the Institutes	of	the	Laws	of	England 45,	55	(1797)

.12
process. U.S.	 Const.	 amend.	 XIV,	 §	 1 ;	 Me.	 Const.	 art.	 1,	 §	 6

- A; see Johnson	 v. Avery ,	393	U.S.	483,	498 & n.24 ( 1969). The	Maine	Constitution’s	concept	of due	 process	 is	 identical	 to	 that	 contained	 in	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution, Penobscot	 Area	 Hous.	 Dev.	 Corp

. v. City	 of Brewer ,	 434 A.2d 14,	 24	 n.9 (Me. 1981) ,	and	as	the	Supreme	Court	has held ,	“absent	a	countervailing state interest	 of	 overriding	 significance,”	 a	 generally	 valid	 statute	 or	 rule	 “may	 be held	 constitutionally	 invalid	 as	 applied	 when	 it	 operates	 to	 deprive	 an individual	of	a	protected	right , ” Boddie	v.	Connecticut ,	401	U.S.	371,	377, 379 (1971)

. [¶1 7 ] As applied	to	Martin,	the	filing	requ irements contained	in 5	M.R.S. § 11002 (1), (3) and	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C (b)

— which do	not	prohibit prison	officials from determining when,	 or	 if,	 they	 forwarded his	 petition to	 the	 clerk	 of
court

— are so	unreasonable that they effectively deprive d him of his	right	 to “meaningful	access	to	the	judicial	process.” Cote ,	577	A.2d	at	1176; see Boddie , 401	U.S.	at 379. Martin	necessarily	lost	control over his	petition on	May	18 , 2016 , the	moment	it	was	delivered	 to	prison authorities, and no	matter	how far	 in	 advance	 he	 delivered	 the	 petition,	 he	 could	 never	 be certain that	 the

cou rt clerk would	 receive	 it	 by	 May	 25 ,	 2016 .	 	 Thus , he	 was denied	 the opportunity	to	contest	his	disciplinary	matter	when	the	petition	was	received13 by	 the	 clerk	 of	 court	 on	 May	 26, 2016, one	 day	 outside	 of	 the statutory window and	eight	days	after	he	gave	it	to	the	prison

. [¶1 8 ] “[I] n	the	absence	of	a	sufficient	countervailing	justification	for	the State’s	action,” Boddie ,	401	U.S.	at	380

- 81,	such ephemeral access	to	the	court cannot	 be	 properly	 characterized	 as	 “meaningful” and	 therefore	 does	 not comport	with	the	open	courts	provision	and	due	process	clause	of	the	Maine
constitution. S ee Me.	Const.	art.	I,	§§	6

- A,	19

. H owever,	this	is	not	to	say	that the	 filing	 requirements	 pursuant	 to	 5	 M.R.S.	 §	 11002	 and	 Rule 80C(b)	 will always deprive	a	pro	se	prisoner	of	his	or	her	right	to	meaningful	access	to	the judicial	process.		Because	it	is	incumbent	upon	a	pro	se	prisoner	to recognize that,	unlike	represented	prisoners	or	nonincarcerated	persons,	he	or	she	has no	 choice	 but	 to mail his	 or	 her	 petition,	 it	 is	 not	 unconstitutionally unreasonable	to	require	that	the	petition	be delivered	to	prison	authorities at least	 three	 days prior	 to	 the	 thirty

- day	 filing	 deadline. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 6(c) (recognizing	that	a	period	of	three	days	is	generally	sufficient	to	allow	for	th e mailing	of	legal	documents). [¶1 9 ] Accordingly,	 a	 pro	 se	 prisoner’s	 constitutional	 rights	 are	 only violated	where

— as in	this	case

— he	or	she completes	the	prison’s	procedures for	 depositing	 the	 petition with	 the	 prison for	 mailing	 at	 least	 three	 days14 before	the	last	day	on	which	t he	petition may	be	timely	filed, and	the	petition does	 not	 reach	 the	 clerk	 of	 court	 until	 after	 that	 deadline	 has	 passed. Put simply,	the filing deadline created	by 5 M.R.S.	§ 11002(3)	and	Rule	80C(b) has effectively	 deprived	 Martin	 “of	 his	 remedy [against	 the	 Depar tment] under color	 of	 regulating	 it.” Sampson ,	 63 Me.	 at	 333. T his	 is	 especially so here , given	that the	Department

— as the	party	against	whom	Martin	had	attempted to	 file	 his petition

— was	 also	 the	 institution he	 was	 forced	 to	 rely	 upon	 to

ensure that	his	petition	was	timely	filed. See Bennett	v.	Davis ,	90 Me. 102,	107, 37	A.	864	(1897) ( holding	a filing statute	unconstitutional	where	it	“might	put
the	 citizen at	 the	 mercy	 of	 his	 adversary	 .	 .	 . a	 result	 abhorrent	 to	 the	 very

nature	 o f constitutional	 government ”) ; see	 also Warner , 135	 S.W.3d at 685 ( recognizing	“ the	unique	problem	that	arises	when	one	party	is	forced	to	rely on	his	opposing	party	 to	en sure	pleadings	are	 timely	 filed ”	(quotation	marks omitted))

. [¶ 20 ] Accordingly , the	 State’s	 argument	 on	 appeal

— that Martin’s constitutional	rights	were	not	 violated	because	he	received	 the	“ample	 time” of	twenty

- thr ee	days	to	petition	the	court

— misapprehends the	constitutional interest	at	stake , as	such	a	standard	would	nonetheless	re sult	in	Martin	losing all	 control	 over	 his	 petition upon	 delivery	 to	 prison authorities	 and would15 permit the	 Department	 to delay his	 petition	 for	 an	 indeterminate period in order	to	ensure his	inability	to pursue	a	claim	against	it. Moreover ,	a lthough the State	identifies	 our	previous	 opinion s in cases	 such as Giberson	v.	Quinn , 445	A.2d	1007, 1008

- 09	(Me.	1982) ,	for	the	proposition	that	the	open	courts provision	does	not	prohibit	a	reasonable	time	limit	for	filing	a	judicial	action , those	cases	and	the	rationale	underlying	them	are inapposite to	the	situation at	hand.		Unlike	Martin,	the	plaintiff	in Giberson was not impermissibly forced
to rely	 o n his	 opposing	 party	 to	 ensure	 that	 his	 p leadings	were	 timely	 filed.
S ee	generally id

. [¶ 2 1] For	the	f oregoing	reasons,	we	adopt	the	prisoner	mailbox	r ule	for
any unrepresented prisoner	whose Rule	80C petition,	having	been	 delivered to	 the	 Department of	 Corrections at	 least	 three	 days before	 the	 last	 day	 on which	 the	petition	may	be	 timely filed, arrives	at	 the	clerk	of	court	a fter	 that deadline	has	expired. The	entry	is: Judgment vacated .	 	 Remanded	 to	 the	 Superior Court for	reinstatement	o f	the	80C	petition.16 E. James	 Burk e,	 Esq., and Alec	 Youngblood, Stud.	 Atty.	 (orally),	 Cumberland Legal	Aid	Clinic,	Portland,	for	appellant	Charles	M.	Martin Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General , and	 James	E.	Fortin,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen. (orally) , Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Knox County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP

- 2016

- 21 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY