No. 2—10—0061 Opin ion f il ed March 8, 2011
IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT
THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) A pp ea l fro m t he C irc uit Co ur t o f OF ILLINOIS, ) De Ka lb C o un t y. ) Pla int iff, ) ) v. ) Nos. 09—DT—408 ) 09—TR—14643 AMY L. DAMK

ROGER, ) 09—TR—14644 ) Defe ndan t-Appell ee )

) Ho no r ab le (Jesse W hi te, Illi nois Secretary of State, ) Me l i ss a S . B ar n h ar t, Contem nor-A ppel l an t). ) Judge, Presidi ng. JUS TI CE BIR KET T d elivered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Pr esiding Ju sti

ce Jor gen se n an d J us ti ce B ow man co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. OPINI ON Jesse W h i te, Il l i n oi s S ec re tar

y of Sta te (Secre tary ), appe al s f

rom th e order of the c i rcui t court hold inghi m i n i ndi rect ci vi l contem pt of c ourt for faili

ng t o iss ue a mo nit o r ing de vic e d r iving pe r mit (MDDP) t o Amy Damkr og er follow ingher sec ond ar re st in a month f or drivi ng unde r the in fl uence (DUI). F or the re ason s tha t fol l ow, we reverse. BACK GROUND The f ac ts are un di spute d. O n J

une 2 1, 2 009 , Da

m krog er w asarres ted

f orDUI in case num ber 09— DT —36 1. Acco rd ing t o t he ar re st ing of f i cer’ s rep ort, Dam

kroger submi

tt ed to a Breat hal

yz erNo. 2—10—0061

-2-

test, which r egist er ed a 0. 144 bloo d alco hol co ncent ra t ion ( BAC) . T he r epo rt furt her re cite d t hat t he off ic er in form ed Dam kroger at the scene

that, as a result of her BAC, her driver’s license wo uld be suspen ded effect ive August 6, 20 09 , t he fo r t y-s ixt h d ay fo llo win g n o t ice o f t he su sp en sio n. On Ju ly 2, 2009, the Secretary m

ai le d Dam kroger a not ic e “confi

rm[i ng] that [her] Illi

nois dri ver’s l icense or dr iving pe r mit an d [ he r ] pr ivileg e t o o pe r at e a mo t o rve hic le or to o bt ain a d r ive r ’s lice nse in I llino is are suspen

ded eff ective [August 6, 2009].” On July 17, less than 30 days af

ter her first DUI arrest, Damkroger was arrested a se co nd t ime f orDUI, in

case num ber 09—D T—408. The report for t hi s arrest states t hat Dam kroger submi

tt ed to a Breathal

yz er, registered a

BAC of 0.118, and consequen

tly was i nf ormed that her d river’s l

icense would be sus pen ded e f f ecti ve Septem be r 1. On Jul y 24, Dam

kroger f i l ed a “ pe ti ti on ** * to res ci

nd the Statu tory Sum mary Sus pe ns i on heretofore

issued in [cas e number 09— DT —40 8] .” On Aug ust 14, t he trial court deni

ed the pe ti ti on to resci nd. On Oct obe r 1 , D amkr og er fil ed a mot ion in cas e nu mber 09 —D T— 40 8 fo r is su anc e o f a MDDP. On

Octobe r 9, the tria l court i ssued an

order di recti ng th e Secretary

to is sue Dam kroger a MDD P. T he o r de rr ec it ed t he co ur t ’s find ing t ha t Da mkr o ge rwa s “a firs t o ffen de ras de fin ed i n [s ec ti on 11—500 of the Illi

nois Vehi cl e Code (Code) (62 5 IL CS 5/1 1—5 00 (W es t 200 8)) ].”Sec ti on 11—500 define s a “firs t o ffe nde r” as , inter al

ia , “any person who has not had a driver’s l icense su sp en si on for violat ingSec t ion 1 1—5 01. 1 [ (6 25 I LCS 5/ 11— 501 .1 (Wes t 200 8) )] wit hin 5 years pri ort o t he date of

the c urren t off en se.” 625 IL CS 5/1 1—500

(We st 2008 ). Section 6—206.1(a)(1) of the Code (6 25 IL CS 5/ 6— 20 6.1 (a)(1 ) (W

es t 20 08 )) prov

i de s th at a “ f i rs t of f en der”i s e n ti tl ed to a MD DP un

l ess , inter al

ia , the “[t]he off

ender’s driv er’s l ic ense i s otherwise i

nva li d.”No. 2—10—0061

-3-

On October 19, t he Secretary n ot if ie d the court that he h

ad no authority to iss

ue Dam kroger
a MDDP, because

she was not a “fi rst offen der” as def

in ed i n section 11—500 o f the C ode. On Novem ber 12 , D am kr oger f i l ed a p eti ti on f or a ru l e to s h ow c au se

di re cti n g th e S ecre tar y to s tate why he sho uld no t be he ld

i n con tem pt of cou rt f or n ot i ss ui n g th e MDD P. D am

kr oge r a rgue d th at, because the suspen si on in case num ber 09—DT—361 was n

ot ye t in ef fect whe n she co mmi

t t ed t he offense char ged in case nu mber 0 9—D T— 408 , she did not have “a driver’s li cense s uspens ion *** wit hin 5 y ea rs pri or to th e d ateof

t he cu rr ent offense ” ( 625 ILC S 5 /1 1—5 00 ( West 200 8) ). The trial court i ssued th e rul

e an d di rected the Se cretary

to respond. In hi s response, the Sec retar y n ot ed that a stat uto ry s

umm ary s uspens ion, such

as was im posedin ca se numb er 09 —D T— 36 1, do es no t t ak e e ffec t unt il 46 da ys aft er no t ice o f t he suspen si on. See 625 ILCS 5/11 —501. 1(g) (West 2008) . The S ecret ary argue d t hat Da mkroge r’s
con stru cti on of se ct ion 1 1—5 00 w ou ld mean, ab su r dly, t ha t a p er so n c o uld comm it serial DUIs y et
r ema in a “ f i rs t of f en de r” a s l on g a s th e suspen si on for the fi rst DUI had not yet becom e eff ective. The Secretary urged

t he trial court to fol

low People v. Crawford , 196 Il l . Ap p. 3d 26 (1990 ), wh ere the ap pe l l atecou

rt, a ppl y i ng an ea rl i er v ers i on of se cti on 1 1—5 00, he l d that the d ef en da nt wasnot
a “ f i rs t of f en de r” f or pu rpos esof re ceiving a jud icial driving perm i t (the predece ssor of the MDDP) follow inghis seco nd DU I w ithin t wo hou rs. The Sec re t ar y not ed t hat , in Craw ford , the s tatutory
su sp en si on for the fi rst arrest was not ye

t in ef fect whe n the second arrest occurred, yet the Craw ford courthel d that t he def

endan t was not a “fi

rst offen der.” See Craw

ford , 196 Ill . App. 3d at 29-30. Under Craw

ford ’s logic, the Secret ary propo sed, Damkroger clearl y was n ot a “f irst offend er ” at t he t ime of her offen

se in case number 09— DT —40 8. The Sec re t ar y urg ed t he co ur t no t t o ho ld h im i n c ontem pt, be caus e he h ad n

o authori ty to i ssue the

MDD P.No. 2—10—0061

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The m atter was hea

rd on Decem

ber 15, 200 9. Fo llowing t he ar gument s o f the par t ies, t he tr ial cou rt ado pt ed Damkro ger’s reasoni ng that she was

a “f irst off ender” wh

en sh e was arrested

in
case num ber 09—D T—

408 , b ec au se

the sta tutory su sp en si on in case num ber 09—DT—361 was not t hen in eff ect. The court found Craw ford in apposite beca

use “s in ce [ Craw ford ] w e’ve ha d t he
new am en dm en ts w h i ch h av e def i n ed wh at a first offend er is.” Ac co rd ingly, the co ur t fou nd t he Secre tary i n i nd i rect ci vi l con tem pt f ornot comply

in g with i ts order to is sue

a MD DP to Dam

kroger. The co ur t gave t he Se cr et ar y time t o p ur ge t he co nt empt and it set t he matte r f or s tatus on Jan uary 15, 2010. On January 15, 2010, the Secretary reaf fi rmed that he had no p ow er t o iss ue t he MD DP . T he courtim posed amonetary

sa nc ti on b ut s tay ed i t pe nd i ng ap pe al . The Se cre

tary ti mel y ap pe al s f rom the orde r of c ontem

pt. AN AL YSIS The Secretary argues that the contempt judgm ent was i mproper becaus e he h

ad n o au th ori ty to is sue Dam

kroger a MDDP as ordered by the t ri al court . Th

e S ecre tar

y pos i ts two se pa ra te rationales. Fi

rs t, the S ec re tar

y con ten dsth at, when

Da m krog er w asarres ted

on July 17, 2009 , in case
num ber 09 —D T— 40 8, she wa s no t a “fi r st offen der” as def

in ed by section 11—500 of

the Code, because she ha d “ a d r ive r ’s lic ens e suspension for violati ng section 11—501.1 [(625 I LCS 5/11—501.1 (West 2008))] withi n 5 y ears prior [to t hat arrest]” (625 ILCS 5/11—5 00 (West 2008) ),
na mel y the su sp en si on a ri si ng out of case nu m be r 09—D T—3 61. Th e Se cre tary con ten dstha t f or purposes of secti on 11—500 the suspen si on in case num ber 09—DT—361 was i

mposed on Jul

y 2, 2009, when he sent Da mkr o ge ro fficia l co nfir mat io n o f t he su sp en sio n. T he Se cr et ar y alt er na t ive ly contends that, ev

en i f Dam kroger w as a

“f i rst of f ender” wh en she co mmit t ed t he o ffen se ch ar ge d inNo. 2—10—0061

-5-

case num ber 09—DT—408, by

the tim e the trial co ur t issued its O ct obe r 9 , 2 009 , o rd er dire ct ing t he Secre tary to is sue Dam kroger a MDD P, he

r l i cense w as “otherwi

se i nv al i d” (6 25 ILC S 5/6—2 06.1(a

)(1) (Wes t 200 8) ), and t he o rd er for a MD DP was wit hou t legal effect , be cau se t he statutory sus pen sion ari

si ng f rom c ase num ber 09—D T—361 h

ad take n e f f ect. We agree , f

or th e re as ons

sta ted be l ow, th at D am krog er wasnot

a “f irst offend er ” whe n she
was arrested in

case num ber 09—DT—408. A s th

i s i s a su f f i ci en t grou nd f orreversi ng the contem

pt judg ment agai

nst the Se cre tary, we do not ad dress whether Damkrog er’s li cense was “otherwise i nv al i d” wh en the tri al court i ssued i

ts Octobe r 9, 200 9, MDD P order. The re is no dis pute over t he standard of revi ew. Whe re a contempt judgm

ent in volv es f actual deter mi nations, t he jud gme nt will no t be r ev er se d “ ‘u nle ss i t is aga inst t he manifest weight of t he evi dence or t he record refl

ects an ab use of di scretion.’ ” In re Marriage of Barile , 385 Ill . App. 3d 752, 759 (2008) (quot in

g In re Marriage of Logston , 103 Ill . 2d 266, 287 (1984)). Where, as here, t he only co nt ent ion is o ver t he lega l effect of u ndispu t ed fac t s, w e r eview t he co nt empt judg ment de
novo . See In re Mar

riage of Kne itz , 341 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 29 9, 303 ( 2003)
. Ad di t io na lly, th e l

eg al ef f ec t of th e u n di spute d f

acts h ere i nv olv es a question of statutory inter pr et at ion, spe cifically t he meaning o f te rms and phr ase s in v arious provi si ons of the Code. Qu es t io ns of statuto ry i

nterpretat ion a

re revi ewed de novo
. In re J.L. , 236 Ill . 2d 32 9, 339- 4 0 (2010 ). The

pri mary obje ctive in construin g a statut e i s to give ef

fect to t he i

ntent of the legi sl ature. Id. at 3 39. Th e m

ost re l i ab l e i

nd i ca torof l egi sl ative

in tent is the statuto ry l

anguage itsel f, whi ch m ust be gi ven i ts plai n a nd ord i na ry mean i ng. Id. The statut ory construction i ssues i nf orm the ul t imate iss ue he re , w hich is whet her t he Secre tary wa s j us ti f

i ed i n re f us i n g to c omp l

y wi th the tria l court’s order to i ssue Dam

kroger aNo. 2—10—0061

-6-

MDDP. A

pa rty ca nn ot b e h el d i n con tem pt of cou rt f or f ai l i n g to c om

pl y wi th a co ur t or der if the pa rty had a “ va l i d excus e” f

or not com

pl y i ng. Barile , 38 5 I ll. App. 3d at 759. T he r e is ex cu sa ble
noncom pli ance wh er e t he pa r t y, t hr o ug h no fau lt o f his o wn , is u na ble t o co mply wi th the court order. In re Marriage of Tatham , 293 Ill . App. 3d 471, 482 ( 19 97 )
. Da mkr o ge rdo es no t dis pu t e t ha t , if she wa s no t a “ firs t o ffen de r ” w he n sh e w as ar r es t ed o n Ju ly 17, 2009, in c ase num

ber 09—DT—408, the Se cretary

had a “ va l i d excus e” f

or ref usi ng to i ssue h er a M

DDP. We pr o ce ed , t he n, t o t he un de r lying is su e of sta tutory i nte rpreta ti on. Th e s

pri ng boa rd f or t he anal ys is is sect ion 6—206.1(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6—206.1(a) (West 2008)), whi ch addre sse s the

i ssu ance of MDD Ps. W

e repr oduce m ost of s ection 6—2 06.1(a ): “Mo nito ring Device Dr iving Permi t. Declaration of

Policy . It is hereb

y de cl ared

a p ol i cy of t he State of

Il l i noi s tha t the dri ver who is

i m pai red b y alcohol , o ther dru

g or d rug s, or into xicat ingcompound or compounds i s a threat to the publ ic saf ety an d wel fare. Theref

ore, to pro vide a deter rent t o such pract ice, a statut ory summ ary driv er’s li cense su sp en sio n is appro priate. It is al

so reco gni

zed that drivi

ng i s a priv il ege and t her efo re , t hat t he gr ant ing of driv in g priv il eges, i n a m ann er co nsist ent wit h public sa fet y, is war ra nt ed d ur ing t he pe ri od of suspen si on in the form of a [MDDP]. *** The followi

ng procedures shal

l a pply when eve r a first offend er is arr est ed fo r a ny offense as def

i ne d i n Se cti on 11—

501 [(6 25 IL CS 5/1 1—501 (West 2008))] or a sim il ar provi si on of a

l ocal ordin anc e: (a) Subsequ ent to a not ifi cat ion o f a st at ut or y summary susp ensio n of d riving priv il eges as pr ov i de d i

n Se cti on 1 1—5 01. 1 [ (6 25 I LCS 5/ 11— 501 .1 . ( West 200 8) )] , t he
cou rt, af ter i nf ormi ng th e f i rst of f ender, as de fine d in Section 11—500 [(625 ILCS 5/11—No. 2—10—0061

-7-

500 (West 2008))], of hi

s or her ri ght to a [MDDP] *** , a nd o f the obligat ions o f the MDDP, sha ll enter an orderdire ct ingt he [ Sec re t ar y] ** * t o iss ue a MDD P t o t he o ffender , u nless t he off ender has opted, in

writi ng, not to have a MDDP i ssued *** . How ever, the

cou rt sh al l not enter the order di

recti ng th e Secretary

to is sue the M DDP, i n a ny i nstanc e, i f the c ourt fi

nds: (1) The o ffender’s dr iver’s license is ot herwise invalid; (2) Death or great b odi l

y ha rm res ul ted f rom the arr es t f or Se cti on 11— 501; (3) Th at the of

f en de r h asbe en

pre vi ous l y con vi cte d of reckle ss hom

ic ide or aggra va ted dri vi ng u nde r the i nf l uen ce i nv olv i ng d eath ; or (4) That the offender i s less than 18 years of age.” 625 ILCS 5/6—206.1(a) (We st 2008 ). Section 6—206. 1 specif

ies “ pro cedures” f

or “ w henever a f

irst off ender is arr

ested for any of

fen se as defi ned i n Section 11—501 or a si mi la r provisi on of a l ocal ordin

ance” (emph

asi s added) (625 ILCS 5/ 6—

20 6.1 (Wes t 2008) ). W e conclude from thi s lan guage t hat a driver’s status as a “fi rst of f en der”i s dete

rm i n ed as of th e date of t he arres t f

or th e curren

t of f en se . In thi s c as e, w e re ckon Damkro ger’s sta

tus as a “ f i rs t of f en der”as of Ju l y 17 , 20 09 , the date

of her arrest in

case num ber 09—DT—408. Section 11—500 defi nes “f irst offend er ” in releva nt par t as “any pe rso n who ha s n ot had a d ri ve r’ s l i ce ns e suspe ns i on f

or vi ol ati ng Sec ti on 11 —5 01
. 1 w it hin

5 y ea rs pri or to th e d ateof t he cu rre n t of f ense .” 62 5 I LC S 5 /1 1— 50 0 ( W es t 20 08 ). As th er e i s n o disputethat Dam

kroger had
no ot her qua lif

ying d r ive r ’s lice nse su sp en sio ns w it hin five yea r s o f Ju ly 17 , 20 09 , t he qu es t io n is
so lely whether the suspe

nsi on stemm in g from case num ber 09—DT—361 occurred, f or pu rpos esof
sec tion 11—50 0, pri

or to Jul y 17, 200 9.No. 2—10—0061

-8-

Rene wing t he p ar t ies’ dis ag re eme nt fro m t he c o ur t belo w, t he S ec re t ar y ass er t s t hat fo r purposes of secti on 11—500 the suspen si on in case num ber 09—DT—361 was i

mposed on Jul

y 2, when the Secretary sen

t Damkroger written confi rmati on of the suspen

si on, while

Dam kroger conten ds that the s

uspe ns i on ca nn ot be sa i d to hav e prec eded

i ts ef f ecti ve date, A ugust 6. T his di scu ssi

on req ui res u s to exa

m i ne how statutory s

um mary sus pen sions a

re i ssued. The

re are sev eral relev an t provi sions. The

f i rst i s se cti on 11—

501.1 of the C ode (625 ILCS 5/11—501.1 (West 2008) ). Su bsec t ions (a) and (d) of section 11—501. 1 (625 I LCS 5/11—501 .1(a) , (d) (West 2008) ) pr o vid e t ha t , wh er e a dr iv er i s arre ste d f or DU I un de r s ec ti on 1 1—5 01 a

nd su bm i ts to a ch em i cal test that re

ve al s a B AC

of 0 .08 or grea

ter, the p oli

ce sha l l f i l e wi th the Secre tary a sw orn reportof the test. Subsecti on (f ) (625 ILCS 5 /11— 501.1(f) (West 2008)) requires the off ic er submitt ingth e swor

n repor t to s er v e “i m med i ate noti ceof the sta tutory su m mary su sp en si on on t he pers on[,] and t he su spe nsion a nd di squa l i f i cation sh al l be ef f ecti ve as p rovi ded i n [s ubs ection] (g).” Sub se cti on (g ) p ro vides t hat t he su mmary susp ensio n “shall ta ke e ffect on t he 46th day follow ing t he da te the notice of the s

tatut ory sum

ma ry s uspens ion wa s g i v en

to th e person.” 6 25 ILCS 5/11—501.1(g) (West 20 08 ). S ub se cti on (e ) s tate s th

at, “[u ]p on r ece ipt ” o f the swo rn r epo rt of t he off i cer, the Secretary “ shal

l e nter the st at ut o r y s umma r y su sp en sio n * ** effe ct ive as pr o vid ed in [su bsec t ion] (g).” 625 ILCS 5/11—501.1( e) (West 200 8). Al so “ [u]pon rece i pt” of the sworn report of the of f i cer, t he Se cr et ar y is to “co nfirm the s t at ut or y summary susp ensio n by mail ing a n oti ceof t he ef f ec ti v e date of th e s us pen si on to the person and the court of ven ue.” 625 ILC S 5 /1 1—5 01. 1( h) (West 200 8) . T he Se cr et ar y’s ent ry and co nfirmatio n of t he suspen si on are contemporaneous actions. See People v. McKen na , 328 Ill . A pp. 3d 3 96, 401 (20 02) . Su bs ec ti ons (e) an d (h ) of se cti onNo. 2—10—0061

-9-

11—50 1.1 con

tem pl ate t hat t he Se cr et ar y will

t ake t hese for mal act ions on the suspen si on in advan ce of i ts ef f ecti ve date. The Code el sewhere

ti esthe su sp en si on to a cti on by the Sec reta ry . Se cti on 1 —20 4, p art of t he definitio nal pr eamble o f the Cod e, de fi nes “[s]uspe nsion of driver’s l i cense” as “ [t]he tem

porary withdrawal by forma l action o f the S ecretary of a person’s li cense or pri

vi le ge to operate a motor
ve hic le o n t he pu blic h igh wa ys, fo ra p er io d s pe cific ally d es ign at ed by t he Se cr et ar y.” ( E mph as is adde d.) 625 ILCS 5/1—2 04 (W est 200 8). That a s uspen sion i s deemed i mposed bef

ore its effectiv

e date is, as the Secr etary not es, im pli ed by section 2—118.1(b) of

the Code (625 ILCS 5/2—118.1(b) (West 2008)), whic h provides that a driver m

ay , “[w]ithi

n 90 day s af ter t he n ot ic e of statuto ry s

umm ary s uspens ion s erved unde

r Sec ti on 11—501.1,” move “

to have the statut ory sum ma ry s uspens ion res ci

nded .” Bec aus e t he driv er ne ed no t wa it an

y l en gth of ti me b ef ore f i l i ng the moti on to res ci

nd , but s i m pl y may not file it after 90 d ay s f ol l owi ng the noti ceof the su sp en si on ( wh i ch se cti on 11 —5 01 .1 (f) requires to be serv ed immed iat ely

by the o ffi

cer ), t he dr iver may make t he moti on to resci nd be fore the suspen

si on becom

es effect iveon

the forty-si

xth day followi ng the n ot ic e. We agreewit h t he Se cr et ar y that t he Co de, by per mitt inga d

ri ve r to se ek res ci ss i on

of th e s us pen si on b ef orei ts ef f ec ti ve da te, dee m s th

e suspe ns i on to exi st even

be f ore i t goes i nto ef f ect. Based on th es e p rov

i si on s, th e S ecre tar

y su gg es ts that t he Code “a

cknowl edges the diff

erence between t he imp o sit io n o f a

su sp ensi on an d th e e x ecuti on of on e. ” T h e S ecre tar

y su b m i ts that “[a]
su sp en si on oc cur s whe n t he Se cr et ar y formally i mpo ses o ne , *** but does not t ake ef fect unti l 46 da ys af ter the DUI of

f en se is com

m i tted.” Under th e Secretary ’sconstructi on, a driver i s not a “fi

rstNo. 2—10—0061

-10-

of f ender” if , at t he tim

e of the current off

ense, the Secretary

had taken f

ormal action to im

pose a sus pen sion, ev

en i f the s uspe ns i on woul

d not b ecom

e ef f ecti ve unti l l ater. We agre e w it h th

e Se cre tary ’s i nte rpreta ti on th at a su m mary su sp en si on c om men ce s f or purposes of secti on 11—500 (defi ni ng “ fi rst offen der”) when the

Secretary takes f

ormal ac t ion to im pose the suspens ion a

nd not when

the su sp en si on b ec omesef

f ec ti ve on th e f orty -s i xth da y f rom the notice gi

ven by the arresting of

fi cer. We recogni

ze that our i

nte rpreta ti on pu ts u s a t odd s wi th Craw ford , wh i ch hol dstha t a sum mary su sp en si on c om men ce s f or pu rpos es of sec t ion 11— 500 when the offense requi

ring suspension occurs. See Craw ford , 19 6 I ll. A pp . 3d at 29
- 30
. T ho ug h in Craw ford the relev ant statut ory provi si ons were subs tantial ly si mi la rto their curren

t versi ons (see, e.g. , Ill . Rev. St at. 1987, ch. 95 1⁄2, par s. 1—104 , 11—50 0, 11—5 01.1), Craw ford ’s h oldi ng i s suspect because t he co ur t did no t cite sec t ion 1 1—5 01. 1 o r se ct ion 1 —10 4, which ad dr ess t he Secr eta ry’s role i n the su m mary sus pen sion proce ss. M oreover , Craw ford was deci ded by the Fourth Distri ct A pp el l ate Cou rt, a n d w e a re n ot b oun

d b y th e dec i si

on s of our siste r d i str i cts ( Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Ass’ n , 351 Ill . App. 3d

101 6, 102 0 ( 200 4) ). As Craw ford is nei ther bi ndi ng nor persuasi

ve, we de cl i ne to foll ow i

t. Dam kroger ci te s two cas es, People

v. Kotz , 223 Ill . App. 3d 524 (1992), and People v. Hardin , 203 Ill . App. 3d 374 (1990), t hat she b el ie ves are au

t ho r it y f or con si de ri ng a suspe ns i on i m posed f or purpose s of

sec tion 11—50 0 asof the ef

f ecti ve date of the s uspe ns i on. In both cases, t he re levant l anguag e of

sec tion 11—50 0 was

as i t is now, i.e. , a “ firs t o ffen de r ” w as o ne wh o did not have a driver’s l i ce ns e suspe ns i on w i thi n f i ve yea rs pri or to h er a rre st f orthe current offe

nse. See Il l . Rev . Stat. 1989, c

h. 95 1⁄2, par. 11 —500.No. 2—10—0061

-11-

In Hardin , t he Se cr et ar y appe aled fr om t he t rial co ur t ’s o rd er dire ct inghi m to is sue t he defend ant a j udici al

dri vi ng p erm i t (JDP). Th

e Secre tar y

argu ed th at a JD P w as n ot ap pr opri ate be caus e the

def endan t had a pri or li cense s uspe ns i on. Hardin , 203 Ill . App. 3d at 37 6. T his court noted that bot h parties

were rely

in g on an out dated versi on of secti on 11—500 (in fact , it was t he
ve rs i on appl ie d in Cr awford, whereby

a driv er was not a “f

irst off ender” i f s he h ad any previous li cense suspen si on, rega rdles s of h ow rem ote in tim e). Id. Applying t he r elevant ver sion o f the statute, we sai

d: “The pri or sus pens ion w

as effective on January

11, 1984; the current off ense di d not t ake pla ce unti l May 7, 1989 , more than f

iv e y ears l ater. Thus, t he trial

court correct ly

determi ned t hat t he de fendant is a first offend er wit hin the mea ning o f the law in effect when t he r uling
wasmade.”

(Em pha si s ad ded.) Id. Dam kroger seizes on Hardin ’s rel ia nce on t he effect ive dat e o f the sus pens ion in calcu lating the fiveye ar peri od. Hardin , howe

ver, is of no for ce o n t he is sue at hand. Most of the opin ion wa s devoted to poi nti ng out th e p arti

es ’ m i sa ppr eh en si on asto wh i ch ve rs i on of secti on 11—500 appl ie d. When t ime ca me f or us to rea ch the meri ts, ou r ap pl i ca ti on of se cti on 11 —5 00 wa s p er fun ct o r y and de vo id of an y di scu ssi on as to when a su spens i on i s prope

rl y deem ed i m posed f or purposes of

se cti on 11—500. The parties

apparently

did n ot rais e the i ssue. In f

act, t here was n

o issue to rais e becaus e, whether deem

ed i mposed wh

en the off ense occurred, when

the Secretary too k action, or when t he
su sp en si on t oo k effec t , t he pr eviou s su spe nsion in Hardinwa s mo re than f iv e y ear s pr ior t o t he
cur re nt offense . Mo re ove r, t hou gh Hardindid m ake refe rence to when the pri

or suspensi

on was “e f f ecti ve ,” we did no t cla rify

what we mea nt by “effective. ” Also , t o t he ex ten t th at Hardincan be read as holdin

g that for purposes of section 11—500 a s umma r y su sp en sio n is deem ed i mposed asNo. 2—10—0061

-12-

of its e ffect ive dat e, its a nalysis was inco mplet e bec aus e it c ited none of t he st at ut or y pro vi si on s (worded the sam

e then as n

ow) t yi ng the i mposi tion of a s umm ary s uspens ion to forma

l act ion by t he S ec r et ar y. See, e.g. , Ill . Rev. Stat 1989, ch. 951⁄2, par. 1—204 (de fi ni ng suspe n sion of driver’s l i cense). Hardin is

of no guidance h

ere. The issue in K

otz wa s m orere l ate d to th

e i ss ue at h an d, b ut Kotz i s ul ti mate l y of no h el p ei ther. In c ont ent ion in Kotz waswh ethe

r, under se ct io n 11—500, “the s econd arrest must occur wit hin fi ve y ears of the imposition of t he f i rs t su sp en si

on or whe ther i t mu st occur w

i thi n f i ve years of the termination of the f

i rst sus pen sion.” (Em

pha ses i n ori gi na l .) Kotz , 223 Ill . App. 3d at 525-26. The is sue had cons equence f or t he def

en da nt i n K otz b ec au se

he r s ec ond arres t occ urred

on Septembe r 12, 1990, and the prior suspen si on “h ad be com e e f f ec ti ve on March 26, 1985” (outside t he fi ve-y ear win dow) and “termi

nated on Septemb er 26, 1985” (withi n the f iv e-yea rwi ndow). Id. at 524-25. The Kotz

court reli ed on case l

aw, in cl udin g Hardin , t o c onc lude t hat “the fi ve-y ear *** pe ri od shoul d be cal

cul ated usin

g the effective date

of the f i rs t su sp en si

on rath er th an the su sp en si on term i na tion date.” ( Em

pha si s ad ded.) Id. at 526. The Kotz co ur t evident ly was no t ask ed t o c ons ider whet her t he pr ior sus pens ion co uld be deem ed i mposed befo re its e ffect ive dat e. The defen dant mi ght have real iz ed that she did not need to ra i se th i s iss ue b ec au se th e e f f ec ti v e date of the suspen

si on was itsel

f b ey ond the fi ve-y ear win dow. Since t he i ssue tha

t conce rns us h ere w as n ot presen ted the re, Kotz is in apposite. Eve n if a holding
on t he iss ue at ha nd co uld be infe r r ed fr o m Kotz , it wo uld be o f dubio us va lueb ecause Kotz , li ke Hardin , ap pa

ren tl y con si de red non e of t he p ro visio ns link ing t he imp o sit io n o f a suspen si on to form

al action by the Se cretary. See, e.g. , Ill . Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95 1⁄2, par. 1—2 04 ( de f i ni ng su sp en si on of d ri ver’sl i cense). M oreover , Kotz was dec ided byt he T hir d D ist r ict Ap pe llat e C o ur t , an d a ga inNo. 2—10—0061

1 Wh en sh e w asarres ted

on Jul y 17, 20 09 , in c as e n umb er 09 —D T —4 08 , Da mkr o ge rwa s s t ill withi n the 45-day

win dow stemm

in g from her arrest in

case num ber 09—DT—361 and, therefore,
wa s sti ll l icensed t o d rive. Ho weve r, as o f July 2, 2 009 , t he da t e t he Se cr et ar y confirmed t he
su sp en si on in case num

ber 09—DT—361, Dam kroger was no longer a “ fi rst offen der,” whi ch di squa l i f i ed h er f rom r ece i vi ng a MDD P i n c ase num ber 09—D T—408. -13- we are not bound by

the decisions of

our sister districts ( Schramer , 351 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 1020). Co ns eq ue nt ly, ne i

ther Hardin nor Kotz

is a usef ul gui de i n determi ni ng when a sus

pensi on is deem ed i m posed f or purpose s of

sec tion 11—50 0 (def

i ni ng “f i rst of f ender”)
. We hold that Damkroger was not ent itled to a MDDP in casenum ber 09—DT—408 because she was not a

“ f i rs t of f en de r” w he n s he wa s a rre ste d i n th at c as e. The

i nte rpreta ti on most f ai th f ul to t he Co de , an d in de ed t he o nly i nte rpreta ti on a dvan ce d by the Sec reta ry , i s th at f orpur pos esof se cti on 11—500 a st at ut or y summary susp ensio n is im posed when t he Se cr et ar y ente rs a nd co nfirms the
su sp en si on pe r s ec t io ns 1 1— 50 1. 1( e) and 11 —5 01 .1 (h ). Th er efo re , if, wit hin five years p rio r t o t he
cur re nt off

ense, a dri ver has had a summary su spe nsion e nt er ed a nd co nfirmed by the Secretary, that pe rs on is not a “fi rst offen der” unde r se ct ion 1 1—5 00. On Ju ly 2, 20 09, Damkr og er was sent
con f i rm ati on fro m the S ecr et ar y tha t he h ad entered the sum

ma ry s uspens ion s

temm in g from her arrest in case num

ber 09—DT—36 1. Co nsequently , when she was arre sted in case num

ber 09—DT—408 on Jul

y 17, 2009, Dam

kroger was not a “fi

rst offen der” and theref

ore was not entitled to a MDDP. 1 Acco rd ingly, the court was ba rred f rom d i recti ng th e Secretary

to issu e the MD DP, and t he Se cr et ar y cou ld no t be held in co nt empt for faili ng t o c omp ly with t he dir ect ive. Be cau se t he fact that Damkroger was not a “f irst off ender” i s a suf

fi ci ent gr ou nd for reversi

ng the contem

pt j udgm en t, we do not

reach the Secret ary’s al

ternat iv e argument that , even i f Dam kro ger was a fi

rstNo. 2—10—0061

-14-

off ender, she was not ent itled t o a MDD P in cas e number 09— DT —40 8 bec aus e, by the t ime the courtis sued

the MDDP order, her li

cense was “otherwise in

val id” (625 ILCS 5/6—20 6.1(a) (1) (West 2008) ) due to the Secretary’s f ormal action on the sum

ma ry s uspens ion i

n case n umb er 09—D T—361. For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e r ever se t he judg ment of the ci rcu i t cou rt of De Ka lb C o un t y. Reversed.