Convoy Ambush Case Studies

Volume II - Iraq and Afghanistan

Richard E. Killblane

Transportation Corps Historian

US Army Transportation School 

Fort Lee, Virginia

2015
Library of Congress Catalog-in- Publication Data

Killblane, Richard E., 1955 -

Convoy Ambush Case Studies, Volume II: 

Iraq and Afghanistan. / Richard E. Killblane

p. cm.

1. Gulf War 2003. 2. Afghan War – 2001. 3. United States Army – 

History – 1st century. I. 

Killblane, Richard E., 1955- II. Title.

DS

Editing:

Map Illustration: Stephen A.Campbell

Book Design/Production: Enterprise Multimedia Center

Photos: Countless soldiers have provided their photographs to the 

Transportation Corps History Office and Army Museums to help tell 

their story, and where possible the names of the person submitting 

them will be provided. In other cases the units collected the 

photographs and the source will be referenced to them. 

Second Edition

The US Army Transportation School publications cover a variety of 

military history topics. The views expressed in this publication are 

those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department 

of the Army or the Department of the Defense.

ISBN: 978-0-9910108-D-7

Front cover photo: M1151 of the 600th Quartermaster Company at 

Tallil with the Ziggurat of Ur in the background in 2008. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Back cover photo: Convoy escorts of D Troop, 4th Cavalry at FOB 

Speicher in 2007. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Title page photo: Gun truck of the 1836th Transportation Company 

(TX NG) test firing its M2 in March 2004. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Contents page photo: Convoy along MSR Tampa in southern desert 

of Iraq in November 2004. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Contents

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq 

507th Maintenance Ambush

An Nasiriyah, 23 March 2003

Tiger Team/Convoy Rat Patrol, June 2003

OIF 2 Al Sadr’s April Uprising

Complex Ambush, 8 April 2004 

Good Friday Ambush, 9 April 2004

HET Ambush, 9 April 2004

10 April 2004 

Ambush at Iskandariyah, 11 April 2004 

Green Zone Ambushes, 11 April 2004

Battle of Broken Chains, 17 April 2004

1018 Firefight, 18 October 2004

ASR Heart Firefight, 30 January 2005

Palm Sunday Ambush, 20 March 2005

Ambush at Ad Duluiyah, 20 September 2005

Suse Ambush, 26 October 2005

ASR Sword, 25 October 2006

Don’t Mess with Texas, 23 February 2008

Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan

Regay Ambush, 13 June 2006

14 April 2007

TK Ambush, 29 July 2009

Observations

Bibliography

Index

5

6

19

21

22

32

64

70

74

82

90

110

116

133

172

180

190

200

208

208

220

222

249

283

287
4 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II
Operation Iraqi Freedom 5

Operation Iraqi Freedom

n 20 March 2003, coalition forces crossed the Iraqi border heading straight for the heart of Baghdad. It had 

been 30 years since the US Army had pulled truck companies out of Vietnam and had forgotten all lessons on 

convoy security from that war. Having accepted much of the media myth about the Americans losing the war, 

many senior Army officers were reluctant to accept any solution from that war. In fact the major lesson learned from 

that war was that the United States would never again find itself fighting an insurgency. On the contrary, the US Army 

had defeated the insurgency by 1969 and was fighting North Vietnamese Army Regulars. The war had changed from 

an insurgency to an invasion, but in appearance it still resembled a guerrilla war. After the United States forced the 

North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty, two years later South Vietnam fell to an invasion of tanks rolling down from 

North Vietnam - not insurgents coming out of the jungle. While the US Army had not been defeated on the ground, 

the American public had lost their resolve to intervene further on behalf of South Vietnam.

The US Army was extremely successful in Vietnam especially in terms of convoy security. With the exception 

of a few days during the 1968 Tet Offensive when the 8th Transportation Group did not yet have gun trucks, the 

enemy never closed down the supply route. The advent of the 5-ton gun truck with three to four machineguns proved 

invaluable in ambushes. Because the 8th Group encountered the most intense and savage convoy ambushes along 

Route 19, its convoy doctrine proved the best. The convoy commanders had learned to keep their convoys to less than 

30 vehicles with a gun truck to a task vehicle ratio of 1:10 with gun trucks placed somewhere up front, center and 

rear. Convoy commanders had learned to ride somewhere between the middle to the rear of the convoy so they 

could better respond to any contact ahead of them. The US Army would relearn these lessons the hard way in Iraq. 

Going into the Iraq War, there were few references to convoy security in the past. Timothy J. Kuta had taken

COL Joe Bellino’s “1968 History of the 8th Transportation Group,” added photos from the Army Transportation 

Museum and published it as Gun Trucks. James Lyles, a Vietnam gun truck veteran, published a series of photo 

studies on gun trucks in his series, Hard Ride. These and two internet web sites, Guntruck.com and the Transportation 

Museum web page were the only sources of information on gun trucks in Vietnam. Fortunately, the Army National 

Guard still had a few aging Vietnam veterans in their ranks who remembered gun trucks. Otherwise, most truck 

companies completely reinvented gun trucks and convoy security doctrine from scratch. Unable to find adequate 

solutions in the first year of the war, most senior leaders relied on their NCOs and company grade officers for solutions. 

Remarkably, they would come up with very similar solutions as their predecessors had during the Vietnam War. 

However, there were differences between the two wars. As one Vietnam veteran told LTC James Sagen, Commander 

of the 106th Transportation Battalion in 2004, while the Vietnamese ambushes were more intense, the Iraqi 

ambushes were more sophisticated. 

Another problem that hindered development of any convoy security doctrine was that Americans saw the 

insurgency of the Vietnam War as an anomaly in history and incorrectly assumed that its wars would continue be 

broad front wars like World War II. Oddly, the broad front concept of war that began during World War I and ended 

with Desert Storm was the anomaly, and armies advancing into enemy territory bypassing enemy resistance had 

been the norm before and would be again in Iraq. Even the convoy ambushes during military operations in Somalia 

did not inspire anyone to develop convoy security doctrine. In fact support troops only fired the minimum 40 rounds 

per year on weapons qualification with no cross training in other weapons. They were not seen as needing any 

additional weapons training as a cost cutting measure. The death of four MPs due to a mine explosion did result 

O
6 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

in the development of the up-armored HMMWV M1114, 

but it was initially just issued to MPs and Cavalry 

units, or - not transportation units for convoy security. 

Surprisingly, the ambush of the 507th Maintenance 

Company in An Nasiriyah still did not inspire any 

changes. The last element of a 600 -vehicle column, 

the 507th had missed its turn and drove into a town 

controlled by militia as the 3rd Infantry Division advanced 

to Baghdad. The ambush unfortunately was interpreted as 

an accident and not a precursor of things to come. 

Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 

23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq1

Overview

n the early morning hours of 20 March 2003, US 

Army, US Marine Corps and coalition ground combat 

forces crossed from Kuwait into southern Iraq and 

attacked northward, beginning the ground phase of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. By dawn on 23 March, major 

US ground combat units had advanced more than 200 

miles into Iraq and were approximately 130 miles north 

of An Nasiriyah, an advance historically unprecedented 

for speed of execution and depth of penetration, 

designed to unhinge the Iraqis’ ability to mount a 

coherent defense.

The rapid advance of coalition troops in thousands 

of vehicles and hundreds of aircraft was made possible 

by the determined, aggressive support of scores of 

logistics, medical, and maintenance units, many moving 

constantly to maintain contact with their supported 

units. One such unit was the 507th Maintenance 

Company, tasked to support a vitally important asset – 

a Patriot missile battalion.

At about 0700 hours (local time) on 23 March 2003, 

while moving through the outskirts of the city of An 

Nasiriyah in southeastern Iraq, an element of the 507th 

Maintenance Company was attacked by Iraqi military 

forces and irregulars. There were 33 US soldiers in the 

18- vehicle convoy. All but two soldiers in the convoy 

were members of the 507th Maintenance Company from 

Fort Bliss, Texas. The other two soldiers belonged to the 

3rd Forward Support Battalion (FSB) of the 3rd Infantry 

Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia, and were traveling 

in their 10 - ton wrecker with the 507th. 

The Iraqi forces in An Nasiriyah conducted fierce 

6th Transportation Battalion convoy right after crossing the berm. Photo courtesy the 6th Transportation Battalion

I
Operation Iraqi Freedom 7

attacks against the convoy. Of the 33 US soldiers in the 

convoy, 11 were killed in combat or died as a result of 

injuries, seven were captured by Iraqi forces, and the 

remaining 16 soldiers were able to rejoin friendly forces. 

Of the 22 US soldiers who survived, nine were wounded 

in action. Although all details of the battle could not 

be determined with certainty, it is clear that every 

US Soldier did their duty.

It was not until 31 March 2003, that elements of 

the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) would take 

control of the city of An Nasiriyah. 

Arrival in Kuwait & Preparation for Movement to Iraq

The 507th Maintenance Company arrived in Kuwait 

from Fort Bliss on 20 February 2003. The company 

consisted of 82 soldiers and their assigned vehicles. 

The unit became a part of US forces under the 

operational control of V Corps, which was located at 

Camp Virginia in Kuwait. From 22 February until 20 

March, the 507th prepared for its mission in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom–to repair and maintain vehicles 

and equipment of the 5th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense 

Artillery (Patriot), supporting the Central Command 

(CENTCOM) battle plan. 

Unit preparation at Camp Virginia built on training 

that had been conducted at Fort Bliss, which included 

individual and crew-served weapons qualification, 

tactical communications, land navigation, Nuclear, 

Biological and Chemical (NBC) defense tasks, first 

aid, spot reporting, equipment maintenance, leader 

certification, force protection, deployment and 

redeployment operations, tactical employment, and 

sustainment operations. Once deployed and in Camp 

Virginia, soldiers of the 507th conducted additional 

training and preparations at Camp Virginia that included 

rules of engagement, unit rehearsals (movement, 

actions on contact, ambush procedures), and weapons 

and vehicle maintenance. During this time, all soldiers 

received their basic combat load of ammunition 

for their personal weapons (210 rounds for M16A2, 
8 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

1,000 rounds for M249 SAW, 45 rounds for M9). The 

company commander ordered an issue of ammunition 

for the unit’s crew served weapons (.50 caliber and 

MK-19, 40mm) prior to movement, however, all 

pyrotechnics, hand grenades, and AT-4 Anti-tank 

weapons were consolidated and secured. 

The plan to move V Corps units from Camp Virginia 

to Objective Rams involved the organization of convoys 

and movement of those convoys along designated 

routes – initially on Route Blue, then Route Jackson, 

then returning to Route Blue –and through three 

intermediate attack positions: Dawson, Bull, and Lizard. 

The 507th Maintenance Company was under the tactical 

control of the 3rd Forward Support Battalion (FSB) for 

this movement. According to the 3rd FSB Orders Brief, 

the 507th Maintenance Company convoy would be 

directed from Blue to Jackson by soldiers at a manned 

tactical control point (TCP) at the site where the 

routes separated. 

The Operations Officer of the 3rd FSB gave CPT 

King, the commander of the 507th, a CD-ROM disc 

that contained orders and route information. Route 

information consisted of the battalion orders briefing 

and annotated large- scale maps. The 507th had 

commercial Global Positioning Systems (GPS) (Garmin, 

Etrex Vista), which had been issued in the United States 

prior to deployment. The GPS gave CPT King directional 

signals via a display arrow that indicated the direction 

and distance the convoy should go. Five additional GPS 

were distributed to other leaders in the company. The 

unit was also issued 1:100,000 scale maps of the area 

of operations– the theater standard. The review of this 

incident revealed that CPT King relied primarily on his 

GPS and one of the annotated maps from the orders 

brief while traveling in his HMMWV. CPT King 

had highlighted only Route Blue on the annotated map, 

and believed in error that Blue was his assigned route. 

On 20 March, at approximately 1400 hours, 64 of 

the original 82 soldiers of the 507th departed Camp 

Virginia in 33 vehicles and moved northwest as part of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 9

a larger convoy. Their ultimate destination was Objective 

Rams more than 350 kilometers distant. The other 18 

soldiers (maintenance contact teams and medics) from 

the 507th were attached to and moved with other units. 

Movement to Attack Position Dawson

During the first leg of the route, from Camp Virginia to 

Attack Position Dawson, while still in Kuwait, the 507th 

traveled off-road over desert terrain. At 2100 hours 

on 20 March, the 507th arrived at its first stop, Attack 

Position Dawson, located just south of the Iraqi border. 

While at Dawson, the soldiers refueled and serviced 

their vehicles, ate and attempted to implement a rest 

plan. Most soldiers got some amount of sleep in the 

10 hours at this location. 

Movement from Dawson to link up with 3rd FSB 

at the Line of Departure (LD), to Attack Position Bull

At 0700 hours on 21 March, the 507th departed Attack 

Position Dawson to link up with the 3rd FSB. They 

crossed the line of departure into Iraq at 1000 hours. 

The convoy moved approximately 35 kilometers, arriving 

at Attack Position Bull at 1200 hours on 21 March. 

Movement from Attack 

Position Bull to Attack Position Lizard

At 1800 hours on 21 March, the 507th departed Bull 

with the 3rd FSB enroute to Lizard, 80 kilometers 

northwest. The convoy continued to travel off-road and 

some of the heavier vehicles bogged down in the soft 

sand. Drivers from many units became confused due to 

the darkness, causing some vehicles to separate from 

their march columns. Poor trafficability and mechanical 

problems resulted in the fragmentation of the 507th 

convoy into two groups. The first group consisted of 

those vehicles that did not break down or get stuck in 

the sand and were capable of keeping pace with the 

3rd FSB convoy. The second group consisted of those 

vehicles that had mechanical problems or were stuck in 

the sand, along with those vehicles used to tow or pull 

other vehicles free. CPT King took personal charge of the 

first group and arrived at Lizard at about 0530 hours on 

22 March, after an all-night movement. 1SG Dowdy was 

charged with recovering the second group and leading 

it to Lizard. Working through the night of 21 March and 

into the next day, 1SG Dowdy recovered and repaired 

Thin skinned HMMWVs and 5-ton of the 3rd Infantry 

Division prior to crossing the berm on 20 March 2004. 

Photo courtesy of Jeffrey Skinner

Thin skinned HMMWVs and 5-ton cargo trucks like those 

of the 507th Maintenance Company. 

Photo courtesy of Paul Nelson

M915 5-ton tractors hauling milvans up MSR Tampa. 

Photo courtesy of Paul Nelson
10 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

vehicles not only from the 507th but from the 3rd FSB 

as well. The 1SG and the second group of 507th vehicles 

would eventually arrive at Lizard at 1600 hours on 22 

March, 22 hours after departing Attack Position Bull. 

Decision to Split the 

507th Convoy at Attack Position Lizard

After arriving at Lizard, while awaiting 1SG Dowdy’s 

arrival, CPT King contacted his battalion commander to 

inform him of the 507th’s situation. LTC Joseph Fischetti, 

Commander, 5th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery 

(Patriot) acknowledged the report. CPT King also recalls 

reporting his status and confirming with the 3rd FSB 

staff that the overall situation, to include route, was 

unchanged. The 3rd FSB staff advised CPT King that the 

convoy would depart at 1400 hours as planned. Based 

on that information and with the intent to push support 

forward, CPT King directed his executive officer, 1LT Jeff 

Shearin, to lead all the available 507th vehicles and 

remain with the 3rd FSB convoy. Shearin departed with 

32 soldiers in 17 vehicles at 1400 hours with the main 

3rd FSB convoy. King remained at Lizard and waited 

for 1SG Dowdy and the remaining soldiers and 

vehicles of the 507th. 

At about 1400 hours on 22 March, 1SG Dowdy 

radioed CPT King to report that he had all of the 

remaining vehicles running or in tow and was 10 -12 

kilometers away from Lizard. He arrived at Lizard at 

about 1600 hours. Along with 1SG Dowdy were the two 

soldiers from the 3rd FSB, SGT George Buggs and PFC 

Edward Anguiano. Buggs and Anguiano were driving a 

10 -ton wrecker and had become separated from the 

rest of 3rd FSB while recovering 3rd FSB fuel trucks 

stuck in the sand between Bull and Lizard. Apparently, 

1SG Dowdy coordinated with Buggs and Anguiano to tow 

a disabled 507th 5- ton truck after they completed their 

recovery of the 3rd FSB fuel trucks. 

At 1930 hours on 22 March, 3 1⁄2 hours after 1SG 

Dowdy closed on Lizard with all remaining 507th soldiers 

and vehicles, CPT King organized them into a new march 

unit. This second element, led by CPT King, departed 

Lizard with 33 soldiers, including himself, Buggs and 

Anguiano. The convoy was comprised of 18 vehicles, 

two of which were being towed.

Intersection of Routes

Jackson (Highway 1) and Blue (Highway 8)

Unable to communicate with the 3rd FSB, CPT King 

attempted to catch up with the 3rd FSB main convoy 

by deciding to take the most direct route (a straight line 

azimuth) to Highway 8. This route proved to be extremely 

difficult, over rough terrain, once again resulting in 

vehicles becoming bogged down in the sand. It took the 

unit five hours to reach Highway 8 [Route Blue] about 

15 kilometers away. At this point, 42 hours had passed 

since the 507th had departed Attack Position Dawson. 

Except for a 10 -hour stop at Dawson, the 507th had 

been continuously moving. Most soldiers had slept only 

a few hours since the morning of the 20th and were in 

their second consecutive night of movement. 

After traveling west on Highway 8, the convoy 

reached the intersection with Highway 1, Route Jackson, 

the assigned route for 3rd FSB. The road on which 

Route Jackson was designated led southwest of An 

Nasiriyah, eventually intersecting again with Route Blue, 

east of Objective Rams. The initial entrance to Route 

Jackson required a left turn at this intersection, where a 

manned Traffic Control Point (TCP) was planned to direct 

traffic. When the convoy arrived at this intersection, US 

personnel were present, but by this time there was no 

formal TCP. CPT King states that the personnel that were 

present confirmed that Blue continued north. Believing 

Route Blue was his assigned route, CPT King led his 

convoy through the intersection and headed north on 

Highway 8, towards An Nasiriyah in the general direction 

indicated by his GPS receiver – the waypoint west of 

An Nasiriyah. 

At about 0530 hours, the convoy stopped when 

CPT King saw lights ahead, which he believed to be an 

industrial complex or an oil refinery. He conferred with 

1SG Dowdy and decided to continue. At an intersection 

south of An Nasiriyah, Highway 8–Route Blu– turned 

west, requiring a left turn. CPT King did not recognize 

this and led his convoy straight north through the 

intersection and on to Route 7/8, exiting Route Blue. 

Route 7/8 led the convoy across the Euphrates River 

into the eastern outskirts of An Nasiriyah. An Nasiriyah 

is flanked by the Euphrates River in the south and a 

series of man-made canals in the north. It is a city 

characterized by buildings no greater than four to 

five stories in height, with many narrow streets and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 11

alleyways. The surrounding areas of An Nasiriyah, 

including the roadsides along the route taken by the 

507th, are marshlands that have been partially -

drained, consisting of soft sand and mud. 

Movement through An Nasiriyah

Five vehicles in the convoy had SINCGARS radios 

and could communicate with one another. SINCGARS 

communications were augmented by handheld radios 

in each vehicle, but because of the extended duration 

of the convoy, the batteries had expired. CPT King and 

1SG Dowdy were communicating about their location 

and situation frequently as the convoy moved 

through An Nasiriyah.

Several soldiers in the convoy, including CPT King, 

observed armed civilians and what appeared to be armed 

Iraqi soldiers at two checkpoints –one upon entering and 

the other exiting the town. None of these people fired or 

indicated hostile intent against the convoy. In fact, the 

Iraqi soldiers at the checkpoints waved to the convoy. 

One or more civilian trucks with armed civilians and 

mounted machine guns (some reports refer to these as 

“technicals”) drove past the convoy several times during 

its travel through the city, but again, no hostile intent was 

shown towards the 507th convoy and personnel. 

Statements from 507th soldiers indicate that rules 

of engagement issued by higher headquarters would 

only permit firing on personnel that exhibited hostile 

intent. Soldiers had also been warned to expect possible 

“happy fire”– shots fired in celebration and not intended 

to cause harm, which is a common practice. Additionally, 

they had been informed that the carrying of weapons 

by uniformed or civilian personnel would not, by itself, 

constitute hostile intent. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) 

in effect were summarized on a card issued to soldiers. 

The ROE were issued by the Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command (CFLCC). 

On its way through the city, the convoy crossed a 

bridge over the Euphrates River and then another over 

a canal before coming to a “T” intersection with Highway 
12 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

16. CPT King led the convoy left at this intersection, 

believing that he was still on his assigned route. The 

convoy soon reached another “T” intersection with 

Highway 7, at which time CPT King turned right, heading 

north with the rest of the convoy following. CPT King 

continued to move the convoy north and out of the 

city for approximately 2 kilometers. At this point, King 

realized, for the first time, that the convoy was off Route 

Blue. CPT King stopped the convoy and set up security. 

His GPS indicated that the main convoy route lay due 

west. There appeared to be no hard surface roads 

leading west from his location. After conferring with 

1SG Dowdy, CPT King decided to retrace their route 

back through An Nasiriyah to find Route Blue/Highway 8. 

Realizing that he was off the convoy route, he instructed 

his soldiers to “lock and load” their weapons and to be 

vigilant. SFC Pierce reiterated these instructions to all 

soldiers. In some of the vehicles, soldiers took the halt 

as an opportunity to change drivers. King then began 

turning the convoy around. This would be the first of 

two U-turns by the convoy. 

While turning around, the 10 - ton wrecker, crewed by 

SGT Buggs and PFC Anguiano, ran out of fuel. CPT King 

stopped all vehicles and ordered the wrecker refueled. 

Soldiers refueled the wrecker using 5 -gallon cans, 

as the only fuel truck in this convoy was emptied over 

the course of the 507th’s extended movement. After 

refueling was completed, CPT King resumed turning the 

vehicles around and headed south on Highway 7. CPT 

King was at the head of the convoy and 1SG Dowdy 

was in the rear. At the intersection with Highway 16, 

the convoy turned left (eastward) and headed back 

towards the city. 

Attack on the Convoy

As the convoy turned left on to Highway 16, at about 

0700 hours, it began to receive sporadic small arms 

fire, the source and direction of which could not be 

determined. The 1SG radioed CPT King that the convoy 

was being fired upon and they needed to speed up to 

get away from the small arms fire. The 1SG directed 

the vehicles at the end of the convoy to increase their 

speed, consistent with unit procedures for reacting to 

a convoy ambush. Due to dissimilar vehicle size and 

acceleration rates, spacing between vehicles in the 

convoy began to increase. 

In the speed and confusion, CPT King, who remained 

at the head of the convoy, passed the intersection with 

Highway 7/8, missing the right turn going south. 1SG 

Dowdy radioed CPT King to alert him that he had missed 

the turn. SFC Pierce, in a 5-ton truck driven by SPC 

Timothy Johnson, sped up to catch CPT King, to tell him 

that he (SFC Pierce) knew the way back to the turn. CPT 

King ordered SFC Pierce to lead the convoy back to the 

intersection. At this point all drivers had passed by the 

Highway 7/8 turn going south. 

Midway in the convoy a 5 -ton tractor-trailer driven 

by PVT Sloan with SGT Walters became disabled. The 

vehicle behind it, a 5-ton wrecker with water trailer, 

driven by PFC Patrick Miller, with SGT Riley in the 

passenger seat, executed a combat pick-up of Sloan 

while moving and under fire. It is unclear whether 

SGT Walters was picked up by others in the convoy or 

remained in the area of the disabled tractor- trailer. 

There is some information to suggest that a US Soldier, 

that could have been Walters, fought his way south of 

Highway 16 towards a canal and was killed in action. 

SGT Walters was in fact killed at some point during this 

portion of the attack. The circumstances of his death 

cannot be conclusively determined by 

available information. 

The remaining vehicles of the convoy had to travel 

almost three kilometers past the intersection before 

finding an area large enough to allow the vehicles to 

execute a U -turn. The convoy pulled off of Highway 16 

to turn around and head back to the missed turn. While 

attempting to make the U -turn, the 10 - ton wrecker 

driven by SPC Anguiano with SGT Buggs, towing the 

507th’s disabled 5-ton supply truck (originally driven 

by PFC Jessica Lynch with SGT Matthew Rose), got stuck 

in soft sand. While the rest of the convoy turned around 

and headed west, soldiers continued to receive fire. 

1SG Dowdy, in a HMMWV at the rear of the convoy, 

conducted a combat pick-up of Buggs and Anguiano 

along HWY 16. Also in that HMMWV were PFCs Lori 

Piestewa and Lynch. Piestewa was the driver, and Lynch 

was seated in the rear. 1SG Dowdy radioed CPT King, 

informing him that he had picked up two soldiers and 

advised King that they needed to get the convoy out 

of the city as quickly as possible. SGT Buggs or PFC 

Anguiano began returning fire with an M249 Squad 

Automatic Weapon (SAW) from the rear of the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 13

HMMWV as they continued south. 

CPT King regained the lead position in a convoy that 

had disintegrated into smaller groups and independent 

vehicles. In the dust and confusion and still receiving fire, 

the larger, slower moving vehicles required additional 

space to turn around while smaller vehicles turned 

around inside of them. This rearranged the convoy’s 

march order and further extended distances between 

vehicles. The remaining 15 vehicles, including a tractortrailer being towed by a wrecker driven by SPC Hudson 

with CW2 Mata, sped south on Highway 7/8. The 507th 

convoy became divided into three smaller groups as it 

attempted to move south out of the area.

Group 1

The first group consisted of the following vehicles and 

occupants: #1- a HMMWV, driven by PVT Dale Nace 

with CPT Troy King in the front passenger seat, #3 - a 

5 - ton tractor trailer driven by SGT Joel Petrik with SPC 

Nicholas Peterson in the passenger seat and #4 - a 

5 -ton truck with trailer, driven by SPC Timothy Johnson 

with SFC Anthony Pierce in the passenger seat. As this 

group fought its way south through the city, it received 

fire from all directions, primarily from the west side of 

Highway 7/8. Iraqis attempted to block the road with 

vehicles and debris. While under fire, PVT Nace, SPC 

Johnson, and SGT Petrik successfully maneuvered 

their respective vehicles around and through obstacles 

and continued all the way through the city. Soldiers 

in this group returned fire while moving. Most of the 

soldiers in this group report that they experienced 

weapon malfunctions. These malfunctions may have 

resulted from inadequate individual maintenance in 

a desert environment. About 10 kilometers south of 

the intersection of Highway 8 and 7/8, this group met 

elements of the 8th Tank Battalion, Task Force Tarawa, 

US Marines. After CPT King briefed the Marines on 

his unit’s situation, the Marine unit immediately sent 

elements north on Highway 8 to attempt to rescue 

the remainder of the 507th. 

Group 2

The second group consisted of the following vehicles and 

occupants: #2 - a 5 -ton tractor trailer driven by SPC Jun 

Zhang with SGT Curtis Campbell in the passenger seat, 

#5 - a 5 - ton tractor trailer driven by PFC Marcus Dubois 

with CPL Damien Luten in the passenger seat, #6 - a 

HMMWV with trailer, driven by CW3 Nash with SSG Tarik 

Jackson in the front passenger seat, #7- a 5 - ton fuel 

truck, driven by PFC Adam Elliot with SPC James Grubb 

in the passenger seat and #10 - a 5 - ton tractor-trailer, 

driven by SGT Rose with CPL Francis Carista in the 

passenger seat. CPL Luten, in the tractor-trailer driven 

by PFC Dubois, attempted to return fire with the 507th’s 

only .50 cal. machinegun, but the weapon failed. Luten 

was wounded in the leg while reaching for his M16. The 

group took increasing small arms and rocket-propelled 

grenade fire from all sides; and like the first group faced 

attempts to block the road with debris and vehicles. 

The tractor- trailer immediately in front of CPL Luten’s 

tractor-trailer, crewed by SPC Zhang and SGT Campbell, 

was hit multiple times and became inoperable about 5 

kilometers south of the city –but short of CPT King’s final 

location further south. Zhang jumped out of the disabled 

tractor- trailer and got on the tractor-trailer rolling 

immediately behind, occupied by Dubois and Luten. 

SGT Campbell was shot while attempting to fire Zhang’s 

M16/M203. The HMMWV crewed by Nash and Jackson 

stopped to pick up Campbell, and was disabled a short 

distance further south. SSG Jackson had received 

multiple wounds prior to stopping to 

rescue Campbell. Dubois, Luten, and Zhang turned 

around and returned to the disabled HMMWV.

SPC Grubb returned fire with his M16 until wounded 

in both arms, despite reported jamming of his weapon, 

while PFC Elliot maneuvered their fuel truck through the 

ambush. SGT Rose, driving a tractor-trailer, maneuvered 

through obstacles in the road while under fire. CPL 

Carista, who was riding with Rose, was wounded by 

shrapnel. The fuel truck, crewed by SPC Grubb and PFC 

Elliot, and the tractor-trailer, occupied by SGT Rose 

and CPL Carista, linked up with the soldiers already at 

the disabled HMMWV. This group formed a defensive 

perimeter, while Combat Lifesavers (Carista, Elliot, Rose, 

Zhang) under the leadership of SGT Rose tended to the 

wounded soldiers (Campbell, Carista, Grubb, Jackson 

and Luten). The Marines arrived at the scene and 

rescued the 10 soldiers at this location.

Group 3

This group consisted of the following vehicles: #8 - a 

5-ton tractor-trailer, driven by PFC Howard Johnson with 
14 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

PVT Ruben Estrella -Soto in the passenger seat, #9 - a 

5 -ton truck with trailer, driven by SPC Jamaal Addison 

with SPC James Kiehl in the passenger seat, #12 - a 

5 -ton wrecker, driven by PFC Patrick Miller, with SGT 

James Riley and PVT Brandon Sloan as passengers, 

#13- a HEMTT wrecker towing a 5 - ton tractor trailer 

(vehicle # 18), driven by SPC Joseph Hudson with CW2 

Johnny Mata in the passenger seat, #15 - a HMMWV 

with trailer, driven by PFC Piestewa with 1SG Robert 

Dowdy in the front passenger seat, and PFC Jessica 

Lynch, SPC Edward Anguiano and SGT George Buggs in 

the rear, and #16 - a 5 -ton tractor-trailer, driven by SPC 

Edgar Hernandez, with SPC Shoshana Johnson in the 

passenger seat. At the point north of the city on Highway 

16 where CPT King ordered the convoy to turn around 

and go back to the missed turn (south on Highway 7/8), 

this group had difficulty turning around, probably due 

to the large size of vehicles and the fact that all were 

towing a trailer or disabled vehicle.

At about 0720 hours, the 5-ton tractor-trailer, 

occupied by SPC Hernandez and SPC S. Johnson, came 

under heavy fire. SPC Hernandez tried to avoid hitting 

an Iraqi truck blocking the road in front of him and lost 

control of the vehicle, veering to the right and off the 

road. To their rear, 1SG Dowdy, in the HMMWV driven 

by PFC Piestewa, reached Miller’s 5-ton wrecker and 

ordered him to increase speed and keep moving. The 

1SG’s HMMWV was then hit by direct or indirect fire 

and crashed at a high rate of speed into the rear of the 

stopped tractor-trailer, still occupied by SPC Hernandez 

and SPC S. Johnson. 

There were five soldiers in 1SG Dowdy’s vehicle: 

1SG Dowdy, his driver PFC Piestewa, and three soldiers 

in the back–PFC Lynch, SGT Buggs and PFC Anguiano. 

1SG Dowdy was killed on impact. Piestewa survived the 

crash, but was seriously injured and died in captivity. 

Lynch was also seriously injured and captured. The 

circumstances of Buggs’ and Anguiano’s deaths 

remain under investigation. 

PFC Miller’s truck, with SGT Riley and PVT Sloan 

as passengers, was disabled by enemy fire about 

400 meters north of where 1SG Dowdy’s HMMWV hit 

SPC Hernandez’s tractor- trailer. PVT Sloan was killed 

by enemy fire before the vehicle came to a stop. PFC 

Miller and SGT Riley dismounted from their truck and 

moved to assist the occupants of the HMMWV and 

tractor-trailer just ahead of them. The occupants of 

the HMMWV appeared to be dead or beyond help. SGT 

Riley attempted to secure 1SG Dowdy’s M16, since his 

own rifle had malfunctioned, but was unsuccessful. SGT 

Riley then directed SPC Johnson and SPC Hernandez to 

take cover. Riley also attempted to fire Johnson’s and 

Hernandez’s M16s, but both jammed. Johnson and 

Hernandez were both wounded. 

Consistent with the Code of Conduct, with no 

means to continue to resist, SGT Riley made the decision 

to surrender the two soldiers (Hernandez and Johnson) 

and himself. PFC Miller, however, moved beyond the 

crash-site and made his way to an Iraqi dump truck 

with which he hoped to escape; but as he approached 

the truck, he spotted enemy soldiers attempting to fire 

a mortar. He realized they would kill his comrades, so 

with average shooting skills he hid behind a sand dune 

and sniped at the mortar crew. Each time his weapon 

jammed, he ducked down, cleared it and then shot 

another Iraqi. One -by- one he killed seven men trying 

to load the mortar and shot another who approached it 

but was eventually surrounded and captured. Although 

unconfirmed, Miller may have killed as many as nine 

Iraqi combatants.2

In the HEMTT wrecker towing a 5 -ton tractor- trailer, 

SPC Hudson attempted to fire his M249 SAW while 

driving, but it malfunctioned. After he had driven past 

obstacles and debris, including an Iraqi tank blocking 

the road, his vehicle was disabled on the southern edge 

of the city. Iraqi forces continued to fire on the vehicle 

after it stopped. CW2 Mata, in the passenger seat, 

was killed, having sustained multiple wounds. Hudson, 

also wounded, was immediately surrounded after 

the shooting stopped, and was pulled from the 

vehicle by Iraqis and captured. 

The 5-ton tractor trailer (#8), crewed by PFC Howard 

Johnson and PVT Ruben Estrella-Soto, and the 5-ton 

truck (#9), crewed by SPC Jamaal Addison and SPC 

James Kiehl, attempted to drive out of the city. After 

both vehicles maneuvered several miles under fire, and 

nearly out of the city, both were destroyed. There are 

few details to describe what happened to the soldiers 

in these vehicles. Both vehicles were stopped: #9 

overturned at the Highway 8 -7/8 intersection, possibly 

hit by direct or indirect fire, and #8 was disabled south 

of the intersection. There is some evidence to suggest 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 15

Hudson’s HEMTT wrecker destroyed in the kill zone. Photo courtesy of We Served Together

that vehicle #8 struck the barrel of an Iraqi tank. 

All four soldiers were killed in action.

Conclusion

Of the 33 soldiers who entered An Nasiriyah in 18 

vehicles (including two that were being towed) on 23 

March, 11 soldiers were killed, seven were captured 

and nine were wounded (including some of those 

captured). Sixteen soldiers in eight vehicles emerged 

from the attack. The number of Iraqi casualties inflicted 

by soldiers of the 507th and 3rd FSB could not be 

determined. From start to finish, the attack on the 

507th lasted an estimated 60 to 90 minutes.

In reviewing the actions on the morning of 23 

March 2003, it is clear that the soldiers of the 507th 

Maintenance Company, including two soldiers from the 

3rd FSB, were attacked for a sustained period of time. 

Fatigue, stress, the asymmetric nature of the threat, 

and the environment contributed to the events leading 

up to and during this attack. Every soldier performed 

honorably and each did his or her duty. The battle for 

An Nasiriyah would last until March 31st when the 

Marine Corps ultimately gained control of the city.3 

Lesson

This attack on the 507th Maintenance Company would 

at best be classified as a hasty ambush. There were a 

number of mistakes made but the soldiers and leaders 

performed as they were trained. The problem was that 
16 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

1 This narration is taken from the Executive Summary, “Attack on the 

507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, an Nasiriyah, Iraq,” n.d.

“1486th Transportation Company Easter Week Firefights.”

2 Patrick Miller, Silver Star Medal Citation; Chris Moon, “Kansan of the Year 

– Patrick Miller,” the Capital-Journal, January 04, 2004, http://cjonline.

com/stories/010404/mid_miller.shtml. 

3 This ends the Executive Summary.

support soldiers did not receive the same emphasis on 

basic weapons training as combat soldiers. The major 

problem with the weapon malfunctions during the 

ambush was dust. The dust in Kuwait and Iraq was like a 

fine talcum powder that was easily stirred up and filtered 

through even the tiniest crack. For weapons to operate 

in that kind of environment required the owners to check 

and clean their weapons several times during the day. 

Even during the Vietnam War, truck drivers routinely 

wiped down their crew-served weapons during a convoy 

just from the dust kicked up by the vehicle traffic on the 

road. Since survival depends upon the weapon, good 

leaders in the Infantry continuously inspect their soldiers’ 

weapons for cleanliness. In the event of a malfunction, 

soldiers needed to instinctively know how to clear a jam; 

and if needed, completely field strip a weapon even 

under fire. This was the reason WWII soldiers placed 

so much emphasis on being able to disassemble and 

assemble their weapons fast and even blindfolded. If 

necessary, a soldier would stop to quickly field strip and 

clean his weapon to get operational. It would be better 

to take the time to fix the problem than fight with a 

malfunctioning weapon. The reason they practiced this 

procedure blindfolded was so they could do this in the 

dark. This kind of training became a lost art.

Always considered “in the rear with the gear,” 

support units did not need much firepower and did not 

have that many crew -served weapons. This war would 

teach the truck drivers the same lessons as the truck 

drivers had learned during the Korean and Vietnam Wars 

- or: nothing commands respect like the M2 .50 caliber 

machinegun. The gunners of this war also had an even 

nicer weapon at their disposal – the MK19 automatic 

grenade launcher, but these were in short supply or 

left behind by the 507th during this movement. 

Amount of basic load was another lesson truck 

drivers would have to relearn. Support units had a 

considerable smaller basic load than combat units 

because they were once again seen as in the safe rear. 

Ambushes taught gunners a very important lesson – 

you can never have too much ammunition in a kill zone. 

The great thing about vehicles was that they could carry 

lots of ammunition and made great mounts for crewserved weapons, but the idea of heavily armed and 

armored vehicles would not catch on until the 

ambushes began in June of that same year.

Finally, units needed rehearsed procedures for 

any contingency. These would evolve from Standard 

Operating Procedures (SOP) of old to Tactics, Techniques 

and Procedures (TTP) of this war. TTPs would continue 

to evolve with the enemy’s ever- changing TTPs. Just like 

clearing a jam or field stripping a weapon, reaction to 

enemy combat had to be rehearsed to the point it 

was instinctive. 

This attack sent shock waves through the support 

units by reminding them that there was no longer a 

safe rear. What the soldiers and leaders assigned to 

the truck units failed to learn from this ambush, the 

Vietnam veterans did. Immediately after this ambush hit 

the news, Vietnam veterans called the Transportation 

Corps Historian telling him that gun trucks would have 

prevented or reduced the loss of life. This attack was a 

precursor of what was to follow but few recognized it.

America’s enemies study our history to look for 

weaknesses, but most do not research further back 

any further than the Vietnam War. The misconception of

this history was that the best way to defeat the American 

Army was to inflict casualties. American media focused 

on the loss of life to a point that overshadowed any 

victories on the ground. Of all the heroic battles in

this ambush, the media focused more on the prisoners 

from the 507th and elevated PFC Jessica Lynch to hero 

status. The initial reports of a blonde soldier fighting 

until he or she ran out of ammunition may have actually

been SGT Donald Walters who was posthumously 

awarded the Silver Star Medal. Less attention was 

aid to SPC Patrick Miller whose heroic actions during

that ambush earned him the Silver Star Medal. This 

focus on loss versus gain by the media was not lost on 

the enemy. All they had to do to make the Americans go 

home was kick up the body count. So for the next year, 

the enemy would improve their ambushes.
Operation Iraqi Freedom 17

Left: HEMTT gun truck, Battleship. 

Photo courtesy of the Transportation Museum

Left Middle: M1098 gun truck.

Photo courtesy of Eric Hedlund

Right Middle: HM998 gun truck. 

Photo courtesy of David Hanselman

Left Lower: Mad Max armor. 

Photo courtesy of Eric Hedlund

Left Bottom: M915 gun trailer, 

Eve of Destruction II.

Photo courtesy of Adam Dumont

Right Bottom: BG Ennis Whitehead 

and 1LT Bradley Lavite in front of 

M915. Photo courtesy of Eric Hedlund
Left: 5-ton gun 

trucks of the 7th 

Transportation 

Battalion with “dog 

house” roofs built 

by the Skunk Werks. 

Left Below:

M1114 Up-armored 

HMMWV of the 

623rd Field Artillery. 

Right Below: 

PLS gun truck. 

Photos courtesy of

Richard Killblane

18 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Right:

Sit and spin HMMWV 

gun truck of the 1836th 

Transportation Company.

Photo courtesy of Steve Ruggiero

Left Below: 

M998 HMMWV with gun box.

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane 

Right Below:

M998 HMMWV with 

add-on-armor kit. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 19

Tiger Team/Convoy Rat Patrol, June 2003

rom the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom 

in March 2003, the MPs had the responsibility 

to escort convoys. Combined Forces Land 

Component Command (CFLCC) required two HMMWVs 

to escort a convoy regardless of its size. The problem 

was most of them were unarmored and armed with 

nothing more than an M -249 squad automatic weapon 

(SAW). The convoys they escorted had more fire power 

than that. At first, the attacks mostly targeted individual 

trucks with small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades 

(RPG) and improvised explosive devices (IED) along Main 

Supply Route (MSR) Tampa. The shortage of MP escorts 

and the increasing threat to convoys in Iraq beginning 

in May 2003 inspired the rebirth of the gun truck. 

That early in the war, some officers actually believed 

gun trucks would not have any effect on this level of 

threat. In war, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) 

were always evolving. As the TTPs 

on one side evolve, the TTPs of the 

other reciprocate. In tactics, nothing 

remains constant, yet some of 

those responsible for doctrine and 

technology saw each step as an 

end rather than a progression. Not 

only that but the normal process 

for research, development, test and 

procurement was painfully slow. 

While those responsible for doctrine 

and technology debated over the 

appropriate solution, the truck drivers 

and mechanics took matters in their 

own hands. The threat was real to 

them and they saw the gun truck 

as an immediate solution to their 

problem. Once again, the development 

of the gun truck was a Transportation Corps initiative.

The initial threat in the summer of 2003 challenged 

the 181st Transportation Battalion at Logistical Support 

Area (LSA) Anaconda, which had responsibility for the 

convoys along MSR Tampa. In June, the insurgents killed 

a civilian contract driver of Kellogg, Brown and Root 

(KBR) and the rest refused to drive in Iraq without military 

escort. The battalion commander, LTC Chuck Maskell, 

tasked CPT Isaac Bristow, commander of the 2632nd 

F

Rehearsing box formation at Udari Range, Kuwait. 

Photo courtesy of 518th Gun Truck Company

Transportation Company, to build 30 gun trucks to 

provide command and control over the civilian convoys. 

Again the issue came down to armor and armament. 

There already was an M1114 armored HMMWV with a 

ring mount in the inventory, but not enough to meet the 

demands of convoys in Iraq. Not until early 2005, would 

the commercial industry produce enough M1114s or 

add - on armor kits to fulfill the increased demands 

of the war.

Instead mechanics welded sheet metal to the sides 

of M998 HMMWVs and because the soft tops could not 

support ring mounts, they constructed gun boxes on the 

backs of HMMWVs. The welders of the 181st Battalion 

experimented with gun truck designs in a section of the 

maintenance area known as the “Skunk Werks.” As the 

ambush threat spread to other areas later that year, 

so did the development of HMMWV gun truck designs. 

There was a wide variety of designs, some good and 

some bad. This led to the term “hillbilly armor.” Because 

the cabs of the HMMWVs did not have ring mounts 

or support the weight of a ring mount, the HMMWV 

designs primarily consisted of an armored box and 

mounted machinegun in the back. Machinegun mounts 

were either pedestal or ring mount welded on a box or 

swivel seat. Some HMMWV gun trucks even mounted 

machineguns on swivel arms hinged to the back doors 

like helicopter door guns. Any vehicle with an M -249 

(SAW) was considered a gun truck. 
20 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

While history does not always repeat itself, this is 

where it rhymed, as Mark Twain joked. The Vietnam 

gun jeep could not support the weight of full armor 

protection as could the 5-ton gun truck; and, since the 

HMMWV was designed to replace both the jeep and the 

2 1⁄2 - ton truck, the HMMWV gun truck combined the 

best attributes of both in terms of armor and armament. 

Like the gun jeep, the HMMWV had the room for the 

communications equipment that made it an ideal convoy 

commander vehicle. Although it could accelerate and 

maneuver like a gun jeep it could not carry the number of 

crew - served weapons as the 5 - ton gun truck. So there 

was still the need for bigger gun trucks.

The larger gun truck designs either consisted of a 

machinegun mounted on a ring mount over the cab or 

for those vehicles that could not fit a ring mount, the 

crews constructed a sandbag and plywood box on the 

back of the 5-ton truck. Many built roofs over their gun 

boxes to provide shade from the sun, thus giving the 

appearance of a “dog house.” It did not take long to 

figure out that sandbags fell apart with the beating of the 

rough road. Crews then began to experiment with steel 

walls. Remarkably some would find their inspiration for 

gun trucks from photos of Vietnam gun trucks on the 

internet. Their only limitation was the availability of steel. 

Yet they had taken the same first steps as the 8th 

Group had in Vietnam. 

Inspired by Dean Dominique’s article, “Convoy 

Rat Patrol,” CPT Bristow developed a doctrine around 

the HMMWV gun trucks he called “Tiger Teams.” Two 

HMMWV gun trucks ran 

ahead of convoys to block

 traffic at intersections so 

the convoys could pass 

without slowing down or 

stopping. In the event of 

an ambush, they could 

respond to the threat with 

fire power. Other units 

adopted this doctrine. The 

Tiger Teams performed 

like scouts out ahead of 

the convoy and security for 

Lead HMMWV gun truck of a convoy of the 1864th Transportation Company. Photo courtesy of 1864th Transportation CompanyRat Patrol blocking road. Photo courtesy of Steve Ruggiero

Early in the war, gun trucks 

employed cavalry tactics 

of dismounting to fight. 

Photo courtesy of 1158th HET
Operation Iraqi Freedom 21

the convoy if hit. The dog house and ring mounted gun 

trucks just maintained their positions in the convoy. The 

idea spread to other units in Iraq and some returned to 

the name, “Rat Patrols.”

The private military contractor, Military Professional 

Resources Inc. (MPRI), also took the initiative to develop 

a convoy live fire training program at Camp Udari, Kuwait. 

JTF7 saw the need to send units back to Kuwait for this 

training. MPRI began by teaching the drivers to dismount 

their vehicles and fight when in the kill zone. Taking 

feedback from drivers, MPRI continually evolved their 

training. They quickly changed the ambush doctrine 

to clear the kill zone. One of their most significant 

contributions was the concept of the floating rally point, 

where convoys would form a box a couple miles beyond 

the kill zone. As gun trucks evolved, so did the MPRI 

training program making them the proponent for 

convoy ambush battle drills.

OIF2 Al Sadr’s April Uprising

n 31 March 2004, four civilian contract body 

guards of the Blackwater Security Consulting, which 

provided security for food deliveries, drove into 

Fallujah and their vehicle was attacked. The contactors 

were killed, their bodies mutilated beyond recognition, 

burned and what was left was hung on the bridge over 

the Euphrates. BG Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director for 

Coalition Operations, pledged to hunt down those who 

carried out killings, but added that he would not send 

forces into Fallujah to retrieve the remains of the victims. 

He instead asked the Iraqi Police to recover the remains. 

Kimmit feared that any coalition forces entering the city 

would encounter ambushes where the insurgents would 

use civilians as human shields and any pre -emptive 

attack into the city could lead to a bad situation and 

make it even worse. The US military would instead act 

on the time and place of its choosing. This hesitancy 

seemed to encourage the insurgents and violence 

spread to other regions in the Sunni Triangle.

At 1300 hours on Tuesday, 5 April 2005, the 

Mosques in the Sunni Triangle relayed Muqtada Al Sadr’s 

call for Iraqi people to take up arms in a jihad against 

the coalition forces. A car bomb exploded next to a 

patrol of three US armored vehicles and two HMMWVs 

I

in Al Ramadi at 1700 hours that day. A series of 

attacks would escalate to the worst weekend of 

convoy ambushes in the history of the Iraq War. 

A platoon from the 1486th Medium Truck stationed 

at Cedar II escorted a KBR Class IX (repair parts) 

Sustainer Push convoy to LSA Anaconda. On 5 April, 

SSG Dan Studer’s squad escorted a KBR convoy 

returning from Anaconda. At 0745 hours, three 

insurgents fired small arms and an RPG from a dump 

truck. The convoy continued to move and did not return 

fire. At 0750 hours on Alternate Supply Route (ASR) 

Sword, the same convoy received more small arms fire 

bowing out the rear duals on a KBR truck. The convoy 

continued to a rally point without returning fire. At the 

rally point, the KBR truck changed its tires. At 0905 

hours, an orange and white vehicle approached from 

the rear at a high rate of speed and two passengers 

fired at the convoy. The convoy returned fire and injured 

on of the insurgents. SGT Hubert applied first aid until 

a medevac arrived. At 1130 hours, a taxi with five 

insurgents fired on the convoy. Upon reaching Convoy 

Support Center (CSC) Scania, KBR pulled their convoys 

off of the road and the squad returned to Cedar. 

The convoy had been ambushed four times in four 

hours. Still these were small kill zones of no more 

than 100 meters.1

On 6 April, a fuel convoy of the 724th POL escorted 

a KBR convoy from Anaconda through the town of Hit. 

As CPT Terrence Henry’s lead vehicle drove through 

the traffic circle on ASR Bronze, the SAW gunner, SPC 

Russell, noticed the absence of ICDC in the circle. As he 

turned to look back, he saw Iraqi gunmen come out from 

behind cars just as an IED exploded on the right side of 

the road. They had detonated it too early and it missed 

the trucks. Russell fired off 13 rounds at the insurgents 

as they opened fire. SGT Bailey and SGT Watson in 

the approaching 5 -ton gun truck saw the exchange 

of gun fire and also engaged targets with their Mk-19 

automatic grenade launcher. SGT Bailey began picking 

off insurgents hiding in the doorways and behind cars. 

The 724th POL had its first ambush and suffered no 

casualties or had any trucks damaged.2

On 7 April, IEDs closed the southbound traffic. The 

Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Militia clashed with elements 

of the 1st Cavalry Division and attacked a convoy on ASR 

Cardinals. The next day, the emboldened Mahdi Militia 
22 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

attacked convoys and again clashed with elements of 

the 1st Cavalry Division on ASR Sword and Cardinals.3

Since 7 April, the 2/12th Cavalry, based out of Camp 

Victory at BIAP, fought with the Mahdi Militia to reassert 

control over their area of operations. The Cavalry patrols 

were frequently attacked by insurgents on ASR Sword 

and Cardinals. The buildings along the streets provided 

excellent concealment for the insurgents to fire down 

upon the passing vehicles. Some insurgents felt 

so bold as to drive right up to the tanks and Bradleys 

and fire RPGs at them. At 0300 in the morning of 9 April, 

CPT Munz ordered his patrol of C, 2/12 Cavalry to take 

the Dairy Milk Factory from which the insurgents had 

launched their attacks. The Cavalry patrol settled in 

to a defensive perimeter for the rest of the morning.4

On Thursday night, 8 April, the Militia dropped eight 

bridges and overpasses surrounding CSC Scania, thus 

severing northbound traffic into Baghdad International 

Airport (BIAP) where the newly arrived 1st Cavalry 

Division drew its supplies. The stage was set for the 

culmination of the attacks on Easter weekend. With 

all the violence flaring up around the Sunni Triangle, 

the combat arms leaders failed to see what the 

logisticians saw. The enemy knew the soft underbelly 

of the Abrams tank was the trucks it depended upon 

for everything it needed to fight. Starting Thursday night, 

the enemy launched large scale ambushes, which 

would be later referred to as complex ambushes.

Complex Ambush, 8 April 2004

1486th Transportation Company

n the desert, an overpass is high ground. 2LT 

James McCormick II had earned the Bronze Star 

Medal as a scout squad leader with the 24th 

Infantry Division during Desert Storm the hard way; it 

came with the Purple Heart. He had just graduated from 

the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Officers Basic Course, but 

realized if he wanted to see combat in this war, he would 

do better to go with a truck company, so he joined CPT 

Pat Hinton’s 1487th Medium Truck Company (Medium 

Truck) National Guard from Eaton, Ohio, in time to 

deploy with them to Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Hinton 

recognized the need for a combat arms mentality in a 

truck unit, which at first caused friction with the NCOs 

who saw the convoy’s mission as merely delivering the 

cargo to its destination. Whether gun trucks should be 

aggressive and take action to deter attacks on future 

convoys or just get the convoy safely through the kill 

zone and onto its destination was a subject of debate 

that was never resolved during this war.

The official policy in OIF had been to rotate units 

upon completion of one -year boots on the ground (BOG). 

The problem was that within a few months, the Army 

had all new units fighting the war. They had a short right 

seat/left seat ride period before the transfer of authority, 

and then the new units had to learn how to fight the 

war all over. Each year the Iraqi insurgents gained more 

experience fighting the Americans, yet the American 

units on the ground only gained one year experience 

fighting the Iraqis and then left. The replacement of OIF 

I units was pretty much completed by March 2004.

The 1487th Transportation Company had arrived 

in Kuwait on 3 February 2004 where it was sent to 

Cedar II and conducted its right- seat- ride with the 

740th Medium Truck Company, from South Dakota, in 

February. The 740th had conducted routine sustainment 

missions from Kuwait to Camp Cedar II and had never 

been hit during its year tour. The 1487th Transportation 

Company’s first right seat ride with the 740th, however, 

was a five to seven-day trip to the Syrian border.5

2LT McCormick’s convoy departed Cedar II for BIAP. 

They rested overnight at BIAP and departed the next 

morning at 0600 hours. A pair of Apache helicopter 

gunships escorted the convoy on ASR Mobile when an 

IED exploded next to an M915. The explosion damaged 

the truck and wounded both drivers. SPC Jacob Bach 

became the first soldier of the 1487th to become 

wounded in action.6

McCormick asked the platoon leader, “What 

next?” She looked at him and said that this had never 

happened to her convoy before. Most of the problems 

occurred north of CSC Scania and the 740th usually just 

ran convoys to Cedar II near An Nasariyah and back. This 

was also their first run beyond Cedar. The platoon leader 

pulled out her folder with the radio frequencies and 

medevac procedures. McCormick was surprised that no 

one had memorized the frequencies but him. They called 

for the medevac but since a helicopter had been shot 

down near Fallujah, they told the convoy to bring 

the wounded in. When McCormick walked back 

O
Operation Iraqi Freedom 23

to the damaged truck, he 

saw soldiers milling around 

and taking pictures as if it 

was a traffic accident. They 

were still in the kill zone. 

So he yelled at the drivers 

to get back in their trucks. 

They continued to Camp 

Champion near Al Ramadi 

and finished the six- day run 

without further incident.7

2LT McCormick 

believed in the aggressive 

approach and after that 

convoy, his crew painted 

their HMMWV gun truck, 

with alternating black and 

tan stripes so the enemy 

would know it was coming. 

McCormick wanted to name it 

something more fitting of its offensive role, like 

“the Striped Avenger” or “the Raptor,” but SPC Thomas 

A. “Mojo” Salemme jokingly called it, “the Zebra.” 

McCormick asked, “Have you ever seen a zebra turn 

and fight?” The rest of the crew thought the name was 

funny and reminded him that it looked like a zebra, 

so he let them call it that. McCormick and his HMMWV 

crew would have plenty of opportunity to prove 

themselves. His platoon also added a ring mount to 

the top of an M915 5-ton and constructed a steel 

gun box on the back.8

On 22 March 2004, the 1487th Medium Truck 

escorted a 70 -plus convoy west toward Al Asaad when 

an IED exploded just past the second bridge on ASR 

Mobile, disabling an M915 and wounding two civilian 

drivers in the last half of the convoy. 2LT McCormick 

had his Zebra, the M915 gun truck and gun trailer turned 

back to secure the damaged vehicle. Meanwhile, the 

5-ton gun truck with an M60 machinegun led the rest 

of the convoy out of the kill zone, but SSG Robert Mata’s 

M915 maintenance truck remained in the kill zone 

where he fired his SAW then ran back to recover the 

wounded civilian drivers. The Zebra crested the overpass 

from the south side and surprised four insurgents on 

the overpass. The Zebra did not have any crew - served 

weapons, so the crew dismounted, except for the 

gunner on top, and laid down suppressive fire 

with their M16s and SAWs. 

The Iraqis then fled to the safety of their white 

pickup. The crew of the Zebra ripped the vehicle 

and insurgents apart with small arms fire and then 

McCormick spotted a white truck with a mortar tube 

in the back firing at them from behind a berm to the 

south. SPC Bryan Noble fired a 40mm round from his 

M203 grenade launcher but the truck was a little out of 

range so SPC Salemme opened up on it with his squad 

automatic weapon (SAW) and the truck exploded into 

M915 tractor with sheet metal door armor. Photo courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company

Zebra gun truck before the .50 caliber machine gun was 

added. At the time of the ambush it had no door armor. 

Photo courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company
24 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

pieces – definitely secondaries. That was typical of most 

small- scale ambushes before the April Uprising of 2004. 

McCormick had learned the success of turning the fight 

back into the enemy. During ten minutes of fighting, the 

Americans had killed at least two insurgents.9

When McCormick turned to talk on the radio, rounds 

hit around his feet and suddenly he felt something hit 

him in the calf. It was the copper jacket of a bullet. He 

refused medevac fearing that he would not be allowed 

to accompany the convoy on the rest of its journey. 

After the damaged M915 was towed away, the Zebra 

returned to where the convoy had staged in a defensive 

posture under the Platoon Sergeant, SFC Tim Haggard. 

McCormick’s leg was treated by a Navy doctor at 

Al Asaad earning him his second Purple Heart Medal. 

McCormick then led the convoy back to Camp Champion 

near Ar Ramadi and dropped off the damaged truck. 

While waiting, the camp received mortar fire for two 

days. Upon his return to Navistar on 26 March, Hinton 

advised the lieutenant to stay off the road and let the leg 

wound heal. McCormick felt any enemy he killed in that 

kill zone was enemy who would not ambush any other 

convoy. The NCOs felt differently and protested to their 

commander that he had recklessly endangered the rest 

of the convoy by not continuing the mission.10

On April 5, 2004, the radical young cleric Muqtada 

al Sadr flexed his muscles and called for a jihad against 

coalition forces in Iraq. The intelligence community just 

expected this to be just a lot more of the same, which 

translated for truck drivers into a lot of small - scale 

convoy ambushes. No one outside the Vietnam veterans 

had anticipated the size and sophistication of the 

ambushes. Up until that time, the prevalent response 

was to push pedal to the metal and race out of 

the kill zone while returning fire. 

Having learned that anyone dressed in the black 

uniform of the militia or wearing their green and yellow 

colors was enemy and coalition forces had authorization 

to shoot without being fired upon, SSG Rick Gruver of the 

1st Platoon, 1486th Medium Truck Company went over 

to ask 2LT McCormick to join his convoy, “I would really 

like you to go. I’ve got a bad feeling. I hear you kick ass.” 

McCormick went to his company commander to ask 

permission to augment Gruver’s convoy, since he had 

been grounded after his last convoy. 

CPT Pat Hinton had used James’ leg wound from 

that previous ambush as an excuse to keep him in to 

see how well the NCOs would do on their own. James 

pleaded with his commander to let him go and Hinton 

finally relented but the lieutenant could only take 

volunteers. This was no problem since he attracted 

likeminded warriors.

McCormick managed to get the six -foot four- inch 

SPC Bryan Noble back as his driver. Noble was a parttime bounty hunter and absolutely fearless in combat. 

CPT Hinton asked SPC Brandon Lawson to go as the 

radio operator. McCormick ran into SPC Ralph Blue, 

from the 812th Battalion staff, and he volunteered to 

go. He had spent six years in the US Marines but when 

the terrorists attacked on 9/11, he enlisted in the Army 

SPC Bryan Noble pointing to where rounds hit the Zebra 

during the Battle of BIAP on 11 April 2004 . 

Photo courtesy of Thomas Salemme

2LT James McCormick, SPC Brandon Lawson and SPC Ralph 

Blue in front of the Zebra right before the mission.

Photo courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 25

Reserves. McCormick was glad to have him. That gave 

him a crew of four. As he had done before every mission, 

he offered his crew the opportunity to back out. In jest 

he told them that he would understand if they did not 

want to go because he knew they wanted to go with him. 

McCormick’s gun truck was a soft-skin HMMWV 

with squad automatic weapon (SAW), but he believed 

had he had a .50 caliber machinegun during his last 

ambush the outcome would have been significantly 

different. Thirty minutes before they were to leave, 

McCormick visited SGT Peacock, of C Battery, 201st 

Field Artillery (West Virginia National Guard), and said, 

“I need a .50 cal worse than a dead man needs a 

casket.” Peacock responded, “Well, yeah buddy, I’ll give 

you one of ours. Pull it over to the shop.” They drove 

the Zebra over to the shop and cut out a hole in the 

turtle shell top where Peacock’s mechanics installed 

a pedestal mount for the M2 .50 caliber machinegun. 

They also found some old Kevlar ballistic vests and hung 

them over the doors for added protection. Because 

McCormick was the only member of his crew who had 

any real experience on the .50, he was the gunner 

with 1,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. Each 

man carried seven 30 -round magazines of 5.56mm 

ammunition for their M16s. Noble carried the M203 with 

30 rounds of high explosive and about ten smoke rounds 

in his vehicle. The crew also stored a few extra ammo 

cans with M16 magazines and a mixture of smoke 

grenades, fragmentary grenades and flares 

in the vehicle.11

Three gun trucks escorted Gruver’s convoy of 

approximately 40 vehicles across the Iraqi border from 

Kuwait up MSR Tampa. This was a regularly scheduled 

sustainment push hauling anything from food, water, 

and ammunition to toilet paper. SPC Kray Holloway drove 

the lead HMMWV gun truck with SPC Brian Coe, SPC 

Justin Miller and SGT Tracy Dyer as SAW gunners in the 

open box, fourth in line of march. Dyer was the company 

clerk but wanted to go out so this was his first run. This 

HMMWV had add - on ballistic armor kit with ballistic 

glass. The Zebra drove in the middle of the convoy as 

the “floater,” which moved up and down the convoy 

keeping trucks in line and raced ahead to block traffic 

at intersections. An M915 tractor in the rear had a gun 

box constructed on the back with an MK19 automatic 

grenade launcher. 

Gruver’s convoy started off without any mishaps 

until it reached “Dirt Tampa.” Then the Zebra crew 

received a call that an M915 driven by Coe and Delany 

had rear-ended another truck, the HMMWV gun truck 

driven by Holloway with Justin Miller and Dyer. The 

M915A3 was damaged and could not be towed. The 

Zebra and the M915 manned by Williams, Prather 

and “Meat” Mealer remained with the damaged truck. 

The rest of the convoy continued on to the Convoy 

Support Center Scania and remained until after dark. 

While waiting on Tampa, the gunners discovered that 

Mealer had placed the firing pin in backwards in his 

M60 machinegun and also “jacked up” the MK19 

automatic grenade launcher. The locals came out and 

watched them like buzzards, so they test fired their 

weapons which kept the locals at a distance, but all 

through the night trucks would drive around them in 

Top: Pedestal mount for the .50 caliber machine gun was 

added to the Zebra right before the mission. 

Bottom: Later view of the Zebra showing the 50 caliber 

machine gun on top after door armor was added. 

Photos courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company
26 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the desert. When finally someone came up from Cedar 

and recovered the wrecked M915, the rest of the convoy 

hurried to Scania. This seemed like a bad omen.12

On Thursday April 8, SSG Gruver’s convoy departed 

Scania for BIAP. From there, they would push supplies to 

the 1st Cav in the Green Zone. Everything was smooth 

sailing up the main highway until the convoy approached 

the final turn into BIAP around 1900 hours that evening. 

The crew of the Zebra saw some Iraqi kids playing 

soccer and then Blue saw one of the kids pick up a cell 

phone and make a call. They knew that kids playing 

soccer would call ahead and warn the insurgents that a 

convoy was coming. Right after that, the lead elements 

of the convoy drove up the ramp of the interchange and 

headed for the south gate a few miles away. The crew of 

Holloway’s HMMWV gun truck could see the gate off in 

the distance. Dyer sat on the left side, Coe stood in the 

middle with the SAW and Miller sat on the right side of 

the gun truck. Coe pointed to the right and said he could 

SGT Kray Holloway’s HMMWV gun truck with vinyl cover rolled back for the three gunners. Photo courtesy of Tom Stewart

Later view of the M915 gun truck, but with a .50 caliber 

machine gun instead of the Mk19. 

Photo courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company

Damaged M915 on the way to Scania. 

Photo courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company

Rear view of the gun box on the M915 tractor. 

Photo courtesy of the 518th Gun Truck Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 27

even see one of Saddam’s’ palaces off in the distance 

to the left, which overlooked the entrance to BIAP. Dyer 

and Miller looked over Coe’s shoulder to see the palace 

when they heard SSG Gruver yell over the radio, 

“Contact on the right side.”13

Just as SSG Tom Stewart’s tractor, third in the line 

of march, made the turn onto the onramp, two mortars 

rounds exploded about ten meters just in front of his 

vehicle to his right. It was as if the rounds were intended 

to block the route heading north. His driver, PV2 Hillary 

Suter, instinctively hit the brakes and when Stewart felt 

the truck slow down, he yelled at her, “Go, Go, Go, don’t 

stop, keep going!” Stewart then turned to his right and 

pointed his M16 out the window to fire, but could not 
28 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

see any enemy in the tall reeds. The HMMWV gun truck 

behind his truck opened fire on the enemy in the reeds. 

As his truck completed the turn, Stewart looked back 

and recognized the Zebra further back on Tampa.14

After the first few vehicles had made the turn onto 

the service road, everyone heard two loud explosions 

in front of the convoy. SSG James D. Martin and Elaine 

F. Coleman saw a mortar round land in the median and 

then they received small arms fire. Coleman called on 

the handheld radio that they were taking fire from both 

sides of the road and Martin started returning fire. Dyer, 

Miller and Coe in the HMMWV gun truck turned around 

and grabbed their weapons.15

SPC Holloway steered her HMMWV gun truck onto 

the right hand side of the road just short of the on ramp 

to provide cover for the passing convoy. Dyer saw three 

Iraqis, with weapons and dressed in black, running off 

to his left towards cover. Dyer fired his SAW at them 

and they received return fire from the left and front. 

A round severed Coe’s thumb and he collapsed into 

the vehicle. SPC Robert A. Delaney immediately went 

to work treating Coe’s wound. He yelled to Holloway to 

get to the gate because Coe needed medical help. As 

the HMMWV began to roll forward, a round hit Dyer in 

the right triceps and twice in the right forearm. As they 

turned down the road to BIAP, a round hit Miller in his 

left arm. He fell down but stood back up to fire, all the 

while cursing at the enemy. Dyer also continued to fire 

his SAW. A mortar round landed on the left side next 

to the HMMWV and shrapnel peppered Dyer from his 

right wrist to his shoulder and hit Coe in the arm and 

face while he was lying down in the vehicle. Just as Dyer 

nearly expended all the ammunition in the drum of his 

SAW, a round penetrated his right forearm and exited his 

elbow causing his arm to go limp. Unable hold his SAW, 

he moved his left hand back to fire his weapon when 

another round hit the hand guard. Unable to hold the 

weapon, he fell back into the HMMWV. In three 

minutes all three gunners were wounded and 

Holloway screamed this on the radio.16

Over in the Zebra, McCormick ordered Noble, “Pull 

up there next to their HMMWV and see what’s going 

on.” The Zebra stopped just 20 feet from Holloway’s 

gun truck. Noble noticed the trucks were pulling over to 

stop as if they were going to “box up.” The box formation 

was used for security like circling the wagons in the 

Old West and formed by the first trucks stopping in a 

row right behind the lead gun truck and the next row of 

trucks pulling up next to it. The lead and rear gun trucks 

would close off the ends like a box. The doctrine called 

for the box formation to be formed outside the kill zone, 

not in the middle of it. McCormick told Lawson to tell 

those drivers to “knock that shit off and get in the gate.” 

Forming a box in the kill zone was suicide!17

By then all of Holloway’s three gunners were 

down. McCormick saw Miller get back up and fire at an 

insurgent on the bridge but recognized the terror on 

Holloway’s face. There was one RPK machinegun behind 

a berm just beyond the overpass that had the onramp 

completely covered and could also shoot down Tampa. 

A second RPK had a perfect shot up the onramp and 

road to BIAP. The two machineguns had interlocking fire 

on that onramp. Unknown to them there was one lone 

militiaman with a SPD sniper rifle on the overpass that 

probably took out most of Holloway’s crew and a mortar 

somewhere beyond the overpass. The bulk of the enemy 

with AKs were concealed in ditches on the left side of 

the Tampa leading to the overpass. In all, there were 

about 30 insurgents in either black militia garb or civilian 

attire forming a perfect L- shaped kill zone. The truck 

drivers had never experienced an ambush this size or as 

well planned as this before.18

Meanwhile, SSG Gruver, meanwhile, led the lead 

elements of his convoy to safety while the gun trucks 

withdrew and returned fire. There was no serpentine so 

the lead elements of the convoy did not have to slow 

down. Once in BIAP, Gruver set about trying to get a 

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) out to the kill zone. Once 

inside the gate, Stewart instructed his driver to pull off 

to the right in a staging area. He dismounted, walked to 

SSG Tom Stewart. Photo courtesy of Tom Stewart
Operation Iraqi Freedom 29

the guard shack where he informed the guards about the 

ambush and counted trucks as they came in. He heard 

some of the trucks had stopped and were waiting for the 

Zebra to suppress the enemy before they would move. 

Evidently a contract driver had halted his vehicle short of 

the kill zone blocking the remainder of the convoy and the 

M915 gun truck remained with that part of the convoy.19

Knowing they could no longer fight, McCormick yelled 

over to Holloway, “Get in the damn gate, get in the damn 

gate!” Holloway then raced to the gate where her crew 

could receive medical attention. As rounds pummeled 

the gun truck, a ricochet hit Dyer behind the right ear 

knocking his head forward. Miller continued to fire his 

weapon until they reached the safety of the compound. 

SSG Stewart watched Holloway’s gun truck come flying 

through the gate and heard her jump out screaming, 

“Help, help, they’ve been shot!” Stewart ran over and 

opened the left back door of the HMMWV and found the 

three gunners lying on top of each other with blood all 

over the place. He grabbed the guy on top, Dyer, by his 

flak jacket and put him out onto the ground. Stewart went 

into his medic mode and started to take the body armor 

off him, but he screamed in pain, so Stewart cut the 

body armor off at shoulders and sides straps. He could 

then just peel the body armor off. Someone had brought 

him a combat life saver (CLS) bag while he searched 

the body and found two or three bullet wounds to the 

right arm. Stewart had another man start bandaging 

the wounds while Stewart and SSG Martin continued to 

calm Dyer down. Stewart luckily found the vein first time 

and inserted an intravenous solution. SPC Keith Miller 

and Hillary Suter cut Coe’s Kevlar vest off in search for 

more wounds. An ambulance pulled up and the medics 

carried the wounded away. Stewart remembered it was 

still daylight. About the time Stewart finished working on 

the wounded, the QRF, a patrol of Air Defense Artillery 

HMMWVs, arrived and stopped at the gate before 

heading out. The Zebra still remained in the kill zone 

fighting it out with the enemy so that the remaining 16 

trucks could reach the safety of the concrete walls that 

surrounded BIAP.20

McCormick noticed three cars filled with Iraqis driving 

up and down the convoy firing at it, so he ordered SPC 

Bryan Noble to drive a little past the onramp entrance 

and pull over to the left facing into the enemy so the 

convoy would have room to pass behind the Zebra. 

The lieutenant had to jump up and sit on the top of 

the HMMWV since there was not enough room in the 

hole to turn the .50 and fire at the cars. The Zebra 

stopped just 70 yards from the overpass in the apex 

of the kill zone. McCormick then popped yellow smoke 

and tossed it to the enemy to the left. He then told 

Lawson to let everyone know the yellow smoke marked 

the enemy position and SPC Brandon Lawson yelled 

over the radio, “Enemy position is marked by yellow 

smoke!” Trucks passed behind them firing at the enemy 

and unintentionally at the Zebra. Noble and Lawson 

dismounted and automatically began firing in their 

sectors from behind their soft-skinned doors as if they 

might provide some cover. SPC Blue fired out the window 

until Noble yelled at him to get out and fire. Noble fired 

40mm grenades out of his M203 as fast as an Mk19 

automatic grenade launcher. He pounded the RPK to the 

left rear of the Zebra until it went silent but neither he 

nor McCormick’s .50 could silence the other up ahead. 

Noble had fired a total of thirty 40mm grenades.21

McCormick knew the most effective enemy fire 

came from the overpass and sprayed it with his .50. 

Suddenly one enemy round punched through the mount 

and hit the ammunition belt sending pieces of the 

shattered round into McCormick’s left hand. He was 

trying to reload when suddenly another hit his ceramic 

plate knocking him down into the floor of the Zebra like 

he had been hit in the chest with a sledgehammer. He 

sat there momentarily stunned when a voice inside 

his head told him to get up. That same moment, Noble 

opened the door and said, “Get the hell out of there, 

LT; you have been shot.” James yelled back, “Fuck No, 

I am getting back up and killing these bastards.” He 

picked himself up from the floor of the vehicle and 

saw two Iraqi insurgents coming in his direction. The 

.50 was out of ammo so he grabbed another belt but 

the blood made the brass slippery and he could not 

hold it. Remembering the advice of an old Vietnam 

vet, he picked up a flare and fired it like a rocket at the 

insurgents. It started a fire in the brush and caused the 

enemy to flee. He then grabbed his M16 and dropped 

both of them. He saw rounds hit one in the in the head, 

blowing a chuck of his skull away and then the man 

bounced on the ground twitching in convulsions. James 

had never seen a man die that way from gunfire. At that 

moment a sudden revelation came over him. A round 
30 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

had hit him square in the chest and he had lived. He 

realized he had no control over whether he lived or died. 

All he could do was just take the fight to the enemy. 

From then on, he no longer feared death and could think 

clearly under fire. He then reloaded his .50 and saw the 

sniper on the overpass leaning over trying to take aim 

on Noble. Evidently the sniper had thought he killed 

the lieutenant so McCormick fired a ten-round burst 

at the bridge blowing out chunks of the concrete and 

splattering the sniper.22

McCormick then wondered why the last half of the 

convoy was not driving through the kill zone. Unknown to 

him, they had boxed up and were waiting for the enemy 

fire to die down before they proceeded. As it was getting 

darker, the lieutenant saw tree branches a couple of 

hundred yards away light up and move every time the 

mortar fired. He started working that tree line with his 

.50 until the mortar ceased firing. Noble then drove 

the Zebra off of the road and the crew dismounted to 

return fire while Lawson called for the Quick Reaction 

Force (QRF). After 20 minutes of fighting, the QRF still 

had not arrived. At last, the remainder of the convoy 

started driving through the kill zone. Soldiers fired out 

the windows as they drove by and one driver not looking 

where he aimed shot up the Zebra with rounds zipping in 

between the crew. One round grazed McCormick’s calf.23

McCormick then told Noble, “Let’s get ready to go 

into the gate,” but Noble informed him, “We’ve got flat 

tires.” The Zebra had three tires shot out so McCormick 

asked, “Will it still roll?” Noble answered, “Yeah.” “Then 

get ready to roll in the gate,” McCormick told him. Just 

then they received a radio call, “We have a TCN [Third 

Country National] and his truck is missing.” McCormick 

then instructed Noble, “Pull over behind this building. 

We have got to find this guy.” The bulk of the fighting 

had died down but there was still some sporadic small 

arms fire. As Blue climbed in, the barrel of his M16 was 

so hot it cooked off a couple rounds. Noble then drove 

the Zebra behind the building where they might find 

one spare tire but did not have the time. They then 

saw the blue car race by shooting at them and they 

poured so many rounds in it that it slid off the road 

and caught fire.24

McCormick then saw the glimpses of light reflecting 

off of the windshields of vehicles speeding his way 

down the dirt access road from Abu Ghraib - the same 

direction as the enemy. It took him a second look to 

recognize the vehicles were HMMWVs of the QRF and 

about that time the truck with the TCN blew past them 

heading for BIAP. The QRF drove between the Zebra 

and its target, the blue car. An aggravated McCormick 

ceased fire and yelled, “What the fuck are they doing?” 

The HMMWVs then pulled around and lined up behind 

the Zebra and they drew fire from where the blue car had 

stopped behind a building. The Zebra crew and the QRF 

returned fire and after about three minutes of intense 

fire, McCormick could tell the car was no longer a threat 

so waved his hand in front of his face giving the signal to 

cease fire. The night then became quiet. That last fight 

had not lasted more than three minutes.25

About that time, the M915 gun truck and a M915 

bobtail pulled up with SPC Dan Baird, PFC Mealer 

and two other soldiers. Adrenaline had McCormick 

still pumped up. He walked around cursing, yelling 

commands and asking how every was, “God, I hate 

these mother fuckers.” That was when he learned that 

Lawson had been shot through the leg. One of the 

soldiers of the QRF bandaged his leg. Another saw the 

lieutenant’s bloody hand and said, “Well sir, you’ve been 

wounded. We’ll take you back to the compound.” The 

combat lifesaver climbed out of the HMMWV with his 

medical aid bag. McCormick yelled at him, “Get your 

ass back in that truck.” With accountability of the 

missing TCN, McCormick wanted to get everyone back 

in the gate to assess the damage to his convoy. The 

soldier replied, “Yes sir,” and did as he was told. The 

lieutenant then wrapped his olive green “drive - on rag” 

around his hand.26

The M915 bobtail hooked up to the Zebra and the 

QRF then escorted them to the Iraqi National Guard 

compound adjacent to the palace. By then McCormick 

had calmed down. There SSG Stewart placed a pressure 

bandage on McCormick’s wound and checked Lawson’s 

wound. In the compound a female driver stepped out 

of the bobtail pale as a ghost. McCormick walked up to 

her and asked her some questions but she just looked 

around as if she was in shock. She started to cry, “I’ve 

got babies. This is crazy. I cannot do this.” The lieutenant 

looked at her with the compassion that a father would 

his daughter and gave her a hug and told her it would 

be okay. She looked at him and exclaimed, “My God, 

look at you guys. All of you have been shot and there is 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 31

blood everywhere.” She then sat down and cried more. 

McCormick consoled her wondering if his daughter 

would ever have to face this.27

The entire fight had lasted 45 minutes resulting 

in five wounded soldiers, but the insurgents lost 18 

confirmed killed in action. The ambush took place a 

mile from the gate at BIAP and a local national convoy 

escorted by HMMWVs was also ambushed on Route 

Sword a few miles to the north in downtown Baghdad. 

That was the beginning of the Easter Weekend 

Ambushes. That night the militia dropped eight bridges 

and overpasses around Scania thus cutting Baghdad 

off from all northbound traffic. The next day, Good Friday, 

the enemy would ambush any convoy that tried to get 

in or out of BIAP. They knew the Achilles Heel of the 1st 

Cavalry was its dependence upon trucks for everything 

they needed to fight. That Easter weekend would result 

in the worst convoy ambushes of the war and the Zebra 

crew’s ordeal had only started. They would lead the 

defense of BIAP against a determined enemy attack 

and escort three convoys through extended kill zones

 on their way to the Green Zone. 

Lesson

By this time in the war, gun trucks had little to no armor 

and employed cavalry tactics of dismounting to fight. 

This brought all weapons to bear against the enemy. 

The enemy laid out an L- shaped kill zone with the 

overpass as the key terrain with a sniper. The two RPK 

machineguns had interlocking fields of fire on the onramp 

and the mortar provided support. In the desert, any 

high ground, whether an overpass or two - story house, 

provided key terrain. The sniper on the overpass inflicted 

the most damage on the two gun truck crews.

The lead gun truck turned in the direction where the 

crew assumed the fire came from and was facing away 

from the apex. Within three seconds, all three gunners 

were wounded and the gun truck was no longer able to 

provide effective fire support. McCormick instinctively 

ordered his gun truck to turn into the apex of the kill 

zone. His .50 machinegun and Noble’s accuracy with the 

M203 grenade launcher took out three of the four key 

enemy weapons. McCormick believed that the sniper had 

assumed he was dead and was taking an aim on Noble 

when McCormick killed him. The key to one gun truck 

defeating the enemy was the accuracy of their fire.

Easter weekend was a turning point in the war in 

Iraq for truck drivers. They enemy had shown great 

sophistication in the planning and scale of their attacks. 

By the end of April, the coalition had suppressed the 

uprising; but for the rest of the year, truck drivers would 

slug it out with the insurgents for control of the road. 

After that Easter weekend, a new term entered the 

Army vernacular – “complex ambush” - to distinguished 

any large - scale ambush from a simple one.

This was not only one of the first complex convoy 

ambushes of the war, but also one of the overlooked 

ambushes in terms of acts of valor. Not since the 

Vietnam War had truck drivers become front line combat 

soldiers and their senior officers had little idea that 

truck drivers could be heroes. For that ambush, the crew 

of the Zebra received the Bronze Star Medal, with the 

exception of Blue. His was downgraded to an ARCOM 

with valor device. Yet their actions, however, exceeded 

those of SSG Timothy Nein and his crew of Raven 

42 for their acts of bravery during the Palm Sunday 

Ambush on 20 March 2005. Nein deservedly earned 

the Distinguished Service Cross and two other soldiers 

earned Silver Stars in the largest convoy ambush of 

the next year. Both crews spent the same amount of 

time in the kill zone. Both Nein and McCormick had 

made the key decisions that saved the convoys. Nein’s 

Raven 42 faced 50 insurgents while McCormick’ Zebra 

faced about 30, but Nein entered the kill zone with 

three fully up- armored M1114 HMMWVs with six more 

up -armored HMMWVs on the main road. McCormick 

entered the kill zone with two HMMWVs and only one 

had plate steel on the doors. It left the kill zone after 

three minutes when all three gunners were wounded. 

Unlike Nein, McCormick was hit twice and kept fighting. 

In fact, McCormick would pick up another volunteer for 

his crew at BIAP and all but one of his five-man crew 

would be wounded before the mission was completed. 

The MPs immediately recognized valor when they saw 

it in Raven 42, awarding two Silver Star Medals and 

one Distinguished Service Cross, but the valor of many 

truck drivers would go unrecognized that weekend. One 

captain did recognize McCormick’s valor and recruited 

him to develop the tactics of his provisional gun truck 

company. When the 1487th returned to Ohio many of 

the soldiers would bring their families up to McCormick 

to introduce them to the man who kept them alive.
32 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

1 “1486th Transportation Company Easter Week Firefights.”

2 SSG Paul L. Marsh and SSG Victor L. Febus, “On the Move with the 

724th Transportation Company: Patriots in the Middle East,” n.d., and 

“Historical Narrative, 724th Transportation Company,” n.d.

3 Power Point, “April 9th Ambush.”

4 SSG Paul L. March, “On the move with the 724th Transportation 

Company: Patriots in the Middle East,” unpublished.

5 1LT James L. McCormick II, “The 518th Combat Gun Truck Company 

(Provisional) ‘US Regulators,’” Transportation Corps Professional Bulletin,

Winter 2004.

6 McCormick, “518th Gun Truck.”

7 McCormick, “518th Gun Truck.”

8 McCormick, “518th Gun Truck,” and telephone interview with McCormick 

by Richard Killblane, 23 July 2005.

9 McCormick email and “518th Gun Truck.”

10 McCormick email and “518th Gun Truck.”

11 McCormick telephone conversation, 18 April 2005 and 

“518th Gun Truck.”

12 McCormick email to Killblane, July 26, 2007.

13 Sworn Statements, DA Form 2823, Dec 1998, SSG James D. Martin, 

8 April 2004; SPC Robert A. Delaney, 9 April 2004; SPC Elaine F. Coleman, 

4 June 2004; SPC Stephen D. Heinmiller, 4 June 2004; SGT James Dyer, 

10 June 2004; Ralph Blue email to Richard Killblane, July 27, 2005.

14 SSG Thomas Stewart interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 

6 August 2007.

15 Sworn Statement of Martin, Coleman, and Dyer.

16 Sworn statements of Delaney, Heinmiller and Dyer.

17 McCormick conversation with Richard Killblane, 3 January 2009.

18 McCormick conversation with Richard Killblane, 3 January 2009.

19 Stewart interview, 6 August 2007.

20 Sworn Statements of Martin and Dyer. Statement by 1LT James 

McCormick, n.d.; McCormick conversation, 3 January 2009; and 

Stewart interview, 6 August 2007.

21 McCormick conversation, 3 January 2009.

22 McCormick, “518th Gun Truck,” and telephone interview with McCormick 

by Richard Killblane, 18 April 2005 and 3 January 2009.

23 McCormick, “518th Gun Truck,” and telephone interview with McCormick 

by Richard Killblane, 18 April 2005.

24 McCormick, “518th Gun Truck,” and telephone interview with McCormick 

by Richard Killblane, 18 April 2005.

25 McCormick telephone conversation with Richard Killbane, 11 October 

2005, McCormick email to Richard Kilblane October 13, 2005.

26 McCormick, 11 October 2005, McCormick email October 13, 2005.

27 McCormick, 11 October 2005 McCormick email October 13, 2005.

Add-on-Armor Kit on M998 HMMWV of the 1158th 

Transportation Company (HET). Photo courtesy of 1158th 

Transportation Company

OIF 1 Sit and Spin design HMMWV gun truck 

of the 1836th Transportation Company (HET). 

Photo courtesy of Stephen Ruggiero
Operation Iraqi Freedom 33

Good Friday, 9 April 2004

Ambush at Abu Ghraib

724th Transportation Company (POL), 

7th Transportation Battalion

n the evening of 8 April 2004, Mahdi Militia 

demolished eight bridges and overpasses 

around Convoy Support Center Scania nearly 

severing Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) from 

resupply from the south. Scania was the last truck stop 

on the main supply route from Kuwait to BIAP. This was 

part of the military plan for Muqtada al Sadr to gain 

control of the suburbs in south Baghdad named after his 

father, Sadr City. This 30 -year old, cleric had declared a 

jihad against coalition forces on 5 April. His Mahdi Militia O had already driven the Ukrainians out of Al Kut and he 
34 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

already had control over An Najaf. All that stood between 

him and control of Sadr City was the 1st Cavalry Division 

with its headquarters at the nearby Green Zone. Sadr’s 

planners realized that the Achilles’ heel to the Abrams 

tanks was their dependency on trucks for fuel and 

ammunition. By severing the supply line, his militia 

could stall the armored offensive raging in Sadr City. 

The Green Zone pulled fuel from BIAP and with the 

main supply route cut from the south, the 13th Corps 

Support Command made the decision that night to 

start pushing fuel from the bag farm at Logistic Support 

Base Anaconda, near Balad. Al Sadr’s plan to cut off 

the 1st Cav from resupply would result in the single 

worst convoy ambush of 2004.1

LTC George Akin’s 7th Transportation Battalion 

provided security for many of the convoys operating 

out of Logistical Support Area Anaconda. An active 

component headquarters from Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, it commanded nine Army truck companies, an 

Air Force truck company and a Navy welding detachment 

which called itself the Skunk Werks. Only two of its 

companies hauled fuel, the 660th Transportation 

Company (POL) a Reserve unit from Zanesville, Ohio, 

and the 724th POL another Reserve unit from 

Bartonville, Illinois. The original intent of using civilian 

contractors as drivers was to reduce the need for 

soldiers in Iraq, but the attacks on commercial convoys 

required the military to remain in force and escort the 

civilian convoys. In this war, unarmed civilians would 

assume a greater role in combat alongside soldiers. 

In Iraq, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) had the contract 

for hauling fuel and supplies in Iraq. Since the insurgents 

had killed the first contract driver in June 2003, these 

unarmed civilian truckers required an armed military 

escort and the 724th Transportation Company had 

inherited the mission. At that time, an escort vehicle 

or gun truck was any vehicle, regardless of armor,a with 

a crew served weapon. Thanks to the Skunk Werks, the 

7th Battalion fielded HMMWVs and 5-ton tractors and 

cargo trucks with plate armor on the doors, referred 

to as “hillbilly” armor, and mounted either the M249 

squad automatic weapon (SAW), Mk19 automatic 

grenade launcher, or the venerable old M2 .50 caliber 

machinegun that had been in service since 1919. 

Soldiers carried M16A2s or M249s as their individual 

assigned weapons while riding in the vehicles. By April 

2004, gun truck technology was still in its infancy since 

attacks on convoys had been primarily harassment fire 

and improvised explosive devices, called IEDs.

KBR drivers signed up out of patriotism to support 

their country and the money, many having served or 

wanted to serve in the military. Some were financially 

destitute and the high wages would help them get 

back on their feet. Thomas E. “Tommy” Hamill had been 

turned down by the Marines for seizures, and signed up 

with KBR to serve his country and save his dairy farm. 

He had been driving in Iraq since September 2003 and 

was a KBR convoy commander. Randy Ross had served 

in the US Air Force but received an early release. So he 

felt he had not fulfilled his military obligation and even 

tried to reenlist for Desert Storm but was too old. When 

he heard about the need for contract drivers in Iraq, he 

signed up. Ross wanted to complete four years driving 

in Iraq, and was assigned to the bulk fuel department. 

Having arrived in March, this mission was his third 

convoy in Iraq.2

On 8 April, CPT Jeffrey F. Smith’s 724th 

Transportation Company (POL) had received a routine 

task to escort KBR drivers on a fuel push from Anaconda 

to Camp Webster, about a hundred miles west of 

Baghdad. The next morning 3 9 April was Good Friday 

and, coincidently, the first anniversary of the fall of 

Baghdad. For an enemy that preferred to attack on 

significant dates or anniversaries, this weekend had 

plenty of significance. More importantly, these jihadists 

believed they would receive a greater reward in heaven 

for killing infidels on their religious holidays. 

At 2330 hours, the convoy destination changed to 

BIAP due to the Mahdi Militia activities that day, which 

broke from the 7th Battalion routine since it had never 

M915 tractor and 5,000 -gallon tanker trailer of the 

660th Transportation Company (POL), a sister company 

of the 724th POL also at Logistic Support Area Anaconda. 

Photo courtesy of James Word
Operation Iraqi Freedom 35

delivered to BIAP before. CPT Smith, curious about the 

change, went to battalion operations to find out what was 

going on since BIAP normally received its supplies from 

northbound traffic out of Scania. The convoy would travel 

along routes code named Milton, Tampa, Force, Sword 

to Cardinals, finally arriving at Entry Control Point 1, the 

north gate at BIAP. Since no one in the company had 

driven to BIAP, except when they passed through there 

on their way to Anaconda in March, Smith requested 

a guide. Battalion tasked the 2632nd Transportation 

Company, an Army National Guard unit from San Bruno, 

California, which provided SFC Mark A. Hawley to meet 

them in the staging area at 0700 hours the next morning. 

The 2632nd was due to rotate home soon so this would 

be Hawley’s last convoy.4 CPT Smith also asked for air 

cover along the route and the battalion forwarded 

the request.5

1LT Matthew R. “Matt” Brown, of the 2nd Platoon, 

would lead the convoy. Brown was a 27- year old Military 

Intelligence officer “cross-leveled”6 to the 724th. After 

two years of ROTC he discovered he liked the challenge 

of the military and considered making it a career. Brown 

had formed a strong friendship and trust with PFC Jeremy 

L. Church during their mobilization. Church was a 25-

year old bartender and Wal-Mart security guard from St. 

Louis, Missouri who wanted to become a police officer. 

He also wanted to serve in the military, so he combined 

both loves and joined the Military Police in 2000. Both 

had laid back personalities, so they hit it off from the 

start and Brown asked Church to become his driver. 

Brown also felt that if anything ever happened to him, 

his driver would have to take over and make decisions; 

therefore, Brown had Church accompany him to all his 

meetings. This was one of the most critical policies that 

affected the outcome of the next day’s events.7

Around 0100 hours, Brown and his platoon 

sergeant, SFC Robert D. Groff, made some changes 

to the mission. Groff had four years active duty before 

joining the Reserves in 1994. They selected drivers for 

their mission in whom they had the most confidence 

in. The mission changed to escorting M915 military 

tractors driven by KBR civilian contract drivers pulling 

5,000 -gallon fuel tankers, and the 724th had received 

a requirement to provide soldiers to ride shotgun with 

the contract drivers. This was also their first time to 

provide “shooters” for KBR. In the past, Akins had 

resisted doing so because he felt it would make the 

commercial trucks targets, but coordinated attacks on 

contract convoys in recent days required the change.8

The 7th Transportation Battalion had planned for 

two separate convoys that day and had plenty of gun 

trucks available so they “bulked up.” The Combined 

Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF7) policy required a minimum 

ratio of one-to-ten escort vehicles to prime movers, 

but that day the 724th would run with five gun trucks: 

two M998 HMMWVs, two M931 5-ton tractors and 

one M923 5-ton cargo. One M915 tractor carried a 

Warlock electronic jamming system to counter remotely 

detonated IEDs. The 644th Medium Truck Company also 

provided an M988 HMMWV to accompany the convoy to 

gain familiarity with the route that brought the convoy to 

a total of 26 vehicles, increasing the gun truck ratio to 

one-to-three. For a little extra punch, the 7th Battalion 

would double the basic load of ammunition in each 

truck from 220 rounds to 440 rounds of M16.9

Critical to security was the need to communicate, 

Escort vehicles of the 724th POL on 9 April 2004. Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh
36 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

but the communications setup was bewildering at best. 

Three escort vehicles had short range Single Channel 

Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) but the 

lead vehicle could not even talk to the rear vehicle a 

mile or two away. Instead the lead vehicle had to relay 

messages back to the rear vehicles. Throughout the 

convoy there was a mixed bag of short-ranged handheld 

radios, citizen’s band radios, and movement tracking 

system. The latter provided text messaging via satellite, 

as well as access to global positioning system data. 

Some vehicles had two or three of these systems. So 

this hodgepodge and the limitations of each type of 

equipment would make it difficult for the vehicles 

to communicate effectively.10 

Brown had decided to let their drivers sleep and 

inform them of the change in mission the next morning. 

At 0500 hours on 9 April, Brown and Church reported 

to the 7th Battalion tactical operations center for the 

intelligence update on the route. Intelligence accurately 

tracked the increase in enemy activity, but all it could 

predict was more of the same - that the Mahdi Militia 

would attack convoys with IEDs, RPGs and small 

arms fire by four to seven insurgents as they always 

had. Although the transporters realized the enemy 

was getting more sophisticated with his attacks, the 

intelligence community did not predict the insurgents 

would increase the size of their attacks to large scale 

ambushes. They were informed the Mahdi Militia would 

be wearing some semblance of a black uniform with a 

green or yellow headband or armband and this would 

constitute positive identification as enemy, since soldiers 

had always needed positive identification before they 

could engage. In addition, CJTF7 employed four colors 

to classify threat levels on any route. Black referred 

to imminent or ongoing enemy contact, and the route 

should be avoided if at all possible. Red warned of the 

existence of a serious threat. Amber indicated some 

threat existed, or that enemy contact had occurred on 

that route within the last 24 hours. Green indicated little 

to no threat. The 49th Movement Control Battalion had 

coded the route to BIAP as black.11

Tommy Hamill, the convoy commander for the KBR 

drivers, likewise reported for his security briefing at 0600 

hours. The KBR security advisor told him that all routes 

were red, which meant they could not drive, but said 

he would check again with the military and see if the 

roads were still closed. Hamill then reported to the Total 

Safety Task Instruction (TSTI) with the rest of the drivers 

to learn who was going out with him that day. He then 

gathered the 19 contract drivers assigned to his convoy 

to talk about the road conditions. About that time, the 

security advisor walked up and informed him that the 

routes had been cleared and route status improved 

to amber. Hamill sensed the security advisor was still 

apprehensive. Of the 19 “green” military tractors, 17 

hauled 5,000 -gallon tankers and two were bobtails, 

tractors without trailers used to pick up any systems in 

case of a break down. The KBR trucks were assigned 

numbers in the order of their lineup, KBR 1 through 

KBR 19. After the meeting, the contract drivers 

climbed into their tractors and fired up the engines.12

Church had not slept a wink that night and neither 

did many of his friends. Like them he had a weird 

nagging feeling in his stomach warning of impeding 

danger or disaster. Brown had a bad feeling, too. The 

premonition of impending danger was more common 

than one would think during this war. In almost every 

complex ambush, someone would have a unexplained 

sense of apprehension. Nonetheless, the 724th soldiers 

drove their escort vehicles out the motor pool to link 

up with the KBR drivers.13

At 0900 hours, 1LT Brown received word of the 

opening of the routes between Anaconda and BIAP, 

though his departure time would be delayed until 1100 

hours.14 At 0954 hours, due to a suspected IED along 

the route leading to the airport’s south gate, the 172nd 

General Support Group Chief of Highway Operations 

contacted the 1st Cavalry Division for an update. The 

battle captain on staff informed the chief that Alternate 

Supply Route (ASR) Cardinals had been closed for two 

days due to intense fighting. The chief then sent an email 

to the 49th Movement Control Battalion: “Sorry, it looks 

like [the route] is closed until further notice. I am trying 

to deconflict.” The 49th never received this message 

as it was later learned the chief had inadvertently

 sent the email to himself.15

Just before 1000 hours, 1LT Brown assembled 

his 2nd Platoon and the contract drivers for the 

convoy briefing.16 He had one change to the rules 

of engagement. Anyone wearing their distinctive green 

and yellow colored head or arm band and black clothing 

of a Mahdi Militia would be considered an insurgent 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 37

and the soldiers could engage without waiting to be fired 

upon first.17 At the end, SFC Hawley drew the route to 

the airport’s south gate on the ground with a stick.18 It 

was only then the civilian contractors learned they were 

going to Baghdad instead of Camp Webster.19 When 

the sergeant asked if anyone had questions, someone 

inquired: “Is that the route to the north gate?” Hawley 

replied in the negative. It was his turn to be surprised 

when 1LT Brown explained that they would be entering 

through the northern entrance. Hawley informed Brown 

he could only vaguely remember approaching the airport 

from that direction once.20 CPT Smith, 1LT Brown, and 

SFC Hawley left the group to verify the route change. 

Upon receiving confirmation via radio, Hawley asked 

battalion headquarters for, and received, the highway 

exit number for ASR Cardinals. He then briefed the 

revised route to the assembled contract drivers and 

soldiers, drawing it out in the sand and gravel of the 

staging area. The trip, he explained, would take 

about two hours.21

The first convoy serial scheduled out that morning 

was escorted by the 2632nd Air Expeditionary Force, 

one of three “in lieu of” gun truck companies provided 

by the US Air Force. They had been recruited from Air 

Force truck drivers, coincidently, all three replaced 

truck companies with gun truck missions. They had 

received barely enough training to qualify them to drive 

trucks let alone crew gun trucks. In time, the Air Force 

Detachments would provide some of the best gun 

truck escorts out of Anaconda, but that Friday was one 

of their first missions. The serial rolled out the gate at 

1000 hours but had problems with its military radios 

and turned back. By a twist of fate, they missed rolling 

into the ambush. As LTC Akin reflected on it later, he 

feared what would have happened had the airmen 

been first. This experimental Air Force unit had drawn 

attention from the Pentagon on down. Had anything 

bad happened, it could have pulled the plug on their 

entire participation. As the first serial returned, the rest 

of the 724th escort arrived and Brown gave another 

convoy briefing. In it, he told the drivers they would head 

southwest out the gate on ASR Milton to Main Supply 

Route (MSR) Tampa, then proceed south through Taji 

to ASR Force (later renamed Vernon) where the convoy 

would turn west on ASR Sword (later renamed Huskies) 

then after two miles turn south on ASR Cardinals and 

drive right into the north gate of BIAP.22

The Battalion Executive Officer, MAJ Mark Pagent, 

was at the staging area and made the decision to send 

Brown’s convoy serial out first since it was ready. PFC 

Keith M. “Matt” Maupin walked up to Church and said, 

“I have a bad feeling about this one. I don’t think I am 

going to make this one.” Church asked, “Do you want to 

switch spots? I know you aren’t too keen on riding with 

that KBR guy.” Maupin answered, “No, you are the LT’s 

driver. You’ll get us through this.” Church consoled him 

by saying, “Well then I will see you at BIAP.” When Brown 

climbed in his HMMWV, Church said, “I have a bad 

feeling about this one, like something’s going to happen.” 

Brown replied, “I have a bad feeling, too. Route, mission, 

we still have to go.” It is not uncommon for soldiers to 

have an apprehension of disaster. Maupin, Church and 

Brown confirmed each other’s feeling of impending 

doom but the important thing about the dedication 

of truck drivers was none hesitated to go out the gate. 

They knew others depended upon them for what they 

hauled on their trucks.23

SPC Craig V. McDermott and SPC Dustin L. Row’s 

M915 gun truck, like most ,had steel doors with no 

ballistic glass windows so they could shoot out. It also 

had a steel plate in back of the cab and narrow one just 

above the front windshield. McDermott manned the 

.50 cal on the ring mount above the cab. They were on 

724th POL Convoy waiting to leave. PFC Slaughter was 

the shooter for Peterson’s truck. Photo courtesy of Randy Ross
38 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

loan from the 1st Platoon. Row was a landscaper and 

McDermott was a 22-year old facility manager. Although 

Row also had the gut feeling something bad was going to 

happen, the extra 400 - 600 rounds gave him “a warm 

and fuzzy feeling.” They hit the front gate at 1030 hours. 

Meanwhile, the 2632nd convoy resolved its problem and 

departed at 1055 hours as the second serial.24

The 724th convoy headed west on ASR Milton. 

Brown liked to ride at the front of the convoy so he 

could see where he was going, since nearly every convoy 

commander at that time feared making the wrong turn in 

the crowded streets of Baghdad. SFC Hawley rode with 

him as the route guide and SGT Terry Blankenship was 

the SAW gunner. SPC Darrell Adams and 1LT Gregory 

Howard, from the newly arrived 644th Transportation 

Company, rode along in the second HMMWV for training. 

Tommy Hamill followed in the M915 tractor driven by 

Nelson Howell. The next M915 gun truck with SPC 

Dustin L. Row and SPC Craig V. McDermott on the M2 

.50 caliber machinegun followed behind four KBR trucks. 

Five KBR vehicles behind it, SSG Donald C. Grage drove 

a M931 gun truck with SPC Jacob P. Brown manning 

Passing an armored convoy on MSR Tampa. 

Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh

The 724th POL convoy on the elevated road (ASR Force which would later be renamed ASR Vernon) leading into Baghdad. 

Photo courtesy of Randy Ross

The 724th POL convoy on ASR Force passing through Baghdad. Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh
Operation Iraqi Freedom 39

another .50. SGT Bryan C. Watson manned the Mk19 

of SPC Michael J. Bachman’s M923 5-ton cargo gun 

truck right behind Grage. Five more KBR trucks preceded 

SFC Groff’s HMMWV driven by SPC Karon G. Lamar 

with SPC Patrick L. Pelz as the SAW gunner. Five more 

contract drivers behind that, SPC Shawn E. Kirkpatrick 

drove the last M931 5-ton gun truck with SPC Matthew 

W. Bohm manning the M2. Essentially, there was one 

crew served weapon between every four to five task 

vehicles. Brown had assigned six shooters to the KBR 

fuel tankers #4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14.25

As the convoy approached the turn onto Tampa, 

SPC Bachman drove ahead in his M923 5-ton cargo 

gun truck to block southbound traffic while Grage’s M931 

blocked northbound traffic until the convoy passed.26

More often, problems with the vehicles or drivers 

occurred early on. Hamill had three new contract drivers 

from another department assigned to his convoy that 

morning. In his rear view mirror he saw that two of them 

were having problems maintaining the proper 100 - meter 

interval between trucks. One kept falling back. 

He coached the new driver over his radio every 

few minutes and by the time they turned south onto 

Tampa, the spacing was correct.27 A 26 - vehicle convoy 

with a hundred meter interval stretched out to two miles 

in length making communication between Groff and 

Brown sporadic at times, but degraded even more 

when the antenna on Grage’s vehicle broke off when 

it hit an overpass. After the convoy completed the turn, 

the two gun trucks fell back into line.28

The first part of Tampa was uneventful. The convoy 

passed the market place and Taji without incident, but 

after an hour and a half of driving, Iraqi vehicles started 

pulling off to the side of the road and the soldiers saw 

fewer and fewer pedestrians, a hint of trouble ahead. 

The convoy then turned south on ASR Force which was 

an elevated freeway. As the road dropped to rooftop 

level, the drivers saw green flags flying from the roofs 

showing their support to Al Sadr. Randy Ross, riding 

in KBR 6 behind gun truck 12, remembered during 
40 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the convoy brief the military had instructions to shoot 

anyone wearing Mahdi Militia colors, so that was 

when things started to get scary for him.29

ASR Sword

At 1230 hours, the convoy had turned southwest 

onto ASR Sword, a stretch of highway located on the 

outskirts of northwest Baghdad known as IED Alley for 

the frequency of such attacks. They passed burnt- out 

trucks as reminders of the danger. After turning onto 

Sword, Ross heard sporadic gun fire behind him. Jackie 

D. Lester and Steven Fisher drove the two rear bobtail 

tractors. As the convoy approached the intersection of 

Force and Sword, Lester saw a crowd of Iraqis on the 

right hand side of the road and then heard gun fire up 

ahead. He began weaving his bobtail past the crowd 

and saw Iraqis running in confusion. He later heard the 

lead gun trucks had fired at the enemy in the crowd.30

A further two miles down the road, there was 

absolutely no traffic or pedestrians, a clear sign they 

were going to get hit. Lester then saw a four-door car 

with two Iraqis riding in front and one in the back drive 

up along the convoy. They slowed down next to his truck 

to look at him and then smiled. So Lester called on the 

radio warning the others of the intruder vehicle. He then 

swerved his tractor over to push them away from the 

convoy but they sped up. Someone later said the car 

pulled over to the shoulder of the road. Far up ahead 

they could see black smoke rising in the air. 31

ASR Sword was a six-lane highway divided by a median

flanked by guard rails that went through the suburb 

of unfriendly Abu Ghraib, a predominantly Sunni town 

which had been the scene of fierce fighting over the past 

two days. Mahdi militiamen had attacked Americans to 

relieve pressure on their brethren in Sadr City as did 

the Sunnis to assist their comrades in Fallujah. 

Tommy K. Zimmerman, driving KBR 2, radioed 

Hamill that his truck was losing power, and the trucks 

behind drove around him. The standard procedure was 

to have a gun truck come up to a disabled vehicle and 

pull security until a bobtail could hook up and tow the 

Burnt out truck on ASR Sword near overpass. Civilian traffic began to drop off after that. Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh

Above: This M1A2 Abrams tank was engaging the enemy 

when the convoy passed, another indicator of the danger 

ahead. Below: The convoy passed more burnt out civilian 

tankers on ASR sword. Photos courtesy of Jarob Walsh
Operation Iraqi Freedom 41

tractor and trailer system off. Hamill radioed Brown 

“I’ve got a truck that is breaking down. We need to get 

gun support there with him.” Hamill urged Brown, “We 

need to get this man picked up. Get the gun truck to 

pick him up. Let’s leave the truck, just get the men.” 

SSG Grage drove his M931 bobtail gun truck up from 

the middle of the convoy and told Zimmerman to hang 

on because he would push the tanker. Lester and 

Fisher also heard Zimmerman call that his engine 

died but did not hear Hamill call for anyone to come 

up and push. The problem was the range of the radios 

did not reach from the front to the rear of the convoy 

so Fisher drove his M915 bobtail up to push the tanker, 

but there is confusion about which truck actually 

pushed Zimmerman.32

About that same time, the 5-ton cargo gun truck 

(Gun Truck 12) in front of Randy Ross slowed down and 

came to a stop thus blocking the road and causing the 

rest of the convoy to stop. Ross yelled at the gun truck 

to go and it did but created a gap with the rest of the 

convoy. When Lester in the rear finally caught up with 

Fisher, they were passing the Minister of Transportation 

compound on their left. The lack of traffic and the black 

smoke billowing up ahead warned Lester that something 

was not right, so he told Fisher to pick up the driver and 

abandon the truck. He felt they could stay in front of the 

fortified compound for protection. Fisher kept moving 

and the rear escort told Lester to keep moving, but 

Lester warned them, “You don’t know what you’re 

getting into.” A few seconds later, he heard on the 

radio the lead vehicles were under attack.33

Less than a mile down the road, Church’s lead 

HMMWV passed an M1A2 Abrams from Company B, 

2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry on the other side of the 

road firing south into Abu Ghraib. One of the tank crew 

members waved at the trucks to turn back. That was an 

obvious clue the route was not clear, yet the truck drivers 

pressed on. Randy Ross remembered convoys passed 

tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles engaging the enemy 

regularly so this was not unusual.34

Up to that time, kill zones had not been more than 

few hundred meters long with a few IEDs and handful 

of militia men firing wildly; so the drivers did not think 

of turning back because speed was their security and 

in the past they had just driven right through the small 

arms fire. Suddenly, the trucks began dodging rocks, 

mounds of garbage, blocks of concrete and tires - all 

placed in the road intended to slow them down. These 

were normal places the insurgents hid IEDs yet the 

drivers saw no detonating wires. As Church and Brown 

approached the burning fuel tanker, black smoke 

obstructed the entire road and their view of what lie 

beyond it. All the clues leading up to this point indicated 

they were entering a kill zone. Church thought to himself, 

“This can’t be good.” Brown similarly realized, “We’re 

in trouble. This is going to be bad.” Brown turned back 

to his guide and warned, “Hey, Sergeant Hawley, I think 

we’re in trouble here.” The sergeant responded, “Yes, sir, 

The scene entering the kill zone. The black smoke of the 

burning civilian tanker obscured the path beyond it forcing 

the trucks to choose to drive through it or turn through the 

opening in the guard rail to the right. IEDs were often hidden 

in trash in the road. Photos courtesy of Jarob Walsh
42 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

I think we’re going to get hit.” Adrenaline started pumping 

as the soldiers and civilian drivers braced for what 

would come next.35

Before they reached the burning tanker, there was a 

break in the guardrail leading to a frontage road adjacent 

to the houses. Brown faced the dilemma that confronted 

many convoy commanders during this war. In combat 

the most important 

decisions in one’s life 

are made in seconds or 

less. The choice between 

life and death can be as 

arbitrary as turning right 

or left, and neither offer 

a clue as to which is 

the right choice. Church 

thought the burning 

tanker was placed there to 

canalize his convoy onto 

the other road. He thought 

there was enough room he 

could still drive past the burning truck and told Brown, 

“Sir, I can try it.” Brown thought differently, “There is a 

road right there, take it.” “Okay” replied his driver who 

turned through a gap cut in the guardrail and 

four vehicles behind them followed.

Suddenly rounds pummeled Brown’s HMMWV from 

the houses across the far left side of the main road. 

The hail of gun fire was loud and the rounds hitting 

his HMMWV sounded like rain hitting a tin roof. SGT 

Blankenship immediately returned fire with his SAW. 

Brown warned the other trucks over the radio, “Small 

arms fire to the left.” He then yelled back, “There’s a 

truck on fire up ahead, we’ve gotta get off this road.” 

According to policy, the passengers and military 

drivers fired out their windows.36 

Suddenly a white sports utility vehicle pulled out 

about 30 meters in front of Church heading the same 

direction and then the first IED exploded on the right side 

of the road killing the Iraqi driver. Church thought it was 

ironic that an Iraqi IED killed one of their own. A hundred 

meters further down the road, small arms fire came from 

the houses on the right and by then they were taking 

fire from both sides of road. The IEDs indicated this 

was a deliberately planned ambush and the burning 

fuel truck had been placed there to canalize them into 

that side road. Brown and Hamill had little idea how 

bad the situation would become behind them.37

The HMMWV of the 644th and three of the next 

five tankers followed Brown’s onto the frontage road. 

The rest of the convoy missed the detour and drove 

around the left of the burning tanker thus remaining 

on the main road. 

Lester was still stopped 

a mile from the overpass 

in his bobtail and the rear 

escort told him to keep 

moving. Lester radioed 

back, “We’re making a big 

mistake and we’re going 

to pay for it.” The rear gun 

truck again urged him to 

drive, and realizing he was 

keeping the gun truck from 

responding to the ambush, 

Lester drove forward with 

great apprehension. About 

halfway to the overpass, he caught up with Fisher who 

was managing about 25 mph pushing the tanker. Lester 

again told Fisher to drop the truck and about that time 

they passed the Abrams tank.38

Driving the armored HMMWV gun truck ahead of 

the two bobtails, SFC Groff heard over the radio, “We’re 

taking fire,” then his radio went dead. He then saw the 

first burning tanker on the right side of the road and the 

wind blew the smoke across the road. As soon as he 

passed the burning tanker, he received small arms fire 

from both sides of the road. Lamar and Pelz fired to the 

left side. Groff meanwhile tried to radio the lead vehicle 

but received no response. When he did get contact, 

he could barely hear anyone. Pelz initially saw a man in 

black knelt down behind a rock to his left and then two 

more behind a pile next to him. When he began to fire on 

the next group of four he heard a pop about 200 meters 

behind him and it felt like someone had slapped him 

on the back. He yelled down to Groff that he thought 

he had been hit, but when he knelt and checked for 

blood, he found none. So he stood back up and 

engaged the enemy.39

Behind him, Lester could see the gunner on the .50 

on the rear gun truck (behind him) searching for targets 

but not engaging. By then the rear of the convoy was in 

LT Brown’s HMMWV. Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh
Operation Iraqi Freedom 43

the kill zone passing burning trucks littering the road and 

Lester wondered when the gunner was going to fire.40

By then everyone reported on their radios receiving 

enemy fire. The enemy initiated the ambush with small 

arms fire and RPGs from both sides of the road. The 

convoy stretched over a mile and the entire length was 

under fire and they were not even near the end of the kill 

zone. The standard response was to “put pedal to the 

metal” and drive through as fast as one could, which was 

about 45 miles per hour towing a 5,000 - gallon load of 

fuel. What they did not know was that they had entered 

a nearly five-mile kill zone with several hundred of Sadr’s 

black-clad militia. Burning fuel trucks along the road 

would create a scene imagined only in hell and the wind 

blew the smoke across their path blinding the drivers 

and crews. The drive through the hail of small arms and 

rocket fire seemed endless. They drew enemy fire from 

both sides of the road but the houses on the right were 

the closest. The fact that IEDs were planted along 

that side road indicated that the militia had time to 

prepare the kill zone.

Up front, Church drove aggressively to avoid enemy 

emplaced obstacles, such as guardrails, concrete 

barriers, and vehicles, intended to slow down the convoy. 

Thirteen IEDs had already exploded behind him. After 

warning the trucks behind him, Brown dropped the 

handset and turned his body to the right facing outward 

to return fire. Suddenly two AK rounds smashed through 

the windshield and one hit his Kevlar helmet. The 

shattered glass hit Church in the face knocking his head 

backwards and at the same time an IED exploded on his 

side of the HMMWV. He felt the blast and the rocks come 

through his driver’s window. Had his head not been 

back, the blast probably would have killed him.41

Brown instinctively reached up to his face. His 

fingers went into his bloody scalp and he felt his left 

eye hanging out of its socket on his cheek. The blunt 

force of the impact had blown his helmet into the back 

seat pealing his scalp from just above his left eye around 

to below his left ear. The feeling grossed him out and 

he quickly pulled his hand away then put it back. He 

wondered, “Is everything else okay?” He turned toward 

Church. Church saw the weird look on his bloody face 

like he wanted help but could not speak. While still 

driving with one hand, Church popped his first aid pouch 

out, ripped it open with his teeth and handed it to Brown, 

instructing him to place the bandage over his left eye. 

Church then returned to firing his M16A2 out the window 

with one hand while navigating through the obstacles 

all the while encouraging his platoon leader to prevent 

him from slipping into unconsciousness. He saw an 

obstacle of boulders and guardrails and did not think 

his HMMWV could jump over it. He angled his HMMWV 

to the right then turned to the left around the obstacles. 

He had told Brown to close his ballistic window to 

prevent further injury just moments before an IED hidden 

in the obstacles detonated on the front right side of the 

vehicle and blew out the front right tire. Continuing to fire 

his weapon with his right hand, Church kept his left hand 

on the steering wheel and pushed the vehicle ahead 

on three inflated tires. Church worried about getting his 

lieutenant to medical attention. After a few minutes, 

Brown blacked out and PFC Church realized he had to 

make the decisions as the convoy commander.42

A burning tanker can be seen on the frontage road. 

Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh

One of the tankers slowing down and leaking fuel on 

ASR Sword. Photo courtesy of Jarob Walsh
44 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Church later remembered, “I had a reality check. 

It’s now up to me to get these guys through here.” It 

was strange but he then relaxed. Everything began to 

move slowly and his thoughts remained clear. He knew 

what he had to do. After that last IED the surrounding 

area opened up with fewer buildings. Small arms 

fire slackened. There was less small arms fire as he 

approached the overpass. Church thought to himself, 

“It’s finally over.” Church had reached the exit ramp, 

turned left up onto the overpass and drove down ASR 

Cardinals. For 30 seconds after he made the turn on 

overpass he received no more fire.43

Meanwhile, the remainder of the convoy bore the 

brunt of the enemy’s wrath. Small arms fire riddled 

the sides of the fuel tankers causing them to spill their 

contents like water sprinklers, consequently making 

the road slick. RPGs slammed into four tankers causing 

their liquid contents to explode into flames blanketing 

the road with thick black smoke. Some of the tractors 

still managed to drive even with their loads on fire. 

The enemy had also detonated their own fuel trucks 

alongside the road turning it into an inferno. 

Following right behind Brown, Hamill grabbed the 

Qualcomm on -board satellite computer and typed out 

a message warning the serial behind them, “Convoy 

under attack.” Just then a bullet slammed through the 

door striking his forearm, knocking the computer out of 

his hands. The round blew a huge chunk of meat away, 

so he wrapped a clean sock around his arm to stop the 

bleeding. He then handed the radio to his driver, Nelson 

Howell. Just then, Hamill’s truck began to have its own 

mechanical problems and slowed down. Other trucks 

began to speed past them on both the frontage road

and highway.44 As Hamill’s truck slipped further behind 

in the convoy, he saw the tanker system a half a mile 

ahead of him begin fishtailing on the slippery road. 

Then slid off onto the median, flipped over and exploded. 

The driver did not have a chance to escape.45 

Behind them, a heavy volume of small arms fire 

riddled the M915 gun truck driven by SPC Row, blowing 

out the mirrors. All the while, McDermott blazed away 

continuously with his .50 caliber machinegun as brass 

cartridges piled up at his feet. Every time McDermott 

had to reload a can of ammunition, PFC Jeffrey Slaughter 

riding in KBR 6 behind him laid down suppressive fire 

with his M249 SAW. Row simultaneously fired out the 

window with his M16A2 but only saw a few Iraqis running 

from bush to bush or coming out of the ditches. He then 

drove past a burning red and white tanker and then 

through the black smoke of another burning tanker. He 

believed he was going to die and was literally waiting for 

the sting of the round, but kept on driving. He steered 

with his left hand and shot over the elbow with his right 

hand. He kept leaning farther and farther to the right 

until he was almost lying sideways.46

Just ahead in KBR 4, SSG Arthur Hollingsworth 

initially returned fire to the left and then started taking 

fire from the right. Row and McDermott saw an RPG 

hit KBR 5 ahead of them driven by William Bradley. 

It exploded on fire and splattered fuel all over their 

windshield. Hollingsworth remembered, “It felt like a 

sledge hammer hitting me in the head.” A round struck 

the rear part of the door behind his head and pieces 

of metal hit his cheek and nose. Blood shot all over his 

Rounds through Ross’ windshield. Photo courtesy of Randy Ross

Possibly Bradley’s tanker burning on the ramp. 

Photo courtesy of Randy Ross
Operation Iraqi Freedom 45

windshield. About that time rounds started hitting their 

trucks. The burning tanker flipped over on its side and 

slid off the road spilling fuel over the road. Row’s M915 

gun truck almost slid off the road at the same spot 

and came to a complete stop.47

SGT Bryan Watson, behind in Gun Truck 12 on 

the main road, heard a large explosion and also saw 

Bradley’s fuel truck explode. As he entered the kill 

zone, Watson received small arms fire from the left 

side of the road and immediately returned fire with 

his Mk19, but the black smoke prevented him from 

seeing the enemy.48

Meanwhile up ahead, Row found the fuel-slicked 

ramp “like driving on ice.” He almost lost control of his 

M915 gun truck but skidded to a stop, then drove onto 

the overpass, turned left and headed for the airport. 

By that time McDermott had expended over 400 

rounds.49 Bill Peterson, driving KBR 6 right behind 

Row’s gun truck, had to turn on his wipers to clear the 

fuel off his windshield. His shooter, PFC Slaughter, kept 

up a heavy rate of fire with his SAW. KBR 6 and 10, the 

only survivors of the second five, made it to the exit as 

well and negotiated the smoke and slippery road onto 

Cardinals. Steven Hulett’s KBR7, Tony Johnson’s KBR 

8 with PFC Maupin as his shooter, and Jeffrey Parker’s 

KBR9 caught fire and crashed on the right side of the 

main road. Jack Montague’s KBR 10 did not travel much 

further before enemy fire destroyed it. His shooter, 

PFC Gregory R. Goodrich, escaped alive but Montague 

apparently did not. The smoke from these burning trucks 

obscured the road.

SSG Grage’s M931 had pushed the tanker for about 

a mile with both he and SPC Brown returning fire. The 

fuel leaking from holes in the fuel trailer sprayed across 

Grage’s truck. Upon reaching the overpass, they could 

not push it any further, because Grage’s own vehicle had 

taken a beating. The radiator was overheating and one 

round went through the side window and out the front, 

the next round penetrated the left door and hit Grage 

in his left leg.50

SPC Bachman drove Gun Truck 12 on past Grage’s 

to keep the rest of the column moving. SGT Watson fired 

off a box of Mk19 rounds, grabbed his M16 and emptied 

it, then reloaded the grenade launcher. A round then 

struck Bachman in the neck, but he kept driving. Another 

bullet hit Watson, and Bachman tried to help him tie 

off a field dressing while they kept moving. Distracted 

amid the swirling smoke, Bachman missed the exit 

to Cardinals and continued down the freeway. Soon 

Bachman realized the rest of the convoy must 

have turned off and he was alone except for Ross’ 

KBR 11, which blindly followed. Ross did not know the 

routes, but when he saw the Baghdad International 

Airport sign, he followed the gun truck. He only had one 

thing to do - keep the gas pedal on the floor and get out 

of there so he would not get captured and get his head 

cut off. He remembered seeing the undercarriage of 

Bradley’s overturned rig on the overpass but it was not 

Rounds through Ross’ windshield. Photo courtesy of Randy Ross
46 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

yet on fire. After he passed Bradley’s truck, Ross also 

received small arms fire from the overpass. He hunkered 

way down in the seat and a round came through the 

driver’s side windshield and then another passed 

through the passenger side. A 12-pack of bottled 

water stopped one round from hitting his leg.51

When Bachman saw the road ahead blocked by a 

pile of guardrails, he feared going around it and running 

into an IED, so he drove right over it and went airborne 

for a moment. The radios fell on the floor. Behind him, 

Ross drove around the barricade of junk in the road. The 

right steering tire blew out causing his truck to swerve 

into the median and then he could only make 35 mph. 

He then received fire from the right side. He pulled back 

onto the road where he could speed back up to 55.52

Back when he arrived in Iraq, KBR taught the new 

drivers that fear can be their best friend or their worst 

enemy. If it paralyzed them then it was an enemy, but it 

if it made them angry then it could be a friend. As soon 

as he took rounds through the window, he prayed to God 

to let him get out of there to see his kids again. His fear 

then turned into anger. The gun truck taking off ahead 

of him pissed him off even more. He caught back up 

with it as it was only doing 45 mph, and drove right 

up to the gun truck’s rear bumper. The gunner poked his 

head out truck and looked around. Ross drove around 

the truck and asked, “Why ain’t you shooting? Why ain’t 

you shooting?” The gun truck was losing power, so 

Ross drove past him. He regretted it later and felt he 

should have pushed them.53

Ross drove down the road and saw three HMMWV 

gun trucks parked on an overpass not returning fire, 

which pissed him off even more. He thought if he only 

had an American flag he would fly it out the window in 

defiance. Instead he decided to moon the Iraqis and 

was trying to pull down his pants when he realized it 

was not such a good idea. With his luck, he would get 

shot in the ass and then have to explain to the doctor 

at the Combat Support Hospital (CSH) why he had a 

bullet wound in the butt and no hole in his trousers.54

By taking the wrong turn, the two vehicles had 

cleared the kill zone and drove on for several miles until 

they eventually came upon military police and a HET 

convoy stopped not far from the west gate of Baghdad 

Airport. The soldiers and the civilian were soon on a 

medical evacuation helicopter - ending their ordeal.55

Back in the kill zone, PFC Jarob Walsh, riding with 

Raymond T. Stannard in KBR 14, had heard Brown on 

the radio, “We are taking rounds - everyone get ready!” 

Not even a minute later, someone else incorrectly 

reported, “The LT’s truck just blew up and I don’t know 

where to go or what to do!” Walsh looked at his driver 

and said “Oh shit, it’s about to get bad.” They continued 

past the first burning tanker on the main highway and 

then Walsh saw a smoking truck, what he thought was 

KBR 8 driven by Tony Johnson, with PFC Maupin as 

the shooter, lose power and drop back to a hundred 

meters in front of his then explode into a ball of flames. 

The overpass where KBR14 and 17 were burning. Photo courtesy of Daniel Petrik
Operation Iraqi Freedom 47

It swerved off the right side of the road, through the ditch 

and into buildings.56

After passing the burning tanker, KBR 14 came upon 

the tanker flipped over on its side in the median. Walsh 

had been taking photos of everything of interest up until 

the fighting began then traded his camera for his M16. 

He then came upon another tanker ahead on the right 

where he saw a man lying prone raising his head up and 

down to watch them. He then propped his weapon on the 

side mirror of his truck and took aim for the man’s head 

thinking he was an insurgent intending to blow up both 

trucks as they passed. He then saw that the man was 

holding up something white in his left hand. Walsh’s heart 

was pounding so hard, that he was sure it was a remote 

detonator, but he kept looking and held his fire. The 

closer they approached; Walsh recognized that the 

man was an American holding his identification card 

in an effort to let them know he was one of their 

KBR drivers. Unfortunately, their heavily laden tanker 

unfortunately could not stop to pick him up.57

Meanwhile, Lester’s bobtail kept pace with Fisher’s 

but he suddenly felt his tractor pummeled by rounds. 

He knew he could not stop after that. When his truck 

cleared the dense black smoke of burning tankers, he 

saw Steven Hulett squatting in front of his burning rig and 

then heard him scream on the radio to come back, “Jack, 

you bastard, you passed me! Come back and get me!” 

Lester could not stop and could not bring himself 

to answer him. The situation had become a desperate 

life and death struggle for the drivers, and then Hulett’s 

radio went silent. Hulett’s unanswered cry for help 

would haunt Lester for years afterwards.58

After his truck passed Hulett’s, Walsh looked in his 

mirror and saw Timothy Bell’s truck behind him explode, 

roll over and slide down the highway. He had never seen 

anything like it before, “It really shook me up, it was just 

like something you would see in the movies.” His driver, 

Raymond Stannard, who had been a machine gunner 

in the Marines, was impressed by Walsh’s calmness as 

this soldier traded fire with the insurgents.59 They then 

drove blindly through the smoke of two more burning 

Iraqi tankers, with Walsh praying that they would not 

run into anything. The fire made it extremely hot and 

Walsh could hardly breathe with the smoke.60

Coming up Sword, Walsh and Stannard’s truck 

cleared the smoke from the burning tankers and saw a 

truck in front of them traveling about 20 miles per hour 

with its trailer on fire. In an attempt to help, they slowed 

down. Walsh yelled at the driver to stop so he could pick 

them up. It was Hamill and Howell. Walsh’s tractor pulled 

ahead of them a little and at that moment, Hamill’s truck 

shook violently from the explosion of an RPG, which also 

blew the Walsh’s truck sideways. Stannard luckily kept 

his tractor under control. Howell yelled to Hamill, “We’ve 

been hit by something – something big!” Hamill yelled 

back, “We gotta keep going!”61

Walsh recognized the overpass further ahead. 

One truck was already traveling over the bridge, and 

another was behind about a mile or two back with 

Groff’s HMMWV trailing behind it. Walsh’s rig drove 

up the ramp, but as they turned left to towards BIAP, 

his driver started yelling.62

The Overpass

Having made the turn onto the overpass, Walsh leaned 

forward and saw behind him the smoke trail of an RPG 

flying toward his truck. The next thing Walsh knew, his 

truck rolled over onto its passenger side and Stannard, 

who had not fastened his seat belt, fell on top of him, 

kicking and screaming trying to get out of the truck. 

Walsh knocked out the windshield with the butt stock 

of his weapon and Stannard climbed out through it, 

turned around, and grabbed Walsh’s Kevlar helmet to 

pull him out of the truck, but Walsh’s knee was stuck 

between the seat and dashboard, and his seatbelt was 

still fastened. Walsh told him to get down and take cover, 

because they were still under fire, but Stannard pulled 

harder and harder on the helmet until Walsh could 

not breathe. Walsh felt like his driver was going to pull 

his head off. Finally, Walsh unsnapped his chinstrap 

causing Stannard to roll backwards. Walsh then yelled 

at the driver to climb back in and lie down. Then Walsh 

unfastened his seatbelt, pulled his knee out of the 

dash, and wiggled out the opening feet first.63

Stannard came back and pulled on his shooter’s 

ankles to which Walsh again yelled at him to get down. 

Finally, Walsh kicked him in the chest with his left 

foot and in the face with his right propelling Stannard 

backwards and blood splattered across his face. 

Assuming his driver had been shot Walsh feared, 

“Damn, he’s dead and now I’m alone.” But Stannard 

just sat there causing Walsh to think, “That’s weird; 
48 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

he’s not dead.” Suddenly, Stannard’s eyes grew big and 

he exclaimed, “Oh my God, you’ve been shot, I’m going 

to die, I’m going to die.” Walsh searched for any bullet 

holes, and not seeing any then ordered Stannard, 

“Lay the fuck down and do not get up.”64

Walsh then stood up but his right foot hurt so bad 

he thought it was broken. When he looked down, he saw 

a bloody boot and realized the blood on Stannard’s face 

came from his foot. Evidently, while kicking Stannard, a 

round hit his foot shattering two of the toes, but pumped 

up on adrenaline, Walsh could still stand. Looking back 

at his tanker, he saw fuel spilling out a six - foot hole and 

a small fire growing inside and on the tires. As he turned 

towards the front of the truck, something hit him hard in 

the chest like a baseball bat, knocking him back into the 

truck. Stunned, Walsh looked down and saw a smoking 

round buried in the SAPI plate of his body armor. He 

picked it out of the vest burning his hand, and then 

pulled himself back to his feet. He looked about a 150 

meters up the road and saw two Iraqi kids, one about 

ten years old and the other was about seven, armed 

with AK47s on the bridge. The youngest held his weapon 

upside down by the magazine and the older one fired 

off three-round bursts, the first round hit right next to 

Walsh’s head. Walsh turned around to grab his weapon 

and was hit two more times; the rounds passing 

through him.65

Infuriated, Walsh grabbed his weapon, jumped out, 

and fired two warning shots over their heads. The two 

scared youths then ran down the ramp. Walsh then fell 

down onto his hands and knees unable breathe or move, 

with his head pounding hard. Walsh painfully looked up 

and saw Stannard running frantically behind the truck, 

the opposite direction from where they were supposed 

to go. Shot several times, Walsh feared he would either 

be captured or killed.66

Determined not to quit, Walsh stood up, grabbed 

his weapon, and limped over to the guardrail. He looked 

down at the horrible inferno of burning trucks scattered 

along the highway billowing black smoke. There were still 

two M915 systems heading toward the overpass. While 

surveying the devastation, about 20 or 30 rounds hit the 

guardrail next to him causing the young soldier to throw 

himself backwards into a prone position. He then lowcrawled towards the end of the bridge, in the direction of 

BIAP, while bullets followed him the entire distance. Then 

to his surprise, Walsh realized he was crawling toward 

the middle of Abu Ghraib. Bullets continued to strike 

the pavement around him as he stood up and ran 

back towards his burning fuel truck, which ironically 

was the safest place.67

Coming up behind them, Michael Brezovay in KBR17 

did not know the route, but saw the other vehicles take 

the exit. With no rubber left on his front tires he was 

unable to make the on ramp, so he tried to make a 

run for the exit ramp. His truck slid over the ramp and 

ran into Stannard’s overturned tanker. He then jumped 

out of the cab as his tanker burst into flames. Spotting 

Stannard nearby, the two drivers joined up and crawled 

away from the tangled wreckage. Brezovay then saw a 

KBR tanker, bobtail and two gun trucks pass him.68

Fisher continued to push the tanker up the onramp 

that was by then covered with slippery JP8 fuel. The tires 

on Fisher’s bobtail began to smoke as they spun on the 

slick pavement and Lester, still beside him, yelled, “Quit 

pushing, I’ll get him out!” They then came to a stop right 

on the ramp. SPC Kirkpatrick drove the rear gun truck up 

alongside Grage’s Gun Truck 102 and all four vehicles 

were stopped on the same ramp. Lester stopped on the 

overpass for one reason; he did not want to die alone. 

He saw enemy fire tear up the guard rails and trucks 

while Zimmerman just sat there. So Lester screamed 

at Zimmerman over the radio to get out of his truck. 

SPC Kirkpatrick and SPC Bohm also yelled at 

Zimmerman, who seemed stunned as he methodically 

tried to gather his personal gear from his cab while 

bullets pummeled the guard rail, pavement and truck. 

The urgency of the moment grew more apparent when 

Kirkpatrick’s gunner, Bohm, killed an insurgent carrying 

an RPG launcher.69 Meanwhile Zimmerman walked in 

front of Lester’s truck and stood there while rounds hit 

all around him. Lester yelled out the window for him 

to get in his truck and then leaned over to open the 

passenger door. The driver, either in shock or no longer 

caring, then climbed into Lester’s cab and the bobtail 

drove off. By waiting, Lester had unwittingly blocked 

the trucks behind him. During the wait, Fisher was shot 

through shoulder and upper torso. Once Lester started 

moving, the others could also drive off.70

Lester made the left turn onto Cardinals and saw 

two overturned tankers spilling their liquid contents onto 

the road. Flames and black smoke leapt from the right 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 49

hand lane across onto the left hand lane. Lester’s 

bobtail slid across the fuel covered pavement into the 

flames and stopped. He then backed out and crossed 

over the median into the opposite lane. After emerging 

from the black smoke, he nearly ran over Stannard and 

Brezovay crawling across the overpass. Lester then drove 

to the end of the overpass where he stopped to wait for 

gun truck escort. He saw rounds hit the guardrail to his 

left evidently aimed at him. He looked down the road 

and as far as he could see were overturned 

burning fuel trucks.71

As SPC Kirkpatrick’s gun truck cleared the overpass, 

he weaved around the destroyed tankers. SPC Bohm, 

manning the M2 machinegun above him, had to shrink 

back from the intense heat of the burning fuel. An IED on 

Sword had already shattered the windows in their truck 

and wounded Kirkpatrick in the legs, as well as giving him 

temporary hearing loss. Bohm had been shot in the foot. 

Now the gunner saw an American lying on the side of the 

road trying to flag them down. Bohm screamed down to 

Kirkpatrick to stop, but the driver neither saw the civilian 

in the midst of the swirling smoke nor heard the pleas of 

his fellow soldier. Bohm looked back as they drove on, 

probably registering the look of horror that Lester saw.72 

The handful of Americans stranded around the overpass 

had watched with dismay as a couple of escort vehicles 

drove past them. SFC Groff’s HMMWV, the last gun truck 

still on the main road, was their final hope. 

SFC Groff’s armored HMMWV, driven by SPC Lamar 

with SPC Pelz manning the SAW, had originally been 

just ahead of the two bobtails. His vehicle began losing 

power as it drove through the gauntlet of small arms fire 

and smoke and then slowed down to the last. On the way 

up, they pulled up behind a bobtail and Fisher climbed 

out. His left side was drenched in blood. Groff stopped 

and his crew pulled the screaming Fisher into the back. 

Once inside Pelz began alternating between treating 

the wounded and laying down suppressive fire, since he 

was also the combat life saver. Looking down the road, 

Lamar saw tankers and trucks scattered across the 

road torn up by bullet holes and RPGs.73

Those were the last elements of the convoy to 

make the turn onto ASR Cardinals. Of the 26 vehicles 

that had left Anaconda that morning, only 14 survived 

the ordeal of the first kill zone on Sword. That included 

all seven military escorts, which presented smaller 

targets than the tankers and were protected by some 

measure of armor and firepower. Eleven of the 17 

tankers and one of the two bobtails now littered the 

freeway, ramps, and overpass. Of the four men whose 

vehicles never made it off Sword, one was already dead 

and the others would not make it back alive to friendly 

hands. Four others had already died on or near the 

overpass. Bachman and Watson in Gun Truck 12 and 

Ross in KBR11 were wounded but had continued down 

Sword to the relative safety of another convoy. The first 

three vehicles driven by Church, Danny Wood, and Rick 

Tollison were the first to drive through the second kill 

Burning tankers on ASR Cardinals. Photo courtesy of Daniel Petrik
50 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

zone and reach safety followed by Row and McDermott 

in Gun Truck 160 and Peterson and Slaughter in KBR6. 

The rest prepared to leave the overpass but their ordeal 

was far from over.

ASR Cardinals

The first to make the turn onto Cardinals, Church thought 

he was safe but a little further down the road small 

arms fire started and intensified. Houses closely flanked 

both sides of the road. Church remembered seeing the 

enemy standing and running at them from 30 meters 

on both sides. These were the militia driven into the 

neighborhood by the cavalry sweep. He had driven into 

a hasty kill zone and the enemy was just as surprised 

as the truck drivers. For the next three to four miles, 

Blankenship began spinning and firing his machinegun 

in 360 degrees. Church heard what he thought were a 

couple IEDs exploding behind him. There were mounds 

that looked like dug fighting positions where RPG teams 

would pop up and fire. About a mile and half before the 

Dairy Milk Factory, he saw a berm mound on the left 

side of the road. Church thought he heard a heavy 

caliber machinegun. The small arms fire was continuous 

all the way to the palm trees about three-quarters of a 

mile from the Dairy Milk Factory, and then it slackened. 

Church had expended six to seven magazines on 

Cardinals and Blankenship was down to his last 100 

rounds. Suddenly, Church saw an Abrams tank and 

thought, “Hey, what’s that doing here?” The tank then 

aimed its main gun at him and Church’s heart dropped 

“all the way to the floor.” That was his scariest moment 

because he knew the tank would not miss. He then 

thought, “Dude, I make it all the way through this 

to get shot by a tank.” 

SSG Thomas Armstrong’s Abrams tank and three 

HMMWVs from SFC Michael A. Klein’s 2nd Platoon were 

providing security on Cardinals just outside the Bilady 

Dairy Milk Factory after noticing the columns of smoke 

ahead. Church had luckily reached the outer security 

perimeter established by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 

12th Cavalry, call sign “Cold Steel,” which had occupied 

the site during the night of 8 April. After 15 minutes 

of driving through a hail of enemy fire, Church’s battle 

damaged HMMWV finally ground to a halt just five feet 

outside the concertina wire. All the while, enemy fire 

continued right up to the gates of the Dairy Milk Factory. 

The cavalry troopers aimed in on the approaching 

HMMWV, being cautious in the wake of recent reports 

of insurgents stealing five HMMWVs from LSA Anaconda. 

Armstrong held his fire and after a few seconds, 

recognized the vehicle’s occupants were Americans 

and visibly shaken.74

SGT Hawley jumped out and pulled back the 

concertina and motioned Church, Wood, Tollison, and 

the 660th HMMWV forward. Guides led the tankers the 

few hundred meters into a safe area inside the dairy 

compound, while Church’s HMMWV remained near the 

checkpoint for the time being. Church exited his vehicle, 

ran inside and quickly described to the cavalry the 

ambush he had just driven through. Church then ran 

back out the wire, pulled Brown out and threw him over 

his shoulder, then aided by SSG Donavan D. Simpson, 

Keith Stanley’s tanker at FOB Daisy, the Dairy Milk Factory. Photo courtesy of Keith Stanley
Operation Iraqi Freedom 51

carried him ten feet to a medical vehicle. By then Brown 

had regained consciousness. He thought if Church was 

carrying him and laying him down then it must be a safe 

area. Brown then recognized he was surrounded by other 

soldiers and assumed that he was in BIAP. In the next few 

minutes, KBR 3 with Danny Wood and KBR 4 with Rick 

Tollison and SSG Hollingsworth pulled into the compound. 

Hollingsworth had been hit in the tip of the nose, which 

bled profusely. As they arrived, an insurgent mortar round 

landed and set fire to a pool of fuel. The first four vehicles 

onto Cardinals had reached safety.75

Church looked back down the road and saw another 

truck about 60 to 70 meters outside the wire with KBR 

drivers lying down. Church, SFC Klein and SSG Simpson 

went out to them only to discover one was playing dead. 

The cavalry platoon leader assisted in medevacing the 

wounded drivers that had reached safety. Inside the Dairy 

Milk Factory, 1SG Charles Q. Taylor and his medics, PVT 

James M. Meaney, PFC Ronald J. Kapture, SPC Justin 

B. Onwordi and SGT Casey J. Blanchette established a 

casualty collection point and treated the wounded.76

The troopers thought the civilians looked shaken by their 

experience, while the contractors felt the cavalry troopers 

had no idea what the convoy had been through. Danny 

Wood was amazed when one soldier asked him where 

his spill kit was to deal with the fuel leaking from his 

shot-up tanker.77 Meanwhile Hawley made a report of the 

ambush and tried unsuccessfully to get air support, while 

SGT Blankenship kept his weapon trained out over the 

concertina and attempted to raise SFC Groff on the radio.

Back down the road, SPC McDermott kept up a high 

rate of fire from his .50 - caliber machinegun, killing one 

RPG gunner for sure and causing others to duck away 

as his gun truck passed. Bullets smacked into his ring 

mount and the ammunition can attached to his M2, but 

he fortunately was not hit. SPC Row drove as fast as he 

could, but with the tires shot out and the highway slick 

with fuel, he was barely making ten miles per hour. He 

was firing his rifle, as well, and thought he hit one Iraqi 

before he ran out of magazines. When the gun truck 

reached safety at the dairy, Row, a trained combat 

life saver, went to work helping with the casualties. 

McDermott checked his ammunition supply. Out of 

the thousand rounds he had started with that morning 

(more than double what he normally would have had), 

he had less than a hundred left.78

Edward Sanchez, driving KBR 12, had also passed 

Grage’s gun truck pushing the tanker. When Sanchez 

saw the exit to Cardinals, he thought it would lead to 

safety, but the enemy fire only intensified as his rig 

climbed the ramp and made the left turn onto the 

overpass. He heard what he thought was a heavy caliber 

machinegun firing and his vehicle shook each time a 

round hit it. With his front tires now shot out, his truck 

slowed down even more. As Sanchez’ tanker passed by 

Stannard, the stranded driver saw his chance, ran to the 

vehicle and jumped on the driver’s side running board. 

Brezovay did the same on the passenger side. Their 

rescue was short-lived, as the tanker caught fire and 

ground to a halt on Cardinals. The two civilians bailed off 

the cab, and Sanchez briefly got his feet hung up in the 

steering wheel as he tried to climb out the window while 

bullets smacked around him. SGT Elmer Krause, his 

shooter, was hit as he tried to follow and the tractor was 

Keith Stanley’s tanker at FOB Daisy, the Dairy Milk Factory. Photo courtesy of Keith Stanley
52 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

soon engulfed in flames. The three drivers crawled along 

the exposed pavement away from the burning hulk.79

James Blackwood, driving KBR 16, navigated 

through the hazards of spilled fuel and wrecked vehicles 

littering the ramp and overpass. He saw a soldier and 

a couple of his fellow contractors on the ground as he 

drove away from the overpass, but the convoy prebrief had stressed that contract drivers were not to 

stop for anything, because the escort vehicles would 

handle breakdowns and other problems. He already 

had dropped his radio on the floor when he was shot in 

the hand. As he drove through the fire along Cardinals, 

he was hit again in the left leg, right arm, and back. He 

had served as a door gunner on a Huey in Vietnam and 

swore he “had never been under attack as on this day.”80 

Blackwood along with Keith Stanley in KBR 13 managed 

to make it to safety at the milk factory, but had to be 

carried from his cab.

Meanwhile, Lester shifted his body armor to his 

head and shoulder because of the fire coming from 

both sides of the road. A hundred yards down the road 

his truck took cross fire from both sides of the road and 

Lester swerved his bobtail back and forth across the 

median to avoid the maze of concrete barriers dragged 

into the road. Small arms fire sounded like a string 

of firecrackers going off as the enemy fired through 

holes in the concrete sound barriers and from two 

story houses that flanked the road. One round punched 

through the passenger door and hit Zimmerman’s lower 

ankle. He then dropped his head into Lester’s lap. Lester 

kept weaving between barriers when he then heard 

the swish of a rocket miss his truck and hit a concrete 

barrier. He heard another rocket heading his way and 

then the rear of his bobtail lifted up and deposited his 

truck sideways in the median. Lester’s foot was pushing 

the gas pedal and the engine was racing. With rounds 

still flying around him, he thought, “Oh my God, I’ve lost 

my rear drives.” He then reached down and pulled back 

on the transmission shifter then his truck took off again. 

He was driving on the left side of the sidewalk so close 

to the insurgents he felt the muzzle blast inside his truck 

as insurgents were firing just over his cab. Driving with 

his head tucked down, a 20mm round split his sun visor 

in half just missing his head by inches. Driving through a 

gauntlet of enemy fire Lester feared his luck would soon 

run out, but after a few hundred yards further the enemy 

stopped firing. Zimmerman’s head was still in Lester’s 

lap and he thought he was finally out of the kill zone 

when he heard another swishing sound and a rocket 

hit the front of his truck but fortunately did not explode. 

Lester’s truck slid another 30 yards down the road and 

came to a halt. Then the small arms fire picked up again. 

Lester told Zimmerman to get out and then fell out 

himself crawling under the truck. He saw the front end 

was nearly on the ground. He saw Zimmerman hit the 

ground and then told him to get under the truck. 

He crawled toward Lester saying, “I’m bleeding to death.” 

His ankle was bleeding badly. Lester then handed him 

a Hajaib to tie around his ankle. Zimmerman continued 

to talk about bleeding to death while Lester saw 

insurgents moving around through the holes in the 

sound barriers. He told Zimmerman to be quiet fearing 

it would not be long before the insurgents killed them. 

Waiting to die, Lester had an unreal sense of fear and 

hoped a burst of full auto would kill him quickly rather 

than get captured and be beheaded.81

About that time, Hamill’s tanker system came 

crawling up the ramp at about five to ten miles per hour. 

Hamill saw the first tanker flipped on its right side with 

its cab crushed. Hamill wanted to stop and check for the 

driver, but if he did his rig would have blocked the exit for 

the trucks behind him. As Howell negotiated the ramp, 

their truck began to fishtail causing Hamill to shout, 

“Nelson, we can’t block this ramp. Try to get over to 

the guardrail as far as you can. If we spin out by the 

guardrail maybe another truck can still get by.”82

As they reached the top of the ramp, another truck, 

probably KBR 15, swerved off the freeway, drove past 

them, and made the left hand turn onto the overpass. 

Hamill then saw Stannard and Walsh’s tanker system, 

which appeared to have been hit by an RPG and flipped 

over against the guardrail. Hamill’s truck began to crawl 

across the bridge past the disabled truck where about 

a hundred yards ahead of them, the fuel truck that had 

just passed them exploded shooting flames in the air. 

By then, Hamill’s truck was making even less progress. 

Walsh looked over and saw all of the tires had been 

shot out, the trailer was on fire, and fuel was spilling out 

of the many bullet holes. Completely trashed, Hamill’s 

tractor slowed down just enough so that Walsh, hobbling 

on his wounded foot could catch up and jump on the 

passenger’s side running board. Hooking his arm around 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 53

the side mirror, Walsh looked in and saw the passenger 

was wounded, but not badly. Hamill was hyperventilating 

while holding his right arm. Walsh then told the driver 

to speed up and Hamill also remembered him yelling, 

“We’ve got to drop this trailer.” Howell yelled back, “We 

are losing air pressure, must have happened when that 

big explosion hit us, must’ve knocked out our brakes.” 

They were dragging the fuel trailer along like an anchor.83

Completely exposed and wounded in the foot, Walsh 

stood on the running board firing away while trying to 

hold on as the truck crawled along on rims. A couple of 

times the soldier grabbed another clip, bumped it, and 

slammed it in his M -16. He sprayed his weapon back 

and forth, not really picking his targets. Walsh 

remembered, “I fired into the city buildings and just 

about everywhere trying to keep the suppressive fire 

down. Unfortunately, it wasn’t working. The more I fired, 

the more rounds were fired at us.” He could not take 

good aim and realized he needed a more stable position; 

so he decided to climb on the hood of the truck.84

Using the side mirror Walsh pulled himself up on 

the hood, but the mirror broke off. As Walsh was falling, 

Hamill reached out and grabbed the handle on the back 

of his flak jacket. Reaching back, Walsh then grabbed 

the passenger window, pulled himself back up onto the 

truck, then crawled up onto the hood, lied down and fired 

left and right into the city. The crowd of Iraqis along the 

street fired at the passing truck and Walsh wondered 

how he did not get hit in the hail of gunfire. He heard 

a weapon fire very close by on the driver’s side of the 

truck. He looked and saw the same two kids that had 

shot at him on the bridge. The older one was firing at the 

vehicle while the younger was firing two to three - round 

bursts directly at Walsh, who fired another round over 

their heads but they did not budge, and apparently were 

not about to. He then aimed at the younger kid’s chest 

and fired. The round entered his throat and exited the 

other side, dropping the kid to the ground dead. The older 

kid looked down at him, then up at Walsh, and started 

spraying 20 to 30 rounds. Walsh rolled over, trying 

not to get hit, then took aim and fired at the kid’s head, 

but hit the wall behind it. Luckily, it knocked enough 

debris on him to drop him to the ground, which 

was good enough for Walsh.85

Approaching one of the burning tankers, Howell 

yelled, “We can’t go by the truck. We’ll catch fire, too.” 

Their tanker was spilling fuel from both sides. Howell 

added, “This truck’s fixin’ to die. It’s fixin’ to quit.” Their 

truck finally ground to a halt propelling Walsh off the 

hood. As he rolled to a stop in front of the truck, rounds 

were hitting around him. He thought if a round hit the 

contractors, they would not make it, so Walsh stood 

up and ran about 50 to 75 meters away from the truck 

and lied back down then fired into the buildings 

wherever he saw anyone.86

Hamill realized they had no other choice but to bail 

out. Walsh looked back and saw the driver climbing out. 

Walsh feared if the driver got out, it would draw attention 

to him and he would end up being shot. Walsh yelled at 

him to get back in the truck, but Howell did not listen. 

Walsh then aimed and fired a round into his door handle. 

Howell jumped back into the truck and closed the door. 

The passengers just sat there looking at the soldier who 

hoped they did not think he was going to shoot them. 

After about ten minutes, they saw Groff’s HMMWV 

coming towards them.87

Lamar drove Groff’s HMMWV down the road to 

catch up with the convoy while trying to avoid guardrails 

and giant rocks placed in the road, but the fuel covered 

road felt like driving on ice. Their HMMWV also continued 

to lose power. When Groff’s HMMWV rolling on rims 

approached, Walsh recognized his chance for rescue, 

jumped up and flagged it down. The HMMWV pulled 

around about 100 feet in front of Hamill’s truck and 

stopped. Walsh ran for it with Howell right behind him. 

They dived through the right side door. Meanwhile Hamill 

ran as fast as he could, but wounded and loaded down 

with body armor and Kevlar helmet, he was about ten 

feet from the HMMWV when it sped off. He yelled but 

they did not hear him. Howell screamed at Lamar that 

he had left Hamill behind, but they did not turn back.88

Hamill was left standing in the middle of the road 

with bullets still flying. He remembered the advice of his 

Vietnam veteran roommate in Kuwait, “If you are ever 

under fire, you get down on the ground as quick as you 

can and stay down.” Hamill did just that. He examined 

his escape routes but saw several Iraqis running toward 

him. He tried crawling toward one of the houses with 

his good arm, but not long after, he was a captive in 

enemy hands.89

Groff’s heavily damaged HMMWV headed towards 

the safety of north gate of BIAP and after a little ways 
54 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

picked up Goodrich, Brezovay, Sanchez, and Stannard. 

Groff’s four-passenger HMMWV was then packed with 

12 people. Goodrich had jumped in and sat on Walsh’s 

lap, who was sitting behind the driver. Goodrich fired 

out the window then Walsh felt a thump - Goodrich had 

been shot. He started yelling, “Ah..ah..ah..I got hit, I’ve 

been hit!” Fisher was begging for water, and would die 

enroute. Sanchez yelled he was a medic and asked 

for a first aid kit. Walsh pushed his wounded comrade 

forward so he could climb back and pull out a first aid 

pouch. He then leaned back up to help Goodrich, but 

blood was coming out of Goodrich’s mouth and he was 

not moving. SPC Pelz, the gunner and also a combat life 

saver, helped with the wounded. Others yelled for him 

to get back on his SAW, the vehicle’s primary means of 

defense. Sanchez placed someone’s fist into Goodrich’s 

wound to slow the flow of blood, then bandaged Fisher’s 

arm. Walsh meanwhile jammed a rifle into Howell’s 

hands and told him to start firing. Crawling along at 

a top speed of about ten miles an hour, they were 

still under heavy fire.90

Groff’s HMMWV had reached the western edge of 

the Abu Ghraib Market about 500 to 700 meters from 

the safety of the cavalry barricade when a round finally 

went through the radiator. The HMMWV rolled about 

another hundred meters before it came to a halt about 

two to three miles from the north gate of BIAP. Pelz saw 

Iraqis advancing to trees around them and began firing 

back. The rest sat in the HMMWV looking at each other 

for what seemed like a “life time.” SFC Groff radioed for 

help, but no one answered. It seemed hopeless. They 

just sat there listening to the bullets bounce off the 

HMMWV, hoping no RPG would hit them. They feared 

they were going to die since that HMMWV had been their 

last hope but it was out of commission. After about ten 

to 15 minutes, Groff again tried calling anyone on either 

the military or KBR radio then SGT Blankenship, gunner 

in the lead HMMWV, answered on the KBR radio that 

a couple tanks were on their way. They heard a loud 

screaming sound like a banshee. Pelz looked up the 

road and saw tanks emerge from the compound ahead. 

Three others stood up and looked out the top of the 

HMMWV and to their delight saw a Bradley racing 

towards them firing at anything that moved with two 

more tanks following right behind it.91

Rescue

Hiding under his damaged M915 bobtail, Lester turned 

down the volume of squelch on his hand held radio and 

called for help. A voice replied, “Where are you?” Lester 

answered, “I’m under a truck. Where are you?” “I made 

it in,” stated to voice on the radio, “We’re coming to get 

you. Just hang in there.” Lester looked down the road 

in the direction he had come from and saw a gun truck 

followed by a HMMWV, most likely Row’s gun truck and 

the 660th HMMWV. He thought they were saved, but 

the crews might not see him. So when the trucks were 

150 yards away, he rolled out from under the truck and 

played dead so he would not get shot. As the trucks 

approached closer, Lester began waving but the trucks 

kept going. They passed within five feet from him. Both 

gunners spun their turrets around and watched him as 

they passed out of sight. Lester rolled back under his 

truck and began to lose all hope of rescue. Pale and 

unresponsive, Lester assumed Zimmerman was near 

death from his loss of blood. Minutes passed and then 

he looked back down the road toward the milk factory 

and saw a Bradley and two up-armored HMMWVs 

coming his way.92

Church guided SFC Klein accompanied by SSG 

Simpson and SGT Eric J. Mehall’s two M1114 HMMWVs, 

and SFC Christopher H. Kowalewski’s M2 Bradley, 

attached from Troop A, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, back 

into the kill zone. Klein’s small rescue force pulled up 

beside Lester’s disabled bobtail to discovered two KBR 

drivers playing dead under it. The ramp of the Bradley 

dropped down and two troopers loaded Zimmerman 

into their vehicle while Lester climbed in one HMMWV. 

About that time, Kirkpatrick’s bobtail gun truck nearly 

sideswiped them.93

Kirkpatrick and Bohm in the last gun truck kept 

firing as they headed east on Cardinals. When 

Kirkpatrick ran out of M16 rounds, he picked up the 

SAW in the cab and fired it. Spotting the small cavalry 

rescue group led by Klein, Kirkpatrick jumped his truck 

over the highway median to head in their direction. As 

he did so and began braking, the vehicle hit spilled fuel, 

spun 245 degrees and then tipped, finally slamming into 

a pile of dirt. The careening gun truck just missed Klein’s 

HMMWV. The wild maneuver threw Bohm backwards 

against his turret, knocking the wind out of him and he 

collapsed in a heap. Klein then led his group back to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 55

the dairy and passed 1SG Taylor and SSG Armstrong’s 

Abrams tanks heading in the opposite direction in search 

of survivors. Kirkpatrick managed to get going again 

and make it to the milk factory, where cavalry troopers 

pulled the injured gunner from his mount.94

As soon as Klein dropped Lester and Zimmerman 

off at the milk factory, he turned his platoon around 

and raced back up Cardinals with Church still as a guide. 

After traveling a half-mile, the small force received 

intense fire from gunmen concealed in houses along 

the right side of the road. With short, accurate bursts 

targeting all visible muzzle flashes, the experienced 

cavalry turret gunners eliminated or suppressed the 

enemy fighters. Klein continued for another mile before 

spotting Taylor and Armstrong’s tanks parked on either 

side of Groff’s damaged HMMWV.95 Klein’s vehicles 

pulled in front and behind, forming a protective box 

around the convoy survivors. Walsh remembered, 

“It was cool as hell!”96

Church recognized the assistant convoy 

commander’s HMMWV amidst heavy black smoke 

and flaming wreckage of burning fuel tankers. He 

dismounted, ran over and pushed his head in the 

window then exclaimed, “Sergeant Groff.” Surprised to 

see him, Groff responded, “Church?” “Yeah, it’s Church,” 

replied the young driver. Church looked in the back of 

the HMMWV and saw a pile of people. 1SG Taylor and 

SSG Armstrong’s tanks then pushed past Klein’s two 

HMMWVs to establish a blocking position and then 

engage enemy. The tanks bore the brunt of the RPG 

and small arms fire that rained in from both sides of 

the road while the dismounted soldiers quickly sorted 

through the bloody mess. Pulling people out of the 

vehicle, they discovered two wounded soldiers 

and four wounded KBR drivers.97

Church and Pelz set up a hasty triage, identifying 

the most critically wounded while Klein’s men provided 

medical assistance and helped the wounded to the 

rescue vehicles. The small reaction force attracted 

a lot of small arms fire during the evacuation. While 

Church was carrying Goodrich to lay him down between 

the vehicles, something grabbed his foot and he fell. 

His helmet was knocked off and rounds passed right 

over his head. If he had not fallen, he would have gotten 

shot in the head. Someone then yelled at Church to put 

his helmet on. Church then bandaged PFC Goodrich’s 

sucking chest wound and performed CPR on him, to 

no avail. Church then carried him over to one of the 

HMMWVs. Lamar saw Church put Goodrich in the back 

of the HMMWV; body armor covered his face so Lamar 

knew Goodrich was dead. Once Church and Pelz had 

carried all the wounded over to the HMMWV, it became 

apparent that there was not enough space for all ten, so 

Klein arranged to link-up with SFC Kowalewski’s Bradley 

halfway toward the milk factory.98

Church insisted the cavalry troopers evacuate the 

wounded back to the casualty collection point while he 

and Pelz wait for their return. Groff did not know anyone 

had been left behind until he reached the safety of 

the compound and started counting the people in his 

convoy. After the vehicles left, Pelz started yelling that 

they were left behind. Church reasured him the cavalry 

would come back and they could hold out. He pushed 

Pelz inside the HMMWV, since he was a better combat 

life saver. After the cavalry vehicles left, the small arms 

fire surprisingly dropped off. Church assumed that the 

militia thought no one remained behind. Church then 

took cover behind the left rear side of the HMMWV 

where he heard a couple Iraqis walk up behind him 

yelling back and forth. Evidently they had not seen him. 

Just as surprised to see them, Church turned and fired, 

killing both of them.99

When the first black columns of smoke from 

burning tanker trucks had appeared in the sky, 

CPT Aaron J. Munz was in a meeting with his battalion 

commander at Logistics Base Seitz. He had departed 

immediately for the dairy, assuming anticipating 

trouble and reached his company around the time 

Klein returned with the survivors from Groff’s HMMWV. 

CPT Munz and SSG Charles Armstead then quickly 

raced out the gate of the milk factory in their Abrams 

tanks and headed into the kill zone. As they came upon 

the disabled HMMWV, a sergeant pointed to the enemy 

and other vehicles. They continued on toward 

the burning fuel tankers with Munz’ tank in the lead 

and dodged over 15 RPGs. AK rounds bounced off the 

armor of his tank and over his head. They found no 

survivors. Three times, Munz halted and oriented his 

tank of the south waiting for the rest of his tanks and 

Bradleys to catch up.100

After ten minutes, the recovery team returned to 

pick up Church and Pelz. Before leaving the area, 
56 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Church initiated a sensitive -items check and weapons 

sweep to prevent capture by enemy forces. In spite of 

the extreme danger to himself, he maintained a clear 

presence of mind. His training had paid off. Once Church 

and Pelz climbed in the vehicle and left, an RPG hit their 

disabled HMMWV. Upon his return to the milk factory, 

Church immediately rendered medical assistance to 

two more civilians with minor wounds and loaded them 

into vehicles for ground evacuation to Log Base Seitz 

where all available medics had been assembled 

to treat them.101

Up the road, CPT Munz radioed 1SG Taylor to 

assemble a tank team to recover the vehicle. Taylor 

led the team out the gate for the third time. Munz and 

Armstead had pulled up to the intersection of Cardinals 

and Sword and as they crested the overpass, Munz saw 

50 to 70 males of fighting age gathered on the soccer 

field west of the intersection and north of Cardinals. As 

soon as the Iraqis saw the tanks, they ran away. They 

were unarmed so the tanks did not engage. Munz saw 

another crowd of Iraqis gathering around the Janah Al 

Salayn Mosque, which began firing on the tanks. About 

that time, Taylor arrived with three tanks, a Bradley 

and two M1114s. Kowalewski engaged with his 25mm 

chain gun and 1SG Taylor fired a 120mm high explosive 

round. They drove the distance of Sword looking for 

survivors and encountered a minimum of seven different 

RPG teams and multiple shooters. CPT Allen and SFC 

Franklin’s two tanks from B Company were ordered to 

up to assist Munz. Enroute they received and returned 

fire. A convoy from the 20th Engineer Battalion pulled 

up to which Allen halted it, turned it around and sent it 

back south on Sword. Once they determined there were 

no survivors in the kill zone, Allen and Franklin returned 

to Check Point 7 to set up a screen line. Unable to find 

any survivors of the ambush, Munz returned with his 

force to the Dairy Milk Factory. The Iraqis had prepared 

an ambush by moving concrete barriers into the road. 

As they approached the obstacle, the lead Bradley was 

hit by multiple RPGs and an IED. The tracked vehicles 

formed a box around the M1114s and continued 

toward the milk factory.102

Safely back at the milk factory, Munz asked SFC 

Groff for an accountability of his men, Groff reported that 

he had could account for all his men except Krause and 

Maupin. He expressed concern about the SINCGARS in 

his HMMWV falling into enemy hands. CPT Munz radioed 

his first sergeant and told him to take care of it. They left 

the safety of the milk factory for the fourth time and 1SG 

Taylor, SSG Armstrong and SFC Christopher H. Kowaleski 

reached the HMMWV they were supposed to recover 

where they saw 60 to 70 Iraqis dancing in celebration 

around it. Taylor fired a high explosive round at the 

vehicle destroying the vehicle, its secure radio, and 

everyone around it. His gunner, SGT Persinger, fired into 

the crowd with his coaxial machinegun. They continued 

west and came across one 5 -ton tractor that was not 

completely ablaze, so they parked two tanks on either 

side and Kowaleski backed his Bradley up to it. They 

then hooked their tow cables to the tractor and dragged 

it. When they reached the other vehicle that Groff had 

told them about, it was engulfed in flames. The heat 

from the flames was so intense that Taylor could feel 

it through the crack in his open commander’s hatch. 

After almost an hour in the kill zone they returned 

Inferno of the overpass. View looking west on Cardinals.

Photo courtesy of Daniel Petrik

Looking west across the overpass. KBR 14 and 17 are 

burning on the left and the smoke from Bradley’s tanker 

is on the right. Photo courtesy of Daniel Petrik
Operation Iraqi Freedom 57

to the safety of the milk factory.103

While Taylor was out, CPT Munz spoke with

 the drivers of the 724th and they looked “absolutely 

awestruck.” They stood there bloodied but asked 

about their buddies who had been evacuated and 

the two drivers still missing. The concern for their 

buddies brought tears to Munz’ eyes. Munz told them 

the wounded had been evacuated to Log Base Seitz 

and would be pushed higher up the ladder of medical 

treatment. Almost to a man, they expressed their 

gratitude for their rescue. One expressed, “I thought 

we were all going to die and then we saw your tanks. 

I was so happy, because I knew we had a chance.”104

7th Transportation Battalion TOC

Meanwhile at 1230 hours, CPT Michael E. Ludwick called 

via telephone to inform the 7th Battalion that the 724th 

convoy had been ambushed. His serial was supposed 

to depart ahead of the 724th but had radio problems 

causing it to delay and depart behind the second serial. 

After they saw the columns of smoke rising up where 

the 724th convoy was and heard the activity on radios, 

they took Route Vernon to Irish to the main gate, instead 

of Route Sword and encountered no ambushes. Having 

avoided the ambush, Ludwick assumed the worst.105

LTC Akin was at the 172nd Corps Support Group 

Headquarters when he first learned of the ambush. 

He did not believe it but thought it prudent to return to 

his headquarters. His first report of the ambush came 

from Ludwick who reported he could see the columns 

of smoke and that the entire convoy had been destroyed. 

This captain was prone to exaggerate, so Akin did not

believe the extent of the damage but assumed something had happened. What fueled his fear was that he 

could account for every convoy but the 724th and could 

not raise anyone in Brown’s convoy on the radio.

Every battalion commander wants to accomplish the 

mission and bring all of his soldiers home alive. The first 

emotion that George Akin felt was disbelief. There was 

no certainty the ambush had happened to one of his 

convoys. Akin like everyone else hoped for the best. The 

accumulating reports increasingly indicated it was one 

of his convoys. Both battalion and CPT Smith made calls 

throughout the day and into the night to determine the 

extent of the injuries. Finally CPT Smith walked in and 

admitted his convoy had been ambushed. Akin’s fear 

was confirmed. Smith was 45 - years old nearly the 

same general age as Akin and prior service enlisted in 

the infantry and Special Forces. Smith was mature and 

level headed. So Akin looked to him more as a peer 

than a subordinate. SFC Groff had called Smith at 

1800 hours to confirm the death of PFC Goodrich and 

that PFC Maupin and SGT Krause were missing.106

Akin realized that soldiers under his command had 

been killed. Disbelief turned into anger. He realized that 

anger would not solve anything. So he calmed down and 

began to think rationally again. He resigned himself to 

the realization of the loss and started focusing on the 

next steps. First he called all the commanders together 

and had them put the word out that no one would call 

home about the ambush until he had a full accounting 

of the losses. He had learned from a previous mortar 

attack that if one person called home to even mention 

there was an attack and they were all right, this would 

Looking east. Abrams tank driving across the overpass past KBR 14 and 17. Photo courtesy of Daniel Petrik
58 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

incite rumors and excite the worst fears that other 

family members who had not heard from their loved 

ones. The reports varied about how many soldiers 

were killed and missing.107

Akin later pulled CPT Smith aside and told him he 

had to push fuel out to Al Asaad, but Smith could not 

go on the convoy until the battalion commander said 

he could. Akin needed Smith to step away from his 

company to help with both the Article 15 - 6 investigation 

and notification. Akin had great respect for CPT Smith 

and felt that he was always “a brain cell ahead” of the 

situation. Fortunately, the 181st Battalion had walked 

the 7th Battalion’s chaplain through the conduct of 

a memorialization ceremony. The problem was that 

this would not be the last one. From then on the 

7th Battalion would have soldiers killed every month. 

Fortunately, the 724th POL would not lose any one 

else killed after this ambush.108

Smith went back to his company, then assembled 

his soldiers and told them to take seats on the ground. 

The soldiers were in a state of shock because of the 

rumors. Smith then told them everything he knew at 

the time, which was Goodrich was killed, eight were 

wounded and Maupin and Krause were missing. The 

commander asked everyone to bow their heads and 

pray. Afterwards, he asked if anyone did not want 

“to go outside the wire.” No one raised his hand. In 

spite of the tragic loss of life to their comrades, 

the rest rolled out.109

Lessons

Never before had any convoy in Iraq encountered an 

ambush this large or intense. At the end of the day on 

9 April, there were seven known dead - SGT Krause 

and PFC Goodrich and civilian drivers Hulett, Johnson, 

Parker, Montague, and Fisher. In addition, eight soldiers 

and four KBR drivers were wounded.110 Four men were 

initially missing in action. The insurgents had captured 

Tommy Hamill, SGT Krause and SPC Maupin, but Hamill 

would escape after 27 days of captivity. Driver William 

Bradley’s remains were recovered in January 2005, 

Krause’s remains were recovered 23 April and American 

troops located Maupin’s body in late March 2008. One 

missing civilian, Timothy Bell, has never been found.111

This ambush experienced similar losses to the first 

large scale convoy ambush in Vietnam on 2 September 

1967 where 30 out of 37 vehicles were damaged or 

destroyed, seven drivers killed and 17 wounded. The 

724th POL convoy lost 16 out of 26 vehicles damaged 

or destroyed with ten civilian and military drivers killed, 

one still missing in action and 12 wounded. In Vietnam, 

the truck companies would adopt gun trucks and evolve 

their convoy tactics, while the ambush of the 724th POL 

already had gun trucks, but without appropriate reaction 

to contact procedures for a complex ambush. So the 

participants of the Good Friday Ambush did the best 

they could with the training and resources they had. 

The planners had made mistakes in route planning; 

but even with the best planning, convoys will still end 

up driving into kill zones. SPC Row summed up the 

experience best, “It wasn’t anyone’s fault, it was just 

hell.”112 But if anyone had to fight that battle again, 

there were some things that could be done differently. 

The first and most common mistake was thinking 

in the present tense. The intelligence community had 

no templates that explained how to predict insurgent 

behavior. Even though the lessons of all previous 

attacks indicated that the enemy was becoming more 

sophisticated, the best the intelligence community 

could do in anticipation of the Al Sadr Uprising was 

predict more of the same – in other words, lots of small 

ambushes, not big ones. The Vietnam veterans watching 

these ambushes from the sidelines of the United States 

had recognized the same pattern as in their war and 

predicted large - scale ambushes.113 The best of minds 

cannot prevent every ambush from happening, but a 

better understanding of the scale of attack can help 

the convoys develop more appropriate tactics for them. 

The 724th convoy drove into that kill zone with tactics 

designed for smaller ambushes - just drive through 

and return fire. Had anyone anticipated a worst case 

scenario of a large scale ambush, they might have had 

the forethought to pull out the old standard operating 

procedures from the 8th Transportation Group during 

the Vietnam War. Surprisingly, they would have read 

that any vehicle not in the kill zone should not drive 

into it. Lester had the right idea when he stopped at the 

compound. While the soldiers of the 724th performed 

as well as they could with the training and equipment 

they had, the best lessons come from comparing this 

ambush with what worked in the past and future.

Unable to predict the future, the intelligence 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 59

community throughout the war in Iraq just force - fed the 

convoys with a list of previous attacks without analysis. 

What was missing that Friday was knowledge of current 

operations. There were so many convoy ambushes 

that day that the 724th would have been lucky to have 

avoided one, but had planners been aware of current 

operations, that convoy would not have driven down 

Cardinals that day. Part of this failure was that convoy 

operations have historically been seen as logistical 

operations rather than combat operations and therefore 

have not been integrated with current operations. Both 

the convoys and the battle space commander need 

situational awareness of what is in their area. When 

in contact, the convoys and maneuver units on the 

ground become part of a team.

Mistakes were made that sent the 724th into that 

kill zone, but despite the best of preventive efforts, 

convoys will continue to drive through kill zones. To better 

understand what they could have done differently, one 

must examine other ambushes. Fortunately, Iraq had not 

yet experienced ambushes on this scale, so the Vietnam 

War might have provided better insight. The level of gun 

truck armor and armament as well as enemy weapon 

technology in Iraq in April 2004 was almost identical to 

that of the Vietnam War, so the two wars separated by 

30 years make fair comparisons. Because of the 

complexity of the different routes, nearly every convoy 

commander’s greatest fear was getting lost in downtown 

Baghdad, so they rode up front during the first couple 

of years of the war; but if a convoy was caught in an 

ambush, the important decisions needed to be made 

in the rear of the convoy where the majority of the 

action took place. In both this war and Vietnam, convoy 

commanders started out riding up front but learned to 

ride near the rear of the convoy. 

In this ambush, however, key decisions were made 

up front. As the convoy approached the kill zone, there 

were more signs of danger ahead, especially the tank 

engaging enemy and a crew member waving them off. 

Stopping or turning back was not a consideration by 

the military based upon recent experience. The next 

decision point was whether to continue through the 

burning smoke or turn off onto the side road. In combat 

tactical decisions are made in seconds or less, and this 

convoy commander had little information to determine 

which road was the safest. As it turned out, because 

of the IEDs on the side road, the burning tanker was 

intended to canalize the convoy into the road where 

the kill zone was planned. The next key decision was 

whether to continue straight or take the left turn and 

follow the planned route to the north gate. The planned 

route unwittingly led them into the neighborhood 

into which the militia had been forced. That became 

the second kill zone, and many trucks were lost just 

trying to make the turn onto the overpass. However, 

an armored cavalry company was not too far down 

the road, which was what rescued most of the drivers 

from the disabled vehicles. Going straight ahead was 

relatively safer, but there were no clues to indicate 

which route was safer. On average, a large kill zone 

consists of not more than 50 guerrillas because of the 

difficulty coordinating fires. So having cleared one kill 

zone the convoy commander would feel reasonably safe. 

Unfortunately, the Cavalry had driven insurgents into the 

neighborhood flanking the rest of the route to BIAP. So 

the leader with the best tactical skills should be in the 

rear of the convoy to control the fight and recovery while 

a good leader needed to be up front to make decisions 

about the route and whether to continue or stop. 

The design of the initial kill zone may have been 

either an L- shaped or Z- shaped kill zone since the 

enemy was engaging from both sides of the road. 

Because of the risk of hitting fellow ambushers on the 

opposite side of the road, strict control measures for 

sectors of fire need to be established. Most of the truck 

drivers described initially receiving fire from the left side 

and then the right. Most of the houses were on the left 

side of the highway with two small neighborhoods on the 

right. Since in the desert key terrain is any overpass or 

two story building, the distribution of the houses most 

likely shaped the first kill zone. 

The main lesson from the Vietnam War was that 

ambushes were won by overwhelming firepower. 

Almost every large scale ambush in Vietnam ended 

with four to five gun trucks in the kill zone or the arrival 

of the nearest armored quick reaction force or attack 

helicopter. Keep in mind that every Vietnam gun truck 

had at least three .50 caliber machineguns, which 

would add up to 12 to 15 heavy machineguns in the kill 

zone. Unfortunately in Iraq, the standard for armament 

was one machinegun per gun truck. Over time, escort 

units in Iraq would learn nothing commanded respect 
60 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

like the M2 .50 caliber machinegun; and similar to the 

Vietnam War, this would become the primary weapon of 

choice for gun trucks. The concern for collateral damage 

caused some gunners to search for identifiable targets 

and others fired short bursts. McDermott blazed away 

with his .50 and expended over 900 rounds (nine cans) 

of ammunition by the time he reached safety. During 

the Vietnam War, unable to identify targets, the gunners 

on gun trucks of the 8th Transportation Group used 

spraying fire; in other words, pressing the butterflies 

(triggers) on the .50s and not letting up except to change 

ammo cans. They fired at anything that looked like the 

enemy or where they thought the enemy might be. One 

escort unit that arrived years later in Iraq said they used 

the spraying fire when hit by IEDs and the frequency of 

attacks dropped because the trigger men knew with 

all that lead flying around, there was a greater chance 

of getting killed. McDermott would have made a great 

gunner in the 8th Group in Vietnam.

During the Vietnam War, gun truck drivers were 

usually armed with M79 grenade launchers, which 

provided the gun trucks a short range indirect fire 

capability. The Mk19 automatic grenade launcher 

was a significant improvement over the M79 and, in 

time, each escort team would have at least one gun 

truck armed with it. The key to winning fire fights is 

overwhelming and accurate firepower. This leads one 

to assume no convoy can ever have too many heavy 

machineguns or too much ammunition in a kill zone.

Going into this war, the Army saw convoys as 

logistical moves from one point to the other so only the 

convoy commanders and assistant convoy commanders 

needed radios. The shortage of issued radios and 

their short range did not allow the leaders and, most 

importantly, the gun trucks to communicate effectively. 

To make up for the Army issue radios and the need to 

talk to contractors, the truck drivers acquired a variety 

of radios from commercial citizen band (CB) radios to 

the Government Issue SINCGARS. Without adequate 

communication, the gun trucks could not coordinate 

their fight and efficiently maneuver. Gun trucks were the 

only maneuverable elements of the convoy, so unable 

to coordinate their efforts they could only return fire and 

act independently. As learned during the Vietnam War, 

the gun truck’s primary role was to suppress enemy fire, 

defend disabled trucks and ensure the drivers escaped 

the kill zone. Had there been effective communication 

throughout the convoy, drivers could have warned 

the following gun trucks of enemy locations, disabled 

vehicles and drivers who needed rescue. As the war 

progressed, the Army would improve the radios and 

issue radios to every military vehicle.

This convoy had five escort vehicles, and clearly 

they did not have the fire power to stand and fight it 

out with hundreds of insurgents. Groff’s HMMWV gun 

truck made a noble effort to rescue as many drivers 

as it could, while others continued to return fire. 

Consequently, many drivers fell into enemy hands. 

The policy in Vietnam was that gun trucks would defend 

all disabled vehicles in the kill zone and ensure no driver 

was left in the kill zone. The gun trucks’ reaction in the 

Good Friday Ambush was to return suppressive fire 

against the insurgents so vehicles could clear the kill 

zone. The obvious lesson was that all vehicles needed 

armor; the gun trucks needed more armor and fire 

power, and the convoys needed procedures for how 

to react to large scale ambushes.

Randy Ross continued driving in Iraq until the US 

forces pulled out in December 2011. His later advice 

to other KBR drivers was not to stop in a kill zone but 

to keep driving because it was the job of the escorts 

to stop and rescue drivers. However, if the driver saw 

a burning truck with a driver outside it, he should slow 

down enough for the driver to jump on board the passing 

truck. This was the same policy during the Vietnam War. 

Ross also advised them if they abandoned their trucks to 

jump on another and leave the door open on their downed 

truck so the escorts would see the cab was empty.

During the Good Friday Ambush, the drivers of the 

fuel systems did exactly what they were trained to do, 

kept driving and returning fire, because it was the job 

of the gun trucks to defend the convoy. The question 

that persisted throughout the war was whether gun 

trucks should adopt passive or more aggressive tactics. 

The 724th followed a passive doctrine of returning fire 

and clearing the kill zone. This passive doctrine also 

included defending disabled vehicles or recovering the 

disabled vehicles. A more aggressive doctrine would 

have the gun trucks to stop and fight until a handoff 

with the ground combat force or everyone in the convoy 

had cleared the kill zone. The mission of the convoy 

is to deliver the cargo to the customer on time, not 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 61

finish the fight, yet, a few gun truck units felt inflicting 

casualties on the attacking force would discourage them 

from future ambushes. In fact, the Iraqis would try for a 

repeat of their success from Good Friday with another 

large-scale ambush on Palm Sunday, 20 March 2005, 

nearly a year later. The mistake the enemy would make 

in the later ambush would be halting two convoys in the 

kill zone, which doubled the number of gun trucks, and 

unbeknownst to them, one convoy was shadowed by a 

patrol of three HMMWV gun trucks. An enemy force of 

50 insurgents faced up to nine gun trucks with improved 

armor and consequently lost nearly all their number 

killed, wounded or captured. This forced the enemy to 

abandon large-scale ambushes in favor of improved IED 

attacks. With the lack of large-scale ambushes, senior 

leaders would favor the passive doctrine in the Iraq War.

Employing a more aggressive doctrine, the gun 

trucks in Vietnam stopped near each disabled vehicle 

to fight until they were sure the driver was rescued. 

Had the 724th understood Vietnam gun truck doctrine, 

as soon as a gun truck saw a vehicle get hit, it would 

have stopped and laid down suppressive fire. Other 

gun trucks would have joined it, multiplying the effect 

of the suppressive fire until the crew of the disabled 

vehicle was recovered. Then the gun trucks would have 

moved to the next disabled vehicle. SFC Groff did his 

best but his HMMWV operated alone. M915s had the 

advantage of height but did not have the room to recover 

wounded drivers. The 5-ton gun trucks of Vietnam with 

their armored gun boxes provided the best extraction 

vehicles for wounded. They had the firepower and enough 

ammunition to stand and fight next to a disabled vehicle 

so no truck driver during the Vietnam War was captured 

with a convoy that had gun trucks.114 In comparison 

with other convoy ambushes that Easter weekend, most 

performed the same way as the 724th but fortunately did 

not encounter such enemy opposition. The one exception 

was the ambushes with the Zebra, because its gun truck 

crew that weekend had strong combat arms background, 

and the leader, 2LT James McCormick had earned 

his first Bronze Star Medal the hard way during Desert 

Storm – with a Purple Heart. They employed aggressive 

tactics during ambushes on 8 and 11 April to defeat 

the enemy rather than just suppress enemy fire, 

which produced a different outcome.

The last lesson that was learned in both Vietnam and 

Iraq was that a guerrilla force fears air power. Any 

convoy in Vietnam or Iraq that rolled with air cover 

usually did not get ambushed. When convoys were 

ambushed, it usually ended when the combat aviation 

arrived. The lesson is when anticipating an ambush, 

call for air support. 

PFC Church had performed heroically as the 

convoy commander under fire and for his actions 

that day he received the first Silver Star Medal awarded 

to a truck driver and a US Army Reserve soldier during 

the war. 1SG Taylor received the Bronze Star Medal 

with V for his leadership under fire that entire weekend. 

Because ASR Force and Sword became synonymous 

with ambushes, their names were changed to Vernon 

and Huskies; but drivers continued to refer Sword by 

its old name so the name Huskies only lasted but 

a few months. This ambush would go down in the 

history of the Iraq war as the worst.

1 BG (P) James Chambers, former commanding general, 13th Corps 

Support Command, interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Lee, VA, May 2007.

2 Randy Ross telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 20 June 2014.

3 CPT Jeffry Smith, “Historical Narrative; 724th Transportation Company,” 

n.p., n.d.

4 SFC Mark A. Hawley Sworn Statement, 172nd Corps Support Group, 

Commander’s Inquiry regarding the 724th TC Convoy on 9 April 2004, 

14 April 2004. This was the second of two sworn statements 

provided by Hawley.

5 Smith, “Narrative.”

6 Cross-leveled referred to soldiers laterally transferred from one unit 

to another to fill shortages for the deployment.

7 Video, “Battlefield Dairies: Baghdad Convoy Attack,” Military Channel, 

2006; and Interview, SPC Jeremy L. Church interview by Richard Killblane, 

14 February 2007.

8 Smith “Narrative,” and Video, “Battlefield Dairies: Baghdad Convoy 

Attack,” Military Channel, 2006; Church interview; Memo, MAJ Mike W. 

Caraballo, for Commander, 172nd Corps Support Group, 2 August 2004, 

Report of Commander’s Inquiry of 724th Transportation Company Hostile 

Engagement, (henceforth referred to as Commander’s Inquiry).
62 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

9 Thomas Hamill and Paul T. Brown, Escape In Iraq; The Thomas Hamill 

Story, Accokeck, MD: Stoeger Publishing Company, 2004; LTC George Akin 

interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Bragg, NC, 5 November 2005; and 

“Battlefield Dairies.” CSM Otis Pate, who had worked in 7th Trans 

Battalion, remembered the basic load in 2014.

10 Commander’s Inquiry.

11 SFC Robert D. Groff Sworn Statement, 172nd Corps Support Group, 

Commanders Inquiry regarding the 724th TC Convoy on 9 April 2004, 

24 April 2004. This was the first of two statements made by Groff.

12 Thomas Hamill and Paul T. Brown, Escape in Iraq; The Thomas Hamill 

Story, Accokeek, Maryland: Stoeger Publishing Company, 2004; and 

“Battlefield Dairies.”

13 “Baghdad Dairies.”

14 Groff Sworn Statement.

15 T. Christian Miller, “US: Iraq convoy was sent out despite threat”, 

Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2007. This account is based on the 

172nd Corps Support Group Commander’s inquiry augmented by 

follow-up interviews by the author.

16 SPC Craig V. McDermott Written Statement, 172nd Corps Support 

Group, Commanders Inquiry regarding the 724th TC Convoy on 9 April 

2004, 22 April 2004. McDermott noted that 2nd Platoon linked up with 

the KBR drivers at 1000, followed by an 1100 departure time. Several 

other statements have placed departure time between 1040 and 

1100 hours.

17 LT Brown Sworn statement, 13 May 2004.

18 Randy Ross described this was how routes were briefed at that time. 

Randy Ross telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 20 June 2014.

19 Hamill, Escape. 20 SFC Mark A. Hawley Sworn Statement, 172nd Corps Support Group, 

Commanders Inquiry regarding the 724th TC Convoy on 9 April 2004, 

11 April 2004.

21 Smith, “Narrative,” and Hamill, Escape. 22 Smith, “Narrative;” Hamill, Escape; and Akin interview. 23 Smith, “Narrative” and Hamill, Escape; “Battlefield Dairies,” Church 

interview; and James Bretney email to Richard Killblane, June 1, 2006. 

Bretney had also interviewed Church.

24 “Battlefield Dairies.”

25 SPC Shawn E. Kirkpatrick Sworn Statement, Commander’s Inquiry, 

Jeffrey Slaughter, updated April 2004; Sworn Statement, 172nd Corps 

Support Group, Commanders Inquiry regarding the 724th TC Convoy on 

9 April 2004, 13 May 2004; Follow Up Serious Incident Report, 172nd 

Corps Support Group, Commanders Inquiry. The report contains a 

diagram listing each vehicle’s position in the convoy.

26 Donald C. Grage Sworn Statement, 9 April 2004; Jacob P. Brown Sworn 

Statement, 11 April 2004; Craig V. McDermot Sworn Statement April 2004; 

and SGT Bryan C. Watson Sworn Statement, Commanders Inquiry.

27 Hamill, Escape. 28 March, “On the move;” “Battlefield Dairies;” and Watson Sworn Statement.

29 Randy Ross telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 20 June 2014.

30 Ross telephone interview; and Jackie D. Lester, “Good Friday Attack April 

9th 2004,” unpublished, Transportation Corps History Archives.

31 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

32 Hamill’s version came from his book, Escape in Iraq. There is confusion 

about who pushed which truck. Jackie Lester wrote Richard Killblane on 

10 June 2014 that Hamill never told anyone to pick up Zimmerman. He 

made this part up for the book. Lester stated there was a difference 

between Hamill’s deposition to the court and what he wrote in his book. 

Tommy Hamill’s sworn statement (DA Form 2823) to the Army dated 

23 May 2004, stated he called for a gun truck to come up and pick up 

Zimmerman’s truck because it was losing power. Lester claimed Fisher 

drove up to push Zimmerman’s truck, but Donald Grage claimed in his 

sworn statement on 9 April 2004 that he pushed Zimmerman’s truck. 

Jacob Brown also wrote they pushed Zimmerman’s tanker. Edward 

Sanchez Sworn Statement 28 May 2004 verified Grage pushed 

Zimmerman’s truck, and Michael Brezovay’s Sworn Statement on 

20 May 2004 claimed Fisher came up and pushed KBR 5 driven by 

Bradley. Randy Ross, however, remembered Fisher pushed Zimmerman’s 

truck. It is possible two trucks lost power. Grage pushed one and Fisher 

pushed the other. If so, both came to a stop right next to each other on the 

onramp which would explain why both stories are so similar.

33 Ross telephone interview, and Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

34 “Battlefield Dairies;” and Church interview, 14 February 2007.

35 “Battlefield Dairies;” Church interview, 14 February 2007; and Lisa 

Burgess, “I’m just glad I didn’t get shot,” June 14, 2005, http://www.

stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28915&archive=true.

36 March, “On the move.”

37 Church interview, 14 February 2007.

38 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

39 SPC Patrick Pelz Sworn Statement, Commander’s Inquiry, April 2004; 

March, “On the move;” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

40 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

41 SPC Jeremy Church Silver Star Citation; March, “On the move;” 

“Battlefield Dairies;” Church telephone interview, 14 February 2007; 

and Burgess, Stars and Stripes. 42 Church Citation; March, “On the move;” “Battlefield Dairies;” Church 

telephone interview, 14 February 2007; and Burgess, Stars and Stripes. 43 Church Citation; March, “On the move;” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

44 Hamill, Escape. 45 Hamill, Escape. 46 McDermott Sworn Statement; Row Sworn Statement; March, 

“On the move;” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

47 SPC Dustin L. Row Sworn Statement, 9 April 2004, Commander’s Inquiry; 

SSG Arthur Hollingsworth Sworn Statement, 26 April 2004, Commander’s 

Inquiry; March, “On the move;” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

48 March, “On the move.”

49 Hamill and Brown, p.41; Row Sworn Statement, and McDermott Sworn 

Statement.

50 March, “On the move;” and Grage’s Sworn Statement.

51 SPC Michael J. Bachman Interview, 14 May 2004, Commander’s Inquiry; 

and Ross telephone interview.

52 Bachman Interview, and Ross telephone interview.

53 Ross telephone interview.

54 Ross telephone interview.

55 Read HET Ambush, 9 April 2004 in this book.

56 March, “On the move.”

57 In his later testimony, Jarob Walsh mistakenly assumed that man 

was Tommy Hamill.

58 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”
Operation Iraqi Freedom 63

59 Raymond T. Stannard interview, Commanders Inquiry, 21 May 2004.

60 Jarob Walsh, “The Real Story Behind the April 9th Insurgency in Iraq,” 

17 May 2004, http://www.thefinalrollcall.us/stories/ambush.htm.

61 Walsh, “The Real Story;” and Hamill, Escape. Hamill thought the soldier 

who jumped on his running boards was Gregory Goodrich and Walsh’s 

colleagues claim that he had a reputation for exaggeration so many did not 

believe that he did all he claimed. However, Hamill’s version was published 

long after Walsh wrote his and neither knew who the other was when they 

wrote their accounts. The AR15-6 investigating officer told Hamill the 

soldier was Goodrich.

62 Walsh, “The Real Story;” “The Real Story.”

63 Walsh, and Stannard interview. Stannard remembered pulling 

Walsh’s body armor.

64 Walsh, “The Real Story.”

65 Walsh, “The Real Story.” 

66 Walsh, “The Real Story.”

67 Walsh, “The Real Story.”

68 Michael Brezovay Interview, Commanders Inquiry, 20 May 2004.

69 SPC Shawn E. Kirkpatrick Sworn Statement, Commanders Inquiry, 

13 May 2004.

70 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

71 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

72 Kirkpatrick Sworn Statement and SPC Matthew W. Bohm Sworn 

Statement, April 2004, Commander’s Inquiry.

73 SPC Patrick Pelz Sworn Statement, Commander’s Inquiry, April 2004; 

SPC Karon Lamar Sworn Statement, Commander’s Inquiry; SPC Karon 

G. Lamar Sworn Statement, Commander’s Inquiry, April 2004; March, 

“On the move” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

74 “Rescue of the 724th Trans-9 April 2004 (Extract from TF 2-12 CAV draft 

history);” extracts from 2-12th Cavalry AAR, “The Holy Week Battle of Abu 

Ghuraib;” Church Citation; Church interview, 14 February 2007; March, 

“On the move;” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

75 Danny Wood Interview and Rick Tollison Interview, Commander’s Inquiry, 

28 May 2004.

76 “Rescue of the 724th Trans;” Church Citation; March, “On the move;” 

1SG Taylor Narrative; 2-12 AAR; and “Battlefield Dairies.”

77 “Rescue of the 724th Trans – 9 April 2004 (Extract from TF 2-12 CAV 

draft history);” extracts from 2-12th Cavalry AAR, “The Holy Week Battle 

of Abu Ghuraib;” Church Citation; Church interview, 14 February 2007; 

Wood Interview; March, “On the move;” “Battlefield Dairies.”

78 McDermott and Row Sworn Statements.

79 Sanchez’s congressional testimony was that Goodrich was his shooter 

and escaped from the cab with him, but all the witness statements much 

closer to the event show that it was Krause and he did not make it out of 

the cab. Interview Summaries, Commander’s Inquiry, Edward V. Sanchez, 

28 May 2004, Stannard Interview, SPC Brown and Church, Sworn 

Statement, Brezovay Interview; Edward V. Sanchez, Former KBR/

Halliburton Employee, Testimony to Senate Democratic Policy Committee 

Hearing, “An Oversight Hearing on Accountability of Contracting Abuses 

in Iraq,” 18 September 2006.

80 James Blackwood Interview, Commander’s Inquiry, 20 May 2004.

81 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

82 Hamill, Escape. 83 Hamill, Escape; and Walsh, “The Real Story.” Hamill thought that the 

soldier was SPC Gregory Goodrich, but everything he described matched 

with what Walsh described.

84 Hamill, Escape. 85 Walsh, “The Real Story.”

86 Walsh, and Hamill, Escape. 87 Walsh, and Hamill, Escape. 88 Lamar sworn statement; Walsh, “The Real Story;” Hamill, Escape; 

and March, “On the move.”

89 Hamill, Escape. 90 Walsh, “The Real Story.”Groff confirmed that Goodrich was firing 

out the window and was mortally wounded.

91 Walsh; March, “On the move;” and “Battlefield Dairies.”

92 Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

93 Walsh, “The Real Story;” “Rescue of the 724th Trans;” Church SSM 

citation; Church interview, 14 February 2007; 2-12th Cav AAR; and 

“Battlefield Dairies;” and Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

94 Kirkpatrick Interview, Bohm Sworn statement, and SFC Michael A. Klein 

Sworn Statement, Co C, 2nd Bn, 12th Cavalry, 13 April 2004.

95 SFC Michael A. Klein Sworn Statement, Co C, 2d Bn, 12th Cavalry, 

13 April 2004.

96 Walsh; “Rescue of the 724th Trans;” Church SSM citation; Church 

interview, 14 February 2007; 2-12th Cav AAR; and “Battlefield Dairies;” 

and Lester, “Good Friday Attack.”

97 “Rescue of the 724th Trans;” Church SSM citation; Church interview, 

14 February 2007; 2-12th Cav AAR; and “Battlefield Dairies.”

98 Church SSM citation; and Church interview, 14 February 2007.

99 Church interview, 14 February 2007.

100 “Rescue of the 724th Trans;” and 2-12 Cav AAR. 101 Church SSM citation and March, “On the move.” 102 “Rescue of the 724th Trans;” and Taylor, Narration. 103 March, “On the march;” Taylor Narration; and 2-12 Cav AAR. 104 2-12 Cav AAR. 105 Smith, “Historical Narrative.” 106 Akin interview and Smith, “Historical Narrative.” 107 Akin interview. 108 Akin interview and Smith, “Historical Narrative.” 109 March, “On the move,” and Smith, “Historical Narrative.” 110 Web page, Purple Heart Recipients for 724th Transportation Company, 

Historians Files, CMH.

111 T. Scott Allen Jr., Testimony given before Senate Democratic Policy 

Committee Meeting, “An Oversight Hearing on Accountability for 

Contracting Abuses in Iraq,” 18 Sep 06, Historians Files, CMH.

112 Row statement. 113 A number of Vietnam veterans had warned Richard Killblane, 

the Transportation Corps Historian, the enemy would escalate the 

scale of ambushes a year before April 2004.

114 A convoy of the 7th Transportation Battalion escorted by eight MP 

gun jeeps (no organic gun trucks) was ambushed on 25 August 1968 

and had two drivers captured.
64 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

HET Ambush, 9 April 2004

96th HET Company

LT Renina Miller was the 1st Platoon Leader 

in the 96th HET on a six-month rotation in 

OIF 2 during the deployment of the 1st Cavalry 

Division. Her convoy of 15 HETs hauled M1 tanks of 

CPT Peter Glass’ Company C, 2-8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry 

Division north to Taji. They had waited at Scania for 

several days because the roads were coded black, 

meaning enemy attack highly likely.1 On Good Friday, 

her platoon sergeant, SFC Samuel Powell, Jr., had heard 

on the radio that other convoys had been hit by IEDs or 

his convoy would receive instructions to go to another 

location on account of an IED. This made them alert.2

The alternator in Miller’s HMMWV wore out while at 

Scania so she decided to ride in the lead HET with SSG 

Wardale as her driver.3 The platoon had five MTS, which 

allowed satellite text messaging, and five SINCGARS 

radios; and Wardale’s HET had an MTS. A 21⁄2-ton gun 

truck with a ring-mount machinegun followed behind the 

lead HET with SPC Sean McEndree, the gunner and SGT 

Rivera, the driver. Miller’s HMMWV driven by PVT Ronald 

Gallet and SPC Walsh, assistant driver, followed behind 

it. They joked, “With us two in the HMMWV, something is 

bound to happen.” The 21⁄2-ton with a ring mounted M2 

.50 caliber machinegun was the third vehicle. SFC Powell 

rode in a turtle shell soft skinned HMMWV with two 

M249 SAWs sticking out the windows in the rear of the 

convoy. So on Good Friday, they departed from their RON 

2

location at CSC Scania enroute for Camp Taji.4

Around 1130, they approached to within three to 

four kilometers of BIAP when a HET broke down. The 

guys were talking about lunch on the radio. They had 

halted for about 15 to 20 minutes before they fixed the 

HET. 2LT Miller asked if they wanted to stop at BIAP for 

lunch or push on to Taji, another 30 minutes away. For 

some reason, they chose to go to Taji. They had never 

failed to stop at BIAP before. It was a good place to relax, 

use the internet or phones. As the convoy started, they 

saw black smoke off in the distance but did not think 

anything about it. Smoke was not unusual in Iraq. Ten 

minutes later they saw five buttoned up Bradley fighting 

vehicles race past them heading south. They realized 

that something was seriously wrong. Normally they did 

not see Bradleys on the road nor buttoned up. Powell 

thought to himself, “What’s going on?” The others asked 

themselves the same question. They began to make 

the connection between the smoke and the urgency 

of the Bradleys. About that time, a message came over 

the MTS, “MSR Sword is Red and closed. All convoys 

head to BIAP.” The convoy was about 15 minutes 

away from ASR Sword.5

SFC Powell called 2LT Miller on the SINGARS and 

asked, “LT did you get the same MTS message?” She 

answered, “Yes. We’re going to turn around and go to 

BIAP.” They halted where they were. Powell switched 

his SINGARS to the Sheriff frequency and heard the 

message, “No convoys go north of BIAP. Insurgents 

attacking military and civilian trucks.” Sheriff was 

M1070 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) of the 766th Transportation Battalion in Kuwait. Photo courtesy of MAJ Kelley Hissong
Operation Iraqi Freedom 65

the equivalent of a 911 operator in a war zone which 

coordinated for medevacs or the Quick Reaction Force 

(QRF) from the battle space owner.6

The convoy had just passed the turn to south gate 

(ECP7) at BIAP and stopped just prior to reaching the 

overpass. Miller remembered the MPs had stopped 

her convoy because of an IED had been spotted. Next 

to them was a KBR convoy driven by American and 

Third County Nationals (TCN), which was heading south 

on a northbound lane. Evidently, they had turned around 

and driven back down the same lane. Guard rails in the 

median prevented them from crossing over into the 

next lane. There was also another civilian fuel convoy 

in the southbound lane.7

Powell’s attention was focused on the black smoke 

ahead. Powell ran past his convoy to look for a place 

to turn around. A three-foot deep ditch paralleled the 

outside of the highway. Powell needed a flat place for his 

HETs to turn around. They were too big to turn around just 

using the width of the road. He could not find a place.8

Some MPs in HMMWVs provided security above 

them on the overpass. The MP HMMWV drove down to 

ask Powell what he was doing so Powell told them that he 

was looking for a place to turn around. So the MPs drove 

ahead looking for a place wide enough to turn loaded 

HETs around. There was one break in the guard rails in 

the median but it was not wide enough to drive the HETs 

through. While the MPs were looking for a place 

to turn around, SGT Donald Heard spotted an IED 

on the side of the road.9

Gallet was used to seeing lots of civilians 

alongside the road, but this day he only saw one, a 

woman hanging laundry. Everyone climbed out of their 

vehicles and pulled security. SSG Hurd looked down and 

spotted an IED hidden in the carcass of a dog. He ran 

up yelling, “We are stopped right beside an IED. 

We need to move!”10

CPT Glass was a very confident Armor officer, 

and while the MPs were looking for a turnaround point, 

he called Miller that one of his tanks reported seeing 

small arms fire but it was too far off to get positive 

identification. She told them that without positive 

identification they could not fire. A few minutes later, 

Glass reported back that the small arms fire was closer 

and they had positive identification, so she told them to 

go ahead and engage the enemy. The gunner then fired 

his .50 caliber. The situation was worsening.11

The MPs found a circle driveway that ran in the 

front yard of two houses on the west side of the road 

that would allow enough room for the HETs to turn 

around. The MPs led the civilian convoy first and it 

turned around facing south in the northbound lane. 

After the civilian convoy turned around, the MPs led 

Miller’s convoy around. Miller waited for her convoy 

M1000 Heavy Equipment Trailer of the 766th Transportation Battalion hauling an M1 Abrams tank. 

Photo courtesy of SFC Vanderwerf
66 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

to catch up and saw the Iraqi woman gathering 

clothes off a clothes line with children in the yard 

and a couple men around.12

 The KBR trucks were parked in the inside of the lane 

and the HET convoy in the center lane both facing south 

in the northbound lane. The MPs returned to the bridge. 

As soon as all Miller’s HETs had turned around, she 

planned to drive to BIAP. Meanwhile, Powell ran back 

to his HMMWV, turned it around where it was and fell 

in behind the 21⁄2-ton truck after it passed him and 

stopped. They were ready to head for BIAP.13

About that time, the MPs escorting the KBR trucks 

pulled their HMMWV right up in front of Miller’s HET, 

blocking its path. They halted the convoy because 

they had learned about the second IED Hurd spotted 

alongside the road. This was standard procedure if 

an IED was spotted ahead. In a state of high anxiety, 

they could not rationalize that the policy was intended 

to prevent convoys from running into IEDs. In carrying 

out the policy, these MPs had halted the convoy right 

beside the IED and would not let them pass. Their strict 

adherence to the instructions endangered lives. At the 

same time, SGT Hurd jumped out of his truck and

jogged up to Gallet’s HMMWV yelling, “You stopped 

us next to the IED!”14

Powell called up, “What’s going on?” Miller 

responded, “They don’t want us to pass because of 

the IED.” Powell could not believe what he was hearing. 

They were deliberately parking the convoy right next to 

the danger instead of letting them pass. Powell said, 

“We will go around them.”15

When the convoy stopped, the Iraqi woman hanging 

clothes ran inside. At that moment Hurd realized things 

had gone from bad to worse. Miller also saw the civilians 

disappear, a clear sign of trouble. Miller then got the MPs 

on the radio and yelled at them to get out of the way 

and let her convoy go or she would push them out of the 

way.16 Miller’s lead HET had to back up to drive around 

the MP HMMWV. The other trucks had to do the same 

to give Miller room. SPC McEndree, the driver of the 

21⁄2-ton truck, climbed out of his truck and walked back 

to make sure he had enough room behind his truck to 

back up. Miller saw that McEndree had climbed out on 

the same side as the IED so she climbed down from 

her HET to warn him. At the same time, they started 

receiving a small amount of small arms fire.17

Miller ordered her drivers out of their trucks and into 

the ditch on the west side of the road. She and Wardale 

exited their HET and heard small arms fire hit on both 

sides of the truck. As she started for the ditch she saw 

M1000 Heavy Equipment Trailer of the 766th Transportation Battalion hauling an M88 tank recovery vehicle. 

Photo courtesy of MAJ Kelley Hissong
Operation Iraqi Freedom 67

out of the corner of her left eye, SPC McEndree and a 

TCN taking cover between two vehicles. A TCN driver 

had jumped out of his truck and pointed in the direction 

of the firing making a gesture with his hand to indicate 

shooting. The KBR drivers yelled at him to get back in 

his truck. Miller ran back to get them when an IED 

exploded. It blew her and McEndree airborne for a couple 

feet with McEndree landing on top of her. The IED had 

exploded just as the TCN started to turn wounding him 

also. Shrapnel also hit the machine gunner of the 21⁄2 -

ton in the back.18 Miller tried to get up and run for the 

ditch but her legs would not move, so she yelled for SSG 

Wardale. Wardale came over and asked where she was 

hit. He panicked a little. He then ran over to the MPs who 

came back with him to help load her in the back of their 

vehicle. Since she was wounded in the back of the leg, 

they laid her on her belly. They loaded McEndree in the 

next MP HMMWV and the TCN in another vehicle. 

Miller then told Wardale to find SFC Powell and have 

the drivers dismount.19

Powell was standing outside his HMMWV with the 

handset to his ear when the IED went off. He immediately 

notified Sheriff that he needed a medevac and helicopter 

gunships. An Apache gunship arrived on station within 

two to three minutes and the pilots talked with Powell 

on the Sheriff frequency. They circled high overhead 

and claimed that they could not see any enemy to 

engage. The enemy fire continued.20

Powell then passed the word to his drivers, “We’ve 

got to get these tanks off loaded.” The drivers and tank 

commanders rode in the tanks while they were chained 

to the trailers. The remainder of the tank crews had flown 

up to Taji. As soon as the ambush began, they buttoned 

up their hatches. The truck drivers climbed back into 

their HETs to maneuver the trailers so that the tanks 

could drive off. Powell ran up to the nearest tank and 

banged on the turret yelling at the gunner to put up a 

fight. Gallet could hear him yelling from his position 

several vehicles ahead.21

Powell then ran back to his HMMWV and called the 

cavalry company commander and said, “Get ‘em off the 

trucks.” The commander had planned to off load just 

one tank, but Powell said, “You have permission to drop 

all of them.” The commander responded, “That’s what 

we’re here for.”22

The HET drivers began maneuvering the trailers 

then the TCs ran back to unshackle the chains so the 

tanks could drive off. SPC Bill Adkins’ HET was right 

behind Gallet. Gallett ran back to unshackle one chain 

while Adkins loosened the other, all while under fire. 

Walsh pulled security. Gallet could hear the gun fire but 

did not know how close it hit until paint chips from the 

tank fell on him. He thought to himself, “Just get the 

shackle off.” His focus on undoing the shackle kept 

his mind off of the enemy fire.23

Once they freed the tank, SSG Wardale, the driver 

of the HET, called Gallet forward to treat the wounded. 

Gallet was the combat life saver. He ran to the most 

critically wounded person first, the TCN driver. The 

wounded man’s helmet was blown off. The man had 

taken the blast in the front and was punctured by 

shrapnel. The metal was still hot and he had not started 

to bleed. His left arm was also dislocated and twisted 

around like a contortionist. Gallet bandaged him up. 

As soon as Wardale had left his truck, a mortar round 

landed on his trailer destroying the M88 that he 

was transporting.24

When Wardale returned, he was told Miller and 

Powell had already gotten the drivers out of their 

trucks and was engaged getting the tankers out in the 

fight. As soon as the small arms fire began, Wardale 

covered Miller from fire and then yelled for help. She 

was still conscious but had received two wounds to her 

lower back. Wardale then jumped up and pulled her in 

between the MP HMMWV and her HET. The MPs came 

over to help. Wardale then ran over to McEndree, who 

was just trying to stand up. The round had penetrated 

his left side, but the body armor deflected it back into his 

body. Wardale wrapped an arm around McEndree and 

helped him to the casualty collection point between the 

MP HMMWV, lead HET and lead KBR truck.25

While all this happened, the tanks rolled off of the 

trailers. The cavalry commander’s tank was the first off 

of the trailer. He was up behind the .50 caliber blazing 

away. He drove his tank down the median to flatten 

the guard rails so vehicles could have more room to 

maneuver. The second tank backed off into the ditch 

and got stuck. The third tank threw its right track. The 

driver climbed out of his tank and looked at the broken 

track, then threw his Kevlar helmet at the tank in rage 

forgetting that he was under fire. Powell yelled at him, 

“What are you doing? You are getting shot at.” The 
68 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

tanker realized his peril then took cover. To Powell the 

tanks drove around in confusion and circled around 

the disabled tanks to provide protection. CPT Glass 

told Powell that they had just crossed the border 

and this was their first action.26

Two medevac helicopters arrived and Powell talked 

them in. The helicopter landed on the southbound lane 

and the other landed in front of the MP HMMWV on the 

northbound lane. Two more Apache helicopters arrived.27

Gallet, SPC Cruz and the two MPs lifted the stretcher 

with the TCN and carried him 

fifty yards ahead to a gap in 

the guard rail, then across 

the median to the medevac 

helicopter. They climbed back 

over the guard rails. By this 

time the shrapnel in Rivera had 

cooled down and his wounds 

started bleeding. A medic 

from the medevac helicopter 

came over and pulled Rivera’s 

flak vest ff and laid him face 

down on the stretcher. Gallett 

and picked up one end of the 

stretcher and the two MPs the 

other end and they carried 

Rivera over to the helicopter.28

By this time the insurgents were firing at them 

from the east, north and west. The white van that Powell 

had seen to the east side of the road was then north 

of him heading west. He realized that it was dropping 

off insurgents. Since the MPs blocked the south, the 

insurgents surrounded the convoy from the other 

three directions.29

Powell saw a military fuel tanker racing down the 

southbound lane on its wheel rims leaking fuel behind it. 

The tires had been shot out and an M923 5-ton cargo 

truck followed behind it. They stopped in the other lane a 

little behind Powell. They were the trucks driven by Randy 

Ross and SPC Michael J. Bachman from the 724th that 

had missed their turn. The Cavalry commander pulled 

his tank up to provide cover for the fuel tanker. A soldier 

walked around the HMMWV with his weapon up and 

lowered it when he saw Ross’ truck. He had the look 

like “where did you come from?”30

Ross bailed out of his truck and ran to a KBR tanker 

and HET then sat behind a HET tire. A soldier asked 

if Ross knew how take shackles off tanks. He started 

loosening the shackles when they began receiving small 

arms fire from the house where the woman had been 

hanging laundry. Ross was about to grab one of the 

weapons lying against the HET but the male and female 

drivers picked them up first and returned fire. He then 

went back to the turn shackles on the tanks.31

The MP HMMWV pulled over to pick up the 

wounded soldier. He was already dead. The drivers 

raced back to their cabs, 

climbed in and sped off down 

the road. The MPs drove back 

and loaded the dead 

TC into the helicopter.32

The driver of a KBR 

truck next to the HET told 

Ross, “Man, get up here. We’re 

getting ready to go to BIAP.” 

Ross asked if they were still 

fighting at BIAP, and he said, 

“Yes,” to which Ross replied, 

“I had just about enough.

 I’ll stay here.” The driver 

insisted Ross get in his truck 

and he finally did. The driver 

then told him, “I never saw a truck shot up that much 

and keep moving.” Ross remembered every 

time he had stopped the warning lights went off.33

After the helicopter lifted off, the KBR trucks 

pulled out. Then the MPs drove off and with the road 

finally clear, Powell’s convoy mounted up and drove 

toward BIAP. The four tanks also drove to BIAP and 

provided base security. Because the roads were rated 

black, the 1st Platoon, 96th HET remained at BIAP 

for 12 days.34

Lesson

War is chaos. Overwhelmed by fear, some soldiers are 

incapable of rational thought. When they do not know 

what to do, they do what they know or have been trained 

to do. Everything is a programmed response, yet in 

combat, one needs to think tactically, which depends 

upon the changing tactical situation. In this case, the 

MPs instinctively stopped the HET convoy upon learning 

of the second IED even though they stopped the convoy 

M1083 5-ton guntrucks of the 25th 

Transportation Company pulling security. 

Photo courtesy of Pablo Santiago
Operation Iraqi Freedom 69

1 CPT Renina Miller interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA, 

5 December 2007.

2 Summary of interview with SFC Samuel Powell, Jr. and SPC Ronald Gallet 

by Richard Killblane at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, 12 March 2005.

3 Miller remembered it was an alternator, but her driver remembered 

it was the MTS that broke so she changed to a lead vehicle that had 

a functioning MTS.

4 Miller, Powell and Gallet interviews.

5 Powell and Gallet interview.

6 Powell and Gallet interview.

7 Miller, Powell and Gallet interviews.

8 Powell and Gallet interview.

9 Miller, Powell and Gallet interviews.

10 Powell and Gallet interview.

11 Miller interview.

12 Miller interview.

13 Powell and Gallet interview.

14 Miller, Powell and Gallet interviews.

15 Powell and Gallet interview.

16 Miller, Powell and Gallet interviews.

17 Miller, Powell and Gallet interviews.

18 Powell and Gallet interview.

19 Miller interview.

20 Powell and Gallet interview.

21 Powell and Gallet interview.

22 Powell and Gallet interview.

23 Powell and Gallet interview.

24 Powell and Gallet interview.

25 Miller, Powell and Gallet interview.

26 Powell and Gallet interview. 

27 Powell and Gallet interview.

28 Powell and Gallet interview.

29 Powell and Gallet interview.

30 Ross, Powell and Gallet interview.

31 Ross telephone interview.

32 Powell and Gallet interview.

33 Ross telephone interview.

34 Powell and Gallet interview.

right next to it. They did not realize that the policy was 

intended to prevent convoys from approaching IEDs. 

Instead, their failure to think through the situation 

further endangered the convoy.

The convoy commander had several options. 

She could have pushed the MP HMMWV out of the 

way and led her convoy to safety or waited. Most likely, 

if she had damaged the MP HMMWV in the process, 

she would have been reprimanded or punched. Fear 

of not knowing how the senior commanders will react 

causes commanders on the ground to avoid conflict. 

This is not an unusual scenario. Sometimes doing the 

right thing in peacetime is the wrong thing in war. 

Leaders at all levels need to know how much latitude 

their chain of command will allow. 

There are so many unpredictable things that happen 

in combat and when they go bad, they tend to compound 

quickly. Just as SPC McEndree left his truck to see if he 

had enough room to back up, Miller got out to check on 

him, and a TCN got out of his truck, which unfortunately 

was next to the IED. With her convoy blocked, Miller 

quickly made the decision to dismount everyone. 

Powell’s decision to dismount the tanks had great 

potential but the performance of most of the tanks 

failed to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. 

2LT Miller earned the BSM with V device and 

Purple Heart for her actions that day.

M923 5-ton gun 

trucks with gun 

boxes designed 

by Skunk Werks. 

Photo courtesy of 

Pablo Santiago
70 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

10 April 2004

227th Transportation Company (Medium Truck)

he 3rd Platoon, 227th Medium Truck Company 

convoy had spent three to four days in BIAP 

because the routes were coded black. The 

convoy had equipment bound for the US Marine camp 

near Fallujah. MAJ Mark Greene was the convoy 

commander. SFC Polee Love was 56 years old with 

33 years in the US Army. He had just ridden on his first 

mission north. At 1545 hours on Saturday, 10 April, 

the day before Easter, his convoy of 14 M915s carrying 

supplies for the US Marines left for Camp Milam, near 

Fallujah. The Marines provided 13 gun trucks, which 

consisted of nine or ten armored HMMWVs, LMTVs 

and a 5 -ton gun truck. 

The convoy headed north on ASR Irish. The Marine 

policy for reaction to an ambush was to dismount and 

fight through the kill zone. The Marines considered 

every Marine a rifleman first. In this convoy, however, 

they were escorting Army truck drivers.1 

They saw burning fuel tankers but kept on driving. 

T

A mile after they reached MSR Tampa, the convoy 

received small arms fire from the left side of the road 

then it started coming from both. For the next ten miles, 

the ambush consisted of daisy chained IEDs mortars 

and small arms fire. The convoy lost one truck. The 

.50 caliber machinegun in the HMMWV in front of SPC 

Shareese McPhee’s truck jammed. The Marine dropped 

down, came up with an M -16 and returned fire.2

SFC Love called in the contact and two helicopters 

flew down the road. Suddenly, he felt something like 

a wasp sting in his right leg. He reached down and 

grabbed the copper jacket of an AK round and pulled 

it out. A few seconds later he felt a sting in his left leg. 

He reached down and pulled back a bloody hand. 

Evidently, the round had passed through his left 

leg and stopped in his right.3

SFC Love called and told the convoy commander 

that he was hit. MAJ Green then told Love to stop. 

Love responded, “Hell, no. We’re getting shot at.” He 

continued driving for about 10 to 15 minutes then 

started to lose consciousness. He fell over with his 

hand still on the steering wheel. His truck commander, 

Brand new M1114 up-armored HMMWVs issued to the 1544th Transportation Company. Photo courtesy of 

1544th Transportation Company
half of the convoy drove off. They received small 

arms fire for eight more minutes.5

When they arrived at Camp Milam, drivers pulled 

Love out of his truck. McPhee saw SFC Love and the 

wounded TCN driver. Since she was a combat life saver, 

she treated Love and they took him to the TMC tent. He 

Operation Iraqi Freedom 71

PFC Donzie Haynes, grabbed Love and moved him out 

of the driver’s seat then took his place all while driving 

at 55 mph. That woke Love up then he reached down 

and picked up a bandoleer. He cut the strap and made 

a tourniquet around his left leg to stop the bleeding.4

While the convoy was still in the kill zone, it slowed 

down. A TCN driving a white truck drove past McPhee 

and stopped. The HMMWV gun truck in front of McPhee 

also stopped, blocking her way so she had to stop. The 

TCN driver was wounded. Another TCN truck came up 

and stopped on the left. Since the convoy traveled down 

the center of the road, McPhee was boxed in, so she 

climbed out of her truck to pull security. Meanwhile the 

rest of the convoy ahead of the Marine HMMWV had 

driven off. She thought, “Oh shit.” While under fire, 

she ran over to the white truck with the wounded 

TCN driver to move it out of the way but could not 

drive it. The other TCN driver on the left also started 

to move his truck. By that time, a Marine told her to 

get back in her truck. She saw her truck commander

had taken her place as the driver, and when she 

climbed in the passenger side of the truck, the last 

Convoy of the 1544th Transportation Company passing exploded gas line near Abu Ghraib prison. Photo courtesy of 

1544th Transportation Company

M1083 FMTV 5 - ton gun trucks of the 25th Transportation 

Company with Tea Cup design gun box. Photo courtesy 

of Pablo Santiago
72 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

was the only US driver wounded in the convoy and the 

TCN died of his wounds.6

Love remained there for two days then flew to the 

CSH at Anaconda. By that time, he was able to walk 

around. Evidently, it was a clean wound and there were 

no complications. There were 11 wounded soldiers at the 

CSH and the medical personnel would not wait on them. 

Love then asked if he could come in and change his 

bandages, but they refused. He complained and 

they sent him back to Navistar. Love asked to go back 

to the airport of debarkation (APOD) in Kuwait. Once 

there, the medical staff at the APOD wanted to send 

him to the medical hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, 

for further treatment. Love refused to leave and wanted 

to rejoin his soldiers. MAJ Greene sent Love down to 

Doha for treatment and he remained there for four 

and a half weeks.7

As it turned out, the round had touched the artery in 

his right leg and cauterized it. Had it punctured, he would 

most likely have bleed to death. Love had carried a box 

of Johnson and Johnson Handiwipes in his left cargo 

pocket and the round entered it first. He believes that 

the Handiwipes slowed down the round just enough to 

save his life. He also joked with the doctor that the wipes 

had also cleaned the round when it entered his leg.8

Lesson

Again, war is chaos. The plan was not to stop, but 

invariably the unpredictable happened and the convoy 

stopped. McPhee took appropriate action to get the 

convoy moving again and for that reason she was 

submitted for the Bronze Star Medal. The drivers praised 

the US Marines for their performance, and the Marines 

had a reputation for following the instructions given 

them. They had to get the convoy through. They stayed 

with the convoy and did not run off to fight the enemy. 

Letterkenny gun box on FMTV. Photo courtesy of 1544th Transportation Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 73

1 Summary of interview with SPC Shareese McPhee by Richard Killblane, 

8 March 2005 and summary of interview with SFC Polee Love by Richard 

Killblane at Camp Arifjan, 12 March 2005.

2 McPhee interview.

3 McPhee and Love interview.

4 Love interview.

5 McPhee interview.

6 McPhee and Love interviews.

7 Love interview.

8 McPhee and Love interviews.

After Easter Weekend all convoys began with a group prayer. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
74 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Ambush at Iskandariyah, 

Easter Sunday, 11 April 2004

172nd and 1486th Transportation Companies 

(Medium Truck)

orthbound convoys were clearly aware of the 

increase in enemy attacks on convoys around 

Baghdad that Easter weekend. A convoy of 

44 M915s from the 172nd and 1486th Medium Truck 

Companies out of Camp Navistar, Kuwait along with 

43 civilian contract tractors and trailers, driven by 

Third Country Nationals (TCN) from various countries 

in the region, hauled the equipment of the 1st Cavalry 

Division up to the Green Zone. About 30 of the M915s 

belonged to the 172nd Transportation Company. Four 

HMMWV gun trucks with add- on- armor kits from the 

172nd Transportation Company escorted the convoy. 

The resourceful commander of the 172nd, CPT George 

Petropoulos, had managed to get his HMMWVs armored 

through barter, also known as a “drug deal,” with a 

friend at Camp Arifjan. Kuwait-based companies 

were lower on the priority for add-on armor than Iraqibased units. The escort vehicles had SINCGARS for 

communication among gun trucks and commercial 

citizen band radios for communication with the military 

trucks. These four gun trucks provided a gun truck to 

task vehicle ratio of about 1:22, but at this time the 

minimum standard was just two gun trucks regardless 

of the size of the convoy. They would be evenly spaced 

throughout the convoy. Up until that Easter weekend, 

N

no convoy had driven through a large kill zone. The 

best defense had been to speed up and drive through. 

In other words, “Drive that truck like you stole it.” 

CPT Amanda R. Gatewood, of the 172nd, was the 

convoy commander. SFC Richard “Rich” A. Bartlett was 

the NCO in charge (NCOIC) of the 1486th Transportation 

Company drivers, but SSG Aaron Brown had asked 

to be the convoy commander for the 1486th trucks. 

CPT Gatewood was a weak and ineffective convoy 

commander, so the NCOs would compete as to which 

of them was really in charge. The 1486th Transportation 

Company had arrived in country before the 172nd and 

was instructed to pass on their experience to the later 

arrivals. Brown may have misinterpreted this guidance. 

He did not have much confidence in Gatewood and 

seemed intent on undermining her authority. The 

awaiting convoys also learned there was a credible 

chemical threat within 25 miles of the area that they 

would have to drive. So SFC Bartlett gave classes on 

and distributed chemical detection paper to each driver 

and conducted training in battle drills. When the convoy 

departed, CPT Gatewood rode in the lead up-armored 

HMMWV with SSG Steve LeClair. Because of his 

superb land navigation skills, SSG Brown chose 

to ride in the lead M915.1

The convoy of 87 vehicles rested overnight (RON) 

outside of Convoy Support Center Scania on Saturday 

night, 10 April, where they learned of the complex 

ambushes up north around BIAP. The convoy departed 

at 1345 hours the next day heading up Main Supply 

M915A3 of the 1486th Medium Truck Company. 

Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC

HMMWV gun truck of the 1486th Medium Truck Company. 

Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
Operation Iraqi Freedom 75

Route Tampa with an escort 

of MPs. A convoy of over 90 

vehicles with a 100-meter 

interval stretched about nine 

kilometers, or five and a half 

miles! Because the insurgents 

had blown several bridges and 

overpasses, the convoy had to 

take a detour onto Alternate 

Supply Route (ASR) Cleveland 

through an urban area. SPC 

Michael “Mike” P. Shugrue 

recorded in his journal,

Northbound on Tampa, midday. Sunny. “American 

Soldier” stuck in my head. A perfect circle of missing 

paint at the front of the trailer [on the bulkhead] 

ahead of us — [SGT] Nancy [Donelson] and Willy [SPC 

Ryan Gearheart]. Riding with Berl Brown, bobtail, tow 

bar strapped to the catwalk. [Stephen King’s] Four 

Past Midnight on the dash. An MRE casserole in our 

bellies — meat loaf (no. 24) and Alfredo pasta (no. 

14). Nothing over the CB (Vernon “Dammit, Driver” 

[SSG Steve] Wells even quiet) until Baxter came over, 

garbled, spitting the same fragmentary message at 

us two or three times — “BIAP...under attack...heavy 

attack...proceed...caution.”

Any incomprehensible feeling I’d had that 

morning seemed affirmed; I’d jotted a quick endnote 

to a letter to Marisa on second thought. There wasn’t 

really fear, but I was pretty sure, I just didn’t expect 

anything till BIAP. Toby Keith continued to wail in my 

head. Following winding Tampa, the convoy — 66 

strong, TCNs and all 2— didn’t flinch.3

Two miles after the convoy made its turn, the MP 

advance party halted and warned the drivers they had 

received fire further ahead. SSG LeClair and Gatewood 

came to the same conclusion. He said, “We can’t turn 

around,” and she agreed, “Let’s push on.” SFC Bartlett 

calmly relayed that information to the rest of the 

convoy. He also knew that any attempt to turn the 

convoy around would lead to devastating results, so 

he agreed to continue on. The convoy proceeded with 

caution and made the turn onto ASR Jackson at a crawl. 

Two miles ahead the MPs halted and did not proceed 

any further. The convoy sped 

up by the time it reached the 

town of al Iskandariyah one 

mile further.4

Shugrue described 

what happened,

We approached MSR (or ASR) 

Jackson by way of Cleveland. 

A green, tree- lined route. 

Narrow; pitted shoulders. Not 

long, maybe five miles. Wells 

came back over the CB. MPs 

(escorts) engaged for the 

second time. We’d wait, boxed up, for one minute, 

then haul ass onto Jackson. “If your weapon isn’t on 

semi, you’re wrong.” [Wells.] Driving, I left it on safe 

but shoved it through the window. Burst, an option 

at which others had their selector levers set, never 

occurred to me.5

LeClair in the lead HMMWV rammed into the 

civilian cars to get them off of the road. Shugrue 

continued his description,6

We came around the corner. Booms, fairly distant. 

Mortars or RPGs (one, I later learned, ripped through 

Bartlett/Sallee’s Conex, the first truck; another, 

a dud, smacked into [SPC Tara] Sauer and [SSG 

Robert] Carter’s trailer). Muffled, firecracker sound 

of small arms. Rounds from the truck in front of us 

kicked off a sand pile near the road. At some point 

Berl [SSG Aaron B. Brown] began to return fire to 

the right. I scanned buildings and windows to the 

left, searching for a source of fire. Vaguely, strongly 

terrified of being shot in the face. Loud; a din. How 

long? Passage of time? We [had] reached Jackson 

at around 1500 Iraqi time (I’ve figured out how to set 

my watch); 0600 Cleveland time—kids still asleep.7

As the convoy entered the town at 1430 hours, 

insurgents on both sides of the road opened fire with 

small arms, mortars and rocket propelled grenades 

(RPG). The insurgents fired from the yards, building 

corners and roof tops. Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IED) exploded next to LeClair’s HMMWV and the enemy 

SFC Richard Bartlett was the NCO in charge of the 

1486th drivers. Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
76 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

fired mortar rounds at a low 45 degree angle trajectory 

at their HMMWV shredding the driver’s side tire. SGT 

Anthony Hernandez, the machine gunner, kept the RPG 

gunners pinned down while SSG LeClair “hammered 

down” on the gas pedal to speed ahead of the convoy. 

They cleared the kill zone before their battle - damaged 

HMMWV finally ground to a halt. Their HMMWV had 

received a lot of small arms fire and LeClair admitted 

if it had not had the add -on armor, they would 

have been killed.8

As soon as the crew learned the lead gun truck 

was disabled, the second HMMWV gun truck, driven by 

SPC Lloyd, raced up front while the last two gun trucks 

held their original positions in the middle and rear of the 

convoy. All the gunners did their best to suppress the 

enemy fire. SPC John D. Delaney, in the second HMMWV 

gun truck, fired his Mk19 automatic grenade launcher

from the ring mount while SSG Steven G. Wells kept 

the rest of the convoy informed of the actions of the 

insurgents and fired his M16A2 out the window. The 

rest of the convoy followed through the cross-fire as 

both the drivers and assistant drivers fired out of their 

respective windows. Shugrue described his personal 

experience of this fight,9

A target to the left: a rhythmic muzzle flash laying 

fire to our rear. Just a flash; movie - like weapons fire 

(for some reason, a sunny day that would reappear 

at St. Mike’s went behind the clouds for this chunk 

of the afternoon; I remember this as if it had 

happened in the gloom). “There it is,” I said, 

and I think my voice suggested wonder.

Berl just yelled, “Shoot!” I let the muzzle flash 

[meant flash suppressor] slide off the windshield 

[door], past the mirror assembly and into my field 

of fire. I fired off six or seven rounds at it. My 

weapon didn’t jam; I went deaf almost instantly. 

Ringing; I thought of the stone - deaf Nelson 

of Black Hawk Down.10

An RPG penetrated the Conex of SSG Bartlett’s load 

narrowly missing the oxygen and acetylene bottles by a 

foot or two. Shaken by the possibility of the explosion, 

Bartlett and SPC Brandon E. Sallee continued through 

the kill zone. An RPG hit the front Conex of SSG Carter’s 

load, but it was a dud which bounced off and landed in 

the median. Delaney, the Mk19 gunner in SSG Wells’ 

lead gun truck, fired at the rocket and caused it to 

explode. An RPG did disable a truck driven by a driver 

from the 172nd. SGT Heather M. Blanton and SGT Kirk 

W. Brown stopped their truck long enough so that the 

dismounted driver could jump on the running board 

and then they exited the kill zone. Signd Mahamd, from 

Pakistan, hauled two M113 Armored Personnel Carriers 

with two soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division. An RPG 

hit his truck, tore out his hip and caught his cab on fire, 

but he kept on driving out of the kill zone. At the far edge 

of the kill zone, his truck came to a halt where he 

then fell out of the burning vehicle.11

As soon as SGT Ronald “Ron” C. Hicks and SPC 

Andrea Motley’s truck turned onto ASR Jackson, they 

heard an explosion followed by small arms fire from 

both sides of the road. The kill zone then extended from 

the intersection with ASR Cleveland to the town. Motley 

drove through the kill zone firing in both directions and 

came upon Mahamd crawling away from his burning 

truck. Motley pulled his truck up in front of the other and 

halted. Hicks dismounted to treat Mahamd’s wound. 

The two 1st Cav soldiers provided covering fire while 

Hicks dragged Mahamd out of the way of passing trucks 

and then bandaged his wound. About that time SPC 

Shugrue pulled up and stopped. As the senior NCO for 

the 1486th trucks, SSG Brown rode in an M915 bobtail 

in the middle of his convoy. He came upon Hicks and 

jumped out to help load the Pakistani driver into his 

cab while Shugrue dismounted to pull security.12

SSG Steven Wells and his M915 gun truck. 

Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
Operation Iraqi Freedom 77

Meanwhile, the two Cavalrymen jumped into the seat 

vacated by Hicks. Hicks reassured Motley he would 

be safe and then Brown and Motley’s trucks drove 

off. Shugrue described the selfless act of valor 

for a fellow driver,13

 

We jockeyed through the fight. Smoke, then a Haji14

truck ahead, engulfed, two APCs on his trailer. (1st 

Cav, for whom we were hauling, had two men riding; 

they made it out, catching a ride with [SPC Andrea] 

Motley.) Pulling up alongside, I saw an image I won’t 

forget, and Chester will be my first son’s middle name 

— [SGT] Ron Chester Hicks dragging a wounded Haji 

away from the flames. (His co-driver, Motley[,] would 

take Haji’s human cargo to safety; I don’t know how 

Hicks got back.)

Berl jumped down; I stopped, continuing to 

watch to the left. Just windows and architecture. 

If there was fire then, I couldn’t discern it. My ears 

rang, but I heard Berl, dragging the wounded Third 

Country National driver into the cab: “Get the fuck in 

there! Stay the fuck down!” To me, softer, “Let’s go.” 

I popped off four or five more rounds at the windows 

and we went. I went where he said to go (Haji wailed). 

Turning and jockeying. I got my arm tangled up in 

the sling once, maneuvering through smoke, 

around this and that.15

SSG Charles M. Schrack and SGT James Dominguez 

followed the convoy inspecting each disabled vehicle to 

make sure no drivers were left behind. They arrived in 

time to see SSG Brown and 

SGT Hicks load the wounded 

Pakistani driver into Brown’s 

truck. Schrack stopped his 

M915, Hicks jumped in next 

to Schrack and began firing 

at the enemy while they drove 

off. They later stopped near 

some MPs pulling security. 

SSG Schrack then jumped 

in a HMMWV to go back and 

recover disabled vehicles.16

SSG Jeffery A. Drushel 

with SPC Colby Leonard as 

his assistant driver drove an 

M915 in the middle of the convoy. Drushel saw LeClair’s 

disabled HMMWV ahead, just outside the kill zone. He 

stopped his truck where it did not impede traffic, and 

then both dismounted. Drushel ran forward to provide 

covering fire while LeClair changed the tire.

As SSG Michelle Zaremba and SGT Mike Mullen 

listened to the radio, they realized both the front and 

rear of the convoy was under fire. Suddenly a mortar 

exploded on the driver’s side of their truck and then an 

RPG hit on Mullen’s side tossing them both to the left. 

As smoke billowed out of the front of their M915 another 

explosion rocked the left side of their truck. They passed 

the charred remains of other trucks as their truck slowly 

ground to a halt. Both wounded from the explosions and 

no radio contact with the rest of the convoy, Zaremba 

and Mullen exchanged fire with the enemy above them. 

Trapped in the kill zone they feared the worst.17

SSG Brett A. Baxter and SPC Joanna Kim came 

upon a disabled contract truck and observed the driver 

was still in the cab. They stopped to help him into their 

cab and then drove off. As they drove further, they saw 

the disabled M915 belonging to SSG Zaremba and 

SGT Mullen. Baxter stopped to see if they needed 

help but did not see anyone in the cab. An RPG had hit 

SSG Zaremba’s truck and set it afire. Both were slightly 

wounded and had abandoned their vehicle. Baxter’s 

truck came under small arms fire and SPC Kim 

returned fire from the right side. Seeing no one inside 

the cab, Baxter then drove to the rally point while 

engaging the enemy.18

Shugrue also described seeing the same truck,19

We pulled up on [SGT Mike] 

Mullen and [SSG Michelle] 

Zaremba’s (at that time 

unknown) truck. A DCU top 

draped over the passenger 

seat — Zaremba’s. Too hot for 

that and the flak, though 

Berl and I wore both. So did 

Baxter. A hole, too big 

to be a bullet hole, centermast [meant center-mass] 

of the passenger- side 

windshield. The truck, in 

a grainy, gunfire -popping, 

newsreel Solitary Reaper, 

SPC Andrea Brooks, SGT Robert Hupp, SSG Michelle 

Zarembra, and Rich Bartlett with SPC Andrea 

Motley behind them. Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
78 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

was empty. I was sure we’d taken KIAs. That hole 

seemed to guarantee it. But I saw no bodies.

“They’re gone.”

Berl said, “Keep going.”20

SGT Robert Hupp and SGT Brian Hawk picked 

them up.

SPC Thomas F. Shaw drove the last M915 in the 

convoy. He had to negotiate around the damaged 

vehicles in the kill zone and maneuver his truck in order 

to prevent civilian traffic from entering the kill zone all 

while returning fire.21

SSG Wells had selected a floating rally point about 

two to four miles outside of the town for the convoy to 

assemble. There he positioned his HMMWV so as to 

pull security and block southbound traffic from driving 

into the kill zone. At the rally point, the rest of the trucks 

formed into a box formation where the trucks parked 

in two parallel rows usually with gun trucks closing off 

the front and back ends thus forming a rectangular box. 

The drivers then dismounted and took up firing positions 

from behind their vehicles while the NCOs checked for 

casualties and ammunition status. SSG Baxter pulled 

up, dismounted and took charge of the box. While still 

receiving sporadic small arms fire, he made sure the 

drivers had a 360 degree perimeter. He calmly waited 

at the end of the box for the last of the trucks to catch 

up, and his relaxed demeanor calmed the other drivers. 

SPC Kim treated the wound of the Third Country 

National and then placed him in a foreign national 

bobtail. Shugrue wrote,22

So we boxed up three or four miles down the road, 

wounded Haji still wounded in the cab. Jumped 

down to pull security. Baxter flummoxed at the 

sight of wounded Haji bleeding all over the cab —

and really bleeding...Baxter set about getting 

him out of the cab.

“Hey Shrug!”

“Yeah.”

“You know Haji’s bleeding all over the cab?”

“That’s where Berl stuck him.”

To Haji, “American truck. Get down outta there.”

A sobbing moan.

“I know it hurts, get the fuck out of the truck.”

Boron pulled security with me while Haji’s buddies 

helped him down; [SPC Curtis] Cook on the other 

side. A puff of dust out to our side (driver’s) 150 

meters. RPG? Cook reminded me to take cover, 

that the fire was coming from his side, from 

buildings 400 meters away. Behind a Conex, I 

scanned for targets. Found none, we pulled into

St. Mike’s twenty minutes (and through a town)

later. Marines charged out as we pulled in; 

Lauthers and I smoked cigarettes, sweating.

Container hit by RPG. Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
Operation Iraqi Freedom 79

Once safely within the confines of St. Mike, 

I set about cleaning out the cab. A bloody footprint 

on the bottom step. A dried puddle - smear in the 

seat, some of which ended up a dark stain on 

Berl’s pants. A smear on the glove-box panel, 

crusted into rubber rivulets of the floor matting. 

Chunks of it in the grating of our milk crate. 

And a little river of it flowed when I moved the 

garbage bag, draining according to the folds 

onto the floor. It was a bit of a job.23

The insurgents were aware of the practice of forming 

a box several miles down the road and had prepared a 

second ambush. Ten minutes after the trucks started 

forming a box, an orange civilian dump truck with a 

mortar in back drove to within 1,000 meters of the 

rally point from the left side of the northbound road 

and fired rounds into the formation of trucks. Delaney 

returned fire with his Mk19 grenade launcher and 

scared the assailants away. Without waiting for the 

remainder of the convoy to arrive, the drivers mounted 

up and pulled out. SSG Rich Bartlett made the decision 

to halt at Forward Operating Base (FOB) St Michaels, 

since not all of the trucks had caught up. “Saint Mikes” 

was a US Marine Corps base. 

The ambush had lasted around 45 minutes. The 

Marines at Saint Mikes sent a quick reaction force (QRF) 

into the kill zone and counted 29 insurgents killed by the 

truck drivers. The QRF also reported the insurgents had 

mortar positions dug along the dirt road that ran parallel 

to ASR Jackson. The convoy lost four Third Country 

National vehicles and two green trucks with only two 

Third Country Nationals wounded. Hernandez was the 

only American in the convoy wounded and he received 

the Bronze Star Medal with V device.24

CPT Gatewood did not seem to know what to do. 

LeClair asked her for the Alpha Roster so he could get 

an accountability of the drivers. He lined the drivers up 

and called out the names with each soldier responding 

when his or her name was called. When he asked 

those to raise their hands whose names had not been 

called, ten raised their hands. He realized the roster was 

incorrect and he would have to question the soldiers to 

determine if anyone was missing. The camp commander 

of St Michaels asked CPT Gatewood if she had all her 

soldiers accounted for. She did not know for sure and 

the colonel was livid. He informed her that if she was a 

Marine, she would be on the next plane home. Keep in 

mind the Marines had suffered badly in the press when 

a young Marine died in the desert because the company 

commander did not know he was missing at the end 

of the training day. There was no inter-service rivalry 

as the Marines provided the Army convoy any help 

they needed or wanted. While LeClair took his wounded 

soldier to the aid station, the Marines changed all the 

tires on his HMMWV.25

Lesson

The key decision was whether to go through the kill 

zone. The MPs had no doubt about the kill zone and 

refused to drive through it, but the truck drivers made 

their decision based upon the past experience when it 

was better to drive through the kill zone than try to turn 

around. The unnecessary delay could set them up for a 

hasty ambush as seen with the previous HET ambush. 

The policy during the Vietnam War was that any trucks 

not in the kill zone should not drive through it. This 

lesson would be relearned in Afghanistan with the 

TK Ambush. Another important lesson is not to count 

on external escorts like the MPs. Truck drivers 

told numerous stories of MPs abandoning them in 

kill zones that weekend. External escorts sometimes 

have different policies and tactics than the convoys 

they are escorting. 

The enemy laid out what appeared to be a linear 

ambush and employed mortars and RPGs as the 

casualty producing weapons. Interestingly, they had 

anticipated the convoy boxing up at a rally point down 

the road and had a mortar in a dump truck waiting for 

them. The accurate fire from the grenade launcher, 

however, scared off the dump truck and a subsequent 

decision was made to move the convoy to the security 

of the nearest camp instead. There, the security force 

returned to the kill zone to police up any disabled 

vehicles and crews. Convoys later abandoned the 

practice of boxing up at the rally point because 

of the mortar threat. The box formation parked too 

many trucks close together allowing a mortar round 

to damage more vehicles.

Legends had been created that Easter weekend. 

Drivers would recount the act of heroism of the truck 

drivers that defended the wall at BIAP. In particular, they 
80 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

described the heroic defense by a lone black and tan 

striped HMMWV, the Zebra. Similarly, stories spread 

about Gatewood’s performance. Most claimed she had 

left drivers in the kill zone. This claim was unfair, for the 

mere fact that she was not in charge although she was 

the convoy commander. Two senior NCOs had to step up 

and make all the decisions in the kill zone. While there 

was talk, no one wanted to come out and outright call 

her a coward, but she definitely did not have a good day. 

The Army had an identity crisis with its warrior ethos. 

Senior leaders had their values shaped during a time 

in the “feel good” Army of political correctness and 

stress cards. That was in strict conflict with the warrior 

ethos though. The Army as a whole avoided the issue 

of cowardice. Gatewood’s performance was not the 

only officer’s performance that was questionable during 

this war or even this weekend. The Marines, however, 

had never violated their core values and minced no 

words on the subject. Because of her lack of personnel 

accountability they told her, “If you were a Marine, 

you would be on a plane home.” They then sent an 

email message to CPT Petropoulos that if he ever 

sent her north again on another convoy, they would 

kill her. Because of her performance, he could not 

keep her in the same company so he made a deal to 

hide her in the newly formed 518th Combat Gun Truck 

Company. There she would get a second chance to 

lead a convoy and would abandon a HMMWV gun truck 

broken down on the road near Safwan at night, a place 

known for criminal attacks on vehicles. As soon as she 

returned to base and learned of the missing truck, she 

went to get something to eat while the company and 

battalion commander went looking for the lost gun truck. 

Interestingly, the commander of the HMMWV crew was 

1LT McCormick, the hero of the Battle of BIAP and four 

ambushes that weekend.26

It was about this time that the Army adopted its 

Warrior Ethos code and instituted training to reflect it. 

Similar to the Marine Corps, the Army began training 

all soldiers in skills needed in combat. There were a 

number of acts of heroism during this convoy ambush, 

but the award recommendations read like each soldier 

was just doing his or her job. To no surprise, the majority 

of recipients of the Medal of Honor explained they 

were also just doing their jobs. It was the level of risk 

that made these acts of valor. Another problem was 

the award packets were submitted late to a new chain 

of command that had no memory of what happened 

that weekend. Consequently, the Transportation Group 

Commander turned down all the awards.

Shrapnel damage to trailer. Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
Operation Iraqi Freedom 81

1 Narrative recommendation for the award of the Bronze Star with Valor 

to SFC Richard A. Bartlett and interview with CPT George Petropoulos and 

SSG Steve LeClair by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA on 5 May 2005.

2 “Officially, the convoy was pegged at 87. Where I got 66, I don’t recall, 

but I was a part of enough northbound convoys to know that anything over 

30 or 35 trucks would have registered a significant blip on the radar for 

anyone who’d have cared to take a shot at us.” Mike Shugrue email to 

Richard Killblane.

3 Entry in journal of SPC Mike Shugrue recorded 19 April 2004 after his 

return to Navistar.

4 SSG Aaron Brown, “Supplemental Narrative for Awards, 11 April 04 – 

Iskandyria, Iraq.” Sworn Statement by SPC Brandon E. Sallee, 11 April 2004 

and Narrative recommendation for award of the Bronze Star to SFC Richard 

A. Bartlett.

5 Shugrue Journal.

6 SSG Aaron Brown, “Supplemental Narrative for Awards, 11 April 04 – 

Iskandyria, Iraq.” Sworn Statement by SPC Brandon E. Sallee, 11 April 2004 

and Narrative of Bronze Star to Bartlett.

7 “Kevin and Dana Shugrue, my brother and sister, at that time seven and 

six years of age, respectively. I often found myself thinking of what they 

might have been doing at a given time.” Shugrue journal.

8 SGT Anthony Hernandez interview by Richard Killblane, at Arifjan, Kuwait, 

8 March 2005.

9 Sworn Statement by SPC John D. Delaney, 16 April 2004; and Narrative 

recommendation for award of the Bronze Star to SSG Steven G. Wells.

10 Shugrue Journal.

11 Narrative from SGT David Boron, Narrative recommendations for the 

award of the Army Commendation Medal with Valor to SGT Kirt W. Brown 

and SGT Heather M. Blanton.

12 Sworn Statement by SGT Rohald C. Hicks, Jr., 11 April 2004 and SSG 

Aaron B. Brown, 14 November 2004, Narrative recommendation for award 

of the Army Commendation with Valor to SGT Ronald C. Hicks and SSG 

Jeffery A. Drushel.

13 Sworn Statement by SGT Ronald C. Hicks, Jr., 11 April 2004 and SSG 

Aaron B. Brown, 14 November 2004, Narrative recommendation for award 

of the Army Commendation with Valor to SGT Ronald C. Hicks and SSG 

Jeffery A. Drushel.

14 It should be noted that “Haji,” as we used it, applied to anyone not 

wearing an American flag on his/her shoulder. Dining hall personnel, 

laundry help, civilian drivers, the enemy. If one happened to be a British, 

sometimes American, contractor, he was simply “white Haji.” In this case, 

I am referring to a friendly civilian driver.

15 Shugrue Journal.

16 Sworn Statement of SSG Charles M. Schrack, 14 November 2004

and Hicks.

17 Michelle Zaremba with Christina Sima, Wheels On Fire; My Year of 

Driving...and Surviving...in Iraq, Ashland, Oregon: Hellgate Press, 2008. 18 Sworn Statement of SSG Brett A. Baxter, 14 November 2004., and Accident Report/Serious Incident Report, 812th TC BN, APO AE09304, Camp 

Navistar, Kuwait, 12 April 2004.

19 Sworn Statement of SSG Brett A. Baxter, 14 November 2004, and Accident Report/Serious Incident Report, 812th TC BN, APO AE09304, Camp 

Navistar, Kuwait, 12 April 2004.

20 Shugrue Journal.

21 Narrative recommendation from the Award of the Army Commendation 

Medal with Valor for SPC Thomas F. Shaw.

22 Sworn statement of Delaney, Sallee, Brown and Narrative from 

SGT David Boron and Narrative of Bronze Star to Wells, Narrative 

recommendation for the Award of the Bronze Star with Valor to 

SSG Brett A. Baxter.

23 Shugrue Journal.

24 Hernandez interview.

25 Interview with Petropoulos and LeClair.

26 Interview with Petropoulos

M915 of the 1486th hauling a HMMWV north. 

Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC

SGT Ronald Hicks behind the Mk19 grenade launcher.

Photo courtesy of the 1486th TC
82 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Green Zone Convoy Ambushes, 11 April 2004

1486th and 1487th Transportation Company 

(Medium Truck)

he night before Good Friday, 9 April 2004, 

Muqtada Al Sadr’s Mahdi Militia had dropped 

anywhere from four to eight bridges severing 

the main supply route south of Baghdad International 

Airport (BIAP). They overran both An Najaf and Al Kut 

and blocked the alternate supply route to the west. On 

Good Friday they then laid ambushes for convoys coming 

to BIAP from the north. The vast number of ambushes 

caused the movement control authorities to close down 

the roads and code them black – attack imminent. The 

trucks were locked down until authorities considered the 

roads safe to travel, so the enemy had shut down the 

supply line. The militia had finally isolated BIAP, which 

supplied the 1st Cavalry Division at the Green Zone 

eight miles to the east. The Green Zone was an 

T

enclosed area of Baghdad considered safe where 

the 1st Cav had taken up residence.

The 1st Cav was all that stood between Al Sadr and 

control of Sadr City. His militia knew it could not defeat 

the American armor and infantry as easily as it had the 

Ukrainians in Al Kut so it went after the convoys instead. 

Without fuel and ammunition the 1st Cav could no longer 

fight, and by Easter Sunday, 11 April, the 1st Cav was 

48 hours from mission failure on fuel and ammunition. 

With the roads around Baghdad coded black, convoys 

were only allowed to haul priority cargo. The 1st Cav 

desperately needed ammunition and fuel but any 

convoy venturing out of BIAP knew it would run a 

gauntlet of enemy fire.

2LT James McCormick II and his platoon sergeant, 

SFC Tim Haggard of the 1487th Medium Truck Company, 

volunteered to escort a convoy of 56 M915 flat beds 

from both the 1486th and 1487th Medium Truck 

Companies, with 2LT Wade Danforth of the 1486th, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 83

to the Green Zone. 2LT Danforth would be the convoy 

commander and 2LT McCormick would be the escort 

commander. Danforth’s M998 HMMWV, armed with 

a M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) in a swivel 

seat and pedestal in the back, would lead the convoy. 

The other three gun trucks had just helped McCormick 

defend the southwest wall at BIAP during an intense 

40-minute battle where the enemy hammered the wall 

with rocket propelled grenades (RPG), mortar rounds 

and small arms fire. SSG Thomas G. Stewart, Jr. of the 

1486th had taken over a gun truck after the ambush 

on Thursday. His M998 gun truck had add -on-armor 

plating and his crew, SGT Thomas Butler and SPC White, 

were armed with 

an M16A2 and a 

handheld SAW. 

SGT Christopher 

“Chris” M. Lehman 

and SGT Matthew 

D. Eby’s HMMWV 

gun truck from the 

1486th was 

armed with an 

Mk19 automatic 

grenade launcher 

in an armored 

box on the 

back. Haggard’s 

armored M915 

gun truck, 

called the Street 

Sweeper, was 

armed with an 

M60 machinegun. The convoy would haul a mixed load 

of ammunition and unessential cargo in containers so 

the enemy would not know which loads were critical. 

Because they had expended most of their ammunition 

defending the wall, McCormick told Haggard to police 

up all the extra ammunition that could be spared and 

give it to his crew of the Zebra. Stewart, Butler and 

White also drove their HMMWV around the camp 

asking other drivers for ammunition and water.1

The Zebra, a black and tan striped thin skinned 

HMMWV was armed with a pedestal mounted M2 .50 

caliber machinegun. 2LT McCormick manned the M2 

because as a former scout squad leader he was the 

only one with experience on the .50. CPL Bryan Noble, 

the driver, was deadly accurate with his M203 grenade 

launcher. The other three crew members carried 

M16A2s. Their HMMWV carried a double combat load 

of 560 rounds of .556mm for each M16; Noble had 

30 rounds of 40mm; and McCormick had 6,000 rounds 

of .50 double-linked into 200 -round belts loaded into 

a Mk19 40mm ammo can mounted on the M2. The 

previous two fights had taught the crew to double 

up on ammunition.

The Zebra had fought its way into BIAP the previous 

Thursday night and just defended the southwest wall at 

BIAP. Three of the crew members included their leader, 

The Hands of Victory in the Ceremony Square of the Green 

Zone. This was where the 1st Cavalry Division established 

its headquarters. Photos courtesy of 518th GT Company

M915 tractor with steel plate welded to the door. Photos courtesy of 518th GT Copany
84 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

2LT McCormick, had been wounded during the fight at 

the wall and also the convoy ambush coming into BIAP. 

McCormick’s crew consisted of former combat arms 

soldiers who were just as aggressive as him 

and expected to get hit when 

they rolled out the gate. 

Having just come off the 

defense of the wall, his men 

were emotionally exhausted 

and only had 30 minutes 

to get ready to roll out the 

gate. When the convoy finally 

received authorization to roll 

to the Green Zone, McCormick 

pulled his crew aside and told 

them if they were too tired, 

they would not have to go, 

but they told him they 

wanted to roll.

Danforth divided the convoy into four serials of 14 

trucks each, which provided a gun truck to task vehicle 

ratio of about one-to- three. His HMMWV would lead 

with Stewart’s HMMWV gun truck somewhere behind it. 

The Zebra would ride in the middle because McCormick 

liked the ability to float around the convoy, Lehman’s 

HMMWV gun truck would follow between the Zebra and 

Haggard’s M915 gun truck in the rear. Danforth gave 

the convoy brief and then McCormick briefed them on 

actions on contact. In case of contact, the gun trucks 

would break to the contact side, set up a rolling screen, 

lay down suppressive fire, and then throw smoke to 

cover the movement of the trucks. All the gun trucks 

had plenty of smoke, since the Iraqis were terrified 

of yellow smoke because Saddam Hussein had used 

mustard gas on both the Iranians and his own people. 

If the wind blew the smoke into their faces, they 

would run away.2

As the first serial pulled out of the staging area, 

CPL Bryan Noble turned on some music to motivate 

everyone in the Zebra. At that moment something just 

felt different. SGT Anthony Richardson remembered, 

“Up until now everything was pretty laid back for 

my entire trip, but everything got really tense all of 

the sudden.” When they pulled up to the north gate, 

everyone warned each other on the radio to stay alert 

and what to watch for. Richardson thought they were just 

a little nervous from their experience in the 

previous ambush.3

The convoy rolled out the north gate of BIAP with 

two M1114 up-armored HMMWVs of the 1st Cav in 

the lead as scouts. The Zebra 

took the lead of the convoy 

searching for IEDs 

and signs of an ambush. 

As the convoy pulled out the 

gate, Richardson pointed out 

an Iraqi man on a roof wearing 

a red shirt talking on a cell 

phone as he watched the 

convoy pull out the gate. He 

then began waving his arms

to signal others, but the 

convoy continued moving 

through a slum area along 

Alternate Supply Route Irish. 

Irish was a four lane highway separated by a median 

and flanked mostly by two - story thick adobe dwellings 

and wrecked cars.

As soon as Richardson heard the last vehicle cleared 

the gate, he heard a round dropped into a mortar tube 

very close by. The round exploded roughly 50 meters 

away from the Zebra and then shots rang out along the 

right side of the road. They were about three miles from 

their destination. SFC Haggard yelled over the radio, 

“Contact right!” The Zebra crew then saw muzzle flashes 

from a heavily damaged 10 - story building about 100 

meters off the right side of the road so they returned fire. 

SSG Thomas Stewart’s M998 HMMWV gun truck 

with add-on-armor kit. Photo courtesy of Thomas Stewart

SSG Stewart took over the gun truck after the original 

crew was wounded in the ambush coming into BIAP three 

days before. Photo courtesy of Thomas Stewart
Operation Iraqi Freedom 85

Richardson also saw flashes from windows in numerous 

buildings lining the adjacent street that paralleled the 

one the convoy traveled on. SPC Brandon Lawson and 

Richardson returned fire with their M16s while their 

lieutenant fired his .50 cal in that direction. Because 

of the fear of hitting civilians, they had to fire only 

at areas they drew fire from. As soon as the ambush 

began, the Cavalry M1114s raced to Green Zone 

without firing a shot and evidently failed to warn 

the gate guards about the ambush.4

Stewart and Butler were the gunners in the back 

of their HMMWV and had agreed that whatever side 

the contact came from, one would drop down to fire 

while the other fired over his head. With contact right, 

Stewart dropped down and the sound of Butler’s gun 

fire resonating off the steel wall hurt Stewart’s ears, 

so he yelled at Butler to cease fire. Stewart then shifted 

his position but could not stand up, so he fired with his 

right hand, using his right arm and left hand to cover his 

ears. Their gun truck pulled out to the right and slowed 

down so the convoy could pass.5

The convoy rolled for a couple of hundred meters 

further, all the while taking fire. The Zebra pulled off to 

the right side of the street and the crew dismounted to 

allow the convoy to clear the kill zone. That maneuver 

put them in the crossfire between the shooters in the 

trucks, who did not stop firing as they passed by, and 

from the insurgents. Someone in the Zebra threw out 

a smoke grenade. After a few minutes of fighting, the 

crew climbed back in the Zebra and tried to regain 

their position in the convoy.6

The Zebra crew then saw an orange and white bus 

about the size of a city transport bus driving along a 

street that paralleled their convoy with its passengers 

firing from nearly every window. McCormick fired a full 

200 -round can of .50 caliber ammunition some Special 

Forces soldiers had given him, called “slap rounds.” 

They passed clear through the bus and hit the wall 

of the building behind it, McCormick remembered,7

“Man, we tore that thing up. I fired the fifty and the 

rounds stitched the front glass and I walked those 

rounds all down the side of this bus nailing it about half 

way down the side so no one could get down far enough 

to escape those rounds. That bus stopped and a guy 

staggered out the door and fired and he was blown away 

by about a 4 to 6 round burst of my fifty and Noble kept 

Top to bottom: SGT Chris Lehman and SGT Matthew 

Eby’s M998 HMMWV gun truck with steel plating on 

the doors. Photo courtesy of Adam Houck

Lehman’s gun truck was armed with an Mk19 

automatic grenade launcher mounted in a steel box.

Photo courtesy of Thomas Stewart

Front view of the 1486th Medium Truck Company’s 

M915 gun truck, The Street Sweeper. Photo courtesy of 

518th Company
86 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

dropping 203 rounds all over 

this thing until it burst into 

flames.”8

The Zebra rolled a 

little past the bus and then 

McCormick again positioned 

it on the contact side. The 

Zebra slowed down to stop 

so Noble could dismount and 

fire his M203 at the bus and 

surrounding area. All hell then 

broke loose as the convoy 

came to a stop. McCormick 

yelled over the radio to ask 

what was wrong. He learned the gate guards had 

stopped the convoy, asked for identification, then made 

the crews get out and ground guide their vehicles in. 

The rear of the convoy was still under fire and the gate 

guards could hear it.9

At that point they started receiving rocket propelled 

grenades (RPG). McCormick saw the RPG gunner and 

two other Iraqis come out from cover to fire at the 

convoy. The lieutenant remembered a Vietnam veteran 

telling him to throw smoke to obscure the enemy vision, 

and he then tossed out a yellow smoke grenade. He 

then fired his M2 .50 caliber machinegun into the smoke 

screen at the insurgents and Richardson saw the Iraqi 

fire the RPG, but the rocket flew up in the air as if the 

gunner was hit when he pulled the trigger.10

SGT Chris Lehman’s gun truck blew its horn to 

notify the Zebra that they were coming up. Lehamn then 

pounded the area around the bus with his Mk19 which 

completely engulfed the bus

 in flames. As Lehman passed 

by, the Zebra crew remounted 

their vehicle and followed 

the convoy to the Green

Zone. Noble also lobbed 

40mm grenades on some 

emplacements dug less than 

50 meters from the road. 

It was a shooting gallery as 

the Zebra crew took fire from 

the roofs of buildings, from 

cars and ditch along the road. 

The crew poured suppressive 

fire back into the enemy until the last truck cleared 

the kill zone.11

 When the Zebra reached the gate, the NCO said, 

“ID and ground guide.” McCormick asked him if he 

“could hear the fucking firefight going on!” They were still 

receiving small arms fire from the surrounding buildings. 

The gate guard said, “This is policy,” to which the 

lieutenant responded, “This is Bullshit!” McCormick told 

the drivers not to get out and ground guide their trucks. 

He did not want them exposed unnecessarily to enemy 

fire. The Zebra pulled off to the side of the road to watch 

for enemy activity while the convoy slowly entered the 

compound. All vehicles of the convoy made it through 

the check point safely with no fatalities. The Zebra then 

followed behind Lehman’s. While they were moving to 

the staging area, not five minutes after they had cleared 

the gate, they heard the gate come under attack. The 

Zebra crew felt the gate guards deserved it for their 

stupidity for keeping the convoy exposed.12

When they reached the staging area, SGT Byers 

came up and showed the Zebra crew where he had 

been hit by shrapnel in his hand. They took him to 

the medic station to get the wound treated. The Zebra 

crew also watched soldiers unload a container of 

miscellaneous cleaning supplies and garbage cans. 

They did not talk about this with anyone else because 

they did not want the drivers to know some had almost 

died delivering that “mission essential” cargo.13

Haggard’s M915 gun truck remained in the Green 

Zone while the others returned to BIAP to pick up the 

next convoy serial. Obviously everyone expected to 

get hammered hard during the second trip. During the 

Rear view of the 1486th Medium Truck Company’s 

M915 gun truck, The Street Sweeper. Photo courtesy 

of the 518th GT Company

The Zebra gun truck before the M2 .50 caliber machinegun 

was added. Thomas Salemme who named the truck is behind 

the SAW. Photo by Dennis Bubnovsky courtesy of the 518th GT Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 87

next convoy brief, McCormick told the gun trucks to turn 

their vehicles toward the enemy putting their engine 

blocks between them and the enemy fire, which would 

provide them some protection. Then the crew should 

dismount and fire all their weapons at the enemy. 

When the next gun truck came up to replace them, 

they would mount up and displace with the convoy 

to the next enemy position.14

As the second convoy left the gate, the Zebra crew 

watched for the spotter in the red shirt. They saw him 

briefly wave his arms and when the first enemy round 

was fired the crew of the Zebra opened fire on him. 

The convoy again received fire, but the “turn, fix, and 

fire” tactic worked. Instead of just suppressing enemy 

fire, the gun trucks and crews inflicted serious 

damage on the enemy. 

After the gun trucks returned to pick up the third 

convoy serial, they again watched for the spotter and 

when he stood up to wave at his fellow insurgents, nearly 

every gunner in the convoy shot at him. The building was 

so riddled with holes it looked like it would collapse. The 

third time the enemy fire was less than the second trip 

indicating there were not as many enemy shooters as 

there had been before. The convoy received sporadic 

fire and in one occasion while returning fire, McCormick 

hit a power lines and saw the transformer blow up in 

sparks. At an intersection, the passengers of a passing 

white car fired at them. McCormick hit it with the .50 

and it slammed into another car. When the gun trucks 

picked up their fourth and final convoy serial, it was 

only shot at once. They remained overnight in the 

Green Zone to escort trucks back.

Lesson

The enemy set up a linear kill zone the entire eight miles 

from BIAP to the Green Zone waiting for anything coming 

out the gate. The first key decision was to increase the 

gun truck ratio to one-to-three. It would have been higher

had the three Cavalry M1114s not left the convoy. Again, 

convoys cannot always depend upon external escorts. 

Those gun trucks had to run the gauntlet of enemy 

fire three times. Each time they put their gun trucks 

Factory built fully armored M1114 HMMWV gun truck. 

Photo courtesy of the 518th GT Company

The Zebra showing battle damage from defending the wall at BIAP. The M2 .50 caliber machinegun can be seen on top.

Photo courtesy of the 518th GT Company
88 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

between the enemy and the convoy, but quick and 

accurate return fire reduced the threat each time. 

Just driving by and returning fire with one or two 

weapons did not seem to discourage the enemy. 

Dismounting and firing all weapons available at the 

enemy had the best effect. Again superior and accurate 

fire power reduced the enemy threat so by the time 

they left on the fourth run, there was almost no enemy 

resistance. Using cavalry tactics these gun trucks had 

beaten the fight out of the enemy.

For most of the truck companies ambushed that 

Easter weekend, that was their first serious exposure 

to convoy ambushes and they learned the hard lessons 

of not anticipating the worst case scenarios. The crew 

of the Zebra, on the-other-hand, demonstrated during 

this and the ambush on Thursday night how a more 

aggressive stance could defeat the enemy. McCormick 

would refine his “turn, fix, and fire” tactic when he 

helped form and train the 518th Combat Gun Truck 

Company. These cavalry tactics of dismounting and 

engaging the enemy with all weapons instead of 

returning fire from one side would gradually decline 

once the crews of other units received fully armored 

gun trucks with ballistic glass. Then, either because 

of higher policy or preference, crews became more 

reluctant to dismount.

During this ambush, Richardson was wounded 

by bullet fragments in the right arm, making him the 

fourth crew member of the Zebra to be wounded that 

weekend. For their actions defending the wall and the 

three convoy ambushes, SFC Haggard, SSG Stewart, 

SSG Butler, SGT Lehman and SPC Blue received 

Bronze Star Medals with V device, while 2LT Danforth, 

CPL Bryan Noble, SPC Ralph Richardson, 2LT James 

McCormick, SPC Brandon Lawson and SGT Anthony 

Richardson posing at the Green Zone right after the first 

convoy on Easter Sunday. Photo courtesy of the 518th GT Company 

812th Transportation Battalion award ceremony for the Easter weekend ambushes. Photo courtesy of Thomas Stewart
Operation Iraqi Freedom 89

SGT Richardson, SPC Eby, and SPC Lawson received 

ARCOMs with V device. 2LT McCormick finally received 

the Silver Star Medal in November 2014. As of 2015, 

CPL Noble’s Silver Star Medal was still pending approval. 

That was the third time McCormick was wounded, 

which earned him a reputation as a bullet magnet. 

On his way out on a convoy one day, CPT George 

Petropoulos jokingly asked him whether he had done 

a risk assessment on himself. MSG Ani Tavai rode in 

a route reconnaissance with McCormick through ad 

Diwaniyah when kids started throwing rocks at them. 

Tavai joked, “If they are not shooting at you, they are 

throwing stuff at you.” Regardless of his reputation, 

many of the men who had volunteered to go out the 

gate with him that Sunday also followed him into the 

518th Combat Gun Truck Company when it was 

formed the next month.

SPC Lawson, CPL Jacob Bach, 2LT McCormick, and SGT Richardson after receiving their Purple Heart Medals for the 

fighting on Easter weekend. Photo courtesy of James McCormick

1 James McCormick telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 5 April 2012; 

Bryan Noble email to Richard Killblane, October 4, 2005; and SSG Thomas 

G. Stewart, Jr. interview by Richard Killblane on 9 August 2007.

2 James McCormick telephone interview, 5 April 2012.

3 SGT Anthony Richardson Account of Easter Weekend 04 emailed to 

Richard Killblane, 2 August 2005.

4 Richardson Account, 2 August 2005; Noble email, October 4, 2005; and 

McCormick email to Richard Killblane, June 7, 2005 and June 8, 2005.

5 Stewart interview.

6 Richardson Account, 2 August 2005; Noble email, October 4, 2005; and 

McCormick email, June 7, 2005.

7 McCormick email, June 6 and 7, 2005 and Noble email, October 4, 2005.

8 McCormick email, October 5, 2005.

9 McCormick email, June 7, 2005.

10 McCormick email, June 7, 2005, and April 3, 2012.

11 Noble email, October 4, 2005; McCormick email, June 1 and 

June 7, 2005 and October 5, 2005.

12 Noble email, October 4, 2005; McCormick email, June 1 and 7, 2005.

13 McCormick email, June 8, 2005 and SGT Anthony Richardson account, 

2 August 2005.

14 McCormick telephone interview, 5 April 2012.
90 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Battle of Broken Chains, 17 April 2004

Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah

1175th HET Company, 2123th HET, 1452nd HET, 

2nd ACR and 2/37th Armor

he Mission and Task Organization

Task Force 2-37 Armor (Iron Dukes) had 

served in Iraq since early June 2003 and was 

completing its transfer of authority with the 1st Cavalry 

Division in early April 2004. The Iron Dukes had been 

assigned responsibility for the northeastern portion of 

Baghdad, including the overpopulated slum area, 

Sadr City. After twelve months of boots on the ground, 

the Iron Dukes and its parent command, the 1st 

Armored Division, was preparing to redeploy to their 

home station in Germany when on 4 April 2004, the 

radical young cleric Muqtada Al Sadr ordered his 

followers to conduct a jihad against the coalition forces.1

Al Sadr’s Mahdi Militia did not have sufficient 

strength to drive the coalition forces out of Iraq so at 

best he just wanted to flex his muscles and establish 

himself as a contender with the elder clerics. To do this, 

he wanted control of three towns. He already had control 

of An Najaf. His militia would drive the Ukrainians out of 

Al Kut, but the Bagdhad suburbs named after his father, 

Sadr City, belonged to the newly arrived 1st Cavalry 

Division. Like a brush fire, uprisings spread across 

T

several cities in Central Iraq, such as An Najaf/Kufa, 

Karbala, Al Hillah/Babylon, and Al Kut. Al Sadr’s Mahdi 

Militia captured local police stations and government 

offices, allowing his followers to set up their own 

governments and courts under Islamic law. 

At 1600 hours on 4 April 2004, the Mahdi Militia 

attacked an Iraqi Police station, isolating Alpha 

Company, 2-5 Infantry (Lancer) of 1st Brigade, 1st 

Cavalry Division. C Company, 2-37 Armor (Crusader) 

was still under tactical control to Lancer Battalion and 

was immediately dispatched as a Quick Reaction Force 

to Sadr City. Crusader Company, followed closely by the 

remaining combat power of Task Force 2-37, attacked 

into Sadr City to rescue the 2-5 Infantry, which had 

already suffered seven killed at the police station. After 

successfully repelling the Mahdi Militia that night, Task 

Force 2-37 braced itself for the inevitable.2

With a transition of authority only days away, Task 

Force 2-37 focused on redeployment. 1LT Colin Cremin, 

Executive Officer (XO) of Alpha Company, 2-37 Armor, 

was preparing to ship the bulk of his company’s supplies 

and equipment south to Kuwait, with the majority of 

their combat vehicles to make the journey a few days 

later. These plans changed with the announcement that 

the 1st Armored Division was extended in Iraq for an 

additional four months.3

With the extension official, Task Force 2-37 fought 

M1070 Heavy Equipment Transporters and M1000 trailers of the 766th Transportation Battalion. 

Photo courtesy of SFC Vanderwerf
Operation Iraqi Freedom 91

with the Mahdi Militia in Sadr City over the next 11 days 

before turning control over to the 1st Cavalry Division. 

Task Force 2-37 then received orders to move southwest 

to assist the Ukrainians regain control of Al Kut. Within 

days of their arrival, Al Kut was secured and power 

restored to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), so 

on 16 April, the Iron Duke’s orders changed to move to 

An Najaf with the simple task to destroy the Mahdi Militia 

and capture or kill its leader – Al Sadr.4 

When the 766th Transportation Battalion received 

the transportation movement request (TMR) back at 

Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, it was to haul the tracked vehicles 

of the Task Force 2-37 to Al Kut, not An Najaf. The 766th 

provided command and control over all Combat Heavy 

Equipment Transportation (HET) companies based in 

Kuwait and assigned the mission to both the 1175th 

Transportation Company of the Tennessee National 

Guard, and the 2123rd Transportation Company of the 

Kentucky National Guard. The 1175th Transportation 

Company provided 16 HETs, three HMMWVs configured 

as gun trucks, one wrecker, and one contact truck. The 

2123rd Transportation Company also provided HETs 

and gun trucks.5 Coincidentlly, the 1175th had also been 

in country for a year and was similarly extended. Once 

the convoy arrived at Al Kut, they received a change in 

mission from the 2nd ACR to transport the Task Force 

2-37 to An Najaf.6

The task force set about preparing to move its base 

of operations from Camp Delta 175 kilometers west to An 

Najaf. On the night of 16 April 2004, CPT Erik Peterson, 

Assistant S4, arrived with the last of the unit equipment 

from Baghdad and found his battalion making extensive 

preparations for the road march to An Najaf. Erik had 

just pinned on captain bars a few months earlier and left 

his job as a tank company executive officer. He became 

the battalion “redeployment” officer possessing nothing 

more than his computer and a rucksack.7 One third of 

the battalion’s equipment was already in Kuwait. So he 

departed Baghdad with the remaining 14 tanks of 2-37 

by HETs to Camp Delta at Al Kut. His move to Al Kut had 

been slow, because the insurgents had destroyed major 

bridges between Baghdad and Al Kut the previous week.

8

When he arrived at Camp Delta in the dark, Peterson 

radioed his battalion tactical operations center and was 

told to stay in position because the battalion executive 

officer wanted to talk with him. Around 2100 hours, 

the executive officer spread out a map on the top of 

his M998 and explained that the battalion had been 

ordered to An Najaf. The only restriction was to not travel 

at night.9 All the wheels in the battalion to include the 

commanders and all staff would roll out at 0700 hours. 

Peterson had one map set of the route with satellite 

graphics of the turns. The HETs were already loading, 

but Battalion did not know how many HETs were 

available, or how much equipment was actually on 

the ground. There was just an urgency to move.10

During his early Operation Iraqi Freedom I 

experience working with HETs, however, Peterson 

learned the HET convoy commanders jealously guarded 

their role as the convoy commanders and the tanks and 

convoy escorts fell under their control for the movement. 

If a maneuver officer, regardless of rank, tried to take 

HMMWV gun truck of the 766th Transportation Battalion 

with first pattern add-on-armor kit, gun shield and turret 

armor. Photo courtesy of MAJ Ressel

Thin skinned HMMWV of the 766th Transportation Battalion with a SAW gunner in back. Photo courtesy of MAJ Ressel
92 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

charge, it usually resulted in shouting matches and 

almost always the Transporter won. The reason was that 

most combat arms officers riding in their HMMWVs did 

not know what a HET could or could not do. Peterson 

figured it made no sense to try to take charge of the 

convoy. He thought he was dealing with just one HET 

company, which was how most missions were assigned, 

but for some reason the 766th Transportation Battalion 

had not designated a single convoy commander.11

Instead CPT Thomas Jerry Moore II, commander of the 

1175th HET, and 1LT Robert L. Henderson II, 2123rd 

HET, agreed each would command their own march 

units and Peterson would be the serial commander.12

The escort platoon came from elements of 1st 

and 4th Platoons of Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), which was 

equipped with four M1025/26s HMMWVs armed with 

machineguns and dual radios. Peterson’s battalion also

provided four of the new M1114 up- armored HMMWVs.13

All 65 of the battalion’s tracked vehicles were 

finally loaded onto the HETs for the trip. The vehicles 

included 39 M1A1 Abrams tanks. Hauling tanks on 

trailers conserved fuel, reduced the wear and tear on 

the combat vehicles and allowed the crews to focus 

on security during the convoy. Most vehicles kept two 

crewmembers inside the tanks with any excess soldiers 

riding inside the cab with the two HET drivers. The crews 

riding in the tracked vehicles could man the crew-served 

weapons, turning each HET into a firing platform thus 

augmenting the security provided by the Apache 

White scout vehicles.14

CPT Peterson task organized the convoy of 53 

HETs, four M1114 and four M1025/26 scout gun trucks 

from the line companies into two serials of roughly 33 

vehicles each,15 because it was easier for the gun trucks 

Convoy of the 1836th HET hauling M1 tanks of the 

1st Cavalry Divison forward. Photo courtesy of James Wood

1LT Henderson and NCOs of the 2123rd HET Company standing next to one of their HMMWV gun trucks. 

Photo courtesy of 766th Transportation Battalion
Operation Iraqi Freedom 93

to support smaller serials of that size. Since the 2nd 

ACR gun trucks had dual radios, Peterson assigned one 

with a map to lead each serial; another to the rear of the 

convoy for security; and kept two gun trucks together 

in the middle of the convoy to respond to any situation. 

Peterson consolidated the four 2-37 Armor M1114s into 

a platoon. Because two did not have radios, he assigned 

them in pairs with ones that did. Peterson did not know 

the HET convoy consisted of two different companies 

and assumed CPT Moore was the company commander 

of all the HETs. So he let Moore pick the order of 

march of the trucks. CPT Moore chose to lead with the 

1175th and have 1LT Henderson follow with the 2123rd 

approximately 45 minutes behind the lead serial.16

The 2nd ACR and 2-37th Armor planned the route 

in conjunction with the two officers of the HET convoy. 

The convoy would move north on Alternate Supply Route 

(ASR) Bismarck to ASR Kiev, then west to Main Supply 

Route (MSR) Tampa, south to ASR Evansville, east to 

ASR Miami, north to ASR Boston, and then south to 

Forward Operating Base (FOB) Duke with a stopover 

at Convoy Support Center (CSC) Scania escorted by 

a security element from the 1st Armored Division. 

The plan was briefed and approved by the 2nd ACR.17

This early in the war, only a few of the HETs had 

SINCGARS military radios and the rest used privately or 

unit purchased citizen band (CB) radios. There were five 

different units in the convoy and each monitored their 

own internal frequencies. The company commander and 

executive officer of the tanks had Blue Force Tracker 

systems, but no headquarters to talk to on the other end, 

since their battalion was also enroute and had not set up. 

Neither did anyone in the convoy have satellite phones. 

The HETs had some mobile tracking systems (MTS), 

which gave them an email texting capability. In the event 

the convoy ran into trouble, these trucks had better 

access to texting for help.18

SSG Vancleeve’s Apache Two led the first march 

unit followed by Apache One, led by 1LT Joel Schuh.19

Concerned about the convoy getting lost, CPT Peterson 

rode in one of his battalion’s M1114s, pretty close to the 

front of the lead serial. During the trip he would primarily 

maintain radio communication with the Apache Troop 

escorts, but would have radio problems throughout 

the journey. By the time the fight came, his radio 

communication failed.20 At Start Point (SP) time, CPT 

Moore, call sign Warrior Five, radioed 1LT Henderson, call 

sign Saber 25, to notify him they were ready to move.21

Move to Scania

By dawn, most of the HETs were loaded and the 

leaders started to work out what was left for future load 

requests. Meanwhile, the Moore and Henderson were 

highly resistant to moving on the route Task Force 2-37 

had planned to take, which traveled around Al Hillah. The 

HET commanders understood the 1st Armored Division 

would provide the escorts, but the addition of the 2nd 

ACR was a change. This was significant because the 

convoy escorts from 1st Armored Division had been 

briefed and helped plan the route from Al Kut to FOB 

Duke.22 The 2nd ACR security element told CPT Moore 

and 1LT Henderson that a deviation from the original 

plan had been approved by the Movement Control 

Team (MCT) at CSC Scania.23 The new route, however, 

was not an approved route so the HET commanders 

were appropriately worried about bridges and weight 

restrictions. HETs loaded with tanks could not always 

travel the same places other vehicles could. In addition, 

they did not have route maps to Camp Echo near Najaf. 

That was when everyone assumed the MCT at Scania 

probably had route maps to An Najaf. Peterson knew 

convoys needed march credits, meaning presumably, an 

MCT was going to select their route. Due to the urgency 

of the fight in An Najaf, the mentality at the time was to 

go and get into the fight as fast as they could and “Don’t 

worry about the formalities.”24

The wheeled vehicles departed Camp Delta first 

early in the morning. Then after re -fueling and a morning 

of delays and confusion over the exact route to be taken, 

the HET convoy finally departed Al Kut around 1230 

HET hauling a M1 Abrams tank. Photo courtesy of James Wood
94 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

hours on 17 April.25 As the convoy approached Scania, 

the new escorts from the 2nd ACR had little knowledge 

of the original route plan and wanted to head north to 

Baghdad.26 1LT Henderson and CPT Moore halted the 

convoy just south of Scania at 1530 hours to explain 

to the Apache Scouts and CPT Peterson that it was not 

the route they had agreed on. So Moore and Henderson 

told Peterson they would not go that way due to roadway 

height and weight restrictions.

Only one map with poor graphics and limited data on 

major intersections was provided for this route. Coalition 

forces had not traveled through areas of this route in 

several months. So CPT Peterson sent two of the scout 

vehicles ahead to the Movement Control Team (MCT) 

in Scania to verify the route and get coordinates. There 

the scouts received a threat brief and the new route. 

This route deviation would take the convoy east on ASR 

Orlando, then east on a route south of the city of Ad 

Diwaniyah to ASR Miami, and onward to ASR Boston. 

After about 30 minutes, the scouts returned with the 

approved route and one set of 1:50,000 maps for the 

entire route. Henderson and Moore agreed on the 

route, briefed their march units and departed.27

The Transporters claimed the handoff of convoy 

escorts should not have resulted in a change in route 

unless dictated by the current enemy situation. Changing 

the escorts led to confusion about the planned route. 

No strip maps were available to the truck drivers of the 

route change or of the immediate area. The movement 

control team at Scania was unable to provide the status 

of the route or any recent intelligence about enemy 

actions in the immediate area.28 The wheeled vehicles 

and the bulk of the battalion leadership, however, had 

departed for An Najaf in a series of convoys early in the 

morning and encountered absolutely no enemy contact 

along their route. This provided no warning as to what 

awaited the main body.29

The new route would take them into the southern 

portion of Iraq. Over Easter weekend, 9 to 11 April, the 

insurgents had for the first time launched large-scale 

complex ambushes throughout the Sunni Triangle. The 

subsequent counter- offensive by the armored units 

seemed to put an end to this threat and Intelligence 

claimed there had been very little activity this far south 

along this route.30 Intelligence also reported that if 

enemy contact was to occur, it would most likely take 

place on the roads outside of Al Kut.31 The convoy rolled 

out around 1600 hours heading south on ASR Orlando.32

Once beyond Al Kut, the HET convoy had escaped what 

it thought was the danger area. Coincidently, a HET 

convoy from the 1452nd Transportation Company from 

the North Carolina National Guard happened to stop 

behind the 1175th and 2123rd HET convoy at Scania 

and was heading the same way, so it fell in behind the 

2123rd as a third march unit.33

Ad Diwaniyah

The convoy had very few problems for the first few hours, 

traveling through some small towns, stopping periodically 

to fix flat tires on the HETs.34 The convoy continued west 

and approached the main supply route where it was to 

turn south. The lead scouts providing convoy security 

Convoy of HETs of the 766th Transportation Battalion hauling tanks with their baggage and crews. 

Photo courtesy of of SFC Vanderwerf
Operation Iraqi Freedom 95

found the traffic ramp closed and impassable to HETs. 

Likewise, it was impossible for the HETs to turn around, 

so Peterson decided to continue driving west, which led 

to the city of Ad Diwaniyah where two alternate supply 

routes merged and the convoy could get back on the 

designated route.35 During the confusion of the April 

Uprising, it was not unusual for an MCT to not know 

a road was blocked, forcing the convoy commander 

to find an alternate route.

At approximately 1715 hours, the lead march unit 

reached the outskirts of Ad Diwaniyah.36 The escort 

element, Apache White One, radioed back for Moore’s 

march unit to halt because an overturned semi-trailer 

blocked the main road through the city. A large crane was 

on hand but it would take some time to clear up. Waiting 

any length of time near a populated area was a seriously 

bad idea, so they needed to find another way around the 

wreck. Peterson saw a local Iraqi Police officer on the 

scene give the scouts directions for a detour and the 

scouts left to reconnoiter it.37

The city had looked like any other Moore had driven 

through. The gas station adjacent to where the convoy 

waited had over ten cars lined up in the road. Children 

had been running around playing soccer and were 

beginning to walk up to the drivers asking for food and 

water. All of this was a common and reassuring sight 

in Iraq. One small child about seven or eight years old 

told Moore his convoy was heading to An Najaf. The 

other drivers similarly reported young children telling 

them the same thing and one young boy added the 

“convoy would be taken care of soon.” Moore thought it 

was very strange how this young Iraqi child knew their 

destination. Moore had been in country 366 days and 

never experienced this before, but did not consider it to 

become alarmed about.38

The scouts returned after about 15 minutes saying 

they had found an alternate route through the city that 

was passable for HETs but tight. One of the reasons 

Transporters do not like to give up control of their convoy 

to non-Transportation Corps officers is that they do not 
96 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

know the capabilities and especially the limitations of 

the vehicles in the convoy. CPT Peterson and Moore 

approved the route, and Moore radioed back to his 

elements and Saber 25, whose march unit had caught 

up by that time, that they had to drive around the 

accident ahead.39

As the convoy entered the city, the situation changed 

dramatically. The fuel station began to close up and 

the cars left in a hurry. Iraqi policemen began stopping 

civilian traffic to allow the convoy to pass and herded 

Iraqi citizens away from the convoy to side streets. An 

eagle statue on a pillar at the entrance of town had a 

picture of Al Sadr and a crowd started to gather around 

the statue as if they were protecting the statue. Many 

flags with the same design and writing were hanging 

on homes as the convoy rolled through the city. Moore 

believed the flags might have been Al Quaida flags. A 

small group of men appeared to be arguing over an 

auto accident, but no one noticed any damage on either 

vehicle causing the soldiers did think the argument was 

staged. The vehicles disappeared along with the men 

after the lead element of the convoy passed them. At 

least two individuals were spotted on top of a building 

overlooking the convoy with what looked like binoculars. 

These were all clear indicators that something bad 

awaited the convoy down the streets of Ad Diwaniyah.40

Contact Lead March Unit

Moore led the convoy deeper into the city down a main 

street with opposite lanes separated by a median. 

He noticed a group of around 60 to 70 men dressed 

in black on the right side of the road listening to a 

man, possibly a cleric, agitating them through a mega 

phone. The man looked upset and did not seem to 

want the Americans there, so Moore relayed back on 

his SINCGARS radio for everyone to pay attention to 

the group as they drove by. Near the end of the city, the 

convoy made a left turn down a street that looked more 

like an alley with low hanging power lines stretched 

across the alley from house to house. The first two HETs 

made their way cautiously down the alley trying not to 

hit the lines and they saw a familiar sight, kids running 

out along the streets waiving at the drivers along with an 

unusual number of adults coming out standing on the 

sidewalks. Moore radioed back that the Iraqis seemed 

friendly so the drivers should try to not tear down the 

power lines. This caused the traffic to slow down to 

a crawl, bunching the two march units into one long 

convoy on the first road. Moore had an uneasy feeling 

negotiating the cramped alley with large HETs and no 

room to maneuver. It was every HET driver’s nightmare. 

The Iraqis grew restless with the convoy taking so long 

and began motioning for the drivers to roll on and not 

to worry about tearing down the lines. Upon closer 

examination, the lines were very small wire and not 

attached to any source of electricity, more like something 

used to hang clothes; so Moore told his drivers to just 

roll on that the Iraqis did not mind them tearing the lines 

down. Then the adults began gathering their children up 

and returned inside their buildings, similar to a scene in 

any Western movie before a gunfight. Moore searched 

for any sign they would reach their designated route 

soon. The convoy turned into a traffic circle beyond 

the overturned truck and then took a right-hand turn 

heading back down another alley. Moore radioed for his 

lead gun truck to set up a traffic control point there to 

make sure everyone made the correct turn as there was 

actually two right turns out of the circle.41

Apache elements led the convoy down an alley 

flanked on both sides by apartment buildings. There 

were no longer any pedestrians on the streets. To the 

scouts’ surprise, the next street ended a short distance 

in at a T-intersection. About 1830 hours, as the convoy 

approached the end of the alley, Moore heard 10 to 15 

rounds fired from what seemed to be his right. He then 

radioed, “Contact right, contact right.” The lead HET, 

Tango One, also radioed there was contact left.42 As the 

rest of the convoy followed, several soldiers saw a green 

The eagle statue with the photo of Al Sadr and the traffic 

jam in the background in Ad Diwaniyah. Photo courtesy of 

MAJ Ressel
Operation Iraqi Freedom 97

flare in the sky and then the convoy began to take small 

arms fire. Some drivers from both the 1175th and the 

2123rd indicated they saw at least three flares and the 

volume of fire increased as each flare was launched.43

A large volume of fire erupted behind Moore and drivers 

radioed him they were receiving small arms fire.44 Upon 

hearing the initial reports of contact on the battalion 

net, 1LT Colin Cremin, A “Aggressor” Company Executive 

Officer, likewise warned the tanks not yet in contact 

about the imminent threat along the route.45

SSG Joshua D. Martin had monitored both his 

company and the drivers’ frequencies on his two radios 

in his tank. After seeing children further down the road 

running away, he heard on the HET drivers’ frequency 

they were in contact. He then charged his .50 while 

his loader brought his M240 to a red status - ready 

to engage. Within minutes he saw weapons pointed 

out every door, window and rooftop. Significantly 

outnumbered, Martin ordered his loader to button 

up the hatch, and he could operate his .50 from 

inside the commander’s turret.46

The ambush began with sporadic small arms fire 

from both sides of the street. The HETs in contact 

reacted by stopping their vehicles and returning small 

arms fire causing the rest of the convoy to a halt.47

After suppressing the targets, the HETs moved on but 

continued to receive more small arms fire. The sporadic 

small arms fire erupted into a full-scale ambush as more 

insurgents arrived to the fight. Armed with automatic 

weapons and rocket propelled grenades (RPG), the 

insurgents lined multi -story residential buildings and 

factories to fire down on the convoy.48

The drivers and the armor crewmen returned a 

heavy volume of fire, but the units in the convoy had 

difficulty talking to each other due to two reasons. First, 

there were no less than three separate radio systems 

within the convoy. Several trucks had SINCGARS, several 

had citizen band (CB) radios, and others had hand-held 

systems. Second, the entire convoy was not on the same 

frequency. Each serial operated on a different frequency 

that forced soldiers to constantly switch channels to talk 

to other serial. This not only made coordination difficult, 

but also enhanced the confusion as to why the convoy 

was stopped.49

In spite of these difficulties, the enemy made one 

very big mistake; they ambushed a HET convoy hauling 

tanks. Each HET provided a firing platform armed with 

anything from a .50 caliber machinegun to a 120mm 

cannon. These could inflict some serious damage and 

the only limitation was fear of collateral damage. At the 

end of the street, Moore’s serial halted while the scouts 

again searched for the correct route out of the city. While 

stopped, insurgents continued to pour small arms fire 

into the convoy while the gunners and drivers returned 

fire with M2s, Mk19s, SAWs, and M16s. When the 

volume of fire became too intense, CPT Moore 

finally authorized the tank crewmen to return fire 

with their main guns.50

HETs rolling through town. Photo courtesy of MAJ Ressel
98 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Halted at the T-intersection, Moore radioed back 

asking if his HETs were all together and Wrench One, his 

maintenance section, replied they had caught up to the 

march serial. He also said he had the 2123rd element 

with him. About that time Saber 25, Henderson’s vehicle, 

called over the radio and announced 1LT Henderson 

had been hit. Moore switched his radio over to both the 

Sheriff and medevac frequencies, but could not raise 

anyone. Sheriff was the equivalent of a 911 operator 

in a war zone which coordinated for medevacs or the 

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from the battle space owner. 

He then radioed his NCOIC, SSG Lee, call sign Warrior 

Two, who was bringing up the rear of his march serial 

and told him to keep calling for medevac, since he could 

not contact them. Moore had to monitor the command 

frequency to stay abreast of the tactical situation. 

Moore told Saber 25 to keep moving. SSG Grimes, who 

was with Saber 25, calmly radioed back and stated he 

needed a medevac immediately. Henderson had been 

shot in the femoral artery and would bleed out and die 

if he did not receive medical attention quickly.51

About three HETs back from the front, Moore could 

not see anyone in the buildings, nor did he see any 

muzzle flashes coming from the buildings ahead. The 

lead HET, Tango One, radioed back that one of the 

crewmen on the tank he was hauling was killed and 

emphasized the convoy needed to move.52 SGT Jonathan 

Hartman, in tank A66 commander’s cupola, was shot 

in the right abdomen and dropped into the turret. 

PFC Eric Mullins, the loader and the only other 

crewmember on the tank, immediately assessed 

Hartman’s wounds and rendered first aid, while at the 

same time still firing back at the attackers. “It took me 

awhile to determine what had happened to John. I just 

thought he was reloading when I noticed his face had 

gone white.” For Hartman to receive proper medical 

treatment the convoy had to get out of the kill zone, so 

while defending his tank and caring for Hartman, Mullins 

threw anything within arm’s reach at the cab until he was 

able to gain the attention of the drivers.53

Monitoring the battalion “Warrior” frequency, 1LT 

Cremin was clueless as to why they had stopped for 

an estimated 15 to 20 minutes. He assumed the HET 

drivers did not know how to properly react to contact and 

had merely stopped in place until they received guidance 

from higher authority. The scout HMMWVs continued 

to suppress the enemy and facilitate movement, but 

the HETs continued to remain in place. Cremin realized 

unless they rapidly cleared the kill zone, all hell was 

about to break loose. So, he quickly scanned his map 

and then ordered all vehicles to consolidate across 

the southern bridge. It took some time to disseminate 

this information from his battalion net to the individual 

companies and finally to the transportation units. By 

then the HETs had started moving forward again, and 

the enemy poured heavy small arms and RPG fire from 

M1 tank on back of HET traversing its main gun and tank commander behind the M2 .50 caliber machinegun 

in search of enemy. Photo courtesy of SFC Vanderwerf
Operation Iraqi Freedom 99

both sides of the street and rooftops.54

At that point, the HET hauling Cremin’s tank was 

halted at an intersection and receiving heavy RPG and 

small arms fire. His driver, Welch, remembered, “I looked 

back and saw 20 to 30 tracer rounds bounce all around 

the executive officer as he was out of the hatch firing his 

M4.” There were numerous enemy combatants on the 

rooftops of both residential and commercial buildings 

firing at the convoy, creating an in-depth kill zone. 

While engaging enemy in a nearby window, an RPG fired 

towards Cremin’s location exploded in the street and 

showered his tank crew with gravel and asphalt. A few 

seconds later, a second and third RPGs impacted with 

an enormous explosion into the right rear of his tank’s 

hull. Shaken by the impact, Cremin quickly assessed any 

damage or injury to his tank and crew. With everything 

still in working order, Cremin immediately identified the 

attacker’s position about 300 meters down the main 

street to the east and then killed him with .50 caliber 

fire while his gunner, SGT Shaun Ellertson, continued to 

fire the loader’s M240 machinegun on insurgents on the 

rooftops from the western side of the street. The enemy 

would momentarily step out from behind alleyways and 

pop up over rooftops while they fired then drop back 

behind cover. While this made it difficult for the tankers 

to acquisition targets, it also decreased the enemy’s 

accuracy, but once the tankers identified the main threat 

in the alleys, they poured overwhelming firepower onto 

the attackers. Cremin’s tank fired small arms fire at the 

nearest targets, and his crew- served weapons at more 

the distant attackers, RPG teams, and any buildings 

the enemy used for cover.55

At one point his M4 carbine malfunctioned, so 

Cremin switched to his AK-47. Cremin caught a white 

flash out of the corner of his eye and a 7.62mm round 

penetrated his backpack directly in front of him. It was 

only then that Cremin had the stark realization that the 

enemy was trying to kill him, which seemed surreal up 

to that point. While still in contact, Cremin did his best 

to encourage the convoy to move to the designated 

reconsolidation point. After what seemed like an 

eternity, his HET finally began to move.56

By then the .50 cal gunners on the M1 Abrams 

and M88s were tearing up the buildings with heavy 

suppressive fire. Tango One, lead HET, said he was at an 

intersection and did not know which way to turn. Moore 

radioed for one of the Apache elements to come back 

and lead them out of there. Moore could hear gunfire 

everywhere and every driver throughout the convoy 

radioed him they under attack. He realized this was 

a very large kill zone.57

Ten to 15 minutes after they had departed, the 

scouts returned with a new route and Moore’s serial 

began to roll out of town.58 Apache scouts made a 

right-hand turn and the lead serial traveled about 50 

yards where it came upon a low overpass that fully 

loaded HETs could not drive under, so it stopped again. 

Moore could hear and see the battle raging the full 

length of the convoy. The situation was turning into a 

nightmare as there seemed no way out of the city. The 

scouts then found another alley that led back to the 

main road. Moore’s serial then turned right and drove 

down a very narrow alley paralleling the bridge. This 

brought them out onto a four-lane road and they could 

finally see their way out of town. With Apache back in the 

lead, Tango One made a U -turn and headed out of town 

across the bridge. Moore looked ahead for any possible 

signs of another ambush. The convoy passed through 

an Iraqi checkpoint in the road and there was a clearing 

with just a few houses about 1200 meters off both sides 

of the road. Moore told Apache to stop and set up a 

perimeter. He then ordered the lead trucks to turn and 

form the box formation blocking both lanes of traffic 

so no one could get near the convoy.59

As Moore approached the bridge, he made the 

U-turn and heard his maintenance element, Wrench 

One, radio it had separated from Moore’s convoy and 

did not know which way to go. Moore told him to stay 

in place and describe what he saw around him. Moore 

recognized his maintenance element was halted at the 

last traffic circle. The maintenance element was the 

rear of his march serial, which meant the 2123rd and 

the 1452nd serials were also stopped in the city. Moore 

knew stopping a convoy in the kill zone violated their 

doctrine and training. He could also tell that everyone 

was very excited and feared if they started to drive in 

different directions he would not be able to get them out 

of the city alive. So he positioned his truck on top of the 

elevated bridge hoping the HET drivers, when they came 

out of the alley, would see it. He informed them over the 

radio his truck was sitting on the bridge and he was not 

going to leave until everyone could see it.60
100 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

While his march serial continued to pass him toward 

the box, Moore could hear the battle raging in the 

alleyways of the city and hear on the radio the coordination 

and movement of his four gun trucks. Those gun trucks 

repeatedly drove back and forth laying suppressive fire 

until all his vehicles had cleared what appeared to be 

three kill zones. It was frustrating to sit on top of the bridge 

listening to his men screaming they had to move while still 

receiving fire from the front to the rear. Feeling the lead 

element was safely out of the city, Moore called his Apache 

element to go back into the firefight to help get the rest of 

the convoy back together so they could move. Moore heard 

Wrench One radio Wrench Three to make that right turn 

because he could see the tail end of the convoy. Moore 

then felt as if he had everyone going in the right direction 

and they could move out.61 

Inside the city, the convoy was still taking fire from 

both sides of the road. Each tank’s crewmen poured 

massive amounts of fire into the buildings with their crew 

serve weapons. Some of them fired their main guns into 

the buildings knocking out personnel firing RPG’s. No 

matter how much fire was coming into the buildings, 

the insurgents kept firing. 

Second Serial

When CPT Moore’s serial made the right turn onto 

the highway heading west, 1LT Cremin noticed that 

there were no other HETs behind his.62 In a convoy 

with few radios and maps, the hail of enemy gunfire 

just added to the confusion about the route. Several 

HET elements accidentally split off and drifted around 

the city. The scouts drove back into the kill zone to round 

up these vehicles and attempt to keep the HETs moving 

toward safety. The HETs for various reasons repeatedly 

stopped, allowing the enemy to relocate and 

concentrate their firepower.63

The 2123rd had not turned down the same route 

as the 1175th. When the convoy commander, 1LT 

Henderson, Saber 25, saw the 1175th’s vehicles moving 

over the bridge he ordered his serial to follow. As the 

2123rd drove down the street, the serial came under 

intense enemy fire. At that point Henderson was shot 

in the thigh severing his femoral artery. His crew did not 

realize the extent of his injury at the time. Henderson 

continued to drive his HMMWV leading his serial down 

the street, eventually drifting into consciousness and 

lost control of the vehicle, which came to a stop at the 

end of the street. At that time SSG Grimes called for an 

immediate medevac. Meanwhile, the enemy fired small 

arms and rocket propelled grenades at the passing 

convoy from prepared positions within alleys along the 

road. Tiring of the delays, the crews fired up their tanks, 

broke the chains, backed off the trailers and turned 

this into a tank battle.64

Cremin made a guidons’ call to all his Aggressor 

tanks to gain situational awareness and determine 

where his platoons were. Aggressor Blue Three, SSG 

Americana Mulitauopele, told him that part of the convoy 

with the rest of his platoon had taken a wrong turn at 

the traffic circle and was traveling away from the main 

body. Realizing the mistake, Aggressor Blue One, 

1LT Joe Rhyne, had to get his HET driver to turn around. 

Without any communication with the truck, he crawled 

out of the safety of his tank’s turret onto the back of the 

HET to bang on the window of the cab. Once he gained 

the driver’s attention, Rhyne directed him to turn around 

and head back to the traffic circle.65

Simultaneously, the HET carrying Aggressor White 

Two became disabled just south of the engagement 

area. The crew dismounted and joined another vehicle. 

The truck was then struck by two rocket propelled 

grenades destroying it.66 The 2123rd serial continued 

down the street and the M1114 gun truck that had 

been following behind the disabled HET continued past 

it while engaging enemy in the alleys and on the 

rooftops. About 100 meters down the road, the crew 

realized the convoy had stopped behind the disable HET, 

M1 Abrams tank of the 2-37th Armor in the streets of Iraq. 

Photo courtesy of SFC David Neuzil
Operation Iraqi Freedom 101

so they turned their gun truck around and drove back to 

provide cover.67 Aggressor White Two, SSG Kevin Morton, 

refusing to allow his tank to fall into enemy hands, ordered 

his gunner into the driver’s compartment, and together 

they broke the tank free of its tie-down chains, drove 

the tank off of the trailer, and fell back into the convoy.68

As the lead HETs continued to move south towards 

the consolidation point, a traffic jam formed at the traffic 

circle because the drivers were confused as to which 

street to take. Still under constant small arms fire, the 

HET convoy halted to sort out the traffic jam. Realizing 

the extreme danger of the situation, Cremin ordered 

his driver to break the tie-down chains on his HET and 

back his tank off the trailer and get into the fight. Cremin 

then radioed his company and stated he needed the 

first three tanks that could provide him with full tank 

crews. Aggressor Red Four, SSG Antonio Costa, 

immediately volunteered his platoon; Aggressor Red 

Two, SSG Ronny Coleman; and Aggressor Red Three, 

SSG Jeff Yager, formed his counter-attack force to 

rescue the stranded HETs.69

A total of 13 tanks dismounted to assist the HET 

movement.70 The serial continued over the bridge under 

fire and linked up with M1s from the 1175th. The M1s 

laid down suppressive fire with crew served weapons

and cannons to lead the rest of convoy to the 1175th’s 

perimeter.71 SSG Martin’s HET had stopped at the bridge 

waiting to move forward when a HMMWV raced past him 

screaming for a medic. He engaged targets of opportunity for 

the next four to five minutes while waiting to move, switching 

from his main gun to .50 since he did not have a gunner.72

Rally Point

As SSG Grimes, Saber 25, pulled into the rally point with 

his seriously wounded platoon leader, he pleaded on the 

radio for Moore to send help back into the city because 

the rest of his 2123rd was still in the kill zone. Moore 

immediately exited his vehicle and motioned for the front 

tanks to dismount. The executive officer, Battle Five, 

was riding in the tank on Moore’s HET. Moore told him 

to send some tanks back into the city to get everyone 

out of there. Some tanks took the time to disconnect the 

chains on their tanks while others just pushed the gas 

pedal, breaking the chains as they drove down the ramps 

heading into the city. Every tank crew climbed 

out on their tank wanting to go back to the fight. Martin’s 

tank had just arrived at the rally point and offered to 

remain to pull security since all the other tanks had 

charged back into the city.73

Moore then radioed he wanted a casualty collection 

point set up at the front of the box formation. Warrior 

Two had finally contacted the medevac, and it was 

enroute. Saber 25 informed Moore that he was then in 

charge of the 2123rd element and asked very calmly 

what Moore needed him to do. The CPT told him to 

park his vehicle next to his and keep him updated as 

to where his personnel were. At that moment, Moore 

had operational control over both HET companies. 

Moore asked the Apache elements to keep trying to 

get air support in there as well as a quick reaction force 

deployed to their location since they were still taking fire. 

Moore also told Apache Two, SSG Vancleve, to look for 

the route out of there because as soon as the casualties 

were lifted out Moore wanted to leave.74

Cremin’s Counterattack

Meanwhile, Cremin, in control of the Aggressor Red 

platoon returned to the traffic circle to find the convoy at 

a standstill. Vehicles were bumper to bumper, all looking 

for guidance from anyone who could direct them out of 

this kill zone. Cremin drove his tank over the curbs and 

around the HETs to head to the bridge on the northern 

side of the circle. Aggressor Red Four and Aggressor Red 

Two went through the center of the traffic circle to reach 

the bridge. It was there that Red Two’s tank ran into soft 

ground and immediately became mired. Not wanting to 

leave him alone, Cremin ordered Aggressor Red Three 

to remain with Red Two and provide security while they 

assessed the situation and attempted to self-recover.75

Cremin then had to choose between defending 

in place and continuing the counter-attack with only 

a tank section. With little time for consideration, he 

pushed his tank forward over the bridge and back into 

the initial kill zone with Red Four, SGT Ellertson. As soon 

as the two tanks crested the bridge, Cremin saw the 

disabled HET swarming with jubilant Iraqis who were 

quickly surprised to see two tanks heading their way. The 

tanks immediately began to receive heavy small arms 

fire again as the enemy scattered to more concealed 

positions. After confirming all personnel to their direct 

front were enemy, the tanks engaged with coax and 

.50 caliber machinegun fire. The number of enemy was 
102 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

astounding, estimated at well over one hundred, and 

their volume of fire was increasing as the tanks moved 

forward. Once Cremin’s tank had cleared the bridge, the 

enemy began to displace down the main street to the 

east, using the buildings and alleyways as cover. An RPG 

fired from a near alley grazed of the front slope of his 

tank. Cremin spotted the enemy sighting in another RPG 

and immediately opened fire with his AK-47. Only after 

eliminating this threat did he realize the enemy was just 

three boys, maybe ten or twelve years old.76

The two tanks continued to maneuver to the same 

intersection where the convoy took the initial brunt of 

the ambush. Cremin’s tank turned right heading east 

and Red Four took up a position behind his facing north. 

Cremin instantly identified several attackers with AK-47s 

still on rooftops and hiding in alleys to his direct front. He 

could also see a large number of insurgents around the 

building about 400 meters down on the northern side of 

the street, but his tanks had to focus on the threat within 

their immediate vicinity. Cremin fired his .50 cal onto the 

rooftops while Red Four was busy clearing the enemy on 

the street to the north, protecting Cremin’s blind flank. 

Fortunately, the enemy was unable to coordinate their 

attacks or concentrate their fires towards the tanks.77

The building 400 meters away was buzzing with 

enemy activity. Cremin saw two bright flashes of light 

as two RPGs flew high over his tank and exploded 

about 100 meters behind him. SGT Ellertson identified 

the Iraqi’s location and instantly fired a 120mm MultiPurpose Anti-Tank (MPAT) round into the building, 

eliminating that RPG threat. Another volley of RPGs 

streaked toward their location, impacting low and to 

the left of Cremin’s tank. After some creative loading, 

Ellertson eliminated that RPG team with another 

120mm MPAT round neutralizing that threat and 

demonstrating the crew’s willingness to use all available 

combat firepower, quickly destroying any arrogance on 

the enemy’s part and any attempt at organization. At that 

point, any remaining attackers fled the immediate vicinity 

down the alleys and side streets. Fearing a possible 

flanking attack, Cremin ordered Red Four back to the 

traffic circle to provide security for the HET drivers 

while they continued to work their way out of the traffic 

jam and while Aggressor Red Two tank continued to 

recover itself from the soft soil. Aggressor White 

Three, Aggressor White Two, and Battle Cat White 

One arrived from the rally point and joined the fight 

providing returning fire against the small arms fire 

coming from rooftops and from the roads leading 

off of the traffic circle.78

Cremin pulled back from the main streets, took up a 

position near the disabled HET and requested guidance 

through Crusader Blue Four about what to do with it and 

Warrior Five’s intent. While awaiting the order to either 

recover or destroy the HET, another RPG slammed into 

the driver’s side door of the HET causing it to burst into 

flames. That seemed to be a rallying cry as the enemy 

armed with small arms swarmed back out into the 

streets. Cremin’s crew-served weapons engaged the 

insurgents as they attempted to maneuver against his 

tank through the alleys and around parked vehicles. 

Their chaotic and uncoordinated attack made it easier 

for Cremin’s crew to identify and eliminate each threat 

as it appeared. All the while, he continued to monitor 

both the battalion and company nets to determine 

the disposition of the convoy.79

Rally Point

Meanwhile as dusk arrived at the rally point around 

1900 hours, the truck drivers could still hear Cremin’s 

fierce firefight in the city. Realizing they were going to 

remain in the box formation for a long while, CPT Moore 

instructed his NCOs to tell everyone to pull out their night 

vision goggles and scan the perimeter. SGT Carlson, the 

medics and other soldiers were trying to keep pressure 

on the wounds of the three casualties. 1LT Henderson 

and PFC Clayton W. Henson, Apache White, both shot 

If the .50 caliber machine gun atop the turret could not 

defeat the threat then the 120mm main gun could. 

Photo courtesy of SFC David Neuzil
Operation Iraqi Freedom 103

in the femoral artery and SGT Hartman was wounded 

in the abdomen. Henderson’s condition was rapidly 

deteriorating. As a Registered Respiratory Therapist, 

CPT Moore could see the lieutenant was crashing fast 

and soon would need an artificial airway to survive. 

Moore grabbed Gun Smoke One, SSG Cross, and told 

him to take his place on the radio. Moore then grabbed 

his oxygen and medic bag and ran to Henderson. 

Henderson was still struggling to get up but just barely 

conscious. Moore leaned down and told him who he 

was and what he was going to do. If Moore could get the 

airway in and give him oxygen, it would help to ensure the 

lieutenant would not have brain damage and also help 

protect his lungs should he aspirate. On the other hand, 

if Moore tried to place the tube in his airway and he did 

regurgitate before the tube was in place, his lungs would 

be filled with the vomit causing him more harm. Moore 

prepared his equipment and decided to quickly try one 

time. He opened Henderson’s mouth and placed the 

larynga scope into the back of his throat. Moore could 

see where the tube needed to be but his vocal cords kept 

collapsing on the tube. Henderson then started to gag 

and Moore realized he needed to stop so as not to cause 

further harm. Moore said he was sorry and to hang in 

there because the chopper was enroute. Minutes later 

Moore saw the soldiers performing CPR on Henderson.80

CPT Moore ran back to his truck for an update on the 

situation. Apache Two told him a Spanish quick reaction 

force was coming from the south and should arrive 

anytime. Moore then radioed the rear of the box warning 

them know not to shoot the quick reaction force as they 

should arrive there soon. Warrior Two was talking to the 

medevac, call sign Medicine Man 23. Moore was still 

receiving reports more HETs were still joining the rear 

of the formation. Battle Five told him there was a 

disabled HET left in town and wanted to know what 

he wanted the tankers to do with it. Moore ordered it 

destroyed as it was not worth the risk of recovering.81

Rescue

As darkness fell, about three hours after the initial 

ambush, Cremin’s tank had secured the bridge leading 

out of the city. This allowed the HETs to finally work their 

way to the HET consolidation point and out of harm’s 

way. His primary concern was local security for Aggressor 

Red Two while he worked to free his tank from the soft 

soil. Cremin noticed a second bridge to the east, about 

400 meters away, and still concerned about a flanking 

maneuver, ordered Aggressor Red Three and Aggressor 

Red Four to secure that bridge. After realizing that selfrecovery would not work, Aggressor White Three was 

sent back to the HET consolidation point to retrieve the 

M88 recovery vehicle.82

At this point, Battle Cat White One and a second 

Battle Cat tank assumed the security mission for 

Aggressor Red Two. On Aggressor White Three’s return, 

Battle Cat White One pushed north towards the bridge 

and provided rear security for Cremin’s tank while he still 

engaged a number of insurgents and cars that would try 

to attempt drive-by shootings. Since these engagements 

were no more than 500 meters away, they were able 

to destroy these threats immediately. Evidently, the 

enemy did not understand the capabilities of the thermal 

and night vision devices, because once the sun set, a 

large number of Iraqis attempted to walk freely out in 

the streets to reposition on his tank or to retrieve the 

dead and their equipment. The thermal sights enabled 

Cremin’s tank to quickly and easily identify combatant 

from non-combatant and engage.83

For a few minutes the city went quiet, providing 

them with the hope this engagement would soon come 

to an end. However, two RPGs were fired from behind 

some buildings to the northeast in an attempt to use 

them as indirect fire, but they were very inaccurate and 

detonated harmlessly away from the vehicles. These 

RPGs, however, did start a new wave of small arms fire, 

as Iraqis tried to engage from across the first bridge. 

Aided by the cover of night, these attackers could not 

accurately identify the location of the tanks so their 

fire was very imprecise and wild, but the muzzle flash 

betrayed their locations. The thermal night vision 

enabled the tanks to place overwhelming and accurate 

firepower to neutralize these threats.84

Finally Cremin received the call from Aggressor 

Red Two that his mired tank was operational and they 

were ready to move to the rally point. Cremin ordered 

Aggressor Red Two, Aggressor Red Three, Aggressor 

White Two and Aggressor White Three to escort the 

M88 recovery vehicle back to the consolidation point 

while his tank and Aggressor Red Four provided cover. 

Once the recovery team moved, Aggressor Red Four 

and Cremin’s tank similarly fell back to the consolidation 
104 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

point covering the withdrawal. As they made their way 

around the traffic circle, Cremin’s driver crossed the 

road to provide rear security for Aggressor Red Four and 

in doing so became mired in the soft ground. Cremin 

immediately notified Aggressor Red Four to stop while he 

appraised the situation. He then called the M88 back to 

recover his tank. Red Three returned with White Two and 

White Three to aid in local security. Within five minutes, 

the M88 had successfully pulled Cremin’s tank out 

and they returned to the consolidation point at 

approximately 2230 hours.85

Rally Point

SFC Handy, call sign Scooby Doo, then came forward and 

said he was now in charge of the 2123rd. Moore told 

him just to remain nearby. Moore then told Gun Smoke 

One to get his landing zone kit and prepare to receive 

the medevac helicopter. There were houses on both 

sides of the roads but the soldiers did not see very many 

people stirring about the area. They marked the landing 

zone with chemical lights placed on a side road in front 

of Moore’s truck. As the medevac helicopter descended, 

it came under fire from the houses to Moore’s right. All 

the soldiers on the right flank fired into the houses but 

the helicopter still flew off. Medicine Man 23 radioed he 

had to leave, but suggested they move the landing zone 

further down the road. Apache One and Two drove about 

one mile down the road and located a safer landing 

zone. Moore instructed everyone to mount up in their 

vehicles because they had to move down the road. They 

placed the casualties on an empty HET trailer and then 

Moore gave the order to move out. They traveled about 

one mile where they formed another box formation and 

Warrior Two called the medevac back in. Gun Smoke 

One again laid out another landing zone to the front 

of the formation. To everyone’s surprise the helicopter 

quickly flew in and landed at the first landing zone. More 

radioed for Gun Smoke Three to run out and tell the pilot 

they needed him to fly to the front of the new formation. 

Within three to four minutes the helicopter had relocated 

to the correct landing zone. They lost no time loading the 

casualties and then the medevac helicopter flew away.86 

At the rally point, Cremin learned three soldiers 

had been killed and medevaced to a Spanish camp 

a few miles away.87 The only thing preventing them 

from departing was getting complete accountability 

of all personnel and the dismounted tanks. Someone 

reported to CPT Moore they had more than 60 HETs in 

the formation. It was then Moore realized the 1452nd 

had followed the 2123rd through the kill zone. Moore 

radioed for someone in the rear to find out who was in 

charge of that march unit and have them contact him 

on his radio frequency. Moore, Apache One and Two 

then made a quick assessment as to what they had to 

do to depart. Moore told the leaders of all the units to 

update him on the status of their personnel, equipment, 

and ammunition. The tank commander said he had to 

download an M88 to go back to the rear to recover a 

disabled M1. The time was around 2100 hours.88

Moore and his scouts pulled out their maps to 

find a route to the nearest coalition base. SSG Grimes 

informed Moore he had a soldier that had flown out 

with the medevac at a coalition base near their location. 

Moore told him to find the grid coordinates. Apache 

Two had also located a base near Hilla to the north, 

but it was a hot spot and dangerous. Grimes finally gave 

them the coordinates, which they plotted on the map. 

The base was to their rear but would force the convoy 

to drive back through the edge of the kill zone. There 

was no way Moore would ask his soldiers to go through 

that again. Their only other option was to continue on 

to the original destination, Camp Duke near Najaf, 120 

kilometers away. Apache Two plotted a route and briefed 

it to Moore who approved it. The drive would take four 

to five hours and they would arrive at Duke early in 

the morning hours.89

From the map reconnaissance, the convoy had to 

drive through just one city; so Moore told Apache Two 

he wanted air support when driving through that city 

and also wanted FOB Duke to have a quick reaction 

force on alert in case of another ambush. All tanks 

with enough fuel would escort the HETs for security. 

Moore wanted pairs of M1 Abrams in the front, middle 

and rear of the convoy in case of any trouble. He then 

briefed the leaders on the route and the support they 

would have. Moore knew his drivers were mentally and 

physically drained by then and knew the leaders had to 

convince their soldiers they would be safe so they could 

concentrate on driving. The units reported back over the 

radio they had everyone accounted for. That was the first 

sigh of relief Moore had since escaping the kill zone. He 

had feared some soldier was left back in the city and the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 105

enemy would mutilate the body as they had done with 

four Blackwater security guards on 31 March.90

As 2300 hours approached, Moore walked around 

checking the physical and mental status of his troops. 

Some were praying while others asked when they 

were leaving. The captain told everyone he met they 

were continuing their mission to the drop point. Moore 

described the route and the support, ensuring they would 

not be attacked again. He asked several drivers if they 

were up to completing the mission and surprisingly not 

one professed needing any help driving. It was hard to 

ask them to keep driving on after they had survived a 

fire fight that lasted over an hour and a half and been 

in a defensive position for over three hours. They would 

have to drive another four to five hours, which would 

keep them awake for over 24 hours.91

Around 2315 hours, the M88 was loaded and all 

vehicles were either ready to move or being towed. The 

HETs had plenty of fuel to make the trip and all light 

wheeled vehicles had added ten gallons of fuel to ensure 

they could complete the journey. The skillful mechanics 

of the 1175th and 2123rd had performed temporary 

repairs on all vehicles in the convoy, which then included 

over 70 vehicles. If not for their quick work and extensive 

knowledge of the HET systems, the convoy would have 

had to wait longer, putting it at even greater risk of 

another attack. With everyone ready, Moore sent word 

for every element to monitor his frequency throughout 

the convoy. Moore then asked for one last status check 

to verify everyone was ready to roll, and the reply came 

back, “Apache element ready,” “Battle Five ready,” 

“Warrior Two ready,” “Scooby Doo ready,” and “1452nd 

(T-Dog One) ready.” Moore assigned Scooby Doo to bring 

up the rear and keep him abreast of any problems back 

there. The convoy finally pulled out along the planned 

route and all along the route they saw men carrying flags 

along the side of the road. Moore was sure everyone 

in his convoy kept a bead on every Iraqi they passed 

because their main concern was survival.92

The radio remained quiet; causing Moore to fear 

his drivers might drift off to sleep. He tried to maintain 

a check on personnel by talking with everyone he knew 

that had a radio in the entire convoy. There was a Ranger 

One, Viper, and several Tango elements of his unit that 

would check on each other to help stay awake. Everyone 

was pulling together to help each other make it through 

this mission. As the convoy drove into the city, Moore 

could hear the air support overhead just as the Apache 

element had requested. That was the last choke point 

causing Moore to finally feel safe. The convoy made one 

last turn heading north with only about 45 miles to go. 

Battle Five called him on the net; some of the tanks were 

down to 1/8th of a tank of fuel and needed to be loaded 

up on the HETs for the rest of the journey. The convoy 

halted and Moore instructed Warrior Two and Scooby 

Doo to supervise the loading. About 30 minutes later, 

the convoy was again ready to move. Moore pleaded 

over the net for everyone to hang in there that they 

were near their destination.93

Finally around 0430 hours, the convoy made 

a left turn and rolled into FOB Duke. Elements from

each company met the convoy and directed their 

vehicles into the FOB. The sand was of fine powder 

and several of the HETs became stuck. They downloaded 

the tracked vehicles and Cremin immediately found his 

commander, CPT Maynulet, briefed him while the rest 

of the company refueled and then prepared for follow 

on combat missions.94

Moore held one more formation to ensure he 

accounted for all of his personnel. He then thanked 

them for the job they had done over the last 24 hours 

and had them bed down for six hours. Scooby Doo had 

done the same for his troops. Ranger One, Saber 25, 

Scooby Doo and Moore sat around discussing the last 

24 hours and then started planning for the next day. 

They came to the conclusion; this group would stay 

together and would always be one family and share 

this bond they had developed due to the unfortunate 

circumstances they had encountered. The sun was 

starting to rise when CPT Moore finally laid his head 

down on his cot.95

Lesson

From appearances, the enemy had executed a 

deliberately planned but hastily executed ambush, 

similar to those that caught the Dalton Gang in 

Coffeeville, Kansas and the James-Younger Gang in 

Northfield, Minnesota. Members of the militia or any 

local who wanted to participate were assigned a place 

to fight only to wait for the prearranged signal, in this 

case green flares. Upon seeing the signal, the fight 

began sporadically indicating its hasty execution 
106 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

and grew in intensity. 

The first key decision for the convoy was whether to 

wait for the Iraqis to clear the roadblock or take a detour 

through the city. Neither was a good idea. Waiting could 

just as likely have invited a hasty ambush, but waiting 

outside town possibly allowed more maneuver room. The 

question was whether that traffic jam was deliberate or 

the result of an accident. A road block can be used to 

channel a convoy into a deliberately prepared kill zone. 

Some truck companies after Easter weekend added 

large pushing bumpers to their 5 -ton trucks and put 

them out front to push right through any road blocks. 

The rules of engagement did not change after the 

April Uprising but as LTC Akin said, “the interpretation of 

them did.” Where before, drivers were more sensitive to 

civilian traffic, this changed. Civilian traffic was no longer 

tolerated in or near US convoys. Lead trucks would bump 

cars off the road to get them out of the way and rear 

gun trucks would not hesitate to put a round through the 

engine block of any car that would not keep its distance. 

The Iraqis quickly learned the rules and pulled off to the 

side of the road and halted when a convoy approached. 

The urgency to get Task Force Duke into action out 

west left not enough time to properly prepare the move 

as a combat operation. All the participants found plenty 

of areas for improvement. At this time of the war, radios 

for trucks were in short supply and no single net was 

established for command and control. But when the 

ambush began down the narrow streets of Ad Diwaniyah, 

the fight was at crew and team level. NCOs and officers 

stepped up and established common communication, 

which ensured everyone cleared the kill zone and 

made it to the safety of the rally point.

The HET drivers were provided with copies of a 

hasty route sketch from Al Kut to An Najaf, not a detailed 

military map, or later computer maps, which revealed 

the streets of Ad Diwaniyah. With one, the trucks might 

have done a better job negotiating their way out of 

Ad Diwaniyah and going around choke points. Mobile 

Tracking System also provided onscreen map display 

of the surrounding area. Once trucks received more of 

those, they could navigate through congested areas or 

around road blocks better. But in this case, once the 

HETs had committed to driving down the streets of Ad 

Diwaniyah, they had no other choice but to follow the 

truck in front of them regardless of the danger. 

The Al Sadr Uprising of April 2004 taught the lesson 

that convoys should not exceed 30 vehicles yet units 

arriving the next year would violate that policy and learn 

this same lesson the hard way. This convoy was divided 

into smaller march serials, but bunched up when they 

ran into a choke point. When the convoy turned into 

Ad Diwaniyah, three march serials had combined into 

a super convoy of 70 vehicles significantly complicating 

command and control. The advantage, however, 

was the combined firepower. 

A centralized command and a separate command 

and control net are crucial to success on the battlefield, 

but this convoy had elements from eight separate 

companies and all operating on different frequencies, 

some even in plain text or on citizen band radios. When 

contact was made, there was no unity of command 

and elements began to defend themselves according 

to their individual leaders’ guidance. CPT Moore was on 

his citizen band or plain text radio talking to the HETs 

and Apache White, while 1LT Cremin was operating off 

of FM 102, Battlecat on FM 202, Crusader on FM 302 

and Headhunter on either FM 650 or 651. To facilitate 

the transfer of information, there needs to be one 

commander and one command net to which leaders 

from all companies monitor. Once established, net 

discipline must be enforced to keep this command 

net clear and for companies to then operate on 

internal nets.96

During this four hour fight, there were incredible 

acts of heroism by the drivers of three HET companies, 

and the troopers of Aggressor, Battlecat, Crusader, 

Head Hunter and Apache White elements. In spite of the 

things that went wrong, the training of the soldiers who 

had never worked together before caused them to pull 

together and do the right thing under the most extreme 

circumstances. Consequently, the officers had nothing 

but praise for their soldiers and especially their NCOs. 

1LT Cremin received the Silver Star Medal for his action, 

and SGT Ellertson and SSG Costa both earned Bronze 

Star Medals with “V” devices. 

The HET convoy accomplished its mission and 

delivered the tanks of the 2-37th Armor, which 

combined with the 2nd ACR took back An Najaf from 

Al Sadr’s followers in bitter fighting. But there is another 

way to look at this fight than getting from point to point. 

The mission of Task Force Dukes was to defeat Al Sadr’s 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 107

resistance and the fight was brought to their convoy. 

Since that was where the fight was, Cremin’s decision 

to go back into the kill zone took the fight to the enemy. 

This brings up the relationship between the maneuver 

forces and the convoys that support them. In the big 

picture of things, the battle space owner’s mission 

is to defeat the enemy and secure the area, if the 

enemy wants to ambush convoys, then the convoys 

provide the bait to draw the enemy out into a fight. 

In this type of war, anyone who ventures outside 

the wire is a combatant and should be a part of 

that combined arms team. 

There were no shortage of things that could have 

been done better in this convoy at all levels internal and 

external; but even when everyone does everything right, 

convoys still drive into kill zones and all that matters then 

is how the participants perform. None of the mistakes 

cited by any of the critics resulted in the death of the 

three soldiers out of 300 or the loss of the only HET. 

The enemy was waiting for a convoy and sooner or later 

one was going to drive through Ad Diwaniyah. On the 

other hand, the enemy made the biggest mistake of all 

– of all the convoys to ambush, they ambushed a HET 

convoy hauling main battle tanks with their crews. Every 

HET was in essence a gun truck. If the tank crew could 

not destroy the target with the .50 caliber machinegun, 

they had the 120mm main gun and were not afraid to 

use it. The key to success was overwhelming fire power. 

In the end, the insurgents of Ad Diwaniyah paid the 

highest price for their mistake.

Peterson reflected, “In the lens of if I got to do this 

again. I would have probably waited one more day prior to 

movement. Most of the issues would have been resolved, 

chiefly, I didn’t understand that I needed to take charge 

of the executing phase of the movement. I thought I was 

coordinating everything up to the move, not the move. 

That would have led to a lot better mission analysis 

when it came to maps, routing, communication, and 

actions on contact. The only solace I have is that I was 

able to execute most of my lessons learned successfully 

as the commander of C/2-12 CAV when I went back for 

my second tour. This whole operation was a textbook 

case on leadership, troop leading procedures, 

and how not to do it.97

MG Martin Dempsey, Commander of the 1st 

Armored Division, wrote, “A day after this fight, I received 

an email from CPT Thomas Moore, of the 1175th 

Transportation, who was the convoy commander. He 

wrote: ‘Were it not for the courage and actions under 

fire of the 2ACR and 2-37 soldiers that day, he is certain 

all of his men would have been killed.’ He asked me if he 

and his soldiers engaged in that fight with us could wear 

the 1AD combat patch. I told him I’d be honored.” 

Both the 1st Armored Division and 1st Cavalry 

Division commanders recognized the valor of truck 

drivers delivering critical supplies of ammunition and 

fuel as well as equipment during the Al Sadr April 

Uprising. Consequently, both authorized the truck units 

that supported them to wear their division patches 

as combat patches. This started a new tradition. 

Customarily, veterans waited until they returned 

home before sewing on the combat patch on their 

right shoulder, but with the recognition by these two 

tank divisions, the truck drivers sewed on the patches 

in theater, which inspired other units to do likewise. 

After the second rotation, units would then hold 

combat patch ceremonies after 30 days in country.

April Uprising Lessons

The Al Sadr Uprising had run its course by the end of 

April and subsided under the pressure of the Marines 

and Army attacks. The Marines pulled out of Fallujah on 

30 April and the Mahdi militia turned in their weapons 

for money. A lull followed as the insurgents reorganized 

and regrouped for their next offensive. When they 

resurfaced, they focused their attacks on civilian targets 

or the Iraqi military and police in an effort to disrupt 

the national election set for January 2005. The threat 

against convoys reduced to IEDs and small arms fire. 

On 15 May 2004, the Combined Joint Task Force 7 

(CJTF7) was redesignated as Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

(MNC - I), under the command of LTG Thomas F. Metz. 

MNC -I similarly made its plans to recapture Fallujah 

in the fall of that year.

The obvious lesson to the general officers in both 

Iraq and Kuwait was that the convoys needed gun trucks 

and a convoy security doctrine. BG James Chambers, 

Commander of the 13th Corps Support Command at 

Logistic Support Area Anaconda, established the policy 

that convoys traveling north of Convoy Support Center 

(CSC) Scania could not exceed 30 vehicles and had to 

have a one-to-five ratio of gun trucks to task vehicles. 
108 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Kuwait-based convoys could travel with a 1:10 gun truck 

to task vehicle ratio. The military truck companies would 

no longer provide shooters for the contract vehicles but 

would integrate one green (military) truck with every 

three white (contract) trucks for KBR convoys and one to 

five for Kuwait contract convoys. The 7th Transportation 

Battalion at Anaconda would redesignate certain 

truck companies as gun truck companies. The 372nd 

Transportation Group in Kuwait would receive the 125th 

MP Battalion to conduct convoy security but would also 

organize a provisional company from volunteers. CPT 

Robert Landry would recruit, organize and train the 

518th Combat Gun Truck Company. He only recruited 

one person by name though, 1LT James McCormick. 

He wanted McCormick to develop the company’s Tactical 

Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP). Based upon 

his recent experience and what McCormick had learned 

from the infantry manual, he came up with the turn, fix 

and fire concept. The following was his instructions to 

the gun truck crews for reaction to contact.

The first thing that must be remembered during 

any contact with the enemy is to maintain your 

composure and report the direction of contact. 

At the first sign of contact be it IED, RPG or small 

arms fire it is important to locate the source, this 

can be very difficult especially in a built up area 

where sound will echo off of buildings and in alleys. 

The first sign to look for its flashes and the next 

would be dust and sound, you will hear fire and your 

first reaction must be to SCAN, once the location 

is determined whoever has the information must 

send up the report. EXAMPLE: (This is Regulator 

2 CONTACT Right 200 Meters, Small Arms Fire, 

IED, Mortar Fire, RPG) The use of smoke and flares 

on the contact side in the direction of enemy fire 

is also effective in helping Gun Trucks to spot the 

enemy. The use of yellow smoke seems to have an 

intimidating effect on the enemy they seem to fear it 

and believe it may be a form of chemical agent “GET 

YELLOW SMOKE”. Flares seem to make the enemy 

nervous, at night I have seen some insurgents stop 

shooting to look up at the flare, make sure you 

shoot it at a slight angle toward the enemy fire. At 

this point vehicles in the convoy will proceed out of 

the kill zone even if they are not in the kill zone you 

MUST NOT STOP, push through the fire, do not allow 

your convoy to be split up or it will be a disaster. 

Return fire!! Effective, Aggressive fire on the enemy, 

the enemy you face here is much more aggressive 

than any we have seen they will only displace if you 

make them displace. Gun trucks must not be a shoot 

on the go element, gun trucks must turn and face 

the contact and deliver effective fire, soldiers in the 

vehicle must get out of the gun truck using the doors 

as cover and delivering suppressive fire. The gunner 

on the top is a target, gunners should not be sky 

lighting themselves and they must get down behind 

the gun at name tape level. In the event the gunner 

is hit the TC must get on the gun and continue 

the fight. Gun trucks must stay in the kill zone and 

not leave until after they have accounted for all 

trucks in the convoy. If you have a down vehicle gun 

trucks must maneuver into a defensive position to 

defend the down vehicle and make a decision to 

do recovery or extract driver and leave down truck 

behind, this decision is made by convoy commander 

if he is available. The destruction of abandoned 

US and coalition equipment has been suspended 

although the destruction of equipment is a long in 

use practice that has been written in doctrine for 

years, you must obtain permission to destroy and 

equipment you can’t take with you. Actions by convoy 

and gun trucks not engaged will be to move out of 

kill zone to move forward to a position that is varied 

between 2 to 5 miles remember that the enemy is 

very aware of the 2 mile rule and most times you 

will run into a secondary ambush or IED at that point 

so push beyond that point it is also important to 

remember the convoy can be up to 4 miles long so 

the last vehicle has the be out of that 2 mile range 

and not the first this has caused some convoys to 

have the first 10 trucks out of the line of fire but still 

have the rear of the convoy in the kill zone, the last 

truck should mark the mileage. The box formation 

is not a difficult maneuver but when you add civilian 

drivers in that convoy it can be a total disaster, make 

sure if you are using the BOX everyone is briefed 

and understands how to do it prior to moving out. 

Ambushes are varied and in most cases they are 

initiated at the 4th to 10th truck back this is done 

to help split convoy the divide and conquer theory.
Operation Iraqi Freedom 109

There was renewed emphasis on the design of 

“hillbilly” armor for trucks and gun trucks until the 

factory-built add-on-armor kits and M1114 up-armored 

HMMWVs arrived. Gun truck designs ranged from “sit 

and spin,” pedestal and ring mounted machineguns. 

There was great imagination in all designs. Some units 

used M998 and M1032 HMMWVs as gun trucks while 

others used M923 5-ton or M1083/1087 FMTV gun 

trucks. Many saw height as an advantage and like using 

M915s as gun trucks. The 233rd HET actually came up 

with a design for a HET gun truck that was not fielded 

until 2005.

1 CPT Erik Peterson email to Richard Killblane, June 9-July 6, 2009; 

and CPT Colin Cremin, “Ad-Diwaniyah, 17 April 2004,” draft report, n.d.

2 Cremin

3 Ibid

4 Cremin, “Ad-Diwaniyah;” and Peterson email, June 9, 2009.

5 766th Transportation Battalion, After Action Review – Attack in 

Ad Diwaniyah, 17 April 2004, 13 May 2004.

6 CPT Thomas J. Moore II, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah,” description of the 

battle emailed to Richard Killblane, June 11, 2009.

7 Peterson email.

8 Cremin, “Ad-Diwaniyah;” and Peterson email.

9 Peterson email.

10 Peterson email.

11 Peterson email.

12 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

13 Peterson email.

14 Cremin, “Ad-Diwaniyah.”

15 Ibid

16 Peterson email.

17 766th AAR.

18 Peterson email.

19 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

20 Peterson email.

21 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

22 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah;” and Peterson email.

23 766th AAR.

24 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah,” and Peterson email.

25 Moore remembered the convoy departed at 1230 hours and 

Cremin remembered 1300 hours.

26 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

27 766th AAR; Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah;” and Peterson email.

28 766th AAR.

29 Peterson email.

30 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

31 Peterson email.

32 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah;” and 766th AAR.

33 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

34 Cremin, “Ad-Diwaniyah.”

35 Peterson email.

36 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah;” and Peterson estimated that the 

drive to Ad Diwaniyah took about an hour, while Cremin believed the convoy 

arrived a little later closer to 1800. The 766th AAR also reported the convoy 

reached the town at 1715 hours. 

37 Peterson email; Cremin, “Ad-Diwaniyah;” Moore, “Ambush at 

Ad Diwaniyah;” and 766th AAR.

38 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah;” and 766th AAR.

39 Peterson email; and Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah;” and 766th AAR.

40 766th AAR.

41 Moore, “Ambush at Ad Diwaniyah.”

42 Ibid

43 766th AAR

44 Moore

45 Cremin

46 SSG Joshua Martin email to Richard Killblane, July 6, 2009.

47 Cremin

48 Peterson

49 766th AAR

50 Ibid

51 Moore

52 Ibid

53 Cremin

54 Ibid

55 Ibid

56 Ibid

57 766th AAR

58 766th AAR

59 Moore and 766th AAR

60 Moore

61 Ibid

62 Cremin

63 Peterson

64 766th AAR

65 Cremin

66 Cremin and 766th AAR.

67 2LT Michael Russo email to Robert Cameron, June 19, 2009.

68 Cremin

69 Ibid

70 Peterson

71 766th AAR

72 Martin email.

73 Moore and 766th AAR.

74 Moore

75 Cremin

76 Ibid

77 Ibid

78 Ibid

79 Ibid

80 Moore

81 Ibid

82 Cremin

83 Ibid

84 Ibid

85 Ibid

86 Moore

87 Cremin

88 Moore

89 Ibid

90 Ibid

91 Ibid

92 Ibid

93 Ibid

94 Cremin

95 Moore

96 Cremin

97 Peterson email, June 10, 2009
110 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

1018 Firefight, 18 October 2004

518th Combat Gun Truck Company, 

1487th Transportation Company

fter the Al Sadr April Uprising, the 13th Corps 

Support Command at Logistics Support Area 

Anaconda, Iraq required all Kuwait-based 

convoys to have a minimum of three gun trucks per 

convoy and no convoy to exceed 30 vehicles. The 372nd 

Transportation Group subsequently organized the 518th 

Combat Gun Truck Company in May from volunteers and 

some soldiers the companies just did not want. Born in 

battle, its gun truck crews, regardless of their motivation 

and level of discipline, had already been baptized under 

fire and wanted a chance to give something back to 

the enemy. The escort company was the brain-child 

of CPT Robert Landry, a battle captain on the 372nd 

staff who had already commanded both an infantry and 

transportation company. Landry specifically recruited 

1LT James McCormick to develop the tactical standard 

A

operating procedures (SOP) who instilled in the crews 

the “turn, fix and fire” doctrine. McCormick believed that 

gun trucks should be aggressive. Instead of continuing 

through the kill zone and returning fire, they should 

respond to enemy fire by going after the insurgents and 

shoving the fight back down their throats. He believed 

that by making the enemy pay a price for attempting to 

kill American drivers, they would seek other game. The 

company came together at Udari Range in May and was 

trained by Military Professionals Resources, Inc. (MPRI), 

a contract company of retired military personnel.

Since April until 18 October, the convoys of the 

372nd Transportation Group had only encountered 

small arms fire or improvised explosive devices (IED), 

no complex ambushes. Their response was always quick. 

The enemy would fire at a convoy, and then the nearest 

gun truck would quickly pull out of the convoy and head 

toward the enemy blazing away with its M2 .50 caliber 

machinegun. That was usually all it took to silence 

the insurgents. After each convoy, the crews would sit 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 111

around in an informal AAR and discuss what happened 

and what should have happened. McCormick, the 

originator of their tactical doctrine, was usually involved 

in these. Through this process, the crews trained their 

tactics. Because of their experience during the April 

Uprising, each knew how he or she would perform 

under fire. With the informal AARs, they knew 

what to do in the event of a complex ambush.

Early in the morning 

on 18 October 2004, three 

gun trucks of the 2nd 

Squad, 1st Platoon, 518th 

Combat Gun Truck Company 

escorted SSG Robert 

Mata’s Iraqi Express convoy 

from the 1487th Medium 

Truck Company from Scania 

to Anaconda. Eight military 

“green” trucks were evenly 

spaced between every three 

“white” commercial trucks 

for a total of 20 white trucks. 

The third green truck back 

in the convoy was hauling 

ammunition and safety 

requirements required it to have appropriate panel 

marking on the rear of the trailer. The 5-ton gun truck, 

Heavy Metal, with call sign Regulator One, led the convoy 

with Regulator Three 20 trucks back and Regulator 

Two in the rear. SGT John O. Williams was the driver 

and NCOIC of the 5-ton gun truck named Big O, call 

sign Regulator Three. SPC David Wallace was his radio 

operator and SPC Roger Bartz was his gunner. That 

5-ton gun truck could get up to 82 mph so it could 

race ahead from the middle of the convoy to block any 

traffic. The 518th kept the HMMWV gun trucks in the 

rear because they could 

accelerate faster. CPL 

Richard Swenson III was 

the commander and 

driver of Regulator Three, 

SPC David Gregory was 

his radio operation and 

SPC Steven Lourigan 

was the gunner. SFC 

Stephen “Steve” Mikes 

was the commander 

of Regulator Two, SGT 

Dale Harshbarger the 

driver and SPC Michael 

Robinson the gunner. 

SSG Mata positioned his 

command and control 

HMMWV, Whiskey 11, in the middle. He had an internal 

gun truck, Whiskey 133, out in lead of the convoy.1

SFC Mikes’ platoon of the 1486th Medium Truck 

SFC Steve Mikes’ escort crew of the 518th Combat Gun Truck Company. Photo courtesy of Steve Mikes

CPT Robert Landry and SGT Jon Henley standing next to a 

M998 HMMWV gun truck with turtle shell top and mount for 

M2 .50 caliber machinegun. The 518th painted a marshal’s 

star logo on their doors. Photo courtesy of Robert Landry
112 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Company had conducted convoy escort before and, 

upon their release from the mission in July, he and his 

gun truck crew joined the 518th Gun Truck Company. 

They had arrived too late to attend the training at Udari 

so they were not trained in the tactics developed by 

McCormick. They continued to use their own instead. 

By then, the insurgents had changed their tactics 

again. With experience, the Americans became much 

better at identifying IEDs. Once an IED was discovered, 

the instruction would go out over the Sheriff net or 

Mobile Tracing System (MTS) for all convoys to halt until 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel came 

up to detonate the IED. Knowing this, the insurgents 

decided to set up IEDs and wait for the EOD personnel 

to arrive, then kill them. Unfortunately, there was always 

some convoy that did not get the word to halt. 

As the 1487th convoy approached the turn 

onto Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Sword from Main 

Supply Route (MSR) Tampa around 0650 hours, Big O 

raced ahead and blocked traffic on the right side. In 

accordance with normal procedure, SFC Mikes called 

into Pegasus Romeo, the unit in charge of the area 

security and was informed the route was clear. After the 

convoy proceeded up ASR Sword, Whiskey 133 ran into 

a security element of the 1st Cavalry Division on route 

patrol, which had the road blocked off at an overpass. 

The MPs informed Whiskey 133 that an IED had been 

found on the overpass and the EOD element was 

inbound. Whiskey 133 radioed back to SSG Mata who 

stopped the convoy just short of the overpass. Likewise, 

Wallace in Regulator One radioed the information back 

to SFC Mikes. SSG Mata had the convoy wait in a linear 

formation. After talking with Mata on the radio, Mikes 

instructed his gun trucks to take up security positions 

for the convoy. Regulator One pulled to the right of the 

convoy for right security and started falling back to 

protect the ammunition trailer. The middle gun truck, 

Regulator Three, pulled out to the left and took up a 

screening position near a cross-over area in the median 

where the guard rails had been knocked down. There 

Swensen and Gregory dismounted. Regulator Two 

pulled rear security with Mikes and Harshbarger 

dismounting to direct civilian traffic down a 

side road to the right of the convoy.2

This section of ASR Sword was the enemy’s 

favorite place for convoy ambushes. Two story dwellings 

flanked both sides of the road with thick adobe walls 

to provide cover from enemy fire. Guard rails in the 

median separated the east and westbound lanes, but 

intermittently had rails removed for vehicles to cross 

over. Around 0655 hours, the HMMWV with the EOD 

personnel finally pulled up on the overpass. Suddenly 

the truck drivers heard an explosion. An RPG had hit 

the bridge. SFC Mikes and Harshbarger spun around 

towards the sound of the explosion in time to see the 

smoke trail of a second RPG streaking past the convoy 

toward the overpass. The RPGs were fired from outside 

a yellow two - story building near the end of the convoy 

on the left hand side. To everyones’ surprise the rockets 

had evidently intended to kill the arriving EOD personnel. 

An entire convoy was sitting in the open and the 

insurgents fired at the HMMWV on the overpass and the 

rockets exploded harmlessly on the bridge. This attack 

was immediately followed by small arms fire from the 

buildings across on the north side of the road.3

Immediately the crews mounted their gun trucks 

while the truck drivers returned fire. Regulator One 

drove back around the convoy and headed down left 

side of the convoy to the ammunition trailer. Swensen 

and Gregory had mounted Regulator Three and 

Swensen drove his gun truck across the median into 

the westbound lane then turned west. He did not know 

where the fire was coming from. He could see the drivers 

returning fire and made contact with SSG Croley who 

pointed in the direction of the fire. Swensen positioned 

his HMMWV between the enemy fire and the convoy 

using his gun truck as a shield. Lourigan began pouring 

“Big O” was a M923 5 -ton gun truck with a pushing 

bumper designed for busting through road blocks. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 113

.50 caliber fire into the enemy in the houses. Swensen 

then radioed Regulator Two to let the crew know 

where they were.4

Upon mounting Regulator Two, SPC Robinson, 

the gunner, yelled down to Harshbarger, “Let’s Go, 

Let’s Go, I got them, Let’s Go, I got them.” He spotted 

the insurgents about 400 meters to his front. Upon a 

positive identification of six to seven insurgents in front 

of the tan building while on the move, he opened fire with 

his .50 knocking one down and the rest retreated into 

the houses. Once in position in the middle of the convoy, 

he saw more muzzle flashes coming from the windows 

and doors of the tan house. While Robinson returned fire 

at the muzzle flashes, the rest of the crew dismounted 

and engaged the enemy. Robinson spotted one to two 

insurgents either hiding behind or trying to get into an 

orange and white car. He emptied the rest of his belt of 

ammunition into the car, nullifying that threat. The crew 

of Regulator Three saw Regulator Two driving up from the 

rear of the convoy and they automatically shifted their fire 

to the left. Robinson quickly switched to the SAW since 

the ammunition cans were down at his feet. So Williams 

drove Big O back to the rear of the convoy and fell in to 

cover an ammunition trailer. He removed the 

ammunition placard so the enemy would not 

know which trailer had ammunition.5

Within a minute after the fight began, a flight of 

Blackhawk gunships, OH - 58Ds and one F16 arrived 

overhead. The gun truck crews continued to engage the 

windows and doors of the buildings until the enemy fire 

ceased. The entire fight ended three to four minutes 

after it started. All the gun trucks had essentially pulled 

out onto the road between the enemy and the convoy 

to create a gun shield for the trucks, then returned fire. 

A sweep of the area provided several dead insurgents, 

numerous caches of bomb making materials, piles of 

weapons and ammunition.6

Lesson

This provided an example of the detailed planning and 

rehearsal of the ambush and inflexible execution. The 

enemy evidently did not know what to do when the 

convoy pulled up so they did what they had trained to do, 

fire at the overpass. This was a mistake the gun trucks 

took advantage of. The truck drivers turned gun truck 

crew members of the 518th had been waiting for 

Rear view of “Big O” showing the fabricated steel gun box for the M2 .50 caliber machinegun. It also had mounts for 

M249 SAWs on the fabricated door armor. Photo courtesy of the 518th 
114 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

a chance to give the enemy 

back a little of what they 

had received in April. Three 

gun truck crews had their 

chance and acted without 

hesitation. The drivers and 

gun truck crews performed 

almost exactly as they 

had trained. 

The enemy plan 

seemed to have been to 

ambush an EOD patrol by 

planting the IED out as 

bait and then wait for the 

EOD vehicles to arrive. By 

policy, once an IED was 

identified, all convoys on that route had to stop before 

reaching the site. In this case, the unexpected happened 

and a convoy pulled up to the overpass with the IED. 

The enemy had to choose between ambushing the 

convoy or following the plan.

The insurgents in Iraq operated very much like the 

insurgents did in Vietnam. They evidently operated in 

small cells of four to seven which did not allow them 

to conduct large scale collective training. They had to 

do everything in secret. Consequently, they conducted 

detailed planning and rehearsal of their ambushes but 

were inflexible in the execution. They could not change 

the plan and take advantage of the convoy that had 

halted in front of them. The advantage of an ambush 

is the element of surprise enables the ambushers to 

destroy targets with their 

opening volley. That was 

one reason the attackers 

initiated with the most 

lethal weapons first. After 

the opening rounds, then 

chaos reigns and the 

battle can go to either 

side. The enemy was 

probably counting on 

the fact that when an 

IED was spotted, convoys 

were usually stopped 

where they were. The 

enemy had not accounted 

for a convoy reaching the 

kill zone. The fact that the enemy was inflexible in the 

execution of their plan was their weakness.

The gun trucks of the 518th did exactly what they 

were supposed to do when halted. They pulled out and 

established a gun wall. They were alert and were in the 

perfect position to return fire when the enemy fired at 

the approaching HMMWV. Having lost the element of 

surprise, the fight went quickly to the side of the 

518th and it was a very one-sided fight. 

The members of this convoy held an after 

action review upon return to Navistar, and SFC Jody 

Cuthbertson, the first sergeant of the 518th Gun Truck, 

pointed out that the gun trucks were so eager to get 

into the fight, they rushed in rather than remain on the 

flanks. Crossing in front of the convoy prevented other 

drivers from engaging the enemy, and leaving the flank 

to enter the kill zone allowed the enemy an opening to 

escape. Had they remained on the flank, the range of 

their weapons would still have suppressed the enemy 

and they could have seen if any enemy tried to escape. 

Raven 42 would employ the flanking maneuver the next 

year in the Palm Sunday Ambush for the very reason 

Cuthbertson described. Cuthbertson attributed this to 

SFC Mikes’ crew not having attended the same training 

as the rest of the company at Udari.

The US Army tends to reward inefficiency when 

it comes to issuing out awards for valor. If everyone in 

the organization performs exactly the way they should 

then there is no opportunity for any one person to 

stand out. Only when things go wrong does the burden 

SFC Mikes’ convoy was stopped before this overpass on 

ASR Sword due to the discovery of an IED. 

Photo courtesy of Steve Mikes

Two-story house from which the RPGs were fired. 

Photo courtesy of Steve Mikes
Operation Iraqi Freedom 115

of success fall upon individuals. History will show that 

the most chaotic operations produce the most heroes. 

In this case, the 518th executed their reaction to ambush 

drill exactly as they were supposed to. Only SGT Williams 

earned the Bronze Star Medal with V device for using 

taking risk to protect the explosive cargo. The 18 October 

ambush, referred to by the participants as the 1018 

Firefight for the numerical date, provided an example 

of efficiency.

Top: View of kill zone from rear of the convoy. The smoke is rising from the two-story house. The HMMWV in the photo 

belonged to the MPs that responded to the ambush. Bottom: The gun trucks shot up this car parked next to the house 

from where the RPGs were fired. Photo courtesy of Steve Mikes

1 SGT John O. Williams interview by Richard Killblane, 8 March 2005; 

SFC Stephen Mikes’ sworn statement, 21 November 2004; and “Firefight 

1018,” Green Tab AARs, 106th Trans Bn.

2 “Firefight 1018,” Williams interview; Mikes sworn statement; SGT Austin 

John O Williams sworn statement, 22 November 2004; and CPL Richard 

David Swensen III sworn statement, 23 November 2004.

3 Mikes, Harshbarger, Swensen and Williams sworn statements.

4 Williams and Swensen sworn statements.

5 “Narrative for Award of the Bronze Star Medal with Valor to SPC Michael 

E. Robinson,” and Williams interview.

6 Williams interview.
116 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Firefight on ASR Heart, 30 January 2005

178 Route Security Element (RSE), Navistar

y November 2004, the replacement crews for 

the 518th Gun Truck Company had arrived 

and were going through their training at Udari 

Range. LTC James Sagen, Commander of the 106th 

Transportation Battalion, wanted the new crews to 

ride with the veteran crews as long as they could. They 

completed their left- seat rides on both Christmas and 

New Year’s Eve. By January 2005, a few of the 518th 

Gun Truck veterans remained at Camp Navistar.1

In Mid - December, 1LT James McCormick had visited 

Sagen in his office to say he could no longer work with CPT 

Thelonious McLean-Burrell, the new 518th Commander. 

McCormick wanted out of the 518th but not the battalion. 

He then asked Sagen if he had ever thought about having 

his own personal gun truck force, something that would 

support him and McCormick would not have to argue with 

the commander, like he did McLean- Burrell. McLeanBurrell had replaced CPT Robert Landry as the new 

commander of the 518th and brought a new command 

philosophy to the company that differed significantly from 

that of the previous commander. McCormick needed to 

leave and wanted to take the remaining 18 members of 

the original 518th before they returned to their parent 

companies. McCormick had already heard some of his 

former soldiers were not well received by their parent 

truck companies.2

Since October, there had been an increase in 

criminal activity just across the border, especially a 

hijacking on 15 October. Locals would lay unexploded 

ordinance (UXO) in the roads to stop the convoys or 

metal spikes to cause flats then hijack some of the 

trucks. Some kid could drag an old artillery shell from the 

previous war out into the road and the Movement Control 

Team (MCT) would shut the road down for hours to 

find out if it was a real threat or for Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal (EOD) to clear it. The Movement Control Team 

would not immediately get the word the road was cleared 

and meanwhile, convoys sat on the road vulnerable to 

attack waiting for clearance to drive. Too much valuable 

driving time was lost. LTC Sagen felt this was ridiculous 

and he needed his own set of eyes out on the road to 

determine if the debris in the road was a real threat 

and to eliminate it. The 518th had discovered large 

B

quantities of ammunition and received small arms fire 

within a mile of the border. McCormick believed the 

Iraqis were building up for something big. The road south 

of Convoy Support Center (CSC) Scania had always 

been considered relatively safe for traffic in comparison 

to the Sunni Triangle. The British had responsibility for 

the area but were spread thin. Their patrols came down 

to the midway point to Safwan. The Danish military 

patrolled Safwan but not aggressively so convoys were 

increasingly being fired on and hijacked just across the 

border. To assess the problem, LTC Sagen went out on 

that road with McCormick looking for an alternate route. 

At first, Sagen was impressed with the lieutenant’s 

intimate knowledge of the road networks throughout the 

town. Along the way, they saw RPGs stacked on the side 

of the road. Sagen anticipated that the insurgent threat 

was moving south. Since the Brits could not cover the 

entire area, he wanted his own route security patrols. 

Its mission would be to conduct day and night patrols 

on Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Circle-Heart and Main 

Supply Route (MSR) Tampa with the purpose of locating 

insurgents and protecting the flow of military traffic. LTC 

Sagen would place command and control of this element 

under his Operations Officer, MAJ James Brady. This was 

a perfect assignment for 1LT McCormick and the former 

518th members.3

Sagen realized that the 518th soldiers had been 

away from their parent companies too long and might 

not be welcomed back. Many of them had been discards 

of their companies in the first place. After everything 

they had been through in the 518th, this was no way 

to treat them. They were battle hardened, just the kind 

of soldiers he needed for this mission and McCormick 

was the ideal leader for them. Besides his knowledge of 

the area, the soldiers respected him. He was fearless 

and Sagen knew he could trust him to make the right 

decisions out there on his own. Sagen also knew that 

McCormick was an adrenaline junkie and it was not fair 

to make him to come off his addiction by going “cold 

turkey” and sending him back to his parent company. 

Sagen wanted to wean McCormick and his 518th 

soldiers slowly off adrenaline before they went home 

and this route security patrol was a good way to do it. It 

would get them back out on the road with great latitude 

but he did not expect much combat this far south. The 

coincidence of the release of the 518th veterans and the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 117

need for the route security worked out best 

for everyone.4

On 1 January, a white truck was hijacked on ASR 

Circle. The 1-178 FA escorting the convoy did not have 

enough assets to chase after the hijacked truck. MAJ 

Brady sent McCormick out to find the truck. Brady also 

informed McCormick it looked like they were going to 

create the gun truck platoon to secure the routes and 

added the lieutenant would be working directly for him. 

McCormick was elated for several reasons; he was getting 

away from McLean- Burrell and he was getting to take 

his guys back out on the road. They never recovered the 

hijacked truck, but found the driver on the side of the 

truck. McCormick felt they had lost too much time talking 

about it. McCormick ran some back roads and did receive 

some gun fire and saw a large explosion in the distance.5

Watching what happened to the 518th and his 

conflict with McLean - Burrell wore away at McCormick’s 

morale. The chance to get his guys back together and 

work directly for MAJ Brady and LTC Sagen brought new 

life to the lieutenant. There was one person he definitely 

wanted back on his team. SFC Jody “Cut” Cuthbertson, 

the acting first sergeant, had been shipped to Camp 

Arifjan but held no job for a couple of weeks. McCormick 

asked LTC Sagen for him and it just so happened they 

had yet not moved him to the Group headquarters. He 

actually was assigned to the 106th Battalion South 

Tactical Operations Center (TOC). It took McCormick two 

weeks to sneak him back to Navistar and assign him to 

the route security mission. They then worked the 518th 

and recovered all their soldiers they wanted except SPC 

Ford, of the 227th. His former leaders worked very hard 

to get him back but he remained the last whipping boy of 

the old 518th.6

So McCormick and Cuthbertson had a new 

challenge to stand up, equip and crew this specialized 

unit. Sagen placed the route security platoon under his 

Headquarters Detachment, commanded by CPT David 

Boland, who picked up all maintenance and logistical 

support functions for the newly formed unit. The platoon 

received four of the old 518th HMMWVs with add-onarmor kits for two patrols. Each gun truck crew was 

armed with a M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW). 

Each team had one M203 grenade launcher with 30 

rounds of ammunition. Each soldier carried double basic 

load – fourteen 30 -round magazines for their M16s, 

and 1,000 rounds for SAW. In addition, the vehicles 

carried smoke grenades, parachute flares, and flashbang grenades. Each crew member carried either a 

bayonet, hatchet or other large knife and many carried 

Iraqi pistols, which fired 9mm ammunition. They found 

the Iraqis feared a pistol pointed at them more than any 

other weapon. The HMMWVs had SINCGARS, citizen 

band radios, cell phones and commercial handheld 

radios. The mission began on 1 January 2005.7

Sagen had not cleared this with his higher 

command, the 7th Transportation Group. It was 

something needed to be done and he just did it. There 

was some tremendous risk in that since COL Jeffrey 

Miser was strict on procedures. At first Sagen named it 

SPC Joe Lane stands in front of his HMMWV. The 178 Route Security Element (RSE) used HMMWVs turned over from the 

518th Gun Truck Company. The 518th kept the M2 .50 caliber machineguns and the RSE mounted M249 SWAs on top 

instead. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
118 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the 106 Convoy Escort and Liaison Team (CELT). During 

the first two days of operation, the CELT found thousands 

of unexploded rounds and, due to these finds they 

developed a joint mission with British EOD. The British 

obviously did not like the name CELT and the 7th Group 

called down telling the 106th they would not have CELTs 

any more. So Sagen changed it to 106 Route Security 

Element (RSE). Over the next five days, the RSE and 

British security force traveled up and down the roads 

finding all kinds of ammunition and bombs for the EOD 

to come along and destroy. During this time the criminals 

and Anti - Iraqi Forces (AIF) started to run when the RSE 

came up on them. About mid -January, the RSE patrols 

drove up and surprised several Iraqis setting up ambushes 

at night, captured five Iraqis and scared the rest away.8

The 7th Group command and staff became upset 

when they heard Sagen had his own gun trucks out 

patrolling the roads. To Sagen’s surprise, 7th Group had 

no conflict with the mission just did not think it was the 

mission of the 106th. The 1st Battalion, 178th Field 

Artillery had responsibility for convoy security within the 

7th Transportation Group. So Sagen made a deal with 

its battalion commander to officially attach the RSE to 

the 1-178 FA and the changed its name to 178 Route 

Security Element so they could go out on missions, but 

unofficially it would still answer to Sagen. The 1-178 FA 

had authorization to patrol the area north of the border, 

but not enough assets to do it. Sagen’s solution worked 

for everyone including 7th Group. 7th Group just wanted 

everyone to stay in their lane. That was essentially 7th 

Group’s blessing on the operation. Unofficially, everyone 

in battalion referred to them as the RSE.9

On 23 January, two RSE HMMWVs were out on 

patrol looking for a hijacked truck when a red vehicle 

pulled up. Several Iraqis with weapons stepped out 

and fired at the RSE. CPL Bryan Noble and SPC Steve 

Lourigan shot two Iraqis. The RSE also thwarted six 

hijackings and chased down the hijackers who had 

stolen trucks and equipment. One of Iraqis they captured 

had a cell phone that kept ringing. The RSE had a 

Kuwaiti interpreter with them that day. He answered the 

call and the Iraqis on the other end asked if he had the 

truck. He said they did and told them to come and get it. 

The RSE detained them when they arrived. The RSE also 

found caches of weapons and detained over 48 Iraqis in 

less than a month. The RSE assisted convoys that had 

broken down, cleared the routes and maintained crowd 

control and stopped kids from throwing rocks. They also 

gave out food, water, clothes, footballs and soccer balls 

to the children in Safwan. It was McCormick’s hope to 

win the hearts and minds and inspire fear in the enemy. 

It proved exactly what Sagen had hoped for. However, 

7th Group saw it differently. After every incident with 

the capture of a hijacker or insurgents, the Group S3 

would call down and ask what the 106th Battalion was 

up to. They were a transportation battalion so why were 

they running combat operations. Sagen had correctly 

guessed that after the Battle of Fallujah, enemy activity 

had been pushed further south.10

ASR Heart Firefight on 30 January 2005

The Route Security Element (RSE) ran two patrols a 

day. Cuthbertson ran the day missions and McCormick 

ran night missions. McCormick liked to go out at night 

because that was when most of the trouble occurred. 

When the other was in, they would be the quick reaction 

force (QRF) for the ongoing mission. If there was trouble, 

the RSE needed an officer to coordinate with the British 

who owned the sector to deploy a reaction force, but 

McCormick knew if he needed help he could count on 

Cut to rally the troops to get his own QRF out there. Cut 

would not second guess whether he had permission to 

go. He would think only that his lieutenant was in trouble 

and he would let nothing stop him. That was the kind of 

trust that McCormick had in Cut.11

Since the 106th Battalion could no longer keep the 

vehicles uploaded with ammunition, this lost time in 

getting the QRF ready to roll. To reduce time, the RSE 

did not keep their vehicles in the motor pool which was 

a considerable distance away, but parked them on the 

barracks side of the battalion headquarters. They also 

stored the ammunition in a CONEX near the vehicles 

to reduce the upload time. In Vietnam, the gun trucks 

similarly remained uploaded and parked right next to the 

barracks at night so they could respond to attacks on 

the perimeter on short notice.12

The night patrol usually left prior to dark, around 

1800 hours. Normally, McCormick took eight people out 

on his mission, four for each HMMWV gun truck. Prior 

to departure, someone would pick up “To Go” meals for 

everyone from the Dining Facility and the RSE soldiers 

would eat around their vehicles. They would also take 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 119

chow out to the other RSE shift and meet at the Bridge 

1A where they would exchange information. Because 

30 January was the day for the Iraqi national elections, 

McCormick had sent out three vehicles that day with Cut. 

The extra HMMWV came in to pick up the dinner meals 

and would go back out with McCormick.13

His soldiers were sitting around eating when 

McCormick noticed SGT K’ray Holloway appeared ill. 

He walked over and asked, “What’s going on girl?” She 

replied that she was feeling sick and did not want to go 

out on patrol. She added she had a feeling something 

bad was going to happen. Upon hearing that another 

soldier said he was also sick. It was very unusual to 

have two crew members sick at the same time. At first 

McCormick thought there might be a flu bug going 

around, but he remembered that Holloway was like a 

barometer for impending trouble. She had no problems 

going out on convoys but whenever she was sick 

something bad happened. In combat soldiers become 

very superstitious and pay close attention to any remote 

indicator of impending contact. Some soldiers also 

develop a heightened intuition of impending danger. 

After what Holloway said, the lieutenant also had a gut 

feeling that something bad would happen but he had 

no idea how bad it would be.14

Since each vehicle had an extra crew member, 

McCormick did not feel he really needed to find 

replacements, but he asked for volunteers from the third 

HMMWV. SPC Travis Stantz said he would go out and 

was volunteering for a 24 -hour patrol. The others in his 

HMMWV said they were tired. Stantz was tired too but did 

not want to sit around camp all night long doing nothing 

when there might be some sort of action. If something did 

“go down,” he felt he could help protect other convoys.15

SGT K’ray Holloway and SPC Travis Stantz had 

not been members of the original 518th Gun Truck 

Company but had volunteered to join the RSE from 

1486th Medium Truck Company. CPT Doug Wilhelm, the 

commander of the 1486th, was very supportive of the 

RSE mission and offered McCormick his good soldiers. 

Both of them had driven on gun trucks in their company. 

Stantz liked the responsibility of protecting other drivers 

and fighting against terrorism.16

Holloway was an assistant gunner on McCormick’s 

gun truck and the guy was the driver on the other truck. 

PFC Timothy Parsons was the driver of McCormick’s 

vehicle and asked to replace Holloway on the SAW. 

Stantz replaced Parsons as the driver. Before they left 

Holloway warned them to be careful because something 

bad was going to happen. The RSE team consisted of 

1LT James McCormick’s M998 crew (Bastogne 1) of 

SPC Travis Stantz, driver, and SPC Brandon Whisenant, 

SAW gunner, and SGT Steve Lourigan’s M1025 crew 

(Bastogne 2) of SPC Joseph “Joe” Lane, driver, and 

PFC Timothy Parsons, SAW gunner. Bryan Noble missed 

this mission because he had volunteered to ride on 

one last convoy of the 1486th into Iraq anticipating 

it might encounter contact.17

The night patrol met with Cut’s day patrol to discuss 

what they had seen that day. They saw a lot of Iraqis out 

Bridge 1A at the intersection of ASR Heart and MSR Tampa. 

The southern desert of Iraq was flat and open. 

Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion

Two RSE HMMWVs usually provided overwatch on 

Bridge 1A. Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion
120 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

voting. Many of them were happy and had come up to 

his vehicle to show them the purple ink on their fingers. 

Cut said one Iraqi came up and told him there was a 

white Chevy Capri with armed Iraqis just outside Safwan 

near Bridge 1A telling people not to vote. The RSE 

soldiers had a great rapport with an Iraqi family that lived 

near the bridge. The soldiers even called the parents 

“Mom” and “Dad” and gave the kids toys and food. The 

family was a tremendous source of useful information. 

After Cut’s patrol left, McCormick’s vehicles patrolled 

their sector watching for that white Chevy Capri. Because 

a pipeline fire had burnt a bridge, the convoys took a 

detour up ASR Circle through Safwan to ASR Heart and 

then rejoined MSR Tampa. It usually took McCormick’s 

patrol two hours checking the route up to the last bridge 

in their sector. They found a few road spikes and trash 

which they picked but otherwise it was unusually quiet. 

The Iraqi thieves placed metal spikes in the road to 

cause flats and would then hijack the truck when the 

driver stopped to replace the flat tire. For an election 

day they expected to see people out firing their weapons 

in celebration. The two HMMWVs then took up an 

overwatch position on Bridge 6A at the intersection 

of ASR Heart and MSR Tampa. It was pitch black and 

cold that night. The crews could see no moon or stars 

making the night very spooky.18

Off in the distance on Tampa north of their position, 

Whisenant saw a couple of vehicles with his night 

vision goggles turn off their lights then approach to 

within a hundred meters of the bridge and halt. He told 

McCormick about them but the lieutenant assumed 

they were either Iraqi Army or Iraqi Police since they also 

patrolled the area. The vehicles turned around, backed 

away and then drove off to the right into the desert.19

The RSE then saw the lights of a HET convoy 

approaching in the distance. The 1158th HET had only 

been in country a few weeks and 1LT Kim Kleiman was 

the convoy commander on her first convoy. She had 

completed one right seat/left seat ride with the 1836th 

HET, which they replaced. Her convoy consisted of 25 

military “green” HETs and 40 contract “white” trucks 

with four gun trucks as escorts. Since 7th Transportation 

Group was new to Iraq, it did not see the need for 

keeping the convoys smaller than 30 vehicles. Not 

only that, but because of the shortage of gun trucks 

in theater, Group had not given her the recommended 

1:10 ratio of gun trucks. With only four escort vehicles, 

Kleiman did not want to divide her convoy into two 

serials thus reducing the protection to only two gun 

trucks per serial. Her internal gun trucks were the last 

vehicles in the convoy. She also had three HMMWVs in 

the middle of the convoy from the 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment whose equipment they were hauling north 

to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Kalsu. While the unit 

rotation maintained good cohesion, it lost continuity. The 

new units arriving had not learned the hard lessons of 

the April Uprising. The biggest challenge facing 7th Group 

was accomplishing the “surge” (rotation of units) with 

an extremely limited number of trucks. The replacement 

units had little comprehension of the intensity of what 

had happened before they arrived.20

The 1158th convoy had linked up with its escorts 

from the 1st Battalion, 178th FA at Navistar. For this 

convoy, the Field Artillery provided two M998 HMMWV 

gun trucks and the 1158th had two internal gun 

trucks. SSG Heggie, from the 1-178 FA, was the escort 

commander. The convoy pulled out of Navistar at 1600 

hours. After crossing the border, the convoy turned off 

of MSR Tampa and followed the detour along ASR Circle 

through the border town of Safwan. Just a few miles 

across the border, the convoy stopped to change a flat 

on a Third Country National (TCN) HET. The convoy had 

just cleared the town of Safwan on ASR Circle when 

it stopped to change 32 flat tires, just two miles short 

of ASR Heart, the last turn before rejoining Tampa 

again. One TCN had abruptly halted separating the last 

nine vehicles from the convoy. This left one 11th ACR 

HMMWV as front security of this last section and SGT 

Michael A. Olivas’ HMMWV gun truck from the 1158th 

McCormick’s patrol pulled the night shift. 

Photo courtesy of Joe Lane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 121

in the rear. The two gun trucks provided security while the 

drivers and maintenance teams changed flats. Some of the 

drivers said they had seen children throwing road spikes 

in the road. 

While the maintenance personnel and drivers 

changed tires, two or three unmarked white civilian 

pickups with unlit rotating amber lights approached the 

convoy from Safwan. New to the country, SPC Aaron J. 

Ingham, in the rear gun truck, had no intention of letting 

them pass even though it had been pounded into his 

head that the Iraqi Police and National Guard were 

friendly and to treat them as coalition forces. Ingham 

had too many soldiers working on the ground and not 

enough security. He did not care who they were, he was 

not letting anyone pass his convoy. So he told them to 

turn around. A short time later, 

the 11th ACR HMMWV called 

back reporting they had several 

pickup trucks up front wanting 

to pass from the other direction. 

The Cavalrymen thought they 

were either Iraqi Police or Iraqi 

National Guard. They wanted 

to let them through, but the rear 

security again said not to let them 

pass. The same Cavalryman called his squad leader in 

the other HMMWV and asked if they could let the Iraqis 

pass. He explained the Iraqis were a little pushy even 

attempting to drive past without permission. The squad 

leader answered, “I don’t care if he is the President of 

the fucking United States, he ain’t coming through my 

sector.” The 11th ACR HMMWV almost had to fire a 

warning shot to get them to leave.21

Once the tires were changed, the rear element 

joined up with the main convoy and SPC Michael L. 

Bennet in the rear gun truck informed Kleiman the 

convoy was together again. She then gave the order to 

move out. The lead gun truck of 1158th convoy came 

driving down ASR Heart to make the right hand turn 

onto Tampa but took a wrong turn on a dirt road 

right before the on-ramp.22

McCormick could see the 

lights of Kleiman’s convoy back 

about five miles on ASR Circle. 

McCormick told the Lourigan 

to mark the turn with chemical 

lights. Lourigan drove down 

the ramp, broke some plastic 

chemical lights and threw them 

so the convoy would see the 

HMMWV of the 1 - 178th FA with add - on - armor kit, local purchased turret armor and gun shield. They escorted the

1LT Kleiman’s HET convoy. Photo courtesy of the Richard Killblane

HET convoy coming off of exit ramp showing 

100 meter interval. Photo courtesy of SFC Vanderwerf
122 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

correct turn. McCormick then had his crews put chemical 

lights on their antennas so they could be identified as 

friendly and reported back to his battalion TOC that 

the gun truck was making the wrong turn. The lead gun 

truck had stopped and then one soldier climbed out 

looking around as if he was lost. McCormick and his 

crews joked, “How are these guys going to find their way 

through Baghdad if they are lost out here?” After five 

minutes of waiting, the convoy caught up with the lead 

gun truck. The soldier then climbed back in his vehicle 

and drove onto Tampa across the strip of desert from 

the dirt road and the convoy followed its exact trail. As 

they were slowly creeping onto Tampa around 2100 

hours, McCormick then sent a text message through his 

mobile tracking system (MTS) to the battalion TOC that 

the convoy had made the wrong turn but was getting 

back on Tampa.23

Once on Tampa, a contract truck had a problem 

with its trailer and Kleiman again ordered the convoy to 

stop. The lead gun truck continued driving further up the 

road. The rear gun truck with SGT Olivas, SPC Bennett 

and SPC Ingham, halted about 100 to 200 meters from 

the off ramp. SSG Lane Wright in the last HET turned to 

see the headlights of another convoy approaching 1,000 

meters behind him. Because of the blackout conditions 

and no illumination, Bennett and Ingham wanted to 

prevent a collision. So they grabbed three breakdown 

triangles from Wright’s HET, hung three chemical lights 

from their body armor, told their gunner, SGT Olivas, that 

they were going out to place the triangles and chemical 

lights in the road a few hundred feet behind them. 

Ingham informed Bennett he was going to break the 

chemical lights at the last possible moment since he did 

not want to be walking down the road in the dark with a 

couple glowing light sticks in his hands. Just as Ingham 

was setting up the triangles and lights, Olivas yelled that 

their convoy was getting ready to roll. The two soldiers 

quickly picked up their chemical lights and triangles and 

then returned to the convoy discussing how they were 

going to warn the rapidly approaching convoy of their 

presence and not violate light discipline.24

After about a 20 minute wait, Kleiman was 

confirming the head count with her assistant convoy 

commander, SSG Carl “Mo” Morabito, when her 

handheld radio beeped indicating the battery was 

growing weak. Kleiman rode in the second green HET 

in the convoy and SSG Mo rode in the rear. She told 

Sergeant Mo, “My battery’s going.” He answered, “No 

problem, ma’am,” and within moments, ran up and 

threw her a new battery. Just as she caught the battery, 

her convoy came under fire. At 2115 hours, she heard 

the whoosh of an RPG fired from the right side of the 

road that landed short of the convoy and exploded. 

Her rear internal gun truck also reported RPGs from 

the right. The RSE saw the explosion at the rear of the 

convoy. The RPG was immediately followed by lots of 

small arms fire from both sides of the road. The front of 

the convoy took fire from the left and the rear from the 

right, more like a Z- type kill zone. SSG Wright had just 

climbed back into the cab of the last HET in the convoy 

when the small arms fire broke out. This ambush caught 

everyone by surprise as no one expected any ambushes 

that far south on Tampa. The area had been considered 

relatively safe except from theft.25

In the rear of the convoy, the drivers looked to their 

right to determine the source of the explosions. They 

saw a large amount of tracer fire and heard a heavy 

volume of small arms fire from the approaching convoy. 

That was when Bennett reported the small arms fire and 

approaching convoy to Kleiman on his SINCGARS. Upon 

hearing small arms fire, Olivas spun his turret toward the 

east side of the road and fired his .50 in the direction 

of the enemy fire. As tracers passed over the hood and 

turret of their HMMWV, Bennett fired out the passenger 

window and reported contact on the radio while Ingham 

fired over the hood of his gun truck. The muzzle flashes 

HET convoy halted on the side of MSR Tampa. When a 

convoy halted, it usually closed up the interval. 

Photo courtesy of SFC Vanderwerf
Operation Iraqi Freedom 123

spread out over 100 to 125 meters from approximately 

seven to ten three-foot high prepared fighting position 

about 50 to 75 meters from the road and the enemy 

fire concentrated on the rear of the convoy.26

The drivers returned the enemy fire with a heavy 

volume of their own. SSG Wright remembered seeing 

the M88 tank recovery vehicles on the trailer ahead of 

and behind him open fire with their .50s. With the lead 

gun truck further out front, her front was exposed and 

Kleiman did not have full accountability from all her 

gun trucks. The lead gun truck upon hearing the gunfire 

turned around and headed back to the convoy. Kleiman 

knew her assistant convoy commander was still not in 

his vehicle. The soldiers returned fire until SSG Mo told 
124 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

her he was unable to get back to his vehicle due to the 

volume of fire–from both the insurgents and the drivers. 

He was worried about getting hit by friendly fire.27

The second convoy came to a stop right behind 

the last gun truck of Kleiman’s HET convoy. The vehicle 

commander of the lead 5 - ton opened his door, leaned 

out and yelled to Ingham asking if he was on Tampa. 

The rest of the convoy continued to engage the enemy. 

Ingham answered that he was on Tampa. The vehicle 

commander then asked if he was heading north on 

Tampa. Ingham again said he was and asked if their 

destination was Cedar II. The vehicle commander said 

yes and Ingham then told him that his convoy could 

follow them out of the kill zone as they were heading 

to Cedar II. The guy closed his door and Ingham turned 

back to firing over the hood of his HMMWV. Then the 

convoy pulled out around the HET convoy and headed 

north, not wanting to wait in the kill zone.28

As soon as the fight began, McCormick reported it to 

battalion and told his guys to mount up and go down to 

investigate. He saw muzzle flashes on both sides of the 

road, most of which came from his right. McCormick’s 

two HMMWVs met up with the rear internal gun truck, 

which was a HEMTT or 5 - ton. As soon as the two RSE 

HMMWVs arrived, the drivers stopped firing even though 

the enemy kept firing. McCormick’s vehicle pulled 

up next to the last gun truck of the second convoy. 

Whisenant yelled up at the gunner, “What’s happening?” 

Their gunner yelled back, “We’re taking fire from both 

sides.” The RSE fired flares at the muzzle flash to drop 

them behind the enemy. This would silhouette the enemy 

and McCormick had learned in an earlier ambush that 

the flares disrupted and confused the enemy. This time 

it did not. McCormick walked up to the rear of the gun 

truck and asked where the fire was coming from and 

the gunner said they were taking fire from the right and 

some from the left. James then fired some more flares 

at the enemy positions on the right. Off in the distance, 

McCormick saw a civilian pickup. Then the gunner in the 

last gun truck told McCormick, “Gotta go.” McCormick 

asked, “Everything good?” They exchanged thumbs up 

and the gunner answered, “Everything was good.” At 

2120 hours the HET convoy was on the road again.29

When the lead gun truck had returned, SSG Heggie 

screamed at the top of his lungs over the radio for 

Kleiman to move her convoy out of the kill zone and that 

they were firing at friendly soldiers at a rally point on 

the left. He did not realize that in the excitement, 

he had become confused about directions. Since he 

was traveling southbound, the rally point was actually 

on his right, but he would not stop yelling. Kleiman knew 

she had a rally point on her left, however, it was farther 

up the road and she was drawing fire from both sides 

of Tampa. Her soldiers returned fire until she realized 

Morabito might be hit. He was alternately ducking 

behind tires as he ran. Kleiman called “cease fire” over 

the radio twice, which caused the external gun truck to 

become extremely upset. It was her call, which may not 

have been right, but she could not live with herself if 

Morabito was hit by one of her own.30

The drivers began to cease firing but the enemy 

continued to fire at the rear of the convoy, but with 

less intensity. The drivers hoped they had inflicted some 

casualties on them. Olivas on the .50 and a few of the 

drivers at the tail of the convoy continued to return fire 

in spite of the order. Heggie’s gun truck drove the length 

of the convoy to the last gun truck. Heggie again called a 

cease fire citing friendly fire problems. Since the last gun 

truck only had one SINCGARS, Ingham advised Heggie 

they were going to “toggle” back and forth between 

the internal frequency and Sheriff net. Sheriff was 

the equivalent of a 911 operator in a war zone which 

coordinated for medevacs or the Quick Reaction Force 

(QRF) from the battle space owner. Heggie made contact 

with McCormick’s RSE who informed them they had 

been watching the fight and their fire had not come 

close to them. They asked Heggie if he wanted them to 

send a spot report up the chain of command. He said, 

“No.” About that time, the enemy quit firing. Morabito 

had called Kleiman that he had climbed into his HET. 

She got a full accountability and told everyone to roll. 

As the convoy pulled out, the crew of the last gun truck 

saw two HMMWVs with dim or no lights about 50 

meters behind them popping flares. Ingham sent 

situation reports to Kleiman on what transpired in the 

rear. As they progressed a few miles up the road, they 

passed the convoy that had passed them. The soldiers 

appeared to be pulling wounded out of their trucks.31

The entire firefight had lasted no more than five 

minutes but the volume of fire was intense. Kleiman 

had learned from her drivers and the rear gun truck 

that what they thought was a convoy behind hers had 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 125

left soldiers in the kill zone. For a long time, she worried 

about those soldiers left behind and wondered if they 

thought she had left them on purpose. To her relief, she 

learned a couple years later that it was not a convoy but 

McCormick’s RSE. That was only the beginning of the 

RSE battle that night.32

The RSE team remained in the kill zone for about 

ten minutes to make sure the convoy was safely out of 

the area and the enemy fire had stopped after the convoy 

left. After the convoy was out of sight, the two HMMWVs 

drove back up on the overpass and then reported back 

to the battalion TOC they saw four civilian trucks around 

the ambush site. Around 2140 hours two white pickups 

approached down both lanes of the highway. The Iraqis 

may have thought the two HMMWVs on the bridge 

were damaged and left behind. Both the pickups had 

unlit amber rotating lights so McCormick assumed they 

were Iraqi Police. One drove south on the northbound 

lane and stopped 50 meters short of the bridge and 

flashed his head lights. McCormick waved at them so 

the Iraqis knew they were Americans. The other pickup 

drove up and halted on the southbound on - ramp 80 

to 100 meters from the HMMWVs and turned off its 

lights. Lourigan remembered this was spooky. At 2200 

hours, the pickup in the northbound lane drove back to 

the on- ramp and halted 50 to 75 meters behind the 

other pickup. It then turned off its lights and the people 

in the back of the truck got out. It was so dark that night 

the Americans had difficulty counting exactly how many 

Iraqis were in each truck, but generally they packed them 

with passengers with about five to six in the front and as 

many as they could hold in the back. It was so dark that 

the Americans only saw silhouettes moving around. This 

activity caused McCormick to become more suspicious 

and he worried they might have an RPG. Suddenly the 

Iraqis opened fire with small arms at the RSE team 

hitting one of the HMMWVs several times.33

Whisenant suspected they were enemy all along 

and opened fire with his SAW without any hesitation. 

Parsons had never engaged the enemy before and fired 

his SAW a second or two after Whisenant. McCormick 

jumped out and took up a firing position over the hood 

of his HMMWV while Stantz jumped out on the enemy 

side and returned fire completely exposed to the enemy. 

Parsons fired controlled six to nine round bursts at 

suspected targets as he was taught to do in Basic 

Training. Whisenant just sprayed first hitting the vehicles 

then dropped to grazing fire sweeping in a zigzag 

pattern. McCormick believed that was what drove the 

enemy back from their trucks. The lieutenant searched 

in the dark through his scope for targets and fired off 27 

aimed shots. The six Americans returned much more 

accurate and overwhelming fire than they received, 

thus, eliminating the enemy fire within a couple minutes. 

As soon as the enemy fire stopped, McCormick yelled, 

“Let’s go, let’s get on them.” He acted with a fighter’s 

instinct and did not want to give the enemy a chance to 

recover and attack again. The two HMMWVs were facing 

the other direction and the drivers spun them around 

in seconds then raced down to the pickup trucks.34

Lourigan stopped in front of the first truck and 

Stantz drove past him to secure the second vehicle. 

When McCormick jumped out, Lourigan yelled, “Be 

careful, sir!” Only the interior lights of the pickups were 

on. McCormick walked around then noticed one man 

lying face down on the side of the road as if he was 

dead. He had a rifle close to him and then another 

man came out with his arms up and surrendered. The 

lieutenant almost shot him but pushed him down to the 

ground and had SGT Lourigan, who had followed him, take 

him into custody. Because it was so dark they searched 

the surrounding desert with a spot light and located seven 

more Iraqis hiding behind a dirt mound on the far side of 

the on - ramp. They immediately surrendered increasing 

the number of detainees to eight. One of the detainees 

spoke English and said another was out in the field by a 

berm. McCormick then heard someone crying. He and 

Stantz walked over to what resembled a fighting position 

bermed up on three sides facing out about 50 meters from 

the on - ramp. They picked up numerous dropped weapons 

View of MSR Tampa looking north from Bridge 1A with HET 

kill zone on the right and the onramp to the left. 

Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion
126 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

along the way and saw evidence of blood and lots of 

drag marks heading into the desert toward an industrial 

complex 700 meters to the northwest. At the berm, they 

found one Iraqi with multiple gunshot wounds to his upper 

torso. McCormick believed there were more Iraqis from the 

vehicles that had escaped into the desert, so they carried 

the wounded Iraqi back to their vehicles and had Lourigan 

treat his wounds. They also picked up six AK47s and one 

RPK machinegun. Lane grabbed his video camera and 

started filming the detainees and weapons to remove 

any doubt about what happened. Since they always turned 

over the detainees and weapons to the British, they 

wanted a record of what happened that night. McCormick 

then ordered his vehicles to tighten up between the two 

pickups and dismount the SAWs to establish a perimeter 

around the nine prisoners. He estimated that with the 

overloaded capacity of the two pickups there might 

have been as many as 15 Iraqis in this fight.35

Having trouble making radio contact with battalion, 

McCormick had to back walk up to the bridge to call 

battalion on his cell phone to report this incident. 

Lourigan also sent multiple MTS text messages 

requesting assistance, but the only reliable source of 

communication with Camp Navistar was the cell phone 

and it was at the limit of its range. MAJ James Brady had 

reported into the TOC as soon as the TOC NCOIC notified 

him of the first Situation Report (SITREP). LTC Sagen 

was north on a convoy, so Brady was in charge of the 

battalion. Upon receipt of the initial SITREP, Brady called 

the British equivalent of their Rear Battle Command Post 

at nearby Basra on a land line telephone number they 

had just for such situations. The initial call just informed 

them of the ambush. Upon receipt of the call for the 

quick reaction force (QRF), Brady sent a TOC NCO to wake 

the rest of the RSE and have them move to McCormick’s 

position. An RSE soldier who was pulling Charge of 

Quarters at the battalion TOC called SFC Cuthbertson 

on his cell phone and told him insurgents had attacked a 

convoy and McCormick was requesting assistance. Having 

worked closely with McCormick for ten months, Cut knew 

if the lieutenant asked for assistance, the situation was 

serious. Cut reported to the TOC to get briefed on the 

situation. After telling Cut all he knew, Brady told him 

to try to get the MTS working when he arrived. Cut 

assembled his standby RSE element of five soldiers 

and had them load double basic load of SAW and M16 

ammunition into their two HMMWVs then left.36

The 106th Battalion TOC then informed Sagen of 

the situation, sent an MTS text message to all convoys, 

updated the Brits, notified 7th Group, alerted the 

Navistar quick reaction force, and requested their use 

since they were under CFLCC release authority. CFLCC 

denied the request since it was at the extreme range of 

the RSE quick reaction force range and well outside the 

Navistar quick reaction force. While others debated over 

whether to reinforce, Cuthbertson’s two HMMWVs raced 

to the rescue. He could not reach anyone in McCormick’s 

party on his radio which only heightened his concern. 

Brady monitored the battle all through the night. The 

battle belonged to the British as soon as they arrived 

on the ground, but Brady was prepared to send 

ambulances and fire rescue if needed.37

Around 2220 hours, six more civilian trucks came 

from the west and turned down the on-ramp toward 

their location. Usually friendly Iraqis came from the 

direction of Safwan, not the desert. This was suspicious. 

McCormick popped flares in the sky to alert anyone in 

the area to come to his assistance. The civilian trucks 

drove away only to return twenty minutes later. Although 

McCormick was suspicious, he was not definitely sure 

they were unfriendly. He did not want to accidentally 

shoot up any civilians and yet, if they were enemy, they 

already had the high ground and could overwhelm his 

men. In every other situation, he acted with a fighter’s 

instinct; this was the one time he was not sure what 

was the right thing to do. He walked forward along and 

halted them away from his perimeter. One Iraqi walked 

toward the Americans and stated in English he was 

a fuel protection service worker and wanted the 

Americans to release the detainees and weapons to 

them. McCormick refused and told him to not approach 

any closer. McCormick informed him the relief was on 

its way and he would turn the detainees over to them. 

The Iraqi returned to his vehicle and then they drove 

off toward the industrial complex.38

2LT Power of the 2nd Prince of Wales Royal 

Regiment was the commander of the Rear Operations 

Battle Group (ROBG) Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that 

night. At approximately 2230 hours,39 he received 

orders that his QRF had been tasked so he went to the 

battalion operations room. There he was informed that 

an American convoy had come under fire along MSR 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 127

Tampa and that the RSE had left the junction of ASR 

Heart and Tampa and also come under fire. He learned 

the RSE had inflicted two casualties and requested 

the QRF to bring an ambulance. His 20 - man platoon 

in five Land Rovers under the call sign “30A” and one 

ambulance departed at approximately 2250 hours 

and rendezvoused with McCormick ten minutes later.40

They came down from the bridge and parked just 

above the RSE. As 2LT Power walked by the Iraqis, he 

said hello and they said hello in return. They appeared 

to be extremely friendly. Meanwhile, the British soldiers 

dismounted their vehicles and faced out in the direction 

of the desert. Power met with McCormick who briefed 

him on the attack on the convoy and this latest fight 

with the Iraqis. Since this was their area of responsibility, 

control of the fight belonged to the British, but Lieutenant 

Power, however, referred to 1LT McCormick as “Sir” and 

deferred to his advice. In the American Army, there was 

no rank among lieutenants. McCormick walked him out 

toward the berm to show him the blood trails supporting 

his belief that there were more out there. Suddenly they 

started receiving an intense hail of small arms fire from 

the direction of the industrial complex.41 The British 

lieutenant rushed back to his platoon while McCormick 

and Stantz ran for cover behind the berm. Both the 

Americans and Brits returned heavy and accurate fire. 

Meanwhile, SGT Lourigan and SPC Lane maintained 

control of the detainees and administered first aid to the 

wounded detainee. SPC Whisenant and PFC Parsons 

monitored the radio and blazed away with their SAWs. 

From the berm, McCormick could see everything in front 

and behind him. He was close enough to the on- ramp 

to yell instructions to his men and the gunners on the 

Land Rovers could fire over his head. Besides, the old 

infantryman in McCormick did not like to give up ground 

to the enemy even if it was only a few meters.42

The enemy fire came from two berms about 200 

to 300 meters out from the on-ramp. McCormick saw 

silhouettes moving around. Suddenly rounds started to 

come in from the south as if the enemy was trying to 

flank them. McCormick and Stantz had nearly exhausted 

all their ammunition, each firing six of their seven 

magazines. Running low on ammunition, Stantz asked 

his lieutenant what they would do next. McCormick fixed 

his bayonet on his rifle indicating that they were not giving 

up any ground. He was prepared for an all - out assault on 

his small perimeter that had then extended to 75 meters. 

Stantz, however, was not looking at McCormick when he 

made his heroic gesture; the soldier’s attention was on 

the enemy. McCormick was not too worried about being 

outflanked because there was no one he trusted better 

than Cuthbertson and the lieutenant knew Cut was on 

his way. After Stantz fired off his last round, he ran back 

under fire to the HMMWVs to pick up an ammunition 

can filled with loaded magazines.

43

The RSE was outgunned, alone in the dark, and 

yet Stantz entertained no thought of withdrawing from 

the battlefield. He later described what the rest of his 

team felt, “Americans don’t withdraw - we stand up and 

fight. The flag on our right shoulder is backwards so it 

resembles us running into battle and not retreating. 

I would rather die for my country than to run from 

protecting it.” McCormick felt a great privilege in 

leading the finest caliber of fighting men that night.44

Suddenly two HMMWVs popped up over the on-ramp 

on McCormick’s left. One of McCormick’s radio operators 

yelled out, “That’s Cut, Sir! He’s on his way!” As Cut’s two 

HMMWVs drove up over the bridge looking for the RSE, 

The berm in front of McCormick’s position with the Industrial Complex off in the distance. The RSE and British QRF 

took fire from this direction. Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion
128 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

they made the right turn down toward the other vehicles 

when a flare went up. Suddenly the two vehicles received 

fire from their left. The gunners immediately returned fire 

and while the flare burned out, Cut saw muzzle flashes 

and three to four personnel maneuvering to his far right. 

After receiving an Ammunition, Casualty and Equipment 

(ACE) report over the radio from his other HMMWV, he 

repositioned his HMMWVs to the left of the last British 

vehicle to secure the flank. Wanting a clear view of the 

battlefield, he ordered his men to pop flares. As the 

battle raged, he ordered his men to aggressively return 

fire. SFC Cuthbertson had pulled his two HMMWVs up 

on line into a flanking position creating a perfect 

L- shape kill zone trapping the insurgents in between 

the cross fire. Cut had maneuvered instinctively without 

any communication between him and McCormick.45

Cuthbertson then ran down to the RSE to get 

updated on what had happened so far and issue them 

more ammunition. While the firefight continued, he ran 

out to McCormick’s position and landed hard on the side 

of the berm then immediately returned fire in the general 

direction of the enemy. While reloading his M16, Cut 

glanced to his left and noticed McCormick was sweating. 

Cut asked, “What the hell is going on?” He then saw the 

lieutenant had several empty M16 magazines on his 

right and as a flare illuminated the area Cut noticed the 

bayonet. “Oh shit, you got your bayonet on your rifle!” 

Right then and there Cut knew that there was no way 

he was going to convince McCormick to leave this fight. 

About that time, the British lieutenant and his radio 

operator joined them. Through the British radio they 

heard that helicopters were on their way. McCormick and 

Cuthbertson then coordinated with the British lieutenant 

to expand the perimeter. Cut then returned to his 

vehicles and the enemy fire erupted again.46

The British grenadier came up with three rounds 

and started scanning for targets. They saw some Iraqis 

running between a gap in berms about 200 meters out. 

They were silhouetted by a light behind the berm. The 

next time the grenadier saw someone running past the 

hole, he fired. His first round hit the berm on the right 

and then his last two landed in the gap and just behind 

the berm - very accurate shooting. Stantz finally returned 

with more ammunition. They fired at the attackers 

while giving commands, directing friendly forces and 

redistributing ammunition and water to both the RSE and 

British platoon. The tenacity of the 11 American and 20 

British soldiers’ return fire fixed the Iraqis in place.47

During the fighting, McCormick ran back to the 

HMMWV to answer some of the MTS messages that had 

come in but it was hit and miss. He had to walk out in 

the open to call back to Navistar on his cell phone and 

ask Brady for additional assistance. Brady instructed 

McCormick to help the British forces if he felt he could. 

McCormick then started walking along their perimeter 

with Cuthbertson while under intense fire, repositioning 

their troops. Then McCormick returned to the berm 

where Stantz, the British radio operator and grenadier 

remained. Battalion then called the British on the phone 

for assistance. After quickly sharing information, the 

British launched another force. After the battle the 

British installed a secure radio system in their TOC.48

That last contact lasted for five minutes, then 

McCormick and Power gave the command to cease fire 

and the British lieutenant told his men to watch closely 

for further enemy activity. During the lull in the enemy 

fire, the British lieutenant and a corporal came up to the 

berm, kneeled down and told McCormick “Sir, I’m going 

to have my corporal take charge of the prisoners if that is 

all right with you.” McCormick warned him, “These guys 

are sneaky. They posed as Iraqi Police when they attacked 

us.” Corporal Mills responded, “Not a fucking problem, sir.” 

McCormick then yelled back and told Lourigan and Lane 

the British corporal would take charge of the prisoners. He 

told them the prisoners were no longer their concern and 

they needed to focus on the enemy to their front. CPL Mills 

pulled the prisoners back to the ambulance that had just 

arrived and kept them on the ground while Power called 

in the contact report to his headquarters.49

About five minutes after that fight ended, CT40 

arrived with four Range Rovers. Just as they did, enemy 

fire erupted again from the same two positions. CT40 

moved slightly north of Power’s position to flank the 

enemy. This fight lasted for approximately ten minutes 

and ceased again. Because Power was uncertain about 

the size of the enemy strength and also whether they 

had RPGs, he requested Warrior reinforcements. 

A civilian vehicle approached from the north and 

CT40 took no chances and stopped the vehicle, removed 

the occupants and searched the vehicle. SGT Farenden 

then called Power and said there was open ground along 

the east side of Tampa where the ambush had taken place 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 129

that would make a good enemy approach. He wanted to 

take his force and reconnoiter along that route to establish 

a forward security position against any possible attack. 

While this took place, the quick reaction force came under 

attack from the same positions for a third time. Power 

called his headquarters to say that his force was prepared 

to move but he was told to stay firm that CT0A was enroute 

and would take command when he arrived.50

Each time the firing died down, McCormick and the 

British officer attempted to recover wounded insurgents 

they heard crying to their front, but every time they 

started to move forward, the fire erupted again. The 

lulls usually lasted about 10 to 15 minutes. The battle 

continued with intensity in waves and each attack 

was driven back with accurate and intense fire. Stantz 

estimated from the muzzle flashes that between 20 

and 25 insurgents were firing at their position. Power 

estimated considerably less - from six to ten. During 

the lulls in the firing, the five men in the berm smoked 

cigarettes and passed water around. This type of fighting 

continued for a little over an hour. The fight had become 

a stalemate but the tenacity of the enemy indicated that 

they either desperately wanted to rescue the prisoners 

or expected reinforcement, because they knew the 

collation forces could always bring more forces up.51

Time seemed to drag. Then at 0015 hours, a 

company-sized British force arrived along with two 

helicopters. The British helicopters using thermal imaging 

reported seeing bodies directly to McCormick’s front 

and some fading heat signatures in the complex. After 

McCormick returned to the berm, he listened to the radio 

traffic between the ground and the helicopters and heard 

the pilot report, “I see three fading heat signatures and 

some trucks in the compound.” Then someone asked 

what was in front of McCormick’s position and 

the pilot responded, “Bodies are lying all around the 

area.” Then the person asked if he could tell if they 

were moving or not. He answered, “They look deceased.” 

When someone fired a flare, the pilot cursed, “Stop 

firing the damn flares! It is messing up my IR.”52

McCormick heard the British were bringing up 

armor to assault the complex. MAJ Bedford, the British 

commander, asked McCormick if his RSE would remain 

and provide them flanking fire for their assault on the 

compound to which McCormick agreed. The British 

commander then asked them to tighten up their forces 

behind that berm and prepare to provide covering fire. 

McCormick called his RSE soldiers over to the berm. At 

0200 hours, the British assault force took up positions 

and spread out along ASR Heart and MSR Tampa. 

McCormick remembered feeling the ground shake when 

the six Warriors armored vehicles rolled in and then he 

received the order to fire. The combined US and British 

force lit the compound up with small arms and flares 

while the armored and dismounted British troops of the 

British Prince of Wales Royal Regiment maneuvered 

across 700 meters of open terrain. Upon request from 

the British, the supporting force shifted their fire as the 

assault force overwhelmed the compound. The British 

then called for a cease fire.53

The British detained 25 more civilians with lots 

of weapons. The British lieutenant told McCormick 

his lieutenant colonel wanted to meet him. When 

McCormick approached, the British colonel was 

cordial, they shook hands. The lieutenant in front of 

the colonel presented McCormick with the 2nd Prince 

of Wales Royal Regiment crest and said how pleased 

they were with their courage and performance.54

Upon investigation, the Iraqi detainees had proper 

identification so the British turned them lose, and 

investigated it no further. The British considered this a 

green (civilian) on blue (friendly force) incident.

Lesson

There are four roles in convoy security. The battle space 

owner has responsibility for protecting the supply routes 

through its area and providing the quick reaction force in 

the event of an ambush. Route security has responsibility 

for reconnoitering the route for possible attacks and 

providing a quick reaction force in the event of ambush. 

The engineer sweep teams have responsibility to clear 

the roads of mines and obstacles ahead of the convoys. 

The problem is that no matter how well the others 

perform their roles, the enemy will always find a place 

to conduct an ambush. In the event the others fail to 

prevent an ambush, the convoys have responsibility for 

immediate security in the form of escort vehicles – gun 

trucks. While the Military Police Corps has doctrinal 

responsibility for route security, in the absence of either 

Military Police or patrols by the battle space owner, 

the Transportation organizations have to provide route 

security. This firefight and the Palm Sunday Ambush 
130 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

provide examples of ambushes involving route security.

In a guerrilla war, the enemy did not always wear a 

uniform clearly identifying them as enemy. Subterfuge 

and deception are common traits of guerrilla warfare. 

It was not uncommon during the Vietnam War, or the 

American conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, for insurgents 

to dress as friendly forces to gain an advantage. With 

multiple host nation factions, some friendlies were not 

always friendly. The threat in the southern part of Iraq 

had been primarily motivated by theft so very likely the 

attackers could have easily worked for the government 

and had their paperwork in order, but in a war where 

the enemy was not identified by a uniform, or had the 

habit of masquerading as friendly forces, Multi - National 

Corps-Iraq policy was that Positive Identification (PID) 

was established when the enemy fired on coalition 

forces. Even after the attack on 1LT Kleiman’s 

HET convoy, McCormick’s RSE held its fire on the 

approaching vehicles until they opened fire. The lesson 

was to remain vigilant and suspicious of everyone.

This was the first time an entire convoy was 

ambushed this far south, but there were plenty of 

indicators of increasing activity. So convoy commanders 

should pay attention to trends and anticipate changing 

enemy threat. Once attacked, the delay resulted from 

lack of handheld radios in gaining accountability. The 

Army later adopted the Harris AN/PRC -117G Wideband 

Tactical Radio with the 152A handheld component 

that could be dismounted. 

Timing is critical in battle just as it is in a fight. 

In boxing there are just three main types of punches, 

straights, hooks and uppercuts, so fights are won by 

speed and timing. Intentionally capturing enemy 

soldiers during a firefight is a difficult task, and again 

McCormick had an instructive feel for the battle. 

As soon as he sensed the enemy fire slackening, 

McCormick immediately ordered his men to charge 

them, which resulted in eight detainees, instead of 

eight dead. The speed with which his men reacted 

reflected great training and teamwork. 

In capturing his attackers though, McCormick gave 

up the advantage of the high ground; so when the Iraqis 

later approached from the direction of the overpass, the 

lieutenant for the first time in all his battles was doubtful 

about what to do. He could not allow the Iraqis to get too 

close to his men, in case they turned out to be enemy 

and attacked; so he approached them alone trying to 

keep some distance between them and his vehicles. 

Luckily the ploy worked. 

The entire battle from the time of the first attack on 

the HET convoy to the end had lasted for a total of five 

hours. The enemy clearly knew the RSE was out there 

but conducted a hasty ambush on the stalled HET convoy. 

From there, the battle grew piecemeal and each side 

committed a larger force in an effort to destroy the other, 

very similar to the Battle of First Bull Run in 1861. The 

winner was the one who tenaciously held ground and 

reinforced the quickest. In that respect, the RSE, 106th 

Transportation Battalion and the British 2nd Prince of 

Wales Royal Regiment made no mistakes. Each acted 

without hesitation. The battle was initially fought by six 

American soldiers who held their ground while detaining 

nine Iraqis against well-armed Iraqi insurgents for 40 

minutes. McCormick performed as heroically as he always 

had. His seasoned crews of combat veterans had the 

utmost confidence in his leadership and never questioned 

whether they should withdraw. Similar to Stonewall 

Jackson, McCormick inspired his men to hold their ground 

against clearly superior odds until the arrival of a British 

platoon. Even then, the enemy force proved larger than 

the 26 defenders as they were about to flank them.

In any battle a commander has to have a reserve 

handy to react to any changing situation on the 

battlefield. In respect to convoys or mounted patrols 

such as route security, that reserve is the quick reaction 

force. The problem with this scenario was the area the 

RSE operated was not only across the Corps boundary, 

but it was in the sector owned by an international 

partner. Since the British and Multi-national Corps -Iraq 

had responsibility for this battle space, and the 106th 

Transportation Battalion belonged to CCFLC in Kuwait, 

they 106th officially could not launch a quick reaction 

force across the border but had to ask permission 

first. Consequently, to launch the quick reaction force 

required coordination at the three-star command level 

and because of the number of layers of command and 

protocol, this resulted in unwanted delays. The 106th 

Battalion took great risk in launching its quick reaction 

force in the form of SFC Jody Cuthbertson. Cuthbertson 

and McCormick had split the route security mission and 

the lieutenant preferred the night shift because that was 

when he expected problems. He wanted Cuthbertson 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 131

back at camp as his 

quick reaction force 

in case his team got 

in trouble, because 

he knew his trusted 

sergeant would not 

wait for permission 

to cross the border. 

Evidently neither 

did MAJ Brady. 

Cut’s timely arrival 

prevented the 

flanking movement 

by the enemy. The RSE 

mission continued for 

years until Navistar 

was abandoned and a 

new military route opened up further to the west. A 

year later, the RSE found itself in a situation where they 

requested permission to launch their quick reaction 

force, and it took 45 minutes to receive a denial. In 45 

minutes, McCormick’s RSE would have been outflanked 

and possibly overrun. Had he counted on anyone other 

than his loyal NCO to reinforce him, the RSE 

might have lost lives.

After the elections, the senior leaders of the Army 

changed the policy on the road to a less aggressive 

stance to show that they were turning the security of 

the country over to the Iraqis. The gun trucks could no 

longer point their weapons at the civilians unless they 

felt threatened. They had to travel with the barrels 

of their .50s and SAWs pointed upward. 

Cuthbertson’s quick arrival and sound judgment 

caused him to instinctively deploy on the flank of the 

enemy snatching any hope the enemy had for destroying 

the small force of defenders. From then the fight turned 

into a stalemate as each side tried to inflict damage 

in the other. The final action destroyed the Iraqi force, 

resulting in the capture of a total of 34 Iraqis as well 

as over 75 weapons. No one swept the area between 

the berm and the complex to count the “fading heat 

signatures,” but the next day local children said some 

people came by and picked up the bodies. As was his 

custom, Sagen conducted a detailed after action review 

and put together another of his “Green Tab AARs” on 

this battle. The 106th Transportation Battalion then 

briefed this fight all 

the way to CFLCC 

Commander, LTG 

John A. Wickham, 

earning everyone’s 

praise. 

 Knowing the 

7th Transportation 

Group Commander 

held a higher 

standard for what 

constituted valor, 

LTC Sagen had 

to wait until 7th 

Group redeployed 

to award the 

participants any medals and then he could only 

issue them Army Achievement Medals and Army 

Commendation Medals, peace - time awards that are 

given out to soldiers who do a good job but never hear 

a shot fired in anger. SFC Cuthbertson received an Army 

Commendation Medal with V device for his actions. SGT 

Lourigan managed to get his award later upgraded to 

a Bronze Star Medal. 1LT James McCormick already 

had the Bronze Star and Purple Heart Medals he had 

earned during Operation Desert Storm and earned two 

more Purple Heart Medals, two Bronze Star Medals 

with V Device and two Meritorious Service Medals for 

his service during OIF. In 2014, he finally received the 

Silver Star Medal for his actions during the Battle of 

BIAP and the ambushes on the way to the Green Zone. 

He was later submitted for a Silver Star Medal for his 

actions during this firefight, which as of early 2015 was 

still pending. No one Transporter participated in as many 

complex ambushes or so heroically as McCormick, which 

made him the Audie Murphy of transporters. He was an 

officer who truly embodied the Warrior’s ethos.

Before he left, 1LT McCormick convinced LTC 

Sagen to not assign a new officer to the RSE but to 

make Cuthbertson the commander of the RSE, which 

Sagen did. SFC Cuthbertson was rated as a commander 

of a company level command, a rare opportunity for 

an NCO. In a few weeks the remaining companies of 

OIF 2 departed. Ironically, while this RSE mission was 

supposed to have weaned McCormick off of adrenaline, 

this turned out to be his most intense firefight.

Author and SFC Jody Cuthbertson flanking the logo of the 518th. These 

were the remaining members of the RSE after 1LT McCormick left. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
132 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

1 James McCormick telephone interview with Richard Killblane, 

23 July 2005.

2 McCormick telephone interview with Richard Killblane, 9 November 2006.

3 106th Transportation Battalion, “Route Security Element (RSE),” 

unpublished report, no date; McCormick telephone interview with Richard 

Killblane, 23 July 2005; LTC James Sagen interview with Richard Killblane, 

2 February 2006.

4 Sagen interview, 2 February 2006.

5 McCormick telephone interview, 23 July 2005 and 9 November 2006.

6 McCormick email to Richard Killblane, March 22, and July 23, 2005.

7 “Route Security Element.”

8 “Route Security Element;” McCormick email to Richard Killblane, June 6, 

2005 and telephone interview, 23 July 2005 and 9 November 2006.

9 McCormick telephone interview, 23 July 2005, and 9 November 2006; 

and Sagen interview, 2 February 2006.

10 “Route Security Element” and McCormick email, June 6, 2005 and telephone interview, 9 November 2006.

11 McCormick telephone conversation with Richard Killblane, 

6 November 2006.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 McCormick telephone conversation 6 November 2006 and Travis Stantz 

email to Richard Killblane, November 7, 2006.

16 McCormick telephone conversation 6 November 2006 and Stantz email, 

November 7, 2006.

17 Power point presentation, Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight,” 

106th Transportation Battalion; and McCormick telephone conversation, 

6 November 2006.

18 McCormick telephone conversation, 6 November 2006.

19 David Whisenant interview by Richard Killblane, at Hurricane, WV, 

12 November 2005; and McCormick email, November 11, 2006.

20 1LT Kim Kleiman email to Richard Killblane, 30 April 2006; SSG Lane 

Wright interview by Richard Killblane at Arifjan, Kuwait, 8 March 2005; 

and SPC Aaron Ingham, “Report of Combat Action on 30 January, MSR 

Tampa at ASR Heart in the vicinity of ASR Circle, Safwan, Iraq,” no date.

21 Ingham, “Report;” and Ingham email to James McCormick, 

December 4, 2006.

22 Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” and Ingham, “Report.”

23 McCormick telephone conversation with Richard Killblane, 3 May 2006.

24 SSG Lane Wright interview by Richard Killblane, in Arifjan, Kuwait, 

March 2005; and Ingham, “Report.”

25 McCormick telephone, 3 May 2006; Whisenant interview; Wright interview; and 1LT Kim M. Kleiman email to James McCormick, 30 April 2006.

26 Ingham, “Report.”

27 Kleiman email, 30 April 2006.

28 Ingham, “Report.”

29 McCormick telephone, 3 May 2006; Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart 

Firefight;” Whisenant interview; and Kleiman email, 30 April 2006.

30 Kleiman email, 30 April 2006; Ingham, “Report;” and Wright interview.

31 Kleiman email, 30 April 2006; and Ingham, “Report.”

32 Kleiman email, 30 April 2006.

33 “Route Security Element;” Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” 

McCormick email, April 7, 2005; telephone interview, 14 November 2006; 

and Whisenant interview.

34 CPT James McCormick, “Description of events on Easter Sunday 2004 

and January 30th 2005; Terrain, conditions and situation,” November 

2006; “Route Security Element;” Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” 

Whisenant interview; and McCormick telephone conversation, 

8 and 15 November 2005.

35 McCormick, “Description of events;” “Route Security Element;” 

Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” Whisenant interview; and McCormick 

telephone conversation, 8 November 2005.

36 MAJ James Brady email to Richard Killblane, November 8, 2006; 

and Jody Cuthbertson email to Richard Killblane, November 13, 2006.

37 MAJ James Brady email, November 8, 2006; and Cuthbertson email, 

November 13, 2006.

38 McCormick, “Description;” Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” 

and McCormick, 8 November 2005 and telephone interview, 

15 November 2006.

39 Power reported this as taking place at 2130 hours, however, the 

106th recorded that they received the call from McCormick for assistance 

at 2220 hours. Both Kleiman and the 106th AAR recorded the ambush 

as taking place at 2100 hours. By adding one hour to Power’s times, 

all the times match.

40 LT Power, hand written after action report, no date. Power’s report has 

him meeting up with McCormick at about 2200 hours when the 106th Bn 

AAR records it an hour later.

41 LT Power reported this time as 2215 hours.

42 “Route Security Element;” Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” 

Power, report; Stantz email, November 11, 2006; and McCormick 

telephone conversation, 14 November 2006.

43 “Route Security Element;” Green Tab AAR, “ASR Heart Firefight;” 

and Stantz email, November 11, 2006.

44 Stants email, November 12, 2006.

45 “Route Security Element;” McCormick telephone conversation, 

9 November 2006; and Cuthbertson email, November 13, 2006.

46 McCormick email, November 11, 2006; and Cuthbertson email, 

November 13, 2006.

47 “Route Security Element;” and McCormick email, November 11, 2006

48 MAJ James Brady email to Richard Killblane, November 8, 2006; and 

McCormick email, November 11, 2006

49 McCormick telephone interview, 15 November 2006; and Power report.

50 Power report.

51 “Route Security Element;” McCormick email, November 11, 2006; 

and Stantz email, November 12, 2006.

52 McCormick, “Description;” “Route Security Element;” McCormick email, 

November 11, 2006; and Cuthbertson email, November 13, 2006. 

Power also agreed the British force arrived shortly after midnight.

53 “Route Security Element;” McCormick, “Description;” and McCormick 

email, November 11 and 13, 2006.

54 Ibid.
Operation Iraqi Freedom 133

Palm Sunday Ambush, 20 March 2005

1075th Transportation Company, 

518th Gun Truck Company, Raven 42, & 1- 623rd FA

he doctrine for reaction to a convoy ambush is 

very simple, clear the kill zone. For gun trucks the 

question is whether to be passive and just return 

fire or be aggressive and shove the fight down the throat 

of the enemy. During Operation Iraqi Freedom there were 

many convoy ambushes where the convoys and their 

escorts reacted exactly the way they were supposed to. 

The worst thing to do during a convoy ambush is stop 

in the kill zone, but sometimes this is unavoidable. It is 

times like these that those caught in the kill zone have 

to make quick decisions where lives hang in the balance. 

One such ambush occurred on Palm Sunday, 20 March 

2005 near where Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Bismarck 

intersected with ASR Detroit. This ambush is of great 

interest not because everything went well but because 

of what went wrong from the outset. There were as 

many as five different units involved this ambush making 

it probably the most complicated ambush of the war. 

Therefore this ambush provides a case study of decision 

making during the worst case scenario with plenty of 

examples of individual heroism that usually occur during 

such times of intense chaos. War is chaos and there are 

no set solutions for reacting to chaos, but the study of 

battles teaches warriors how to react.

After the 7th Transportation Group replaced the 

T

375th Transportation Group in Arifjan, Kuwait it had 

every intention of continuing the 518th Gun Truck 

Company even though it had received the 1st Battalion, 

178th FA as its convoy escort battalion. The 7th Group 

selected volunteers from the arriving companies of the 

OIF 04 - 06 rotation to replace the OIF 2 veterans of the 

518th. The replacements arrived at Udari Range the 

day after Thanksgiving 2004 and underwent two weeks 

of training. In mid - December, they fell in with the one 

remaining platoon of the 518th that would train them 

with a couple of right - seat, left- seat rides. Although 

many of the original 518th crews would not leave with 

their parent companies until February and March of the 

next year, the emphasis on getting rid of the “cowboy” 

attitude of the original members and starting over 

caused the new company commander and 7th Group 

leadership to return the original members to their parent 

companies as soon as possible. The original members of 

the 518th had placed greater emphasis on maintenance 

of vehicles and weapons but little else. They often left 

ammunition in their vehicles upon return because they 

saw it as a waste of time to take the ammunition out 

at night when they would just have to load it up again 

the next morning. Keeping the vehicles uploaded, 

however, gave them a quicker response time if needed. 

They often left trash in their vehicles, but their previous 

performance in combat validated the saying that good 

combat units do not pass inspections. They were battle 

hardened veterans of the April Uprising. They may not 

Three M1025 HMMWVs of the 518th Gun Truck Company with add-on-armor kits waiting at CSC Scania. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
134 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

have looked pretty but they had proved they could fight. 

The new regime, however, wanted a higher state of 

discipline. Vehicles would be cleaned and ammunition 

would be returned to the arms room at the end of each 

mission. They followed the philosophy that if the leaders 

paid attention to the little details the big things would 

take care of themselves.

While the new crew members were highly motivated, 

they had not been blooded in combat as had the original 

members. They were well-trained by Military Professional 

Resources Inc. (MPRI) at Udari; but unlike the original 

company, whose two officers were heavily involved 

in the coaching and leading of the company, the new 

518th had a company commander, CPT Thelonious 

McLean- Burrell who believed officers were managers. 

A rift grew between him and 1LT McCormick, and CPT 

McLean - Burrell did his best to keep the aggressive 

lieutenant off the road. McCormick was a warrior leader 

who had proven his courage during the Easter Weekend 

ambushes and the Battle of BIAP. He had also developed 

the original tactics of the 518th. To compound matters, 

Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) 

in Kuwait also denied the gun trucks use of the open 

desert to test fire their weapons and had not found a 

suitable replacement test fire range. So they would not 

know how well their weapons worked until they engaged 

the enemy. Essentially the burden of training and leading 

the gun truck crews fell to the NCOs, but no one except 

a few older NCOs like SFC Louis Cass, platoon sergeant, 

had any combat experience. 

Because the transition between 

the original and new crews was so 

short, the replacement gun truck 

crews did not carry on the practice 

of conducting nightly after action 

reviews after each convoy and 

war gaming ambush scenarios. 

With the myriad of different 

types of armor, CLFCC categorized 

armored vehicles into three types. 

Locally produced “hillbilly” armor 

was called Level 3 armor. Factory -

built add-on armor was called 

Level 2 and factory-built armored 

vehicles such as the M1114 or 

M1117 Armored Support Vehicle 

were called Level 1 armored vehicles. By the end of 

2004, enough add-on armor (AOA) kits for HMMWVs 

had arrived and all the old M998 gun trucks of the 518th 

were replaced with M1025 and M1026 HMMWVs with 

the Level 2 armor that Iraqi-based units had traded in 

for brand new M1114s. Units in Iraq still had priority for 

M1114s. So vehicle design and armor in the 518th was 

standardized. Most had M2 .50 caliber machineguns 

mounted on rings with turret shields and gun shields. 

Because these did not have any armor around the 

engine compartment, the new 518th abandoned the 

“turn, fix and fire” doctrine. They did not want to expose 

the front of their gun trucks to the enemy fire. Most gun 

trucks also employed dual weapon systems, a M2 and 

a M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW).1 

The 7th Group commander, COL Jeff Miser, seemed 

to show an affinity toward anything that resembled the 

5 - ton gun trucks of the Vietnam War with their black 

paint and elaborately painted names on the sides of 

the gun boxes. Like many other field grade officers, he 

respected the achievements of the gun truck crews of 

Vietnam and believed they did the best with what they 

had. However, COL Miser had ordered the 518th to 

dismantle all four of its 5 - ton gun trucks, regardless of 

how much they liked them. The current senior leaders’ 

version of professionalism, however, frowned on the 

individualism of the Vietnam gun trucks especially 

exemplified by their elaborate art work. Consequently, 

a Multi- National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and CFLCC policy 

M915A3 of the 1864 Transportation Company. It had the same improvised door 

armor as the 1075th. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 135

restricted art work of any kind on trucks but 7th Group 

did cast a blind eye to the company logos spray -painted 

on the doors. In keeping with this anti-Vietnam gun truck 

attitude, both MNC -I and CFLCC wanted to come up with 

a new term to call their gun trucks. MNC-I coined the 

term convoy protection platform (CPP) while 7th Group 

came up with the term convoy escort platform (CEP) - 

both the same creature by a different name. The crews 

continued to call them gun trucks. 

After the April Uprising the previous year, the gun truck 

escort ratio south of Convoy Support Center (CSC) Scania 

was set at 1:10 and supposed to be 1:5 north of Scania. 

The 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM) established 

this ratio based upon the idea that Kuwait-90

based convoys would hand off regular sustainment 

convoys to Iraq-based escorts at Scania. This policy did 

not account for common user land transportation (CULT) 

convoys that originated in Kuwait and delivered directly to 

their destinations throughout Iraq. However, there were 

not enough gun trucks to go around so many Kuwaitbased convoys ran with only three gun trucks per convoy 

regardless of the size of the convoy. The goal was to 

keep the convoys below 30 vehicles. The 518th had 

asked for addition HMMWV gun trucks so they could 

run with four per convoy, but again there were just not 

enough available.2

So on Saturday, 19 March 2005, three HMMWVs 

of the 518th escorted an Iraqi Express convoy of the 

1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 1075th Medium Truck Company, 

a Nebraska National Guard unit, led by SSG Jeffrey 

M. Uhl from Camp Navistar to Logistic Support Area 

(LSA) Anaconda just north of Baghdad. The last truck 

companies from OIF II had redeployed and the 1075th 

had been in country since October 2004. Because 

of the ratio of one green military truck to every four 

commercial white trucks, convoys were organized by 

squads. Uhl’s six M915A3 tractor and trailer systems 

and two bobtails accompanied 22 IAP Worldwide 

Services and Department of Defense (DOD) contract 

trucks. The IAP drivers were mostly drivers hired from 

English speaking countries, but there were also Third 

Country Nationals (TCN) who spoke different languages. 

The contract trucks had no armor or radios. Because 

of the language barrier, they were not included in the 

convoy briefs, so they were entirely unpredictable in 

an ambush. They liked to keep the English speaking 

drivers in the back half of the convoy in case there 

was an ambush, they could communicate with them. 

Unfortunately, the Army only issued SINCGARS radios 

to the convoy commander, assistant convoy commander 

and escorts. The 1075th purchased commercial citizen 

band radios for everyone else. The problem was that 

these truck drivers had no training in radio discipline 

and procedures. 

Although the company had previously trained in the 

United States with the convoy commander in the middle 

of the convoy and his assistant riding up front, SSG Uhl 

rode up front as recommended by the company they 

replaced. They explained that often the security guards 

at the gate of each destination would stop the convoy 

and want to speak with the convoy commander. Not 

only that but every convoy commander’s biggest fear 

was making the wrong turn and getting lost in downtown 

Baghdad. So his assistant convoy commander, SGT 

Anthony Bloebaum, rode in the middle of the convoy. The 

Kuwait-based trucking companies hired Third Country 

Nationals. It was common for a convoy to have drivers who 

spoke several different languages and English was not one 

of them. Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion

Contract trucks were for obvious reasons referred to as 

white trucks and military as green. Photo courtesy of the 

106th Transportation Battalion
136 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

problem was that most 

ambushes happened 

somewhere behind the 

lead vehicle and at that 

time the NCO Academy 

did not train NCOs on 

how to run convoys. 

They learned this 

through hands on 

experience, because 

officers were schooled to 

be convoy commanders.3

When their convoy 

crossed the border at 

Safwan, a road spike 

ripped out the oil pan 

of one M915. Uhl hooked his lead bobtail up to the trailer 

and would leave the damaged tractor at Convoy Support 

Center (CSC) Scania for repairs, so the convoy only had 

one remaining bobtail. The 518th Gun Truck Company 

provided the escort for the convoy with the call sign, 

“Regulator.” Their three HMMWVs with add-on-armor 

were armed with .50 caliber machineguns. Regulator 1 

and 3 were manned by active duty volunteers from the 

567th Cargo Transfer Company trained by SFC Cass. The 

crew of Regulator 2 came from the Reserve companies. 

Other than a few IEDs, 

none had been under fire 

yet. The convoy rested 

overnight at Scania and 

would finish the run 

to Anaconda on Palm 

Sunday.4

 That Sunday, 

20 March, the 3rd 

Squad, 3rd Platoon, B 

Battery, 1-623rd FA, 

an Kentucky National 

Guard unit whose call 

sign was “Stallion 33,” 

escorted 30 Army Air 

Force Exchange Service 

(AAFES) vehicles driven by Third Country Nationals, 

primarily Turkish, in the opposite direction from 

Anaconda to Scania. Stallion 33 led by SFC Rickie D. 

Hammons consisted of three M1114s, two with M2 .50 

caliber machineguns and one Mk19 automatic grenade 

launcher. They had been in country since December 

2004. Following behind them were three M1114s of 

2nd Squad, 4th Platoon, 617th MP Company, another 

Kentucky National Guard unit led by SSG Timothy F. 

Nein, call sign “Raven 42.” Likewise they had two M2s 

M915 bobtail truck at the end of the convoy. These spare 

tractors were used to pick up a trailer from a disabled M915. 

Photo courtesy of Jonathan Kennedy

M1114 of the 623rd Field Artillery had dual weapon systems, M2 .50 caliber machinegun and M249 SAW. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 137

and one Mk19. Raven 42 had experienced several 

ambushes and habitually discussed the day’s events 

and what they could do better. The 617th MPs based out 

of Camp Liberty, Baghdad had responsibility for route 

security and had been in country since November 2004.5 

Because of the April Uprising, there were only three 

routes between Scania and Anaconda and the movement 

control battalion changed the routes every few days to 

confuse the enemy, but it did not work. After the convoys 

quit running one route, the enemy knew it would be 

about seven days before convoys would return. This gave 

them plenty of time to prepare IEDs. On Palm Sunday all 

convoys would follow the eastern route which was about 

a nine hour drive. The wide open desert of the eastern 

route provided ideal cover with its scattered trees and 

irrigation ditches and consequently had a bad reputation 

for enemy attacks. The drivers called one stretch “IED 

alley” because of the frequency of IED attacks. 

The MPs performed route security by reconnoitering 

the routes prior to convoys hitting the road and then 

patrolling the roads afterwards. The MPs did not have 

a good reputation with the truck drivers for standing 

and fighting but the 617th MP was an exception. The 

company commander, CPT Todd Lindner, enforced high 

standards of discipline, training and uniformity. SSG 

Nein was on his second tour and understood the enemy 

tactics. While the enemy usually attacked in small cells 

of 7 to 10 men, in the open desert of the eastern route 

he had seen them ambush convoys with larger forces of 

over 20 insurgents. What he may not have understood 

was that large ambushes usually consisted of 40 to 50 

insurgents, significantly more than 20. Although not very 

coordinated, their tactic was to hit the convoys fast and 

hard before anyone could counter- attack. The attacks 

were usually initiated with rockets or machineguns and, 

once in a while, mortars then followed up with small 

arms fire that would last three to four minutes. They 

would escape in vehicles that ran faster than the 

up-armored HMMWVs and before the nearest quick 

reaction force could arrive. Because of the secrecy in 

which they operated and the disconnection between 

cells, the ambushes showed detailed planning but 

inflexible execution, very similar to guerilla ambushes 

during the Vietnam War.6

Raven 42 had been ambushed twice before. The 

first time was on the night of 27 January. As the three 

gun trucks were driving by, the enemy opened fire and 

the M1114s returned fire then called in the cavalry. Early 

one morning on 29 January, Raven 42 was out scouting 

for IEDs and ambushes an hour or so before the convoy 

window opened when they surprised seven to twelve 

insurgents setting up an ambush behind small berms, 

a concrete barrier wall, a couple of cars and a concrete 

block building. That day, SGT Dustin Morris’ vehicle was 

in the lead and he had a senior ranking NCO driving his 

M1114 who was not his regular driver. The insurgents 

opened fire on Raven 42 with small arms and RPGs 

thinking they had been discovered. Instead of reacting 

according to SSG Nein’s instructions, Morris’ driver 

reacted the way he thought best and failed to either 

Rear view of M1114 of the 623rd FA. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

M1114 of the 617th MP Company. Photo courtesy of the 

Army Women’s Museum
138 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

act in unison or react fast enough. The fight lasted for 

15 minutes until five of the seven insurgents escaped 

on foot through dense vegetation in the canal system 

leaving two wounded to fall in the hands of the MPs. 

The MPs of Raven 42 learned to react faster and act 

in unison. In addition, they found situations where 

the crews needed to dismount and others where 

they did not. They had to be flexible.7

On 18 March, Raven 42 had been sitting in an 

observation post along ASR Detroit. About ten minutes 

after they moved out, they heard a call for assistance 

from a white convoy that reported it was hit in the very 

same place Raven 42 had just vacated. Nein could not 

believe it. When they returned, sure enough, around 50 

insurgents had opened fire with RPGs and small arms 

fire destroying or disabling 16 out of 30 vehicles.8 

Raven 42 liked to shadow white convoys, since 

at that time the enemy targeted civilian trucks most. 

Following behind the convoy allowed the escorts to focus 

on clearing the kill zone while the MPs engaged the 

enemy. Nein’s 2nd Squad had driven the same routes for 

three to four months and knew them well. At night after 

they returned, they would sit around a dry erase board, 

reviewing what they had done, map out most likely 

ambush spots and war game what each crew would 

do, thus perfecting their battle drills. Each crew member 

was encouraged to participate and suggest what he or 

she could do better. In the end, each crew member knew 

exactly what he or she would do and that would become 

their new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). They 

also improved upon their vehicle load plans. Nein did not 

like clutter. His company commander, CPT Todd Lindner, 

had emphasized setting and maintaining standards. In 

combat, each crew member needed to know exactly 

where everything was and they could afford to have 

nothing in the way like coolers and trash. In the heat 

of combat, there was no time to waste moving things 

around. Nein took pride that his team leaders, SGT Joe 

Rivera, SGT Leigh Ann Hester and SGT Dustin Morris, 

maintained the standards no matter how long they 

had been on the road. They performed their preventive 

maintenance checks and cleaned out their vehicles 

rather than just go straight to bed even if they only 

had nine hours before they would go back out on the 

road again. Nein lived what he preached and had 

earned the utmost confidence of his soldiers.9

It was around 1030 hours on the morning of 20 

March, when Raven 42 fell in behind the convoy of 

Stallion 33 after it entered their sector. Raven 42 

notified the convoy on the Sheriff net they would 

shadow the convoy to the end of their patrol sector 

where ASR Detroit met up with ASR Bismarck. The 

HMMWV of the 1-178th FA stopping to refuel on the eastern route because the up -armored HMMWVs consumed fuel 

faster and fuel tanks did not carry as much fuel as the M915s. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 139

area was vast open desert cut by irrigation canals and 

dotted with scattered groves of trees and houses. The 

convoy radioed back they were going to stop to refuel. 

Because the eastern route took nine hours to complete, 

the up-armored HMMWVs did not have enough fuel in 

their tanks to complete the run so they carried four extra 

gas cans and stopped along the route to refuel. The 

stop also allowed drivers to get out stretch their legs and 

relieve their bladders. Completing the refuel, the convoy 

continued south again at about 1135 hours. Stallion 33A 

was the lead gun truck, Stallion 33B was the sixteenth 

vehicle in the convoy and Stallion 33C brought up the 

trail. Raven 42 trailed about 200 to 300 meters behind 

the convoy. About five minutes down the road, SSG Nein 

in the lead vehicle of Raven 42 noticed that the trucks in 

the middle of the convoy starting to maneuver to the left 

and right as if under fire. Suddenly one of the lead tractors 

was hit by an RPG, came to a halt and began to burn. The 

Stallion 33 convoy was under fire from their right.10 

The southbound AAFES convoy had just passed a 

large open plowed field with a power plant on the right, 

then over a wide irrigation ditch that ran east and west. 

A smaller irrigation ditch paralleled the west side of the 

road to the right of the convoy. Stallion 33A, the lead 

vehicle, came adjacent to an access road leading off 

ASR Detroit to the west. The area in between the large 

irrigation ditch and access road was covered by fields 

lined with groves of trees. SGT James R. Baker, the 

vehicle commander of Stallion 33A, saw two Iraqis stand 

up in the field to his right and fire an RPG and small 

arms at the convoy. He yelled at his driver, SPC William 

P. Young to clear the kill zone. Stallion 33B, the 16th 

vehicle in the convoy, and Stallion 33C, the trail vehicle, 

heard Baker call contact over the radio. Shortly after 

that the entire convoy came under fire. The lead gun 

truck sped up as per doctrine and SPC Patrick T. Malone 

began firing away with his Mk19 automatic grenade 

launcher at the enemy on his right. Baker and Young 

The kill zone was just south of the plowed field and power plant. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum

Kill zone looking northwest with the burning truck. 

Photo courtesy of Aaron Castro

Overturned bus in the kill zone. Photo courtesy of the 

106th Transportation Battalion
140 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

heard explosions and looked behind them just in time 

to see the bus flip over what looked to them like eight 

times. A Ford sport utility vehicle (SUV) raced up beside 

them on their left as if using their M1114 for cover. 

Young saw rounds stitch the side of the vehicle and 

window hitting the driver and causing it to crash. Another 

SUV was also damaged in the initial fire and careened 

across the median. An RPG hit a tractor behind them, 

setting it on fire. Stallion 33A drove through a gauntlet 

of enemy fire for approximately one and half miles then 

reached the Iraqi Check Point about two miles down the 

road. Upon reaching the safety of the check point, they 

realized only one Third Country National (TCN) truck had 

followed them. The rest of the Third Country National 

drivers behind them had swerved and stopped their 

vehicles, climbed out of the cabs and hid behind the 

tires. With the convoy halted, Stallion 33B moved 

around while 33C defended the rear of the convoy.11 

At the check point, SGT Baker told the Iraqi National 

Guard to go help the convoy. As the Iraqi headed for the 

kill zone, the crew of Stallion 33A checked their vehicle 

for damage and checked the Third Country National 

driver. Stallion 33A waited for the rest of the convoy to 

clear the kill zone. About 15 minutes after the ambush 

began, it became clear that no one else was able to 

escape, so SGT Baker called Stallion 33B and asked if 

they wanted him to come back into the kill zone. They 

said, “Yes.” Baker then instructed the contract driver 

to remain at the check point and his M1114 turned 

around and headed back into the kill zone passing the 

northbound 1075th convoy, which was also under fire.12 

Earlier that morning, SSG Uhl of the 1075th Medium 

Truck was warned there would be a demonstration in 

a town along the way and that insurgent activity had 

increased around a bridge south of Anaconda, but 

nothing about an attack that had occurred on Detroit 

two days prior. Uhl left one of his 22 M915s at Scania 

due to an oil pan ripped open by a road spike near 

Safwan so his lead bobtail pulled the trailer. This would 

limit his maneuverability. SPC Jenny Beck had an 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 141

unexplained nervousness about the trip that day and that 

morning she had told her fiancé, SPC Tim Bos, “I don’t 

want to leave. Can’t we stay here?” Bos was driving for 

SSG Uhl in the lead truck and Beck drove for Bloebaum, 

the assistant convoy commander in the third military 

truck. SPC John Harris, driving the next military truck in 

line also felt nervous after he learned they were taking 

the notorious eastern route. Leaving Scania, the convoy 

traveled along the eastern route where it turned from 

ASR Bismarck onto ASR Detroit and headed north.13

The demonstration in the small town on the Tigris 

River was peaceful with a multitude of Iraqis walking 

around waving black flags. Most of the military drivers 

noticed nothing unusual, but Ron Hart and William 

Cross, veteran contract drivers, saw the Iraqis making 

the cutting gesture across their throats or bringing their 

hands together like they were praying, then pointing to 

the drivers. They knew the significance of the gestures. 

The first was obvious and the second meant that they 

were going to meet God soon, a clear indication there 

was something bad up the road.14 

Around 1120 hours, the convoy had slowed down 

to snake its way through the Iraqi check point. Civilian 

traffic backed up as the Iraqi National Guardsmen waved 

the convoy through. The drivers saw an Iraqi National 

Guardsman standing there with an RPG on his shoulder, 

which was shock since they had not previously been 

allowed to carry RPGs. The lead vehicles continued on 

up the four- lane paved road separated by a median 

while the rest accelerated coming out of the check point 

to catch up. There was the typical civilian traffic parked 

along the side of the road to let the convoy pass, nothing 

to raise suspicions. Both sides of the road were open 

fields with small groves of trees.15 

Shortly after clearing the check point, the lead 

vehicles saw none of the indicators of an ambush when 

around 1140 hours, gun fire broke out from a twostory building to their left rear in the open field about 

150 to 200 meters from the road. Uhl saw the lead gun 

truck start swerving then SPC Barbara Higgins, driving 
142 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Regulator 1, screamed on the radio, “Contact left.” 

The excitement in her voice surprised and confused 

SSG Uhl who asked his driver, “What did she say?” Bos 

answered, “I don’t know.” This was not like her. Higgins 

was a no -nonsense soldier who normally did not get 

excited. Her HMMWV then swerved toward the center 

median and stopped for a few seconds. Bos tried to 

drive around to the right but did not think he had enough 

room to pass and hit the brakes, subsequently stopping 

the entire convoy like an accordion. Higgins had pulled 

Regulator 1 out into a blocking position in the median 

as she had been taught but not far enough. Her gunner, 

SSG David Van Roekel, fired off an eight to ten - round 

burst of his .50 then waved at the lead vehicle to 

keep going.16 

Uhl then heard what sounded like fire crackers and 

told Bos to drive around the right of Regulator 1. Three 

RPGs hit the road and exploded right next to them. Then 

from the southbound lane a SUV came veering across 

the median slamming into a parked car in front of him. 

He and Bos assumed that SUV was an insurgent vehicle 

designed to block the road. Unknown to them, it was 

from a southbound AAFES convoy escorted by Stallion 

33. The two convoys had literally run into each other in 

the middle of a large kill zone. Uhl again told Bos to keep 

going. He then called over the radio, “Action left. Keep 

moving.” Bos accelerated and rammed the SUV, spinning 

it around. He then drove around the SUV into the median 

which surprisingly was full of water. Mud splashed over 

his windshield while rounds pinged off the armor. The lead 

M915 cleared the kill zone as doctrine dictated and drove 

about a mile down the road before Uhl looked in his side 

mirror and realized no one had followed him. All he saw 

was smoke beginning to rise from the burning truck.17 

According to their policy, the lead gun truck was 

supposed to accompany the vehicles out of the kill 

zone but since only one vehicle escaped, Regulator 1 

remained in the middle of the kill zone just past the 

overturned bus and dueled with the enemy. They saw 

an AAFES tractor and trailer stopped up ahead in the 

southbound lane about 20 meters from the grove of 

trees that lined the access road with two more white 

trucks behind it and the third one that had just started 

to burn. Van Roekel saw four or five Iraqis in blue shirts 

and black pants, the uniform of Iraqi Police, pop up 

about 100 meters off the road to his left rear. One was 

wearing a black Kevlar. One was standing straight up 

while the rest walked, fired, crouched then stood up and 

fired again walking toward the convoy. He fired another 

eight- round burst of his .50 but it kept misfiring. The 

timing was off. They would have known this if they had 

SUV of the southbound convoy damaged in the kill zone. Photo courtesy of Combat Studies Institute

Van in northbound convoy struck by RPG. 

Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion
Operation Iraqi Freedom 143

been able to test fire their weapons. He switched to the 

SAW also mounted on his turret shield and fired. PFC 

Jairo Torres, sitting behind the driver, saw five insurgents 

around the two - story building to his left and one had 

an RPG. He and Higgins fired their M16s out windows 

on the enemy side, dropping three enemy insurgents to 

the ground and the other two ran around the building. 

This was their first time under fire. SFC Ramiro, from the 

1864th Medium Truck Company, was the NCOIC of the 

gun truck on his first right-seat ride. Van Roekel, who 

was normally the NCOIC, manned the machineguns.18 

The gun fire was intense and RPGs were impacting 

up and down the convoy in rapid secession. There was 

excitement in the vehicle as they yelled out where they 

saw the enemy. Most of the fire was coming from the 

two - story house and direction of the warehouse a couple 

of hundred meters behind it. At 1256 hours, around 15 

minutes into the fight an RPG flew within feet of their 

HMMWV and struck the van that had halted behind the 

overturned bus. The driver of the commercial tractor 

either jumped out or was blown out the window, but he 

looked uninjured. Van Roekel yelled at Higgins, “RPG! 

Get back, get back!” It punched through the white trailer 

stalled in the southbound lane. A second RPG came 

flying at them. He believed a moving target was harder 

to hit and yelled, “Let’s get moving, let’s get moving!” 

Higgins backed the HMMWV up 20 meters. By then, 

Van Roekel was out of SAW ammunition and had to 

try and get his .50 working. He would fire a few rounds, 

pull back the charging handle and fire again. For 

15 minutes, Regulator 1 had maneuvered and fired 

waiting for the convoy to move out of the kill zone 

but nothing happened.19

When the ambush began, the next four white trucks 

swerved violently and slowed to a halt at odd angles 

completely blocking the road. SGT Terrance Ricketts in 

his M915 behind them pulled over to a halt near the 

median. Small arms fire bounced off his door armor. He 

then inched his truck forward when the AAFES bus hit 

the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and was thrown 

thirty to forty feet before it came to rest on its side in 

front of his M915. Ricketts then turned his truck into 

the median to go around the left of the burning bus and 

became mired in the mud. Immediately his truck became 

engulfed in small arms fire. Rounds ricocheted off the 

door and shredded his left tires. They were trapped. 

Top: View of kill zone from the tail end of the northbound convoy. The woods on the left flank the access 

road. Middle: Battle damage to Ricketts’ M915A3. 

Bottom: The black mark on the door was made by 

the armored piercing round that hit Ricketts. 

Photos courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion
144 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Two well aimed armored piercing rounds penetrated 

the door; one hitting Ricketts’ left leg stopping short 

of his testicles. It filled his body with searing pain and 

he screamed to his co -driver, SPC Ricky Delancey, 

“I’m hit.” Ricketts and his co - driver made an odd pair. 

Ricketts was a muscular prison guard who played a 

guitar in a rock and roll band while the younger and 

shorter Delancey reminded his friends of Sleepy in the 

“Seven Dwarfs.” The athletic Ricketts could not move 

his legs and his survival then depended upon his friend. 

Delancey grabbed the microphone and handed it to 

Ricketts who then screamed into the radio with pain, 

“I’m hit. I’m hit. It hurts.”20

That pleading voice coming from a pillar of strength 

sent shock waves through the convoy. Beck and 

Bloebaum’s M915 had come to a halt at the left edge 

of the pavement and could see Ricketts’ truck. At first, 

Beck assumed the worst and thought the voice was her 

fiancé’s. She then recognized whose voice it really was 

and thought it was the worst screaming she had heard in 

her life. SPC Michael Shrapels in the second to last M915 

thought “it was scariest thing in the world. It sounded 

just like a child screaming for his mother.” SSG Uhl by 

then isolated from his convoy heard the voice and felt 

completely helpless to do anything. Not only had Ricketts 

demoralized the other drivers but he had inadvertently 

tied up the radio so no one else could talk.21

Further south in the northbound convoy, contract 

driver Ron Hart watched the spectacle ahead of him. 

Ahead of him, he had seen a big cloud of dust of the 

IED that flipped the AAFES bus, and then the convoy 

came to a halt and bunched up. William Cross, who was 

pulling a flatbed about three or four trucks from the rear 

somewhere behind Ron Hart, saw the contract truck 

ahead of his turn on its left blinker, which was the signal 

for contact left. He then heard the gun fire and saw the 

rising black column of smoke from the burning tractor 

attesting to the beating the vehicles in the front of the 

convoy were taking. Suddenly, a bullet shattered his left 

Damage to Regulator 2. Photo courtesy of Jonathan Kennedy

Regulator 2. Photo courtesy of Jonathan Kennedy
Operation Iraqi Freedom 145

mirror and side door window passing just an inch above 

his left shoulder. It was one single round. Ron Hart was a 

retired infantry man and his military training caused him 

to assume it came from a sniper. He thought, “I better lay 

down here.” He wanted the sniper to think he had hit him. 

He summed up what every unarmed civilian driver felt 

at that moment, “I was scared shitless.” Hart then saw 

Regulator 2 drive forward with its gunner firing his .50.22

SPC John Harris and SPC Jacob Graff listened to 

Ricketts in the military truck right behind Regulator 2 in 

the middle of the convoy. 

They were wondering 

what was going on and 

why the other drivers 

were not trying to get 

out of the kill zone as 

they were supposed to. 

Sitting in the kill zone 

was definitely not a good 

idea. Graff and Harris 

debated over what to do 

next when looking past 

his buddy, Harris saw an 

insurgent popping up and 

down. He pointed him 

out to Graff sitting in 

the driver’s seat closest 

to the enemy side. Graff turned and did not see him. 

Then Harris saw gun smoke rising from a patch of tall 

grass and, as he pointed Graff fired off seven or eight 

shots into the area and that put a halt to any small arms 

fire coming from that direction. Looking ahead of them, 

they saw the civilian drivers climbing out of their vehicles 

and either hiding behind the wheels or in the ditch 

alongside the road. Suddenly rounds from their left front 

struck their truck. One passed through the windshield 

and just missed Graff’s ear. Then Graff realized, “This 

is real. Oh my God, is this really happening?” He could 

not believe what was happening. He could also see SPC 

Brandon Dettman on Regulator 2 having trouble firing 

off more than two or three rounds with his .50 before it 

jammed as they drove ahead.23

Dettman in Regulator 2 was the first to hear the 

cracking of small arms up ahead. SGT Jonathan Kennedy, 

the NCOIC of Regulator 2, then heard over the radio, 

“Contact left,” and acknowledged the message. He then 

told his driver, SPC Ryan Hubbard, to pull over in the 

southbound lane and drive forward into position to form 

a gun shield for the convoy. Regulator 2, the seventeenth 

vehicle in the convoy, drove across the median ahead of 

Beck and Bloemaun’s vehicle, five vehicles ahead of his. 

The crew asked Dettman where the shots were coming 

from. All the enemy fire seemed to be concentrating 

on the military trucks and gun trucks. He saw muzzle 

flashes originating from the two - story brick house 

to his left and fired his .50 in that direction.24 

 The HMMWV gun 

truck stopped and the 

crew heard the pinging 

of rounds hitting their 

armor as Regulator 2 

took a beating from small 

arms fire. Its add - on 

armor was unlike that 

of the M1114s; there 

were gaps and one was 

in front of the dash. One 

round penetrated that 

gap and hit Hubbard in 

the abdomen just below 

the body armor. He said 

he was hit and Kennedy 

began checking for the 

wound but could not find it. When Hubbard slumped 

forward the body armor covered it. He passed out so 

Kennedy poured water on him and Hubbard woke up. He 

said he was shot. Kennedy lifted up the body armor and 

saw a pool of blood. Meanwhile, Dettman fired off bursts 

of his .50 at the two - story house, but the timing was 

also off and the .50 jammed, so he picked up his M16 

and fired. He saw black- clad militia crouching around 

the two blue-green warehouses which were several 

hundred meters behind the two - story house. Dettman 

reloaded another magazine in his M16 when white 

smoke came pouring out from under the dash. At that 

time, Graff further back saw Dettman disappear from 

the turret.25

Another round had penetrated a gap in Regulator 

2’s armor and hit the fire extinguisher filling the 

compartment with white smoke and greater confusion. 

Kennedy thought the rounds had hit his engine and set 

it on fire. He made the decision to get his gun truck out 

An AK round penetrated the gap between the add-on-armor 

and engine and struck Hubbard. Photo courtesy of Jonathan Kennedy
146 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

of there. He told Hubbard to put the HMMWV in reverse, 

but Hubbard kept fading in and out of consciousness. 

Hubbard started backing the HMMWV up when he 

passed out. Kennedy then reached over with his left 

leg, straddling the center of the HMMWV, pushed down 

on the accelerator and steered. Kennedy also heard a 

grinding noise from the transmission as they backed 

down the southbound lane. Dettman had fired off two 

magazines from his M16 and about 60 rounds of .50 

caliber ammunition. Ron Hart 

saw the gun truck moving 

backwards with smoke coming 

out of the turret. He asked 

himself, “Where’s the gunner?” 

That was not a good sign and 

he thought, “The shit is getting 

to hit the fan. Awe shit, what is 

going on now?” The same exact 

thoughts occurred to Cross 

behind him. Regulator 2 drove 

all the way back to the rear 

bobtail and stopped while still 

facing the enemy.26

Meanwhile up ahead, 

Delancey heard the low thud of 

an explosion followed by a second

explosion closer to his vehicle. 

“Mortars,” he thought. The third round exploded on the 

hood right in front of his windshield. Beck, five vehicles 

back, saw the cloud of smoke rise up from his vehicle. 

The blast had blown the console into Delancey’s lap, 

knocking him back and out of his seat. He then felt 

burning pain in his right shoulder and the shattered glass 

cut his face. The detached console had also landed on 

Ricketts’ leg pinning him to the floor. He could not 

feel his legs any more nor could he move. He heard 

Delancey screaming that he could not see. Just as 

Delancey sat back up, a round pierced the left front 

of his helmet, grazing the skin just above the left eye 

and exited out the back of his helmet. A second round 

punched through the right rear of his helmet. He 

screamed he was shot in the 

head. Ricketts saw 

that his friend’s face was 

covered with blood.27 

 Delancey looked at 

Ricketts and said with despair, 

“We are going to die.” Ricketts 

looked back at him and 

acknowledged, “I know.” 

With the blood cleared from 

his eyes Delancey looked 

out the window and saw four 

or five insurgents bounding 

from berm to berm toward his 

disabled truck. He grew angry 

at the prospect of dying and 

thought he might take a few of 

them with him. He said, “Fuck,” 

leaned back and kicked out the rest of the shattered 

windshield then crawled out onto the smoking hood. He 

saw between four and five insurgents shooting at him 

from a berm. He then opened fire with his SAW and not 

as many fired back after that. He fired another burst with 

Fire extinguisher struck by round made the crew think 

they had an engine fire. Photo courtesy of Jonathan Kennedy

The mortar round impact on Ricketts’ truck. After wiping 

the blood from his eyes, Delancey kicked out the rest of the 

windshield to engage the approaching Iraqis. Photo courtesy 

of Richard Killblane

The scar on Delancey’s left eyebrow is where 

one round struck him and his helmet shows the 

evidence of two rounds that penetrated it. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 147

anger until there was no 

more return fire. Witnesses 

said he hit two to five 

insurgents. In spite of their 

losses, the insurgents still 

had both the northbound 

and southbound convoys 

trapped in the kill zone. 

Success was still within 

their grasp.28 

Over across the 

median, only two gun 

trucks defended the stalled 

southbound convoy. Within 

the first two minutes of the 

ambush, the enemy had fired 

over 12 RPGs but fortunately only hit two trucks. Stallion 

33C guarded the rear of the convoy and Stallion 33B 

sat in the middle. It would be a matter of time before 

the insurgents destroyed most of the trucks by fire and 

assault. Several insurgents maneuvered past Stallion 33B 

toward the front half of the convoy to the irrigation ditch 

that paralleled the road and yelled out a loud, “Alla Akbar!” 

as they prepared to overrun the stranded white trucks.29

As soon as SSG Nein saw the ambush from behind 

the southbound convoy, he rushed his Raven 42 patrol 

across the median to the northbound lane to race past 

the convoy, passing Stallion 33C parked on the shoulder 

of the road where they returned fire on the enemy. Nein’s 

intent was to take the initiative away from the enemy. 

He recognized this was the exact same location that a 

convoy had been hit two days before. He knew there 

was an access road up ahead. As he approached the 

turn, he only saw about ten 

insurgents hiding behind a 

little scrub of orchard trees 

that paralleled the access 

road. He assumed that the 

access road was the flank 

of the kill zone and told his 

driver, SGT Morris, to take 

the right hand turn and 

they would flank the enemy. 

Morris passed the halted 

tractors and trailers until he 

found a gap. As they passed, 

the MPs saw the civilian 

drivers climbing out of their 

vehicles. The MPs then 

pulled out between the 

convoy and the enemy and 

drove down the southbound 

lane at about three minutes 

into the ambush. Ahead of 

them trucks were twisted 

and turned in a herringbone 

manner. Raven 42’s 

gunners blazed away at 

the enemy as they raced 

ahead. SPC Jesse Ordunez 

in the second M1114, 

Raven 42B, had the choice 

of the Mk19 grenade launcher, M240B or M249 SAW. 

He was firing his M240B. An Iraqi seeing them yelled out 

in Arabic, “Here they come.” Unknown to Raven 42, they 

drove up right after the insurgents had yelled, 

“Alla Akbar,” thus disrupting their assault.30 

Raven 42C raced to the intersection through a 

hail of RPK machinegun fire and RPGs. RPK and AK 

rounds hit the windshield and grill of the HMMWV. Nein 

realized there were far more than just ten insurgents. 

Immediately after accessing the situation, he called the 

relay station, call sign “Handcuff,” for close air support. 

He wanted Apache attack helicopters as back up. When 

Raven 42C reached the road to make the right turn, an 

RPG struck the passenger door and the explosion lifted 

the vehicle up off the ground and moved it sideways. 

Nein turned around to check on his gunner, SPC Cooper. 

Cooper had collapsed face down behind Nein’s seat with 

his head hanging in the foot 

well. SPC Ashley Pullen, 

driving Raven 42B behind 

them, saw the explosion 

and hit her brakes. She 

thought, “Oh shit! Cooper’s 

there and I don’t see him.” 

Cooper was usually the 

gunner of her truck. Nein 

shook Cooper but he did 

not answer. Assuming he 

was dead, Nein started to 

climb over him to get up in 

SSG Timothy Nein was the squad leader of Raven 42. 

Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum

SGT Dustin Morris and SPC Casey Cooper of Raven 42C. 

Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
148 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the turret and man the .50. Suddenly, Cooper jumped 

up and said he was alright then climbed back into the 

turret. Seeing that Raven 42C was still moving, Pullen 

thought, “Okay, they’re fine,” and followed. As soon as 

Raven 42C turned west on the dirt road, Nein turned 

back to facing the front and saw seven parked cars with 

all four doors open and four of their trunks open. He 

quickly did the math and realized that there could be up 

to 28 insurgents in the area. He again called Handcuff 

telling them he needed close air immediately and then 

told Morris to drive about 200 meters down the road and 

stop. Raven 42B followed closely about 30 yards behind 

followed by Raven 42A with Ordunez blazing away with 

his SAW. SGT Rivera in Raven 42A had also seen the 

insurgents in a canal that paralleled the main road fire 

the RPG at Nein’s vehicle.31 

Heading down the access road, Nein told his driver, 

SGT Morris, to stop next to the main ditch so they could 

lay down flanking fire. When Raven 42C came to a stop, 

Nein saw his HMMWV was pretty shot up and oil was 

spraying on the windshield. He then saw an insurgent in 

the field getting ready to fire an RPG at them, so he and 

Morris climbed out of the vehicle to fire back with their 

M4 carbines. Nein heard rounds ping off his vehicle. SGT 

Hester’s Raven 42B with the Mk19 had halted about 50 

meters behind Nein and SGT Rivera’s Raven 42A armed 

with the M2 halted about 50 meters behind Hester’s. 

The access road was flanked by tall berms of earth and 

an orchard and smaller canal paralleled the north side 

of the access road. Rivera’s team had the best field 

of fire down the main canal that paralleled the main 

road and began engaging the insurgents. They likewise 

received the fury of the enemy’s fire.32 

Below: SPC Ashley 

Pullen drove Raven 

42B. Photo courtesy 

of the Army Women’s 

Museum

Left: SPC Cooper 

stands next to the 

RPG impact that 

wounded him. 

Photo courtesy of 

the Army Women’s 

Museum

Egress cars parked along the access road leading away 

from ASR Detroit. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum

Access road looking toward ASR Detroit. Photo courtesy of the 

Army Women’s Museum
Operation Iraqi Freedom 149

The gunners in the turrets began engaging the enemy 

while SSG Nein, SGT Hester, and SGT Morris came on 

line along in front of their vehicles to return fire. This was 

a drill they had rehearsed. SPC Pullen climbed out and 

went behind the left rear of her vehicle to fire as she had 

been taught. She was relatively new to the unit. She fired 

off a magazine and tossed the empty through her open 

door because she had been told the insurgents liked to 

rig explosives to dropped magazines.33

Some of the insurgents behind the irrigation ditches 

realized they had been flanked and tried to escape. Nein 

saw about four in the canal and one behind a car parallel 

to the road shooting at SPC William Haynes, the gunner in 

Rivera’s gun truck. Then SGT Casey Cooper in the turret 

of Raven 42C yelled down that there was an Iraqi firing 

from the berm behind them, “Somebody throw a grenade 

over there.” Nein went over and climbed up the 10 -foot 

high berm. At the same time, Pullen passed him going to 

Hester’s side. She asked her team leader, “What are we 

doing?” Pullen then heard yelling on her handheld radio 

in the HMMWV and told Hester she was going to find out 

what the noise was. She reached through the passenger 

door and picked up the radio then stood there listening 

to SPC Jason Mike yelling he needed help and that 

everyone was down. She looked down the road and 

so no one but Rivera rolling on the ground in the mud. 

She then looked up and saw Nein throw a grenade 

over the south berm.34 

Pullen was having trouble understanding Mike and 

told him to go to his SINCGARS. At the same time, Hester 

came back for more 40mm rounds. Pullen then saw 

Nein climb back up the berm to make sure the insurgent 

Access road looking toward the kill zone of the 1075th and 518th convoy. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum

Damage done to Raven 42C in the kill zone. Photo courtesy 

of the Army Women’s Museum

Rear view of Raven 42C in the kill zone with the embankment to its left. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
150 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

was dead. The insurgent was missing, but Nein saw 

spent cartridges where the insurgent had fired an RPK. 

Nein assumed he had fallen into the wet canal that 

paralleled the access road, so his rear was clear. Nein 

then turned back to the main fight north of the access 

road all the while enemy fire continued. Pullen finally 

heard Mike clearly and told him she was on her way. 

Hester had returned to the berm so Pullen yelled over to 

SSG Nein, “SGT Rivera is down, everybody’s down and 

Mike needs help. I’m going.” Nein looked down the road 

to Rivera’s location but saw who he thought was PFC 

Brian Mack, Rivera’s driver, lying on the ground. They 

were taking a beating from enemy fire. He told Pullen, 

“Okay, you do what you got to do,” then went running 

back to Hester’s position on the north berm.35 

Right after Raven 42A had stopped adjacent to 

the irrigation ditch that paralleled the main road, SGT 

Rivera, SPC Mack, and SPC Mike dismounted and took 

cover behind their vehicle to engage the insurgents in 

the irrigation ditch while SPC Haynes blazed away with 

his .50 in the turret. Mack, the combat medic, fired all 

his 9mm rounds then picked up Mack’s M4 and fired it. 

Mack was firing Haynes’ SAW. Shortly after, Mack was 

shot in the arm. Mike then pulled Mack to cover halfway 

under his vehicle. Moments later, Rivera was hit in the 

lower torso. Since both had been behind the vehicle, Mike 

realized that they were taking fire from the south side of 

the road. At that distance from the two-story house, the 

berm did not offer Raven 42A as much cover from fire 

as it did the other two gun trucks closer to it. Mike also 

pulled Rivera to a covered position under the vehicle and 

returned fire in that direction. While he was engaging to 

his rear, a round similarly hit Haynes in the back. Haynes 

stopped firing to bandage his own wounds. Mike picked 

up the SAW and fired into the irrigation ditch until Haynes 

could get back up behind his .50. It was at that time Mike 

radioed Pullen that nearly everyone was a casualty.36

Upon hearing the news of casualties, Nein realized 

that his small force was severely outnumbered and it 

occurred to him there was a good chance his force could 

get overrun. He feared if the enemy overran Rivera’s 

position so far away, they could then turn the .50 on his 

two crews. The situation looked grim. He grabbed the 

radio and told Handcuff they were fighting a platoonsized force or larger and needed close air support 

immediately. The situation looked so desperate he 

even considered destroying his Blue Force Tracker. Nein 

returned to the firing line and began to take fire from the 

two-story house behind him to the south of the access 

road. It finally dawned on him that he was not on the 

flank of the enemy but in the middle of the kill zone.37 

After what seemed like 10 to 15 minutes fighting 

on the access road, the situation looked desperate and 

Nein considered a bold an audacious attack on the 

enemy to throw them on the defensive. Nein went over 

and told SPC Ordunez, the gunner on Hester’s vehicle, 

The two-story house is almost hidden by the embankment of the access road. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
Operation Iraqi Freedom 151

to fire his Mk19 into the house. He fired off between 10 

and 15 rounds but it had no effect on the enemy gunner. 

Ordunez then fired his SAW until a round knocked it out 

of his hands into the HMMWV. Ordunez looked behind 

him and saw an Iraqi with an RPK machinegun pointed at 

him about 15 meters away on top of the berm. Ordunez 

thought, “This is end, there is no way out.” He then spun 

his 240B around and fired it at him. Meanwhile, Nein 

walked back to the firing line, stood up and then jumped 

into the canal that paralleled the access road and yelled, 

“I need a 203 down here!” Hester with the M203 joined 

him. Morris intuitively followed along the road knowing 

they needed overhead cover.38

Nein with an M4 on the left and Hester with an 

M203 on the right advanced along the ditch. Both had 

two hand grenades each. Something else they had 

discussed before was if they ever had to go head-tohead with the enemy square up that way the body armor 

would protect them. The side of the body armor was 

weak where the Kevlar material overlapped. Hester fired 

two grenade rounds from M203 at the enemy about 50 

meters away but the rounds went over them. Nein told 

her they had to keep going forward. 

They would have to throw hand grenades instead. 

Hester would fire over Nein’s shoulder while he threw 

grenades then advance and clear out the ditch. He threw 

his two grenades and Hester handed him one and ended 

up throwing one herself. At one point an Iraqi 20 yards 

away sprayed his AK at them from the hip. Rounds hit 

all around them but Nein could not believe he missed. 

It usually took four rounds of 5.56mm (just a little larger 

than a .22 caliber) to drop the Iraqis. They killed four 

Iraqis in the canal that led to the main canal.39

Meanwhile, Pullen had climbed back in the driver’s 

seat and yelled up to her gunner, Ordunez, they were 

going to help Rivera. She then put the vehicle in reverse; 

spun back around facing the opposite direction then 

put it in forward and drove closer to Rivera. While Nein 

and Hester approached the main canal, Raven 42B 

paralleled them with Ordunez firing over Morris’ head. 

They halted when they reached Rivera’s vehicle.40

Pullen then climbed out of her vehicle on the contact 

side and ran to Rivera with her M4 in hand. They were 

still under heavy enemy fire so she sat next to Rivera 

with the back of her body armor toward the enemy. She 

saw Mike and asked, “Mike, what do you need me to 

do?” He told her, “Tend to Rivera. I’ve got everything 

else covered.” She then looked at Rivera and asked 

where he hurt. Pullen realized she needed bandages 

and since Rivera did not have his weapon she left him 

hers. Armed with her 9mm Beretta, she ran back to her 

vehicle and brought back her combat life saver bag not 

thinking there was one in the vehicle next to her. She 

dumped the contents out on the road. Rivera screamed 

SGT Leigh Ann Hester standing near the irrigation ditch with ASR Detroit in the background. The HMMWVs are parked 

at the intersection. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
152 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

he could not feel his legs. She told him to calm down 

and that he needed to help her. He helped her take off 

his body armor and she pushed up his shirt. She saw 

he was bleeding from a hole in his stomach and saw a 

lot of blood everywhere. She told him she needed to roll 

him over and check for an exit wound. She found one. She 

then heard Mike yell into the radio, “AT4! Backblast area! 

Clear!” Pullen threw herself over Rivera’s body to shield 

it because she was so close to Mike she could reach out 

and touch him. He fired the AT4 at the two - story house 

that was causing most of the trouble.41

As the evidence would later reveal, around 50 

insurgents had laid an L- shaped ambush oriented to 

the north with the base of the “L” across the road about 

where the middle of the 1075th convoy halted. The 

access road divided the kill zone in two parts and Nein 

was looking at about 35 insurgents to the north engaging 

the southbound convoy and about 15 behind him to 

the south engaging the northbound convoy. The south 

half of the ambush began with a couple of insurgents 

firing from a different two - story house to the west of the 

road followed by fire from about five insurgents behind 

berms to the south of the house. After a while, about six 

insurgents behind the house began to fire on the rear half 

of the 1075th convoy. There were two insurgents across 

the street forming the “L.” The bulk of the enemy fire 

was concentrated near the access road where the two 

convoys met. Amazingly, in the heat of battle the soldiers 

of the two convoys had not even seen each other.42

From the south part of the kill zone, the 1075th 

convoy heard the intensity of the gun battle on the access 

road, but still had fight of their own. Bullets zipped through 

Ron Hart’s truck. He was drawing fire from his left, so he 

decided to drive around to the right and get behind the 

container trucks. The only trucks with containers were 

Army green trucks. The commercial white trucks pulled 

thin-skinned vans or flat bed trailers. Ron pulled up and 

stopped beside the green truck but saw drivers behind 

him had followed. Cross and others were thinking of self 

preservation and also wanted to pull up beside a military 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 153

truck to use it for cover. Where Hart had stopped left the 

others exposed and the enemy fire had increased. So 

he decided to drive further up to the forward-most green 

truck to allow the others to also find cover behind the other 

green trucks. He passed two more green trucks 

and pulled up to right of Ricketts’ truck.43 

Four other trucks edged up right behind Hart’s truck 

and could go no further. Cross, in the third vehicle behind 

Hart, saw enemy fire from the right side of the road. The 

other drivers climbed out of their trucks for cover and 

Cross knew he also had to get out. As he was rolling 

down the window to get out, he heard the back of his 

trailer get hit four times and then heard a boom. The 

next thing he knew, he was flying through the window not 

knowing whether he had been blown through it or jumped 

out through it, but he worried about his face hitting the 

asphalt. So he put his hand out and rolled coming to a 

stop near the rear tandems. He planned to remain there, 

but heard rounds hitting the trailer and decided to hide 

behind his tractor. He saw a white truck and a military 

truck with a container ahead of it, so he took cover 

behind the rear tandems of the white truck. Another 

American driver pulled up behind him and Cross held up 

his fist to signal him to stay put. A Third Country National 

jumped out of his vehicle cried, “Allah,” and knelt down to 

pray. Cross knew things had gone from bad to worse.44

Meanwhile, Hart had thrown the air brakes on and 

likewise climbed out of his truck to get down behind 

the cover of the duals of the green truck, but ran into 

Delancey just as he was climbing out of his truck. The 

young soldier’s face was covered with blood and he still 

had the SAW in his hand. When Hart saw Delancey, he 

lost his fear and forgot he was a civilian. It kicked in his 

head that he was a platoon sergeant again and Delancey 

was one of his soldiers. The old retired infantry sergeant 

first class got angry and told Delancey to get his ass 

down. “Give me that SAW.” Delancey told him his partner 

was still in the truck. Hart told the young soldier there 

was nothing he could do for Ricketts right then, but “we 

need to kill these bastards before they kill us.” Hart then 

picked up the SAW and took up a firing position behind 

the first set of rear duals on the tractor below the trailer. 

It gave him the best amount of protection and good 

field of fire. He fired at all the windows of the two- story 

house where he thought the sniper was. He then fired at 

the water tower. He then fired at anything he suspected 

looked like a sniper position.45

After firing off the first 200 rounds, Hart asked 

Delancey if he had any more ammunition. Delancey said, 

“Up in the cab.” Hart went up to the cab and grabbed 

one can of ammunition and hoped it was not M16. He 

heard Ricketts moaning and told him “Just hang on. We 

will get you out as soon as we can. Don’t move around.” 

Hart then returned to his position and loaded the belt 

directly into the SAW. Delancey wanted to show him 

how to load the plastic drum on the side of the SAW. 

Hart said, “Don’t worry about that I already know how 

to do it. We don’t need to be pretty right now.”46

Six Iraqis popped up along the berm that paralleled 

the left side of the road and were running away toward 

where they could shoot at the rear of the convoy. They 

were wearing the Iraqi Police uniforms: blue shirt, black 

Kevlar vest and black helmet. It puzzled Hart but he 

thought, “They are in the wrong location,” so he decided 

the fire them up. He fired off another 100 round belt. He 

did not know if he hit anyone, but when he stopped firing, 

“they weren’t running anymore.” He heard something 

going on to his right side and saw a soldier climbing into 

the cab of the truck. Hart continued to provide covering 

fire with the SAW. It was SPC Jenny Beck, the driver of 

the next M915 in line behind Ricketts’. The drivers were 

beginning to take decisive action.47

SSG Uhl and SPC Bos had waited at the rally point 

and hoped the remainder of the trucks would start 

coming out of the kill zone, but for the longest time, none 

followed. Uhl finally turned to Bos and said, “We have to 

go back.” This violated their doctrine but he had to do 

something. So Bos skillfully turned his rig around and 

Uhl radioed the others he was driving back into the kill 

zone. Suddenly, Beck called back and asked, “Can we 

come out to you?” For the first time, SGT Bloebaum, 

the assistant convoy commander, finally realized the 

convoy commander was no longer with the convoy. 

There had been no battle handoff to let him know 

he was in charge.48 

Beck had gone through a roller coaster ride of 

emotions. First she had mistaken Ricketts’ voice as 

that of her fiancé, SPC Bos. She was panicky until she 

realized who it really was. She then saw the mortar 

round hit Ricketts’ truck and she called them on the 

radio. She heard nothing. She had a sinking feeling in 

her stomach fearing the worst had happened. Tears 
154 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

welled up in her eyes and Bloebaum comforted her 

saying, “It’s okay. They’ll be fine.” He added, “Don’t 

worry about it. Let’s get out of here.” With that he began 

typing a request for medevac on his MTS and sent 

their grid coordinates. Both of them let the air out of 

their seats to let them sit lower behind the door armor. 

Bloebaum then came up with a plan.49

He knew that to get convoy vehicles moving, a 

military truck would have to lead them out. He told 

Beck, “We’ve got to get these white trucks out of our 

way. We’ve got to get the ones behind us to back up. 

That way, we can back up and go around the rest of the 

whites to Ricketts and Delancey.” About that time, Graff 

called over the radio asking if there was a way to drive 

around the traffic jam. That was a relief for Beck.50 

Five vehicles behind them, Graff and Harris decided 

to clear the kill zone on their own. Their truck crawled 

forward looking for an opening on the right but that 

escape route was blocked. As they moved, enemy fire 

increased. Just as they were about to turn to the left, a 

burst of machinegun fire hit their cab. Graff looked over 

at Harris and he was holding his neck. One round had 

penetrated the windshield, hit the lip of Harris’ helmet, 

shattering and sending fragments of the helmet and 

bullet down his face and neck, knocking him against 

the passenger door. Harris lay there trying to clear 

the cob webs out of his mind when he felt something 

cold and wet splash against his hand. He knew it was 

blood. This brought him a little back to his senses and 

he reached up and pinched off his carotid artery. He 

then saw Graff looking at him. Unable to speak, Harris 

motioned to the front. Graff knew what it meant. He 

had to get his battle buddy quickly out of the kill zone to 

safety where he could be medevaced or he would die.51 

Graff pushed down on the accelerator and 

maneuvered around the right side of the convoy. 

Upon coming abreast of Ricketts’ vehicle he pushed 

the smoldering bus out of the way and drove into the 

southbound lane, drawing a hail of small arms fire that 

hit the truck sounding like popcorn. Graff was driving 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 155

through the center and most intense part of the kill 

zone. Chunks of fiberglass from the hood of his truck were 

flying everywhere as rounds tour it apart. A round passed 

through the side window striking him in the shoulder. Graff 

only felt a tug and reached up underneath his deltoid 

armor and drew back a bloody hand. He also heard the 

hiss of an air leak and feared rounds had punctured an air 

line and his trailer brakes might lock up. Unknown to him 

the hiss came from his tires. He pushed his truck on as 

hard as he could and cleared the kill zone.52

Once Graff’s vehicle left, the white trucks behind 

Beck and Bloebaum had room to back up. Beck hung 

out the door and motioned the DoD drivers behind her to 

back up. They understood and were still in their cabs. The 

first DoD speaking driver put his rig in reverse, backed up 

and then drove around the convoy. Others followed. After 

four more vehicles passed by, Van Reokel in the lead gun 

truck, Regulator 1, ordered Higgins to follow them to the 

rally point, “Let’s get moving, let’s get moving!” At 1157 

hours, they cleared the kill zone. They had spent around 

15 minutes near the center of the kill zone and had fired 

off a total of 30 magazines of M16, two drums of M249 

SAW ammunition and 200 rounds of .50 caliber.53 

As soon as room opened up behind Beck and 

Bloebaum, Uhl came over the radio saying he was coming 

back. Bloebaum told Beck to tell Uhl to stop, turn around 

and set up a casualty collection point. He knew if Uhl 

reentered the kill zone, there would be no one to stop 

the other trucks coming out. They would just keep driving 

down the road. Beck radioed Uhl, “Don’t come back. Can 

we come out where you are at?” Relieved, Uhl found her 

question funny. That was what he had wanted them to 

do. He said, “Yes, yes. Get out here.” Uhl then ordered 

Bos to turn his truck around and return to the spot 

where he originally stopped.54

About that time Graff pulled up next to Uhl with fluid 

spraying out of his tractor. Graff jumped out and yelled 

that Harris was hurt. Uhl jumped from his truck, ran to 

Harris’ door and opened it to see the young soldier with 

blood covering his face. Harris looked at his squad leader 

as if to ask how he was. He then gritted his teeth and 

rolled his eyes. He tossed his combat life saver bag to 

Bos who helped Graff pull Harris from the cab and set 

him down against the wheel of his truck. Bos then began 

treating his wounds while Uhl radioed for a medevac.55

Back in the kill zone, Bloebaum told Beck to pull 

her rig up to the right of Hart’s. They crept forward about 

15 mph when a Third Country National jumped up the 

running board next to her door to show her the wound in 

his arm. She opened the door and he crawled in behind 

her next to the MTS. Reaching Hart’s vehicle, she then 

jumped out of the cab and walked around to Ricketts’ 

truck still under fire. Typical of a truck driver, she did not 

carry her weapon. Upon seeing her, Delancey struggled 

to his feet. He told her to get them out of there and that 

Ricketts was still in the truck. She told him to get in her 

truck. Bloebaum had just opened the door to get out 

when Delancey climbed up and jumped in. Sandwiched 

between the Third Country National and Delancey, the 

assistant convoy commander then treated Delancey’s 

wounds and sent more MTS text messages.56 

Meanwhile, Beck opened the passenger door and 

looked in the cab at Ricketts lying helplessly on the floor 

board pinned under the wreckage of the console. He 

raised his head off the seat and looked surprised to see 

her. He told her, “I’m stuck.” She told him, “I don’t care. 

You’re getting out of there.” She reached in and began 

pulling. Trapped under the console, he could not budge. 

She cursed at him and he explained, “I can’t move.” It 

seemed the harder she pulled the tighter he became 

lodged under the console. She yelled at him, “We’re not 

leaving you here. If you’re not doing it for yourself, you’re 

doing it for me. You’re not staying here.” He said, “Okay, 

but my legs are stuck...my right leg is stuck and I’m shot 

in the left leg.” She told him to push with his good leg 

no matter how much it hurt. She counted to three and 

she strained with all her strength. Ricketts finally started 

moving. She now had a problem in that she could not 

hold Ricketts up.57

When Hart looked over again, he saw Beck pulling 

Ricketts out. She appeared excited and out breath, but 

in control. Afraid she would drop Ricketts, Beck asked 

Hart if he could help pull Ricketts out of the cab and 

drag him around to the other side of his truck. So Hart 

laid the SAW down near the rear duals and the two 

lowered Ricketts to the ground. Then they dragged him 

by the collar of his body armor. Still under fire, Ricketts 

then rolled over on his stomach and started to crawl so 

Hart could pull him a little faster. About that time, Stallion 

33A drove by heading north to the access road.58

Beck then climbed half way in her cab when she saw 

that her truck was crowded with three people in the cab. 
156 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

She turned around, looked down and told Hart she had 

no more room in her truck. She felt bad about having 

to leave him. Ricketts was trying to climb into the cab 

when she told him there was not room. He understood, 

climbed down and crawled under Hart’s trailer. She said 

someone else would come and pick Ricketts up. She 

then asked Hart if he had picked up Ricketts’ M16. She 

did not want to leave any weapons around. He said no 

and she then asked if he could go get it. He responded, 

“Right, no problem.” She then climbed back in her cab 

and radioed the trucks behind her to pick up Ricketts. 

She stepped down again to tell Hart to hold that position 

until one of the drivers behind her recovered Ricketts. 

For some reason her focus on a military driver picking 

up Ricketts overlooked the fact that Hart’s truck still 

worked and he could have driven him out. Beck then 

signaled the civilian drivers behind her to get ready to go, 

mounted, and drove her M915 into the median and out 

of the kill zone with several other drivers following.59

Cross remembered Beck came back screaming, 

“We’ve gotta move.” A truck driven by an English man 

had stopped immediately behind Hart’s, the next was 

driven by Peterson from Australia,60 and then Cross 

with another American driver behind him. Cross replied, 

“I can’t move unless they move. Listen I’m back here. 

If you can get these guys to move, I’m with you a 

hundred percent.” So the other drivers climbed back 

into their trucks and followed her out. The Brit led the 

group, followed by the Aussie, Cross and then the other 

American. As they pulled out there was an explosion 

behind the Aussie’s truck and the right side of Cross’ 

truck. Cross drove with his eyeballs peering just over 

the steering wheel.61

Beck led the four contract trucks across the median 

just past the burning bus. When the truck directly in front 

of Cross’ reached the median, its drive wheels began 

spinning in the mud. Meanwhile Cross was building up 

momentum to power through the mud, but feared he 

was going to run into the back of the trailer ahead of 

him. Flames were shooting out of the bus just a few feet 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 157

away and Cross felt the intense heat coming through his 

window. He held off hitting brakes until the last moment, 

and luckily the truck ahead caught traction and took off. 

So Cross kept his foot on the accelerator and his truck 

fishtailed through the muddy median.62

Cross saw Iraqis fire and duck. Most were wearing 

street clothes, but a couple wore blue shirts and one 

even wore a dark blue Iraqi Police armband. He saw no 

more than two at a time. He then spotted the head and 

shoulders of an Iraqi with an RPG to his left. Cross hit the 

brakes and his truck wiggled as it slowed down just 

as the RPG flew past the front of his truck, glanced off 

the asphalt and landed in the field. He did not know 

if it exploded. He remembered it them took 45 seconds 

to clear the kill zone.63

Meanwhile, Beck radioed back to SPC Kelly 

Kinzer and SPC Paul Rullo that she had Delancey, 

was heading north and for them to pick Ricketts up. 

They misunderstood that she had Ricketts. Uhl also 

misunderstood her. Kinzer and Rullo followed her out of 

the kill zone as Ricketts watched the column of trucks 

pass. A strange sense of ease came over him. He did 

not want to stop any of them because they were not 

supposed to stop in the kill zone. He would have felt 

terrible if someone was killed on his account. A good 

portion of the 1075th convoy had finally cleared the kill 

zone and no one picked up Ricketts.64

After the first four trucks had driven forward behind 

Graff, Regulator 1 raced ahead of the vehicles past 

the AAFES convoy on their left and after a minute 

slowed down, unable to see any vehicles behind it. An 

RPG streaked at it and the crew returned fire. They 

accelerated again and, after less than a minute 

of driving, Van Roekel asked, “Is the driver behind us?” 

Higgins answered, “No.” 

“Why are you driving then?” 

Higgins responded, “You told me to get out of the 

fucking kill zone.” 

“So where is the convoy?”65

By their doctrine they were supposed to establish 

the rally point three to six miles down the road out of the 

range of enemy weapons, but they had no idea Uhl had 

set it up just one mile from the kill zone.

Higgins then slowed her HMMWV to a stop and 

realized no one was behind them. They had not even 

seen Uhl’s M915 when they passed it. They then 

checked their status of ammunition and SFC Ramero 

stepped out to look for the convoy. Two minutes later 

they turned around and drove back toward the kill zone. 

They found Graff and Uhl’s M915s parked side-by- side. 

The crew dismounted and then Torres and Higgins went 

over to treat Harris’s wound. A few minutes later the 

white trucks pulled up. Refusing treatment, Graf walked 

to the southbound lane and waved at an approaching 

HET convoy to stop.66

About 20 minutes after the ambush began, SSG 

Shirley Jacobs’ southbound convoy of the 4th Platoon, 

96th HET heading from Anaconda to Scania neared the 

kill zone from the north. Her call sign was “Dragon 47.” 

This was SSG Jacobs’ first time as convoy commander. 

Her convoy included seven green HETs, 14 white HETs, 

three gun trucks, a contact truck with spare parts and 

a wrecker, for a total of 25 vehicles. Off in the distance, 

Jacobs saw smoke which was a common sight in Iraq. 

Locals burned everything. She then heard on the Sheriff 

net about an ambush, but when she plotted the ambush 

grid on her route map, it was not in the direction she 

headed. She had the wrong grid coordinates so she 

did not think there was any trouble up ahead.67

She then called “Yellow Jacket,” her escort from 

A Battery, 1st Battalion, 178th FA on the SINCGARS, 

“I can hear them on the SINCGARS. We’re close.” As 

her convoy neared the smoke, Jacobs saw three parked 

M915s about 300 meters ahead. Smoke was coming 

from the right hand side of the road further ahead. She 

planned to stop and help, and as soon as she passed 

the first M915, she saw a soldier bleeding from a head 

wound, a sergeant and a female soldier standing next 

to him. Jacobs then pulled up next to the second 

M915 and stopped.68

Jacobs then instructed her convoy to go into a box 

formation. Her green HETs alternated pulling in left and 

right behind her vehicle. The white HETs followed the 

green HETs in front of them and the gun trucks took up 

security around the box. She had been a drill instructor 

at Fort Jackson and taught basic training soldiers the 

box formation. She called her soldiers on the SINCGARS, 

“Get out of the trucks and pull security. Do not go to the 

right side.” From the sound of gun fire, she could tell that 

her right side was exposed to fire. The ambush sounded 

like the gun fire she had heard on firing ranges when 

she was a drill instructor. As soon as the Third Country 
158 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Nationals climbed out of 

their vehicles, the NCOs 

knew to herd them into the 

center of the box.69

Graff yelled over that 

his convoy needed medics 

and combat life savers. 

SSG Jacobs, PFC Christy 

Kirkland, the combat life 

saver, and SGT Eddie 

Munos, the driver, climbed 

out of her lead HET and 

went over to the wounded 

soldier in front of the lead 

vehicle. About that time the gunfire stopped. Jacobs saw 

an Apache helicopter overhead. It circled in wide loops 

and the enemy fire always stopped when the Apache 

appeared overhead. Kirkland automatically started 

triaging the wounded. 

Jacobs asked Uhl, “How many are hit, how 

many vehicles in your convoy? Have you called for 

a medevac?” 

Visibly shaken, Uhl answered, “There are three or 

four people that I know of.” He also told her how many 

vehicles he had and he had already called for 

a medevac.70

Up until then, Stallion 33C was under fire in the 

rear of the AAFES convoy when SGT Ricky D. Burke, 

the vehicle commander, heard Stallion 33B was 

receiving heavier fire up front. Burke and his .50 gunner, 

SPC Kirby Gregory, suppressed much of the enemy fire. 

That was the time Raven 42 radioed they were taking 

fire from both sides of the road and needed help. By 

that time, Jacobs’ HET convoy had pulled up so Burke 

knew she covered his rear and he instructed SGT 

Mathew T. Simpson to drive their M1114 to the front 

of the convoy. They drove down the northbound lane 

behind the vehicles, passed the burning Reefer trailer, 

crossed over into the southbound lane again. Upon 

seeing Raven 42’s M1114s on the access road, 

Stallion 33C drove to help them.71 

Much earlier, Regulator 3, in the rear of the 1075th 

convoy, heard gunfire to their left front but could not see 

where it was coming from. They could hear the sound of 

gun fire getting closer and, about two or three seconds 

later, rounds started pinging off their HMMWV. A heavy 

volume of fire flattened 

three of its tires and hit 

its ballistic windshield. 

The crew still could not 

see any enemy to engage. 

They then heard Ricketts 

scream on the radio, 

“I’ve been hit, I’ve been 

hit!” SSG Aaron Castro 

on the .50 returned fire 

in the direction he heard 

enemy fire but his .50 also 

jammed after firing a few 

rounds. His turret also 

locked up and would not rotate. SGT Rondell Brown, the 

vehicle commander, thought they were sitting ducks 

and SGT Anthony Hernandez, the driver, yelled they had 

to get out of there. Although their place was protecting 

the rear of the convoy, they were unable to see anything 

to fire at so Brown told Hernandez to drive around the 

right side of the convoy using the trucks as a shield just 

as Raven 42 and Stallion 33 had. They saw the drivers 

on the right side of the road hiding behind their trucks. 

As they drove down the right side of the convoy they 

received small arms fire from the field in that direction. 

They returned fire and quieted that side of the road. 

Through the gaps they saw Regulator 2 falling back. 

Brown asked Hernandez, “Where are they going?” 

Regulator 3 returned fire and kept going until they found 

a gap in the convoy large enough to drive through. They 

nosed their HMMWV through and saw enemy fire from 

the direction of the warehouse and grove of trees by the 

access road. They felt if they could drive to the cover 

of the berm, they could suppress the enemy fire and 

protect the convoy. While they drove to it they saw three 

Iraqis come out of the two - story house with RPGs. They 

arrived right behind Stallion 33C.72 

Upon reaching the access road, the crew of 

Regulator 3 only saw two HMMWVs parked with their 

crews in a fight of their own. They saw one wounded MP 

on the ground, Haynes firing the .50 from the turret and 

Mike firing his M4 from the berm. They saw Haynes get 

hit in the hand and then he dismounted. They thought 

the .50 was inoperable. This was the final act in the 

heroic fight by the MPs of the Raven 42.73

While engaging the enemy, Haynes, on top of Raven 

Looking north from the kill zone with Apache flying 

overhead. Photo courtesy of the 106th Transportation Battalion
Operation Iraqi Freedom 159

42C, saw SSG Nein and SGT Hester approaching along 

the irrigation ditch. He stopped firing his .50 and called 

a cease fire. About that time, Nein, Hester and Morris 

came over to assess the situation. SGT Hester calmly 

walked over while the enemy fire continued and asked 

Pullen what she needed. Pullen was holding down a 

compress bandage on Rivera’s stomach and said she 

needed another bandage. She was not trained as a 

combat life saver (CLS) and did the best she could, but 

did not know what she was looking for in the CLS bag. 

For some reason, she did not think to use the bandage 

on Rivera’s vest. Rivera was screaming for her to get off 

of him because it was hurting. She fought back the tears 

as she tried to calm the sergeant down. She told him 

to think about his little son, his mother, his home and 

Kentucky. Hester then calmly walked over to Brown and 

Hernandez who had dismounted from Regulator 3 and 

asked if they had a combat life saver on board. All were 

combat lifesaver qualified, so Hester told Brown, “We 

need a Medevac, we need a Medevac!” Brown walked 

back to his vehicle and called for a Medevac on his radio. 

While Hernandez headed toward the wounded, Brown 

learned a medevac was already on the way so he took 

up a firing position along the berm with Castro who had 

already dismounted with his SAW. Pullen looked up at the 

nearest gun truck, Stallion 33A, and saw the driver sitting 

there. She yelled over at Mike, “Get him out of there and 

make him do something!” Mike physically hauled him out 

of the vehicle. SGT Burke and SGT Simpson, wearing tan 

body armor, dismounted and ran over to Pullen to render 

medical assistance to Rivera and provide covering fire. 

She did not hear them. She just saw them staring at her 

causing her to remark, “If you’re not going to help me, 

go shoot somebody or something; but just don’t stand 

there and stare at me!” They were still under fire and 

ran over to help Mack.74

Simpson then dragged Mack behind the cover of 

the driver’s side of his vehicle to treat his wounds. They 

then came under fire from the two - story building to the 

south. That was when they saw Mike fire the AT4 into 

the building. After the explosion, the crew of Regulator 3 

saw six or seven Iraqis running from the house. Shortly 

after this, Stallion 33B arrived and provided additional 

.50 caliber fire into the irrigation ditch. SFC Hammons 

and his driver, SPC Kevin R. Vogal, climbed out to load 

SPC Mack into their vehicle for evacuation. As Stallion 

33B prepared to leave, Stallion 33A pulled up. Hammons 

then instructed SGT Baker in Stallion 33A to call for a 

medevac and establish a landing zone. As both Stallion 

33A and 33B drove back to the main road, they received 

heavy fire from both sides of the access road. Stallion 

33A fired to the north side of the road while Stallion 

33A returned fire to the south side. They drove south 

to the check point taking fire the whole way. There they 

established a casualty collection point and landing zone 

600 to 1,000 meters south on the road. Stallion 33A 

and 33B then found the lone Third Country National 

where they had left him. Baker called in the nine-line 

medevac report. The tail end of the 1075th convoy 

was still ahead of them.75 

While they were working on Mack, SPC Hernandez 

of Regulator 3 walked up wearing green body armor and 

asked Pullen, “What can I do to help you!” She said, 

“We need to move him, get him out of the mud and get 

him to a truck.” Hernandez pulled out his Gerber knife 

and cut off Rivera’s gear and then he helped bandage 

SGT Rivera’s wounds while Pullen calmed him. They 

called SPC Mike over who then grabbed Rivera’s feet, 

Hernandez his arms and lifted him while Pullen held 

the bandages. They carried him to the nearest vehicle, 

Stallion 33C, and started to slide him across the back 

seat, but there was a cooler and other trash in the way. 

Pullen yelled, “Get this crap out of here. He’s not going 

to be in any more pain than necessary.” Someone came 

and tossed the junk out of the vehicle which took a 

while. Ordunez finally came over while Pullen was trying 

to insert an IV into Rivera. Since she was not combat 

life saver trained she did not know how, which was 

good. She later learned that she was not supposed to 

administer an IV to someone with a stomach wound. 

Ordunez handed Rivera the guardian angel his fiancé 

had mailed him for protection then looked at Pullen and, 

with tears in his eyes, asked if Rivera would be okay. 

Pullen told him she would not let anything happen to 

him. After 20 minutes the fight had died down on the 

access road but it still raged over on the south half 

of the kill zone.76

After Beck drove off, Hart went back to Ricketts’ 

truck, picked up the SAW and took up another firing 

position. Lying under Hart’s trailer, Ricketts had watched 

the trucks roll by with none stopping. Hart remained in the 

firing position for five more minutes until he knew Beck 
160 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

was safely down the road. He picked up the M16 and 

threw it inside his truck. He then went over to check on 

Ricketts and give him water. A Third Country National had 

shown up and was also sitting next to him. They waited 

for someone to drive by and pick Ricketts up. However, it 

finally occurred to Ricketts the others had forgotten him.77 

Beck and Bloebaum reached the casualty collection 

point established by Uhl. There she climbed out of her 

cab and felt a sense of relief seeing her fiancé, Bos. 

The two helped Delancey out of his body armor so the 

combat life savers could treat his wounds. She sat by 

comforting him while worrying about Ricketts. Someone 

yelled out that Ricketts was inbound with Rullo and 

Kinzer. Beck and several other drivers grabbed a litter 

to meet the truck. To her shock, Ricketts was not in 

the truck. She realized they had left him behind. She 

was furious and communication with the rear of the 

convoy was bad.78

Back in the kill zone, Hart and Ricketts, however, 

remained along with seven white trucks, two green and 

the bobtail. Many of the contract drivers were hiding 

in the ditch. SPC Michael Sharples, the driver of the 

second-to-last M915, had understood the call to pick 

Ricketts up and had seen Rullo and Kinzer’s truck slow 

down as it passed Hart’s truck. He was glad to see the 

convoy finally moving again. Just to make sure 

that someone picked up Ricketts, he asked on the radio, 

“Did anybody get Sergeant Ricketts?” Someone said, 

“Yeah, he’s here.” They may have confused Ricketts 

with Rickey Delancey.79

About that time, an F16 jet arrived and circled 

overhead as a show of force. Sharples told his driver, 

SPC Thomas Heesacker, “Stay here. I’ll be right back.” 

Sharples climbed out of his cab and ran along the line 

of trucks opening the doors to check for civilian drivers. 

The windshields and cabs were shot up but all the 

drivers were taking cover in the ditches. Upon reaching 

the last vehicle, there was a long gap between it and 

other trucks. As he stepped out, gun fire opened up on 

his left with the rounds hitting the ground in front of him. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 161

The small arms fire made the distance between 

the trucks immense. He told himself he was not going 

to run it alone, turned and then ran back to his truck 

hearing a couple more rounds pop over his head.80

About the same time, Birkel sitting in the last bobtail 

reached for the radio and asked the crew of Regulator 

2, “What’s wrong with your vehicle?” They told SPC Josh 

Birkel their transmission had been damaged. It had 

made a lot of noise when it backed up so SGT Kennedy 

wanted to tow it out. For this reason, they pulled up 

behind the bobtail. While the bobtail lined up with the 

tow bar on the front of the HMMWV, Kennedy ran up to 

ask the mechanic to come out and help. Once the tow 

bar was hooked up, the bobtail lurched forward. A few 

minutes after the F16 had arrived, a pair of Apaches 

flew overhead and the enemy fire momentarily died 

down. Dettman, in the turret of the HMMWV, was still 

firing when he felt the tow bar jerk. Kennedy called that 

he needed a medevac and whined why they were not 

leaving. They did not have a combat life saver bag in 

the vehicle so Kennedy used his and Dettman’s field 

dressing to bandage Hubbard’s wound. After they pulled 

up about 50 feet, Kennedy heard Regulator 3 was on its 

way to pick up Hubbard. While waiting, Birkel decided 

to climb out of the cab, go back and check the shot-up 

HMMWV for himself. It turned out the transmission was 

not damaged but he learned when Hubbard slumped 

forward, his body put the vehicle in low gear. So they 

disconnected the tow bar and Birkel returned to his 

cab where he ran into Sharples.81 

Pointing to the civilians, Sharples told him, “You 

need to help me get these guys out of here. There’s a 

big gap up there and I don’t want to do it alone. Maybe 

we can cover each other or something.” Wide - eyed at 

the suggestion, Birkel snapped back, “I’m not going to 

do that.” Sharples pleaded again, “C’mon man, we’re 

never going to get out of here if we don’t get them back 

in their trucks.” Birkels realized he was right and agreed. 

He then told his co-driver, SPC Jay Schrad, he was going 

forward with Sharples. Schrad provided covering fire 

out the window of his truck and Dettman, in Regulator 

2, laid down suppressive fire on insurgent positions in a 

dune and a house to their left and watched two to five 

insurgents drop and not get up again. The other two ran 

between the gaps in the trucks. Each time they drew 

enemy fire and Birkels was sure he was going to get hit. 

Soon Birkels became focused on what he was doing and 

blocked out the danger. He quit hearing gunfire. They 

reached the large gap and Sharples leaned around the 

nose of the truck and fired off a burst, then both sprinted 

across the gap. To their surprise, they drew no enemy fire 

this time probably because two Apache helicopters had 

arrived and circled overhead.82

Sharples and Birkel ran the 300 to 400 meter 

length of the convoy trying to get the drivers back 

in their trucks. Scared and unable to speak English, 

most of them did not initially respond to the orders 

and remained hidden in the ditch. Some climbed out 

of the ditch to hear what they had to say. It took a lot 

of prompting to get them back into their vehicles and 

drive out. Sharples discovered one Third Country 

National who had been shot in the butt hiding behind 

the tire and helped him into one of his friend’s truck. 

After getting all the drivers in their trucks, the two 

Americans were about to run back.83

Hart thought it was taking way too long for anyone 

to come and pick up Ricketts, so he went over to 

Ricketts’ cab and found his Motorola. He called on the 

radio, “I’ve got a wounded soldier. I need someone to 

come up here and get him.” It seemed like forever as 

nothing happened. Then he got on the radio again and 

said the same thing. Someone asked who he was. Hart 

said, “I’m one of the Western drivers up here at the front 

of the convoy with a wounded soldier.” Finally they said 

someone was coming up there.84 

As Birkel was about run back to his bobtail, a civilian 

driver grabbed his shoulder and pointed to Hart’s truck. 

There Birkel astonishingly saw Ricketts lying on the 

ground. Birkel ran yelling and waving to get Sharples’ 

attention. After Sharples saw Ricketts, he picked up 

the radio and angrily said, “I thought you guys had 

said you had Ricketts. Why is he still here?” Someone 

answered, “I don’t know. Get him up here because the 

choppers are here.” They sprinted across that open road 

and when they reached Ricketts he was nearly faint 

from the pain. Birkel inspected Ricketts’ leg wound and 

was surprised at how little it bled. The hot round had 

evidently cauterized the wound. Birkel and Sharples then 

carried their friend to Hart’s cab and loaded him. Hart 

jumped up in his truck while they assisted Ricketts into 

the sleeper behind him and then one said, “Once you 

get him loaded, go on down to a casualty collection 
162 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

point.” A Third Country National opened the door and 

asked if he could ride with Hart. Hart recognized him as 

one of the IAP Third Country Nationals and let him ride. 

So Hart drove off. His truck only had a few flat tires.85

As Birkel and Sharples ran back to their trucks, 

they forced the rest of the civilian drivers back into their 

trucks. Along the way,they saw one tractor had its air 

lines damaged so it could not pull its trailer, so they 

unhooked the trailer and had their bobtail come up and 

hook up to it. Birkel and Schrad then remained in the 

kill zone until the last of the civilian vehicles had cleared 

it. As the convoy drove forward, Hubbard came to and 

Kennedy told him to drive Regulator 2 forward. Finally 

the last drivers of the 1075th Medium Truck cleared 

the kill zone. 86

Over on the access road, Pullen told Hernandez 

they needed to medevac SGT Rivera soon. Hernandez 

replied, “Okay, let’s go.” So he crawled in the driver’s 

seat of Stallion 33C to drive to the southern casualty 

collection point. SGT Brown and SSG Castro mounted 

Regulator 3 and Brown told Hernandez to follow him 

there. Mike drove Raven 42A with Haynes in the 

turret behind them. Pullen sat in the back where the 

gunner normally stood and talked to Rivera. Meanwhile 

SPC Gregory, the gunner, rode up front in the vehicle 

commander’s seat. Pullen looked out the window and 

saw blown up trucks and SUVs - what looked like total 

destruction. She got on the radio and asked where 

SPC Mike was. Someone said he was behind her 

vehicle. She then asked where the landing zone was. 

He answered, “It’s straight ahead. Just keep moving.”87

Along the way they saw Regulator 2 still sitting in 

the kill zone behind the maintenance bobtail. Brown 

pulled Regulator 3 up to Regulator 2, where Kennedy 

informed him Hubbard was seriously wounded. Brown 

then called for a gun truck from the southern casualty 

collection point to come and pick up Hubbard. Stallion 

33B happen to be returning to the kill zone when they 

flagged it down. Brown and Castro jumped out then 

pulled Hubbard from his vehicle and put him in Stallion 

33B’s vehicle. Kennedy grabbed Burke’s hand and 

placed it on Hubbard’s bandages to keep the pressure 

on. Stallion 33C then drove him back to the southern 

casualty collection point.88

The medevac helicopter arrived at 1216 hours. 

SGT Baker and SPC Young were treating Mack’s arm 

wound when Regulator 3, Stallion 33B and 33C arrived 

at the casualty collection point with Hubbard and Rivera. 

A Regulator 3 combat life saver then relieved Young 

and took care of the wounded so Young could return 

to his .50 and provide security. Pullen told Rivera she 

was going to check on his boys, referring to Mike and 

Haynes. The wounded sergeant gave her a look like he 

wanted her to make sure they were okay. She told him 

Enemy weapons collected by the MP quick reaction force. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
Operation Iraqi Freedom 163

she would be right back and climbed out of Stallion 33C. 

She ran into SPC Mike who handed Haynes off to her. 

She walked him over to the helicopter and asked how he 

was. He had a glazed look and was shot in the hand. He 

said, “I’m okay. How are you?” She thought shock was 

setting in as he was a little off. She handed him to the 

guys in the helicopter and told him she was going back to 

get Mack. She walked over and looked down at Mack on 

the stretcher. She and Mack had fought with each other 

since she arrived in the company but bonded like brother 

and sister. She knelt down by his head because they 

were strapping him in and asked how he was. He looked 

up at her and asked, “Who are you?” Pullen responded, 

“What? It’s me Ammons (her maiden name). How can 

you forget me? You hate me?” He asked her to tell them 

to loosen his straps because they hurt his wounded 

arm. They later found out that he had a collapsed lung. 

Someone loosened the straps and Mike grabbed one 

side of the stretcher, Pullen the other and another soldier 

the other end. They loaded him into the helicopter. Pullen 

then went back to Rivera on the stretcher in Stallion 33C 

and the helicopter started to take off. She started yelling, 

“Where the hell are you going? I have another injured 

man down here!” The helicopter returned to the ground.89

Pullen held Rivera’s hand while they carried him 

to the helicopter. She told him she would not leave him. 

She had only been in the company for a month and a half 

and had formed a bond with SGT Rivera. He had a death 

grip on her hand. When they reached the helicopter the 

medics asked what was wrong. She told him that Rivera 

had an entry and exit wound in his stomach. She was 

getting ready to crawl up in the helicopter but the crew 

would not let her. She felt bad because she could not 

keep her promise to her sergeant. After the helicopter 

left with the three wounded, Pullen looked at Hernandez 

and SPC Gregory in Stallion 33C and then said, “If you’re 

coming with me, I’m going because my guys are still 

under fire so you better get your asses in.” They climbed 

in the vehicle and Pullen signaled Mike she was going 

back. The three HMMWVs, Raven 42A, Stallion 33B 

and 33C, returned to the access road where they found 

a large number of MPs sweeping the field north of the 

access road. Pullen dismounted and asked, “Where the 

hell did all these people come from? Where were they 

20 minutes ago when I needed them? She manned the 

radio the rest of the day. At the same time, Hernandez 

linked up with Brown in Regulator 3 and then drove 

north to Jacob and Uhl’s casualty collection point.90

After Raven 42A had left, Nein ordered his remaining 

Raven and Stallion soldiers to sweep the field and 

the two-story house while he and SGT Burke cleared 

the irrigation ditch that paralleled the main road. SPC 

Simpson provided cover from the turret of Raven 42B. 

During the sweep, some of the wounded Iraqis reached 

for their weapons and the soldiers had to kill them. 

Those that did not resist were taken prisoner. They 

recovered 26 Iraqi insurgents killed and six wounded 

and collected 22 AKMs, 13 RPKs, six RPG launchers, 

39 hand grenades and 16 RPG rockets, 123 full AKM 

magazines, and 52 empty magazines. Questioning of the 

detainees revealed there had been 40 to 50 insurgents 

in the area with ten cars. Some of the insurgents had 

zip ties and handcuffs - a clear indication they planned 

to take captives. CPT Lindner arrived with the rest of the 

MP company and took over control of the sweep. This 

relieved Stallion 33 so they could rejoin their convoy.91

The MP quick reaction force had picked up four lost 

contract trucks on their way to the kill zone. As the four 

contract trucks followed Beck down the road, Cross saw 

a blue truck with a bucket on the right hand side and a 

red truck was on the left hand side. The Iraqis in bucket 

were working on poles. Someone came up from the 

berm as the bucket descended and then they drove off. 

The contract trucks then received a couple of rounds 

from right hand side. They continued down the road but 

SSG Nein and SPC Cooper standing near enemy weapons. 

Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
164 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

did not see any other trucks follow them or see any of 

the convoy rallied up along the road. Somehow they had 

missed Beck pulling into the rally point. When they drove 

by a burning red truck, they received gunfire from a car. 

They then rallied up, dismounted and the Brit said he 

knew where he was. Cross did not know because he had 

never been on that route before. The Brit said they were 

just a couple of miles from the back gate to Anaconda. 

Cross did not want to move, because he felt safe and 

believed the cavalry would come to the rescue. He 

wanted to wait, but was out voted.92

As they drove further down the road, mobs came out 

and threw rocks at their trucks. Some appeared to have 

guns and women made cutting motions across their 

throats. One child ran out in the middle of the road to 

try and stop them. So Cross stood up and acted like he 

had a pistol. The kid withdrew and then threw a rock 

through the Aussie’s windshield.93

When the four trucks came to the T- intersection, 

they parked beside each other. The Brit admitted he did 

not know where he was. He wanted to turn right and drive 

down that road. Cross saw street lights to the right and 

none to his left. Cross told him, “That’s going downtown. 

We’ll be better off staying in the country than driving in 

the city.” The Aussie then admitted he knew where he 

was, “We were supposed to turn to the right a couple 

of miles back. I know where we had to turn.” Cross 

however did not want to drive back through the mob.94

In spite of his protest, they drove back down the 

road a couple miles and turned left. They continued 

down that road for about a mile and saw four or five 

M1114 gun trucks approaching. The four commercial 

trucks flashed their headlights at them to stop, but the 

MP quick reaction force did not realize they were part 

of the convoy that had been ambushed and had no 

intention to stop. So the four trucks blocked the road 

to prevent the HMMWVs from passing. When the MPs 

stopped, Cross explained they had come from the kill 

zone and the MPs told them, “Form up with us.” The 

contract drivers then followed them back toward the kill 

zone, but by then the ambush was over. They drove up 

to the convoy of HETs parked behind the southbound 

convoy that was ambushed and stopped. The IAP convoy 

commander had not even known the four trucks were 

missing. The MPs had not believed what had happened 

but the Iraqis were still coming out throwing rocks.95 

At the north casualty collection point, a medevac 

helicopter landed behind Jacob’s HET convoy. Munos 

and another sergeant from her convoy were about to 

head into the kill zone to pick up another wounded 

soldier when the last of the 1075th convoy arrived. 

Munos carried Ricketts, using the fireman’s carry, 

over to their casualty collection point. Jacobs then 

went to work on the leg wound. Finishing dressing Harris’ 

head wound, Torres came over and gave Jacobs and 

Munos bandages. After dressing their wounds, Munos, 

The contract truck burnt to the ground on ASR Detroit. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
Operation Iraqi Freedom 165

Kirkland, Torres and Uhl carried Harris and Ricketts on 

litters over to the helicopter. SSG Uhl received a call that 

another wounded soldier was coming to the casualty 

collection point. After they loaded the third wounded on 

the medevac helicopter, Jacobs jumped in Sheppard’s 

gun truck and drove into the kill zone, which was about 

200 to 300 meters ahead.96

Driving through the kill zone, Jacobs saw a northbound 

white truck with an RPG hole through the van. She also 

saw the bus tipped over in the middle of the median. On 

the other side of the bus from Jacobs was a burning vehicle 

and an SUV beside it. Next she saw Ricketts’ abandoned 

M915. She continued through the kill zone checking for 

wounded and sensitive items. The rest of the convoy 

was still in a straight line on the side of the road.97

Jacobs met and talked with the crew of a gun truck. 

They were shaken up. She asked if they were with the 

1075th. They said, “No.” They were Stallion 33 escorting 

Third Country Nationals and AAFES trucks to Scania. 

She then asked where the convoy commander was. 

One guy said the convoy commander was back counting 

trucks. Jacobs, Sheppard, the driver and gunner walked 

down looking for the convoy commander. She found 

SFC Hammons and asked if he had accounted for all his 

trucks. He said, “No.” She then asked how many military 

vehicles he had. He said, “Three, one is down and another 

needs to be towed. The other one has two flat tires.” All 

the Stallion 33 vehicles were badly shot up. 33A had a 

damaged transmission, oil cooler, lost brakes and a flat 

tire. 33B had two flat tires. She told him they were hauling 

battle damaged HMMWVs and his crews could take 

the tires or whatever else they needed. He then told his 

mechanic to get some tires and Jacobs told Hammons 

to have his mechanic meet up with her mechanic to take 

what he needed. Jacobs then asked how many killed and 

wounded he had. He told her he had two killed, one Third 

Country National and another who worked for AAFES.98

Hammons then left and Jacobs walked back to her 

bobtail to send a MTS message to convoy operations. By 

the time she reached the bobtail, approximately eight MPs 

were there and two Apaches flew overhead again. After 

finishing an MTS dialog, she went over to Hammons to 

get a count and tell him to have his convoy fall in with hers 

because the MPs were pressuring her to move out. Jacobs 

told the convoy commander she wanted two white trucks 

to fall in behind each of her whites. “Get all your people 

together and I’ll be right back.” She then climbed back 

in her vehicle at the head of the convoy where she waited 

about 10 to 20 minutes until everyone had changed tires 

and someone hooked up Stallion 33A to a tow bar. Then 

Jacobs called out, “Mount up, we’re rolling.” The other 

convoy fell in with hers as planned and they left.99 

Lesson

The purpose of studying battles is to learn lessons. As 

students of the art of war, we are armed with hindsight 

and a much better knowledge of what each element 

was doing. In actual battles, the fog of war shrouds 

the participants from seeing and knowing everything. 

To learn from any battle, the student must learn what 

was done well and what mistakes were made. Then the 

student should place themselves in the various positions 

in the battle knowing only what the participant knew and 

decide what decisions they would have made or what 

they could have done to improve their comprehension 

of the battle. The advantage of studying this ambush 

was the number of moving parts providing a student of 

the art of war plenty of roles to choose from. Pointing 

out the mistakes of any particular person or unit is not 

meant as criticism as all war is chaos and mistakes are 

made on both sides. Victory is often determined by who 

makes the least mistakes or capitalizes on their enemy’s 

mistakes. Pointing out these mistakes makes for a more 

realistic portrayal of what happens in a battle. The most 

important thing is the outcome and for this battle, the 

coalition participants can take pride.

Timing was significant. The Anti-Iraqi Freedom (AIF) 

Insurgents evidently liked to attack on significant dates. 

This ambush was launched on the anniversary of the 

beginning of the ground war in 2003 and also Palm 

Sunday. While this was not quite the anniversary of the 

Easter Weekend ambushes, it was close. They clearly 

wanted to take hostages as they had done on Good 

Friday 2004 and the anniversary of the fall of Baghdad. 

Unfortunately, the situation on 20 March 2005 turned 

bad for the Iraqi insurgents. 

This ambush also hinted that they wanted to take 

advantage of the one-year rotation policy of the US 

Army. The last big ambushes began in April 2004 when 

all the units were new to the theater. By March 2005, 

no veteran OIF 2 transportation units were left on the 

road. The 518th Gun Truck Company had been reformed 
166 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

from new volunteers in November 2004, but the new 

leadership had not reinforced the turn, fix and fight tactic 

or placed the same emphasis on weapons training. 

Similarly, B Battery, 1- 623rd FA (Stallion 33) was also 

new in country and interestingly, both units responded 

the same way, the way they were taught by MPRI. 

Palm Sunday became both units’ first complex ambush. 

This rotation policy resulted in a spike in attacks soon 

after arrival. As the Army would send brand new units 

to Iraq each spring, the Iraqis would gain another year 

of experience. The individual rotation policy during the 

Vietnam War ensured a better transfer of knowledge 

and experience, but it resulted in poor cohesion. The 

unit rotation provided better cohesion but left the units 

vulnerable during the first few months of their arrival.

Consequently, this was the first complex ambush for 

the 1- 623rd FA and the new members of the 518th Gun 

Truck Company. The new units had to learn how to fight 

the war for the first time while the enemy already had 

two years of experience. The crews did not perform like 

the original company and did not follow their “turn, fix 

and fire” doctrine. Part of it resulted from the short handoff between the old and new crews and change in tactics 

due to weakness in armor. Keep in mind that the original 

518th developed their tactics with hillbilly armor. 

Tactics change and this ambush presented a change 

in enemy tactics. Prior to this ambush, the insurgents 

usually shot at the white contract trucks but during this 

ambush the small arms fire was directed at the green 

military trucks and the fire targeted mostly the cab area. 

The insurgents also had handcuffs and zip ties on them 

and the MPs remembered seeing the trucks of their 

escape vehicles open. So the insurgents clearly 

wanted American casualties and captives. 

The turn of events was not due to the lack of 

planning and preparation by the insurgents. Generally, 

the enemy operated at either the squad-size or 

company-size when conducting ambushes. Based upon 

their cellular structure of four to seven insurgents per 

cell, a company-sized ambush was usually included 

40 to 50 insurgents. In this case, about 50 insurgents 

established about a 1,000 meter kill zone. The access 

road divided the kill zone in two parts with approximately 

35 insurgents north of it and 15 south. They tended to 

follow standard ambush doctrine with their force divided 

into security, support and assault elements. Supposed 

to initiate with the most casualty producing device 

followed up by rockets and small arms fire, this ambush 

began with small arms and RPGs. The fire increased 

gradually with not everyone firing at one time. Even with 

stationary targets, the insurgents were not very accurate 

with RPGs as only a small fraction hit their targets. 

They did have snipers or designated marksmen spread 

throughout the kill zone and at least one was armed with 

armored piercing rounds. Two such rounds penetrated 

Ricketts’ door and one hit him in the leg. 

This was a well planned and executed L- shaped 

ambush that caught two convoys in the kill zone. It was 

oriented to catch a southbound convoy. Coincidently, 

a northbound convoy had entered the kill zone at the 

same time. Either by accident or design, the insurgents 

initiated the ambush with both in the kill zone. The 

problem with attacking two convoys at the same time 

was it doubled the number of gun trucks in the kill 

zone. What their spotters of the security element failed 

to identify was that an MP route security patrol was 

shadowing the southbound convoy. This tripled the 

number of gun trucks giving the convoys an advantage. 

Expecting a truly soft target, the insurgents unexpectedly 

had nine HMMWV gun trucks coming at them from 

opposite directions. A Stallion 33 gun truck cleared the 

kill zone and established a casualty collection point 

south of it where it repeatedly drove back into the kill 

zone to pick up wounded. The access road divided 

the kill zone into two separate fights. A couple of the 

Stallion 33 M1114s later joined the fight in the access 

road with the two of Raven 42 that had been shadowing 

the southbound convoy. The 1075th and 518th also 

engaged the southern part of the kill zone. Allowing 

this many gun trucks in the kill zone was a big 

mistake of the enemy.

Although it was policy for convoys not to stop 

in the kill zone, in the confusion of the battle, the 

civilian drivers did. Third Country Nationals were the 

unpredictable factor in ambushes. RPG and IEDs 

brought the southbound convoy to a halt. Regulator 1 

in the northbound convoy inadvertently hit the brakes 

and caused the convoy behind to stop. Both the north 

and southbound convoys came to a halt with only three 

vehicles escaping the kill zone. The insurgents had not 

done so well in any of their recent ambushes. At first it 

looked like things were going in favor of the insurgents. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 167

Unfortunately, the language barrier did not allow the 

convoy escorts to properly instill in the Third Country 

Nationals the importance of remaining in their vehicles. 

When they dismounted, this kept the rest of the convoy 

from driving down the road. After this convoy, the 7th 

Transportation Group came up with cartoon illustrations 

to brief Third Country Nationals on what to do during 

contact. These later fell by the wayside and the convoy 

commanders just gave the convoy brief to the Third 

Country National drivers regardless of whether they 

understood it or not. The important lesson was to engage 

the civilian contract drivers in order to make them feel 

like members of the team. Usually there would be at 

least one Third Country National who spoke a little 

English and could translate for the majority who spoke 

his language. As the years progressed, many of the 

Third Country National would remain and accumulate 

more experience on the same roads than the US Army 

drivers. As unpredictable as their behavior was in 

contact, many would surprise the Americans with 

their cool headedness and bravery under fire.

The position of the convoy commander was key to 

this fight. By riding at the head of the convoy, however, 

the convoy commander of the 1075th was able to 

escape the kill zone, but was the only one. Because 

of the breakdown in communication between him and 

his assistant convoy commander, Uhl was unable to 

influence the action behind him. In the event an ambush 

split a convoy, most of the important decisions were 

almost always made in the middle or rear of the convoy. 

The lead element would most likely always escape 

the kill zone. By the end of the Vietnam War, convoy 

commanders likewise learned to ride in the middle or 

rear of the convoys for this very reason.

CSM Dwayne Perry, the 7th Transportation Group 

command sergeant major, identified there was no battle 

handoff between the convoy commander and assistant 

convoy commander. For this reason, the convoy sat in 

the kill zone for up to 20 minutes. Bloebaum had no idea 

why the convoy was halted ahead of him. The assistant 

convoy commander, a junior E5, took action about 10 

to 15 minutes into the ambush. Because of the ratio of 

green to white trucks, squads escorted convoys. NCOs 

led many of the convoys in Iraq yet none of their military 

education trained them for this. Only officers received 

school training in convoy operations and most NCOs 

picked it up through on-the -job experience. The units 

that historically performed the best during ambushes 

were those that war-gamed every possible scenario 

daily. There cannot be enough emphasis placed on 

this type of training. Not only that but rank should 

not be the criteria for responsibility. By 1969, the 8th 

Transportation Group in Vietnam appointed convoy 

and assistant convoy commanders based upon their 

experience rather than rank. It was not unusual for a 

sergeant to be a convoy commander with a lieutenant 

riding along to gain experience. 

CSM Perry also recognized that the escorts focused 

too much on engaging the enemy rather than getting 

the convoy through. In the Torres video shot from inside 

Regulator 1, the crew can be heard asking why the 

convoy was not moving. That was an inherent problem 

with external escorts. They usually had little rapport with 

the convoys they escorted and in this case did not talk 

with the convoy. They should not have been asking each 

other why the convoy was not moving but should have 

talked with the convoy commander and assistant convoy 

commander. The HMMWV gun trucks had the advantage 

of maneuverability which would have allowed them to 

act like sheep dogs getting their herd moving again. 

The problem here was the culture of the new 518th. The 

7th Transportation Group did not allow for the old 518th 

leadership, under 1LT James McCormick and SFC Jody 

Cuthbertson, to train up their replacements. McCormick 

had stressed the importance of the escorts to help the 

convoys at their destinations, but the culture allowed 

by the new leadership allowed the replacements to act 

like fighter escorts peeling off to go take care of their 

business when the convoy rolled into its destination. 

They had learned this from the 1-178th FA. To create a 

bond between the escorts and the escorted in Vietnam, 

8th Transportation Group kept the gun trucks internal to 

the truck companies. At the end of the day, the gun truck 

crews faced the drivers they had to escort and defend. 

The result of this ambush would have been much 

different had the gun truck crews come from the 1075th 

Transportation Company. However, the trend during the 

war in Iraq would be to not only consolidate the gun 

trucks into an external company, but external battalions 

and by the end of the war, an external escort brigade. 

It would take command emphasis to ensure cohesion 

between the convoys and external escorts.
168 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

The policy the gun trucks followed was for the lead 

gun truck to lead the convoy to the rally point. Stallion 

33A did this, but only one vehicle followed. Since 

only one vehicle of their convoy escaped, Regulator 1 

remained in the kill zone and thus bore the brunt of the 

fighting. It only left the kill zone after the lead part of the 

convoy departed. The remaining two gun trucks in each 

convoy held their ground and defended their part of the 

convoy. However, Regulator 2 put up a short fight and 

cleared the kill zone after their driver was wounded and 

thought it had an engine fire. Regulator 3 had a dilemma. 

It had to protect the rear of the convoy but the fight was 

up front. It left the rear of the convoy and drove behind 

the convoy till it found a gap in the convoy then raced to 

the access road, just as Stallion 33B and 33C did when 

they received the call for help. Regulator 3 also drove 

behind the convoy similar to Raven 42 then looked 

for an opening. With the exception of Regulator 2, the 

gun trucks of Regulator and Stallion 33 performed 

identically. This was the product of MPRI training.

The decisive action of the battle was that taken by 

Raven 42. The MPs of Raven 42 used a more aggressive 

posture and tried to flank the enemy. Similar to the 

original 518th, they conducted daily after action reviews 

and war gamed constantly. They had been blooded 

so each member knew how he or she would perform 

as well as knew how the others would perform. They 

had confidence in their leaders and followed without 

hesitation. While Regulator and Stallion 33 performed 

as MPRI doctrine trained them, the main lesson was 

that the units which conduct daily after action reviews, 

rehearse and war game perform the best. They knew 

the area and had rehearsed their tactics for such a 

situation. One possible miscalculation Raven 42 made 

was they underestimated the size of the enemy and kill 

zone. SSG Nein expecting a force of no more than 12 

insurgents as he had faced before planned to cut off 

their retreat and kill or capture all of them. Knowing the 

access road was ahead of them, he raced his squad to it 

with the intention of flanking the enemy. To his surprise, 

Nein cut the insurgents off from their egress vehicles 

but he ended up facing around 50 insurgents spread out 

over a kilometer and the access road was in the middle 

of the kill zone not the flank. This miscalculation put 

Raven 42A in the cross fire of two enemy positions. This 

was the product of the fog of war. However, realizing the 

dire circumstances, the MPs countered again. SPC Mike 

and SSG Nein quieted the fire from their rear (south) 

and then Nein led an assault on the enemy north of the 

road. Raven 42A’s .50 had accounted well for itself in 

killing insurgents in the main canal. 

Historically, the units that performed the best in 

ambushes conducted extensive after action reviews, 

talked over their tactics and revised them constantly. 

This eliminated confusion and caused the participants 

to act in unison and instinctively. Over the previous 

three years of the war, MPs operated with less 

aggressive tactics. Raven 42, however, demonstrated 

LTG John Vines, MNC-I Commander with members of Raven 42 after award ceremony. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
Operation Iraqi Freedom 169

how MPs should perform. Caught in a bad situation, 

they responded quickly and violently turning the fight 

back on the enemy. The 617th MP Company had strong 

leadership involvement from the company commander 

down. The loss of the aggressive leaders and lack of 

proper company grade officer involvement in the training 

and after action reviews of the new 518th resulted 

in a passive posture and hesitation. The Regulators 

did perform heroically but what was needed in the 

northbound convoy was someone taking charge and 

getting them moving as soon as the convoy bunched 

up and halted. This happened more at the individual 

level rather than the result of a single leader and then 

only ten to 15 minutes into the fight. Good rehearsals 

and war-gaming of the different scenarios might have 

taught this. Raven 42 acted without hesitation but then 

they also put themselves between the cross fire of the 

enemy rather than on the flank. Raven 42B had more 

wounded because of this. Still, quick decisive leadership 

turned a bad situation into a good one. The fight on the 

access road was the turning point in the battle. The key 

to the American success was their ability to adapt to the 

changing situation faster than the enemy and fire power. 

Had the insurgents trapped one convoy with only three 

gun trucks, the situation would have most definitely 

turned out different. For this many vehicles, it took nine 

gun trucks to turn the fight back on the enemy. The 

established 1:10 ratio for each convoy only allowed for a 

passive defense. The additional three gun trucks allowed 

them to take the offense and turn the battle around.

The worse indictment of 518th was the failure of 

the M2 .50 caliber machineguns. None of their .50s 

could fire more than seven rounds before the weapons 

misfired. Clearly the timing was off on all three and 

had they been able to test fire their weapons, they 

would have realized this early on. No investigation 

was conducted as to who set the timing. This once 

again reinforced why it was important to test fire 

weapons before each operation. The purpose of higher 

headquarters was to provide the soldiers the best 

means to accomplish their mission, not impede it. 

War is chaos and mistakes were made on both 

sides. The side that wins is the side that recovers 

from its mistakes and takes advantage of the enemy’s 

mistakes the quickest. This ambush turned out to be 

the most complicated ambush of the war. No other 

convoy ambush had as many different units involved. 

It is an excellent study of what happens when convoys 

get trapped in the kill zone and the difference between 

aggressive and defensive tactics. The sweep of the 

northern half recovered 26 dead Iraqis and six prisoners 

and enough weapons for 41 insurgents. There was 

no sweep of the kill zone south of the access road to 

determine how many Iraqis were killed by the 518th 

and 1075th but by eye witness accounts the enemy 

took a beating there too. Coalition casualties were three 

Third Country Nationals killed and seven wounded, the 

617th MP had only three soldiers wounded and one of 

its HMMWVs severely damaged. The 1075th and 518th 

suffered five soldiers wounded, three civilian wounded, 

two destroyed M915s, and four destroyed civilian 

tractor-trailer systems. All three 518th gun trucks were 

shot up but from SSG Van Roekel’s inspection, Regulator 

3 had the most battle damage. There were no Americans 

killed or captured. That was a pretty good day in 

anybody’s book. The ambush on Palm Sunday turned out 

to be a one - sided victory in favor of the coalition forces. 

The 518th and 1075th believed this ambush occurred 

on ASR Bismarck and consequently referred to it as the 

Battle of Bismarck. The MPs referred to it as the Battle 

of Salman Pak from the nearby village. Since it did occur 

on ASR Detroit, Dr. Tom Bruscino of Combat Studies 

Institute gave it the name the Palm Sunday Ambush. 

 In consequence of their actions, SPC Jason Mike, 

SGT Leigh Ann Hester and SSG Timothy Nein received 

Silver Star Medals for their actions during the battle. 

Nein’s award was later upgraded to the Distinguished 

SSG Nein and SGT Hester after receiving their Silver Star 

Medals. Photo courtesy of the Army Women’s Museum
170 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

1 SFC David Van Roekel email to Richard Killblane, November 20, 2006.

2 SFC David Van Roekel email to Richard Killblane, November 20, 2006.

3 2LT Charles Gilkey, “Convoy 678N Engagement Narrative;” CPT Kevin 

Hynes, “Under Fire, Nebraska drivers played critical role during Battle of 

Bismarck,” Prairie Soldier, February 2006. 4 Hynes, “Under Fire.”

5 CPT Eric S. Minor, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Historical 

summary on 20MAR05 Ambush on ASR Detroit, 503rd Military Police 

Battalion (Airborne), 27 March 2005.

6 SSG Timothy F. Nein interview by Tom Bruscino at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 

28 June 2006; and SGT Dustin Morris interview by Tom Bruscino at 

Ft Leavenworth, KS, 19 July 2006.

7 Nein interview and Morris interview.

8 Nein interview.

9 Nein interview.

10 Nein interview and Minor, “Historical summary.”

11 SGT James Reed Baker, SPC William P. Young, SPC Patrick T. Malone, 

SGT Rickie D. Hammons, SGT Kevin R. Vogel, SPC Richard S. .Saylor, SGT 

Ricky A. Burke, SGT Matthew T. Simpson, and SPC Kirby Gregory sworn 

statements, 20 March 2005.

12 Baker, Young and Malone sworn statement. The time is based upon the 

videos shot by the two civilian contract drivers in the 1075th convoy and 

the video shot in Regulator 1 gun truck. Stallion 33A passed the convoy 

as SPC Beck was pulling Ricketts from his truck. She was not able to move 

forward until the tuck behind her cleared the kill zone, which allowed 

Regulator 1 to leave the kill zone, which they did at 1157 hours.

13 Hynes, “Under Fire.”

14 Ron Hart telephone interview with Richard Killblane, 12 May 2006; 

William Cross telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 15 April 2014; 

and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

15 Jairo Torres video and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

16 SFC David Van Roekel email to Richard Killblane, October 24, and 

November 20, 2006; Van Roekel sworn statement, 20 March 2006; 

Interview with SSG David Van Roekel, SPC Barbara Higgins, PFC Jairo 

Torres, SGT Jonathan Kennedy by 2LT Charles Gilkey and Richard Killblane, 

28 March 2005; and Hynes, “Under Fire.” There was considerable 

discrepancy over the exact time of the ambush. The MNC-I SIGACTS listed 

the ambush as having started at 1155 hours. All the 623 FA sworn statements listed the time of the ambush at 1145 hours and the 503rd Military 

Police Battalion, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Historical summary on 

20MAR05 Ambush on ASR Detroit, dated 27 March 2005, listed the time 

of the ambush “at approximately 1140hrs (local).” The 7th Transportation 

Group AAR, “Convoy 678N Engagement Narrative,” only mentioned the 

time the convoy passed through the check point as 1120 hours, but did 

not estimate the time the ambush began. The video shot by Jairo Torres 

in Regulator 1 had them at the check point at 1120 hours and the video 

began filming again at 1152 hours after the ambush had started. Since 

the kill zone was only a couple miles up the road, it would not have taken 

but a few minutes to reach it, but it would have taken the convoy a good 

five to ten minutes just to clear the check point. The crews claimed to have 

been under fire for approximately 20 minutes. It is more likely that the 

617th MPs and 623rd FA had better communications with their 

headquarters so the 1140 to 1145 time is probably more accurate.

17 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

18 Torres interview and video; Gilkey, “Narrative;” Van Roeckel email, 

October 24, November 18 and 19, 2006; and Van Roekel, Higgins, and 

Torres interview, 28 March 2006.

19 Torres video; Van Roeckel email, October 24, November 18 

and 19, 2006.

20 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

21 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

22 Hart interview, and Cross interview.

23 Hynes, “Under Fire.”

24 SGT Jonathan Kennedy and SPC Brandon Dettman interview by 

2LT Gilkey and Killblane, 20 March 2005, and Gilkey, “Narrative.”

25 Kennedy and Dettman interview, and Gilkey, “Narrative.”

26 Hart interview ; Kennedy and Dettman interview; Gilkey, “Narrative;” 

and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

27 Gilkey, “Narrative;” Hynes, “Under Fire;” and CPT Kevin Hynes, 

“Nebraskans kept cool during heat of ambush,” Prairie Soldier, April 2006. 28 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

29 Henry J. Dordes, “Nebraska Guard unit recalls ambush in Iraq,” 

World-Herald, May 29, 2005; Gilkey, “Narrative;” and captured Iraqi video. 30 Nein interview, Morris interview and SPC Jesse Ordunez interview by 

Tom Brusino at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2004. The timer on the 

captured Iraqi video showed all three Raven 42 M1114s driving past ten 

trucks in front of the camera man at about two minutes into the fight. 

The video had started right after the ambush began.

31 Nein interview, Morris interview and SPC Ashley Pullen interview by 

Tom Bruscino, at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 16 August 2006.

32 Nein interview, Morris interview and Pullen interview.

33 Nein interview, Morris interview and Pullen interview.

34 Nein interview.

35 Nein interview and Pullen interview.

36 Minor, “Historical summary.”

37 Nein interview and Morris interview.

38 Nein interview, Morris interview and Ordunez interview.

39 Nein interview and Morris interview.

40 Pullen interview and Ordunez interview.

41 Pullen interview.

42 “Battle of Bismarck Green Tab AAR,” 106th Trans Bn. The numbers of 

enemy and their locations south of the access road were based upon three 

days of interview of the 518th and 1075th soldiers by 2LT Charles Gilkey 

and Richard Killblane immediately after their return from the convoy.

43 Hart interview; Cross interview; and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

44 Cross interview.

45 Hart interview.

46 Hart interview.

47 Hart interview.

48 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

49 Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

50 Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

51 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

52 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Under Fire.”

53 Van Reokel, Higgins and Torres interview; Gilkey, “Narrative;” Hynes, 

“Nebraskans;” and Torres video.

54 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

55 Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

Service Cross in 2007. SPC Jenny Beck received the 

Bronze Star Medal in 2006. The 1075th Transportation 

Company also received the Meritorious Unit 

Commendation in 2011. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 171

56 Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

57 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

58 Hart interview; Hynes, “Nebraskans;” and videos PHOT0021 and 

1075BOB shot from digital cameras by two different DoD drivers.

59 Hart interview; Hynes, “Nebraskans;” and DOD video.

60 Peterson filmed the event from his cab.

61 Cross interview.

62 Cross interview.

63 Cross interview.

64 Cross interview.

65 Conversation was recorded in the Torres video.

66 Torres video and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

67 SG Shirley Jacobs interview by Richard Killblane at Arifjan, Kuwait, 

9025 March 2005; and Hammons, sworn statement.

68 Jacobs interview.

69 Jacobs interview.

70 Jacobs interview and Hynes, “Nebraskans.”

71 Gregory, Burke and Simpson sworn statements. 

72 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and SSG Aaron Castro, SGT Rondell Brown and SPC 

Alexander Hernandez interview by 2LT Charles Gilkey and Richard Killblane, 

at Cp NAVISTAR, Kuwait, 28 March 2005.

73 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Castro, Brown and Hernandez interview.

74 Hynes, “Soldiers;” Burke sworn statement and Pullen interview.

75 Minor, “Historical summary;” Hammons, Vogel, Saylor, Simpson and 

Burke sworn statements; Kennedy interview; Dettman interview; and Castro, 

Brown, and Hernandez interview.

76 Minor, “Historical summary;” Castro, Brown, and Hernandez interview; 

and Pullen interview.

77 Hart interview and Hynes, “Soldiers sprint through enemy fire to rescue 

comrade,” Prairie Soldier, April 2006. 78 Hynes, “Soldiers.”

79 Hynes, “Soldiers.”

80 Hynes, “Soldiers.”

81 Hart interview; Kennedy and Dettman interview; Castro, Brown and 

Hernandez interview; Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Soldiers.”

82 Gilkey, “Narrative.”

83 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Soldiers.”

84 Hart interview.

85 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Soldiers.”

86 Gilkey, “Narrative;” and Hynes, “Soldiers.”

87 Gilkey, “Narrative;” Minor, “Historical summary;” Castro, Brown and 

Hernandez interview; and Pullen interview.

88 Gilkey, “Narrative;” Minor, “Historical summary;” and Castro, Brown 

and Hernandez interview.

89 Minor, “Historical summary;” and Pullen interview.

90 Minor, “Historical summary;” Hammons, Vogel, Saylor, Baker and Young 

sworn statements; and Pullen interview.

91 Minor, “Historical summary;” Hammons, Burke and Simpson, 

sworn statements.

92 Cross interview.

93 Cross interview.

94 Cross interview.

95 Cross interview.

96 Jacobs interview.

97 Jacobs interview.

98 Jacobs interview, and Hammons, sworn statement.

99 Jacobs interview and Hamons, sworn statement.
172 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Ambush at Ad Duluiyah, 20 September 2005

1173rd Transportation Company, 

457th Transportation Battalion

SA Anaconda occupied the Army’s side of 

Balad Air Base, a former Iraqi base just north of 

Baghdad. This was the hub of the hub and spoke 

sustainment operation centered in the heart of the 

infamous Sunni Triangle. Consequently, every convoy 

out of the base was a combat operation, so the Corps 

Support Command (COSCOM) began referring to them 

as combat logistical patrols. These convoys pushed 

vital cargo to all the forward operating bases (FOB) 

surrounding the area. In September 2005, the 181st 

Transportation Battalion had just replaced the 457th 

Transportation Battalion and assumed control over 

its predecessor’s truck companies. Five of the ten 

were convoy escort companies. These veteran 

companies had been navigating the hostile roads 

of Iraq since the beginning of the year. 

Before the 457th Transportation Battalion had 

handed over responsibility for the convoy operations to 

the 181st Battalion, they still kept convoys less than 30 

vehicles and ran with a gun truck ratio of one-to-five, 

a policy started by the 181st Transportation Battalion 

during the first rotation. To do this, LTC David Gaffney’s 

457th Battalion would assign four gun trucks to escort 

L

no more than 20 prime movers. After he had inherited 

the convoy mission from 7th Battalion, he also had the 

convoy commander and assistant convoy commander 

ride in HMMWV gun trucks. This increased the number 

of gun trucks to six per convoy reducing the gun truck 

ratio to less than one-to- four. By the third OIF rotation, 

the 457th had replaced all its add- on - armor and 

“hillbilly” armor HMMWVs with up -armored M1114s. 

At first LTC Gaffney did not like the 5-ton gun trucks 

and even less after one with the New Livermore gun 

box rolled over. This was the result of an inexperienced 

driver who accidentally drove the 5 - ton up over an 

Iraqi car that had swerved in front of him and then the 

truck rolled over on its side. Because of this, Gaffney 

457th and 181st Transportation Battalion T-barriers. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

M1114 with dual weapon systems. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 173

considered the 5 -tons unsafe and wanted to take them 

off the road. Unfortunately, Multi - National Corps-Iraq 

(MNC- I) began taking some of his M1114s away and 

giving them to other units. To keep the same gun truck 

ratio, Gaffney had quite a number of 5-ton gun trucks 

with a variety of gun boxes. Consequently, Gaffney began 

substituting the 5 -ton gun trucks for the M1114s he 

was losing. Because of his safety concerns, he would 

not allow anyone to ride in the gun boxes. Instead the 

machine gunner manned the M2 .50 caliber machinegun 

on the ring mount over the cab. Not putting a crew in the 

box also reduced the number of crews from a minimum 

of three to just two. To his surprise, the crews liked the 

5-tons. The greater height advantage over the HMMWVs 

improved observation and survivability against IEDs. 

The convoys pushed the 5-ton through obstacles better 

than HMMWVs and could intimidate civilian traffic better. 

After trial and error, Gaffney settled on a three- and-two 

ratio of three M1114s and two 5 - ton gun trucks for 

each convoy. In Iraq, the HMMWV gun trucks were called 

convoy Protection Platforms (CPP) and the 5 - ton gun 

trucks were called Heavy Armored Trucks (HAT). 

The 457th Transportation Battalion tended to place 

the 5-tons up front and in the rear of the convoy paired 

up with an M1114. The third M1114 rode in the middle 

as the floater.

This improved armor caused a change in tactical 

doctrine. With all around protection, crews remained 

buttoned up and adopted passive tactics of suppressing 

enemy fire and clearing the kill zone. Only the semiexposed gunners in the turrets returned fire. Ironically, 

early in the war when gun trucks had less armor, some 

of the crews adopted more aggressive tactics of stopping 

in the kill zone and exiting the vehicles to return fire until 

all vehicles had cleared the kill zone.

Communications had improved. By that time almost 

all the military trucks had SINCGARS radios so they could 

communicate internally. So the convoy commander had 

double -stacked SINCGARS to communicate internally 

with the convoy and another to communicate with the 

Sheriff network, battle space owner and call in medical 

evacuations. They usually had the same type of civilian 

radios the KBR drivers had plus Mobile Tracking System 

(MTS) with the lap top display and text messaging 

capability. In addition, the crew members had headsets 

with internal communication. So a convoy commander 

had to manage four different radio networks at the same 

time. To complicate matters worse, the truck drivers 

lacked radio discipline and a language unique to their 

operations, which would simplify communication. When 

the infantry or armor made contact with the enemy, in 

a few short phrases everyone understood what they 

needed to do. The convoys had not yet developed that. 

While the convoys finally had the ability to communicate 

like any other combat maneuver unit, this complicated 

the duties of the convoy commander and assistant.

The 457th and its replacement, the 181st Battalion, 

also had the responsibility to escort Kellogg, Brown and 

Root (KBR) convoys. KBR was an American contract 

company that hired primarily English speaking truck 

drivers. Because the contract drivers were considered 

non-combatants, the Army lawyers would not allow 

civilians to carry any weapons for their protection if 

captured. This would violate their non-combatant status 

and the Geneva Convention could not protect them. 

The enemy had demonstrated their disregard for the 

Geneva convention in regards to contractors. They 

were an integral part of the planning and preparation 

of convoy operations. The KBR convoy commander and 

assistant convoy commander attended the planning 

briefs with the transportation battalion. Another thing 

that Gaffney had instituted in the battalion was that 

each company would build a sand table for the crews 

to rehearse battle drills or “what if” scenarios in case 

of ambushes. Prior to each convoy, each convoy to 

include the KBR drivers, had to rehearse one reaction 

to contact drill. 

In September 2006, ABC News aired a broadcast 

of a video shot by KBR contract driver, Preston Wheeler 

of Mena, Arkansas, about an ambush that occurred 

20 September the previous year. The video showed the 

M1114 gun truck in front of his truck leaving his and 

two other disabled contract trucks in the kill zone. Two 

contract drivers in front of him were killed while Wheeler 

was heard in the video screaming on the radio for help. 

At one point the Iraqis fired up his truck wounding him 

but were not able to come over and pull him out of 

the truck because to his belief, the attack helicopters 

arrived. He accused his escorts of cowardice. ABC News 

jumped all over the story claiming that the video spoke 
174 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

for itself. What neither Wheeler nor ABC News knew 

or saw was that a gun truck was standing guard right 

behind his. The gun trucks were doing exactly what 

they were trained to do.

On 20 September 2005, the convoy of 12 KBR 

trucks was escorted by the standard three and two mix 

of gun trucks of the 1173rd Transportation Company, a 

National Guard unit from Rocky Mount, North Carolina 

and Martinsville, Virginia. An M1114 and 5 -ton gun 

truck led the convoy with SSG Marty Herron, the convoy 

commander, in the middle M1114 gun truck that was 

right in front of Wheeler’s. A 5-ton and M1114 gun 

truck closed up the rear. Herron was a veteran of 

Desert Storm, Somalia and Bosnia.1

The gun trucks were leading the KBR convoy to 

FOB Mackenzie, a camp about 45 minutes from 

Anaconda that they normally did not travel to. Misled 

by faulty maps, the convoy mistakenly made a wrong 

turn down into the village of Ad Duluiyah in the 

dangerous part of the Sunni Triangle. They drove down 

a narrow two lane road flanked closely with houses and 

brush. Kids came out and threw rocks at the contract 

trucks. After traveling several miles, the road dead 

ended to everyone’s surprise and the convoy had to 

turn around. Evidently the insurgents knew the convoy 

would have to turn around and an estimated 100 to 

200 insurgents prepared a hasty ambush for them. 

While the convoy turned around, one old man pounded 

one hand into the other like a knife cutting a chopping 

block. The drivers knew what it meant. Bad things 

waited for them down that road.2

The street that had been crowded with people a few 

minutes before was disturbingly empty. Within minutes 

IEDs exploded accompanied by small arms fire, rockets 

and hand grenades thrown and fired at the passing 

convoy from roof tops, garages, bushes and culverts 

along the quarter-mile kill zone. The drivers came 

over the radio reminding everyone to keep driving and 

clear the kill zone.3

Christopher Lem was driving the lead white truck 

with the KBR convoy commander, Marc Kenyon. An AK 

round hit Lem in the neck killing him and causing his 

truck to flip over in the two -lane road. Terry Steward in 

the next KBR truck steered around the flipped truck but 

was shot four times with another six rounds bouncing 

KBR Mercedes tractor with external armor. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Convoy line up at Taji with M1114 in front and M923 with 

LLNL gun box behind it in March 2005. By September, the 

convoys began putting the 5-tons up front. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Interior of M1114 with double stacked SINCGARS and 

MTS. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 175

off his body armor. His truck came to a halt. Kenyon 

climbed out of his overturned rig, climbed up into 

Steward’s cab and drove the truck out of the kill zone. 

Keven Dagit in the third white truck also tried to steer 

around the overturned rig but his was disabled by fire. 

This evidently was the worst part of the kill zone. 

Sascha Grenner-Case in the next truck stopped 

to rescue Dagit.4

SPC Andrew Thompson drove Herren’s M1114 

gun truck and SPC Ryan Totten, the gunner, was shot 

in the arm but kept firing. Wheeler was in the next 

white contract truck behind the HMMWV gun truck. 

As Wheeler’s truck approached the overturned rig, a 

rocket brought his truck to a stop in the middle of the 

road. To his horror, he watched Herren’s HMMWV keep 

going. Wheeler later commented on television, “I do 

not know who the driver was of that HMMWV, but 

he abandoned us.”5

Herren’s HMMWV cleared the kill zone as the policy 

dictated and raced ahead to the rally point where he 

called in a request for air support and medevac. From 

there he sent the other M1114 gun truck, driven by 

SPC Caroline Kibogy, back into the kill zone to rescue 

the trapped drivers. Back in the kill zone, the next two 

contract trucks behind Wheeler’s drove around his and 

continued to the rally point as policy. Robert Cunningham 

driving the next truck was shot five times through 

the torso and arms causing his truck to halt behind 

Wheeler’s. It blocked the road.6

Wheeler took cover under the console then behind 

his seat and began to scream into the radio for help, 

“I’m fixing to get killed, God damn it! I cannot move! Truck 

five cannot move! Copy? I am getting shot! Someone 

get their ass back here now!” Understandably he was 

scared since he was trapped unarmed in the worst part 

of the kill zone. In the truck behind Cunningham’s was 

Robert Woolvine, the assistant convoy commander. He 

tried to calm Wheeler down who kept shouting that he 

was going to die and for them to tell his family he loved 

them. Finally Woolvine just told Wheeler to shut up that 

he had his hands full and help was on its way. Several 

minutes later, Wheeler witnessed the insurgents pull 

Dagit and Grenner- Case from their vehicles and shoot 

them. Wheeler became hysterical and screamed into 

the radio, “They just killed him! Oh, Jesus! Oh, my God!” 

Rick “Poncho” Wynne, a contract driver at the rear of the 

convoy, tried to calm him, “I know you’re under fire, but 

you have to keep your head on your shoulders.”7

What Wheeler and his camera failed to record were 

the two gun trucks from the rear of the convoy fighting 

their way forward. Wynne witnessed the gun trucks 

going forward and reach Wheeler’s disabled truck within 

minutes. Unable to drive around the contract trucks 

stopped in the road, some of the crew dismounted the 

safety of their gun truck and took up firing positions 

beside Wheeler’s truck while he continued to scream 

for help. The insurgent fire, however, kept the drivers 

from reaching his cab. About that time, 15 minutes 

after the attack began; the attack helicopters arrived 

overhead forcing the insurgents to take cover while they 

kept fighting. The last four contract trucks and two gun 

trucks finally drove forward. Wynne and Woolvine pulled 

Wheeler from his cab under fire and loaded him in one 

of the HMMWVs then took him to the rally point where 

he was evacuated. Two other wounded drivers were 

evacuated while the gun truck laid down suppressive 

fire. The ground reinforcements arrived 30 minutes 

after the beginning of the ambush and drove off 

the remaining insurgents.8

Typical of shoddy television journalism, they aired 

a video and interview showing only one small part of 

a large ambush that made the Army gun truck crews 

look like cowards. ABC News claimed to have asked the 

Army for a report for several days but did not receive 

any response so they ran with the story without fully 

researching it on their own. The newspapers such as 

Roanoke Times and Richmond Times - Dispatch evidently 

had no difficulty in tracking down the Army veterans 

of that battle and getting their side of the story. While 

Example of sand table at Arifjan in 2006. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
176 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the Army and KBR may not have responded in a timely 

manner to provide both sides of the story, ABC News 

failed to do the responsible thing and air a follow-up 

story to tell of the heroism of the Army gun truck crews. 

ABC News had insulted the reputation of the 1173rd and 

simply posted the Army and National Guard responses 

on its web site. From Wheeler’s perspective, he was 

left alone but his perspective was that of an unarmed 

civilian driver hiding inside a disabled truck in the middle 

of a kill zone. What he did not realize was that the 

insurgents did not kill him because of the gun trucks 

behind him. The whole idea of objective reporting was 

that thorough research could provide more than just a 

very narrow perspective of a battle and come closer to 

finding the truth, something ABC News was unable to 

do. SSG Herren had a very simple counter to Wheeler’s 

accusation that the gun trucks abandoned him, “If we 

abandoned him, why is he back in the US telling his 

story?” Needless to say, the Guardsmen were bitter 

with Wheeler and ABC News.9

Three of the 13 KBR contract drivers were killed and 

three others were wounded. Wheeler and Dagit’s brother 

would blame the HMMWV gun truck in front of them for 

continuing through the kill zone and leaving him. The 

Army would conduct an investigation of the attack and 

agreed that the Ssoldiers had followed their SOP to clear 

the kill zone. They had performed as they were taught 

and trained. The problem with the passive tactics is when 

vehicles are stopped in the kill zone. Ideally, one 

of the rear two gun trucks would have come up to defend 

the disabled vehicles in the kill zone while the other 

protected the rear of the convoy. The problem was that 

there were four disabled trucks in the kill zone and the 

rear gun trucks could only reach the last one and the 

lead HMMWV gun truck did not reach Dagit in time to 

prevent his death. In hindsight, the middle HMMWV gun 

truck was the only vehicle that could have defended the 

first two disabled trucks in the worst part of the kill zone. 

This is where the more aggressive “turn, fix and fire” 

tactics would have worked best. Yet again, there is no 

guarantee that this tactic would have saved anyone’s 

life. It would have been just one HMMWV defending three 

disabled trucks. If there was any fault, it was not with the 

Soldiers but their doctrine and training. They performed 

bravely under the conditions and saved all but three of 

the contract drivers. The Army awarded ten medals for 

valor and one Purple Heart to the Virginia Guardsmen.10

Lesson

While according to the battalion convoy procedures the 

convoy was not guilty of the accusations, that did not 

mean the procedures were correct for the situation. 

Getting lost and making a wrong turn down a narrow road 

closely flanked by houses and walled yards did not allow 

for any maneuver room in the event a truck was stopped 

in the kill zone. The locals demonstrated their hostility 

toward the convoy so the threat level was elevating. 

Preemptive measures could have been taken.

Most convoy ambushes ended when the combat 

unit that owned the battle space responded with a 

maneuver force. It would have been advantageous if, 

when the convoy commander suspected the convoy was 

in danger, to go ahead and alert the battle space owner 

in order to have them prepared to respond. As learned in 

MTS laptop display and CVC helmet with internal 

communications. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 177

Vietnam and later in Iraq, overhead cover also deterred 

enemy activity. So when the threat increased, as a 

minimum, the convoy commander should have called 

for air support. An Apache could have scouted the route 

looking for signs of ambushes. As learned in two wars, 

the presence of helicopter gunships was a deterrent 

against ambushes. Had an Apache helicopter gunship 

flown overhead, this would very likely have prevented 

the ambush or at least kept any Iraqis from 

approaching the disabled KBR trucks.

Although the policy of the 181st Transportation 

Battalion and its predecessor, the 457th, was for the 

gun trucks to clear the kill zone, this was not the best 

option for that situation. Even though their standard 

operating procedures called for the gun trucks to fight 

from the flanks of the kill zone, the Vietnam gun truck 

veterans understood their job was to go into the kill 

zone and defend all disabled vehicles until the drivers 

had been recovered and accounted for. Had the 

convoy commander’s gun truck remained in the kill zone, 

it would have more likely deterred the enemy 

from approaching the disabled trucks and executing 

the civilian drivers. 

Kevin Dagit’s tractor and trailer overturned in kill zone. Photo courtesy of Preston Wheeler, DVIDS

The Army Judge Advocate General’s policy of not 

allowing civilians to carry side arms in combat only put 

them at greater risk since the enemy did not respect 

the non-combatant status protected by the Geneva 

Convention. Had these drivers had side arms, they at 

least would have had a chance to defend themselves. 

1 John Cramer, “1173rd Transportation Company convoy leader denies 

ABC News report,” The Roanoke Times, http://www.roanoke.com/news/

Roanoke/wb/85517; John Cramer, “Attack reverberates for Guard, 

truckers,” The Roanoke Times, http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/

wb/86192.

2 Peter Bacque, “Virginia Guard leader disputes ABC report on convoy 

in Iraq,” TimesDispatch.com, Sep 29, 2006; Cramer, “Attack;” and 

Wheeler video.

3 Bacque, “Virginia Guard;”and Wheeler video.

4 Cramer, “Attack.”

5 Cramer, “Attack.”

6 Cramer, “Attack.”

7 Cramer, “Attack;” and “1173rd Transportation Company.”

8 Bacque, “Virginia Guard;” and Cramer, “1173rd Transportation Company.”

9 Cramer, “1173rd Transportation Company.”

10 Bacque, “Virginia Guard” and “Convoy leader details Iraq ambush,” 

TimesDispatch.com, September 30, 2006.
178 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

M923 with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) gun box prior to the policy excluding gunners in the back. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

FMTV with Stewart and Stevenson gun box and cab armor kit. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 179

Letterkenny gun box on FMTV. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

FMTV with Letterkenny gun box and Stewart and Stevenson cab armor kit. Photo courtesy of the 1544 Transportation Company
180 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Suse Ambush on ASR Cheyenne, 

26 October 2005 

729th and 1173rd Transportation Companies, 

181st Transportation Battalion

ot even a month after a 1173rd convoy was 

ambushed at Ad Duluiyah, another 1173rd 

convoy was ambushed. The convoy on the day 

of the ambush started out normally. At 0730 hours on 

the morning of 26 October 2005, fourteen M915A2 

tractors and trailers with factory- built add - on cab 

armor, one M915 bobtail, and one HEMTT wrecker from 

the 729th Medium Truck Company, an Army Reserve 

unit from Fresno, California, linked up with their escort 

in the company motor pool. Since every convoy was a 

combat operation, they required an escort of gun trucks. 

The 1173rd Medium Truck Company provided the escort 

and convoy commanders, which consisted of three

up - armored M1114 HMMWVs and two M923A2 

5 - ton Heavy Armored Trucks (HAT). The 5-tons 

had the “Frankenstein” add- on cab armor. 

The crew of each gun truck consisted of three 

soldiers -the driver, the assistant driver and the gunner. 

The assistant driver operated a myriad of electronics: 

SINCGARS radio, internal communications (ICOM), 

Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) and Mobile 

Tracking System (MTS), as well as searching the 

surrounding area for the warning signs of an ambush. 

The battalion deemed it unsafe for the gunner to ride 

in the box, so the M2 .50 caliber machine gun moved 

from the pedestal in the gun box to a ring mount over 

N

the cab. The battalion’s policy was to place one 5 -ton 

HAT in the lead with a second in the rear to keep civilian 

traffic from intruding on the convoy. The M1114, known 

in Iraq as Convoy Protection Platforms (CPP), could 

accelerate faster and race forward to block traffic at 

intersections and turns. Collectively, soldiers referred 

to both systems as gun trucks. The call sign for each 

CPP or HAT was “Gun Truck” or “Gun” for short and the 

number of its sequence in the convoy–1 through 5. 

Convoy commanders used their company call signs and 

the 1173rd used “Hawkeye.” SSG Michael Mulcahy, the 

convoy commander, was Hawkeye 34. This was an all 

green (military) convoy. Official Corps Support Command 

policy called for a 1:5 ratio of gun truck to task vehicle, 

but experience had proven that the 1:4 ratio worked 

better. Because all the vehicles had improved armor, 

no one fired out the windows anymore. Only the 

gunners in the turrets returned fire.1

The night before, the drivers had war - gamed the 

different threat scenarios along their route on company 

sand tables. Prior to the convoy brief, the drivers 

conducted their rehearsals. That morning they practiced 

a roll - over drill, snatch and grab, nine - line medevac, 

and how to set up a landing zone. Because the drivers 

were on the road so much, this was the only way they 

could sustain training. This convoy was every bit a 

combat operation.

Prior to 26 October, the 1173rd had only run 

north to Suse once. It was a detention camp under 

construction for the Iraqis and not a normal run for the 

Anaconda- based convoys. After their first trip, they had 

M915 with cab armor kit. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 181

learned to travel the route only during day light hours. 

SSG Mulcahy considered the new mission was 

“a cluster” from the start. His battalion tactical 

operations center (TOC) had received the mission at 

the last minute and with no intelligence on the route. 

The main problem was communication with different 

maneuver units between areas of operations on the 

Sheriff net. The northern maneuver units used different 

punch keys on their SINCGARS and the convoys could 

not talk to them until they pulled into a forward operating 

base (FOB) and found an authorized person to key their 

radios. The problem was supposed to be resolved the 

month prior but had not. If the convoy ran into trouble, 

it could not talk directly to the maneuver units in the 

area which were supposed to come to their rescue. 

Mulcahy, SGT Rebecca Baumgarner, his assistant convoy 

commander, and the company truck master tried to get 

in touch with local maneuver elements, but received the 

usual “run around.” Without adequate communication 

with the maneuver units, they would communicate with 

battalion via satellite email through the mobile tracking 

system (MTS). They finally received fairly decent maps 

and intelligence that the route was a clear run with little 

to no enemy threat. Mulcahy requested a later starting 

point (SP) time because of advice he received from 

some of the local units.2

The convoy rolled out of the gate on time at 0920 

hours with Gun 1, a 5 - ton HAT in the lead, followed by 

the bobtail, then four M915 tractors and trailers. SGT 

Baumgarner rode in Gun Truck 2 followed by four more 

M923s. The rest of the gun trucks were interspersed 

about every fifth vehicle with a 5 -ton HAT in the rear. 

SSG Mulcahy rode in Gun Truck 3, which was an 

M1114 in the middle of the convoy. SGT James 

Witkowski manned the M2 .50 caliber machine gun on 

Gun Truck 3. SGT Gary Smith drove Gun Truck 4 with 

SPC Monica Beltran as his gunner. Another 5 - ton HAT 

picked up the rear position. Although SSG Mulcahy 

was the convoy commander, CPT Nate Peterson, 1SG 

David Heuer, and MSG John Phillip Souza accompanied 

1173rd Transportation Company convoy returning from FOB Spartan. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company

IED crater on ASR Cheyenne shook loads loose on trailers. 

Photos courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company
182 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the convoy. CPT Peterson, Executive Officer of HHC, 

1/504th PIR, and his clerk were riding along to rejoin 

their unit at FOB Suse. 1SG Heuer and MSG Souza were 

both assigned to the 729th. MSG Souza was also the 

battalion master driver with the responsibility to ride in 

convoys to inspect convoy discipline and operations. 

The convoy was delivering Class VII medical 

supplies, Class IX repair parts and Class VIII construction 

materials for construction of a detention facility at FOB 

Suse. They turned onto ASR Cheyenne from ASR Dover 

and headed north. The gun trucks radioed in all their 

marks. As they reached FOB Spartan, near Ashraf, they 

passed a small outbound convoy of four vehicles. Around 

1040 hours, just past Ashraf, the convoy halted for 

about ten minutes where the area was considered safe 

so the drivers could check their loads and tighten any 

straps that came loose. The previous roads were riddled 

with IED craters, which had bounced the loads around. 

The drivers wanted to tighten straps, so they would not 

have to stop again until they linked up with their escort 

at FOB Warrior. They again headed north and, along the 

way, they encountered a vehicle accident leading into 

a small Iraqi village. One truck was overturned in the 

northbound lane blocking the road, and the other was 

overturned on the side of the road. The contents of both 

were spilled around them. It looked as if they had been 

there awhile and Iraqi Police were standing around so it 

did not arouse any suspicion. The convoy went “Hadji,” 

swerving over into the southbound lane to drive around 

the obstacle. The trucks then closed up their interval 

driving through the town, but opened up again as they 

cleared it on the other side.3

A couple miles after clearing the town, an IED 

detonated to the right of Gun Truck 1. Traveling at 50 to 

55 mph with a 75 to 100 meter interval, fortunately, the 

IED exploded behind the 5 -ton. The trucks immediately 

sped up throwing off the enemy’s timing of the IEDs. A 

second IED exploded to the left, between the bobtail 

Vehicle accident with Iraqi Police just prior to the village. 

The convoy went “Hadji” by driving around it in the opposite 

lane. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company

First IED detonation. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd 

Transportation Company

Second IED detonation. The concrete barriers on the 

right were most likely the reference point for the trigger 

man to detonate the IEDs. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd 

Transportation Company

The berm that flanked the kill zone after the IEDs. Photo 

courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 183

and the M915, quickly followed by the explosion of a 

third IED to the right of the M915. The blasts covered the 

road with smoke and debris so the drivers could not see 

what was ahead of them. Immediately after the IEDs 

exploded, the rear of the convoy came under heavy 

RPG and mortar attack then the entire convoy started 

receiving RPGs and small arms fire from the left side. 

An RPG hit a load of lumber on a trailer a couple of 

vehicles behind Gun Truck 2 setting the lumber on fire. 

The crews radioed to the other drivers the results of 

each explosion.4

The insurgents had a well - laid kill zone. A burnt- out 
184 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

truck and an overturned 

concrete HESCO barrier 

marked the boundaries 

of the half- mile kill zone. 

The three IEDs were 

intended to disable the 

lead trucks thus blocking 

the road. There were 

small concrete barriers 

nearby that the enemy 

possibly used to time the 

detonation of their IEDs 

based upon the speed of the convoy.

Anywhere from a squad to a platoon of insurgents 

armed with small arms and RPGs hid behind a berm 

which paralleled the road about 30 meters to the west, 

on the driver’s side of a northbound convoy where only 

the gun trucks could return fire. In all the ambushes 

Mulcahy had seen or heard of, the insurgents used 

tracer rounds. They did not use them in this fight which 

made it harder for the gunners to determine where the 

fire was coming from. Some drivers claimed there were 

some insurgents on the right side of the road, but others 

believed it was just dust kicking up from the impact of 

stray rounds. This was a linear ambush. Some saw a 

white pickup truck on the left side of the road with a 

crew-served weapon and another truck parked alongside 

the road facing north at the southern end of the kill 

zone. The gunner on the rear 5 - ton thought the vehicle 

looked suspicious and 

opened fire. Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 

later confirmed the truck 

was a Vehicle - borne IED 

(VBIED). The plan looked 

as if the enemy wanted 

to stop the lead vehicles 

with IEDs and then 

maneuver a VBIED up 

to the last vehicle to 

trap the convoy in the 

kill zone. Had the convoy been boxed in, the enemy 

would have picked off the trucks with ease.5

The Iraqi insurgents planned their ambushes out 

in detail. They studied the reaction of the convoys and 

changed their tactics accordingly. The improvements 

in the level of armor protection of the vehicles 

subsequently reduced the number of catastrophic kills. 

The survivability of the convoys allowed them to clear 

the kill zone. This time the insurgents directed a light 

amount of small arms fire at the tires of the line haul 

trucks, in order to disable them in the kill zone, but 

concentrated their armored piercing rounds at the 

doors and windows of the gun trucks. Concealed in 

the cloud of dust from the explosions was an enemy 

grenadier who tried to lobbed grenades into the turrets 

of the passing gun trucks. Just as the guerrillas had 

during the Vietnam War, they had realized that to destroy 

There was a gap between the end of the berm and the road. 

The convoy continued to receive small arms fire here. Photo 

courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company

Gun Truck 5 changing a flat tire and Gun Truck 3 hooked up to a HEMTT Wrecker. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 185

the convoy, they had to disable the gun trucks first.6

Right after the first explosion, Mulcahy was on the 

radio checking for casualties and telling everyone to 

push through and return fire. Since none of the trucks 

were disabled by the IEDs, the drivers drove through the 

black cloud of smoke and a hail of small arms fire and 

out of the kill zone. The enemy initially had the element 

of surprise, but the gun trucks returned with heavy 

suppressive fire turning the fight back on the insurgents. 

SGT Gerald Clemmens in Gun Truck 1 briefly returned 

fire before his vehicle cleared the kill zone. SPC Jennifer 

Suchowski in Gun Truck 2 also returned fire expending 

almost 200 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. SGT 

Witkowski had fired off about 60 rounds before the 

insurgent tossed a hand grenade into his turret. He 

stopped firing to get rid of it, and then SSG Mulcahy 

heard the explosion and his vehicle filled with blood and 

smoke. The driver, SGT Jeffery Gantt, started screaming, 

“Oh my God! They got Ski! They got Ski!” Mulcahy 

looked back and saw Ski slumped over. He yelled at 

the passenger behind him to get the medic bag while 

Mulcahy started feeling SGT Witkowski for injuries 

since he could not see. He then checked for a pulse. 

The blast had killed Ski, but he had shielded his crew 

from most of the shrapnel.7

Mulcahy then asked if everyone else in his gun 

truck was alright. The bonding of a crew is strong. So 

SGT Gantt was in tears and kept repeating what he 

said earlier. The passenger was in a state of shock, but 

acknowledged he was alright. Everyone had received 

some shrapnel wounds. Mulcahy yelled over the radio 

for the other vehicles to keep going and get out of 

Discarded lumber set afire by the RPG. Photo courtesy of the 

1173rd Transportation Company

OH58D Kiowa scouting the area for enemy. Photo courtesy of 

the 1173rd Transportation Company

Gun Truck 3 hooked up to the HEMTT Wrecker with OH58D searching the area. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company
186 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the kill zone. He then encouraged Gantt to drive and 

just look straight ahead. Mulcahy kept repeating this 

while checking on the status of the rest of the convoy. 

After he was sure the convoy was safely out of the kill 

zone, he told Gantt to stop. Mulcahy could tell from the 

emotional stress of losing his friend, Gantt needed to 

stop. The lead half of the convoy, however, did not hear 

his instruction over the radio to stop, so by the time it 

stopped in a linear formation about three to four miles 

down the road from the kill zone, it was about half 

a mile ahead.8

The drivers of the lead half climbed out to pull 

security and checked the damage to their vehicles. All 

vehicles sustained small arms fire and grenade or RPG 

damage, attesting to the accuracy of the enemy’s fire. 

A load of lumber was on fire behind Gun Truck 2 and 

another tractor had two left rear tires shot out. The 

crew put out the fire with a fire extinguisher and 

chained up the axle expecting to pull out soon.9

The lead half communicated with SSG Mulcahy they 

had no one injured. The latter half of the convoy was not 

so lucky. It had received the full brunt of the enemy’s fire. 

Since his vehicle could not drive, SSG Mulcahy called for 

SGT Baumgarner in Gun Truck 2 to bring up a body bag 

and close the front door on his box formation. Mulcahy 

then climbed out of his vehicle and instructed the lead 

person from the 729th, SSG Christine Froncak, to check 

her personnel and equipment for damage. Mulcahy then 

bandaged SGT Gantt’s wounds. Mulcahy could not get 

any of the local maneuver elements on any channel, 

including on plain text, which the maneuver element 

should have been monitoring. SGT Baumgarner arrived 

and walked over to see what was going on. Mulcahy 

told her to get a couple of people together to help with 

SGT Witkoski’s body. While she was doing this, Mulcahy 

texted his company and battalion tactical operations 

center via MTS to start coordinating medevac. He had 

a total of five wounded: Gantt, the passenger, SGT Gary 

Smith, SPC Monica Beltran and himself. SGT Smith and 

SPC Beltran were in Gun Truck 4, which was hit by what 

appeared to be three large caliber explosive rounds. 

One penetrated the driver’s window and shrapnel hit 

SGT Smith in his back. SPC Beltran had part of her 

thumb shot off by small arms fire, but she had 

kept on firing.10

Realizing they were going to wait for a while, 

MSG Souza and 1SG Heuer decided to have the lead 

half form a box. The lead 5-ton HAT closed the front door 

and SPC Fernando Magdelano from the fourth M915 

and SSG Edwin G. Stracke from the seventh or eighth 

M915 ran to the rear of the formation with their SAWs 

to close the rear door. The lumber was still smoldering, 

so CPT Peterson made the decision to dump the load 

for fear it might catch fire again. Meanwhile six soldiers 

Convoy heading south on ASR Cheyenne with OH58D escorts. Photo courtesy of the 1173rd Transportation Company
Operation Iraqi Freedom 187

worked at changing the two blown tires while the rest of 

the drivers took up prone positions around the convoy 

and pulled security. The rear half of the convoy did 

likewise and the medevac arrived about 30 minutes 

after they boxed up.11

Upon receipt of Mulcahy’s message, the 181st 

Transportation Battalion immediately called for the 

quick reaction force (QRF), which was deployed from 

FOB Spartan, but detected a daisy chain of IEDs in 

the vicinity of the original ambush. The combination of 

Marine and Army forces waited for two hours until EOD 

personnel cleared the IEDs. An hour had elapsed by the 

time the 181st learned about the delay so they called for 

two OH -58s, which did not arrive for another two hours. 

By luck, an F15 circled high overhead and provided cover. 

Due to his injuries, SSG Mulcahy turned command over to 

his assistant, SGT Baumgarner, who sent Gun Truck 4 up 

to the lead half of the convoy. Shortly after that, the QRF 

reached the rear half of the convoy. After the QRF arrived, 

they asked why the convoy was running without air cover 

and ground support. They explained there had been a 

lot of enemy activity along that route. MAJ Mathews, 

from the 793rd MP, decided the best course of action

 was to turn the convoy around and roll fast, since it 

was getting dusk and the nearby village was unfriendly 

to Americans. The lead half of the convoy turned around 

and joined up with the latter half, while they finished the 

repairs and recovered their damaged vehicles. Civilian 

traffic had backed up the entire time. The convoy 

passed the burning VBIED and returned to FOB 

Spartan for the night.12

Lesson

For a variety of reasons there was a breakdown in 

coordination with the owner of the battle space for 

this mission. This was the responsibility of the chain of 

command up through the Corps Support Command to 

the Multi -national Corps - Iraq. The intelligence analysts 

up to that time had no template for how to interpret 

enemy activity to predict future attacks on convoys, so 

they usually just provided a history of recent attacks and 

let the convoy commanders interpret them. What the 

intelligence reports usually missed was current activity, 

but the battle space owner usually understood the 

current threat in their area of responsibility better than 

anyone. Had the convoy managed to get in contact with 

the battle space owner, they would have been warned 

of the increased threat level and probably advised to 

have air cover. 

The enemy planned this kill zone very well. The 

insurgents in this ambush had evidently planned to 

destroy the lead and rear vehicles of the convoy with 

both IEDs and a VBIED. The initial IED was intended to 

disable the lead gun truck and the other two IEDs on 

opposite sides of the road were intended to disable any 

vehicle that tried to go around the first thus blocking 

the road. The VBIED would maneuver to disable the 

last vehicle thus trapping the convoy in the kill zone. 

Small arms fire was directed at the tires of the M915s 

to immobilize them and shooters with armored piercing 

rounds targeted the gun trucks. Since the insurgents 

never planned anything by accident, the grenadier was 

clearly placed in a position where he would be concealed 

by smoke to throw grenades in the turrets of the gun 

trucks if they tried to pass. The open turret was the 

only significant target for a grenade. The advantage of 

a linear ambush was that it could ambush a convoy 

heading in either direction, but the way the IEDs and 

VBIED were planned they were clearly waiting for a 

northbound convoy. In concept, the insurgents’ objective 

was to halt the convoy trapping it in the kill zone and 

then destroying it in detail.

Fortunately, the convoy foiled the enemy’s plans and 

the lead vehicles cleared the kill zone. The speed of the 

convoy threw off the timing of the command detonated 

IEDs and the alertness of one gunner prevented the 

VBIED from moving up to a vehicle and detonating. The 

improved level of armor on all vehicles protected the 

crews from most of the small arms fire and RPGs. The 

gun trucks quickly turned the fight back on the enemy, 

allowing the rest of the convoy to escape with minimum 

damage. Unfortunately, the enemy grenadier did kill one 

gunner and wounded the rest of the crew. Evidently, the 

convoy procedures and improved armor worked. 

There was reluctance from senior field grade officers 

to employ 5 - ton gun trucks with their open gun box 

design reminiscent of the Vietnam gun truck for many 

reasons, but fear of a grenade tossed in the box was 

one. Because of one roll - over in 2005, no one was 

allowed in the gun box of 5 - tons in Iraq. Up to that time 

the author has found no case of a grenade thrown in 

the back of a 5 - ton gun box, but has found at least two 
188 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

cases of grenades landing in the turrets of HMMWVs. 

Another lesson lost from the Vietnam War was 

the need for air cover to prevent ambushes. Up to that 

time of the war in Iraq, air cover was called in after 

the ambush, and most participants noticed when the 

air cover arrived overhead, the enemy gun fire usually 

stopped. The battle space owner clearly understood the 

convoy should have had air cover when it drove through.

Everyone can learn from a battle, but the losers have 

the most to learn from failure. The insurgents would then 

start using infrared (IR) motion detectors to set off their 

IEDs, thus eliminating the timing problem. They would 

use their cell phones to arm the device when they saw 

the target convoy approaching. They also shifted from 

IEDs made from unexploded ordinance to the energy 

formed projectiles (EFP) a platter charge designed to 

penetrate the improved armor of the vehicles and, in 

particular, destroy the gun trucks first.

1 MSG John P. Souza’s e-mails to Richard Killblane, March 23-29, 2006; 

MSG Souza’s sworn statement 20051028; 1SG David J. Heuer’s sworn 

statement, 20051028.

2 SSG Michael Mulcahy email to Richard Killblane, April 6, 2006 and 

Mulcahy telephone interview.

3 MAJ Christopher Hart’s e-mail to Richard Killblane, March 30, 2006; 

MSG Souza’s and 1SG Heuer’s sworn statements.

4 MAJ Hart’s e-mail; MSG Souza’s and 1SG Heuer’s sworn statements; 

MSG Souza’s e-mail, 1 April 2006, Mulcahy email, April 6, 2006, and 

Mulcahy telephone interview.

5 MAJ Hart’s e-mail; telephone conversation with MSG Souza, 30 March 

2006; Mulcahy email, April 6, 2006; and Mulcahy telephone interview.

6 Mulcahy telephone interview.

7 SGT James Witkowski, Silver Star Citation, Mulcahy email, April 6, 2006.

8 Mulcahy email, April 6, 2006.

9 1SG Heuer’s and MSG Souza’s sworn statements.

10 Mulcahy email, April 6, 2006.

11 1SG Heuer’s and MSG Souza’s sworn statements, and MSG Souza’s 

e-mail, 1 April 2006.

12 1SG Heuer’s and MSG Souza’ sworn statements, MAJ Christopher Hart 

email to Richard Killblane, April 4, 2006.

Top: M1114 with added ceramic plates and factory 

built bumper. 

Middle: M1114 with BAE Objective Frag 5 Doors, Marine 

Turret and Gun Shield, and Rhino 2. 

Bottom: M1114 with Interim Fragmentary 5 Kit, Dukes 

Electronic Jammer and Rhino 2.

Photos courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 189

Top: M1151A1 with Rhino 2, Dukes jammer, AM General 

Gunner Protection Kit, Marine Corps gun shield, and extra 

ballistic glass on turret and door.

Middle Left: M1114 with Interim Frag 6 Kit, extended 

Rhino, Objective Gunner Protection Kit, sniper screen and 

Duke jammer. 

Middle Right: M1117 Armored Support Vehicle (ASV). Bottom Left: M1114 with BAE Objective Frag 5 Doors, another 

type of Objective Gunner Protection Kit.

Bottom: M1114 with BAE Objective Frag 5 Doors, another 

type of Objective Gunner Protection Kit.

Photos courtesy of Richard Killblane
190 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

ASR Sword Hasty Ambush, 25 October 2006

217th Transportation Company (HET) & A Battery, 

121st Field Artillery

ue to the improvements in vehicle armor and 

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) by 

2006, the enemy had pretty much abandoned 

deliberate complex ambushes in favor of Iranian 

imported energy formed projectiles (EFP), which could 

penetrate any kind of 

armor. However, the 

Iraqis tested the convoys 

now and then to check 

for weaknesses in their 

TTPs or to see if a sense 

of complacency about 

complex ambushes had 

set in after each new 

rotation of units. All 

convoys north of Convoy 

Support Center (CSC) 

Scania were conducted 

at night, which eliminated 

any problem of civilian 

intruders since there was 

a curfew in effect with Iraqi civilians. So the convoys had 

the roads to themselves. That allowed them to change 

lanes and go “Hadji” – driving in the opposite lane. 

The intent was to confuse the IED triggerman as to 

where the convoy drove.

In addition, Sheriff net, which had been established 

D

early in the war, was the coordinating network for any 

convoys passing through a battle space to call for 

medevac or quick reaction force, kind of like a 911 

operator in a war zone. The manager of the Sheriff 

network would then coordinate with the appropriate 

units for any assistance needed by the convoy. Each 

network was managed by a different Sheriff designated 

numerically. Sheriff 15 operated out of Baghdad 

International Airport (BIAP) and Sheriff 16 operated out 

of Logistic Support Area 

(LSA) Anaconda.

 In 2006, the 24th 

Transportation Battalion 

owned all the HETs and 

had learned to lead 

convoys with the larger 

HETs because they 

survived EFPs better than 

M1114 up -90 armored 

HMMWVs, which were 

lower to the ground. By 

this time the HETs had a 

factory - 9090 built cab 

armor kit that protected 

them against most IEDs, 

and the height of the HET required such an angle on the 

EFP that it usually passed under or over the passengers. 

Each company in the 24th Battalion backed up the lead 

HET with a gun truck of its own. Because the object of 

the lead HET was to find or trigger IEDs, it usually had 

additional armor on the doors. By that time all military 

Energy formed projectile (EFP) was a platter charge that 

combined kinetic energy and heat to penetrate any kind of 

armor. They were often camouflaged as concrete, rocks or 

trash alongside the road. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

The new cab armor kit for the M1070 HET tractor. The white antenna is the Dukes electronic jamming device used to jam 

radio signals for arming or detonating IEDs. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 191

vehicles had Dukes jamming device mounted on their 

trucks along with radios. Although the Ambush of Ad 

Diwaniyah had clearly shown that having the tank crews 

ride with their tanks turned each HET into a gun platform, 

Multi-national Corps-Iraq (MNC- I) changed the policy 

that crews could no longer ride with the HETs hauling 

their tanks. 

By the 2006 rotation, the Transportation battalions 

at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait had consolidated their gun 

truck escorts into escort companies, and the 37th 

Transportation Group had the 1st Battalion, 121st 

Field Artillery at Camp Navistar as its attached escort 

battalion. The 1st Battalion, 121st Field Artillery was 

a National Guard unit from Wisconsin that had arrived 

in July and completed its transfer of authority on 15 

August. The battalion lost its first casualty, SPC Stephen 

Castner hours after crossing the border on his first rightseat ride on 24 July. The subsequent investigation and 

repercussions from this made the chain of command 

up to the 336th Transportation Group almost paranoid 

about casualties from then on. The death of SGT 

Stephen W. Jopeck by an IED on 24 July 2006 caused 

Combined Land Force Component Command (CFLCC) 

headquartered in Kuwait to also require gunners to ride 

“eyeball” defilade, in other words, only the gunners eyes 

were allowed to be above the gunner’s hatch. Jopeck had 

been sitting at “nametag” defilade when shrapnel from 

an IED came over the turret armor and killed him. 

The Intelligence section (S -2) also studied the 

history of enemy attacks searching for patterns and 

discovered windows of time the enemy preferred to 

attack. So the 336th scheduled convoys to avoid those 

windows making the missions twice as long as normal. 

To make up for this, the 336th increased the number of 

task vehicles per convoy from 30 to 45. With an escort 

ratio of 1:10, this increased the number of gun trucks 

per convoy to four. This allowed two middle gun trucks 

to “float” by driving up and down the convoy rather than 

just one. The tactics was to return fire and clear the kill 

zone, or defend any disabled vehicles in the kill zone, 

but not to go after the enemy. The 121st had learned 

from its predecessors to stagger their gun trucks left 

and right along the convoy so they could see up and 

down the convoy, instead of following right behind the 

task vehicles. The escort commander was subordinate 

to the convoy commander.

The 1-121st FA restructured for the mission using a 

Military Police organization with the platoons organized 

into four escort teams. Convoys were escorted by 

teams that had trained and remained together. They 

drove M1114 up - armored HMMWVs with the interim 

fragmentary kits for additional protection against the 

Realizing the HET was the most survivable vehicle against an IED or EFP, convoys started leading with a HET tractor with 

additional door armor to protect against an EFP. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
192 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

EFP. The lead escort vehicles had the Rhinos attached to 

the front bumper. The enemy would arm the EFP with cell 

phones after civilian traffic had passed and the convoy 

approached, then an IR motion detector would set off 

the EFP. So an innovative soldier wired a glow plug in an 

ammunition can filled with oil on a pole six feet in front 

of the truck to detonate the EFP ahead of the vehicle. 

This design was standardized and issued as the Rhino. 

Every truck also had Blue Force Tracker (BFT) instead 

of Mobile Tracking System (MTS) because the former 

provided situational awareness of other coalition forces 

in the area.

The 217th Transportation Company (HET), US Army 

Reserve from San Antonio, Texas, based in Camp Arifjan 

had only been in theater three months when it received 

the mission to haul M1 Abrams tanks to LSA Anaconda. 

SGT Tucker led the convoy of the 217th with an M1070 

HET and M1000 trailer hauling an M1 Abrams tank. 

SSG Joe Gutierrez’s M1114 gun truck armed with an 

Mk19 automatic grenade launcher followed behind as 

part of the 217th HET scout team. The next HET was 

the pace setter for the convoy, which was followed 

by nine white (contract) HETs driven by Third Country 

Nationals (TCN). SSG Vernon Drake followed behind in 

his HET as the convoy commander. The external escorts 

for this mission came from Headquarters Platoon, A 

Battery, 1st Battalion, 121st Field Artillery with SSG Gary 

Jandreau, the escort commander. Half of A Battery came 

from Maine and the other half came from Arizona and 

Nevada. Jandreau rode in the middle M1114 and SSG 

Kirkland behind him in a HET also followed by nine more 

white HETs. SFC Bernard Wilson followed them also with 

nine white HETs in tow. SSG Raz, the assistant convoy 

commander, brought up the trail party with his HET, a 

green (military) maintenance HET, and CPL Leonard 

Hanson’s 121st FA M1114 gun truck.1

On 25 October 2006, the northbound HET convoy 

left Scania at 0100 hours and passed the turn off to 

BIAP around 0400 hours. It had spent three days at 

Scania due to IED damage to a HET. Its destination 

for the day was LSA Anaconda, so it made the turn off 

MSR Tampa onto ASR Sword heading for the turn onto 

1-121st FA at Camp Navistar restructured their organization similar to MPs with permanent escort teams and the teams 

had their assigned areas in the motor pool. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

M1114 with Frag 5 door armor and Rhino 2 in the up 

position. Rhinos provided a heat signature ahead of the 

vehicle to detonate the IEDs triggered by motion detectors. 

The 1- 121st FA had their 157th FA Brigade patch as the 

logo on their gun shields. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Rear view of M1114s of the 1-121st FA. Photo courtesy of 

Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 193

ASR Vernon, which would lead them back onto MSR 

Tampa toward Anaconda. The convoy had numerous 

breakdowns along the way and SGT Tucker’s M1000 

semi-trailer in the front of the convoy had two bad bogies, 

which caused the convoy to halt on ASR Sword. The 

Multi - National Corps - Iraq (MNC - I) and CFLCC policy 

was not to abandon any vehicles on the road, but secure 

and recover them; and Wilson’s policy was to never to 

leave a vehicle behind and maintain convoy integrity. 

Sword, which ran through the suburbs of Baghdad, was 

still the most heavily ambushed road in Iraq. After a 30 

to 45 - minute delay on Sword, the lead element of the 

convoy drew small arms fire from the left around 0700 

hours. The lead gun truck radioed back taking small arms 

fire on the left and SSG Jandreau heard the report on 

the radio. He then reported the small arms fire and grid 

coordinates to Sheriff 15.2

Meanwhile, Jandreau’s gunner saw an Iraqi reach 

over the wall with his AK and fire at the convoy. As soon 

as the gunner returned fire, the Iraqi ducked. The gun 

truck pulled off the road to the left side and stopped 

to let the convoy pass. When the Iraqi stood up to fire 

again, the gunner fired his M2 .50 caliber machinegun at 

him. The Iraqi never fired back again. A few minutes after 

the small arms fire started, Jandreau heard explosions 

and felt the concussion, but did not see where the 

explosions came from.3

Two mortar rounds exploded about 200 meters to 

the left and right side of Tucker’s truck at the head of 

the convoy. 15 to 20 seconds later, three more rounds 

exploded a little closer to the left and right of his truck, 

and he realized the enemy was bracketing his truck and 

walking rounds closer. SSG Drake then gave the call for 

the convoy to continue mission and drive out of the kill 

zone. As the lead elements of the convoy negotiated the 

serpentine check point manned by the Iraqi Police (IP) 

under the overpass, small arms fire broke out on both 

sides of the road. A TCN driver heading for the check 

point was shot in the abdomen and the convoy came to 

a halt with six trucks in the serpentine and four white 
194 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

HETs ahead of it. Jandreau pulled his M1114 to the left 

at an angle in what he called a “spiked L” in order to see 

up the convoy. CPL Hanson likewise pulled his M1114 

to the rear, but the gun trucks identified no targets to 

engage. The enemy fired had ended.4

Right after the halt, SFC Wilson drove his HET up 

past a TCN who was out of his 

vehicle trying to get his attention. 

Wilson stopped his truck and while 

still under fire, dismounted and 

walked over to the TCN who was 

then calmly standing by his driver’s 

door. Wilson noticed the white HET 

had been damaged by small arms 

fire, and about that time, another 

TCN pulled his HET up alongside 

the damaged HET, so Wilson put 

the other TCN driver in that truck. 

The driver then signaled with his 

hands to Wilson that the TCN in his 

truck was wounded, so Wilson ran 

back to his HET to get the combat 

life saver bag. Upon returning to the 

white HET, he realized the contract 

vehicle was unarmored so he 

assisted the wounded TCN up to 

his armored HET. Although the TCN 

was wounded in the left leg, he could 

still walk. Once safe in the armored 

cab, Wilson bandaged the contract 

driver’s leg.5

Jandreau then called Sheriff reporting the convoy 

had wounded and to standby for a nine -line medevac 

report. He also requested the quick reaction force, and 

then called SSG Gutierrez to reposition his 217th gun 

truck from the front to the rear and for CPL Hanson to 

come up from the rear and provide medical aid to the 

wounded TCN, since Hanson was 

also an emergency medical service 

(EMS) civilian. Hanson pulled up 

about a 100 meters from the Iraqi 

check point, grabbed his combat 

life saver bag and ran to the TCN 

with the abdominal wound where he 

assessed the extent of injury and 

rendered medical aid. Hanson then 

told his gunner, SGT Michael Albert, 

the nine- line, who then radioed it to 

Jandreau. Jandreau likewise relayed 

the nine- line medevac report to 

Sheriff and reported possible enemy 

troops in the area. After 

about 15 minutes of quiet, the 

convoy began receiving more small 

arms fire from the right side and 

a TCN came back and in broken 

English told Hanson another TCN was 

wounded up front. Hanson asked if 

the TCN could bring the wounded 

back. Two TCNs and two Iraqi 

Policemen went up and brought the 

wounded driver back. The driver had 

The 1-121st FA was recently issued the M1117 Armored Support Vehicle (ASV). Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

LT Olson, Platoon leader in the 

1-121st FA. The new body armor had 

side SAPI plates and shoulder guards. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 195

been shot through both legs. Hanson then treated 

both and a minute and a half after Jandreau had called 

in the nine - line, a medevac helicopter and Apache 

gunship arrived. The appearance of the gunship 

overhead ended the enemy fire.6

Coincidently, Commando 16, a patrol of four Strykers, 

eight- wheeled armored combat vehicle, out of Taji, heard 

the call and asked Jandreau if they could provide security. 

Jandreau was extremely grateful for the additional fire 

support. Five to ten minutes later, four Strykers arrived 

and asked where they could be best placed. Jandreau 

told them to position two up front, one in the middle and 

one in the rear. The two up front guarded the far side 

onramps leading up the overpass.7

SFC Wilson, however, had lost radio communications 

earlier that day and needed to inform his assistant 

convoy commander about the wounded TCNs. His truck 

commander, Niky Eakins, ran back past 18 white HETs 

to Raz’s HET to inform him about the wounded TCN. 

Eakin reported the situation to Raz. When the Strykers 

arrived, one Stryker pulled up next to Wilson’s truck 

where they quickly loaded the wounded contract driver 

in it and drove him back to the rear of the convoy where 

the medevac helicopter landed. Jandreau asked Hanson 

what color smoke he was going to throw. Hanson tossed 

purple smoke, and the medevac identified the correct 

color. The helicopter landed, loaded the two wounded 

contract drivers, and was not on the ground for three 

minutes before it took off.8

Jandreau then radioed for Hanson to move his 

gun truck back to the rear and for Gutierrez to return 

to his position up front. On Hanson’s way back, small 

arms fire opened up from both sides of the road in 

front of Jandreau. His gunner saw Iraqis on the roof 

tops and in the windows on the right side of the road. 

The crews of the Strykers saw them also and both laid 

down suppressive fire. The .50 caliber rounds, however, 

seemed to have no effect on the thick adobe walls of 

the houses along the road but the Mk19 automatic 

grenade launchers on the Strykers silenced the 

enemy fire. However, a couple more white HETs were 

disabled by enemy fire. Jandreau then called the convoy 

commander to go back and recover the HET and tank. 

He then called Sheriff asking where the quick reaction 

force was, but Sheriff did not know and said it should 

have been there by then. Sheriff admitted they in the 

middle of a shift change so the message may not have 

been passed down. Jandreau’s adrenalin was pumping 

with anger and said they had better give him air 

support or something.9

Meanwhile, Wilson waited for Eakins to return, so 

he ran back to the middle of the convoy and saw two 

to three white HETs damaged by small arms fire that 

could not drive. One was shot through the engine and 

M1114 and M1117 ASV of the 1-121st FA returning from an escort mission. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
196 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

another had a flat tire. Wilson then met up with Raz, 

and sent someone back to bring up the two white 

bobtails. When Jandreau saw Wilson, he exited his gun 

truck and ran with his M203 grenade launcher to the 

convoy commander. Wilson reported the battle damage, 

situation on the ground, and who he was talking with 

on the radio. They then walked back to the first contract 

truck discussing how to recover the disabled vehicles 

when small arms fire opened up on them from their 

right front on the other side of the berm that flanked 

the onramp. Jandreau dropped to the prone position as 

rounds stitched the ground just inches to his left. Wilson 

had leaned against the truck and the two looked at each 

other then ran back down the line of trucks to get away 

from the enemy fire. Rounds were hitting in front and 

behind them as they ran. Jandeau thought for sure he 

was going to get hit and ran holding his Kevlar helmet 

so it covered the back of his neck. Everything seemed 

to move in slow motion. They had passed three or four 

HETs when they finally stopped to rest against a contract 

HET. As the rounds hit closer to them, they started 

running further to the rear of the convoy. Jandreau then 

heard someone yell. Another TCN was hit. Jandreau 

stopped three or four trucks away and yelled out if the 

TCN was ready. The TCN gave the thumbs up sign, so 

Jandreau and Wilson ran the rest of the way back to 

the rear of the convoy. It was then Jandreau saw Hanson 

and Raz on top of a tank trying to cut the lock.10

Previously, Hanson met up with Raz at the rear of 

the convoy and decided to recover the equipment. The 

recovery team switched out the HET that had a flat tire 

and then decided to drive the tank off the trailer of the 

disabled HET. They asked who knew how to drive a tank 

and Raz said he had driven a tank before but not an 

M1, but was willing to try. So Raz and Hanson climbed 

up on top of it only to discover the hatch was locked. 

Hanson then brought up a pair of bolt cutters from his 

gun truck but could not cut the lock. They then started 

receiving small arms fire from the right side of the road 

since the Strykers were on the left side. Hanson and Raz 

immediately jumped to the ground. Hanson dropped his 

M4 and returned fire with his M9 Berretta pistol then the 

small arms fire increased. Wilson nearby could see one 

Iraqi to his right and fired four to five rounds from behind 

the rear wheels of trailer with the tank, and the enemy 

fire stopped. Raz had landed on the right side and 

crawled under the trailer to the front of the cab where 

he was yelling in pain. Wilson asked if he was hit, and 

Raz said he had twisted his knee on the landing.11

Raz, Wilson and Hanson then climbed into 

Jandreau’s gun truck to discuss what to do next. It was 

pretty evident the longer they remained in the kill zone 

recovering vehicles, the more vehicles were damaged 

and more drivers wounded. They agreed Raz would 

drive the white HET and Wilson would go to the front of 

the convoy. After Wilson received the “green light” that 

everyone was ready, he would lead them out of the kill 

zone. Wilson parked his HET on the other road. There 

were two white HETs and a bobtail that had not yet 

entered the serpentine. Jandreau drove SSG Drake over 

to his bobtail, which was parked behind Wilson’s HET. 

They received the word that all green (military) trucks 

were ready to go.12

It was then that Wilson saw SSG Drake. Wilson 

walked at a stoop over to Drake standing next to a white 

HET where Wilson then explained what had happened 

so far. About that time the small arms fire increased 

and someone yelled that another TCN was wounded. 

Wilson and Drake saw a wounded TCN by the tire of the 

same vehicle they had just left. Wilson handed Drake 

his weapon and ran over to the wounded driver, grabbed 

him by the collar of the IBA and dragged him behind the 

second white HET. The TCN had been wounded in the 

left hand and right leg. The Stryker was also there to 

take the wounded TCN. The situation was deteriorating 

the longer they remained in the kill zone.13

At that point, Drake made the decision to leave the 

disabled HET before they had any more drivers wounded. 

Wilson asked the Stryker to cover him while he ran to 

his truck, and the Stryker drove between him and 

the enemy while he ran. Upon reaching his HET, he 

discovered three gun shots to the windshield and one 

to the radiator, which was leaking fluid on the ground. 

Unable to drive his truck, Wilson decided to secure the 

sensitive items. As soon as he jumped out of his truck, 

Drake came up with the maintenance vehicle. Wilson 

tossed the sensitive items in the maintenance vehicles 

and climbed in. Once he reported to Drake he was in 

the vehicle, the convoy drove off. The quick reaction 

force arrived much later.14

After dropping off Drake, Jandreau turned his gun 

truck around to drop Hanson off with the TCN. Jandreau 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 197

then dropped Raz off with the white HET while Hanson 

drove up the convoy blowing his siren, an understood 

signal to mount up. Raz climbed in the white HET. The 

main body of the convoy was already at Taji and what 

was left of the convoy was still drawing small arms fire 

and the gunners on the gun trucks and Strykers were 

still engaging the enemy. Mk19 rounds sounded like 

mortar rounds exploding on their targets. The convoy 

finally pulled out with Jandreau’s gun truck in the front, 

Hanson’s in the rear and Raz three vehicles behind 

Jandreau. They made the turn onto ASR Vernon, but 

Raz was having trouble getting the commercial HET into 

higher gear so it moved at a crawl. Military trucks had 

automatic transmissions. He stopped on the onramp to 

Vernon and after five minutes a TCN in the HET ahead 

of him came back to show him how to shift gears. With 

that the convoy started moving again. About three miles 

down Vernon, they saw one of their green HETs parked 

on the side of the road. They stopped for a moment 

and reported the grid coordinates to Sheriff 16 saying 

they needed quick reaction force and KBR recovery. 

Sheriff 16 called Sheriff 15 to send the recovery team. 

Meanwhile, Jandreau was trying to get the convoy 

commander on the radio. They had abandoned two 

bobtails, an empty white HET and one green HET with 

an Abrams tank behind. Commando 16 (Strykers) asked 

what they wanted done with vehicles left behind. At Taji, 

Jandreau learned two white HETs had been recovered 

but two HET bobtails were burning.15

Lesson

Only gun trucks should halt or remain in a kill zone. 

Everything else needs to clear the kill zone and rally 

at a safer area as quickly as possible.

This case study illustrates how rapidly a situation 

can deteriorate in the effort to recover a disabled 

vehicle. The delay in the enemy opening fire on the 

halted convoy and the sporadic nature of the fire 
198 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

indicated this was a hasty ambush. ASR Sword was 

historically notorious for convoy ambushes and any 

halt on that short stretch of road incurred high risk. 

The prolonged delay of the convoy in recovering the 

initial disabled vehicle provided a target of opportunity 

for the insurgents; and once the shooting started, the 

longer the convoy remained in the kill zone, the more 

vehicles were damaged and drivers wounded. 

During 2004 and 2005, units could abandon 

vehicles if they could not recover them within ten 

minutes, but that policy later changed. MNC - I policy 

no longer allowed convoys to abandon any vehicles. 

This, however, did not require the entire convoy to remain 

in the high threat area during the recovery. To minimize 

risk to others, they could have pushed all the other 

vehicles out except a few gun trucks and bobtail HET 

for security and recovery, or set a time limit on how 

long the convoy could stay in the area before having 

to move to a rally point in a safer area.

Another option was to call up the battle space owner 

as soon as the HET trailer broke down to have the quick 

reaction force secure the convoy as rapidly as possible. 

These decisions were made after the enemy fire began. 

Rarely has anyone thought of calling the quick reaction 

force before contact, but if done earlier it could have 

reduced the risk of other vehicles and drivers in the kill 

zone. They were fortunate that two Strykers happen to 

be passing by because the quick reaction force arrived 

1 SFC Bernard Wilson and SSG Vernon Drake interview by Richard Killblane 

at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait on 4 March 2007; and SSG Gary Jandreau 

interview by Richard Killblane at Camp Navistar, Kuwait, 6 March 2007.

2 Wilson and Drake interview, and Jandreau interview.

3 Jandreau interview.

4 Wilson and Drake interview, Jandreau interview, and CPL Leonard 

Hanson interview by Richard Killblane at Camp Navistar, 6 March 2007.

5 Wilson and Drake interview.

6 Jandreau interview, and Hanson interview.

7 Jandreau interview.

8 Wilson and Drake interview, Hanson interview, and Jandreau interview

9 Jandreau interview.

10 Jandreau interview.

11 Wilson and Drake interview, Hanson interview, and Jandreau interview.

12 Jandreau interview.

13 Wilson and Drake interview.

14 Wilson and Drake interview.

15 Wilson and Drake interview.

long after the convoy had abandoned the vehicles.

Once in a kill zone, the counter measure is to 

suppress the enemy fire with overwhelming and 

accurate fire. In this ambush, the M2 .50 caliber 

machineguns failed to suppress the enemy fire 

coming from the buildings, but the Mk19 automatic 

grenade launchers were the only weapons that 

stopped enemy fire. The next case study has a 

convoy halt in the same area but showed the 

advantage of overwhelming and accurate fire.

After three years of the war, the third country 

nationals (TCN) had plenty of experience working 

with Americans and performed very well that day. 

M1114 of the 1-121st FA. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 199

Top: Cab armor kit FMTV. 

Two Left: Cab armor kits for M915s.

Right Bottom: Cab armor kit for M923 

aka “Frankenstein Box”

Photos courtesy of Richard Killblane
200 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Don’t Mess With Texas; 

Ambush on ASR Sword, 23 February 2008

A Company, 3-144th Infantry (TX NG) 

106th Transportation Battalion

ince SSG Shane Lindsey and SFC Efrain Garcia 

were interviewed within three weeks after the 

incident, the language used during the ambush 

was still fresh in their memory. This story captures 

the language used in a kill zone. For people who are 

offended by profanity, they should do their best to 

stay out of kill zones.

The 106th Transportation Battalion, then 

commanded by LTC Christopher Croft, returned to the 

war a third time in 2007 to conduct convoy escort out 

of Logistic Support Area (LSA) Anaconda, or Balad as 

the US Air Force called it. The 106th Transportation 

Battalion assumed the convoy escort mission for short 

haul convoys to the different logistic bases in each 

Multi-National Division area. These missions usually took 

a day or two to complete. Its escort companies ranged 

from combat arms companies such as infantry or cavalry 

to logistics units. The 106th had changed its nickname 

from “Spearhead” to “Spartans” because they assumed 

the 7th Sustainment Brigade would arrive in Iraq 

ahead of them and had adopted the name Spearhead 

(although their motto was Resolute). The popular movie 

“300” also embraced the same warrior’s mindset that 

Croft wanted in his convoy escort companies.

S

LTC Croft had an offensive mindset about convoys 

and encouraged his companies to come up with 

innovative solutions. He admitted his infantry and cavalry 

companies performed the best, but the 106th was held 

back on some of its ideas by COL Brian K. Leonhard, 

Commander of the 213th Area Support Group, who 

believed convoys should just get from point 

A to point B. This rotation also occurred during the 

surge of combat troops in the Baghdad area. Many 

subordinates felt the colonel was risk adverse 

because he did not want any unnecessary casualties. 

The innovations by the escort companies and the 

combination of walling the routes with concrete barriers 

reduced the number of IED attacks on the convoys 

throughout the Baghdad area.1

A Company, 3 -144th Infantry was the infantry 

escort company under the 106th Transportation 

Battalion. This was an East Texas National Guard 

company of the 36th Infantry Division with an aggressive 

gunslinger mentality. They claimed the wide open 

ranges of West Texas allowed cowboys to shoot long 

distances from horseback, but in East Texas the area 

was more urban and cowboys had to be quicker on the 

draw. Consequently, 1LT Michael Geraci joked about his 

gun trucks crews, “If you shoot at them, you just make 

them mad and they shoot back.” Geraci claimed his 

1st Platoon had the most enemy kills of the company. 

The company had only returned from Afghanistan six 

months before it was alerted for this deployment to Iraq. 

M1151 and M1117 ASV with tow bars up front at LSA Anaconda. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 201

All volunteered to deploy so they could stay together as 

a company. So 80 percent of the company had been 

deployed to Afghanistan and maintained the same 

aggressive attitude of taking the fight back to the enemy. 

CPT Chris Miller had served in Iraq before as contractor 

with KBR and assumed command of A Company in April 

2007. The company mobilized in May 2007 and went to 

Camp Shelby. It then arrived in Iraq during the second 

week of August where it replaced the D Battery, 1-5th 

FA, which the Texans claimed did not have a combat 

mentality. They did not take personal weapons with 

them on the road. They were not prepared to be hit 

when they crossed the wire. Their mentality was, 

“If we get hit, we get hit.”2

A Company was the first replacement company in 

the 106th Battalion to complete its transfer of authority 

(TOA) and it quickly established a more aggressive 

mentality for the next companies to arrive. LTC Croft put 

out his intent to maintain an aggressive and disciplined 

mentality. After a couple weeks in country, a convoy 

from A Company was hit by an IED on the way to Camp 

Speicher, outside Tikrit. It drove off the road and raided 

a building looking for the trigger man. While LTC Croft 

had to encourage some of his other companies to be 

more aggressive, he had to tell the Texans to slow down, 

fearing they might stumble into an ambush. When he 

advised them to take an offensive posture, he did not 

mean to dismount and kick in doors. He said, “Look at it; 

do you really want to do it.” LTC Croft then added tactical 

patience to his guidance. “Let the EOF [escalation of 

force] system work; don’t go straight to shoot to kill. 

Does that threat have to be eliminated or blocked?”3

The infantry knew if they could see the trigger man 

through their thermal night vision goggles then they 

could take him out. If they were hit by an IED, then they 

would scan for the trigger man and take him out. The 

Texan attitude was “If you get hit and you can eliminate 

the threat, he will not be around to hit someone else.”4

The infantry ran with tow bars on the front part of 

their vehicles, which served a practical purpose and 

happened to also identify them to the enemy. CPT Miller 

claimed his company also came up with the idea of 

employing snipers. He wanted to infiltrate snipers along 

the main supply route in habitual hot spots where they 

were often hit by IEDs, but the battle space owner did 

not want them to do it. B Company, 297th Infantry also 

asked to do it. The snipers then asked what they could 

do. So they rode in armored LMTVs and could shot 

from the top.5

The recent surge in combat units in the Baghdad 

region had reduced the IED threat to convoys because 

of the increased number of patrols in the area. This did 

not allow the enemy time to properly conceal their IEDs. 

In addition, the coalition forces began erecting concrete 

T-wall barriers along the main routes through Baghdad 

used by coalition forces, which eliminated much of the 

New armored cab of KBR tractors. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
202 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

trash that littered the roads, in which the enemy hid 

the IEDs. The barrier program was still underway and 

Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Sword had not yet been 

walled up. It was still an unfriendly road and houses 

along it had thick concrete or adobe walls that some 

thought were reinforced because .50 caliber rounds 

failed to penetrate them.6

By then convoys only drove at night, which meant 

they could see the muzzle flash of enemy fire, which 

gave them positive identification, so vital to returning 

fire. The procedure for reaction to contact had not 

changed much: clear the kill zone and defend any 

disabled vehicles, but the organization of the gun 

trucks had. Because the enemy had targeted the 

lead and rear gun trucks, the convoys placed three 

gun trucks up front and two in the rear. That way if one 

was disabled, another could defend it, and in the case 

of a gun truck hit up front, the third gun truck could 

escort the convoy to the rally point.

To minimize casualties, current Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) policy did not permit the crews to 

dismount their vehicles and engage the enemy as the 

gun truck crews had done during early deployments. 

Since the vehicles were fully armored with ballistic glass, 

senior commanders felt the crews were safely cocooned 

inside the armored vehicle. Senior commanders were 

so paranoid about the casualty numbers reported on 

the news that they micro -managed the war through 

power point. 

After SGT Stephen W. Jopeck, of the 1st Battalion, 

121st FA (WI NG), was killed by IED shrapnel sitting 

high in the gunner’s turret on 24 July 2006, the 336th 

Transportation Group required all gunners to sit at 

eyeball defilade in the turret. MNC - I likewise studied 

charts of casualty statistics and realized that gunners 

were often wounded by shrapnel that slipped through 

the gap between the gun shield and turret shield, so 

they also established the policy that gunners had to sit 

at “eyeball defilade.” In other words, only the top of the 

gunner’s head was allowed above the roof of the gun 

truck. This would not allow the gunner the benefit of his 

greatest advantage against an IED – vision, but instead 

had to rely on the driver and truck commander to spot 

IEDs.7 Evidence would later show that 80 percent of 

IEDs were found visually versus by any technology. 

On 23 February 2008, A Company, 3 -144th 

Infantry escorted a KBR fuel convoy returning from 

Convoy Support Center Scania with SSG Efrain Garcia 

as the escort commander. The convoy had two M1117 

Armored Support Vehicles (ASV), a four-wheeled 

armored car (upgrade of the old V-100 from the Vietnam 

War), up front because they considered them more 

survivable, next followed eight KBR trucks. The convoy 

commander’s M1114 armored HMMWV mounted with 

an M240B was next, followed by eight more KBR fuel 

tankers, and then the assistant convoy commander’s 

M1114 armed with an M2 .50 caliber machinegun and 

240B. Garcia placed his assistant convoy commander, 

SSG Shane D. Lindsey, in the middle of the convoy 

because he had the most experience in responding to 

ambushes. Garcia essentially placed his best tactical 

leader in the right place. Lindsey was followed by eight 

more KBR fuel tankers, then an ASV, wrecker, eight 

more KBR tankers, and finally two M1114s armed with 

KBR fuel tankers. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 203

.50s and 240Bs. The convoy had no fire truck, which 

was common with some fuel convoys. Seven gun trucks 

escorted 24 fuel tankers with a ratio of one - to - four.8

SSG Garcia’s convoy rolled down ASR Sword near 

Abu Ghraib just past the dip in the road adjacent an 

apartment complex with thick adobe walls. As the rear 

M1114 gun truck was just moving up front to block the 

turn onto ASR Vernon, SSG Garcia heard a loud explosion 

at 2245 hours. He asked on radio if anyone heard or 

saw it. Someone in the ASV gun truck that had moved 

up front said he heard it was behind Gun Truck Number 

2. A KBR driver went crazy saying he was taking small 

arms fire. Then all the trucks from the lead gun truck to 

convoy commander’s gun truck, 11th vehicle back, took 

small arms fire from a group of buildings on the right 

hand (south) side of road. SSG Garcia called on radio, 

“Contact right.” Their tactics, techniques and procedures 

(TTP) called for a gun truck to pull to the contact side 

and return fire, so the gun 

truck in contact pulled the 

right side. The lead three 

gun trucks had cleared 

the kill zone, so SSG 

Garcia’s gun truck pulled 

over and the assistant 

convoy commander 

came up to join the fight. 

The gunner saw three 

Iraqis on top of the 

building to his right. 

SSG Lindsey saw two 

on the roof top, more 

in the second story 

windows, and possibly 

five on the ground running 

from house to house.9

Lindsey then saw a KBR truck stopped in the kill 

zone with its brakes locked up. So Lindsey’s M1114 

gun truck pulled up to the right rear between the truck 

and the enemy. His M1114 started receiving small 

arms fire from south side (his right), then he saw two 

more enemy insurgents with AKs on the north side. 

SSG Garcia’s gun truck also received automatic fire 

from an RPK machinegun.10

As the ASVs were leading the rest of the convoy out 

of kill zone, the crew of the lead ASV called that they saw 

an IED wrapped in a bag in the median 300 meters from 

the convoy commander. SSG Garcia instructed them not 

to stop. He knew if they stopped they would be trapped 

in the kill zone. They replied, “Roger, we are not stopping; 

we are pushing left.” As the rear ASV with the wrecker 

drove past the convoy commander’s gun truck, the 

IED detonated behind it causing no damage to wrecker. 

Only the two gun trucks and disabled KBR truck 

remained in the kill zone and the rear M1151 gun truck 

was coming up. As soon as Lindsey’s gun truck received 

fire from both sides of the road, he called to say he 

needed “Six” to come up. While waiting, Lindsey pulled 

further forward to the right side of the KBR tanker. The 

small arms fire sounded like hail hitting his passenger 

door and gunner’s turret. Lindsey told his gunner, SPC 

Anthony D. Cooke, to find where the most concentration 

of fire came from and suppressive it, “Find the fuckers!” 

Lindsey was so mad at that point; he yelled, “Find me a 

fucking target.” Lindsey 

was highly pissed off 

because that was the 

12th IED that went off 

on this convoy and the 

enemy was trying to hit 

his gunner. When the 

enemy saw Lindsey’s 

door crack open, they 

concentrated even more 

fire on his door, which 

pissed him off even more 

because they did not 

want to let him out.11

 Meanwhile, Gun 

Truck 6 pulled up next 

to Lindsey’s M1114 and 

the gunner, CPL Tanerrius D. Robinson, fired to the left 

(north) killing two insurgents with his .50 and the truck 

commander, SGT Leonard Girramita, opened his window 

and engaged with his M4 carbine to the right. They were 

drawing fire from both sides of the road at that location. 

The KBR bobtail with “Medicine Man” stopped behind 

the disabled vehicle. Garcia’s driver talked to “Medicine 

Man,” who said, “I’m not getting out of this truck till the 

shooting stops.”12

An IED then detonated behind Garcia’s truck while 

he was trying to figure out what the rest of the convoy 

Convoy escorts staging for a night convoy. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
204 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

was doing. Garcia told the lead truck to stop and 

assess the damage. He saw fuel was leaking 

everywhere. “Lost Boy’s” gun truck (the middle floater) 

was up front; SGT Tony Robbins called Garcia and said 

he still saw heavy enemy fire. He heard Garcia say they 

were getting ready to move and he saw trucks receiving 

small arms fire. “Lost Boy” made the decision to turn 

back into the kill zone leaving the three ASVs up front 

for security. Garcia told Hernandez in Gun Truck 1, an 

ASV, to stop and then roll at 10 to 15 mph to allow 

time for the recovery operation. Meanwhile PFC Jesse 

“Woody” Henderson drove “Lost Boy” zigzag through 

the convoy with a police light on his front grill to get the 

Third Country National (TCN) and KBR drivers out of the 

way. The tankers that had bullet holes pulled to the right 

so the fuel would spill into the median, not the road. 

The ones not shot pulled to the left. SGT Robbins yelled, 

“Don’t stop shooting!” His gunner, CPL Clinton Williams, 

was firing his M240B at the house that was engaging 

Garcia but his weapon jammed. He then switched to fire 

the SAW but it could not work either. Robbins then yelled 

up, “Shoot something.” Disgusted, Williams threw the 

SAW down into the truck yelling, “If you want to shoot the 

mother fucker, you shoot it!” Robbins then picked up the 

SAW, got out of the truck and laid down suppressive fire. 

About that time Williams got his M240B working.13

Enraged and with no regard for his own safety, 

Lindsey exited his vehicle and fired his M203 grenade 

launcher using the armored door for cover and a steady 

aim. He fired three or four rounds, the first one in a 

window with two enemy insurgents then the others in the 

windows next to it. That quieted the fire coming from the 

house. He then shut the door and walked around behind 

his gun truck to check on the KBR driver while Cooke 

Vice President Dick Cheney presenting Bronze Star Medals to SSG Shane Lindsey and PFC Veronica Alfaro of the 

106th Transportation Battalion. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 205

provided covering fire. His driver, SPC Miguel Velazquez, 

yelled out, “Hey, the damn KBR guy is out of his truck.” 

He had dismounted to hook up a tow pin. Seeing another 

gun truck, Lindsey yelled, “Who’s fuck’n truck is that?” 

It belonged to SGT Robbins, who was out of his M1114 

using it as cover while walking and firing his SAW. Lindsey 

asked, “What the fuck you doing bringing your truck so 

close to mine?” Robbins said, “There’s a guy out working 

on his truck out here.” Lindsey asked, “What fucking 

guy?” It turned out “Medicine Man” was under the truck 

trying to hook up a “D” ring so he could tow the disabled 

truck. “Medicine Man” was cool under fire. Lindsey then 

walked back the rear of his truck and fired more HE 

rounds in the building and behind the wall. He spotted 

an Iraqi wearing the blue sweatshirt behind the mud 

wall that surrounded the house about 75 meters from 

the road and the .50 cal chewed him up. The .50s from 

Lindsey’s and Garcia’s gun trucks worked the wall and 

also fired at the enemy running toward the four 

cars down the alley.14

Up front, “H” Hernandez had stopped the lead part 

of the convoy up the road and boxed it up with an ASV 

front and rear, trucks in two rows, and the third ASV was 

in middle. Garcia then told “H,” “You got the front until we 

get out of here.” “H” then dismounted and coordinated 

with the KBR convoy commander to conduct a battle 

damage assessment (BDA) on their trucks. “H” told the 

drivers and truck commanders to get on the ground and 

for the gunners to keep scanning. Discovering seven 

tankers with bullet holes leaking fuel, CPL Nichols and 

the KBR convoy commander then started patching bullet 

holes with plugs to stop the fuel from leaking. To plug 

the higher holes, Nichols had a KBR driver climb up on 

his shoulders. After the KBR driver was drenched in fuel, 

they switched, until Nichols was also covered with fuel. 

Meanwhile, “H” checked drivers and found a driver who 

was shot in the head. He then sent a text message 

to the battalion tactical operations center.15

After receiving the MTS message, “KBR was shot 

in the head,” Doc, who was in Lindsey’s gun truck, said, 

“We got to go; somebody’s shot in the head.” Lindsey 

got on MBITR (hand held squad radio) and asked, 

“What ta hell is going on up there? Is somebody shot 

in the head or not.” Doc was panicky. Lindsey then 

told “Junior” Velazquez to find out what was going on, 

and then Lindsey returned to shooting bad guys while 

“Medicine Man” finished hooking up to tow the 

disabled KBR tanker.16

It turned out a round had busted out the dome light, 

the ricochet hit the KBR driver’s helmet and split it just 

grazing his head. “H” pulled him out of the truck and 

took him to his ASV gunner, SPC Jesse Vanegas, who 

asked the guy if he is alright. Vanegas, who never said 

much, told him, “Drink some water,” not knowing what 

else to do for him.17

By that time the small arms fire was dying down, 

so Gun Truck 6 concentrated its fire at the enemy on 

the roof while Lindsey’s gun truck fired at guys on the 

ground, with Lindsey firing his M203 into the second 

floor windows. Garcia’s gunner, Armstrong, was shooting 

star clusters and parachutes flares at the building, 

yelling, “Hey, mother fuckers shoot at me over here!” 

Lindsey could not see where the enemy was firing from, 

but Garcia could. Looking at the building the flare went 

into, Garcia said, “Look at that mother fucker; I caught 

it on fire.” This was the result of a change in their 

tactics, technique and procedures. 

After getting hit by their first IED, they sped up and 

cleared the kill zone. That first IED had scared them; 

but by their second IED, they reacted the same way 

but it pissed them off. So they discussed it and Garcia 

said they did not need to speed through the kill zone 

after an IED attack because it had already detonated. 

They needed to slow down and let everyone catch up. 

After the third IED, they wanted to do something to 

discourage further attacks, and decided to fire back at 

anything suspicious. They knew the trigger man had to 

be hiding out in the desert and they shot up the desert 

to scare him from further attacks. That was when they 

also decided to shoot flares at the enemy to catch them 

on fire. The next day it worked out. Lindsey said, “Gotta 

make a point. Recon by fire. The truck that gets hit 

marks the site, pulls over and finds something to shoot 

at to draw fire.” So during this ambush on ASR Sword, 

“Phalanx,” Garcia’s call sign, fired flares everywhere.18

By that time, the bobtail was backing the chain out, 

Lindsey was also shooting flares on top of the building, 

then a Stryker unit came up and the enemy small arms 

fire stopped. When the convoy had made the turn onto 

ASR Sword, they passed the slower moving Strykers 

heading in the same direction. The convoy had switched 

lanes after entering Sword, then pushed the third gun 
206 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

truck up to block the turn onto ASR Vernon. For some 

reason it took the Strykers 20 minutes to catch up. 

When they arrived, the Stryker crews asked if the convoy 

needed help. With the KBR truck hooked up for tow, 

Garcia’s convoy continued its mission.

Lesson

The enemy laid out a common pattern kill zone. They 

placed a couple IEDs up front to disable the lead vehicle 

and any vehicle that tried to drive around it. They also 

planned to disable a vehicle in the rear to trap the 

convoy and finish it off with small arms fire. The first IED 

missed and everyone sped up, throwing off the timing of 

the trigger man. The gun trucks did as they were trained 

and led the convoy out of the kill zone. Two gun trucks 

defended the one tanker system that was disabled. The 

enemy had selected an ideal location for the kill zone as 

the concrete walls of the neighboring buildings protected 

them from .50 caliber fire, but they did not count on 

the accuracy of SSG Lindsey with his M203 grenade 

launcher. He dropped 40mm grenade rounds in any 

window he saw fire come from and quickly silenced 

the enemy.

His act of getting out of the vehicle was actually 

against MNC - I policy. Restricting only the gunners to the 

fight reduced the advantage of firepower when the gun 

trucks stopped. Not only that, but MNC- I had restricted 

the gun trucks from mounting the Mk19 automatic 

grenade launcher to minimize the collateral damage. 

They felt the Mk19 was too much fire power for a convoy 

and would instead be a greater danger to local civilians. 

As Lindsey demonstrated, the grenade launcher was 

the ideal weapon for ASR Sword.

Like James McCormick, this crew adopted the 

aggressive policy to deter further enemy attacks and 

also learned the advantage of firing flares at the enemy. 

A flare coming at the enemy did not look much different 

from an RPG. A flare fired at the ground behind the 

enemy at night could also illuminate them from behind 

making them easier to see. It could also burn down the 

building they are hiding in.

Hidden so low, the gunner would be unable to see 

above the gun shield. Later statistics would show that 

80 percent of IEDs were spotted visually, not by 

technology. In reality, most gunners ignored the policy 

and sat high in the turret so they could see out.

Lindsey’s selective disobedience won the day, 

but almost got him in trouble. Fortunately, LTC Croft 

defended his actions and even recommended him for 

the Silver Star Medal. On 18 March 2008, Vice President 

Dick Cheney presented SSG Lindsey with the Bronze 

Star Medal for his valor. Robbins also received the 

Bronze Star Medal. Cooke, Armstrong, and Robinson 

received ARCOMs with V devices.

1 LTC Chris Croft interview by Richard Killblane at LSA Balad, Iraq, 

12 March 2008.

2 CPT Chris Miller interview by Richard Killblane at LSA Balad, Iraq, 

13 March 2008; and 1LT Michael Geraci interview by Richard Killblane 

at LSA Balad, Iraq, 17 March 2008.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 SSG Shane Lindsey and SSG Efrain Garcia interview by Richard Killblane, 

at LSA Balad, Iraq, 13 March 2008. Since this interview was conducted 

within a couple weeks after the ambush, the vocabulary was still fresh 

in Lindsey’s memory.

7 Richard Killblane, OIF 2007 Journal.

8 Garcia and Lindsey interview.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.
Operation Iraqi Freedom 207

Top Left: MAXXPRO with anti-RPG Q-net. 

Photo courtesy of SPC Edward Bates DVIDS 

Middle Left: MAXXPRO. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Bottom Left: MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) 

with anti-RPG Q-net. 

Photo courtesy of SPC Vang Seng Thao DVIDS

Top Right: RG31. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane

Bottom Right: Caiman. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
208 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 209

Operation Enduring Freedom,

Afghanistan

Regay Ambush, 13 June 2006

First ambush of a US military convoy in Afghanistan Team Cadillac, 710th BSB

he 10th Mountain Division planned a large offensive against the Taliban which would not only expand the 

operational area of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, but would also require military convoys to sustain the force. 

Up until that summer, American units in the field had been sustained primarily by air or Afghan contract “Jingle” 

trucks. For this reason, Americans had not encountered logistics convoy ambushes in Afghanistan, but that was about 

to change. Beginning in the summer of 2006, the US Army would run ground convoys in Afghanistan and the first 

convoy ambush would soon follow. Although American soldiers had plenty of experience with convoy ambushes in 

Iraq, the nature of the enemy and terrain in Afghanistan only allowed some of the lessons to carry over into this war.

The 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry formed the nucleus of Task Force 2-87 for this offensive into Regional 

Command-South. Its forward support company (F Company), however, was tied down providing logistical support 

and force protection to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun -E. The 10th Sustainment Brigade Commander, 

COL John Nicholson, instead tasked LTC Vernon Beatty to support this operation with his 710th Brigade Support 

Battalion (BSB), which was conducting split-based operations between Bagram and Salerno. LTC Beatty decided to 

create a forward support company (FSC), which would move forward with the infantry. The forward support company 

borrowed 65 Soldiers of A Company, 20 Soldiers from B Company (Maintenance), two medics from C Company 

T

Jingle trucks at Little Round Top. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
210 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

(Medical), and 

some cooks from F 

Company. CPT Carolyn 

Trias-DeRyder, the 

Headquarters 

and Headquarters 

Company Commander, 

assumed command 

of the newly organized 

Forward Support 

Company, H Company, 

which most called 

“Team Hotel.” This ad 

hoc unit would form 

the convoy that was 

ambushed.1

In planning for the summer offensive, Operation 

Mountain Thrust, the Joint Logistics Command was 

losing a lot of equipment due to pilferage and ambushes 

on the Jingle trucks traveling west from Kandahar across 

Highway 1 in Regional Command (RC)-South. Joint 

Logistics Command needed to provide a military convoy 

capability. The original intent was 50 percent military 

and 50 percent host nation contracted Jingle trucks. 

Military trucks had rarely escorted Jingle trucks before 

and no one else in the Joint Logistics Command had 

extra soldiers to provide drivers. So mid-April 2006, 

Joint Logistics Command directed the Logistics Task 

Force to provide a convoy capability. Logistics Task Force 

directed CPT Michael Dolge and CPT Devin Callahan, 

Signal Company 

Commander, and 

the Logistics Task 

Force Deputy Support 

Operations Officer 

(SPO) to develop 

a plan. CPT Dolge 

(Transportation 

Corps) was the 

commander of the 

699th Maintenance 

Company (Direct 

Support) (Light), from 

Fort Irwin, California. 

During the remainder 

of April and beginning 

of May, the two captains found, stole or borrowed four 

M1114 up - armored HMMWVs and five Palletized 

Loading Systems (PLS) with trailers, and a HEMTT 

wrecker from other units around Bagram to meet the 

mission requirements. Essentially, they were building 

an ad hoc convoy from men and resources thrown 

together for this mission.2

The PLS had no armor kit at that time, so Dolge 

visited the Army Materiel Command (AMC) shop on 

Bagram and had them fabricate an armor kit with a ring 

mount on each PLS and his HEMTT wrecker. He only 

had four M2 .50 caliber machineguns and two Mk19 

automatic grenade launchers for his four M1114 up -

armored HMMWVs; but in case they had to establish 

M1114 with SAW, Dukes electronic jammer and TACSAT. radio. 

Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge

PLS trucks in the desert of RC - South. Photo courtesy of 

CPT Michael Dolge 

HEMTT wrecker of Team Caddy. This one replaced the one 

destroyed in the ambush. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 211

a fire base in the desert, they could arm both the 

M1114s and PLSs. Otherwise, the opening in the ring 

mount allowed the truck commander to stand up and 

fire out of the cab.

CPT Dolge, two other captains, and SFC Michael 

Leipheimer, the Headquarters’ Platoon Sergeant of 

the 699th, then sat down to discuss how to organize 

the team. They drew a diagram with each of the ten 

vehicles and decided what crew each vehicle needed. 

Mechanics could drive trucks as well as fix them so they 

needed mechanics (MOS 63B and 63H) as drivers. SFC 

Leipheimer happened to be a track vehicle mechanic. 

They also discussed what they needed to be selfsufficient. They needed radio mechanics, so Dolge took 

SSG Debutts and SPC Brown from his Communications 

and Electronics (C&E) Shop. He wanted a small arms 

mechanic but did not have one. Needing two medics, A 

Company provided SPC Roger Pena, Jr., and SPC Smith. 

Dolge found SFC Hall from the 699th who he could leave 

in their rear headquarters at Kandahar and depend upon 

to get the team whatever it needed. Fuel handlers knew 

the supply system, so SGT Trujillo joined the team from 

the 699th. This was an unlikely combination of soldiers 

for convoy operations but they rose to the challenge.

The team would operate out of Kandahar and Camp 

Bastion (owned by the British). At Bastion, the team 

would set up a forward supply point. 699th’s NBC NCO, 

SSG Greg Gardner, would work in the Jump TOC with 

Trujillo and Brown. The team of 28 drivers voted on 

the name Team Cadillac. The 710th Brigade Support 

Battalion provided direct support to the 3rd Brigade 

Combat Team so Team Cadillac (Caddy for short) would 

deliver supplies to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team.

As the senior captain, both the brigade and battalion 

commanders picked CPT Dolge as the commander of 

the team. The other captains had other missions. Dolge, 

however, had an executive officer, 1LT Audry Ahlvers, and 

platoon leader, 1LT Lucas Overstreet. His plan was to get 

the mission running and then turn it over to his platoon 

leader, but this did not work out because they did not 

conduct that many convoys.

During the second week in May, Team Caddy drove 

from Bagram to Jalalabad to pick up an organic HEMTT 

wrecker. They took four HMMWVs and two PLS trucks 

as recovery vehicles. This was a test run to determine 

what problems they would encounter on the road. As 

a convoy it was a successful mission, but there were 

serious communication issues. The Joint Logistical 

Team Caddy after training. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
212 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Command and Logistics Task Force could not see them 

on Blue Force Tracker (BFT) or talk to them on either 

PRC117s radios or the Iridium and Thuraya cell phones. 

Designed to jam enemy remote electronic detonation 

devices, the Dukes interfered severely with the FM 

communications and the lead vehicle could even not talk 

with the rear vehicle. Without communication with higher 

headquarters, the convoy would have been in serious 

trouble had it been ambushed. It could not have 

called for help.

After their return to Bagram, the crews placed a 

filter on their Dukes so it would not block certain FM 

frequencies. The 699th was the first unit in Afghanistan 

to be “clean fielded,” which meant they had only one 

type of jammer. To mitigate the communication issues, 

they added an Acorn jamming device to the lead and 

rear vehicles, which did not jam as many frequencies. 

To talk long distances, the convoy had to halt requiring 

the gunners to search five meters out and then ten 

meters out, “five and ten checks;” then they would turn 

off their Dukes and then turn on tactical satellite radio 

and Blue Force Tracker. This did not work if there were 

mountains to the south because the satellite was low in 

the southern horizon. With Acorn, the lead or trail truck 

would pull away from the convoy outside the range of 

the Dukes, turn off the Dukes and then turn on Acorns. 

This electronic jamming technology was new and one 

system interfered with the other. 

The next task was to relocate the entire team from 

Bagram to Kandahar in preparation for the offensive. 

The standby soldiers flew to Kandahar to replace any 

casualties or soldiers who went on leave. All ten vehicles 

convoyed first to Camp Phoenix in Kabul, then Ghazni, 

FOB Laghman, and onto Kandahar. The convoy became 

lost in Kabul and stopped at Phoenix to find an escort 

through Kabul. Then a Vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) 

exploded 600 meters outside the gate. This was the 

first VBIED directed against American soldiers since 

2001. The VBIED drove across the depressed median 

and detonated in the depression and could not drive up 

the other side. The convoy suffered no injuries, but one 

tire thrown from the VBIED hit a PLS four vehicles back. 

SPC Garcia, the driver of the HMMWV had just opened 

his window to because the gunner had farted, which 

happened to allow the concussion to escape without 

blowing the gunner out. The convoy took two full days 

to complete the trip from Bagram to Kandahar.

As soon as the convoy arrived at Kandahar, all the 

vehicles had maintenance problems and it took about 

seven days to service them. Dolge wanted to get every 

vehicle as close to TM 10-20 maintenance standards 

as possible before kicking out again. Two days after their 

arrival, they received an escort for the run to Bastion, 

but they cancelled it because of too much enemy activity 

Buffalo was designed to dig up mines. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 213

at Gereshk. They did reconnoiter the route through 

Kandahar with five HMMWVs, and around 3 June, four 

or five days later, they ran the first full convoy to Bastion. 

The unit move included one or two containers of Class I 

provisions, Class V ammunition, tents, personal gear, a 

Gator, and a contact truck - a HMMWV with a tool shelter 

on back. They had one 20-foot container for personal 

provisions, sundry packs, carpentry tools, toilet paper, 

and spare parts.

The Task Force 2-87 column departed Kandahar 

early to mid- evening and, as the task force moved out, it 

stretched out into a number of serials and Dolge’s serial 

left sometime between midnight and 0200 hours. His 

four M1114 gun trucks escorted the five PLS trucks and 

one HEMTT wrecker. They traveled across Highway 1 

towards FOB Price with the intent to turn north at Price 

and head up into Helmand Valley. An Engineer route 

clearance patrol (RCP) was embedded in an infantry 

column ahead of the column searching for IEDs in the 

road. The plan was once the convoy turned right off of 

Highway 1 at Price, the route clearance patrol would then 

take the lead and clear the route. Halfway to Price, an 

insurgent fired an RPG from a building on the left side 

of the road that hit the Buffalo Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected Vehicle (MRAP) right below the driver’s 

compartment. It penetrated the engine compartment 

and started a fire. Other than a small hole and smoke, 

there was very little visible damage to the vehicle. 

Fortunately no one was hurt. The infantry consequently 

captured three or four insurgents and Dolge’s mechanics 

and HEMTT wrecker were called up to recover the 

damaged vehicle, then tow it the rest of the way. That 

Buffalo was unfortunately their only capability in the 

convoy to dig up mines, so the column turned around 

and headed back to Kandahar where it took a couple 

of days to repair the damage.

This delay caused the task force to revise its plan 

and abandon FOB Bastion as a logistics base but run 

directly to Musa Qala instead. When they reached to the 

town of Musa Qala, they would head north around a hill 

mass. Between that and the next mountain ridge, they 

would establish the forward operating base.

During the middle of the night on 11 June, Task 

Force 2-87 again departed Kandahar. The large convoy 

did not reach Musa Qala before nightfall and, because it 

was not advisable to navigate through the town at night, 

they stopped. The lead element halted on a small hill 

mass, which they named Little Round Top, just north of 

Scouts of 277th ASG pulling overwatch while the rest of the convoy catches up. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
214 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the mountain near Musa 

Qala. The main body of 

the convoy halted in 

the desert. 

Musa Qala became 

the forward operating 

base for the infantry 

operations in the Helmand 

Valley and most supplies 

were delivered by air. 

The Forward Support 

Company provided support, 

conducted container deliver system air drops, ran the 

fuel point, water point, shower point and pulled base 

security. The trucks of A Company were occasionally 

tasked out piecemeal to support the infantry during 

the 42 days of operation.3

Upon their arrival, one of Dolge’s PLS trucks was too 

broken down to return. Bastion was supposed to be the 

staging area, so Dolge had not planned to leave them 

behind. So Dolge had to leave three mechanics and 

drivers there to build a mini-forward operating base. 

The mechanics figured out the part they needed and 

Dolge left Gardner, Brown, and Trujillo.

The next day on 13 June, Dolge led his ten-vehicle 

convoy back to FOB Bastion to pick up supplies and 

return to the task force camp at Little Round Top. 

Dolge’s convoy headed south through Musa Qala and 

the Helmand River Valley with Gereshk and FOB Price 

at the end of the valley where it narrowed between the 

mountains in the central part of Afghanistan. South 

of Musa Qala, the valley opened up into a delta with 

canyons and hill masses. Musa Qala was in the Sanagin 

District, which was commonly referred to as “Taliban 

Central” because of the level of enemy activity. Dolge’s 

convoy was rolling south in the vicinity of Regay. The 

road narrowed and the convoy ran into some overhead 

wires and Dolge wanted to find an access route to get 

onto the western desert where he had more freedom of 

maneuver. A trickle of the river meandered through the 

wadi covered with shrubs and rocks, flanked by 15 to 

20-foot embankments. So Dolge had his and another 

M1114 lead the convoy as scouts using a traveling 

overwatch technique. His two gun trucks scouted the 

route ahead and provided security at a rise of ground 

while waiting for the rest of convoy to catch up. Each 

scout vehicle leapfrogged 

ahead of the other in 

a bounding overwatch 

fashion.

After traveling south 

paralleling the river for a 

couple of hours, Dolge 

found a path leading out 

of the wadi to the entrance 

of a small Afghan town of 

Regay. Adobe houses and 

buildings were on the left 

(east) and the right side (west) opened up into a farm 

field with some rugged terrain and trees. He saw a hill 

mass to the west and wanted to drive on top of it to 

see if there was a route out of the valley.

Dolge’s vehicle was about 600 to 800 meters 

ahead of the other HMMWV when it climbed up the path. 

At that time, an RPG hit it from the left side. It detonated 

in the gap between the left rear door and the frame, hit 

SPC Pena in the passenger seat and came to rest in a 

box of Mk19 ammunition. The blast blew the door open 

and ejected the medic from the vehicle. SPC Garcia and 

SSG Debutts continued driving not knowing they had 

lost their passenger. Immediately after the RPG, they 

began receiving small arms fire. Dolge heard somebody 

on the radio report, “We were taking fire from the right.” 

Yet, most of the fire was coming from the left. The next 

vehicle in line was 200 to 300 meters behind. All the 

vehicles reacted by pushing the gas pedal to the metal 

and racing through the kill zone. The first PLS through 

the kill zone, driven by SGT Eric Trueblood, was hit with 

shrapnel to the driver’s side fuel tank. It was leaking fuel 

but had not caught fire so the vehicle continued to roll 

forward. Dolge told everyone to push far enough ahead 

of the kill zone to create some maneuver space for the 

others and then wait for the rest of the convoy to catch 

up. As the wrecker, third vehicle from the rear, came 

upon the same spot where Pena’s HMMWV was 

initially hit, it was also hit by an RPG in the fuel tank 

setting it on fire.

Meanwhile, Dolge looked at his map and identified 

an unpopulated open area just south of the town. He 

wanted to get to there so they could consolidate and 

reorganize, then move to the next terrain feature. Just 

then the second HMMWV pulled up and stopped. It 

Regay. Photo courtesy of LCPL Joshua Rudy DVIDS
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 215

could not move forward anymore and blocked the road. 

SGT Eric Trueblood’s PLS came to a rest almost 50 feet 

behind it right between two buildings and an alley. It 

began taking fire through that alley and from a hill mass 

off to the right. The truck commander and team executive 

officer, 1LT Luke Overstreet, jumped out of the cab of 

his PLS and started putting out the HEMTT fire with his 

fire extinguisher. He then saw Pena lying back in the kill 

zone. Meanwhile, Trueblood and his truck commander 

dismounted, ran up to the M1114 and climbed inside 

to escape the small arms fire. About that time, their PLS 

was hit by another RPG, which set the leaking fuel on fire. 

The gunner on the disabled gun truck kept on engaging 

the targets to the right front with his Mk19 and that 

enemy fire stopped.

So the first HMMWV was disabled, with the PLS 

disabled and burning right behind it. SSG Alan Peterson’s 

HEMTT was also on fire in the rear of the convoy trapping 

the convoy on the road. The trail HMMWV driven by 

SGT Blankenship with SFC Leipheimer as the vehicle 

commander recovered Pena, quickly loaded him on their 

hood and then cleared the kill zone. With three disabled 

vehicles, Dolge had nine passengers needing seats in his 

six remaining vehicles. He did not have that many seats 

because every HEMTT and PLS had the Dukes and radio 

mount installed on the doghouse inside the truck. So 

the captain tried to get his battalion at Kandahar on the 

tactical satellite radio but it was not working. He finally 

reached them on the Iridium cell phone and told them 

he had one killed and no wounded. They in turn called 

the British at Bastion to scramble Apache gunships.

The battalion tactical operations center started 

coordinating fixed wing support as well. Eventually the 

convoy received the two British Apaches, a US Blackhawk 

an A10, two British GR8s, a B1 bomber and a French 

Mirage. Dolge called the medevac for Pena and at the 

same time planned to load those other nine guys into the 

helicopter. The British sent a medevac helicopter from 

Bastion but it could not find a landing zone free of enemy 

fire, so it left. The tactical operations center decided to 

send the British Quick Reaction Force, a large company 

team stationed at Bastion with two Chinooks. The 

company had to go through the entire NATO 

channels to scramble, which took about six hours. 

In the meantime, Dolge and his driver, SPC Ben Bese, 

controlled all the aircraft on station.

The French Mirage arrived first, but the convoy could 

only talk to the pilot on FM radio, which meant the plane 

had to fly very close to the ground. Its inability to stay low 

and slow limited its ability to stay within range of Dolge’s 

radio, so the plane just ended up leaving. As soon as 

the Apaches arrived, the enemy’s rate of fire decreased 

significantly. The enemy ceased firing when the Apaches 

came in for strafing runs, but when they circled around, 

the convoy received fire from about 200 meters away. 

As gunships came for another strafing run, the enemy 

fire stopped again. The pilots told Dolge to mark the 

targets, so he had his M203 gunner fire smoke rounds 

and a couple of his SAW gunners fire tracers at the 

area where the enemy fire came from as the Apaches 

approached. The Apaches then fired its mini guns and 

the drivers saw a puff of pink mist (blood splatter) 

and the enemy fire ceased from that direction, but the 

convoy then took fire from 100 meters to the left and 

repeated the technique. The fire in that direction ended 

but started up again from the initial position. About 

that time the A10 Warthogs arrived overhead.

The drivers received most of their enemy small 

arms fire from the buildings, then a tree line and another 

compound to their left (east). At one point, a donkey 

would walk out from around the corner of that compound 

and each time that donkey came out they would receive 

fire from that general area. After two or three times 

Dolge’s gunner, SPC Nathan Toews, finally realized, 

“Every time that donkey comes out, we get shot at. 

Let’s kill that fucker.” So Dolge lined up as many people 

as he could and when the donkey came out everybody 

unloaded on it, turning it into small chunks of meat. To 

no surprise they stopped taking fire from that corner.

By that time, Dolge was talking to the A10 pilots with 

his Iridium cell phone while his driver, SPC Bese, talked 

to the Apache pilots on the radio. About the time they 

had killed the donkey, Bese asked the Apache pilot if he 

could see anything in the compound where the donkey 

had come from. The Apache pilot saw a bunch of people 

running around there, so he fired 20 to 30 rounds into 

that little compound. Consequently, the convoy stopped 

taking fire from that direction. They then received fire 

from the tree line and Bese instructed the Apache to 

lay some fire into the tree line. It swooped down from 

far away and fired 40 to 50 rounds from its cannon and 

two or three rockets into that tree line in one pass. The 
216 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Apache cleared out a good 150-meter wide section 

of that tree line. The convoy only received random fire 

from there after that.

Again, Toews realized they were taking fire from a 

door of a building. So Dolge pulled out his last magazine, 

which he had loaded with tracers, and fired three-round 

bursts into the building. It then began to smoke and 

they no longer received fire from there either.

During the fight, the remaining medic, Smith, ran to 

the HMMWV while still taking fire, opened up the back, 

dove inside, searched around and then came running 

back around with a white box. Dolge thought he might 

be bringing IVs or something important, but the medic 

ran up to Dolge and handed him a pack of cigarettes, 

“Here sir, you want some?” To which the captain replied, 

“Okay, great.” Smith then went to every person in the 

convoy and handed them a pack of cigarettes. That 

day everyone was smoking.

About 1700 hours the British quick reaction force 

landed 300 to 400 meters to the north in two CH47 

Chinooks. Two platoons circled around to the west to 

secure that area while one platoon headed directly to 

the convoy. Dolge talked with the company commander 

and they agreed the hill mass just to the west was a 

good location to move everyone to for cover. They set up 

their four or five 60mm mortars in the low ground and 

their 7.62mm general purpose machineguns around the 

perimeter with two of the M1114s on the corners with 

the heavy machineguns pointed towards Regay and 

the third one on the backside oriented towards a more 

sparsely populated portion of the line. But before 

they left, they had to recover as much of the equipment 

from the disabled vehicles as they could.

The HEMTT wrecker had burnt to the ground along 

with all the sensitive items, Dukes and radios. The 

British ignited a thermite in the wrecker to ensure there 

was nothing the enemy could salvage. An Apache also 

fired 15 to 20 rounds into the wrecker and the PLS to 

complete the destruction. Consequently they lost the 

Dukes in both trucks, three of four radios, and a couple 

pair of night vision goggles. The burning PLS also had 

their QUADCON, the Mk19, the .50 cal, two basic loads 

of ammunition for all the weapons, a couple of spare 

radios, extra laptops, and everyone’s personal gear in it. 

At the end of the day, 14 of the 28 crew members owned 

nothing more than what they were wearing. Fortunately, 

some had their assault packs in another vehicle.

The British called in a medevac and a Chinook 

but neither could land. The Chinook however brought 

in some water, tossed it out and then flew away. Every 

truck had three days of supply of water; but through 

the course of the day, the soldiers had drunk about 

two days’ worth of it. Dolge’s uniform was soaked from 

head to toe with sweat. Water was dripping from his 

body armor and he had drunk 12 bottles of water in six 

hours. Once in the perimeter, the soldiers requested 

spare parts, tires, fluids, and more ammunition. Most 

of the vehicles leaked oil and the PLS leaked hydraulic 

fluid. They patched the hoses with duct tape. Two US 

Blackhawks flew in with tires and other supplies, but 

they were not willing to take the casualty at that point. 

They mistakenly brought HEMTT tires and not PLS tires, 

which were useless; so the drivers just slashed them 

and threw them into the desert.

Because they did a light insertion, the Brits called 

in two more Chinooks with food and water. The quick 

reaction force did not know how long they would stay, 

but decided they would remain long enough to need 

some more food, water and ammunition. Once Dolge’s 

trucks pulled up, they threw their ammunition on the 

trucks, and radioed back for more ammunition. They 

decided to remain there until the sun came up then 

move further west. 

About midnight, Dolge was sitting in his HMMWV 

typing up an email message on the Blue Force Tracker. 

Toews was leaning on the hood and the assistant 

gunner, SPC Daniel Colon, was sitting at the back left 

tire of the vehicle bathing himself with baby wipes. 

Suddenly an RPG exploded on the front left headlight 

tossing Dolge into the back seat and knocking Toews 

down. Toews right eye was hanging out on his cheek 

and small shrapnel had peppered his face, but he had 

a big gash to his head. Colon received a big gash in his 

neck all the way to his Adam’s apple, which was bleeding 

severely but easily dressed. He also received a deep 

gash in his right thigh and a little piece of shrapnel in 

his stomach because his body armor was open. Toews 

was unresponsive and had very labored breathing. The 

bone in his right wrist looked as if it was severed, but 

not bleeding very much, as if a piece of shrapnel swiped 

him. He also had a big gash in his leg, so they called over 

a British medic since the convoy medic was on the other 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 217

side of the perimeter. They took him by litter to the middle 

of the perimeter and had to pry his grip finger by finger to 

let go of the M16. They patched up his injuries and then 

cut off his body armor to check for other injuries 

but found none.

They called in another British Chinook, which 

arrived with more supplies and then left because two 

US Blackhawks were coming in behind them. They put 

the wounded driver and assistant gunner on the 

medevac helicopters with six other drivers which flew 

off. One of the Blackhawks flew back to FOB Price with 

its passengers, set it down long enough to pick up some 

gas and returned. The British Apaches then swapped 

out with American Apaches for the rest of the night. 

When the sun came up, Dolge only had three 

M1114s and his was less than mission capable with 

one flat tire and the driver’s side of the windshield 

blacked from the blast. All four of his PLS trucks had 

some form of damage and could not travel far on 

their own. They departed at a walking pace while the 

Blackhawk scouted a route ahead of them and the British 

light infantry walked beside the seven trucks across the 

desert. Because his new driver could not see out the 

windshield, Dolge and his new gunner, SGT Trueblood, 

had to tell him where to drive. They stopped on a rise 

of ground and another British Chinook delivered more 

food and water, which they shared with the Americans, 

because their Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) had burned 

up with the PLS and the cans of water and fuel had 

exploded from the impact of rounds. 

Dolge tried to coordinate with Kandahar or Musa 

Qala for an aerial escort from there to Price or a groundbased escort either from Price to take them back to 

Price or from Musa Qala to escort them south. The 

captain felt with all his vehicles disabled, his gun trucks 

had lost their ability to maneuver and if they received 

another attack, he would need additional support. 

The task force finally said it would send an infantry 

company with a route clearance patrol to lead them 

to Price. The infantry would secure a landing zone 

for the Brits to leave and then they would escort the 

convoy back to Musa Qala. After 36 hours, the infantry 

company arrived in HMMWVs with the route clearance 

patrol but they said they were not going to escort the 

Blackhawk scouting route for convoy of PLS trucks. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
218 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

convoy because it was not part of their mission set. They

were instead heading back into Regay with the route 

clearance patrol, consolidate the damaged vehicles in 

one spot and call in close air support to complete the 

destruction of the vehicles. So Dolge requested some 

Blackhawks as his escorts. The next morning, 15 June, 

they received a couple of Blackhawks and completed 

their journey to Price without any further problems.

They remained at Price for two days refitting and left 

for Kandahar on 17 June. After nine hours on Highway 

1, they arrived at Kandahar and immediately started 

to perform maintenance on the vehicles. They held a 

memorial service for SPC Pena while at Kandahar.

Lesson

This early in the Afghan war, military convoys rolled with 

a one-to-one gun truck ratio, and were still ambushed. 

Because of civilians killed by mistaken identity or 

collateral damage, US and allied air cover could not 

shoot into villages unless they had positive identification 

of enemy. So the Taliban used the village for cover and 

the road through the village channeled the convoy into 

the intended kill zone. Traveling through wadis, convoys 

were not confined to a strict path except when crossing 

fords or going through villages. These choke points 

became places to expect ambushes, but knowing which 

one was the kill zone was often unpredictable. Dolge’s 

convoy had no prior intelligence indicating any threat 

in Regay. The Taliban would continue to attack from 

villages throughout the war.

The soldiers wanted to blame someone for their 

misfortune and most of their blame was directed at 

CPT Dolge since he was their convoy commander. The 

battalion S3 at Kandahar held an after action review 

and learned when the convoy left Musa Qala instead 

of going straight, it turned left. Had it turned at the right 

location, it probably would have avoided the contact; but 

in combat the difference between life and death can be 

as simple as turning left, right or going straight ahead 

with no hint as to what the right answer is. 

If any mistake was made, it was having the vehicles 

not in the kill zone drive through the kill zone, but that 

was the policy and would remain the policy during the 

TK Ambush three years later. As early as 1968, the 8th 

Transportation Group’s Standard Operating Procedures 

(SOP) stated in the event of an ambush: a. (1) When a 

convoy encounters sniper fire, an ambush or mines it 

should KEEP MOVING if at all possible. (2) The security 

M1151 of the 277th ASB with Helmand Valley in the background. Photo courtesy of CPT Michael Dolge
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 219

forces will be contacted by radio immediately. (3) All 

vehicles which are beyond the “kill zone” will continue 

moving toward their destination. (4) If unavoidably 

stopped in the “kill zone,” personnel must dismount, 

take up covered and concealed positions, and lay down 

a heavy volume of fire only on active enemy targets, 

staying in close proximity of their vehicles. In no case 

will convoy personnel close with or attempt to pursue 

the enemy as this will interfere with the tactical reaction 

plan. Convoy personnel will cease fire upon arrival of 

tactical security elements to allow tactical vehicles and 

personnel freedom of movement against enemy forces. 

Convoy control personnel will insure that traffic begins 

to move as soon as the tactical situation permits. (5) 

Those vehicles which have not yet entered the “kill zone” 

will halt at 100 meter intervals, dismount and defend as 

described in para 8 (a) (4) above, firing only if the enemy 

targets are visible. This last point was a lesson the 

convoys in Afghanistan had yet to relearn.

The battalion determined that once in contact, the 

soldiers’ actions were good. The crews did everything 

they could to clear the kill zone, disrupt or destroy the 

enemy, called in close air support and controlled it well. 

The high gun truck ratio was still not enough to deter 

attack. The battalion at Kandahar did not have an 

accurate manifest of the vehicles in the convoy, so when 

the convoy asked for PLS tires the battalion thought they 

had HEMTT LHSs because that was what the battalion 

had. So the battalion went to KBR and sent out HEMTT 

LHS instead of PLS tires. They similarly sent ammunition 

based on the weapons they had and not what the convoy 

had. They did not have any Mk19s and the convoy did 

not have any M240s. So when ammunition arrived, the 

drivers just gave the M240 ammunition to the Brits. They 

only had phone numbers on their cell phones for Task 

Force 290 -87, but not the British or Special Forces that 

occupied the nearest FOBs. Unlike Iraq, there was no 

Sheriff network to coordinate with everyone in the 

same battle space.

The terrain in Afghanistan was vast and the coalition 

forces were spread out at great distances. The wide 

open desert and narrow mountain passes required the 

convoys to send scout vehicles out ahead to the next 

terrain feature (usually a rise in elevation) in search 

of IEDs or possible kill zones. They would provide 

overwatch for the convoy until it caught up and then 

would scout to the next key terrain. Unlike Iraq, the 

convoys in Afghanistan did not drive through some 

brigade’s battle space and could expect a quick reaction 

force in a matter of minutes. Consequently, the convoy 

commanders had to know how to call in artillery, attack 

helicopters and direct close air support. 

1

1LT Maria Flores and 1LT Leah Mock interview by Richard Killblane at 

Fort Eustis, VA on 30 January 2008; and CPT Carolyn Trias-DeRyder, 

Operation Mountain Thrust, Army Logistician, Jan-Feb 2008. 2The following narrative is taken from a series of interviews with 

CPT Michael D. Dolge by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA on 

17 July 2008 and 10 April 2009. 

3Flores and Mock interview.
220 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

14 April 2007

782nd BSB

ith the introduction of a second brigade 

combat team to the northern part of Regional 

Command-East, Jalalabad and Salerno 

became the two logistical hubs run by one brigade 

support battalion. Inclement weather such as rain, snow 

or dust storms routinely prevented air operations, which 

had been the major mode of distribution to many combat 

outposts. Salerno was in a bowl surrounded by mountains 

on all sides and a low ceiling prevented aviators from 

flying out of the bowl although it could distribute to remote 

combat outposts along the Pakistan border. 

With the new requirement for ground convoys, LTC 

Michael P. Peterson, Commander of the 782nd Brigade 

Support Battalion, decided to move the hub from 

Salerno west across the mountain range to FOB Sharana 

since a paved road connected it with Highway 1 at Ganzi. 

Highway 1 was the major paved highway through the 

area from Bagram and would make a good main supply 

route (MSR). Moving the hub from Salerno to Sharana 

would also make their hub accessible to Bagram by 

both land and air. 

1LT Marco Oledan (Quartermaster) had responsibility 

for the long haul convoy out of Sharana, consisting of 

three gun trucks, either M1114 or the newer and more 

powerful M1151s, escorting ten to 15 task vehicles. 

W

Every military vehicle except the load handling system 

(LHS) had a ring -mounted crew-served weapon.1 Each 

military vehicle also had a Dukes electronic jammer. 

Host Nation contract trucks, known as Jingle trucks, 

would also tuck in with the convoy for protection. 

Engagements in Afghanistan were officially 

called troops in contact (TIC). There were two types 

of engagements, direct fire (DF) and indirect fire (IDF). 

The long haul and local haul convoys had run into two 

direct fire ambushes and the local haul convoy was able 

to just drive through the kill zone. The ambush that hit 

the long haul convoy damaged and stopped several 

vehicles. Because of electronic intercept capability, the 

enemy had a hard time maneuvering undetected in large 

numbers, so most ambushes by the summer of 2007 

were small in nature. Because of the rarity and simplicity 

of convoy ambushes in Afghanistan, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTP) were still in their infancy.

Probably because the ground convoy operations 

were fairly new in Afghanistan, the sustainment convoys 

out of Sharana had not run into any IEDs or been 

ambushed in the mountains. The few attacks had been 

initiated with RPGs followed up with small arms fire in 

the open valley. The enemy usually fired on the convoy 

from positions 100 to 150 meters up the slope. The 

current TTP for reaction to contact was to stop in the 

kill zone, engage and kill the enemy. Convoys also 

called for close combat aircraft (helicopters) and close 

M1114s with Frag 5 doors and Dukes belonging to the 782nd BSB at FOB Salerno. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 221

air support (fix wing). This aggressive tactic was obviously 

a product of the airborne attitude of the 82nd Airborne 

Division. The 782nd convoys did not get hit much but the 

security patrols were attacked more often. The mission 

was coming to an end since the 82nd Airborne Division 

was pulling its people out of the two outposts as 

they redeployed.

At 2230Z 14 April 2007, Oledan’s first convoy from 

Bagram was ambushed. The destination was an Afghan 

National Army (ANA) outpost on a route that the convoy 

had not driven before. The battalion staff had studied 

the route and the terrain and the S2 had conducted 

a pattern analysis of the enemy activity in the area. 

Oledan’s ten - vehicle convoy consisted of a HMMWV 

gun truck up front followed by a task vehicle then a Jingle 

truck. Oledan decided to let the Afghan contract Jingle 

truck fall in the convoy for security. One or two tractors 

and trailers followed the Jingle Truck and the second 

HMMWV gun truck with the convoy commander followed 

behind them. A fourth tractor and trailer system followed 

behind that gun truck and Afghan National Army (ANA) 

soldiers rode in a Ford Ranger behind it. A wrecker and 

third HMMWV gun truck brought up the tail of the convoy. 

Every military truck had Dukes electronic jamming device 

with a radius far enough to cover the host nation truck 

and ANA vehicle between them.

Direct fire ambushes were not common on military 

convoys, but route clearance patrols (RCP) came under 

direct enemy usually initiated to inflict damage to 

one vehicle and then exfiltrated the area. The Taliban 

habitually ambushed individual Jingle trucks driving 

down the road with the intent to scare the drivers away 

so they can pilfer the cargo.

It was night as Oledan’s convoy entered a mountain 

pass and rising slope on both sides restricted any 

maneuver off the road. The enemy fired an RPG at 

the Jingle Truck disabling it then followed up with small 

arms fire. The Jingle truck came to a halt and the driver 

ran away thus blocking the road. The two lead trucks 

did not hear the attack and kept driving as if the convoy 

was behind them. 1LT Oledan, not hearing the attack 

wondered why the convoy had stopped. He radioed 

ahead asking, “Why are we stopped?” The lead vehicle 

replied they had not stopped. Oledan decided to drive 

around the truck ahead of him to determine the source 

of the problem. The road offered little space so they 

drove very slowly. It was then he saw tracers fired across 

the road and muzzle flashes a hundred meters up the 

slope. He realized it was an ambush.

The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) was 

to return fire and clear the kill zone, drop off the task 

vehicles at a security rally point then have the gun 

trucks return to the kill zone and engage the enemy 

until the quick reaction force (QRF) arrived. As the convoy 

commander’s gun truck negotiated its way into the kill 

zone, the enemy fired flares. Oledan then called asking 

about injuries. The ANA soldiers jumped out of their Ford 

Ranger and ran away, blocking the path of the last two 

vehicles. Oledan radioed the others to drive around. The 

vehicles followed his out of the kill zone to the rally point 

a mile and a half up the road. Once he had a hundred 

percent accountability of his military personnel,he 

consolidated the convoy and drove away. As they drove 

on, the last gun truck saw head lights approaching 

from behind. Oledan feared it was a Vehicle -borne IED 

(VBIED) and ordered his convoy to speed up while the 

rear gun truck did an escalation of force with the laser. 

The vehicle did not stop. It turned out the driver of the 

Jingle truck had been wounded and hopped a ride with a 

passing civilian truck. Battalion called and told Oledan to 

turn around, return to the kill zone and secure the Jingle 

truck that was hauling ammunition. The quick reaction 

force and air support was on its way.

Oledan halted his convoy, turned his three gun 

trucks around and returned to the kill zone just as the 

close air arrived. The enemy feared close air support and 

had already exfiltrated the area. Oledan stopped his gun 

trucks short of the kill zone and saw the burning Jingle 

truck but saw no enemy fire, so he called the rest of the 

convoy to join him. They established 360 degrees of 

security while waiting for the quick reaction force. QRF4 

arrived and Oledan joined them in the kill zone with one 

of his gun trucks but leaving the other with the convoy. 

He assisted them in a sweep of the area and, judging 

from the spent brass, discovered approximately 12 

enemy fighting positions. Battalion then directed Oledan 

to destroy the Jingle truck with incendiary grenades. The 

close air also wanted to help and made strafing runs on 

the truck. The ANA soldiers finally returned to their Ford 

Escort, the quick reaction force turned back to where 

they came and Oledan led the convoy on 

to its destination.
222 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Lesson

This ambush was very typical of most ambushes in the 

mountain passes of Afghanistan. The enemy initiated 

the ambush with an RPG hoping to block the pass with a 

disabled vehicle and then finish off the rest of the convoy 

with small arms fire. The enemy kept their distance at 

about 100 to 150 meters up the slope so as to be able 

to break contact if their mission failed. They tended to 

select mountain slopes with a 30 to 45 degree slope. 

The policy then was to not to escort host nation 

trucks because the locals usually knew where the kill 

zones or IEDs were. If they did fall in with the convoys, 

it was at the rear and it was also their responsibility to 

keep up. The convoy usually had Afghan interpreters 

assigned to them to communicate with locals and 

any host nation truck drivers.

The lessons Oledan drew from this ambush was 

that he violated his TTP by traveling a different route. 

However, this mission was directed from higher so he 

did not have much of a choice. He felt the driver of the 

Jingle truck or the ANA soldiers may have tipped off the 

enemy. He thought it may have been better not to let the 

Jingle Trucks. Photo courtesy of SSG Darian D. George DVIDS

Jingle truck into his convoy. With the need for gun trucks 

to escort host nation vehicles, this might not have been 

an option so he would collect the host nation drivers’ cell 

phones. He also had interpreters in the convoy explain 

the TTPs to the host nation drivers of not stopping in 

the kill zone but to keep driving. Nonetheless, the other 

trucks managed to clear the kill zone. 

1This account comes from 1LT Marco Oledan interview by 

Richard Killblane, FOB Salerno, Afghanistan, 1 March 2008.
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 223

TK Ambush, 29 July 2009

286th Combat Support Sustainment Battalion 

n 29 July 2009, Taliban guerrillas ambushed a 

convoy of 286th Combat Support Sustainment 

Battalion (CSSB) (MN NG) (Task Force Dirigo) 

in the largest complex attack on an American convoy 

during the entire Afghan war. The 286th CSSB operated 

at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) in Regional Command (RC) 

– South, the southern region of Afghanistan next to the 

Pakistan border. 1LT Tamara Da Silva’s 1st Platoon, 

53rd Quartermaster Company, call sign Outcast, had 

been detached from its parent company in Bagram 

and operating out of Kandahar since January 2009. 

During the cold winter months, the Taliban usually 

waited across the border in the camps until the weather 

began to warm. During this lull in attacks, Silva’s platoon 

became familiar with the terrain and acquired experience 

escorting convoys. Unlike Iraq, US ground convoys were 

new to Afghanistan.

O

Until the summer of 2006, the Coalition Forces had 

relied on air and host nation “Jingle” trucks to deliver 

cargo throughout Afghanistan. That summer the United 

States doubled the number of Brigade Combat Teams 

in country without a reciprocal increase in the number 

of lift assets. This required the Americans to run ground 

convoys for the first time during the war. When the 

Russians had expanded their footprint in Afghanistan, 

this made them more vulnerable to convoy ambushes. 

The Russians, however, chose to defend their convoys 

with tanks and armored personnel carriers. By the time 

the 53rd Quartermaster escorted a convoy of the 154th 

Transportation Company into harm’s way, they drove the 

latest RG31 MRAPs and had tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) battle tested during the last six years 

of war in Iraq and modified to adapt to the unique 

terrain of Afghanistan.

The Taliban were not necessarily from the local area 

although they might rely on local sympathy and support. 
224 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

During previous ambushes, they tended to attack 

coalition convoys from the slopes of mountains or from 

inside villages to negate the effectiveness of coalition 

air support, which required positive identification to 

prevent collateral damage to innocent Afghans. During 

the TK ambush these guerrillas would use both to their 

advantage in a very well-planned kill zone. While the 

Taliban made preparations for their spring and summer 

offensives, this allowed the new American units time 

to acclimate to the Afghan environment. 

In keeping with President Barack Obama’s 

campaign promise to provide greater focus on the war 

in Afghanistan, he deployed US Marines into Regional 

Command- South during the spring of 2009. This 

increase in US forces in the British area of responsibility 

required the 45th Sustainment Brigade to extend its 

reach into Regional Command-South with the 

286th CSSB.

The 154th Transportation Company (PLS) had 

originally deployed to Iraq in 1 January 2009 where it 

performed convoy escort for three months. In keeping 

with his campaign promise, President Obama shifted 

units from Iraq to Afghanistan. The 154th was alerted 

to deploy to Afghanistan in March and arrived on 15 

April. It provided the line haul capability for the 286th 

CSSB while Silva’s platoon of the 53rd Quartermaster 

Company provided its escorts. The 154th PLS had 

ironically trained to escort convoys in the deserts of Iraq, 

but was not prepared for the mountainous terrain and 

deep wadis of Afghanistan. In the desert of Iraq, high 

ground was any overpass or two- story house; 

but in Afghanistan, the rugged terrain provided 

the ideal kill zones.

Mission to TK

The mission to Tarin Kowt was far from routine. The 

286th CSSB tasked the 154th Transportation Company 

to provide a convoy of 15 PLS trucks escorted by seven 

RG31 MRAP gun trucks from the 53rd Quartermaster 

Company to deliver construction materials to FOB 

Tarin Kowt (TK), between the Oruzgan and Kandahar 

Provinces on 27 July. 1LT Da Silva would be the 

escort commander and SSG Anthony Williams, 154th 

Transportation Company, the mission commander, 

and 1LT Latonya Polk rode along because there was 

a shortage of co-drivers. She was originally a platoon 

Outcast Platoon of the 53rd Quartermaster Company provided security for the convoys of the 154th Transportation 

Company. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 225

leader in the 154th Transportation Company but was 

filling in as the acting commander and added her name 

to the manifest as a truck commander the day before the 

mission.1 The 90th Maintenance Company provided the 

extra wrecker and the 149th Transportation Company 

provided the two drivers for a PLS. 

The escorts did not even have a day between their 

last mission and this new one. On 26 July, the escort 

platoon had completed a split mission. Da Silva and 

a staff sergeant took one mission to Wabak while her 

Platoon Sergeant, SFC Bryon Mills, and another sergeant 

took a convoy to Ramrod and then returned around 2100 

hours. The entire platoon had been on the road until 

2100 hours the night of 26 July. SFC Mills felt because of 

their level of experience in country, they had enough time 

to prepare for the mission to TK the next day. Because 

of the recent surge in troops, they were used to the high 

operational tempo anyway. They had enough time to 

get eight hours of sleep, draw equipment and vehicles.2

SGT Brandon Lee Burks, however, felt that for a mission 

of that magnitude (an unfamiliar and dangerous route), 

they needed more time to prepare.3

Similarly, some PLS drivers were caught by surprise. 

A PLS platoon of the 154th Transportation Company 

had previously been sent to FOB Leatherneck where it 

was attached to the 100th Brigade Support Battalion 

for an anticipated two-week mission that lasted a full 

month. Some of the soldiers like SGT Young Kim had 

returned to Kandahar on 26 July just to pick up more 

uniforms and were asked if they would go out on the TK 

mission. They accepted.4

In planning for the convoy, SSG Williams was 

briefed that the major threat was an area going into 

FOB Frontenac known as IED Alley. Beyond Frontenac, 

Route Bear turned into an unimproved road that was 

supposed to be safe all the way to TK, but it was an 

uphill drive and the PLS trucks were also pulling trailers.5

1LT Polk, however, had heard that any convoy heading to 

TK was always hit by the enemy.6 Special Forces, British, 

and other coalition partners had been the only ones to 

complete a mission to TK. Red Horse had tried it twice 

but was hit both times, turned around and returned. 

Silva’s Platoon Sergeant, SFC Mills, also knew the route 

was “historically hot” and every unit that had driven it 

was hit and had soldiers medevaced out of there. SGT 

Mario E. Saenz was the NCOIC of the lead gun truck and 

had spent a week studying the route because they had 

not driven it before. He learned from Special Forces at 

Kandahar that the evening was the best time to travel 

the route, because they had never experienced enemy 

contact during those hours. However, the 53rd preferred 

to travel during the daytime so they could assess the 

local women and children activity as an indicator of an 

ambush. Special Forces warned of the choke points 

and not to go in with a large convoy. They also warned 

there was no Afghan National Police or Army along 

the route, but only a private Provincial Security Force 

manning checkpoints.7

PLS trucks of the 154th Transportation Company pulling trailers with RG31 MRAPs of the 53rd Quartermaster Company 

as escorts on the return trip from Tarin Kowt. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
226 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

The primary threat to convoys had been IEDs buried 

in the road followed up with small arms fire. The Afghans, 

fortunately, did not have the energy formed projectiles 

(EFP) that penetrated armor. The enemy tended not to 

stand and fight but just seemed to feel out the convoys 

and tried to inflict casualties. Probably because of the 

high gun truck to task vehicle ratio (1:1 a year before and 

recently 1:2) the enemy rarely ambushed on US convoys. 

Most convoy ambushes resembled the attacks on Route 

Clearance Patrols, where the enemy would detonate an 

IED then fire small arms and RPGs at the vehicles from 

concealed positions 100 to 150 meters up the slope 

of a low mountainside or from a nearby village.

The Taliban had not attacked Afghan convoys until 

they ambushed a 17-vehicle Jingle truck convoy on its 

way to Wazi Qua in May 2008 probably because the 

Provincial Governor rode on it. The Taliban destroyed 

the fuel trucks and two trucks carrying MRAPs. Afghan 

convoys were soft targets simply because they did not 

have gun truck escorts, thus making them easy targets. 

In June 2008, the Taliban massacred an entire 60-plus 

Jingle truck fuel convoy heading from Kabul to Warduk. 

It took several days to clean up the mess on the road 

and scared the host nation drivers from driving until 

they hired escorts. The Taliban had demonstrated they 

were capable of complex convoy ambushes but only 

against soft targets.

Route clearance patrols (RCP) swept the roads 

for IEDs, but they followed a schedule that did not 

always match with the convoy’s schedule and route. 

Regardless, each vehicle in the US convoy had Dukes 

electronic jammers to jam the radio frequencies 

detonating IEDs. The convoy speed was 15 -25 kph, 

but reduced to 5 kph during contact and their battle 

drills still required the convoy to push through the kill 

zone.8 Because of the distances between camps, quick 

reaction forces (QRF) were not as available as they were 

in Iraq, so convoys had to rely on close air support, 

helicopter gunships and indirect fire in case of attack. 

The lead gun truck acted as a scout vehicle searching 

for signs of IEDs and kill zones out ahead of the convoy. 

The next gun truck set the pace for the convoy and 

provided security for the lead or scout gun truck. With 

nearly a 1:2 gun truck ratio, a gun truck was placed 

between every two or three task vehicles. 

This convoy would haul A2 rubber flooring matting, 

each weighing over 2,700 pounds each, six on a 

trailer and six on a PLS; but if the drivers kept up 

their momentum, they could climb the grade with no 

problems.9 Because of his concern about pulling the 

heavy loads uphill, SFC Mills discussed the route with 

Special Forces. They said that due to the incline in some 

areas, they had to stop their vehicles and chain a gun 

truck to the local national truck to pull it up the hill. 

Afghanistan offered a variety of terrain. Photos courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 227

The PLS trucks fortunately could switch to low transfer 

and pull their loads up the inclines, but Da Silva and 

Mills feared the Taliban would ambush the convoy at 

one of those inclines where they would have to slow 

down. They also had a concern with the shortage of 

backing pins, without which the driver could not back up 

the PLS without jackknifing the truck and trailer. Even if 

they could back up, the convoy had no alternate route.10

Departure from Kandahar

The soldiers arrived at the motor pool around 0600 hours 

on 27 July. Since the gun trucks were running every other 

day, the crews did a clean sweep of their weapons the 

night before and also that morning along with a systems 

check, radio check and weapons check. The leaders 

inspected the soldiers’ personal equipment to make 

sure they had everything. At 0800 hours, they held 

the convoy brief, manifest and roll call.11

There were multiple indicators of a possible attack. 

Prior to departure, the convoy received a report from 

the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) that an aerial 

surveillance team observing an area had noticed 

four perfect squares cut out of the road. There was 

another report that 11 Afghan men were walking along 

the route placing rocks, but they were not sure if they 

were marking the road for upcoming construction or 

an ambush. Da Silva contacted the 286th CSSB at 

Kandahar and informed them of the intelligence reports. 

The battalion acknowledged and the convoy would still 

continue the mission. Probably the best indicator was 

when the local Afghan drivers learned of the destination, 

all of them took off.12

Start point time was set for 1000 hours. The mission 

to TK included 15 PLS trucks, seven gun trucks, and two 

wreckers with over 60 personnel. They were supposed 

to escort local national trucks that day but the Afghans 

had refused to go. The order of march had Gun Truck 1 

as the scout gun truck followed by Gun Truck 2 (lead gun 
228 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

truck), then PLS 1- 3, Gun Truck 3, PLS 4 - 6, Gun Truck 

4, HEMT Wrecker, PLS 7-9, Gun Truck 5, PLS 10-12, 

Gun Truck 6, PLS 13-15, HEMT Wrecker, and Gun Truck 

7. As soon as the convoy was about to depart, indirect 

fire hit the FOB about 400 meters from the convoy, and 

then the convoy continued the mission.13 

Along the route, the PLS trucks had difficulty 

negotiating the dry river beds.14 The loads kept shifting 

with every bump or turn even though they traveled at a 

slow 5 mph. When they came to a hill, the mechanics 

told the drivers to downshift into low gear to climb up it; 

but some tried to climb in high gear, which bogged them 

down. After the convoy passed FOB Frontenac, Route 

Bear narrowed to the width of one and a half vehicles so 

on-coming traffic would have to stop to allow the other 

to pass in the opposite direction. At the wadi, they had 

trouble negotiating the turn up the bank and had to back 

up, then go forward, and back up again to climb the hill.15

One of the PLS drivers had to stop his vehicle, dismount 

and ground guide the other PLS around to make sure 

the trailers did not break while making the turn. The 

wreckers also had to pull a couple of PLS trucks up the 

hill. This process took about an hour.16

During the trip, the gunner in Gun Truck 5 spotted 

an Afghan beside the road, filming the convoy with his 

cell phone. SGT Brandon Lee Burks, truck commander, 

asked Da Silva for permission to dismount. SGT 

Burks and his assistant gunner dismounted and then 

confiscated the cell phone. He initially had trouble 

figuring out what buttons on the cell phone to push 

because they were written in Arabic, and then he 

watched the video. The first video revealed two men 

talking in a pasture. The second video filmed the convoy 

showed the spacing of vehicles, bumper numbers, 

vehicle tires, and fuel tanks. The third video contained 

footage of insurgents planting a pressure -plate IED. So 

Burks texted Da Silva on his Blue Force Tracker (BFT) 

they had picked up some good intelligence. Other than 

that, the journey seemed relatively safe.17

It took 14 hours to reach TK, so the convoy did not 

arrive until around 0200 hours on 28 July, becoming 

the first US sustainment convoy to reach TK.18 SSG 

Ronnie Biggers remembered the trucks were nearly 

out of gas by the time they reached their destination.19

The 286th CSSB planners had estimated the Outcast 

convoy traveling at a steady 30 mph would reach TK at 

1600 hours, download and depart the following morning 

at 0900 hours but did not take into consideration the 

elevation and terrain. However, due to late arrival and 

that the receiving unit was not prepared to download the 

trucks, the battle space owner insisted Da Silva contact 

MAJ Tikem and ask to stay one more day until they 

downloaded the 15 PLS trucks.20

While she did this, SGT Burks turned the cell phone 

over to 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade but they did not 

have time to properly interpret the video before the 

convoy rolled back out. The video did heighten their 

concerns about an impending attack on the return trip. 

The S -2 of the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade provided 

some additional information that a Dutch convoy had 

been ambushed along the route three days earlier and 

had to turn back. It had taken them two and a half days 

to reach Kandahar, and Da Silva’s convoy had seen their 

burnt out HET trailers on the way up. The S -2 of the 

Return trip from Tarin Kowt with empty trailers. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 229

286th CSSB had failed to inform their convoy of this.21

The only thing SSG Williams remembered from the threat 

briefing was a British truck had been blown up during the 

last 24 hours. The route to TK had been considered safe 

because most units traveled at night, so the intelligence 

community did not know what the threat was like during 

the day.22 Because they anticipated increasing danger 

on the return trip, 1LT Da Silva and SFC Mills preferred to 

push out on schedule with little to no sleep, so as not to 

allow the enemy another day to prepare kill zones. They 

discussed this with their soldiers but, nonetheless, their 

start point time was pushed back to 0700 hours on 29 

July. So they spent 28 July downloading their trucks.23

While waiting, the drivers conducted an after action 

review with the brigade commander and that was 

when they finally saw the video on the cell phone. Prior 

to departure on 29 July, SFC Mills met with Special 

Operations Forces to gather more intelligence about 

the route, which identified one Known Area of Interest 

(NAI) - a canal zone north of Kandahar City just prior to 

Frontenac. Special Forces stated they traveled Route 

Bear at night and told Mills that there had been no 

significant activities from Frontenac to FOB Tarin Kowt. 

Special Forces acknowledged the provincial security 

in the hills were friendly. Mills said he had a “warm 

and fuzzy” feeling regarding the route from the 

Special Forces.24

They would have preferred to schedule a route 

clearance patrol to sweep the route of IEDs before they 

drove down it; but the Engineers planned route clearance 

patrols two weeks out, and a route clearance patrol 

had not operated north of Frontenac during the last two 

weeks. Regional Command -South dictated additional 

moves, so they would need a Level 1 Contingency 

Operation (CONOP) to schedule another route clearance 

patrol. Convoys, however, had a greater need for route 

clearance patrols than air weapons teams. A route 

clearance patrol traveled at 5 kph through known areas 

of interest; and even though they had the Husky vehiclemounted mine detectors, Task Force Thor admitted that 

80 percent of all IED discoveries by a route clearance 

patrol were visual. So the Outcast convoy would have to 

rely on their own eyes to spot IEDs.25

Regional Command-South did not have a 

common operating picture of the threat. The Kandahar 

Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC) was disconnected 

between IED/air weapons team/route clearance patrol 

and all other intelligence assets. Besides CPT Savoie 

was a newly assigned 45th Sustainment Brigade liaison 

to Regional Command- South for route clearance patrols 

and air weapons teams.26

Departure from TK

The delay at TK actually gave the enemy plenty of time 

to select and prepare their kill zone and, unfortunately, 

the convoy had no alternate route. It would have to travel 

back along the same route, keeping in mind the enemy 

had observed which areas the trucks had difficulty 

negotiating and where the gun trucks pulled over to 

provide overwatch. The enemy planned accordingly 

and then waited.

The Outcast soldiers arrived at the motor pool 

two hours prior to departure, as usual, to inspect and 

prepare their trucks for the mission. Then at 0800 hours, 

Wrecker hooking up to PLS. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
230 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the trucks closed up to move to the front gate where 

it encountered maintenance issues. PLS 433’s starter 

did not work, so SGT Todd Wilkens hooked it up to SGT 

Kee’s wrecker from the 98th to tow it back. The crew, 

SPC Roper and SPC Williams, rode in other vehicles. 

PLS 14 remained at TK so the two soldiers from 149th 

Transportation Company flew back to Kandahar.27 The 

air brakes on PLS 433’s trailer locked up so SGT Wilkens 

managed to get them unlocked causing the convoy not 

to depart until 0910 hours – ten minutes late.28

On 29 July, the Outcast convoy of 22 vehicles 

returned from FOB Tarin Kowt along the same exact 

route, MSR Bear, to FOB Frontenac.29 Order of march 

when ambushed:

Gun Truck 1 (scout gun truck) 

(SGT Saenz, Osborne, Weidel)

Gun Truck 2 (lead gun truck/pace setter) 

 (Palacios, Garcia)

PLS 301 (SSG Williams)

PLS 312

PLS 313 

Gun Truck 3 (convoy commander) 

 (1LT Da Silva, Lewis, interpreter)

PLS 425 (SGT Kim)

PLS 438

PLS 316 

PLS 308 (Biggers)

Gun Truck 4 (SGT Hattock)

PLS 119

PLS 436

Gun Truck 5 (Burks)

PLS 305 (1LT Polk)

PLS 434

Gun Truck 6

PLS 118

PLS 120

HEMT Wrecker 130 (SGT Wilkens)

HEMT Wrecker 502 (Kee)

Gun Truck 7 (asst convoy commander) (SFC Mills)

SGT Saenz was the NCOIC of Gun Truck 1 that led 

out as the scout vehicle. SSG Williams followed in the 

lead PLS 301. 1LT Da Silva rode in Gun Truck 3 and 1LT 

Polk was in PLS 305, right behind a Gun Truck 5. SFC 

Mills rode in Gun Truck 7, the last vehicle in the convoy. 

SGT Kee’s wrecker started out in the middle of the 

convoy but it did not have the power to haul the PLS, 

Outcast convoy showing the dispersion of the first four gun trucks. Photos courtesy of the 53rd QM Company

Afghan National Army check point. 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 231

so SGT Wilkens hooked the PLS up to his wrecker 

and Kee’s wrecker fell behind Wilkens’ in the rear 

of the convoy.30

The convoy passed through two towns without 

incident and then came upon an Afghan National Army 

(ANA)31 check point. The ANA soldiers had strung a rope 

across the road to stop traffic. Gun 1 then called 1LT 

Da Silva in Gun 3 forward. The guards reported the 

ANA had been in contact with the Taliban all morning 

up on the ridgeline. Da Silva then informed everyone 

in the convoy of the situation and also notified Dirigo 

tactical operations center. The tactical operations center 

informed them that a route clearance patrol could not 

make it out there for two weeks; and since the convoy 

could not turn the PLS trucks and trailers around in 

that narrow road, their only choice was to continue the 

mission or camp on that road for two weeks. Everyone 

pretty much agreed to “Charlie Mike” (continue the 

mission). Because the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade 

had wanted their rubber floor matting; in return, they 

provided air cover from Kandahar to TK and back. 

However, since the helicopters had consumed fuel 

circling around in search of the enemy, the convoy 

had to wait for the helicopters to refuel and return 

before it could continue.32

The convoy then departed Tarental and turned 

onto Route Bear, a route not a normally traveled by US 

personnel. Route Bear was unimproved the entire length 

to Kandahar dotted with small villages with not a lot of 

civilian traffic. Along the way, Da Silva noticed some very 

clean looking civilian farmers with long beards in white 

who just seemed out of place watching the convoy. The 

convoy had one breakdown prior to reaching the ANA 

check point. One flat rack came off of the PLS, which 

they had to recover and also had one flat tire, which 

took about an hour. The convoy was in the vicinity where 

they confiscated the cell phone and they did not see any 

civilian population on the road or playing - an indication 

of impending danger.33

ANA Check Point – Decision Point

At 1201 hours, an unconfirmed intelligence report 

from MIRC Chat claimed insurgents waited ahead along 

with multiple mines and IEDs. Task Force Kandahar, 

Task Force Thor and Task Force 72 were contacted to 

request route clearance assets after being informed by 

ANA of IEDs ahead of them in the road. Task Force 72 

was the only source that might be able to help so they 

began initial coordination. Outcast was trying to get 

positive identification of the threat so an OH-58 Kiowa 

conducted a reconnaissance of the threat area.34

Around 1300 hours, approximately 30 miles from 

Frontenac, SGT Saenz saw an ANA soldier waving for the 

convoy to stop so he had Gun 1 stop on the road.35 SGT 

Saenz and his driver, SPC Dana S. Osborne, saw the ANA 

soldier pointing ahead of him making a hand motion of 

shooting. Saenz then called his convoy commander to 

come up with the interpreter to find out what was going 

on.36 Da Silva’s Gun Truck 3 stopped 75 feet behind 

Gun 1, and then CPL Robert W. Lewis, assistant gunner, 

and the interpreter dismounted to talk with the Afghan 

soldier.37 The Afghan translated that all ANA check 

points along the route had been attacked and overran 

by the Taliban all morning so the road was closed to 

civilian traffic, and the ANA had been in contact with an 

estimated a battalion-sized Taliban element for several 

hours. Da Silva could see the Taliban on the mountain 

east of her position, the ANA on a low ridge and hear 

gun fire behind the convoy indicating a large 

engagement area.38

Da Silva relayed this information back to the rest 

of the convoy and both Saenz and Da Silva radioed for 

the Kiowa to fly around to pinpoint the Taliban location, 

but the air cover could not positively identify any Taliban 

on the ground. The fire fight between the Taliban and 

the ANA appeared to have halted when the Kiowa flew 

over. Not only that but the air support was for the convoy 

and it did not want to fire a few hellfire missiles in case 

the convoy might run into an ambush later. The pilot 

The convoy drew fire from this wadi and village to their left. 
232 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

recommended the convoy continue the mission because 

the contact appeared to be taking place between the 

Taliban and the ANA, not a threat to the convoy.39

The Kiowa then flew back to refuel while the convoy 

waited for its return.40

SGT Burks in Gun 5 believed this was a deliberate 

delaying tactic and the Kiowa also believed that enemy 

contact on the hilltop was intended to delay the convoy 

to provide the Taliban up ahead more time to prepare 

the kill zone.41 This, and because the area where they 

had confiscated the cell phone was completely empty 

of people, they knew they were going to get hit.42 

The ANA soldier stressed the enemy was out there 

and also warned there was a possibility of IEDs on the 

road ahead. Da Silva contacted the 286th Battalion to 

inform them about the contact and possibility of IEDs. 

The 286th Battalion tactical operations center confirmed 

the threat and asked for a route clearance patrol, but 

it was denied unless the threat could be identified. The 

next sweep along that route was not scheduled for two 

weeks.43 The narrow road was about the width of the 

PLS trucks, so without the backing pins there was no 

alternate route, and there was no way to turn around, 

so they were committed to going through. The drivers 

heard small arms fire coming from the rear of the convoy 

so, as the convoy pushed forward, they thought they 

left the fight behind them. 1LT Da Silva consulted with 

her platoon sergeant, SFC Mills, as to what they should 

do. Mills told her it was her call if she wanted to push 

forward. He reminded her they had air cover and all their 

battle systems (electronic counter measures) were a go. 

She then asked the crew of the scout gun truck and 

SGT Saenz recommended they continue the mission, 

“Let’s get home.” So Da Silva decided to push forward 

until they had some kind of positive identification 

on the IED threat.44

After about half an hour to an hour wait, Da Silva 

informed the drivers of the situation, that she had been 

in contact with Dirigo Base (286th CSSB) and they were 

going to roll. The other soldiers broke radio discipline 

exclaiming excitedly, “Hell yeah, let’s do this!” She did not 

poll her drivers as to how they felt but they agreed to push 

forward. “We all agreed to continue the mission, because 

that was our mission,” confirmed PFC Jose L. Garcia, the 

Gun Truck 2 gunner.45 She warned the convoy to prepare 

for contact and then the convoy pushed forward.46

At 1354 hours, Da Silva reported to the 286th 

tactical operations center that the enemy contact 

appeared to have ended and the Kiowa could not 

positively identify the Taliban position, so the she 

decided to continue the mission until they could 

positively identify a threat.47

Contact

North of Frontenac, Route Bear narrowed into a choke 

point where the trailers became a liability. The road 

through the kill zone curved around a hill to the right, 

then turned left and dropped down into the wadi, where 

it snaked back up to the right and over another hill and 

then curved back to the left. The excessive weight of 

the trucks and trailers made it nearly impossible to 

turn around, so the convoy proceeded cautiously.48

PFC Jeffrey Weidel, the Gun Truck 1 gunner, 

observed several holes dug in the ground up ahead.49

Before they left TK, intelligence had warned of possible 

IEDs at certain grid coordinates and Saenz plotted them 

on his Blue Force Tracker. As Gun 1 approached the first 

one, Saenz sent air support forward to scout the area. 

The pilot radioed back he had spotted a one-by-one 

hole dug in the ground and hovered over the area, but 

did not seen anything else. Saenz’ scout vehicle then 

approached the area and stopped about 200 to 250 

meters away from the hole. Saenz handed binoculars 

to Weidel up in the gun turret and had him examine the 

hole. Saenz then called Da Silva, who asked what he 

wanted to do. Saenz said he wanted to approach it for 

a better view. So they drove a little closer where Weidel 

identified loose gravel around the hole but did not see 

any wires. Saenz’ vehicle then drove around to the left 

of hole and then approached the location of the next 

reported IED. 

Just two or three miles past the ANA check point, 

Gun 1 stopped and Weidel spotted a green cell phone 

on loose gravel in the bottom of another square hole 

about four to five inches deep on the west side of the 

road.50 The enemy sometimes left cell phones as decoys 

but the yellow light indicated their Dukes was jamming 

a radio signal trying to activate the cell phone. Gun 1 

reported, “My Dukes is jamming, my dukes is jamming.” 

Gun 1 told Gun 2 to check the hole it as it passed. Gun 

2 drove up and saw the same green cell phone in the 

hole.51 When Gun 2 passed the cell phone, its Dukes 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 233

also jammed the signal.52

The next three PLS trucks 

reported over the radio 

their Dukes were jamming 

the signal. As Da Silva’s 

gun truck drove past, she 

looked down at her Dukes 

and saw a solid yellow light 

indicating her Dukes was 

also jamming the signal.53

Someone was clearly 

trying to detonate an IED 

as the trucks passed.

The convoy passed 

a tree then into the open 

and there was a green fuel 

truck that 1LT Polk thought would make a big explosion.54

Every vehicle’s Dukes jammed the original signal until 

the last wrecker approached. SFC Mills in the last gun 

truck was just about to let Da Silva know the convoy had 

cleared the narrow village when the IED detonated.55

SFC Mills came on the radio stating the wrecker had 

been hit, but SGT Wilkens quickly interrupted, “Break, 

break, break, this is the wrecker. Yes, we were hit, 

but are fine to go. Push through!” The wrecker had its 

Dukes on but the PLS truck it was towing did not, so 

the IED detonated on the towed vehicle. Right after 

that Wilkens’ radio blacked out because of the explosion. 

PFC Stewart checked the systems and everything 

seemed to be working.56 After the initial explosion, the 

convoy picked up speed and heard more explosions in 

rapid succession as if a daisy chain of IEDs.57

Up front Gun Truck 1 rounded a bend and drove 

down into the valley to a wadi flanked by mountains to 

their right and left front. 

On the left, enemy small 

arms fire hit them from 

woods in a dry creek 

bed. PFC Weidel, in the 

gunners hatch, pointed 

at something up the 

mountain and turned his 

turret forward. As Saenz 

looked in the mirror he 

heard an explosion that 

tossed his MRAP about 

15 feet to the side of the 

trail, blew the M240B 

out of the gun turret and 

completely disabled the 

vehicle and all communication systems onboard.58 

The concussion inside the vehicle was so intense 

it knocked the wind out of Saenz. It felt as if his driver 

had slammed on brakes. After a few minutes, Saenz 

caught his breath and then checked his arms and legs 

for injuries only to discover he had hit his head on the 

screen and split his chin. He then told his crew to check 

each other. He knew the vehicle was disabled, but the 

dirt on windows did not allow him to clearly see out. So 

he told his gunner to climb back up in the turret, but 

Weidel had fractured his ribs. Since the M240B was 

also blown 10 to 15 meters away, Weidel could not 

pull security, so Saenz had him close the gunner’s hatch, 

and then began pulling out sensitive items in preparation 

to evacuate vehicle. Saenz destroyed the hard drive on 

the Blue Force Tracker since they could not cross level it. 

As soon as Weidel closed the hatch, Saenz saw 

Gun 2 pull up.59

When the crew of Gun 2 saw the explosion and 

resulting cloud of dust engulf Gun 1 ahead of them, 

they quickly reported on the radio that Gun 1 was hit. 

As soon as the dust cleared enough to see, Palacios 

raced Gun 2 up as a gun wall between the disabled 

Gun 1 and the enemy (left side).60 Da Silva’s Gun 3 also 

pulled up to the contact side behind Gun 2, and Gun 

4 stopped right behind Gun 3, boxing in the destroyed 

MRAP. SSG Williams also had his driver pull up leaving 

almost no gap between his PLS and Gun 4.61

After the initial IED detonated, the enemy began 

pummeling the rear of the convoy with RPGs. One 

Gun Truck 1 was destroyed by a mine. 

Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company

IED or mortar explosion on the rear of the convoy. 

Photo courtesy of the 143rd Transportation Company
234 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

exploded in front of SFC Mills, in the last gun truck, 

kicking up dust and smoke causing his driver to jerk 

the steering wheel to the left and ram into a big tree. 

He backed up and tried to push through in time to hear 

Gun 1 get hit by an IED and become a mobility kill. 

The next IED detonated on PLS 434 in the middle 

of the convoy driven by SPC Kuhn with SSG Ronnie 

Biggers as the truck commander.62 Biggers heard the 

explosion behind him but did not know what it hit. The 

driver in the truck behind his said Bigger’s trailer had 

been hit but with not much damage. 

When Wilkens’ radio in the wrecker finally came 

back on, he heard Da Silva say Gun 1 had been hit, the 

front end had been blown off and it was resting on its 

nose.63 Da Silva instructed everyone in the convoy to 

push through, but Gun 1 was disabled right at the choke 

point and the other three gun trucks blocked the road. 

As the rest of the convoy closed up to the bottleneck, the 

convoy came to a stop in the kill zone. While the convoy 

waited, RPGs, mortars and small arms fire 

rained down on the trucks.64 At 1419 hours, Da Silva 

reported to Dirigo base the convoy was taking small 

arms fire and multiple IEDs in the Tanji Valley.65

Gun 2, 3 and 4 had formed a box around the 

disabled Gun 1 and laid down suppressive fire. They had 

rehearsed this technique so often it was instinctive. Da 

Silva and her assistant gunner jumped out of Gun 3 to 

retrieve the soldiers in Gun 1. The entire front end of the 

RG31 MRAP had been blown away as it was designed 

to deflect the majority of the blast away from the crew 

compartment, so the front of the vehicle was resting 

on its frame. CPL Lewis dismounted from his vehicle 

and banged on the door of Gun 1. Da Silva opened the 

driver’s door and looked inside to see the crew was 

stunned by the blast and had moved to the rear of their 

vehicle. She reverted to her old drill sergeant voice and 

commanded the soldiers to exit the vehicle. They began 

to climb out through the driver’s door, the only operable 

door. Da Silva then passed them to her assistant gunner 

who quickly hurried them into his gun truck through 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 235

the passenger side door since the enemy fire from the 

high ground above them prevented them from entering 

through the rear door. Because of the confined space, 

the crew of Gun 1 had to take off their body armor. 

Lewis borrowed Da Silva’s M4 carbine and began to 

return fire but could not see any muzzle flash to aim 

at. As the others climbed in the vehicle someone 

accidentally kicked the Blue Force Tracker, disabling it.66

Once in Gun 3, Saenz put on a headset to listen 

to the radio. Air support called asking if they needed a 

medevac and Saenz replied, “Yes.” Saenz did not know 

he had injured his back until the gunner said he needed 

more ammunition and when Saenz grabbed ammo can 

to hand him he could not hold it up.67

Da Silva’s crew assessed the injuries. SPC Osborne 

had been thrown to the back of the vehicle by the 

concussion. PFC Wiedel had broken his ribs. SGT Saenz 

had injured his back when thrown against the door. 

SPC Rodriguez, the assistant gunner, had a dislocated 

shoulder, but the crew put it back into place. Since her 

Blue Force Tracker did not work, Da Silva could not 

contact the 286th CSSB, so she requested the Kiowa 

to call for a medevac for three casualties; SPC Osborne, 

PFC Wiedel and SGT Saenz.68 Although in pain, SPC 

Rodriguez, the assistant gunner, wanted to remain with 

the convoy to fight the enemy.69

Having successfully recovered the crew of Gun 1, 

the only disabled vehicle in the kill zone; the subsequent 

events would disable more vehicles and delay the convoy 

about six hours in the kill zone while mortar rounds 

and RPGs exploded around them. The important thing 

was that Da Silva sounded calm and in control and was 

making decisions. The danger was that the enemy had 

set up a very well-planned kill zone. The front part of the 

H58 Kiowa. Photo courtesy of the 143rd Transportation Company

The kill zone as it looked from the rear of the convoy. 

Photo courtesy of the 143rd Transportation Company

The road headed down into the wadi and back up to the 

right. Photo courtesy of the 143rd Transportation Company
236 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

kill zone was in a valley flanked by two mountains. The 

enemy fire initially came from the mountain slope to the 

9 o’clock position in relation to the convoy and there was 

an abandoned village at the 10 o’clock position in a tree 

covered valley, so the Kiowa could not engage that area 

without positive identification of the enemy. The enemy 

in the mountain, however, was dug in under cover so 

they could not be seen from the ground or air.

The one -lane road through the wadi was flanked 

by steep embankments. It was an ideal choke point to 

trap the convoy and the enemy had seen the difficulty 

the trucks had negotiating it a couple days before. 

Fortunately, the trucks behind the bottleneck were not 

damaged. The enemy had detonated IEDs on the rear 

PLS and wreckers hoping to block the egress route, 

but the trucks could not turn around and their tactic, 

technique and procedure called for them to push 

forward anyway. The participants divided the fight into 

three parts: the forward green zone, the “circle of death” 

in the wadi, and the rear safe haven or green zone.

At first the enemy fire came from up the mountain 

slope to the convoy’s 9 o’clock position and then, as Gun 

2 returned suppressive fire it, began receiving fire from 

its 3 o’clock position. Gun 2’s dismounted crew then 

fired in that direction while the gunner in turret fired at 

the 9 o’clock threat. The gunners then alternated their 

fire from one direction to the other.70 The radio traffic 

was congested and the Kiowa could not understand how 

the fire could be coming from two different directions. 

So it placed suppressive fire on the ridge line.71 A ridge 

line linked the two mountains around the road leading 

out of the wadi, allowing the enemy to fire down on the 

convoy from two sides thus forming a U-shaped kill zone.

After Da Silva cross-leveled the crew of Gun 1 into her 

vehicle and recovered the sensitive items, she ordered Gun 

2 to push through. The IED explosion that destroyed Gun 

1 had also damaged Gun 2’s antennas so its Blue Force 

Tracker and Dukes did not work. SGT Armando Palacios did 

not have the route so Da Silva told him to follow the road.72

Gun 2 drove directly up the hill but, because the 

disabled Gun 1 blocked the road in the wadi, Gun 3 

and 4 made a detour around a tree. SSG Williams’ PLS 

301 tried to drive around the tree but did not complete 

the full turn and had to back up, then make a second 

attempt before climbing the hill. As his PLS was driving 

through, it triggered a pressure plate IED that detonated 

under PLS 312. The explosion ejected SPC Ineda Carr, 

the co - driver of PLS 312, from the truck.73 SGT Young 

Kim, truck commander in PLS 425, saw PLS 312 get hit 

by the IED as PLS 313 passed.74 At the same time, an 

RPG hit the back of PLS 312 and that damaged truck 

blocked the route. Williams saw an RPG explode in front 

of his truck and another hit the truck behind his. After 

his PLS 301 cleared the kill zone, mortar rounds 

started coming in.75 

Only Gun 2, 3, 4 and PLS 301 reached a flat open 

stretch of road 500 meters on the other side of the hill, 

which became the safe haven or green zone; and then 

someone said, “We’re not leaving anyone behind. Get 

the PLSs out.”76 Da Silva called for Gun 2 to come back 

and Palacios replied, “Roger.” Palacios turned his gun 

truck around and the three gun trucks left SSG Williams’ 

Outcast convoy showing the dispersion of the first four gun trucks. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 237

PLS alone in the green zone for about an hour to an hour 

and a half. His truck received some “chip shots” but the 

small arms fire was not as intense as in the kill zone.77

Gun 2, 3, and 4 left the safety of the green zone to go 

back and escort the rest of the convoy out of the kill zone.

Gun 2 followed Gun 3 up over the hill and met three 

or four PLSs driving up the other side. Gun 2 pulled off 

to the right to let them pass - the same place it had set 

up an overwatch position on the drive to TK. Evidently 

the enemy had anticipated this and Gun 2 detonated 

a pressure plate IED disabling that gun truck. Da Silva 

believed insurgents had closely studied the convoy 

negotiating the wadi two days previously.78

Right before Gun 2 blew up, Palacios pulled his 

throttle down and then radioed his truck was hit.79 PLS 

313 was heading up the road next to Gun 2 when the 

concussion of the IED blew SGT Baronsay White’s door 

open and his M16 flew out, so Gun 4 drove up and 

recovered it.80 Wilkens, in the wrecker, also saw an RPG 

round explode in front of Gun 4, blowing out its tires, but 

it could still escort two or three more PLS’s out of the 

wadi.81 When SGT White’s PLS 313 arrived in the green 

zone, the convoy commander and assistant convoy 

commander called for him to take charge of the trucks in 

the green zone, because they were still stranded back in 

the kill zone.82

Down in the wadi, both air lines of Gun 5 were shot 

through so the brakes locked up. Burks later admitted 

had he known his vehicle better, he could have put it 

in four-wheel drive and driven it even with all the brakes 

engaged.83 Burks dismounted Gun 5 and provided 

suppressive fire from behind his armored door all day 

and his gun truck took a beating. He picked up a .556 

mm armored piercing slug that had penetrated his door 

so he assumed the enemy had M16s. Burks felt the 

majority of the enemy fire was coming from the buildings 

Gun Truck 2 was destroyed after it returned to the kill zone. Photos courtesy of the 53rd QM Company

Rally point at the Green Zone. Photo courtesy of the 

53rd QM Company

Gun Truck 5. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company
238 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

and trees directly to his 

9 o’clock position and 

requested the Kiowa 

spray the buildings 

and tree line, but the 

helicopter would not 

fire for fear of collateral 

damage. If he had an 

Mk19, Burks could have 

blown the trees down 

and possibly destroyed 

the buildings as well.84

Meanwhile, Da 

Silva’s Gun 3 drove 

down into the kill zone 

to get the rest of the convoy moving again but took a 

round through the engine and was disabled. Da Silva 

radioed back for someone to drive up and bump Gun 

5 out of the way so they could pull the immobilized PLS 

312, and then the other PLS trucks could continue out of 

the kill zone.85 Her gun 

truck came to a halt 

facing Gun 2 just 30 

meters away. 

 Kim’s PLS 425 had 

been stranded behind 

the disabled PLS 312, 

as Gun 4 had already 

escorted PLS 313 over 

the hill to the rally point. 

Kim’s PLS tried to make 

a ten point turn to 

drive around PLS 312; 

and as soon as Kim’s 

truck passed PLS 312 

and reached the top of the hill, he saw the damage to 

Gun 2. Kim radioed the convoy commander that Gun 2 

was damaged. As Kim’s PLS 425 was passing around 

the bend behind Gun 2, an RPG aimed at Gun 2, hit his 

trailer but it was still able to drive to green zone.86

Rear gun truck driving forward around PLS and another gun truck 

can be seen returning into the kill zone above the wadi. 

Photo courtesy of the 143rd Transportation Company
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 239

After PLS 312 was destroyed, Gun 4 drove back 

and picked up its crew. The tires on Gun 4 were shot out 

but not enough to stop it; but it could turn neither left 

nor right. Nonetheless, it led the next three PLS’s out 

of the kill zone, but could not return to the kill zone. So 

the MRAP pulled security with SGT Hattock as the truck 

commander. For about another hour, Gun 4, PLS 301, 

303, and 304 remained in the green zone.87

Within the first hour of the ambush, the Taliban 

had disabled three of the four lead gun trucks and two 

of the first five PLS trucks and blocked the chock point in 

the wadi halting the rest of the convoy in or behind the kill 

zone. This was a very well planned and executed ambush, 

but the Americans were not finished yet. 

Breaking The Bottle Neck

Unable to backup, the convoy had to clear the kill zone 

to survive. The other trucks still in the kill zone reported 

taking fire from their 9 o’clock position. Wilkens had 

advanced his wrecker to within 150 meters of the wadi 

where he could see the damaged Gun 1. He also heard 

Gun 2 and 3 had escorted a PLS out of the wadi and 

were on their way back, then Gun 2 was disabled and 

another PLS was also hit by an IED. Three or four PLS 

trucks had reached the far side but the disabled PLS 

312 blocked the road in the wadi. Gun 2, 3 and 

5 remained disabled in the kill zone and then time 

began to drag on.88

Up around the bend in the road, disabled Gun 2 

was cut off from the rest of the convoy. The enemy 

fired armored piercing rounds and one penetrated their 

gun truck and another cracked the driver’s windshield. 

Suffering only a mobility kill, Gun 2 could fight but 

remained isolated in its position for about two hours 

laying down suppressive fire switching between firing 

to the 9 and 3 o’clock directions. Some of the enemy 

actually advanced toward the trucks in the kill zone and 

the Kiowa periodically flew over Gun 2, firing hellfire 

missiles at any insurgents that approached the stranded 

vehicle.89 Because of duration of the fight, the crew of 

Kill zone as it looked when the recovery team entered it. PLS 312 blocked the wadi, another PLS was stranded behind it, and 

the mark where they were dropped. Gun Truck 1 is behind the second abandoned trailer. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company

Rear gun truck passing Gun Truck 1. Photos courtesy of the 143rd Transportation Company
240 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Gun 2 ran out of gun lubricant and improvised by using 

shampoo and lotion out of a hygiene kit to lubricate their 

.50 -caliber machine gun.90

About an hour into the fight, the wreckers began 

to receive incoming mortar rounds to their 3 o’clock 

position on the hill. The enemy walked the rounds in. 

The first one hit on the side of the hill, the second one 

exploded 40 meters closer and then the third landed 

40 meters from the wrecker. After that, additional rounds 

exploded sporadically around the convoy. From Wilkens’ 

vantage point he could see Gun 5 and two PLS trucks 

hit by RPGs. Wilkens’ wrecker also began receiving 

small arms fire.91

1LT Polk’s truck was hit on her passenger side and 

an RPG hit the back side of the truck in front of hers. 

To the left and right was a ditch or drop off making it 

impossible to turn around. So Da Silva gave the order to 

drop trailers and drive out of the kill zone. This required 

the co - drivers to get out and unhook the trailers, but 

they were still taking small arms fire so Polk froze and 

refused to get out of her vehicle.92 As an officer, her 

refusal disappointed Da Silva to say the least. 

Behind her, SGT Biggers tired of waiting in the kill 

zone and knew it would be an uphill battle to climb 

that hill again hauling the trailer. He knew they needed 

to get out of the kill zone and there were still vehicles 

behind his. So SGT Biggers called Polk on the radio, 

“LT, I’m going to drop this trailer and you and your driver 

can hook up to this truck and drive the PLS out.” They 

called for the gun trucks to support them. Biggers and 

his driver then dismounted and disconnected the trailer 

on Polk’s truck, so her truck could hook up and pull 

one of the two disabled vehicles blocking their path. It 

was about that time, Gun 7 came up from the rear and 

pushed Gun 5 out of the way. Polk’s PLS could not pull 

up to the PLS in front of hers. Someone else hooked up 

to the disabled PLS and pulled it out. Polk’s PLS pushed 

another PLS out of the kill zone. The RG31 had both rear 

tires blown out and was not going anywhere so Biggers 

instructed the crew to pull the PLS out because it had 

all its wheels and could roll a lot better. It was one hour 

before sunset.93

The two remaining gun trucks in the rear of the 

convoy had not yet been engaged, so Da Silva called 

for Gun 6 to come up, but it could not make it past 

the disabled vehicles. Da Silva then told Gun 7 that 

someone had to come and push a couple of vehicles out 

of the way. After about 90 minutes into the ambush, 

SFC Mills’ Gun 7 drove around the wreckers and 

reached the wadi where it pushed SGT Burks’ Gun 5 

out of the way. Driving into the kill zone, Mills could not 

see who was shooting at them. His gun truck laid down 

suppressive fire in the direction of where the gunner 

thought the fire came from, and the Kiowa could not 

get positive identification either, so it fired into areas 

the truck drivers pointed out. Once Gun 7 pushed the 

disabled PLS 312 out of the way, it broke the bottleneck 

and then escorted the remainder of the convoy out of 

the kill zone. On the way out, Gun 7 stopped 100 meters 

short of the disabled Gun 2 after the crew spotted 

a secondary IED near the disabled gun truck. SGT 

Palacios’ crew collected their sensitive items and ran 

to Gun Truck 7 who then hauled them to the green 

zone for medical evacuation. This cleared the path 

for the rest of the convoy to escape.94

After Gun 7 had escorted the lead elements of the 

convoy to the green zone, Gun 6 continued to escort 

PLS trucks out of the kill zone. Eventually, the cargo 

trucks with their long trailers could not fit through the 

narrow curved road because too many disabled vehicles 

blocked the way. One by one, Gun 6 pulled up to the 

contact side of each PLS, so each driver could 

dismount and unhitch the trailer.95

First Medevac 

Da Silva wanted to evacuate as many drivers out on 

helicopters as she could to minimize the risk of them 

getting hit again riding in other gun trucks. The US Air 

Force at Kandahar Airfield launched the HH-60 Pave 

Hawk medevac helicopters to their rescue. The first 

medevac was airborne at 1446 hours and could only 

evacuate two patients. A second medevac flight followed 

at 1450 hours. At 1451 hours, Da Silva also requested 

a route clearance patrol (RCP) via MIRC Chat96 because 

the quick reaction force (QRF) could not launch from 

Frontenac since the route was mined. Due to the current 

enemy contact, an RCP, which had not been available 

for two weeks, was then released to clear the route.97

The first medevac landed about 75 meters uphill 

from Da Silva’s position because it did not see the 

enemy fire when it arrived. Gun Trucks 2 and 3 were still 

taking small arms fire, so when the two Air Force para-
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 241

rescue men (PJs) exited the helicopter, it then flew off. 

The two PJs ran up to the disabled Gun 3 and asked if 

the crew was alright. The PJs then established security 

and laid down suppressive fire for the helicopter to return. 

Both the convoy and air weapons team overhead had 

difficulty locating the well- concealed enemy. The pilots, 

however, detected fire coming from three sides on the 

convoy, but had difficulty making positive identification 

of the source of fire during daylight.98

On the ground, Osborne and Wiedel had both 

removed their body armor because of possible injuries. 

Da Silva along with Gun 3’s driver, PFC Devin Chapman, 

shielded Osborne and Wiedel with their bodies as they 

ran to the first helicopter. Da Silva, Lewis, Chapman and 

Rodriguez carried Saenz on a liter to the helicopter and 

then strapped him in.99

As the helicopter lifted off, the passengers smelled 

fuel. Evidently enemy small arms fire had caused a leak 

that forced the helicopter to land on the other side of the 

mountain to check the extent of the damage. Da Silva 

did not see the helicopter go down.100 As soon as the 

helicopter went down, a Fallen Angel call went out and 

all available aircraft at Kandahar Airfield deployed to 

aid the immobile helicopter. Wiedel said, “You could look 

up into the sky and see Kiowa pilots in their [physical 

training uniforms] and their helmet.”101 An F-18 Hornet 

was on station conducting a show of force, and AH64 

Apache gunships launched from Qalat were also circling 

overhead.102 As air support stacked up, Da Silva focused 

on coordinating with them and her battalion for external 

support while SFC Mills took charge of the recovery.

Once on the ground, the helicopter crew climbed 

out to check for damage. Saenz worried about security 

as his crew had left their weapons with Gun 3, so Saenz 

asked the helicopter crew for weapons. A PJ pulled a 

9mm pistol out of his bag and Saenz asked Wiedel if 

he could fire, then the PJ handed it to Wiedel. None 

of injured soldiers exited the helicopter. The area was 

still hot, so the pilots decided to take off. It flew the 

wounded to Kandahar where the battalion commander 

was waiting for them. Saenz told the commander the 

convoy needed ammunition. Saenz and Da Silva both 

knew before the ambush the basic load was not enough 

ammunition if they ever got into a complex ambush, 

but they were not allowed to take more.103

Second Medevac 

At 1517 hours, Dust Off 67 (the second medevac) 

was low on fuel and could not land because of enemy 

contact. The first medevac, however, had wheels up 

and was on its way back to Kandahar Airfield. A third 

medevac was also inbound at 1636 hours.104 When 

the second helicopter did land, SGT Williams ran 

the casualty evacuation. They loaded the first two 

Blackhawk helicopter landing to medevac wounded. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company 
242 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

injured soldiers and were supposed to load a third, 

SGT Sanchez, but he was helping load the liters so 

others mistakenly thought he was part of the aid and 

litter team. He turned around after loading the injured, 

walked back with the others and did not get on the bird 

when it lifted off. He repeatedly told everyone he would 

be alright.105 At 1648 hours, SPC Carr and PFC Bryne, 

were successfully evacuated.106

Recovery

Meanwhile another convoy (Ghost Rider 7) of the 154th 

Transportation Company with two wreckers from the 

90th Maintenance Company happened to be on a “turnand-burn” mission107 from Kandahar to Frontenac to 

drop off a load of 155mm ammunition. They were about 

an hour into their download when they read a message 

on their Blue Force Trackers that the Outcast convoy was 

ambushed and had suffered casualties.108

CPT Jennifer Ernest, Commander of the 149th 

Transportation Company (Port Operations), had ridden 

along on battlefield circulation to check on her soldiers 

stationed at Frontenac. While the convoy commander 

was at the command post talking with battalion, she 

saw several helicopters circle and land to conduct a hot 

refuel. Ernest saw a female Canadian pilot climb out 

of a helicopter with a shrapnel wound in her leg and 

went over to ask her what was going on. She told Ernest 

about the ambush and then proceeded to get medical 

treatment.109 SGT Dill Tabota, 154th Transportation 

Company and lead gun truck commander, also talked 

with the pilots who said the convoy was receiving heavy 

small arms fire, RPGs and mortars and they needed 

someone on the ground to help get that convoy out 

of the kill zone as soon as possible.110

At 1615 hours, battalion tasked Ghost Rider 7 to 

assist with recovery operations and the route clearance 

patrol (Task Force Thor) was expected to arrive within five 

hours. At that time the second medevac was still on the 

ground due to contact and one US Air Force para-rescue 

man was on the ground at the helicopter crash site.111

The convoy commander then called everyone 

together to inform them Da Silva’s convoy was 

ambushed on its way back from TK and there were 

casualties. They were going out to recover the vehicles, 

but some were still in the kill zone. The PLS drivers in 

the Outcast convoy were from the same company as the 

Ghost Rider convoy, and the wrecker crews were also 

from the same 90th Maintenance Company. CPT Ernest 

was getting ready to go with them when the convoy 

commander told her she did not have to go. Ernest 

Recovery Team in the Green Zone. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 243

replied that soldiers in that convoy belonged to those of 

her battle buddy and she wanted to help them. She then 

called her battalion from the Canadian command post 

to make sure she could go. She was not alone. All the 

members of Ghost Rider 7 had friends in that ambushed 

convoy and were eager to go help them.112

At 1700 hours, the second medevac had returned 

to Kandahar Airfield and at 1702 hours, SFC Mills in the 

green zone sent up a LACE113 report that his convoy was 

out of water, but had plenty of ammunition for the M2 

and 700 M249 rounds. They still had two possible IEDs 

in front of the green zone, so the rest of the soldiers 

hunkered down and waited for the route clearance 

patrol to arrive and clear the route. Battalion submitted 

a request to Task Force Pegasus to resupply Outcast 

with water and ammunition and would extract up to 

eight combat ineffective personnel.114

Over at Frontenac, the recovery convoy wanted 

to depart as soon as possible, but had to wait for the 

route clearance patrol to arrive from Kandahar. While 

waiting, the convoy commander studied the route with 

the Canadian explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) team 

and planned how they were going to recover the convoy. 

Meanwhile, the drivers loaded their vehicles with extra 

MREs, water and ammunition for their friends in the kill 

zone because they knew they would be out.115

With the arrival of the route clearance patrol, the 

recovery convoy consisting of five MRAPS, six PLS, and 

one wrecker. The route clearance patrol with a Canadian 

EOD team finally departed Frontenac at 1809 hours.116

Even though the kill zone was only 20 to 30 kilometers 

away, the recovery convoy crept along at 5 to 10 mph 

while the route clearance patrol swept the road ahead of 

them for IEDs.117

Back in the kill zone, PFC Gacia was added to the 

medevac list at 1854 hours and two more US Air Force 

HH -60G Pave Hawk helicopters were dispatched on 

medevac mission to the kill zone. On lift off from the 

kill zone, one HH-60G received small arms fire and 

made a hard landing. The over watch HH-60G landed 

and evacuated crew and injured drivers.118 SGT Kim 

remembered the HH-60G was shot down around 1830 

hours, just before it turned dark, and then watched it 

burn all night on the right side of the hill. The sun began 

to set at 1910 hours and then the enemy firing slacked 

off. The enemy knew the Americans could see their 

muzzle flash in the dark with their night vision devices, 

so they quit firing after it became dark.119 SGT Kim had 

not left his vehicle while in the green zone because he 

still heard small arms fire; but when the firing quieted 

down, he climbed out with his driver to check on the 

damage to their truck. He noticed that the two rear tires 

on his truck were shot out and everything on the bottom 

of his vehicle was leaking hydraulic and transmission 

fluids, and fuel. He reported the damage to the convoy 

commander and she said his vehicle was not going to 

be able to move. So Kim and his driver collected all the 

sensitive items and zeroed out the night vision goggle.120

SGT Biggers had helped the wrecker recover 

vehicles and brought up a tire from the kill zone by the 

time the firing quieted down. Because of the congestion 

of damaged vehicles in the kill zone, they had to roll a 

spare tire to the green zone to get an RG31 moving on 

its own.121 The wrecker drove up to recover Gun 3 but 

became mired in the mud. So the PLS, wrecker and Gun 

3 blocked the route to the green zone. By that time, they 

had radio contact with the Ghost Rider 7.122 After six 

hours in the kill zone, SGT Biggers finally reached the 

green zone where he contacted 1LT Da Silva and gave 

her his battle assessment of the equipment on his truck. 

He then waited in the green zone for another three hours 

before the recovery convoy arrived.123

Even though it had turned dark, the fight was not 

over. At 1956 hours, MIRC Chat reported that enemy 

radio chatter indicated insurgents were planning to 

exploit the downed helicopter and engage any first 

responders.124 At 2044 hours, two additional medics 

were inbound on a UH-60 Blackhawk to the kill zone 

and the recovery assets from FOB Frontenac with route 

clearance patrol and one company of Canadian forces 

were three kilometers south of ambush site.125 Within 

two kilometers of the kill zone, the Canadians found two 

pressure plate IEDs and had to clear them. This delayed 

the recovery convoy even longer.126

At 2051 hours, however, the aerial re-supply was 

five minutes out and SFC Mills coordinated with a PLS 

in the back of the formation to set up a landing zone 

for resupply of food, ammo and water.127 Prior to their 

deployment, the company had rehearsed medevacs with 

actual helicopters. SGT White said his training kicked in 

and he brought in the medevac and resupply helicopters. 

He sent a landing zone team out to set up 360 degrees 
244 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

of security. When the pilots called him to ask where he 

wanted it to land, he identified where they were and 

the helicopters landed, dropped the food, water and 

ammo and then left.128 The survivors of the ambush then 

settled in for a long night and at 2300 hours, RC - South 

and Task Force Pegasus informed the 286th CSSB it 

had until dark the next day to decide whether to 

blow the equipment in place.129

When Ghost Rider 7 recovery convoy finally reached 

the green zone at 2300 hours, it was dark and they saw 

the burning helicopter about 500 meters to the left of 

the road. They saw civilian traffic had also backed up 

behind the convoy. The crews of Ghost Rider realized half 

the MRAPs and the wrecker of Outcast had recovered 

as many vehicles as possible and the other half of the 

convoy was still in the kill zone. All the Outcast vehicles 

had battle damage and some of the drivers could not 

exit their vehicles because the doors were jammed. 

SGT Tabota remembered an RPG had bent the armor 

on a fellow NCO’s PLS, so they had to strap the door 

and pull it open to get him out. Ghost Rider 7 loaded 

up what they could from the first half but was told to 

stand fast and wait for EOD to clear the route into 

the kill zone.130 SPC Aaron Ward, 90th Maintenance 

Company, did not recover any that night, but gave 

out two tow bars and changed some tires that were 

punctured by shrapnel.131 They could not drive down 

into the kill zone and recover the rest of the vehicles 

because the route had not been cleared.132

Realizing they did not have enough assets to 

recover all the damaged vehicles, Da Silva and the 

convoy commander of Ghost Rider 7 called back to 

Kandahar for more. 1LT Joshua Kolleda, executive 

officer of the 149th Transportation Company, sent out 

M915s with lowboy trailers with a second recovery 

convoy (Ghost Rider 5) from the 154th Transportation 

Company.133 At 0410 hours, the route clearance patrol 

found a secondary IED and they received an aerial 

resupply of water and ammunition. By 0525 hours, 

Ghost Rider 5 departed Kandahar with seven MRAP 

gun trucks from the 154th Transportation Company, 

two wreckers from the 90th Maintenance Company 

and two M915 lowboys. The convoy was beginning its 

second day in the kill zone.134

At 0651 hours, Outcast discovered another pressure 

plate IED on the passenger side of PLS 312 and a 

disabled gun truck was also in the immediate vicinity of 

the pressure plate. Gun 12 was then forced to evacuate. 

Around 0800 hours, Ghost Rider 5 finally arrived and 

the combined recovery teams entered the kill zone 

to complete the recovery.135 The M915s pulled up to 

the first damaged MRAP and CPT Ernest assisted her 

soldiers in recovering it. There was still some enemy 

small arms fire so anyone not involved in the recovery 

had to climb back into their vehicles and pull security.136

While the recovery was taking place, the air cover 

spotted a Taliban mortar team coming around the 

mountain to fire on the trucks. While her M915 drivers 

were chaining down the second disabled vehicles, CPT 

Ernest remembered hearing on the radio some aircraft 

were going to fire some Hellfire missiles. When the 

enemy started to flank the green zone, an F-18 Hornet 

dropped two 500 -pound bombs on the ridgeline and 

that ended any further enemy attacks.137

Around 1030 hours, SGT Kim and his driver were 

evacuated out on a Blackhawk flying back to refuel. 

He reached Kandahar 30 minutes later.138 By 1645 

hours, the recovery mission was complete and everyone 

returned to Frontenac at 2045 hours, where the 

battalion commander and command sergeant major 

were waiting for them with chemical lights to wave 

them to the refuel point. There, other soldiers of the 

forward logistics element took over the vehicles so the 

drivers could get a hot meal. The chain of command 

then debriefed them and the chaplain was also there for 

counseling.139 The recovery teams waited two days at 

Frontenac for air support and then pushed to Kandahar 

with all damaged vehicles divided into two march serials. 

That ended the mission.140

Lesson

The 286th CSSB S -2 had estimated the convoy was 

ambushed by an 80 -man enemy force.141 Burks 

estimated the enemy had about 40 men and two 

mortar teams. The enemy set up a U-shaped kill zone 

taking advantage of the high ground surrounding a 

choke point in the wadi below. They enemy made an 

excellent selection of the kill zone having seen the 

trouble the convoy had negotiating it on the way to TK. 

Everyone agreed the ambush was very well planned. 

Because of the remote distances between forward 

operating bases, any convoy in Afghanistan had to be 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 245

able to defend itself for several hours on its own with 

only the aid of air support or artillery. 

During the nine - hour battle, insurgents fired 

approximately 14 RPGs along with detonating multiple 

roadside bombs and pummeling the convoy with smallarms fire. Some insurgents used armor-piercing rounds. 

The Taliban fired machine guns and assault rifles from 

nearby homes, the tree line or from dug-in positions on 

the mountain ridges. Although the militants were wellcovered, many soldiers recalled the enemy had been 

close enough to see faces. After the battle, several 

soldiers reported seeing doors in the hillside 

and speculated hollowed areas in the ground may 

have held weapon and ammunition caches. 

Five MRAPs were disabled, and ten PLS trucks had 

been hit by mortar rounds. One RPG hit a PLS, and two 

RPGs hit at the rear of Gun Truck 4, taking out its rear 

tires with shrapnel. Fortunately for the convoy, several 

IEDs never detonated. Five soldiers were evacuated that 

day and one soldier was evacuated the following day. 

The MRAPs performed the way they were designed and 

deflected the blast away from the crews, blowing the 

front ends away, but saving the crews. 

Da Silva, to her credit, asked for support from 

the maneuver force at TK and also asked for a route 

clearance patrol, but none were available to support the 

run back. The convoy had no alternate routes to choose 

from and even knowing the enemy was waiting, they 

chose to return. This was a typical truck driver attitude, 

regardless of the threat; the convoy had to get to its 

next destination as soon as possible. The next critical 

decision point came when they were stopped at the 

ANA check point. Again, the decision was unanimous 

to push through. The crews felt very confident in their 

equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures. 

Later Da Silva admitted once in the kill zone, she 

should not have pushed the rest of the convoy through 

the choke point; but at the time, their tactics, techniques 

Gun Truck 2. Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company 
246 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

and procedures were to push through. They did not 

have the hindsight of Vietnam War standard operating 

procedures that warned that any trucks that had not 

entered kill zones should not do so. If they had changed 

their tactics, techniques and procedures to stop and pull 

security, then the enemy would just adjust their tactics 

to maneuver on the halted convoy. Only the lead trucks 

that had escaped the kill zone had a choice in where 

they set up the rally point, and then the enemy still tried 

to maneuver on it. Only the arrival of air cover prevented 

the enemy from assaulting the vehicles in both the kill 

zone and the green zone. Enough emphasis cannot be 

stressed on the importance of air cover for the survival 

of convoys. 

Even though the enemy selected an ideal site for 

an ambush and made good use of the terrain, no driver 

was killed. The tactics, techniques and procedures 

worked. The escort crews knew and had rehearsed 

them to the point they executed them instinctively and 

rapidly recovered the crews of the disabled vehicles. 

The gun truck ratio was adequate for this threat. With 

the exception of one person, the drivers and wrecker 

crews reacted heroically, which got most of the vehicles 

out of the kill zone.

Not having anticipated such a high amount of battle 

damage, the convoy admitted it did not have enough 

self-sufficient recovery assets or spare parts, especially 

tires. Complex ambushes are rare events so there may 

not be enough self-recovery assets and spare parts 

for every convoy. For such worst case scenarios, there 

needs to be recovery assets on call, and fortunately, 

the Ghost Rider 7 convoy happened to be nearby at 

Frontenac. Everyone admitted the Canadians and 

Americans worked exceptionally well together and NCOs 

took charge of the medevacs, resupply and recovery 

missions. Even with Ghost Rider 7 nearby, the selfrecovery was begun by Outcast before Ghost Rider 

had arrived, but no one could return to the kill zone to 

complete the recovery until the next morning after Ghost 

Rider 5 arrived from Kandahar. An ambush is chaos and 

aside from all the problems, nearly everyone did as they 

were trained; so at the end of the day, not one American 

died during the battle.

After this ambush, the tactics, techniques and 

procedures changed that vehicles would no longer 

immediately push through the kill zone. The lead gun 

trucks would stop, assess the situation, conduct their 

5 and 25 meter scans for IEDs, then try to identify the 

Gun Truck 5 with crew: SPC Gerber Sierra, SPC Jared Hawkins, SPC Mabel Fields, and SGT Brandon Burks. 

Photo courtesy of the 53rd QM Company 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 247

enemy and look for secondary IEDs. After that ambush, 

the gun trucks also started carrying Mk19s automatic 

grenade launchers.142

Eight soldiers received Purple Heart Medals for 

this ambush and no one, including 1LT Da Silva or 

SFC Mills received any award higher than an Army

Army Commendation Medal with Valor device for 

having fought in a nine -hour ambush.

1

1LT Latonya Polk interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, 2009; and SSG Anthony Williams interview by 

LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

2 SFC Byron Mills interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009

3 SGT Brandon Lee Burks interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

4 SGT Young Kim interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009

5 Williams interview.

6 Polk interview.

7 Mills interview, and SGT Mario Saenz telephone interview 

by Richard Killblane, 22 June 2012.

8 AAR - Outcast TIC.

9 Williams interview.

10 1LT Tamara Da Silva interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, 2009.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Da Silva interview, and Mills interview.

14 Ibid.

15 SGT Ronnie Biggers interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, 2009.

16 Polk interview, and SGT Todd Wilken interview by LCDR Jason Roberson 

at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

17 Burks interview.

18 Da Silva interview, and Mills interview.

19 Biggers interview.

20 Da Silva interview.

21 Burks interview.

22 Williams interview

23 Da Silva interview, and Mills interview

24 AAR - Outcast TIC.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Da Silva interview; and Wilkens interview.

28 Williams interview.

29 Spc. Elisebet Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed, Battles Insurgents for 

9 Hours,” Joint Sustainment Command – Afghanistan September 1, 2009.

30 Da Silva interview, and Wilkens interview.

31 In the interviews soldiers used reference to ANA and ANP 

interchangeably, but for consistency, they will be referred to 

as army not police.

32 Williams interview

33 Da Silva interview.

34 AAR - Outcast TIC.

35 Da Silva interview, and Saenz interview.

36 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed;” and Saenz interview.

37 Mills interview.

38 Da Silva interview, and DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement 

by Tamara Da Silva, 1 August 2009.

39 Da Silva interview, Saenz interview, and Da Silva Sworn Statement.

40 SGT Armando Palacios interview by LCDR Jason Roberson 

at Kandahar, 2009.

41 AAR - Outcast TIC.

42 SGT Burks interview.

43 AAR - Outcast TIC.

44 Da Silva interview, and Saenz interview.

45 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

46 Da Silva interview.

47 AAR - Outcast TIC.

48 Ibid.

49 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

50 Saenz interview, Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

51 Williams interview.

52 Palacios interview.

53 Sworn Statement by Tamara Da Silva, 1 August 2009.

54 Polk interview.

55 Mills interview.

56 Wilkens interview.

57 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

58 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed,” and Saenz interview.

59 Saenz interview.

60 Palacios interview, and Williams interview.

61 Williams interview.

62 Da Silva interview.

63 Wilkens interview.

64 Da Silva interview and video shot during the ambush by a 

TC in the rear of the convoy.

65 AAR - Outcast TIC.

66 Da Silva interview, and Saenz interview.

67 Ibid.

68 AAR - Outcast TIC.

69 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

70 Palacios interview.

71 Williams interview.

72 Palacios interview.

73 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

74 Kim interview.

75 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

76 Williams interview.

77 Ibid.

78 Palacios interview; SFC Mills interview; Freeburg, 

“US Convoy Ambushed.”

79 Palacios interview.

80 SGT Baronsay White interview by LCDR Jason Robison, Kandahar, 2009.

81 Wilkens interview.

82 White interview.

83 Burks interview.

84 Ibid.

85 Mills interview.

86 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

87 Williams interview and Kim interview.

88 Wilkens interview.

89 Palacios interview.

90 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

91 Wilkens interview.
248 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

92 Biggers interview; and SFC Mills interview

93 Biggers interview and Polk interview.

94 Mills interview; Wilkens interview; and Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

95 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed.”

96 MIRC Chat was a new form of instantaneous text messaging.

97 AAR - Outcast TIC.

98 AAR - Outcast TIC, and Da Silva interview by Richard Killblane, 

21 November 2011.

99 Freeburg, “US Convoy Ambushed;” Da Silva, 21 November 2011.

100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 AAR - Outcast TIC. 103 Saenz interview. 104 AAR - Outcast TIC. 105 Williams interview. 106AAR - Outcast TIC. 107Turn and burn was slang for a convoy that was scheduled to return 

from its destination the same day instead of remaining overnight.

108 SGT Dill Tabota interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, 2009; SPC Daniel J. Marler interview by LCDR Jason Roberson 

at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009; and SGT Jeremy Dowling-Wise interview 

by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

109 CPT Jennifer Ernest interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Lee, VA, 

20 January 2012.

110 Tabota interview. 111 AAR - Outcast TIC. 112 Marler interview, and Ernest interview. 113 Liquid, ammunition, casualties and equipment (LACE). 114 Mills interview, and AAR - Outcast TIC. 115 Tabota interview, and SFC Mills interview. 116 AAR - Outcast TIC. 117 Tabota interview, and Marler interview.

118 AAR - Outcast TIC. 119 Mills interview, Polk interview, and Kim interview. 120 Kim interview. 121 Biggers interview. 122 Mills interview. 123 Biggers interview. 124 AAR - Outcast TIC. 125 Ibid. 126 The AAR - Outcast TIC stated it took the convoy two and a half hours 

to reach the site and two hours to clear the IED, and the members of the 

convoy agreed they linked up with the ambushed convoy around 2300 

hours. Marler interview, and Tabota interview.

127 AAR - Outcast TIC, and Mills interview. 128 White interview. 129 AAR - Outcast TIC, and Mills interview. 130 Tabota interview. 131 Ward interview, and Tabota interview. 132 SPC Aaron Ward interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, 2009; Tabota interview; Dowling-Wise interview, and 

AAR - Outcast TIC.

133 Ernest interview. 134 AAR - Outcast TIC, Dowling-Wise interview, and Ernest interview. 135 Ibid. 136 Ernest interview. 137 Mills interview, Ernest interview, Biggers interview, Freeburg, 

and “US Convoy Ambushed.”

139 Kim interview 139 Ernest interview. 140 Dowling-Wise interview. 141 Mills interview. 142 Kim interview.
Observations 249

Observations

he previous case studies have examined the conduct of ambushes and what takes place inside kill zones. 

An ambush is the worst case scenario when things have gone terribly wrong. The trick is to avoid an ambush 

if at all possible. 

The study of convoy ambushes and convoy security operations reveals certain patterns. Some of these never 

seem to change and violation of them renders convoys vulnerable to attack. The challenge has been to articulate 

them. Throughout history, philosophers of war have tried to define those permanent tenets or principles that define 

the conduct of combat. The US Army has defined its doctrine in the Field Service Regulations beginning in 1914, 

that evolved into FM 100 - 5 in 1941 and, more recently FM 3-0, to fit a period of time, but this doctrine never fully 

addressed partisan, irregular or guerrilla warfare. Instead, soldiers and leaders have developed their own doctrine 

for how to conduct operations for each conflict. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) on the other hand, vary 

constantly based upon the mission, enemy, friendly troops, weather and terrain. Understanding the enemy and 

either anticipating his action or recognizing his strengths and weaknesses during the action, the convoy or security 

commander uses the advantage of terrain and weather to employ his strength at the enemy’s weakness while 

protecting his own vulnerabilities. The US Army has participated in three wars with different terrain - Vietnam, 

Iraq and Afghanistan - that have provided ample material to understand convoy security.

To help identify the solutions, one must first understand the characteristics of an ambush. An ambush is an 

attack with the element of surprise. The element of surprise allows the enemy the liberty to select which targets to 

destroy first, which is why an ambusher initiates with a casualty producing device. The amount of damage depends 

upon how well coordinated and accurate the fire is. A convoy ambush differs from other ambushes in that the targets 

are vehicles and the ambush is generally restricted to the road. In most cases, convoy ambushes are linear but, 

depending upon the path of the road or surrounding terrain, may vary. 

Vehicles can provide the advantage of armor, fire power, speed and maneuverability. The security vehicles, 

more commonly known as gun trucks, can provide a platform to mount armor and weapons systems that provide an 

offensive capability. While a good road can allow them to drive fast, other road conditions can significantly reduce 

their speed or even stop the convoy. The size of trucks, however, makes them easy targets when halted or driving 

slowly. Being road bound, the enemy knows the path the convoy has to follow, which makes it easy to obstacle with 

road blocks or explosives. Roads through jungle and urban areas also limit maneuverability and offer cover and 

concealment to the enemy.

The need for security vehicles should have become doctrine after the Vietnam War, but most doctrine developers 

saw the Vietnam War with no safe rear as an anomaly of the 20th century; where, more accurately, the broad front 

concept of war that dominated the 20th century was the anomaly that ended with Desert Storm. So the Vietnam War 

laid the ground work for convoy security, but there were three unresolved issues from the Vietnam War related to 

convoy escort doctrine. What was the best type of escort platform? Should convoy escort be internal or external to the 

truck company, and what branch can best perform convoy security? Should convoy tactics be passive or aggressive? 

The following observations are derived from what has and has not worked during three wars.

T
250 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Doctrine

Doctrine involves more permanent concepts that define 

how to conduct military operations. Because of the 

separate branches of the US Army, convoy security is 

divided into three areas of responsibility. The maneuver 

forces have responsibility for rear area security and the 

supply routes which pass through their battle space. 

Historically, whatever security measures the battle space 

owners have taken, the enemy has found other ways 

and locations to ambush convoys. As a minimum, the 

battle space owner can provide the quick reaction force, 

medevac, recovery, and synchronize the battle. The Military 

Police likewise has responsibility for route security and 

can also serve as a quick reaction force. Also, the enemy 

studies their operations for gaps in their security. Since 

neither can completely protect the routes and convoys, 

convoys therefore need their own means of immediate 

self-defense. So the convoys have to defend themselves 

until the nearest reaction force can arrive and conduct a 

battle handoff so the convoy can continue its mission. 

There are several options for internal convoy 

security. One is to arm most or all of the task vehicles. 

The minimum security consists of armed right seat 

passengers, referred to as “shotguns” during the 

Indian and Vietnam Wars and “shooters” during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. While this allows the truck to 

return fire, task vehicles do not have the flexibility or 

maneuverability to flank the enemy or defend disabled 

vehicles in the kill zone. A dedicated escort vehicle with 

crew-served weapons provides the most flexibility and 

maneuverability. The best defense consists of armored 

vehicles dedicated as weapons platforms. The term 

“gun truck” refers to any cargo truck used as a weapon’s 

platform. Different terms were used to avoid confusion 

between the larger platforms that could carry more than 

one crew-served weapon system and smaller platforms 

that could only carry one. The Vietnam War added a new 

dimension to gun truck concept and terminology with 

“hardened truck” referring to any truck that had armored 

plating. A gun truck became not only an armed platform 

but an armored one as well. An armed 1⁄4-ton M151s 

were called gun jeeps and armed 3⁄4-tons were called 

gun beeps. By 2004 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

armored HMMWVs with crew-served weapons were 

officially called Convoy Protection Platforms (CPP) by 

units based in Iraq and Convoy Escort Platforms (CEP) 

in Kuwait. Unofficially, the crews referred to them as gun 

trucks as had the veterans of the Vietnam War. For the 

purpose of this study they will be referred to as either 

gun trucks or escort platforms.

Type of Escort Platforms, Arms and Armament

By doctrine, convoys traveling through enemy territory 

should have dedicated escort platforms, referred to in 

this book as gun trucks. The question is type, 

armament, and identification.

When convoys began getting ambushed during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in June 2003, a gun truck by 

definition was any vehicle, whether armored or not, 

armed with a crew-served weapon. It could have been 

a gunner sitting in the back with an M249 5.56mm 

Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) or a M2.50 caliber 

machinegun. The type of vehicle did not matter. During 

the Vietnam War, truck drivers converted any wheeled 

vehicle into an armored gun truck and practical 

experience settled on three basic designs: the gun jeep, 

5 -ton gun truck, and V-100 four-wheeled armored car. 

Each type of escort vehicle had its advantages 

and disadvantages. Although the M151 jeep could not 

carry much armor and only mount one light machinegun 

(M60), it had the room for extra radios and was very 

maneuverable, making it a preferred platform for a 

convoy commander and assistant convoy commander 

vehicle. Some convoy commanders upgraded their 

M151 1⁄4-ton gun jeeps for the M37 3⁄4-ton gun beep. 

Its cargo capacity only allowed it to mount single -plate 

armor, but it could mount two light machineguns. In a 

1969 study in Vietnam, nearly every colonel and above 

believed the 5-ton gun truck was a temporary substitute 

until enough factory-built V-100s could be fielded in the 

Transportation Corps truck companies, since the MPs 

had priority on issue in the field. The gun truck crews, 

however, knew the V-100 was a death trap if anything 

penetrated the armor such as rounds, shrapnel or blast 

as there was no place for it to escape. Infantrymen 

knew this and rode on top of armored personnel carriers 

rather than inside as the vehicle was designed, and even 

layered sandbags on top for extra protection against 

mines. There were several cases during the Vietnam War 

where RPGs hit the gun boxes of 5-ton gun trucks and 

only killed the gunner directly in the line of the blast, but 

the rest of the crew would survive. Although wounded, 
Observations 251

the crews could still continue to fight. The V-100 only 

had one crew-served weapon mounted in a cupula, while 

the 5-ton gun trucks mounted at least three. This offered 

360 degrees of observation and fire. By the 1971 study, 

senior officers admitted what the crews had known all 

along - that the 5- ton gun truck was superior to the V90

90 -100. The armor on the gun truck was the same 

as a V-100 but the open box design allowed the blast 

or shrapnel to escape. The open gun box design also 

allowed for a minimum of three machineguns and the 

lesson of convoy ambushes in Vietnam was the fight 

usually ended with superior and accurate firepower, 

and accuracy could be compensated for with sheer 

volume of fire power.

The V-100 had the advantage of its off-road 

capability. CPT Walter Anderson, Commander of the 

563rd Transportation Company at Pleiku then Phu 

Bai had six 5 -ton gun trucks and two V-100s when 

he assumed command in February 1970. He liked the 

V-100s because they could accelerate faster and drive 

off-road. On the coastal plain they could go after the 

enemy in the rice paddies. Other than the MPs, Anderson 

was one of the few who liked the V-100. Because the 

gun trucks preferred to enter the kill zone and fight it out 

with the enemy, they preferred the 5- ton gun truck with 

the open box and three to four machineguns. The convoy 

escort solution during the Vietnam War was a mixture of 

different escort platforms with different capabilities. 

During the later Iraq War, as they did in Vietnam, 

the drivers turned any wheeled vehicle into a gun truck 

platform to include the biggest truck, the HET, but settled 

on three escort platforms: the HMMWV, 5 - ton gun truck 

and M1117 Armored Security Vehicle (ASV). Again, each 

had its advantages and disadvantages, which were 

similar to their Vietnam predecessors. 

The M1114/1151 HMMWV, like the M151 jeep, 

remained the preferred command and control platform 

because it had the space for the additional electronics. 

During the Iraq War, the convoy commander and 

assistant convoy commander had double-stacked 

SINGCARS radios to talk not only to the convoy but to the 

Sheriff net, plus Mobile Tracking System (MTS) or Blue 

Force Tracker (BFT) to track their real-time movement 

on a laptop map image, provide satellite email capability, 

and with BFT situational awareness of other forces in the 

area. In addition, electronic jamming devices were added 

to the vehicles. Consequently the HMMWV remained 

the preferred command and control vehicle until the 

fielding of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 

vehicles. All these extra electronics, plus the weapons, 

ammunition and equipment maxed out the load capacity 

of the HMMWVs, let alone the additional armor. The 

HMMWV still had the advantage of rapid acceleration 

for blocking intersections or getting the commander to 

the scene of an attack, if the convoy ran at a speed five 

miles an hour slower than the maximum acceleration 

speed of the HMMWV. The HMMWV was not designed 

to be an armored vehicle so the additional weight left 

little flexibility in the suspension system, so any quick 

correction of the steering would cause the HMMWV to 

roll over. For this reason the up- armored HMMWV had 

the highest roll-over rate of any vehicle.1

As the enemy weapons improved, so did the armor. 

The kinetic energy and heat of the Explosive Formed 

Projectile (EFP) (platter charge) could penetrate nearly 

any armor fielded by the Tank Automotive Command 

(TACOM), so the thickness of the door armor was 

increased with the Objective Fragmentation 5 Kits 

(OF5K), and even heavier Frag 6 kits for the M1114s. 

The additional weight of the 400 and 600 pound doors 

severely stressed the power train and suspension of 

the M1114, which led to the fielding of the M1151 with 

improved suspension and power train. But even with the 

Frag 5 and Frag 6 kits, the M1114s and M1151s were 

still vulnerable to EFPs. There were several cases where 

the EFP had not penetrated ballistic glass, but only 

melted it inward, which inspired units in Taji and Tallil to 

reinforce the outside of their doors with ballistic glass. 

Essentially the HMMWVs were becoming tanks.2

Unlike the HMMWV, the 5 -ton cargo truck was 

designed to handle the weight of the armor and still 

maintain speed (if one tweaked the governor). During the 

first year of gun truck construction, the truck companies 

that had 5 -ton cargo trucks built gun box designs similar 

to those used in Vietnam, except for the size. Because 

of the limited amount of hardened steel, the units 

initially constructed gun boxes large enough to only fit 

one pedestal -mounted machinegun. As steel arrived in 

greater quantity, the “Skunk Werks” welding shop at LSA 

Anaconda, Iraq began constructing larger gun boxes, but 

still the units mounted only one machinegun, probably 

because of the initial shortage of M2 .50 caliber 
252 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

machineguns. There were a few rare exceptions where 

units mounted more. 

The 5 -ton cargo trucks, either the M900 series or 

the M1083, had a much better height advantage for 

spotting IEDs. Its size also made it more intimidating to 

civilian traffic than the ASV. Many units in Iraq, especially 

the northern area, preferred to lead with the 5-ton, 

because the threat was mostly victim - detonated IEDs 

and the crews felt the 5 - ton offered greater survivability. 

Some liked the M900 series, because the front axle was 

forward and the cab was very high off the ground, so 

the IED detonated forward of and under the cab. Others 

felt the M1083 was better, because the front axle was 

under the cab and the mine would actually detonate 

behind the cab. On one convoy that the author rode on, 

an IED did destroy the front left wheel of an M923 with 

no injury to the crew. It was clear that the 5 -ton was no 

more survivable, but its passengers were. The problem 

with the M1083 was the frame could not hold the 

additional weight of the armor. The frames were showing 

the strain of the cab armor kit and cracked. The same 

units that liked the 5 - ton up front similarly liked to place 

one in the rear. Its size was more likely to intimidate 

approaching traffic into stopping, and the height allowed 

better escalation of force. A .50 caliber on the cab could 

depress low enough to shoot in front of any oncoming 

vehicle. The 5 -ton had the slowest acceleration speed, 

so it was not good for 

racing ahead to block 

traffic. Many 5 -ton 

gun trucks used 

the bed or “hillbilly” 

armor gun box on 

the back to store 

extra tires and spare 

parts, very much like 

maintenance gun 

trucks of Vietnam.3

Stewart 

& Stevenson, 

Letterkenny and 

Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory 

(LLNL) designed gun 

boxes for the 5-ton 

cargo trucks. LLNL 

started with a solution from the past and improved 

upon it. John Hunter studied the Eve of Destruction in 

the Transportation Museum and recognized the doublewalled armor box was more survivable than most armor. 

He assembled a group of technical experts and two 

Vietnam veterans to examine how they could improve 

upon the original design with the latest improvements 

in armor and ballistic glass. The result was far superior 

to the Vietnam solution and anything in the field at the 

time. At least one LLNL gun truck, named Iron Horse, in 

the 1073rd Maintenance Company at Camp Ridgeway 

was hit by a double-stacked IED in 2005 and the entire 

crew was unharmed. The 7th Transportation Battalion 

at Anaconda received the first LLNL kit on 14 July 2004 

and realized that it was superior to anything else they 

had on the road at the time. Factory-built M1114s 

up-armored HMMWVs had not yet been issued to 

transportation units. Consequently, the 7th Battalion 

asked for more and received 26 more kits, which arrived 

in December 2004. By then the 457th Transportation 

Battalion had replaced the 7th Battalion, and the new 

commander, LTC David Gaffney, did not like 5 -ton gun 

trucks. In 2005, one rolled over when an Iraqi car quickly 

pulled in front of it causing the truck to drive up over 

the car and roll over. Consequently, Gaffney considered 

the gun box a risk and would no longer allow crews to 

ride in the gun box. At the time of the rollover there 

had been over 300 

HMMWV rollovers 

resulting in over 80 

deaths. After the Palm 

Sunday Ambush in 

March 2005, complex 

ambushes became 

rare so there was 

rarely a need for 

suppressive firepower 

of the crew- served 

weapons.

However, in 

2006 and 2007, the 

1-325th Infantry and 

2nd Brigade Combat 

Team, from the 10th 

Mountain Division, 

liked to use the LLNL 

Crew of Iron Horse of the 1073rd Maintenance Company that 

survived a double - stacked IED in 2005. Photo courtesy of the US Army 

Transportation Museum
Observations 253

gun trucks to insert scouts, observation posts, and 

sniper teams; and also evacuate casualties and 

detainees. This was the only gun truck platform that 

was used as troop carrier. The 1-325th liked the LLNL 

better than the Stryker or Bradley, because they could 

fit more combat- ready soldiers in the gun box.4

LTC Gaffney was far from alone in his opinion. There 

was considerable bias against the 5 - ton gun truck from 

the majority of senior Army officers. Most battalion 

commanders and above came to the war with two goals, 

accomplish the mission and bring all their soldiers home 

with all their moving parts. In their defense, the senior 

officers wanted to provide their soldiers with the best 

possible protection and saw the best way to protect a 

gun truck crew was cocoon them inside 360 degrees 

of armor. Consequently, they did not like the open box 

design of the 5 - ton gun truck. The 5 - ton gun box left 

the crews exposed, so many commanders saw this as 

too much risk. Added to this was a dislike of anything that 

resembled a solution from the Vietnam War. The senior 

officers had fallen victim to the media hype the US Army 

had lost the Vietnam War, when in fact it had defeated 

the insurgency by 1968 and negotiated a peace treaty 

with North Vietnam by 1973. Since the misconception 

was the US Army had lost the war in Vietnam, therefore, 

nothing could be learned from that war, or any solutions 

of that war would not apply to this one. In fact the 5 -ton 

gun truck successfully kept the roads open in Vietnam. 

COL Jeff Miser, Commander of 7th Transportation 

Group during its 2004 -2005 rotation, had even visited 

with Vietnam gun truck veterans on replicas of their 

gun trucks and still did not like the Vietnam solution. 

He recognized it was a good solution for its time, but 

he did not like the “cowboy” attitude of the crews or 

individualism represented in their artwork. He believed 

in standardization of gun truck design and definitely did 

not like the elitism. Consequently, he made the 518th 

Gun Truck Company dismantle its 5 -ton gun trucks and 

definitely did not let them field the Livermore gun box. 

Ignoring the casualties brought about by the additional 

armor of the HMMWVs, the senior officers looked for 

any excuse to validate their beliefs about the problems 

of the 5 -ton gun truck.

When combat units began taking away his M1114s 

in 2005, Gaffney relented and let his escort companies 

take the 5 - ton gun trucks out but not allow any crew 

members to ride in the gun box. Once the crews had the 

battalion commander’s consent to use the 5 -tons, they 

admitted they liked them and the battalion adopted a 

three and two mix of M1114s and 5 - tons. After a LLNL 

gun truck drove off a bridge due to driver error, MultiNational Command- Iraq (MNC - I) forbid any LLNL gun 

trucks from going outside the wire of a forward operating 

base. If the same rules had applied to all platforms 

Skunk Werks patching and adding additional armor to underside of M1117 ASV. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
254 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

as was applied to the LLNL gun box, then no ASV or 

M1114/1151 would have been allowed to go out on 

the road. What few LLNL gun boxes the author saw in 

transportation units in March 2007 were used for troop 

transportation and litter carriers.5

Similar to the V-100 in Vietnam, the Transportation 

units were the last to receive the M1117 Armored 

Security Vehicles (ASV); but by 2006, most 

Transportation units had enough ASVs to field at least 

one or two per convoy. The M1117 ASV, contrary 

to Tetron’s claim that it was a new design, was an 

upgrade of the V-100/150. Not only that, but Tectron 

was a subsidiary of Cadillac Gage that had built the 

original V-100/150. The main difference between the 

V-100/150 and the M1117 was an improved power 

train and upgraded armor. Otherwise, it had the same 

four-wheeled armored car design. It had all the same 

problems as the V-100 in Vietnam and some.

ASVs and 5 - ton trucks were initially considered 

the most survivable and both were used as lead and 

rear vehicles in convoys. However, when the author met 

with the welders of the Skunk Werks at LSA Anaconda, 

he learned they had patched holes in 30 ASVs since 

their arrival six months before. The ASV was not as 

survivable as some thought. They had taken IED and 

mine blasts and kept rolling, but did not stand up to 

an EFP. They had cramped compartments and were 

difficult to egress while wearing body armor. For this 

reason, some crews preferred to not wear body armor 

at all. Neither was there much room for MTS and Blue 

Force Tracker up front which were instead placed 

near the VIP seat in the back, requiring a fourth crew 

member. Although the turret had limited peripheral 

observation, the optics was an advantage. Once the 

gunners became used to looking through the scope, they 

liked the increased magnification capable for searching 

the road farther ahead. The gunner could usually see 

details much sooner than the drivers. However, he had 

to rely on the drivers for identifying suspicious objects 

much closer alongside the road because of a narrow 

peripheral vision. The weapons system on the ASV 

offered the gunner two very good options: the .50 caliber 

machinegun or the Mk19 automatic grenade launcher. 

The design of the ASV, however, did not allow the gunner 

to depress the gun to the rear in order to conduct an 

escalation of force in the event a car approached the 

rear of the convoy. For the gunner to fire a pen flare 

or shine the laser at the approaching vehicle, he had 

Airmen of the 70th Motor Transportation Detachment “Scorpions” in Kuwait in 2008. Two are wearing the black LVC patch 

for Lead Vehicle Commander. Photo courtesy of the 70th MTD
Observations 255

to climb out of the turret and expose himself. The ASV 

accelerated faster than the 5 - ton gun trucks; and for 

these reasons, some units preferred to use the ASVs 

up front and rear. Other units that liked the 5 - tons as 

lead and rear vehicles placed the ASVs behind the lead 

gun truck and ahead of the rear gun truck, so they could 

race up and block traffic. Crews praised the ASV for the 

smoothness of its ride. Its suspension system was not 

maxed out, but it did have a high center of gravity and a 

high tendency to roll over on the slightest incline and the 

turret would pop off, so it could not go off road. When 

initially fielded, the ASV was very well liked by most units; 

but by 2008 after a year of use, many units quit using 

ASVs because of the restricted compartment, limited 

observation, tendency to roll over, and the inability to get 

to an injured crew if the doors were combat locked from 

the inside. Once again, if given the choice, the majority of 

truck units preferred the 5 -ton gun truck.6

The Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) proved to 

be the most survivable wheeled vehicle on the road due 

to its height. Even after EFPs became the primary threat 

in 2006, the high angle needed to hit the passenger 

or driver had to be exact or it would pass over or under 

the person, where a more horizontal shot on a HMMWV 

almost guaranteed hitting the passengers. Consequently, 

the 24th Transportation Battalion in 2006 made the 

HET the lead vehicle in all its convoys. By 2009, all truck 

battalions in Kuwait placed a HET up front until they 

finally received MRAPs.

By 2007, the M1114/1151s armored HMMWVs, 

M1117 ASVs, and 5 - tons, either the M900 series or 

M1083s were the platforms in use. After questioning 

drivers and crew members throughout Kuwait and Iraq, 

the author found no consensus of opinion on what was 

best. Interestingly, many of the opinions contradicted 

one another. Some crews in one battalion considered 

one type of platform, such as the ASV or 5 - ton truck, 

the best while crews in another battalion at another 

camp considered it the worst. 1SG James Shreve, 

1041st Engineer Company (AFB) (WY NG) at FOB 

Speicher, summed it up best. “They prefer what they 

are the most familiar with.” This fact was important 

because for the most part, the chain of command 

dictated what platforms the convoys would use.7

By 2008, convoy escort units began receiving Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. TACOM 

reluctantly adopted the MRAP from South Africa until 

it could develop its own similar or better design. The 

seven MRAP designs with their signature V- shaped hulls 

to deflect mine blasts had been the innovation of the 

Rhodesian Army during their civil war in the 1960s. They 

were top heavy and could not take a turn faster than 25 

mph. They were good on level paved roads but some 

troops complained about them on uneven roads possibly 

rolling over and the suspension system made them 

ride like stage coaches and a bump in the road would 

Lead HET had the Rhino attached to the fron bumper. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
256 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

bounce the passengers off the ceiling of the vehicle. Its 

high profile provided great observation for the gunners 

and had the compartment space for all the electronics. 

It combined the best features of the 5 - ton gun truck 

and HMMWV.8 The most important feature was that 

the design deflected any mine blast away from the 

crew compartment. Units in Afghanistan liked the RG31 

because of the room to carry several soldiers although 

there was no need for such capacity in their mission. 

These were later replaced by the International MaxxPro.9

By 2008, the escort and truck companies had 

employed all the platforms, except the MRAP, long 

enough to thoroughly know what they liked. The 

main lesson was all escort units preferred a mix of 

capabilities, usually two types of gun truck platforms. 

The MRAP replaced all other escort vehicles. The key 

features looked for in an escort vehicle depended upon 

its function and place in the convoy. Lead and rear 

vehicles needed the advantage of height for observation 

and survivability against directional mines like the 

platter charge. The V- shaped hull was clearly a 

preferred feature for all trucks. 

In conclusion, there was no one platform, except 

possibly the MRAP, that possessed all the advantages 

needed in a convoy escort platform. Each had 

capabilities that were needed in the convoy. Survivability 

was probably the paramount concern of the crews for all 

vehicles. The key features looked for in an escort vehicle 

depended upon its function and place in the convoy. 

For lead and rear gun trucks, observation and fire power 

were next. The 5 - ton gun trucks, HETs and MRAPs 

provided the height advantage, but the ASV has the best 

long range optics at the cost of peripheral vision. The 

rear vehicle needed the capability to conduct escalation 

of force that included shining a laser or spotlight at the 

approaching vehicle, firing a warning shot in front of 

the approaching vehicle and, lastly, shoot through the 

vehicle. The 5 - ton and MRAP were probably the best 

vehicles for trail vehicle and the V- shaped hull was 

clearly a preferred feature for all trucks. There was a 

need for a few vehicles in the middle of the convoy with 

speed to race ahead to block traffic. The MRAP, ASV or 

HMMWV performed this role better. All vehicles needed 

the internal space to house the myriad of electronics 

that made up convoy operations and yet still allow 

soldiers in full body armor to move around and egress 

with ease. The open box design of Vietnam did not 

get a fair chance to prove its merit in Iraq, and neither 

did most gun trucks have more than one crew-served 

weapon. Many gun truck crews did not have a choice 

in what platform they received, and were not in the 

selection process. Clearly the senior leaders’ concerns 

were far different than those of the crew members, so 

future fielding of gun truck platforms should involve 

the crews, if possible, in their operational environment. 

Simply provide the gun truck crews with what is available 

and let them pick what works best.10

Weapons and Ammunition

The key feature to turn any vehicle into a gun truck was 

the crew- served weapon. What was missing from Iraq 

and Afghanistan were gun trucks with multiple crewserved weapons. Instead, the convoys fielded more 

platforms with single crew- served weapons. What these 

wars had in common was one weapon. From the Korean 

War to Iraq and Afghanistan, the preferred weapon of 

choice was the M2 .50 caliber machinegun over either 

the .30 caliber or later 7.62mm machineguns. Originally 

designed to target enemy vehicles and aircraft, the .50 

caliber intimidated the enemy more because it did not 

wound but literally blew a man apart if hit by it. Some 

gun trucks during the Vietnam War liked the 7.62mm 

mini - gun, which was a small caliber Gatling gun with 

an electric motor that had an incredibly high cyclic rate 

of fire of 2,000 to 6,000 rounds per minute. It was also 

very intimidating, but had a higher chance of misfire. In 

Vietnam, the gun truck crews preferred the most lethal 

weapons systems available, as well as the gun truck 

crews in Iraq, but senior commanders wanting to limit 

collateral damage in urban areas knew accidental killing 

of civilians can result in unintended consequences and 

sometimes preferred less lethal weapon systems. 

Escort units in 2005 often had a smaller caliber 

M249 SAW as a backup weapon when in urban areas 

since the .50 caliber could travel further and cause 

more collateral damage. The dual weapons systems 

were removed by the next year though. The next 

favorite weapon was the Mk19 automatic grenade 

launcher, which provided the escorts with an indirect 

fire weapon. The Vietnam War introduced the M79 and 

M203 grenade launcher, basically a handheld indirect 

fire weapon for the gun truck, which lobbed a 40mm 
Observations 257

grenade out to about 150 meters. This was the preferred 

weapon of the gun truck drivers, but the gunners would 

have loved the rapid fire and longer range of the Mk19 

automatic grenade launcher. It had a cyclic rate of 

fire of 325 to 375 rounds per minute and could throw 

rounds out to 2,023 meters with an effective range 

of 1,400 meters. It could hit targets hidden behind 

protective walls the M2 .50 caliber could not penetrate. 

As effective as it was in Iraq, MNC - I took it away from 

the escort companies in 2008 because of its potential 

collateral damage with civilians, especially in built -up 

areas. The A Company, 3 -144th Infantry Texas National 

Guard ambush on ASR Sword and the TK Ambush in 

Afghanistan reinforced the need for the Mk19 grenade 

launcher. In an effort to restrict collateral damage, 

commanders placed their convoys at risk in the event 

they ran into complex ambushes.

The Common Remote Operated Weapons Station 

(CROWS) was a remote controlled .50 caliber weapon 

system on top of the HMMWV fielded in limited quantities 

by 2005. Even though most gunners had plenty of video 

game experience, the CROWS was universally disliked 

because when the fighting was for real, the gunners 

preferred the wide peripheral vision and feel of the 

weapon in their hands rather than a 

joy stick. The one good feature liked about the CROWS 

was its thermal optics, but the crews preferred the 

short range thermal imagers (SRTI) that were 

becoming available in 2008.11

Artwork and Elan 

The Army of the Potomac was at a low state of morale 

when MG Joseph Hooker assumed command in January 

1863. He improved the diet, sanitation and supply of the 

Army and also authorized each corps to wear a distinctive 

insignia. All had an immediate effect on improving the 

sagging morale of the Army. During World War I, the 

US Army authorized divisional insignia and regimental 

crests in 1924. For a century and a half, the US Army 

has recognized that distinctive identification is a source 

of pride for soldiers. 

During the Vietnam War, the question of art work 

on gun trucks was an issue. Just as they have done 

with boats and planes, men have had a love affair with 

trucks and consequently have named them. After the 2 

September 1967 complex ambush in Vietnam, LTC John 

Burke, the acting commander of 8th Transportation 

Group until COL Joe Bellino arrived, directed each 

company to build gun trucks. Not all but many named 

them and stenciled the names in white letters on the 

sides of their truck. One of the first gun trucks named 

was Burke’s Law, which was a TV show at the time. 

When LTC Burke saw it, he decided to let the crews 

continue to stencil the names of their gun trucks on the 

side. In fact, Burke’s Law was named by SP4 Larry Hicks, 

in the 563rd Medium Truck Company, after his platoon 

sergeant also named Burke. Over the next year, the gun 

trucks remained olive green like the other trucks.

When COL Garland Ludy replaced Bellino as the 8th 

Group Commander in September 1968, the élan of the 

gun truck crews was increasing and consequently, they 

wanted their gun trucks to reflect it. However, Ludy forbid 

the crews to paint their gun trucks anything other than 

olive green and only stencil the names on the sides. Ludy 

wanted the gun trucks to look just like any other truck, so 

the enemy would not know which one was the gun truck 

or task vehicle. The difference, however, was blatantly 

obvious. In violation of Ludy’s policy, SGT Steve Calibro, 

of the 523rd Transportation Company, built a 5 - ton 

gun truck and had its name, Eve of Destruction, painted 

in Old English style white letters with the red shadow, 

and put it on the road on 4 July 1968. It is not certain 

whether the Eve was the first gun truck with elaborate 

artwork, but the day after Ludy gave up command, 

the paint brushes came out. Some crews even hired 

Vietnamese artists to paint the art work on the sides 

of their gun trucks. The artwork was reminiscent of the 

The eagle on the nose of the M915s belonged to the 

729th Transportation Company at Anaconda in 2005. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
258 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

nose art on WWII bombers. The trucks remained olive 

green but crews began to add varnish to the green to 

give it a darker hue so the truck would stand out more. 

Over time, the green became darker and darker until 

the crews just painted their gun trucks black and added 

bright color trim. The gun truck crews wanted the enemy 

to know they were coming and generally the enemy took 

out the gun truck first inspiring the belief the enemy 

had bounties on gun trucks. Because the Brutus, in 

the 359th POL Truck Company, was hit twice in a short 

span, November 1970 and February 1971, this led to the 

belief the Brutus had the highest bounty. This belief did 

not encourage the crews to hide their colors, but only 

added to the élan even more and helped recruit new 

crew members. Only the best and courageous drivers 

served on gun trucks in the 8th Group. The permanent 

gun truck crew members in the 500th Group had the 

same élan, but the two additional gunners were tasked 

from other units on Cam Ranh Bay. While the crews 

rotated through them, the gun trucks of Vietnam grew 

into legend enhanced by their names and artwork.

No surprise, the crews in Iraq had likewise named 

their gun trucks. At first units like the 459th Medium 

Truck scratched the names of their gun trucks on the 

side with chalk during the first year of the war, but this 

eventually gave way to paint. Because some units drew 

offensive slogans on the sides of their trucks, the official 

policy in Kuwait and Iraq was no artwork of any kind on 

vehicles, but National Guard and Army Reserve units 

cut stencils to paint unit logos on the doors of their 

trucks to show the pride of their state and unit. Senior 

commanders cast a blind eye to this at first since it 

made it easy for them to identify convoys while driving 

55 to 60 mph down the road. 

As a pattern, most crews did not name their 

HMMWVs, but tended to name their larger gun trucks 

and paint the names on the side. One exception was the 

Zebra. After his first ambush, 2LT James McCormick, of 

the 1487th Medium Truck Company in Kuwait during OIF 

II, wanted to paint his HMMWV in alternating black and 

tan tiger stripes so the enemy would know it was coming 

down the road. He wanted to instill fear in the enemy to 

cause them to leave his convoys alone. He had originally 

wanted to name his gun truck, the Raptor or Striped 

avenger, but his crew jokingly said it looked like a zebra 

and outvoted him. The Zebra was definitely recognizable 

and earned the reputation McCormick wanted it to. 

When he helped form the 518th Combat Gun Truck 

Company, they adopted the marshal’s star as their 

logo with the same idea. 

A story circulated during the OIF III rotation about 

one unit that painted the Punisher’s death head on their 

trucks to intimidate the enemy, but the unit had poor 

discipline and their convoys were hit so often as if the 

enemy waited for them to roll down the road. The unit 

took the art work off their trucks. In fact MNC - I made 

all units take art work off their trucks so the enemy could 

not tell the difference between tough alert convoys and 

weak ones, but the enemy could still tell. Nearly every 

unit arriving in theater was hit hard during its first 

month after arrival.

COL Jeff Miser, Commander of the 7th 

Transportation Group during its deployment to Kuwait 

from September 2004 to September 2005, disliked 

elitism and individuality. He did recognize the advantage 

of the unit logos but forbid any other artwork on the 

trucks. He also liked standardization and ordered all 

the 5 - ton gun trucks disassembled in his unit. His 

Command Sergeant Major, CSM Dwayne Perry, learned 

from the Iraqis they watched for identifying objects 

in trucks as reference points. For example, if a driver 

had fuzzy dice hanging from the mirror, the spotters 

could warn the ambushers where an ideal target was in 

relation to the truck with the fuzzy dice. So they forbid 

Centurion logo on M915s of the 424 Motor Truck 

Detachment (USAF) with artist, Sr Airman Jason Marquez, 

in 2006. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Observations 259

anything that made the trucks look different.

After a while, MNC - I and later Coalition Force Land 

Component Command (CFLCC) policy did not allow units 

could to even paint unit logos on the doors, because the 

enemy watched for weak units and the unit logos made 

their work easier. Eventually, the trucks even went so far 

as to removing the bumper numbers, and still the enemy 

knew which convoys were new. One thing for certain, 

the enemy watched and studied convoys like a predator 

searching for the weak prey. Convoys would pass through 

kill zones unmolested until the right one came through 

and then the enemy would spring the ambush. There 

were clearly visible things a convoy could do to avoid 

getting hit.

During the Vietnam War, LTC Orvil Metheny, 

Commander of the 6th Transportation Battalion from 

1968 to 1969, knew the enemy looked for the weakest 

convoy so he had his drivers wash their trucks every day 

and leave early to present an image of a disciplined unit. 

He understood the enemy would attack the weakest 

convoy. While the worst ambush during his tour involved 

the 7th Battalion, his convoys were ambushed four 

times during his tour.

A National Guard officer, during one of the early 

rotations into Iraq, had his drivers deliberately leave 

their trucks dirty so to give the enemy the impression 

his was a seasoned truck company rather than a brand 

new one. With the one - year unit rotation in Kuwait and 

Iraq, the enemy looked for new units and hammered 

them hard their first month in theater, until they learned 

to fight back.

From MG Hooker to the present day, distinctive 

uniform insignia has contributed to the pride of 

units which contributes to the fighting spirit. Similarly, 

distinctive art work on gun trucks clearly added to the 

élan of the crew, which historically has had a significant 

contribution to performance on the battlefield. The 

problem is that convoys become easily recognizable 

and the enemy will go after the weak ones; but as Iraq 

demonstrated, the enemy will identify the weak convoys 

regardless of taking away any identifiable markings. 

Size and Organization

Another doctrinal issue is convoy size and ratio of gun 

trucks to task vehicles. The organization and structure 

of the convoy depends upon the mission, enemy, 

troops, and terrain issues. History of convoy operations 

during the 19th century, Vietnam and Iraq, however, 

reinforces that a certain convoy organization works best. 

Nineteenth century doctrine interestingly divided large 

convoys into divisions of 100 vehicles further divided 

into sections (later termed march serials) of 20 to 30 

wagons separated by 30 to 40 yards. The 1914 Field 

Service Regulation that codified Army doctrine assigned 

an NCO as the wagon master (later convoy commander) 

for 20 to 30 wagons with 25 yards between these 

march serials. From wagons to trucks, convoys and 

march serials of 20 to 30 vehicles seemed the right size 

for security, command and control. In the absence of 

attacks, however, convoys during the early part of the 

Vietnam War and Iraq War grew to 100 vehicles lined 

up at 100 meter intervals. Ambushes, maintenance and 

load problems, and control issues would reduce the 

size of convoy serials during those wars and integrate 

gun trucks. The size of convoys and ratio of gun trucks 

should, therefore, become standardized into doctrine.

After the 2 September 1967 convoy ambush in 

Vietnam, the battalion commanders agreed to require 

each truck company to build gun trucks for self - defense, 

but left the design to the crews. The acting 8th Group 

Commander, LTC John Burke, established the doctrine 

of convoy organization and gun truck ratio, which started 

out with convoys divided into serials of ten task vehicles 

with a gun truck ratio of one -to-ten. After a year of 

experience, COL Ludy settled on convoy serials not to 

exceed 30 vehicles with a gun truck ratio still at oneto -ten with 20 -minute interval between serials. This 

seemed the most manageable size of convoy and had as 

Some soldier humor at LSA Anaconda in 2005.

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
260 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

many as three gun trucks. This would allow for one gun 

truck to escort the lead element of the convoy out of the 

kill zone to the safety of a security check point while the 

remaining two gun trucks and convoy commander’s gun 

jeep provided suppressive firepower in the kill zone. 

History did not record whether the 8th Group 

commanders came up with the ideas themselves or 

acted on suggestions from subordinates. During the first 

two years of the Iraq War, the development of gun truck 

technology and doctrine was a bottom- up approach, 

whereby the soldiers who rode in the convoys originated 

most of the good ideas and the battalion and group 

commanders implemented them. During this war, the 

author made a point to identify the authorship of the 

majority of good ideas and during the first couple years, 

the best ideas came from the ranks of staff sergeant to 

sergeant first class and warrant officers. 

During the first year of the war, it was not unusual 

to have convoys of 80 to 100 vehicles that stretched 

for miles. Consequently, convoy commanders in the 

lead of the convoy could not talk to the assistant 

convoy commander in the rear with the radios issued 

at the time. During the first year of the war, the 181st 

Transportation Battalion admitted it was the NCOs who 

came up with the recommendation convoy size not to 

exceed 30 vehicles with a gun truck ratio of one- tofive. SSG Walter “Tony” Floyd, of the 1-178th FA during 

2004 -2005, explained that a convoy of 20 normally had 

one maintenance or load problem that required a halt. 

Increasing the number of trucks increased the number 

of maintenance halts and consequently increased risk. 

Smaller convoys improved the chances of the convoy 

commander and his assistant at opposite ends of the 

convoy to talk on the radio and limited the time the local 

nationals had to wait for a convoy to pass through an 

intersection. With a 100 meter interval, a 30 -vehicle 

convoy would still stretch three kilometers 

(approximately two miles). 

After the April Uprising of 2004, BG James 

Chambers, the 13th COSCOM Commander, mandated 

this convoy size and gun truck ratio policy for any 

convoys north of Scania, essentially driving into the 

Sunni Triangle, and one -to - ten for convoys south of 

Scania. The reason for the difference was the 375th 

Transportation Group had to scrounge to even find 

enough gun trucks to meet the one-to - ten ratio, let 

alone the one - to -five, and all routine sustainment 

convoys handed off to Iraq - based escorts at Cedar, 

which was south of Scania. The threat south of Scania 

was mostly theft and Kuwait was always a lower priority 

to fielding of new gun truck technology. However, 

Common User Land Transportation (CULT) missions 

out of Kuwait delivered anything anywhere in Iraq and 

Kuwait- based convoys rarely had enough gun trucks add 

more than a one -to -ten ratio when traveling north of 

Scania. The shortage of escort platforms and personnel 

to man them was always an issue to fielding more gun 

trucks with the Transportation Group based in Kuwait.

The gun truck to task vehicle ratio was based upon 

escort vehicles and by 2005, the escorts usually came 

from a different company than the line haul trucks. 

Some commanders like LTC David Gaffney, Commander 

of the 457th Transportation Battalion at LSA Anaconda 

from 2004 to 2005, required the convoy commander 

and assistant convoy commander bring HMMWV gun 

trucks, which improved the ratio to closer to one -to - four. 

Clearly, the drivers wanted more gun trucks if they could 

field them, but the availability of gun trucks was always 

Two columns of M1151s awaiting their convoys at Tallil in 2007. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Operation Iraqi Freedom 261

the limiting factor on how many convoys the Kuwaitbased Transportation Group (and later Sustainment 

Brigade) could put on the road at any one time.

During the “Surge” of 2007, MNC - I increased the 

convoys from 20 to 30 vehicles and the number of gun 

trucks increased from four to six, because six gun trucks 

provided greater flexibility to organize the convoy. The 

Kuwait- based convoys also saw the use for an extra gun 

truck, but increased the number of prime haulers to 40 

in order to add the fourth gun truck. So those convoys 

still ran with the gun truck ratio of one -to - ten.12

The convoy ratio was significantly different in 

Afghanistan. By the summer of 2006, the US Army 

doubled the size of its brigades in Afghanistan 

without increasing the number of aviation brigades. 

Consequently, the Army began conducting ground convoy 

operations. Because of the threat and lack of a quick 

reaction force, the gun truck ratio started out at one -

to - one but by 2009 decreased to one - to - two. This still 

did not deter the enemy from ambushing convoys as 

illustrated by the TK Ambush on 29 July 2009. Ground 

convoys were not the primary means of distribution in 

Afghanistan so the convoys remained small allowing 

for a better gun truck ratio.

Studies of both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars concurred 

that no convoy or march serial should exceed 30 

vehicles. This did not stop replacement Transportation 

Group in Kuwait from trying to field 80 to 100 - vehicle 

convoys, but they relearned the same lessons as their 

predecessors. The convoy interval reduces vulnerability 

by preventing vehicles from bunching up. Throughout 

the 20th century, combat and logistics units agreed that 

a 100 - meter interval on the open terrain and 50 meters 

in urban areas are ideal to reduce the number of vehicles 

in the kill zone and still maintain control. This was 

consistent with the convoy interval during the 

Vietnam War.

The main difference between the lessons of the 

Vietnam, Iraq and Afghan Wars was the gun truck ratio, 

and the question was whether the ratio applied to vehicle 

or number of crew- served weapons. A Vietnam gun 

truck had three -to-four crew - served weapons while 

an Iraq or Afghan War gun truck only had one. So the 

weapon ratio in a Vietnam convoy was more like one -

to - three, as compared to the one - to - five with an Iraq 

War convoy or one - to - two in Afghanistan. This matched 

with the one - to - three weapon ratio of ring mounted 

machineguns during the Korean War. Because convoy 

serials in Vietnam traveled about five minutes apart, the 

gun trucks from one serial could quickly reinforce the 

other, combining five gun trucks in a kill zone with as 

many as 15 to 20 crew - served weapons. As far as how 

many machineguns a gun truck needs, one should ask if 

caught in a kill zone how many machineguns would one 

want? The answer should as many as possible. Most 

ambushes in Vietnam ended when either the tanks or 

APCs arrived from the security check point or five gun 

trucks gathered into the kill zone. The lesson of the 

Vietnam ambushes was that overwhelming fire power 

ended the fight. As a minimum, a convoy should have 

one - to - ten ratio of gun trucks to task vehicles, one -

to - three is more ideal, and one - to - one is best. Since 

the purpose of the gun trucks is to provide immediate 

security until the nearest combat force can take over the 

fight, the ratio depend a lot on the threat and availability 

of a quick reaction force. 

Organization of the convoy and placement of the 

gun trucks varied depending upon the enemy tactics 

so this was more of a technique, but generally their 

placement should be front, center and rear, but more 

than three gun trucks offers variety. The author found 

two examples of “super convoys” in Iraq. Super convoys 

consisted of several convoys combined as march serials 

into one large convoy, which provided a much greater 

combat capability.

During the Indian Wars when convoys rolled across 

the vast open prairie or desert, they had an advance 

guard usually consisting of a small cavalry company 

to search for any possible ambush, the main body 

escorted by either infantry or cavalry to defend the 

convoy, and a rear guard to react to any threat from the 

flank or rear. Often, Indian scouts screened the front 

and flanks for enemy scouts, and followed behind to 

police up the rear. This convoy had to be self-contained 

because of the absence of any other support as the 

convoy advanced from outpost to outpost. In a modern 

operating environment, the different branches of the 

Army provided the three organizations of a convoy. The 

MPs provided route security, which operated similar 

to the advance guard while the Engineer sweep teams 

searched for mines and explosives along the route. The 

gun trucks provided the internal security to the main 
262 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

body. The combat arms provided the quick reaction force 

similar to the rear guard depending upon how fast they 

could respond to an attack. The war in Iraq provided 

some refinements to this convoy structure.

LTC William H. Adams, Commander of the 143rd 

Combat Suustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) at 

Camp Speicher, Iraq, realized that convoy operations 

were combat operations, and second, he knew that the 

role of his staff was to provide the convoys everything 

the convoy needed, but not control them. LTC Adams 

instructed his S3, CPT Cory Olmstead, “Cory, what can 

we bring to the fight to help the soldiers?” Right after 

the battalion completed its transfer of authority (TOA) 

on 14 September 2006 and before the old companies 

departed, LTC Adams and CPT Olmstead held a meeting 

with all the convoy commanders and asked what they 

needed. They wanted aviation support, to move during 

the day, get the roads cleared of IEDs, and an offensive 

mindset from the top down.13 

CPT Olmstead then did a lot of leg work to find 

air support. First he walked over to the 82nd Aviation 

Brigade and asked for support. They informed him they 

were direct support (DS) aviation to the ground combat 

troops and recommended he find the general support 

(GS) aviation. He located the 25th Combat Aviation 

Brigade (CAB) which had OH58Ds and could provide 

general support to the convoys. In fact they did not have 

very many missions and were waiting for work. So Cory 

talked captain-to - captain and picked up nearly daily 

aviation support for his convoys. They only flew a window 

of five hours so they could not cover every mission. 

CPT Todd Minarich arrived in Balad, Iraq with the 

1034th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion in 2006 

and similarly asked for Apache escorts for his convoys. 

It just seemed logical and worked. It was not always 

available due to other missions, but when it was, no 

convoy was hit by anything other than a victim 

detonated IED.

This was important because the author had 

proposed to the 457th Transportation Battalion back in 

March 2005 because the lesson from Vietnam was that 

any convoy that ran with air cover of any kind did not get 

hit, but LTC Gaffney turned it down. Probably because 

there was a shortage of aviation assets in Iraq, no unit 

asked for routine air cover until late 2006. To everyone’s 

pleasant surprise, convoys with air cover did not even 

get hit by IEDs. Evidently the trigger men had watched 

all the infrared videos of helicopters killing enemy in 

the night and feared ending up as “thermal splatter” 

on some Youtube video. This success created a 

demand for air cover by other units.14

CPT Olmstead also tried to coordinate support with 

the battle space owner, but the battle captains of the 

82nd Airborne Division said their units were too busy. 

Cory still wanted to provide some kind of overwatch and 

offensive capability. So instead he considered using his 

D Troop, 4th Cavalry in this role. Because of the shortage 

of assets, the cavalry escorted convoys continuously 

with little down time. CPT Olmstead and LTC Adams 

realized a convoy was a combat maneuver element.15

CPT Olmstead then talked to the 1st Engineers 

that provided the time and place where they conducted 

their IED sweeps. He then scheduled the convoys to 

depart right behind the EID sweeps. This would reduce 

the opportunity of any Iraqi setting up an IED between 

the time the Engineer sweep team passed and convoy 

arrived. It did require the convoys to travel at a slower 

pace. CPT Olmstead also started attending the Target 

Areas of Interest (TAI) meetings to predict most likely 

areas the convoys would get hit.16

CPT Olmstead then combined the convoys for the 

night into what he called “super convoys” or “mutually 

supported convoys.” It consisted of three or more 

regular 30 - vehicle convoys with their separate convoy 

commanders under the overall supervision of a platoon 

leader. Each march serial was separated by a 5 to 15 

minute interval following about 15 minutes behind the 

Engineer sweep team. In the event any element was 

ambushed, the gun trucks from another could converge 

in the kill zone and maximize fire power as gun trucks 

had done during the Vietnam War.17

Because Coalition Force Land Component 

Command, 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) 

(the term for the former Corps Support Command) 

and civilian contract convoys required a specific ratio 

of gun trucks to task vehicle, most convoys rolled with 

the bare minimum. This left them little flexibility to drop 

gun trucks off to respond to problems and still permit 

the convoy to continue on to its destination. If a convoy 

halted to detain a couple of kids digging alongside the 

road or wait for the medevac and vehicle recovery teams 

to relieve them of their casualties or damaged vehicles 
Observations 263

(which happened on a convoy the author rode on), it had 

a long wait. Any time a convoy halted on a road in Iraq it 

became vulnerable to attack. Most of the ambushes the 

author studied during his 2007 trip to Iraq were hasty 

ambushes that took place after a convoy had delayed for 

about 20 minutes. So had the 143rd CSSB added extra 

gun trucks in the convoy, they could have waited for the 

relief of detainees or wounded while the convoy rolled 

on to its destination behind the Engineer sweep team. 

Another battalion out west, however, did come up with a 

concept for a completely self-sustained super convoy.18

After the April Uprising of 2004, BG James 

Chambers, 13th COSCOM Commander, had opened 

up the western route by the end of the year to bring 

in supplies from Jordan so as not to depend upon a 

single supply line out of Kuwait. He established an 

escort battalion at Al Asaad in the Anbar Province of 

Western Iraq. Since there were no forward operating 

bases (FOB) to provide infantry or MP support along 

the western route, the convoy had to take its own route 

reconnaissance, recovery and quick reaction force (QRF). 

The 1-133rd Infantry (IA NG) arrived in March 2006 

and organized the escort mission to the Jordanian border 

into three elements. The Forward Security Element (FSE) 

consisted of six gun trucks and sometimes an LMTV 

5 -ton cargo truck. The main body escort had up to 200 

contract trucks divided into two serials of 100 vehicles 

per serial each with the mandatory one -to - ten gun truck 

ratio. The 133rd Infantry averaged about 133 commodity 

trucks and the 2- 504th, which replaced it on 11 July 

2007, averaged about 169 but had escorted as many 

as 226 commodity trucks. Each convoy required two 

separate companies to escort the serials. Since there 

was no battle space owner, the convoy had to provide its 

own quick reaction force (QRF), a maneuver force that 

consisted of three recovery vehicles escorted by six gun 

trucks. The 2 - 504th changed it to six gun trucks under 

one platoon leader, and the recovery team consisted of 

the command and control element, a recovery section of 

three gun trucks, one PLS truck and one recovery vehicle. 

The 2- 504th preferred to load any disabled vehicle on a 

PLS ruck since the distances they traveled were too long 

to tow a vehicle. Consequently, the entire convoy could 

stretch 30 to 50 kilometers.19

The first leg of the four- day cycle drove 225 miles 

and took 10 to 14 hours to reach Camp Korean Village 

(CKV). CKV was a forward camp with six soldiers from the 

battalion: intelligence analysts and operations analysts 

to provide the latest intelligence under the direction of 

an officer. The 1-133rd Infantry placed a major in charge 

of the team because their battalion had an excess of 

majors, but the 2- 504th put a captain in charge. The 

battalion also added a five -man maintenance team to fix 

any mechanical problems on the convoy. On Day 2, the 

convoy drove along ASR Mobile to Trebil on the border to 

pick up loaded trucks, drop off empties and then return 

to CKV. The 118 - mile round trip took three hours and 

45 minutes. The border inspections, however, caused 

delays. There was a nine-soldier quality assurance team 

to inspect the contract trucks to make sure the vehicles 

were mechanically sound enough to complete the entire 

trip. On Day 3, the convoy returned but at the “TQ Split” 

one half the convoy headed back to Al Asaad, completing 

a three-day mission, and the other half with half the 

escorts and the recovery team headed down ASR Long 

Island to al Taqaddum (TQ), a 236 - mile journey that took 

an average driving time of three hours and 45 minutes to 

complete. On Day 4, the last convoy returned to Al Asaad 

completing the journey in four hours and 53 minutes. 

The reason the return trip took so long is that they drove 

down ASR Uranium, an unimproved road. The convoys 

took this route because ASR Bronze passed 

through towns.20

Essentially, the 133rd Infantry had reinvented the 

19th century convoy organization with the advance 

guard (route security), main body and rear guard (QRF). 

The air cover of the 143rd CSSB filled the role of the 

Indian scouts screening out around the convoy. So even 

though the MPs have doctrinal responsibility for route 

security and the combat arms has reasonability for rear 

area security which includes the quick reaction force and 

recovery, if neither is available then the convoy should 

provide its own. The advance guard should consist of 

vehicles that can accelerate rapidly to screen the road 

ahead to identify potential problems in order to give the 

convoy commander time to properly react. In the event 

the convoy is hit, the route security can either provide 

security for the rally point or provide a reaction force 

to the front part of the convoy. Doctrinally, a gun truck 

should never be sent out alone. So gun trucks should, as 

a minimum, work in pairs so that if one is disabled, the 

other can secure it. The Raven 42 route security element 
264 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

during the Palm Sunday Ambush effectively operated in 

a team of three HMMWV gun trucks. The same with the 

two gun trucks of the 178 Route Security Element (RSE) 

during the ASR Heart Firefight. While the organization of 

the main body of a convoy seemed simple enough with 

march serials not exceeding 30 vehicles with a minimum 

gun truck ratio of one - to - ten, the scout element and 

rear guard needed more explanation.

Scouting

In 2003, the 181st Transportation Battalion at 

Anaconda, Iraq initially adopted the Rat Patrol/Tiger 

Team concept developed by MAJ Dean Dominique in 

that two gun trucks would scout out ahead of a convoy 

looking for ambushes and blocking traffic, the inspiration 

for future convoy scout teams. By April 2004, the 7th 

Transportation Battalion had improved on the 181st 

Transportation Battalion’s convoy doctrine by reducing 

the size of convoys to less than 30 vehicles and 

increasing the number of gun trucks to five for a one -

to - five gun truck to task vehicle ratio and, ideally, one -

to - four. This moved the gun trucks to the main body 

of the convoy where they were evenly spaced out very 

similar to the Vietnam doctrine.21

By 2006, battalions across Iraq began pushing 

out the lead gun truck, often called the “rat,” as a 

scout vehicle. Kuwait- based battalions, with fewer gun 

trucks, realized that bigger trucks were more survivable, 

especially the HET, and pushed them out ahead as the 

lead vehicle looking to initiate or discover the IED or 

ambush. The second vehicle was the “pace” vehicle 

which set the pace for the rest of the convoy. After the 

start of the “Surge” in 2006, MNC - I increased the size 

of the convoys to add six gun trucks, they initially spaced 

them evenly throughout the convoy. The primary threat 

became energy formed projectile (EFP) so the enemy 

then began targeting the lead gun trucks. In response, 

convoys placed two gun trucks up front so the second 

could provide security for the first in the event it was hit. 

In March 2007, the enemy hit the “pace” gun truck to 

see what the scout gun truck would do. Realizing it would 

drive down the road alone to provide security for the 

rally point, the enemy then set up a secondary kill zone 

for the lead gun truck. So the convoys added a third gun 

truck to the front: two scouts and one pace. This way, 

two gun trucks could run forward as a team to establish 

the rally point. The enemy then shifted their attacks to 

the last gun truck and the Iraq - based convoys, because 

of their higher gun truck ratio, moved a second gun truck 

to the rear of the convoy. Essentially, the convoys were 

creating an advance and rear guard but at the expense 

of security for the main body.22

LTC Chris Croft’s 106th Transportation Battalion, 

which assumed the convoy escort mission at Anaconda 

in 2007, also sent out a small overwatch element a 

short distance ahead of the convoy with great success 

in disrupting up the enemy’s ambush, but his brigade 

commander later disapproved of sending it out as a 

separate overwatch element. LTC Croft instilled an 

offensive mindset resulting in the innovation of a 

number of concepts. A Company, 3 -144th Infantry (TX 

NG) developed a unique concept for convoy security - 

snipers. Knowing the battle space owner did not have 

the resources to defend every inch of the supply routes, 

the infantry company proposed sending out a sniper 

team ahead to overwatch the most likely areas they 

would be hit. Unfortunately, the brigade commander 

did not permit the 106th Battalion to send out any gun 

trucks ahead of the convoys, so the infantry integrated 

snipers into their convoys. They were still successfully 

able to spot and kill an IED trigger man. Snipers, when 

appropriately employed, provided a tremendous combat 

multiplier. The use of air support increased and convoys 

that had some form of air support flying overhead usually 

did not get hit. Just as during the Vietnam War, the 

enemy seemed to fear being seen and hit from the air.23

By 2008, after the success of the “Surge,” nearly all 

convoys north of the Iraqi - border returned to only two 

gun trucks up front. With the route between Anaconda 

and Tikrit a the major hotspot, convoys running north 

reverted back to the Tiger Team concept where the 

two lead gun trucks acted as scouts, one providing 

overwatch while the lead gun truck scouted most likely 

ambush areas. This was very similar to the point- man 

team in the infantry in Vietnam. The point man searched 

for trip wires and signs of ambushes from eye level 

down, while his “slack” searched eyelevel and above as 

well as kept the pace count and direction. Kuwait-based 

convoys put a HET followed by a HMMWV gun truck up 

front. The lead HET was similar to the point man out 

front searching for the enemy. The gun truck behind it 

with the MTS was similar to the slack man or compass 
Observations 265

man. It also protected the lead vehicle in case it was hit. 

The lead task vehicle in the convoy was the pace setter, 

which was the same as the pace man in a patrol. The 

rest of the convoy was organized just like a patrol also 

with the patrol leader, aid and litter team, landing zone 

party and assistant patrol leader. Convoys were 

combat operations.

Military convoys in Afghanistan employed a slightly 

different method with the two lead gun trucks. The lead 

scout vehicle would patrol ahead of the slower moving 

convoy and scout to the next terrain feature where it 

would wait in an overwatch position until the lead gun 

truck of the main body came within sight and then it 

would bound to the next terrain feature, using what 

the mechanized infantry referred to as the traveling 

overwatch movement technique. Essentially, the same 

methods that have worked for the dismounted infantry or 

cavalry heading down a trail in column formation work for 

convoys. Generally the crews of the scout vehicles were 

the best of the units.

The most successful scouts were those that were the 

best at spotting IEDs or ambushes before their convoys 

entered the kill zone. The author discovered two such 

units throughout the war; the 1032nd Transportation 

Company (VA NG) during OIF 1 and the 799th 

Maintenance Company during OIF 3. The common factor 

in each scout element was their degree of situational 

awareness. SFC Kelvin B. Davenport, 1032nd, was in 

law enforcement by profession. When tasked to form a 

scout element, he selected men with law enforcement 

backgrounds or proven good judgment under fire. The 

trait he was looking for was situational awareness; men 

who could identify trouble merely by body language 

of the pedestrians.24

Similarly, SFC John A. Wolitski, 799th Maintenance 

Company 2005 to 2006, also served in law enforcement 

by profession. Surprisingly, he did not select his scouts 

from soldiers with law enforcement experience, but from 

soldiers with good situational awareness during the IED 

lane training and soldiers who had demonstrated good 

decision making abilities. Wolitski’s scouts roamed 

1,500 to 2,000 meters ahead of the convoy, which 

would give the convoy time to stop and still maintain its 

proper interval. He bragged that his convoys were never 

hit while others in MND - West were. The lesson is that 

the scout elements should not come from any particular 

branch, but individuals who go through selection and 

training by civilian law enforcement, with added training 

in identification of IEDs and ambushes.25

Conversely the mission of the lead HET was to set 

off IEDs and was a position of great responsibility, risk 

and pride since only a few drivers wanted the job. SPC 

Wesley Rhoads boasted he earned the position of lead 

HET driver because he was the best HET driver in the 

24th Transportation Company during 2007 and 2008. 

He took great pride in driving the lead HET. SGT Dan 

Snyder had been his truck commander and was on 

his third tour driving in Iraq. Everyone has their limit of 

combat, IEDs or fights. It is a magical number that no 

one knows until they reach it and then they are done. 

SGT Snyder reached his limit of IEDs on the night of 19 

September 2007 when his HET was hit by an IED driving 

into Tikrit and another driving out. Two IEDs in one night 

was enough for him so he returned to driving a truck in 

the main body of the convoy. Rhoads kept driving until 

he shot his mouth off to his convoy commander and 

was busted back to driving for the convoy commander. 

Driving for the convoy commander was usually reward 

for being a good driver, but in this case it was Rhoads’ 

punishment. For many drivers being assigned to the 

lead HET would have been punishment, but for Rhoads 

it would have been his reward. One driver’s reward 

could be another’s punishment.26

Rear Guard

During the Vietnam War, the minimum trail party 

consisted of a maintenance or recovery vehicle, gun 

truck and command and control vehicle. Recovery 

vehicles could have been either a wrecker or bobtail. 

After a while, the maintenance vehicle was replaced by a 

maintenance gun truck that carried spare tires, batteries 

and belts to make quick repairs on the spot. Recovery, 

security, and command and control were also the three 

main elements the 133rd had identified it needed in 

its rear guard. Most convoys in Iraq, similar to Vietnam, 

just had the minimum, a gun truck, some bobtails for 

recovery and maybe a command and control vehicle.

At best, the rear guard should consist of a reaction 

force that can reinforce the main body and possibly flank 

the enemy. That is why it travels a safe distance behind 

the convoy. There were a couple of times during the 

Vietnam War where the security force had responded to 
266 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

a decoy ambush but were in a position to more rapidly 

respond to the main ambush. The rear guard can either 

be gun trucks or tactical wheeled vehicles. Gun trucks 

are restricted to the roads and have limited avenues with 

which to flank the ambush while dismounted infantry 

or tactical wheeled vehicles can do this over a greater 

variety of terrain. There is an inherent danger of the rear 

guard consisting of infantry riding in unarmored cargo 

trucks if the enemy is looking for an increased body 

count. The infantry passengers would provide the enemy 

a better target than the cargo or fuel trucks. The infantry, 

however, provide an ability to dismount and flank the 

enemy using terrain. They do not need to stay with the 

convoy once they had dismounted. The US Marine Corps 

preferred to have tanks and infantry mounted in cargo 

trucks escort their convoys during the Vietnam War. 

Historically, the truck companies in the Army have had 

to resort to internal gun trucks because there has never 

been enough infantry to go around and most infantry 

commanders prefer to hunt for the enemy rather than 

defend convoys.

Part of what has held up the official establishment 

of any doctrine on convoy security was the inability of 

everyone to agree on a doctrine. The answer to the two 

key issues of internal versus external escorts, or passive 

and aggressive tactics were actually related. While some 

claimed the purpose of the gun truck was to just get 

the convoy out of the kill zone and defend any disabled 

vehicles in the kill zone; others believed that unless the 

gun truck made the enemy pay a price for ambushing 

the convoy, they would have no incentive to stop. The 

answer was actually both tactics work. The problem 

has been looking at the escort as just one element 

instead of three: scout, main body, and a follow-on 

maneuver element. The main body should employ 

passive tactics while the maneuver elements employ 

aggressive tactics.27

To understand the need for three elements within 

a convoy, one must understand the frustration convoys 

had with the battle space owners. The maneuver unit 

that has had responsibility for the battle space the 

convoys passed through has also had responsibility to 

defend the routes. Because there were just not enough 

maneuver assets for the battle space owner to cover 

everything, the enemy tended to attack in areas not 

covered. Convoy commanders also admitted they tended 

to get hit by IEDs in the same locations with great 

regularity. Some commanders, of groups and battalions 

responsible for convoy operations, also expressed the 

lack of support by the battle space owner to defend the 

main and alternate supply routes. Those that expressed 

success in getting the battle space owner to move his 

forces to the areas of attacks have done it by showing 

clear patterns of attacks on convoys in those areas. 

That meant the convoys had to be attacked 

several times in the same area before the combat arms 

repositioned their limited resources to defend the area. 

The enemy then just picked another unguarded section 

of the route to attack. Consequently, it would be more 

economical to provide the convoys a maneuver element 

of their own, allowing them the offensive capability to 

fight or fix the enemy until the nearest quick reaction 

force arrives.28

One officer came up with various option for mixing 

these elements. After the 734th Transportation Battalion 

assumed responsibility for convoy escort out of LSA 

Anaconda in September 2006, CPT Nicholas M. Breen, 

the 734th Transportation Battalion support plans officer, 

met with CPT Sandor, commander of outgoing C Battery, 

1-17th Field Artillery; CPT Matt Snell, Commander of 

B Company, 1-16th Infantry; and CPT Carta, 1-34th 

Brigade Combat Team that the 1-133rd Infantry fell 

under, to discuss the idea of a maneuver element 

shadowing the main body of convoys. CPT Breen (TC), 

a former cavalry officer, called the concept, “Roving 

Shadows,” because each follow- on maneuver element 

would follow a convoy like its shadow. Their idea would 

beef-up the lead element of three to four vehicles 

serving as scouts with another force serving as the rear 

guard. By then, most units just pushed one gun truck out 

forward as a scout. The idea was that each forward and 

trail element could act as a separate maneuver force 

able to attack and flank any ambushers while the gun 

trucks defending the main body could focus on clearing 

the kill zone. These officers believed that just returning 

fire and clearing the kill zone was not discouraging the 

enemy from attacking convoys. CPT Breen refined the 

idea into three courses of action based upon availability 

of resources.29

 - COA 1 was to attach a shadow element to all 

convoys. This, of course, was the ideal situation providing 
Observations 267

each convoy a maneuver capability. However, it required 

additional personnel and gun trucks. This was actually 

the way convoys were conducted during the Indian Wars. 

The troopers of Troop D, 4th Cavalry had also pressed 

this idea of a maneuver element with their higher, the 

143rd CSSB.30

- COA 2 was to attach shadow elements to random 

convoys. This was an economy of force option, if there 

were not enough shadow forces to follow each convoy. 

Raven 42 of the 617th MP Company employed this 

concept during the Palm Sunday Ambush on 20 March 

2005. The MPs, who normally patrolled this sector of 

road, were shadowing a southbound convoy down ASR 

Detroit when about 50 Iraqi insurgents ambushed the 

southbound convoy and a northbound convoy. The worst 

case scenario occurred and both convoys stopped in 

the kill zone. Although both of the convoys had their own 

escorts of three gun trucks each, they were committed 

to defending the halted convoys. The enemy had every 

intention of capturing drivers as they had a year before 

during the Good Friday Ambush of the 724th POL on 

9 April 2004. The turning point in the battle came when 

the three MP HMMWV gun trucks raced into the kill 

zone and flanked the enemy by turning down an access 

road. The combination of passive and aggressive tactics 

resulted in 26 enemy killed and six wounded.31

- COA 3 proposed to establish roving patrols in 

known areas of interest. This was another economy 

of force option in which there were only a few shadow 

elements. This was very similar to the route security 

element (RSE) started by the 106th Transportation 

Battalion on 1 January 2005, as a result of increased 

enemy activity just across the Iraq - Kuwait border. While 

this area belonged to the British sector, they did not have 

the resources to patrol the area closest to the border. 

Consequently, the 106th Battalion Commander, LTC 

James Sagen, formed the RSE out of veterans of the 

518th Gun Truck Company and had it patrol the route his 

convoys traveled. The RSE uncovered several planned 

ambushes and disrupted a number of attempted 

hijackings. On 30 January 2005, a northbound HET 

convoy halted, due to a number of flat tires caused by 

road spikes, near the overpass where the RSE set up on 

overwatch. The convoy then came under attack, and the 

RSE raced to render additional fire power. The convoy 

returned fire, and once it had all its personnel accounted 

for it departed. The RSE returned to the overwatch 

position on the bridge. A short while later, the RSE came 

under attack by Iraqis approaching up the on-ramp. The 

RSE then overwhelmed the attacking force and captured 

nine Iraqis. A platoon - sized British quick reaction force 

from the 2nd Prince of Wales Regiment arrived just 

before more Iraqis attacked. As the combined force of 

eight tactical vehicles defended the on- ramp, some 

Iraqis maneuvered to the high ground. At that time the 

RSE’s quick reaction force arrived on the high ground 

thus flanking the enemy. The forces increased piecemeal until the British reinforced with a company. The 

combined RSE and British quick reaction force provided 

the base of fire, while the British Armored Company 

assaulted the flank. This severe punishment of enemy 

aggression ended the threat of complex ambushes near 

the Kuwaiti border for a long time, and the replacing 

battalions continued the route security element. 

Neither course of action was accepted.32

Nearly every branch of the US Army, including 

the US Air Force, provided companies as “in lieu of” 

truck companies, and every branch had a different 

culture making some better for different missions. 

CPT Olmstead wanted to use Troop D, 4th Cavalry as 

the maneuver force. In March 2007, the author observed 

cavalry units serving as escort companies for the first 

time. The combat arms units that served as escorts 

complained the most about not being allowed to go 

after the enemy. They had to be reminded that their 

mission was to get the convoy to its destination and 

not close with and destroy the enemy. The cavalry, 

unlike the infantry, were primarily a mounted force. 

While they may dismount to fight, they would always 

come back to their vehicles. Route clearance was 

part of the Cavalry’s mission.33

Troop D, 4th Cavalry served as convoy escorts, 

but chomped at the bit to take the offensive. After an 

IED detonated, 1LT Ed Pluciennik took his gun trucks 

and cordoned off a building that he was convinced the 

spotter/trigger man was hiding in. He turned the area 

over to the quick reaction force who then captured the 

trigger man. Pluciennik admitted the best gun truck 

escort for the main body should be truck drivers, since 

they know what trucks can do. Likewise he claimed 
268 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

the cavalry was probably the best unit to serve as 

the maneuver element because this was more in 

line with their mission. The cavalry was definitely the 

better maneuver element for the open desert, but an 

augmentation of infantry would be better for urban 

environments. In this case, either Strykers or LLNL 

gun boxes would make good insertion platforms 

for the infantry accompanying convoys.34

A conclusion was that convoy escorts for the main 

body should employ passive tactics and clear the kill 

zone while the rear guard, which shadows the convoy, 

employs aggressive tactics to punish the enemy. Since 

school trained drivers (88M) better understand the 

capabilities of the trucks in the convoy and have a loyalty 

to the other drivers, convoy commanders prefer internal 

escorts, who belong to their companies, for the main 

body. The advance and rear guard should come from 

the infantry and cavalry. 

Any progress toward this convoy organization 

seemed limited by the availability of gun truck assets 

and the reluctance of senior commanders with a 

defensive mindset. After the Palm Sunday Ambush 

of March 2005, the battlefield threat did not require 

an offensive mindset; and with increased armor, the 

defensive tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) 

seemed to suffice against the increasing IED threat. 

However, the defensive mindset would not be sufficient 

to counter ambushes like those convoys faced on 

Good Friday, 2004.35

Command, control and communication unity of 

command is paramount, but throughout history there 

has been a separate convoy commander and escort 

commander. So who does history say has authority 

over both? During the 19th century, the escort 

commander had overall responsibility. There was no 

separate Quartermaster branch so Quartermaster 

officers were merely line officers detailed to the position 

and most tactical commanders had experience with 

wagon transportation. With the exception of the 48th 

Transportation Group in Long Binh during the Vietnam 

War, there was no separate escort commander since 

the gun trucks fell under the control of the convoy 

commander. Since the 48th Transportation Group 

initially did not allow gun trucks, their convoys depended 

upon the combat maneuver units in the area for convoy 

security. A 1971 report had the provost marshal flying 

overhead responsible for convoy security until the 

maneuver unit arrived and then it took control of the 

convoy in case of an ambush. The problem arose during 

the war in Iraq where the convoy commander and 

escorts came from different units. Generally the convoy 

commander had control of the convoy until it made 

contact with the enemy and then the escort commander 

took over. The Palm Sunday Ambush is a good example 

of no battle handoff and consequently the convoy sat 

in the kill zone for 20 minutes before trucks started 

moving. The best person take command of the convoy is 

the one who understands the mission better depending 

upon the situation, but this has to be agreed upon either 

by policy or not before the convoy takes the road.

Because most combat maneuver commanders do 

not understand the capabilities and limitations of most 

of the vehicles in the convoy and think in terms of closing 

with and destroying the enemy, the transportation officer 

or NCO should have authority over both the convoy 

and its escort. This has been a tough pill for field grade 

officers of the combat arms units to swallow, but too 

many problems have arisen with combat arms escorts 

during OIF. For various reasons, they tended to leave 

the convoys unprotected when contact was made with 

the enemy. The combat maneuver vehicles tend to 

drive slowly when they should drive faster. When the 

two commands worked together for the common goal 

of protecting the convoy all the way to its destination, 

they were usually successful. For example the convoy 

commanders praised the support of the US Marines 

during the April Uprising of 2004. The key to maneuver 

commanders taking command of the convoy is knowing 

the capabilities and limitations of the vehicles in the 

convoy and never forgetting their mission is to deliver 

the cargo, not fight the enemy.

To successfully maneuver in a kill zone, elements 

need to be able to communicate. During the Vietnam 

War, it took about a year to get radios for every gun 

truck. Lucky convoy commanders had two radios, one 

to talk with the security force defending the road and 

another to talk with the gun trucks. The lesson of every 

contingency or war after Vietnam was that every truck 

needed some form of communications. 

By the April Uprising in 2004, this came close 

to a reality. There was an unintended consequence 

of this though. Without truck drivers trained in radio 
Observations 269

discipline or combat terminology, the different networks 

became cluttered with noise and the commanders 

became overwhelmed with processing the high volume 

of information. During the Palm Sunday Ambush on 20 

March 2005, the convoy commander was not able to 

talk with his subordinates because of the excited drivers 

talking on the radio. By 2005, most convoy commanders 

had double stacked SINCGARS radios, one to talk with 

the military drivers and escort and the Sheriff net to 

talk with the units responsible for support in the area 

of operation. They also had either a Citizen Band (CB) 

or Motorola radios to talk with the contract drivers and 

an internal head set to talk with the crew of their gun 

trucks. Over the next few years, the Army issued all 

trucks radios. During an ambush, this could easily result 

in information overload. During the ambush of 20 April 

1971, 2LT Jim Baird kept his radio transmissions brief 

telling the gun trucks only what they needed to know. He 

had total confidence that they would do the right thing. 

He only spoke one more time upon the arrival of the 

gun truck, King Kong to inform the crew that the enemy 

had infiltrated the ditch near him. Since convoys have 

become combat operations, every truck needs radios to 

synchronize activity during an ambush. Convoy personnel 

also need the same training in radio discipline as their 

maneuver counterparts. 

Internal or External Gun Trucks

During the Vietnam War, most truck companies kept 

their gun trucks internal to the company. They operated 

on the premise that no one would defend a truck driver 

better than another truck driver, especially when the gun 

truck crews had to return to the same barracks as the 

men they escorted. In some cases, the Vietnam truck 

companies might consolidate the gun trucks into a single 

platoon, but they still remained in the company. The 

8th Transportation Group once consolidated gun trucks 

into a single company but quickly went back to internal 

gun trucks. The 48th Transportation Group at Long Binh 

was the last motor transport group to adopt gun trucks 

and consolidated theirs into a single gun truck company 

during the last two years of the war.

During the second Gulf War, gun trucks were often 

consolidated into escort companies for standardization 

of platforms, standard operating procedures (SOP), 

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and 

simplification of training and maintenance. This way the 

maintenance was reduced to one type of task vehicle 

and command and control vehicles. In the effort to 

reduce the simplicity of command responsibility by 

consolidating gun trucks into escort companies, 

there was an unforeseen risk. 

Whether by design or by accident, convoy security 

was taken from Transportation Corps units and 

given to the Infantry, Armor, Cavalry or Field Artillery 

battalions. In Kuwait, successive Transportation 

Battalions consolidated their gun truck assets into 

convoy escort companies for simplification in training 

and maintenance, and standardization of tactics, 

techniques and procedures (TTP). In 2004, the 1-178th 

Field Artillery assumed the consolidated escort mission 

for the transportation group operating in Kuwait. Still 

truck companies in the two other battalions created 

their own internal escorts. These were later consolidated 

into single escort companies in the battalions. For the 

2008 rotation, the National Guard sent battalions with 

the warning that if the companies were broken up and 

piecemealed to other battalions, the states would not 

send any more units to Iraq. The Ohio National Guard 

deployed the 1-126th Cavalry and the 1-148th Infantry 

to Kuwait. The 1-126th Cavalry replaced the 1-160th 

Infantry at Camp Virginia, which had been a consolidated 

escort battalion since 2004; however, three companies 

of 1-148th Infantry replaced the convoy escort 

companies of the 10th and 1144th Transportation 

Battalions at Arifjan, Kuwait thus taking the escort 

mission from the line - haul battalions. The 10th had 

one remaining escort company as it had consolidated 

its gun truck platoons under its HHC for training and 

maintenance, but the platoons only escorted 

their companies.

In December 2008, the 29th Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) deployed from Hawaii to Arifjan with all 

three battalions. The 299th Cavalry replaced the 

148th Infantry at Camp Arifjan; the 100 - 442nd Infantry 

replaced the 126th Cavalry at Camp Virginia; and 

the 487th Field Artillery assumed the security force 

mission at Camp Buerhing, Kuwait. Since the battalions 

deployed with their brigade headquarters, the escort 

battalions were pulled from the 4th Sustainment Brigade 

(SB) and placed under the control of the 29th Brigade 

Combat Team. So for the first time, the logistics brigade 
270 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

headquarters responsible for convoy operations no 

longer provided command and control of the escort 

battalions. The 4th Sustainment Brigade had to 

task the 29th Brigade Combat Team for assets. 

Consequently, the 4th Sustainment Brigade required 

each of the two truck battalions to build internal escort 

assets and the battalions tapped into external escorts 

only after they had exhausted their internal assets.

By 2009, nearly all the convoy escort battalions in 

Iraq were maneuver units. Only the 10th Sustainment 

Brigade at Taji, Iraq did not have a maneuver 

escort battalion. The 1-185th Armor escorted 16th 

Sustainment Brigade convoys in MND - North. The 

2-142nd Infantry and 1-303rd Cavalry escorted 371st 

Sustainment Brigade convoys in MND-West. The 

3 -133rd Field Artillery escorted 287th Sustainment 

Brigade convoys in MND - Southeast, and the 1-161st 

Infantry escorted 304th Sustainment Brigade convoys 

out of Balad, Iraq. The 1-161st Infantry replaced the 

293rd Infantry in November 2008, which had replaced 

the 106th Transportation Battalion in March 2008. That 

was the first time the mission of convoy escort at Balad/

Anaconda was taken from a transportation battalion. 

The mission of convoy escort in MND-West was tasked 

to maneuver units since the 1-34th Brigade Combat 

Team had arrived in 2006. 

Most company commanders, if given a choice, 

preferred internal escorts to external escorts. There 

were several cases in which the escorts and convoy 

commanders did not even talk to each other during 

attacks. In one case where a tractor and trailer had 

been damaged by an IED on ASR Sword, the convoy 

commander was in a dead space and could not reach 

the battle space owner, so he relayed messaged through 

Mobile Tracking System (MTS) back to his battalion 

tactical operations center in Kuwait, completely unaware 

that his escorts had radio contact with the battle space 

owner. Some convoy commanders also complained that 

when they rolled into the gate of their destination for 

the day, the escorts peeled off like fighter aircraft during 

a bombing raid not to be seen until they were ready to 

roll out the gate the next day. Yet there was still a lot of 

coordination needed by the convoy before the drivers 

could bed down and the more maneuverable escorts 

could have been very helpful. The bond of commitment 

between the convoy and their escorts is critical to 

teamwork and success. This can be best facilitated by 

keeping the gun trucks in the companies they escort.

Standard Operation Procedures

The key to success as a fighting unit is cohesion and 

team work. Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) or 

Tactical Standard Operation Procedures (TACSOP) 

provide rules by which units adhere to minimize risk 

and ensure everyone performs the same way in combat 

thus reducing as much chaos as possible. The SOPs 

and TACSOPs included battle drills, and many of the 

battle drills in Iraq, such as how to block an intersection 

or box up at the rally point, were developed by Military 

Professionals Recourses, Inc. (MPRI) at Udari Range. 

MPRI borrowed these from units in the field and changed 

them accordingly. For example by 2005, the convoys 

abandoned the box formation at the rally point but just 

pulled off to the side of the road so they could rapidly 

depart once personnel and equipment were accounted 

for, recovered and medevaced if necessary. Another 

policy that changed over time in Iraq was abandoning 

disabled vehicles. Initially, when the threat was greater, 

if a disabled vehicle could not be recovered within a 

given amount of time, it was set afire and abandoned; 

but as the threat of complex ambush diminished, MultiNational Corps - Iraq (MNC - I) would no longer allow 

convoys to abandon vehicles on the road. So during 

both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, SOPs evolved 

over time because of new experience or changes 

in the enemy threat. 

Ambush after ambush during the Vietnam War 

taught that superior and accurate firepower determined 

the victor. After the element of surprise was lost, the 

safety of the remaining vehicles and crews depended 

upon whether the convoy could mass superior firepower 

against the enemy. The question of how many weapons 

a gun truck must have or how many gun trucks should 

escort a convoy depends upon the worst case ambush 

scenario that the enemy can present. During a Good 

Friday Ambush of 2004 in Baghdad, Iraq, the 724th 

POL convoy ran through two kill zones, one deliberate 

and one hasty, that stretched for several miles. Five 

gun trucks with one crew - served weapon each was 

clearly not enough since the convoy lost seven out of 

19 fuel tankers, lost seven contract drivers killed, two 

military and one civilian driver captured. While this 
Observations 271

study examined the actions and results during convoy 

ambushes, there were claims during both Vietnam 

and Iraq that a well-armed and well - disciplined convoy 

deterred the enemy from attacking it. More gun trucks 

and weapons pointing out of the vehicles possibly 

intimidated the enemy and forced them to select 

weaker targets. During OIF 1 and 2, this was called the 

“porcupine effect.” On certain occasions during the 

Vietnam War when the probability of attack was high, 

the 8th Transportation Group sent out convoys of entirely 

gun trucks. The enemy avoided contact with these “death 

convoys.” History shows that the deciding factor in any 

gun fight is always superior and accurate fire power. 

One can never have enough machineguns in a convoy.

So the next question is what should the trucks 

and gun trucks do in case of an ambush? The answer 

depends upon where they are in relation to the kill zone 

since even a small convoy can stretch for several miles. 

An ambush will most likely occur in the front, middle or 

rear of the convoy either stopping the convoy or dividing 

it. Reaction to an ambush should consist of three 

possible scenarios, vehicles that have driven past the kill 

zone, vehicles in the kill zone and vehicles about to drive 

in the kill zone. Those vehicles that can clear the kill zone 

should continue to safety, whether it is a “floating rally 

point,” security check point or military camp. Those that 

are not in the kill zone should not drive into it and those 

caught in the kill zone have to fight their way out. There 

were different ways to do this.

US Marines believed that the best reaction to an 

ambush was for the drivers to stop, dismount and attack 

through the kill zone. For any military organization where 

the primary training was based upon the philosophy that 

everyone was a rifle man, this reaction would work. In 

fact LTC Christopher Croft discovered this same attitude 

with A Company, 3 -144th Infantry (TX NG). Croft led 

the 106th Transportation Battalion to LSA Anaconda, 

Iraq from 2007 to 2008 and had several branches 

represented under his battalion and admitted the 

infantry and cavalry were his best for convoy escort. 

He embraced an offensive mindset and encouraged 

his subordinates to explore new ideas. He also admitted 

he had to reign in those Texas infantrymen because 

they wanted to leave the convoy and go after the enemy. 

They were more concerned about fighting the enemy 

than delivering the cargo. 

There are some inherent dangers with this concept. 

By doctrine ,dismounted infantry march with an interval 

of five to ten meters between them. If caught in an 

ambush, they are close enough to support each other in 

an attack on the enemy, but vehicles ideally travel with 

an interval of 100 meters between them - too far apart 

for a coordinated infantry assault. Even if the vehicles 

are bunched up, the length of the vehicles still does 

not bring the drivers close enough to mount a counterambush. As seen in ambushes on Route 19 on 2 

September 1967 and at Ap Nhi, Vietnam, on 25 August 

1968, the drivers had to fight as infantry; but because 

of the spacing of the vehicles, they fought isolated 

battles and defended their trucks. The similar situation 

happened to the 1075th Medium Truck convoy during 

the Palm Sunday Ambush on 20 March 2005. The 8th 

Transportation Group established its SOP that drivers 

should only dismount and fight if trucks were unable to 

clear the kill zone. The main advantage that trucks have 

over dismounted infantry is they can maneuver more 

rapidly; but as LTC Croft pointed out, their mission was 

to get the trucks to their destination and not hold it up 

fixing, fighting and finishing off the enemy threat.

LTC Croft admitted his E Troop, 105th Cavalry had 

a much better concept for how to fight the enemy as 

was also seen with the Troop D, 4th Cavalry at Speicher. 

The cavalry traditionally rides into battle, dismounts to 

engage the enemy, but not too far from their mounts. 

As a screening force, they usually fix and fight the enemy 

until they can hand off the battle to the follow - on 

infantry and then the cavalry can remount to continue 

the mission. This is the ideal offensive role for convoy 

escort; take the fight to the enemy, but do not stray 

too far from the road or convoy, fix the enemy and then 

turn the fight over to the battle space owner. In one IED 

attack, Croft’s cavalry company surrounded the trigger 

man in a building and kept him pinned down until the 

battle space owner arrived. The main difference between 

the infantry and cavalry was the infantry always wanted 

to finish the fight while the cavalry was just as content 

to hand off the fight and return to the road.

It is a different case for vehicles disabled in the kill 

zone since they have their choices narrowed. Drivers 

of task vehicles can dismount and take up fighting 

positions behind their trucks or in the cabs if armored. 

The lesson of Vietnam is that drivers should remain 
272 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

with their trucks until rescued by passing trucks or gun 

trucks. Accountability is the problem. If a driver has 

been rescued by a passing truck escaping the kill zone 

then they should notify the convoy commander and gun 

trucks. This will prevent weapons platforms needlessly 

waiting in the kill zone looking for the driver.

The vehicles that have not entered the kill zone have 

more options. They can continue to drive through as 

the 172nd and 1486th Medium Truck convoy did during 

their ambushes on 9 April 2004. The leaders based their 

decision on the fact that previous kill zones were only a 

few hundred meters long and they had the speed to race 

through it. Under that assumption it would have been 

more difficult to turn a convoy of tractors and trailers 

around and head back. This kill zone, however, stretched 

for over a mile. The decision of the 2123rd HET to take 

a detour around a disabled vehicle in ad Diwaniyah 

on 17 April 2004 actually sent them into the kill zone. 

1LT DaSilva realized driving through the kill zone was a 

bad idea during the TK Ambush in Afghanistan on 29 

July 2009 and they lost five out of seven MRAP gun 

trucks damaged or destroyed. Without the ability to turn 

around, waiting in both cases might just as easily invited 

attack. While driving through a kill zone is not a good 

option, sometimes the only other option is to wait 

to get attacked.

The second choice is to halt and wait for other forces 

to clear the kill zone. When a convoy escorted by the 

518th Gun Truck Company was halted on ASR Sword 

in Iraq on 18 October 2004, this placed them across 

from Iraqi insurgents lying in wait. Fortunately for them, 

the enemy was waiting for the Explosive Ordnance 

Demolition (EOD) HMMWVs to drive up to disarm the 

improvised explosive device. Sticking to the plan, the 

insurgents missed the opportunity to disable a greater 

number of soft skinned vehicles. After they opened fire 

on the HMMWV arriving on the overpass, five gun trucks 

in blocking positions opened fire on the enemy and the 

one -sided fight ended in a few minutes. The problem 

with halting is that it makes the convoy a more 

vulnerable target. Speed is security. It is harder to hit a 

moving target than a stationary one. The ambush of the 

96th HET in Baghdad on Good Friday 2004 illustrates 

that. The MPs halted a convoy right next to an IED after 

it had turned around because that was their policy. 

The delay allowed the insurgents to conduct what 

appeared to be a hasty ambush. A similar hasty ambush 

happened to the recovery convoy blocked by the 

Koreans at a bridge along Route 19 in Vietnam on the 

night of 16 December 1970. In most ambushes during 

the Vietnam War, however, the enemy initiated with 

the highest casualty producing weapon on a particular 

vehicle or vehicles in a certain location that would 

block traffic for the purpose of destroying the remaining 

vehicles with subsequent fire. 

The third option is to turn around and return to the 

safety of a rally point or compound where the convoy 

can wait. This may not always be an option if the blocked 

road is too narrow to allow tractors and trailers to turn 

around. If halted, the convoy must take up position ready 

for a hasty ambush. There are any number of defensive 

formations; however, vehicles bunched up make easy 

targets for mortars as witnessed during the Iskandariyah 

ambush of the 172nd and 1486th convoy on Good 

Friday 2004. The enemy anticipated the vehicles that 

had escaped the kill zone would drive ahead about a 

mile to form a box. So the insurgents were waiting for 

them with a mortar in a dump truck. No one solution 

works in every situation so the convoy commander has 

to analyze the best course of action depending upon the 

enemy capability, safe places to go, and available friendly 

assets. Be aware that the enemy looks for patterns to 

predict the reaction of the convoy. Changing the reaction 

to contact policy can keep the enemy off guard but more 

often the convoys were reacting to the enemy changes 

instead of anticipating them.

Regardless of the course of action followed, one 

rule should always be followed: if the convoy divides, 

never leave an element of the convoy unprotected. If the 

lead element of the convoy flees the kill zone, at least 

one gun truck should accompany that element. As seen 

in ambushes along Route 19 on 25 January 1968, 8 

March 1968, and 9 June 1969, the enemy employed 

a decoy ambush to draw off the gun trucks in hope of 

having the convoy drive unprotected into the main kill 

zone up ahead. There has to be some balance between 

how long some gun trucks can remain in the kill zone 

waiting for the infantry and its ability to respond should 

the convoy encounter another ambush up the road.

During the Iraq War, the major threat changed 

after the Palm Sunday Ambush of 20 March 2005 from 

complex ambushes to energy formed projectiles (EFP). 
Observations 273

Consequently, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) 

changed accordingly. By 2007 senior military leaders 

became paranoid about casualties, so TTP decisions 

were being made at the highest levels, based upon the 

analysis of data, to mitigate loss of life where during 

the first couple years of the war it was a bottom’s up 

approach to tactical and technical solutions. The topdown directives included the number and type of gun 

trucks used in each convoy, the uniform, or even how 

high the gunner could sit in his turret. The emphasis 

became one of reducing the risk to soldiers.36

Data indicated that shrapnel from IEDs had killed 

gunners by coming in over the top and through the gap 

between the gun and turret shield, so both CFLCC in 

Kuwait and MNC - I in Iraq directed that gunners ride at 

eyeball defilade, rather than nametag defilade as 

before. “Eyeball defilade” meant sitting so that only 

the top of the head extended above the gunner’s hatch. 

While this may have reduced the gunner’s desire and 

ability to watch for ambushes, the reality was that they 

seldom received small arms fire and were rarely able 

to return fire. This was because the insurgents lost the 

majority of their attacking force during the Palm Sunday 

Ambush on 20 March 2005 and had little success on 

the few complex ambushes after that. Thus they changed 

their tactics primarily to IEDs and hasty attacks when 

a convoy halted for over 20 minutes in a danger area, 

usually waiting for the engineers to blow an IED up 

ahead. The gunners, however, liked gunning and trusted 

their eyes better than any technology for spotting IEDs or 

kill zones, so they rarely followed this directive. In fact, 80 

percent of IEDs were spotted visually.37

While many of these top - down driven directives 

saved lives, some veterans of the previous deployments, 

on the other hand, felt their initiative stifled. The one 

area still left to the imagination of the companies 

was modification to vehicles. From Kuwait to Iraq, the 

companies had taken the basic gun truck and added 

lights, laser designators, thermal sights and moved 

the electronics around to improve the capability 

of the platform.38

The units that listened to their subordinates such as 

the LTC Chuck Maskell’s 181st Transportation Battalion 

at Anaconda in 2003, LTC William H. Adams’ 143rd CSSB 

at Speicher in 2007- 2008, or LTC Chris Croft’s 106th 

Transportation Battalion at Anaconda in 2007-2008 led 

in innovation. LTC Adams’ philosophy, “What can we 

bring to the fight to help the soldiers?” caused his staff 

to listen to the suggestions of their companies so much 

so that the troopers of Troop D, 4th Cavalry claimed to 

be the inspiration of nearly every good change in convoy 

doctrine the battalion adopted. LTC Adams admitted the 

other three companies also helped develop the battalion 

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). These ideas 

included leaving right behind the engineer sweep teams, 

combining several small convoys into super convoys and 

having aviation escort the convoys. Convoy operations 

in Iraq revealed that the best ideas usually came from 

the ranks and primarily from the ranks of staff sergeant 

to sergeant first class – the most experienced leaders 

doing the work. Staff can come up with good ideas but 

need the advice of good NCOs with hands-on experience 

to determine if they are sound.39

Reaction to Enemy Contact

During the Vietnam War, the 8th Transportation Group 

was the first to develop gun trucks and how to react to 

contact. Route 19 through the Central Highlands was the 

most heavily ambushed road in Vietnam, so the convoys 

of the 8th Group faced the greatest threat. Their policy 

was for any vehicles in or ahead of the kill zone to drive to 

the nearest security check point, but vehicles behind the 

kill zone should halt and establish security. Their policy 

for how to react if caught in a kill zone was very simple.

If unavoidably stopped in the kill zone, personnel 

must dismount, take up covered and concealed 

positions, and lay down a heavy volume of return fire on 

active enemy targets, staying in close proximity of their 

vehicles. In no case will convoy personnel close with or 

attempt to pursue the enemy as this will interfere with 

the tactical reaction plan. Convoy personnel will cease 

fire upon arrival of tactical security elements to allow 

tactical vehicles and personnel freedom of movement 

against enemy forces. Convoy control personnel will 

insure that traffic begins to move as soon as the 

tactical situation permits.

As the gun trucks turned the fight back on the 

ambushers, the enemy reduced the size of the kill zones 

to about 100 meters in length. This would allow about 

two or three vehicles to enter the kill zone and the 

enemy learned to attack the gun trucks first then any 

task vehicle in the kill zone, so there were almost always 
274 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

one or two disabled vehicles beside a gun truck in the kill 

zone. A mobility kill on a gun truck could still keep laying 

down suppressive fire while waiting for the arrival of 

other gun trucks. This led to the new policy of, “Provide 

flanking support fire into kill zone. Security vehicles 

apply maximum base of fire; fight as a team; deploy 

upon command.” Basically this translated into all gun 

trucks racing into the kill zone to provide suppressive 

fire. The firing method preferred by the gunners of 

the 8th Group gun trucks was spraying fire where the 

gunners depressed the butterfly triggers on the M2 

.50 caliber machineguns until the 100 - round belt of 

ammunition was expended. They would then replace the 

belt and repeat this until they had exhausted four cans 

of ammunition, then change out barrels to allow the first 

to cool down. Although the school taught gunners to fire 

three - to - six round bursts so as not to quickly overheat 

the barrel, the gunners of the 8th Group could not see 

the enemy muzzle flashes when they rolled into a kill 

zone, so not identifying the exact location of the enemy, 

they just fired in every direction. Three to four .50 caliber 

machineguns blazing away in every direction seemed to 

have an intimidating effect on the enemy. 

Although the same policy called for the gun trucks 

to stand off on the flanks of the kill zone and provide 

suppressive fire, the 8th Group gun trucks usually just 

raced into the kill zone next to any disabled vehicle and 

laid down suppressive fire until the air cover arrived 

or the security force assumed control of the fight. 

Because of the small kill zones along Route 19 and 

later Route 9 during Lam Son 719, there were no more 

than two disabled vehicles so the gun trucks focused on 

protecting them from inside the kill zone. 

The gun trucks of the 500th Group in Cam Ranh 

Bay, on the otherhand, developed its gun trucks and 

techniques a year after the 8th Group. These gunners 

used the three - to - six round bursts as taught in the 

schools, but because of the large size of their convoys, 

preferred to have the gun trucks in the kill zone lay 

down suppressive fire until the next gun truck came up 

to replace them, and then continue with the rest of the 

convoy. Surprisingly, many escort units in Kuwait and 

Iraq would develop the same method for reaction to 

contact and call it “bumping,” because the gun truck in 

the kill zone would wait for the next gun truck to come up 

and “bump” it, so it could follow the rest of the convoy 

out of the kill zone. This was the method used by the 

518th Gun Truck Company during the Palm Sunday 

Ambush. CPT Eric Lendewig, of A Battery, 1-143rd FA 

(CA NG) at Taji in 2008 liked bumping because it did not 

allow his gunners to expend all their ammunition.40

2LT James McCormick developed the concept for his 

“turn, fix, and fire” technique during the second convoy 

to the Green Zone in Iraq on Easter Sunday, 11 April 

2004. On his first ambush driving into BIAP the previous 

Thursday night, he had his gun truck drive right into the 

apex of the kill zone and set up a gun shield between the 

enemy and his convoy. With a smaller convoy to escort 

to the Green Zone, he had his gun trucks drive between 

the enemy and the convoy as a gun shield, but decided 

to have the gun trucks turn into the enemy, stop and 

then have everyone get out and fire at the enemy while 

the convoy passed. He found this worked and taught 

this method of “turn, fix, and fire” to the gun truck crews 

of the 518th when it was formed in May 2004. This 

technique quickly suppressed any small ambush the 

convoys ran through.

Once the escort units in Kuwait and Iraq had factorybuilt M1114s, M1117s, and M1151s, the crews had 360 

degrees of armor and ballistic glass, therefore, MNC-I 

would not allow anyone to exit the vehicles, so only the 

gunners could return fire. This limited the number of 

weapons the crews could bring to bear on the enemy. 

The Texans of the A Company, 3 -144th Infantry violated 

that policy during the ambush on ASR Sword in 23 

February 2008 and the gunnery of SSG Shane Lindsey 

armed with the M203 turned the fight back on the 

enemy. This ambush illustrated the need for soldiers to 

employ all their weapons. The open gun box design of 

the Vietnam gun truck allowed this, but the cocoon of 

armor the soldiers rode in during the latter part of the 

recent war forced them to exit their gun trucks in order 

to engage all weapons. The design of the gun trucks 

had to weigh the risk and benefit of protection and 

offensive capability.

Convoy Times

During the Vietnam War, the truck units believed the 

enemy owned the night and made it policy to roll 

only during daylight. Crews wanted 360 degrees of 

unobstructed vision to spot any signs of ambushes or 

mines, but they could not see the muzzle flash of the 
Observations 275

enemy weapons during the day time. During Lam Son 

719 in 1970, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 

had priority of movement on Route 9 that paralleled 

the Demilitarized Zone, so the American convoys of the 

515th and 523rd Truck Companies had to drive at night. 

While they could not see any signs of a kill zone, once the 

ambush was initiated, they could see the muzzle flash of 

the enemy and knew exactly where to aim their weapons. 

There were many advantages and disadvantages to 

driving during day and night.

In 2005, MNC - I required the convoys to roll at night 

to eliminate the threat of civilian intruders in the convoys 

and possible Vehicle - borne IEDs (VBIED), because 

the curfew prevented civilian traffic after the hours of 

darkness. This eliminated the problem of civilian traffic 

and VBIEDs, but darkness reduced the chances of 

convoys spotting IEDs hidden alongside the road. 

So soldiers came up with novel solutions.

SFC John A. Wolitski, of the 799th Maintenance 

Company (GS), Iraq was the NCOIC of the Logistical 

Security Team during 2005 and 2006, which escorted 

convoys out of Ar Ramadi. Wolitiski, his lieutenant and 

squad leaders studied the intelligence reports on IED 

attacks, type of attacks, location, time of day, day of 

week of attacks and realized that 90 percent of the 

attacks took place an hour before dusk to half an hour 

to an hour after dark. Since convoys were required to 

run at night, Wolistski scavenged extra flood lights off 

of destroyed wreckers and wired them onto the scout 

HMMWV so it could illuminate the path and identify the 

signs of IEDs at night. It had two on each end pointing 

down to the side of the road, two more looking out a little 

bit further, plus the regular head lights. Every one of his 

gunners had spot lights so they could scan the sides of 

the roads. He borrowed that idea from his police work.41

After showing the evidence, SFC Wolitski told his 

superiors if they ran daylight convoys, their scouts could 

spot the IEDs better, and if something did happen they 

would have better observation on them. Out in the 

western part of Iraq they did not have a lot of civilian 

traffic and the area was open desert so it did not have 

the same need to run at night. They began running right 

after daybreak and were off the road before dark. The 

only time they were restricted to driving at night was 

when they had to drive through Fallujah or Baghdad. 

When running to Al Asaad, Al Taqaddum, Habadia, 

Corregidor, they ran during the day and were never 

hit by IEDs.42

The Marines in the area were hit because they 

believed speed was security. By driving fast, they could 

not spot the IEDs. The enemy ran detonation wires 

through plastic tubing across the road and air brushed 

Lead M1114 with extra lights to illuminate the road ahead and theRhino in the down position. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
276 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

it to look just like asphalt. After the gun trucks began 

looking for things in the road, the enemy then laid the 

tubes parallel to the asphalt, so if a tire veered off the 

asphalt, it detonated the IED. Wolitski restricted his 

convoys to 45 mph on open road, so they could better 

identify IEDs.43

After a while, this became MNC - I policy. Convoys 

traveled at 45 mph to identify IEDs, and in the elevated 

threat zones (ETZ)44 had to slow down to 25 mph. 

Like Wolitski’s scout vehicle, other units also began 

to add extra lights to their gun trucks. By December 

2006, LTC Edward McGinley had standardized the light 

configuration in his 24th Transportation Battalion with 

four 5 - ton lights on the bumper and two rotating search 

lights, called “Go Lights” mounted on the top right and 

left of the cabs.45

The next evolution in convoy times came in the 

terms of movement windows. During OIF 3, the XVIII 

Airborne Corps had a fusion net which empowered 

soldiers with information rather than data. The 82nd 

Sustainment Brigade, at Tallil from 2006 to 2007, 

conducted a 90 - day pattern analysis of route segments 

to determine tier- one hot spots based on times and 

locations of IED attacks. The 90 - day pattern of 

analysis provided the best windows for travel and 

seemed to work.46

Soon after the 336th Transportation Group replaced 

the 37th Transportation Group in Kuwait, its first soldier, 

SPC Stephen Castner of the 121st FA, was killed just 

a few hours after crossing the Iraq border in his first 

convoy on 1 August 2006. Previously, Castner had 

written his father complaining about the inadequate 

training at the mobilization station for the mission his 

unit would perform in Iraq. Consequently, his father, an 

influential lawyer, started a letter writing campaign all 

the way to the Pentagon. COL Don Cornett had threestar generals asking lots of questions, so he had his 

executive officer, COL James A. Haun, conduct an 

AR15 - 6 investigation into the matter. From then on, 

the 336th Group became very cautious and averse 

to taking risks.47

In the 82nd Sustainment Brigade, the 336th 

Group had their intelligence analysts study the times 

and places of attacks and predicted the period time 

during each day for IED attacks along certain routes. Its 

subordinate, 57th Transportation Battalion, claimed to 

have had the best intelligence section for predicting time 

of attacks. They provided these patterns to the convoy 

commanders so they could schedule their departure 

times during low incident periods with the movement 

control teams to avoid the likelihood of attacks. They 

had reduced the windows for driving time to a couple 

of hours each night. These short movement windows, 

however, reduced the time on the road to the point 

it took theater-based convoys twice as long to reach 

their destinations as before. The convoys ran to Camp 

Navistar, Kuwait during the day, waited until night to 

cross the Iraqi border and head to LSA Cedar. They 

waited at Cedar until the next night to run to Scania 

where they received another movement window the 

next night for their convoy to BIAP. From BIAP they left 

the next night to LSA Anaconda or their destination. A 

trip that used to take two days increased to four, if there 

are no problems. The movement windows provided by 

the Intelligence office significantly reduced the Serious 

Incident Reports (SIR) but also the volume of supplies 

moving forward.48

The 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), 

commanded by MG Kevin A. Leonard, replaced the 

377th TSC in May 2006 and brought with it senior 

officers with battalion and brigade level command 

experience from previous tours in theater, such as BG 

Luis Visot who commanded the 32nd Transportation 

Group in 2003. For this reason they reversed a trend 

toward casualty aversion. Knowing the current convoys 

had far more armor and resources than during the 

previous years they were there, the 1st TSC ended the 

practice of avoiding certain high - threat windows and 

thus reduced the turaround time for convoys, surprisingly 

with no significant increase in loss of life due to enemy 

activity until the “Surge.” The surge in troop strength 

caused an initial spike in enemy attacks in September 

and October 2006, but declined with the increased 

patrolling in the Baghdad area and the barrier detail 

which began in May 2007. The concrete T- wall barriers 

lining all the roads throughout Baghdad reduced the 

trash that hid IEDs, and the active patrolling reduced the 

time the enemy could properly hide them. So the enemy 

initially responded by firing small arms at the convoys 

in Iraq, which had the same effect as throwing rocks at 

the armored trucks. Over time they used the walls as 

fortifications and attacked through loop holes in them. 
Observations 277

Nonetheless, the new leadership knew risk aversion 

should not impede the mission.49

Just as terrain provides tactical advantages, so does 

the time of day determine the risk to convoys. Daylight 

makes it easier to detect signs of mines, IEDs, and kill 

zones, but hides the enemy’s muzzle flash. The night 

reveals the muzzle flash of enemy positions, but makes 

it harder to detect mines, IEDs or kill zones. Lighting the 

front of the truck like a sports stadium helps gun truck 

crews see in the dark though. Reducing the time of travel 

to certain windows may be beneficial to those convoys 

that do not have that far to travel, but for long haul 

convoys, this increased the time of turnaround 

making it counterproductive to the mission. 

Tactics

Battle drills and standard operating procedures (SOP) 

standardize the way units operate and react to different 

situations and provide the tools for a commander to 

maneuver units or, in this case, gun trucks, utilizing the 

advantage of terrain to counter the enemy tactics. The 

Vietnam gun truck veterans had SOPs but do not like to 

talk about tactics. They claimed officers liked to talk in 

terms of tactics, but the gun trucks of 8th Transportation 

Group only had one tactic – drive into the kill zone with 

machineguns blazing in every direction. The gun trucks 

out of 500th Group did something different and used the 

bumping method of having the gun trucks in the kill zone 

lay down suppressive fire until the next gun truck came 

up to replace it. The gun truck would then continue with 

the rest of the convoy. LTC Ed McGinley, Commander of 

the 24th Transportation Battalion in Kuwait during 2005-

2006, explained that the gun truck crews in Vietnam 

had to face every kind of threat, whether mines, small 

ambushes or large complex ambushes. Having to face 

every kind of threat, they could not study or develop 

tactics for everything, but the convoys driving in Iraq after 

2005 faced primarily one type of attack – mines then 

better known as improvised explosive devices (IED), and 

the enemy established patterns based upon perceived 

weakness in the convoys. To react properly to an ambush 

one must understand tactics.

Tactics is dependent upon the mission, enemy, 

friendly troops, weather and terrain. The mission of the 

convoy is simple – deliver the goods to the customer. 

A question has arisen about how aggressive the convoy 

security should be. 2LT McCormick believed that gun 

trucks should shove the fight back down the enemy’s 

throats. This idea had many supporters during the 

Vietnam War. Some gun truck crews felt that the gun 

trucks needed to turn the fight back against the enemy 

as quickly as possible. The mission of the Transportation 

Corps, however, is to deliver the men and material to 

their appointed destination on time. A purely defensive 

philosophy would only have the gun trucks remain in 

the kill zone long enough for all the vehicles to clear 

the kill zone. A defensive tactic does not discourage 

the enemy from further attacks but might encourage 

them to continue their quest to improve their ambush 

tactics. Turning the fight back on the enemy and making 

them pay a higher price in casualties would more likely 

discourage them from attacking again until they have 

learned from their mistake. Most ambushes during 

the Vietnam War ended with the gun trucks fixing the 

enemy until the combat arms units arrived and 

flanked the enemy. 

The purpose of the ambush is to destroy as much 

of the convoy as possible in as short a time as possible 

using the advantage of terrain combined with the 

element of surprise. Surprise allows the enemy to hit 

their first target, which is why an ambush should always 

be initiated with a casualty producing weapon. This 

guarantees one kill if the aim is good. A common trait 

between the guerrilla war in Vietnam and Iraq was the 

fact that the enemy operated in small guerrilla cells. So 

they had to conduct detailed planning and rehearsal in 

isolation, and only came together for the ambush. That 

meant they were inflexible in their execution. The lesson 

from the Vietnam War was to disrupt the enemy’s plan 

as quickly as possible.

Tactics resemble the shield and the sword. The 

shield protects the warrior’s weakness while the sword 

strikes at the opponent’s weakness. Wheeled vehicles 

provide the advantage of speed of maneuver, armor, 

and firepower. Assuming that a gun truck is an armored 

vehicle and dedicated weapons platform, its primary 

purpose is to protect the convoy. To do this in an 

ambush, they have to turn the fight back on the enemy 

as rapidly as possible through either accurate or superior 

fire power. In the 8 April 2004 ambush, 2LT McCormick 

and CPL Noble took out the key enemy weapons through 

accurate fire. During the 23 February 2008 ambush, 
278 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

SSG Lindsey likewise took out the enemy’s weapons 

by his accuracy with the M203. (Both these ambushes 

occurred at night). The A Company, 3 -144th Infantry 

also found nothing more accurate than a sniper. 

Because they could not see the enemy muzzle flash, 

they used spraying fire and trusted to luck. SFC Gabriel 

Bueno, of the 250th Transportation Company at Tallil, 

Iraq during 2006 - 2007, admitted they were hit by 

IEDs 13 times on their first 11 missions escorting 

KBR convoys, but when they finally started tearing up 

the open desert with machinegun fire after any IED 

detonation, the attacks dropped off. While they did not 

have the required positive identification of the enemy 

trigger man, they assumed the trigger man feared the 

odds of getting hit. Other units confirmed this trick to 

stopping IED attacks. The lesson is that as a minimum, 

gun trucks have to lay down accurate or suppressive fire 

until all the vehicles have cleared the kill zone and, if 

vehicles are trapped or disabled in the kill zone, the 

gun trucks have to rescue the driver and defend the 

vehicles until the convoy commander determines to 

abandon the vehicles.50

One enduring question has been whether to 

suppress enemy fire from inside the kill zone or the flank. 

The answer has to depend upon the nature of the kill 

zone, enemy position and friendly situation. If friendly 

vehicles are trapped in the kill zone, then the gun trucks 

need to protect them. By entering the kill zone and firing 

on the enemy, they draw fire away from the other trucks. 

By sitting off on the flank, the gun trucks get to use 

the advantage of the long range of weapons such 

as the .50 caliber machinegun or Mk19 automatic 

grenade launcher.

The purpose of maneuver is to rapidly find that 

decisive point on the battlefield that allows one side 

to employ its weapons systems against the enemy’s 

weakness. This decisive point is often considered 

key terrain on the enemy’s flank. The 4 January 1970 

ambush along Route 19 in Vietnam provides an excellent 

example of where the Koreans cut off the retreat of the 

insurgents when the accurate fire of the gun trucks drove 

the enemy from their positions in the rice paddy. In the 

Iraqi desert, key terrain was an overpass or two-story 

building but in Afghanistan, key terrain was a mountain 

that flanked the road. Flanking either concentrates 

superior fire against a weakly defended or undefended 

area if done with speed, or forces the enemy shift some 

of its fire power away from the kill zone. By finding the 

flank along a linear kill zone where maneuver is restricted 

such as in the jungle, mountains or city, the flank is the 

edge of the kill zone along the road. In cases where there 

is room to maneuver or other maneuver elements, the 

flank can be off the road. 

Most ambushes during the Vietnam War ended when 

Soldiers of the B Co., 3-144th Infantry rehearsing medevac procedures in 2008. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Observations 279

the reaction force arrived. During the Palms Sunday 

Ambush in Iraq on 20 March 2005, three HMMWV 

gun trucks of the MPs drove down the access road and 

flanked the insurgents and were later joined by three 

more, resulting in as many as 27 enemy killed. This 

flanking action clearly caught the enemy by surprise and 

was the decisive action of the battle. It worked because 

the enemy did not expect it. During the 22 March 2004 

ambush, 2LT McCormick had his gun truck mount the 

overpass where it had excellent observation of the 

enemy, but during the 8 April 2004 ambush, turned 

his gun truck into the apex of the kill zone so he could 

dismount his crew and employ all his weapon systems 

against the enemy. He also turned into the enemy during 

his ambushes to the Green Zone on 11 April 2004. The 

decisive point is different in each battle. The problem 

of flanking with road bound vehicles is that the enemy 

can predict which roads they might try to flank on. When 

behavior becomes predictable, then the enemy can 

plan for it. Beware that the enemy can set traps for the 

flanking element. 

Tactics require swift judgment for the best use of 

friendly weapon systems and the advantage of terrain 

against enemy action. There is no one answer to all 

situations, so every solution is situational dependent. 

To understand tactics requires training the mind, and 

each ambush provides examples to study.

After Action Reviews, Training and Rehearsals

The study of convoy ambushes from Vietnam to Iraq 

revealed that these battles were won by superior and 

accurate fire power. Enough emphasis could not be 

placed on the perfection of marksmanship rather 

than just routine firing on the range. In January 2003, 

Military Professionals Recourses, Inc. (MPRI) at Udari 

Training Range, Kuwait recognized the need for a live 

fire exercise for support units before they invaded Iraq. 

This evolved into their convoy live fire exercise, which 

by the second year of the war, CFLCC required every 

arriving support unit to undergo before crossing the 

border into Iraq. 

By 2004, similar live fire ranges had sprung up 

throughout the United States, so MPRI could focus on 

situational lane training. They questioned units in Iraq for 

what did and did not work, then by 2006 had developed 

a situational lane training. They constructed a mockup 

town and overpass, hired Kuwaitis to play pedestrians 

and present the arriving convoy personnel with realistic 

scenarios from IEDs to intruders and VBIEDs they might 

encounter in Iraq. 

After he received the task to create the Logistical 

Security Team in August 2005, SFC Wolitski went to the 

US Marines at Ar Ramadi and asked them to explain 

what kind of IEDs they expected to get hit by. He asked 

them if they could set up something to show them, so 

they set up an IED alley for training and SFC Wolitski 

would send his teams through the lanes. Everyone went 

through the training, and Wolitski paid attention to the 

most observant solders and picked them as his scouts. 

Other units set up IED lane training.51

The gunners needed to fire the same way they 

would engage the enemy in battle, both stationary 

and on the move. In 2006, LTC Ed McGinley’s 24th 

Transportation Battalion conducted Table 8 mounted 

gunnery training for its gun truck crews, but LTC Robert 

C. Ling’s 10th Transportation Battalion replaced the 

24th Battalion and improved upon this, making Table 6 

and 8 gunnery a quarterly requirement and calling them 

motorized platoon live fire exercise (MPLFS). Another 

important skill was aggressive driving. Rollovers were 

probably the next biggest killer of truck drivers to IEDs. 

Drivers needed to train at pushing their vehicles to the 

limit in a safe environment in order to understand the 

capabilities and limitations of those vehicles. Again, the 

10th Transportation Battalion developed such a routine 

training program. LTC Ling also consolidated all his 

gun trucks into his HHD and tasked its commander, 

CPT Patrick Knight, to develop the initial and 

sustainment training.52

By 2008, most units had developed some form 

of initial training or a certification program for convoy 

commanders. Sustainment training was the area where 

there was great variation because there were certain 

skills that either declined or needed perfection. 

From the author’s observations, the units that 

performed the best in combat conducted daily after 

action reviews (AAR) and war- gamed combat scenarios. 

SSG Timothy Nein of the 617th MP Company (KY NG) 

religiously conducted AARs after every patrol and wargamed how his Raven 42 patrol would react to the same 

situation or could improve upon their operations. It was 

the study of a recent ambush that inspired him to want 
280 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

to flank the enemy on the next ambush, which turned 

out to be the turning point of the Palm Sunday Ambush. 

Likewise, the 518th Combat Gun Truck Company during 

2004 also conducted similar AARs after each contact. 

SFC Wolitski, of the 799th Maintenance Company at 

Ar Ramadi in 2005 - 2006, designated one primary 

scout vehicle and trained an alternate. The crew studied 

anything related to scouts, information about enemy 

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), current hit 

lists, current suspected VBIED vehicles. They had 

no personal life; they just studied every bit of useful 

information, so they would know what to look for. 

His convoys were never hit.

Most units either rehearsed or more often recited 

their tactics, techniques and procedures prior to each 

convoy. The problem was complacency. The units that 

performed the best in ambushes were those that had 

war-gamed scenarios. LTC Lee Ellis, Commander of the 

1103rd CSSB 2007- 2008, directed his Intelligence 

section during the rehearsals prior to each convoy to 

interject different scenarios and ask each gun truck 

what it would do. CPT Patrick Knight, a veteran of 

three tours, also studied the routes for the most likely 

ambush locations, such as intersections, overpasses 

and choke points, and then developed tactics, 

techniques and procedures for each location based 

upon the configuration of the convoy.53 SFC Wolitski’s 

Logistics Security Team likewise knew where the hot 

spots were and developed tactics accordingly. They 

had specific battle drills for each hot spot. A convoy 

brief usually lasted 30 minutes. They did not have a 

sand table but used rocks on the ground for their 

SSG Villareal of the 2nd Platoon, 1498th HET (CA NG) going over the route in briefing tent in Kuwait in 2009. 

Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Observations 281

1 Richard E. Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007, 13 April 2007.

2 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008.

3 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

4 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008.

5 Ibid.

6 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

7 Ibid.

8 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008.

9 Ibid.

10 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

11 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008.

12 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007, and OIF 2007 Journal.

13 Killblane, OIF 2007 Journal.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

19 Killblane, OIF trip Journal 2008.

20 Killblane, OIF Trip Journal 2008.

21 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

“ROC drills.” Most units the author observed during 

his five visits to Iraq and Kuwait had built sand tables 

with roads, overpasses and intersections with wooden 

vehicles so they could war game scenarios, but he 

never saw any unit use them. 

The enemy was constantly changing the way they 

emplaced and hid IED/EFPs. This information was 

either disseminated verbally or through photos. Most 

were found, but identifying IED/EFPs was an art that 

needed perfection. In 2007, the 7th Sustainment 

Brigade at Tallil during 2007-2008 included in its 

Combat Logistical Patrol (CLP) Academy lane training 

in IED identification as sustainment training. Clearly 

the best training was hands - on training with lanes 

replicating the latest IED camouflage methods.54

By 2008, escalation of force (EOF) had become 

a serious issue with many units in Iraq as the Iraqis 

received more freedom on the roads. Most escalation 

of force incidents resulted from the fear of Vehicleborne IEDs (VBIED). There were indicators that identified 

a suicide bomber versus a typical aggressive Iraqi 

driver and his family. These were taught verbally, but 

18 and 19 - year old gunners had to make life and 

death decisions in a matter of seconds. The wrong 

decision more often resulted in the death of innocent 

Iraqis, which had unintended consequences, such as 

increased attacks. Since the gunners had to visualize 

the situations, visual training aids or, again, situational 

training exercises were needed. Interestingly, one of the 

better units with a low escalation of force incident rate 

was CPT Eric Lendewig’s A Battery, 1-143rd FA (CA NG). 

Those California National Guard soldiers drove on the 

most congested roads in America and had learned to 

anticipate another driver’s moves by what the car did. 

Consequently, they were used to aggressive driving 

and had only fired one warning shot during their first 

seven months in Iraq.55

In Summary

Four wars requiring convoy security operations 

provide ample material to study. There are some 

obvious patterns that should be codified into doctrine 

and lessons to form the foundation for standard 

operating procedures and tactics, techniques and 

procedures for the next conflict. Anyone who assumes 

the responsibility for the safe delivery of cargo inherits 

the great responsibility to accomplish the mission 

while protecting the crews, cargo and drivers assigned. 

The preceding ambush case studies will allow any 

students of war to mentally take the place of any of the 

participants and train their minds to find solutions, but 

in a non-threatening environment. Hindsight is usually 

20/20, but it is the decision process one must focus 

on, not so much what was the right answer, for in 

combat life and death decisions will be made in 

seconds or less. 

In summary, Sun Tsu said “Know the enemy 

and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles 

and win every one.” One can never know enough about 

the enemy. Find his patterns then plan and exploit 

his weaknesses. Conduct after action reviews after 

every mission to learn what one can do better. Know 

the ground one travels down to the littlest detail and 

know what ground provides a tactical advantage. Look 

disciplined, always look formidable and dangerous rolling 

down the road, and look alert especially in high threat 

areas. One can never have enough machineguns or 

ammunition in a kill zone. Whenever available, ask for air 

escort; both the Vietnam and Iraq wars taught that any 

convoy rolling with air cover did not get hit. 
282 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

24 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

25 SFC John A. Wolitski interview by Richard Killblane, at Fort Eustis, VA, 

19 July 2006.

26 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2008.

27 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

35 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008

36 Killblane, OIF Trip Report 2007.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Killblane, OIF 2008 Journal.

42 Wolitski interview.

43 Wolitski interview.

44 Ibid.

45 Killblane, OIF 2007 Journal.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Killblane, OIF Trip Reports 2007 and 2008.

50 Killlbane, OIF 2007 Journal.

51 Wolitski interview.

52 Killblane, OIF/OEF Trip Report 2008.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

Convoy staging out of FOB Sharana, Afghanistan. Photo courtesy of Richard Killblane
Bibliography 283

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284 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

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Baxter, SSG Brett A., Sworn Statement, 14 November 2004.

Bohm, SPC Matthew W., Sworn Statement, April 2004, Commander’s Inquiry.

Brown, SSG Aaron B., Sworn Statement, 14 November 2004.

Brown, Jacob P., Sworn Statement, 11 April 2004.

Brown, 1LT Matthew R., Sworn Statement, 13 May 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Burke, SGT Ricky A., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Coleman, SPC Elaine F., Sworn Statement, 4 June 2004.

Da Silva, 1LT Tamara, Sworn Statement, 1 August 2009.

Delaney, SPC Robert A., Sworn Statement, 9 April 2004.

Delaney, SPC John D., Sworn Statement, 16 April 2004.

Dyer, SGT James, Sworn Statement, 10 June 2004.

Grage, Donald C., Sworn Statement, 9 April 2004.

Gregory, SPC Kirby, Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Groff, SFC Robert D., Sworn Statement, 24 April 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Hammons, SGT Rickie D., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Hawley, SFC Mark A., Sworn Statement, 14 April 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Heinmiller, SPC Stephen D., Sworn Statement, 4 June 2004. 

Heuer, 1SG David J., Sworn Statement, 20051028.

Hicks, SGT Rohald C., Jr., Sworn Statement, 11 April 2004.

Hollingsworth, SSG Arthur, Sworn Statement, 26 April 2004.

Kirkpatrick, SPC Shawn E., Sworn Statement, 13 May 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Klein, SFC Michael A., Sworn Statement, 13 April 2004.

Lamar, SPC Karon G., Sworn Statement, April 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Malone, SPC Patrick T., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Martin, SSG James D., Sworn Statement, 8 April 2004.

McDermott, SPC Craig V., Written Statement, 22 April 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Mikes, SFC Stephen Sworn Statement, 21 November 2004.

Pelz, SPC Patrick, Sworn Statement, April 2004, Commanders Inquiry.

Row, SPC Dustin L., Sworn Statement, 9 April 2004, Commander’s Inquiry.

Sallee, SPC Brandon E., Sworn Statement, 11 April 2004.

Saylor, SPC Richard S., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Shrack, SSG Charles M., Sworn Statement, 14 November 2004.

Simpson, SGT Matthew T., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Souza, MSG John P., Sworn Statement, 28 October 2005.

Swensen, CPL Richard David III Sworn Statement, 23 November 2004.

Van Roekel, SSG David, Sworn Statement, 20 March 2006.

Vogel, SGT Kevin R., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Watson, SGT Bryan C., Sworn Statement, Commanders Inquiry.

Williams, SGT Austin John O., Sworn Statement, 22 November 2004.

Young, SPC William P., Sworn Statement, 20 March 2005.

Testimonies

Sanchez, Edward V., Former KBR/Halliburton Employee, Testimony to Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing, “An Oversight Hearing on 

Accountability of Contracting Abuses in Iraq”, 18 September 2006.

Scott, Allen, T. Jr., Testimony given before Senate Democratic Policy Committee Meeting, “An Oversight Hearing on Accountability for 

Contracting Abuses in Iraq”, 18 Sep 06, Historians Files, CMH.

Interviews

Akin, LTC George interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Bragg, NC, 5 November 2005.

Bachman, SPC Michael J. interview, 14 May 2004, Commander’s Inquiry.

Biggers, SGT Ronnie interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Blackwood, James interview by MAJ Mike W. Caraballo, Commander’s Inquiry, 20 May 2004.

Brezovay, Michael interview by MAJ Mike W. Caraballo, Commanders Inquiry, 20 May 2004.

Burks, SGT Brandon Lee interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.
Bibliography 285

Castro, SSG Aaron, SGT Rondell Brown and SPC Alexander Hernandez interview by 2LT Charles Gilkey and Richard Killblane, 

at Navistar, Kuwait, 28 March 2005.

Chambers, BG (P) James interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Lee, VA, May 2007.

Church, SPC Jeremy L. telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 14 February 2007.

Croft, LTC Chris interview by Richard Killblane at LSA Balad, Iraq, 12 March 2008.

Cross, William telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 15 April 2014.

Da Silva, 1LT Tamara interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Da Silva, 1LT Tamara interview by Richard Killblane, at Ft Lee, VA, 21 November 2011.

Dowling-Wise, SGT Jeremy interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Ernest, CPT Jennifer interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Lee, VA, 20 January 2012.

Flores, 1LT Maria and 1LT Leah Mock interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA, 30 January 2008.

Dolge, CPT Michael D. interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA, 17 July 2008 and 10 April 2009.

Geraci, 1LT Michael interview by Richard Killblane at LSA Balad, Iraq, 17 March 2008.

Hanson, CPL Leonard interview by Richard Killblane at Camp Navistar, 6 March 2007.

Hart, Ron telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 12 May 2006.

Hernandez, SGT Anthony interview by Richard Killblane, at Arifjan, Kuwait, 8 March 2005.

Jandreau, SSG Gary interview by Richard Killblane at Camp Navistar, Kuwait, 6 March 2007.

Kennedy, SGT Jonathan and SPC Brandon Dettman interview by 2LT Gilkey and Killblane, at Navistar, Kuwait, 20 March 2005.

Kim, SGT Young interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Lindsey, SSG Shane and SSG Efrain Garcia interview by Richard Killblane, at LSA Balad, Iraq, 13 March 2008.

Love, SFC Polee by Richard Killblane at Camp Arifjan, 12 March 2005.

Marler, SPC Daniel J. interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

McCormick ,CPT James L. II telephone interview by Richard Killblane, March 22, 2005; 23 July 2005; 3 May 2006; 6-15 November 2006; 5 April 2012.

McPhee, SPC Shareese by Richard Killblane at Arifjan, Kuwait, 8 March 2005.

Miller, CPT Renina interview by Richard Killblane at Fort Eustis, VA, 5 December 2007.

Miller, CPT Chris interview by Richard Killblane at LSA Balad, Iraq, 13 March 2008.

Mills, SFC Byron interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Morris, SGT Dustin interview by Tom Bruscino at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 19 July 2006.

Nein, SSG Timothy F. interview by Tom Bruscino at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 28 June 2006.

Oledan, 1LT Marco interview by Richard Killblane, FOB Salerno, Afghanistan, 1 March 2008.

Ordunez, SPC Jesse interview by Tom Brusino at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2004.

Palacios, SGT Armamdo interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, 2009.

Petropoulos, CPT George and SSG Steve LeClair interview by Richard Killblane at Ft Eustis, VA, 5 May 2005.

Polk, 1LT Latonya interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Powell, SFC Samuel, Jr. and SPC Ronald Gallet by Richard Killblane at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, 12 March 2005.

Pullen, SPC Ashley interview by Tom Bruscino, at Ft Leavenworth, KS, 16 August 2006.

Roekel, SSG David Van, SPC Barbara Higgins, PFC Jairo Torres, SGT Jonathan Kennedy interview by 2LT Charles Gilkey and Richard Killblane, 

at Navistar, Kuwait, 28 March 2005.

Ross, Randy telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 20 June 2014.

Saenz, SGT Mario telephone interview by Richard Killblane, 22 June 2012.

Sagen, LTC James interview by Richard Killblane, 2 February 2006.

Stannard, Raymond T. interview by MAJ Mike W. Caraballo, Commanders Inquiry, 21 May 2004.

Stewart, SSG Thomas G., Jr. interview by Richard Killblane, Ft Eustis, VA, 9 August 2007.

Tabota, SGT Dill interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Ward, SPC Aaron interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Whisenant, David interview by Richard Killblane, at Hurricane, WV, 12 November 2005.

White, SGT Baronsay interview by LCDR Jason Robison, Kandahar, 2009.

Wilken, SGT Todd interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Williams, SSG Anthony interview by LCDR Jason Roberson at Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009.

Williams, SGT John O. interview by Richard Killblane, 8 March 2005.

Wilson, SFC Bernard and SSG Vernon Drake interview by Richard Killblane at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, 4 March 2007.

Wolitski, SFC John A. interview by Richard Killblane, at Fort Eustis, VA, 19 July 2006.

Wood, Danny interview and Rick Tollison interview by MAJ Mike W. Caraballo, Commander’s Inquiry, 28 May 2004.

Wright, SSG Lane interview by Richard Killblane at Arifjan, Kuwait, 8 March 2005.

Emails

Blue, Ralph email to Richard Killblane, July 27, 2005.

Brady, MAJ James email to Richard Killblane, November 8, 2006.

Bretney, James email to Richard Killblane, June 1, 2006.

Cuthbertson, SFC Jody email to Richard Killblane, November 13, 2006.

Hart, MAJ Christopher email to Richard Killblane, March 30, 2006; April 4, 2006.

Ingham, SPC Aaron email to James McCormick, December 4, 2006.

Kleiman, 1LT Kim email to Richard Killblane, 30 April 2006.

Kleiman, 1LT Kim M. email to James McCormick, 30 April 2006.
286 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Martin, SSG Joshua email to Richard Killblane, July 6, 2009.

McCormick, CPT James email to Richard Killblane, April 7, June 7, June 8, October 5, 2005.

Mulcahy, SSG Michael email to Richard Killblane, April 6 – May 10, 2006. 

Noble, Bryan email to Richard Killblane, October 4, 2005.

Peterson, CPT Erik email to Richard Killblane, June 9 - July 6, 2009.

Richardson, SGT Anthony Account of Easter Weekend 04 emailed to Richard Killblane, 2 August 2005.

Russo, 2LT Michael email to Robert Cameron, June 19, 2009.

Souza, MSG John P. emails to Richard Killblane, March 23 -29, 2006.

Stantz, Travis email to Richard Killblane, November 7, 2006.

Van Roekel, SFC David email to Richard Killblane, October 24, and November 18, 19, 20, 2006.

Citations

Bartlett, SFC Richard A., Narrative recommendation for the award of the Bronze Star with Valor.

Baxter, SSG Brett A., Narrative recommendation for the Award of the Bronze Star with Valor.

Brown, SSG Aaron, Supplemental Narrative for Awards, 11 April 04 – Iskandyria, Iraq.

Brown, SGT Kirt W., Narrative recommendations for the award of the Army Commendation Medal with Valor.

Blanton, SGT Heather M., Narrative recommendations for the award of the Army Commendation Medal with Valor.

Church, SPC Jeremy, Silver Star Citation.

Drushel, SSG Jeffery A., Narrative recommendation for award of the Army Commendation with Valor.

Hicks, SGT Ronald C., Narrative recommendation for award of the Army Commendation with Valor.

Robinson, SPC Michael E., Narrative for Award of the Bronze Star Medal with Valor.

Shaw, SPC Thomas F., Narrative recommendation from the Award of the Army Commendation Medal with Valor.

Wells, SSG Steven G., Narrative recommendation for award of the Bronze Star.

Witkowski, SGT James, Silver Star Citation.

Videos

Documentary, “Battlefield Dairies: Baghdad Convoy Attack,” Military Channel, 2006.

Video of Battle of BIAP filmed by Matt Roark, 1487th Transportation Company.

Video of Battle of BIAP filmed by Matthew Sands, 172nd Transportation Company.

Video of Battle of BIAP filmed by Chris Marion, 762nd Transportation Company.

Video of the Palm Sunday Ambush filmed by Jairo Torres, 518th Gun Truck Company.

Videos PHOT0021 and 1075BOB shot from digital cameras by two different DoD drivers.

Captured Iraqi video of the Palm Sunday Ambush.
Index 287

A

Adams, SPC Darrell, 38, 

Adams, LTC William H., 262, 263, 273

Addison, SPC Jamaal R., 11

Adkins, SPC Bill, 67

Ahlvers, 1LT Audry, 211

Akin, LTC George, 34, 35, 37, 57, 58

Albert, SGT Michael, 194

Alfaro, PFC Veronica, 204

Allen, CPT, 56

Anderson, CPT Walter, 251

Anguiano, PFC Edward, 11

Armstrong, 205, 206

Armstrong, SSG Thomas, 50, 55, 56

B

Bach, SPC Jacob, 22, 89

Bachman, SPC Michael J., 39, 45, 46, 49, 68

Bailey, SGT, 21

Baird, SPC Dan, 30

Baird, 2LT Jim, 269

Baker, SGT James R., 138-140, 159, 162

Bartlett, SFC Richard, 74-77, 79

Baumgarner, SGT Rebecca, 181, 186, 187

Baxter, SSG Brett A., 75, 77, 78

Beatty, LTC Vernon, 209

Bedford, MAJ (UK), 129

Beck, SPC Jennifer, 140, 141, 144-146, 

153-157, 159, 160, 163, 164, 169

Bell, Timothy, 47, 58

Bellino, COL Joe, 5, 257

Beltran, SPC Monica, 181, 186

Bennet, SPC Michael L., 121, 122

Biggers, SSG Ronnie, 228, 230, 234, 240, 243

Bese, SPC Ben, 215

Birkel, SPC Josh, 161, 162

Blackwater Security Consulting, 21, 105

Blackwood, James, 52

Blanchette, SGT Casey J., 51

Blankenship, SGT, 215

Blankenship, SGT Terry, 38, 42, 50, 51, 54

Blanton, SGT Heather M., 76

Bloebaum, SGT Anthony J., 135, 141, 144, 153-

155, 160, 167

Blue, SPC Ralph, 24, 26, 29-31, 88

Bohm, SPC Matthew W., 39, 48, 49, 54

Bolland, CPT David, 117

Bos, SPC Tim, 141, 142, 153, 155, 160

Brady, MAJ James, 116, 117, 126, 128, 131

Bradley, William, 44-46, 54

Breen, CPT Nicholas M., 266

Brezovay, Michael, 48, 49, 51, 54

Bristow, CPT Isaac, 19

Brooks, SGT Andrea, 77

Brown, SPC, 211, 214

Brown, SSG Aaron B., 74-77

Brown, SPC Jacob P., 38

Brown, SGT Kirk W., 76

Brown, 1LT Matthew R., 35-39, 41-46, 

50, 51, 57

Brown, SGT Rondell, 158, 159, 162, 163

Bruscino, Dr. Tom, 169

Bryne, PFC, 242

Bueno, Gabriel, 278

Buggs, SGT George, 10-12, 14

Burke, LTC John, 257, 259

Burke, SGT Ricky D., 158, 159, 162, 163

Burks, SGT Brandon Lee, 225, 228, 230, 232, 

237, 238, 240, 244, 246

Butler, SGT Thomas, 83, 85, 88

Byers, SGT, 86

C

Calibro, SGT Steve, 257

Carta, CPT, 266

Callahan, CPT Devin, 210

Campbell, SGT Curtis, 11, 13

Carista, CPL Francis, 11, 13

Carlson, SGT, 102

Carr, SPC Ineda, 236, 242

Carter, SSG Robert, 75, 76

Cass, SFC Louis, 134, 136

Castner, SPC Stephen, 191, 276

Castro, SSG Aaron, 158, 159, 162

Cheney, Dick, 204

Chambers, BG James, 107, 260, 263

Chapman, PFC Devin, 241

Church, PFC Jeremy L., 35-37, 41-44, 49-51, 

54-56, 61

Clemmens, SGT Gerald, 185

Coalition Forces

Coalition Force Land Component 

 Command (CFLCC), 11, 19, 126, 

 131, 134, 135, 191, 193, 259, 262, 

 273, 279

Multinational Corps-Iraq, 107, 130, 134, 

 168, 173, 191, 202, 206, 253, 264, 

 274, 275, 276

Combined Joint Task Force 7, 21, 35, 

 36, 107

2nd Prince of Wales Royal Regiment, 126, 

 129, 130, 267

Coe, SPC Brian, 25-29

Coleman, Elaine F., 28

Coleman, SSG Ronny, 101

Colon, SPC Daniel, 216

Cooke, SPC Anthony D., 203, 204, 206

Cooper, SPC Casey, 147-149, 163

Cornett, COL Don, 276

Costa, SSG Anthony, 101, 106

Cremin, 1LT Colin, 90, 97

Croft, LTC Christopher, 264, 270, 272

Cross, SSG, 103-107

Cross, William, 141, 144, 146, 152, 153, 156, 

157, 163, 164, 168

Croley, SSG, 112

Cunningham, Robert, 175

Cuthbertson, SFC Jody, 114, 117, 118, 126-

128, 130, 131, 167

D

Dagit, Keven, 175-177

Danforth, 2LT Wade, 82-84, 88

Da Silva, 1LT Tamara, 223-225, 227-238, 

240-245, 247, 272

Davenport, SFC Kelvin B., 265

Debutts, SSG, 211, 214

Delancy, SPC Ricky, 114, 146, 153-155, 

157, 160

Delaney, SPC John D., 76, 79

Delaney, SPC Robert A., 28

Dempsey, MG Martin, 107

Dettman, SPC Brandon, 145, 146, 161

Dolge, CPT Michael, 210-218

Dominique, CPT Dean, 20, 264

Dominguez, SGT James, 77

Donelson, SGT Nancy, 75

Dowdy, 1SG Robert J., 9-12, 14

Drake, SSG Vernon, 192, 193, 196

Drushel, SSG Jeffrey A., 77

Dubois, PFC Marcus, 11, 13

Dyer, SGT Tracy, 25-29

E

Eakins, Niky, 196

Ernest, CPT Jennifer, 242, 244

Eby, SGT Matthew D., 83, 85, 88

Ellertson, SGT Shaun, 99, 101, 102, 106

Elliot, PFC Adam, 11, 13

Ellis, LTC Lee, 280

Estrella-Soto, PV2 Ruben, 11, 14

F

Farenden, SGT, 128

Fields, SPC Mabel, 246

Fischetti, LTC Joseph, 10

Fisher, Steven, 40-42, 47-49, 54, 58

Floyd, SSG Walter “Tony,” 260

Ford, SPC, 117

Franklin, SFC, 56

Froncak, SSG Christine, 186

G

Gaffney, LTC David, 172, 173, 252, 253, 

260, 262

Gallet, PVT Ronald, 64-68

Gantt, SGT Jeffrey, 185, 186

Garcia, SPC, 212, 214

Garcia, SFC Efrain, 200, 202-206

Garcia, PFC Jose L., 230, 232

Gardner, SSG Greg, 211, 214

Gatewood, CPT Amanda R., 74, 75, 79, 80

Gearheart, SPC Ryan, 75

Geraci, 1LT Michael, 200
288 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

Glass, CPT Peter, 64, 65, 68

Goodrich, PFC Gregory R., 45, 54, 55, 57, 58

Graff, SPC Jacob, 145, 154, 155, 157, 158

Grage, SSG Donald C., 38, 39, 41, 45, 48, 51

Greene, MAJ Mark, 70, 72

Gregory, SPC David, 111, 112

Gregory, SPC Kirby, 158, 162, 163

Grenner- Case, Sascha, 175

Grimes, SSG, 98, 100, 101, 104

Groff, SFC Robert D., 35, 39, 42, 47, 49, 51, 

53-57, 60, 61

Grubb, SPC James, 11, 13

Gruver, SSG Rick, 24-28

Gutierrez, SSG Joe, 192, 194, 195

Gun Trucks

Battleship, 17

Big O, 111-113

Brutus, 258

Burke’s Law, 257

Eve of Destruction, 252, 257

Eve of Destruction II, 17

Heavy Metal, 111

Iron Horse, 252

King Kong, 269

Street Sweeper, 83, 85, 86

Zebra, 23-26, 28-31, 61, 80, 83-88, 258

H

Haggard, SFC Tim, 24, 82-84, 86, 88

Hamill, Thomas E., 34, 36, 38-42, 44, 47, 52, 

53, 58

Hammons, SFC Rickie D., 136, 159, 165

Handy, SPC, 104

Hanson, CPL Leonard, 192, 194-197

Harris, SPC John, 141, 145, 154, 155, 157, 

164, 165

Harshbarger, SGT Dale, 111-113

Hart, Ron, 141, 144-146, 152, 153, 155, 156, 

159-162

Hartman, SGT Jonathan, 98, 102

Haun, COL James A., 276

Hawk, SGT Brian, 78

Hawley, SFC Mark A., 35, 37, 38, 41, 50, 51

Hawkins, SPC Jared, 246

Haynes, PFC Donzie, 70

Haynes, SPC William, 149, 150, 158, 159, 

162, 163

Heard, SGT Donald, 65

Heesacker, SPC Thomas, 160

Heggie, SSG, 120, 124

Henderson, SGT Jesse, 204

Henderson, LT Robert L. II, 92-94, 98, 100, 

102, 103

Henley, SGT Jon, 111

Henry, CPT Terrence, 21

Henson, PFC Clayton W., 102

Hernandez, SGT Alexander, 158, 159, 162, 163

Hernandez, SGT Anthony, 76, 79

Hernandez, SPC Edgar, 11, 14

Hernandez, “H”, 204, 205

Herron, SSG Marty, 174

Hester, SGT Leigh Ann, 138, 148-151, 159, 169

Heuer, 1SG David J., 181, 182, 186

Hicks, SP4 Larry, 257

Hicks, SGT Ronald C. Jr., 76, 77

Higgins, SPC Barbara, 141-143, 155, 157

Hinton, CPT James, 22, 24

Hollingsworth, SSG Arthur, 44, 51

Holloway, SPC K’ray, 25, 26, 28, 29, 119

Hooker, MG Joseph, 257, 259

Howard, 1LT Gregory, 38

Howell, Nelson, 38, 44, 47, 52-54

Hubbard, SPC Ryan, 145, 146, 161, 162

Hudson, SPC Joseph, 11, 13-15

Hulett, Steven, 45, 47, 58

Hunter, John, 252

Hupp, SGT Robert, 77, 78

Hurd, SSG, 65, 66

I

Ingham, SPC Aaron J., 121, 122, 124

J

Jackson, SSG Tarik, 11, 13

Jacobs, SSG Shirley, 157, 158, 164, 165

Jandreau, SSG Gary, 192-197

Johnson, PFC Howard, 11, 13

Johnson, SPC Shoshana, 11, 14

Johnson, SPC Timothy, 12, 13

Johnson, Tony, 45, 46, 58

Jopeck, SGT Stephen W., 191, 202

K

Kapture, PFC Ronald J., 51

Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), 19, 21, 34-40, 

44-52, 54-58, 60, 65-68, 108, 173, 174, 

176, 177, 197, 200, 202-206, 219, 278

Kennedy, SGT Jonathan, 145, 146, 161, 162

Kenyon, Marc, 174, 175

Kibogy, SPC Caroline, 175

Kiehl, SPC James M., 11, 14

Kim, SPC Joanna, 77, 78

Kim, SGT Young, 225, 230, 236, 238, 243, 244

Kimmitt, BG Mark, 21

King, CPT Troy K., 8-14

Kinzer, SPC Kelly, 157, 160

Kirkland, PFC Christy, 158, 165

Kirkland, SSG, 192

Kirkpatrick, SPC Shawn E., 39, 48, 49, 54, 55

Kleiman, 1LT Kim, 120-124, 130

Klein, SFC Michael A., 50, 51, 54, 55

Knight, CPT Patrick, 279, 280

Kolleda, 1LT Joshua, 244

Kowalewski, SFC Christopher H., 54-56

Krause, SGT Elmer, 51, 56-58

Kuhn, SPC, 234

Kuta, Timothy J., 5

L

Lamar, SPC Karon G., 39, 42, 49, 53, 55

Landry, CPT Robert, 108, 110, 111, 116

Lane, SPC Joseph, 117, 119

Lavite, 1LT Bradley, 17

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 

172, 174, 178, 252-254, 268

Lawson, SPC Brandon, 24, 28-308, 85, 88, 89

LeClair, SSG Steve, 74-77, 79

Lee, SSG, 98

Lehman, SGT Christopher M., 83-86, 88

Leipheimer, SFC Michael, 211, 215

Lem, Christopher, 83-86, 88

Lendewig, CPT Eric, 274, 281 

Leonard, SPC Colby, 77, 192

Leonard, MG Kevin A., 276

Leonhard, COL Brian K., 200

Lester, Jackie D., 40-43, 47-49, 52, 54, 55, 58

Letterkenny, 252

Lewis, CPL Robert W., 230, 231, 234, 235, 241

Lindner, CPT Todd, 137, 138, 163

Lindsey, SSG Shane, 200, 202-206, 274, 278

Ling, LTC Robert C., 279

Lourigan, SPC Steven, 111, 112, 118, 119, 121, 

125-128, 131

Love, SFC Polee, 70-72

Loyd, SPC, 76

Ludwick, CPT Michael E., 57

Ludy, COL Garland, 257, 259

Lyles, James, 5

Lynch, PFC Jessica, 11, 12, 14, 16

Luten, CPL Damien, 11, 13

M

Mack, SPC Brian, 150, 159, 162, 163, 174

Magdelano, SPC Fernando, 186

Mahamd, Signd, 76

Mahdi Militia, 21, 22, 33, 34, 36, 40, 82. 90, 

91, 107

Malone, SPC Patrick T., 139

Marquez, Jason, 258

Martin, SSG James D., 28, 29

Martin, SSG Joshua D., 97, 101

Maskell, LTC Charles, 19, 273

Mata, CW2 Johnny V., 11, 13, 14, 23

Mata, SSG Robert, 111, 112

Maupin, PFC Keith M., 37, 45, 46, 56-58

McCormick, 1LT James, II, 22-25, 28-31, 61, 

80, 82-86, 88, 89, 108, 110-112, 116-

122, 124-131, 134, 167, 206, 258, 274, 

277, 279

McDermott, SPC Craig V., 37, 38, 44, 45, 50, 

51, 60

McEndree, SPC Sean, 64, 66, 67, 69

McGinley, LTC Edward, 276, 277, 279

McLean-Burrel, CPT Thelonious, 116, 117, 134

McPhee, SPC Shareese, 70-72

Mealer, PFC, 25, 30
Index 289

Meaney, PVT James M., 51

Medicine Man, 203, 205

Mehall, SGT Eric J., 54

Metheny, LTC Orvil, 259

Mike, SPC Jason, 149-152, 158, 159, 162, 163, 

168, 169

Mikes, SFC Stephen, 111, 112, 114

Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), 21, 

110, 134, 166, 168, 269, 270, 279

Miller, CPT Chris, 200

Miller, SPC Justin, 25-29

Miller, SPC Keith, 29

Miller, PFC Patrick, 11, 12, 14

Miller, 2LT Renina, 64-67, 69

Mills, CPL, 128

Mills, SFC Bryon, 225-227, 229, 230, 232-234, 

240, 241, 243, 247

Minarich, CPT Todd, 262

Miser, COL Jeffrey, 117, 134, 253, 258

Montague, Jack, 45, 58

Moore, CPT Thomas J. II, 92-107

Morabito, SSG Carl, 122, 124

Morris, SGT Dustin, 137, 138, 147, 148, 

151, 159

Motley, SPC Andrea, 76, 77

Mulcahy, SSG Michael, 180, 181, 184-187 

Mullen, SGT Mike, 77

Mullins, PFC Eric, 98

Mulitauopele, SSG Americana, 100

Munos, SGT Eddie, 158, 164

Munz, CPT Aaron J., 22, 55-57

N

Nace, PFC Dale, 11, 13

Nash, CW3 Mark, 11, 13

Nein, SSG Timothy F., 31, 136-139, 147-152, 

159, 163, 168, 169, 279

Nichols, CPL, 205

Nicholson, COL John, 209

Noble, CPL Bryan, 23-25, 28-31, 83-86, 88, 89, 

118, 119, 277

O

Oledan, 1LT Marco, 220-222

Olivas, SGT Michael A., 120, 122, 124

Olmstead, CPT Cory, 262, 267

Olson, LT, 194

Onwordi, SPC Justin B., 51

Ordunez, SPC Jesse, 147, 148, 150, 151, 159

Osborne, SPC Dana S., 230, 231, 235, 241

Overstreet, 1LT Lucas, 211, 215

P

Pagent, MAJ Mark, 37

Palacios, SGT Armando, 230, 233, 236, 

237, 240

Parker, Jeffrey, 45, 58

Parsons, PFC Timothy, 119, 125, 127

Peacock, SGT, 25

Pelz, SPC Patrick L., 39, 42, 49, 54-56

Pena, SPC Roger Jr., 211, 214, 215, 218

Perry, CSM Dwayne, 167, 258

Persinger, SGT, 56

Peterson, (AU), 156

Peterson, Bill, 37, 45, 50

Peterson, SSG Alan, 215

Peterson, CPT Erik, 91-96, 107

Peterson, LTC Michael P., 220

Peterson, CPT Nate, 181, 182, 186

Peterson, SPC Nicholas, 11, 13

Petrik, SGT Joel, 11, 13

Petropoulos, CPT George, 74, 80, 89

Pierce, SFC Anthony, 11-13

Piestewa, PFC Lori, 11, 12, 14

Pluciennik, 1LT Ed, 267

Polk, 1LT Latonya, 224, 225, 230, 233, 240

Powell, SFC Samuel, Jr., 64-68

Power, 2LT (UK), 126-128

Pullen, SPC Ashley, 147-152, 159, 162, 163

R

Ramiro, SFC, 143

Rat Patrol, 19-21, 262

Raz, SSG, 192, 195-197

Rhoads, SPC Wesley, 265

Rhyne, 1LT Joe, 100

Richardson, SGT Anthony, 84-86, 88, 89

Ricketts, SGT Terrance, 143-145, 153-156, 

158-161, 164-166

Riley, SGT James, 11, 12, 14

Rivera, SGT, 64, 68

Rivera, SGT Joe, 138, 148-152, 159, 162, 163

Robbins, SGT Tony, 204-206

Robinson, SPC Michael, 111, 113

Robinson, CPL Tanerrius D., 203, 206

Rodriguez, SPC Alfredo, 235, 241

Rose, SGT Matthew, 11-13

Ross, Randy, 34, 39, 40, 41, 44-46, 49, 60

Row, SPC Dustin L., 37, 38, 44, 45, 50, 51, 

54, 58

Rullo, SPC Paul, 157, 160

Russell, SPC, 21

S

Sadr, Muqtada al, 21, 24, 33, 34, 39, 43, 58, 

82, 91, 96, 106, 107

Saenz, SGT Mario E., 225, 230-233, 235, 241

Sagen, LTC James, 5, 116-118, 126, 131, 267

Salemme, SPC Thomas, 23, 86

Sanchez, SGT, 242

Sanchez, Edward, 51, 54

Sandor, CPT Wesley, 266

Sauer, SPC Tara, 75

Schrad, SPC Jay, 161, 162

Sharples, SPC Michael, 160-162

Shaw, SPC Thomas F., 78

Shearin, 1LT Jeff, 10

Schrack, SSG Charles M., 77

Shreve, 1SG James, 255

Shugrue, SPC Michael P., 75-78

Sierra, SPC Gerber, 246

Simpson, SSG Donavan D., 50, 51, 54

Simpson, SGT Mathew T., 158, 159, 163

Skunk Werks, 18, 19, 34, 69, 251, 253, 254

Slaughter, PFC Jeffrey, 37, 44, 45, 50

Sloan, PV2 Brandon, 11, 12, 14

Smith, SPC, 211, 216

Smith, CPT Jeffrey F., 34, 35, 37, 57, 58

Smith, SGT Gary, 181, 186

Snell, CPT Matt, 266

Snyder, SGT Dan, 265

Souza, MSG John Philip, 181, 182, 186

Stanley, Keith, 50-52

Stannard, Raymond T., 46-49, 51, 52, 54

Stantz, SPC Travis, 119, 125, 127-129

Steward, Terry, 174, 175

Stewart, PFC, 233

Stewart, SSG Thomas G., Jr., 27-30, 83-85, 88

Stewart & Stevenson, 178, 179, 252

Stracke, SSG Edwin G., 186

Studer, SSG Dan, 21

Suchowski, SPC Jennifer, 184

Suter, PV2 Hillary, 27, 29

Swenson, CPL Richard III, 111

T

Tabota, SGT Dill, 242, 244

Taylor, 1SG Charles Q., 

Tavai, MSG Ani, 89

Thompson, SPC Andrew, 175

Tiger Team, 19, 20, 264

Tikem, MAJ, 228

Toews, SPC Nathan, 215, 216

Tollison, Rick, 49-51

Torres, PFC Jairo, 143, 157, 164, 165, 167

Totten, SPC Ryan, 175

Trias-DeRyder, CPT Carolyn, 210

Trueblood, SGT Eric, 214, 215, 217

Trujillo, SGT, 211, 214

Tucker, SGT, 192, 193

U

Uhl, SSG Jeffrey, M., 135, 136, 140-142, 144, 

153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 163, 165, 167
290 Convoy Ambush Case Studies - Volume II

US Army units:

Corps

V Corps, 7, 8

Division

1st Cavalry Division, 21, 31, 34, 36, 91, 

 107, 112

1st Armored Division, 90, 93, 107

3rd Infantry Division, 6, 9

10th Mountain Division, 209, 252

24th Infantry Division, 22

36th Infantry Division, 200

82nd Airborne Division, 221, 262

Infantry

5th Infantry, 90

16th Infantry, 266

87th Infantry, 209

133rd Infantry, 263, 265,266

135th Infantry, 253

142nd Infantry, 270

144th Infantry, 200, 202, 257, 264, 271, 

 274, 278

148th Infantry, 269

160th Infantry, 269

161st Infantry, 270

293rd Infantry, 270

297th Infantry, 200

325th Infantry, 252, 253

442nd Infantry, 269

504th Airborne Infantry, 263

Cavalry

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 90, 91, 

 93, 94, 106

4th Cavalry, 262, 267, 271, 273

5th Cavalry, 54

8th Cavalry, 64

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 120, 121

12th Cavalry, 22, 41, 50

105th Cavalry, 271

126th Cavalry, 269

299th Cavalry, 269

303rd Cavalry, 270

Armor

37th Armor, 90, 93, 100, 106

185th Armor, 270

Field Artillery

5th Field Artillery, 200

17th Field Artillery, 266

121st Field Artillery, 190, 191, 194, 195, 

 198, 202, 276

133rd Field Artillery, 270

143rd Field Artillery, 274, 281

178th Field Artillery, 118, 120, 121, 133, 

 138, 167, 260, 269

201st Field Artillery, 25

487th Field Artillery, 269

623rd Field Artillery, 18, 133, 136, 

 137, 166

Air Defense Artillery

52nd Air Defense Artillery, 7, 10

Aviation

25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 261

82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, 227,

 228, 231

Engineer

1st Engineer, 262

20th Engineer Battalion, 56

1041st Engineer Company, 255

Military Police

125th MP Battalion, 108

617th MP Company, 136, 137, 169, 

 267, 279

Support

1st Theater Sustainment Command, 276

377th Theater Sustainment 

 Command, 276

13th Corps Support Command, 34, 107, 

110, 135, 260, 262, 263

172nd General Support Group, 36, 57

213th Area Support Group, 200

4th Sustainment Brigade, 270

7th Sustainment Brigade, 200, 281

10th Sustainment Brigade, 209, 270

16th Sustainment Brigade, 270

45th Sustainment Brigade, 224, 229

82nd Sustainment Brigade, 276

287th Sustainment Brigade, 270

304th Sustainment Brigade, 270

371st Sustainment Brigade, 270

3rd Forward Support Battalion, 6, 8

100th Brigade Support Battalion, 225

143rd Combat Sustainment Support 

 Battalion, 262, 263, 267, 273

286th Combat Sustainment Support 

 Battalion. 223, 224, 227-229, 232, 

 235, 244

710th Brigade Support Battalion, 209, 211

782nd Brigade Support Battalion, 220

1034th Combat Sustainment Support 

 Battalion, 262

1103rd Combat Sustainment Support 

 Battalion, 280

Transportation 

7th Transportation Group, 18, 117, 118, 

 120, 131, 132, 167, 253, 258

8th Transportation Group, 5, 58, 60, 

 167, 218, 257, 271, 273, 274, 277

32nd Transportation Group, 276

37th Transportation Group, 191, 276

48th Transportation Group, 268,269

336th Transportation Group, 191, 

 202, 276

372nd Transportation Group, 108, 110

375th Transportation Group, 132, 260

500th Transportation Group, 258,274, 277

6th Transportation Battalion, 6, 259

7th Transportation Battalion, 33-35, 57, 

 108, 252, 259, 264

10th Transportation Battalion, 269, 279

24th Transportation Battalion, 190, 255, 

 276, 277, 279

49th Movement Control Battalion, 36

57th Transportation Battalion, 276

106th Transportation Battalion, 5, 116, 

 130, 131, 199, 204, 264, 267, 270, 

 271, 273 

181st Transportation Battalion, 19, 172, 

 177, 180, 187, 260, 264, 273

457th Transportation Battalion, 172, 173, 

 252, 260, 262

734th Transportation Battalion, 266

766th Transportation Battalion, 64, 65, 

 66, 90-92, 94

812th Transportation Battalion, 88

1144th Transportation Battalion, 269

25th Transportation Company, 68, 71

96th Transportation Company, 64, 68, 

 157, 272

149th Transportation Company, 225, 230, 

 242, 244

154th Transportation Company, 223- 225, 

 242, 244

172nd Transportation Company, 74, 

 270, 272

178th Route Security Element, 116-118, 

 120, 264, 267

217th Transportation Company, 190, 191

227th Transportation Company, 70, 117

233rd Transportation Company, 109

250th Transportation Company, 278

359th Transportation Company, 258

459th Transportation Company, 258

515th Transportation Company, 275

518th Combat Gun Truck Company, 80, 

 88, 89, 108, 110-117, 119, 131, 

 133-136, 149, 165-169, 253, 258, 

 267, 272, 274, 280

523rd Transportation Company, 257, 275

563rd Transportation Company, 251, 257

567th Transportation Company, 136

660th Transportation Company, 34, 50, 54

644th Transportation Company, 35, 38

724th Transportation Company, 21, 33-38, 

 57-61, 68, 267, 270

729th Transportation Company, 180, 

 182, 186, 257

740th Transportation Company, 22

1032nd Transportation Company, 265

1075th Transportation Company, 133, 

 135, 140, 149, 152, 157-159, 162, 

 164-167, 169, 271
Index 291

1158th Transportation Company, 32,

 120, 121

1173rd Transportation Company, 172, 174, 

 176, 180, 181

1175th Transportation Company, 90-94, 

 97, 100, 101, 105, 107, 167, 169

1452nd Transportation Company, 90, 94, 

 99, 104, 105

1484th Transportation Company, 257

1486th Transportation Company, 21, 22, 

 24, 74-76, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 111, 

 119, 272

1487th Transportation Company, 22, 23, 

 31, 82, 110, 111, 112, 258 

1498th Transportation Company, 280

1544th Transportation Company, 70, 71

1836th Transportation Company, 18, 32

1864th Transportation Company, 20,

 134, 143

2123rd Transportation Company, 90-94, 

 97-101, 104, 105, 272

2632nd Transportation Company, 19, 35

424 Motor Truck Detachment, 258

Quartermaster

53rd Quartermaster Company, 223-225

Ordnance

90th Maintenance Company, 225, 

 242, 244

507th Maintenance Company, 6-13, 15, 16

699th Maintenance Company, 210-212

799th Maintenance Company, 265, 

 275, 280

1073rd Maintenance Company, 252

US Air Force

70th Motor Transportation Detachment, 

 254

2632nd Air Expeditionary Force, 37, 38

US Marine Corps

1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 7

V

Vancleeve, SSG, 93

Van Roekel, SSG David, 142, 143, 157, 169

Vanegas, SPC Jesse, 205

Velazquez, SPC Miguel, 204, 205

Villareal, SSG, 280

Vines, LTG John, 168

Visot, BG Luis, 275

W

Wallace, SPC David, 111, 112

Walsh, PFC Jarob, 46-48, 52-55

Walsh, SPC, 64, 67

Walters, SGT Donald, 11, 12, 16

Ward, SPC Aaron, 244

Wardale, SGT, 64, 66, 67

Watson, SGT, 21 

Watson, SGT Bryan C., 39, 45, 49

Weidel, PFC Jeffrey, 230, 232, 233

Wells, SSG Steven G., 75, 76, 78

Wheeler, Preston, 173-176

Whisenant, SPC Brandon, 119, 120, 124, 

125, 127

White, SPC, 83

White, SGT Baronsay, 237, 243

Whitehead, BG Ennis, 17

Wickham, LTG John A., 131

Wilhelm, CPT Doug, 119

Wilkens, SGT Todd, 230, 231, 233, 234, 237, 

239, 240

Williams, SSG Anthony, 224, 225, 229, 230, 

233, 236, 241

Williams, CPL Clinton, 204

Williams, SFC John O., 111, 113, 115

Wilson, SPC Bernard, 192-196

Witkowski, SGT James, 181, 185

Wolitski, SFC John A., 265, 275, 276, 279, 280

Woolvine, Robert, 175

Wood, Danny, 49-51

Wynne, Rick, 175 Y

Yager, SSG Jeff, 101

Young, SPC William P., 139, 140, 162 Z

Zaremba, SSG Michelle, 77

Zhang, SPC Jun, 11, 13

Zimmerman, Tommy K., 40, 41, 48, 52, 54, 55