UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2405

BENJAMIN BELROSE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

THE HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:10-cv-00764-LMB-TRJ)

Argued: January 26, 2012 Decided: April 13, 2012

Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and J. Michelle CHILDS, 

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, 

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Childs wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Duncan joined.

ARGUED: Susan A. Leslie-Fraser, LAW OFFICE OF SUSAN LESLIEFRASER, Warrenton, Virginia, for Appellant. David Edward 

Constine, III, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Laura D. Windsor, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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CHILDS, District Judge:

Benjamin Belrose (“Belrose”) appeals the district court’s 

order granting Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company’s 

(“Hartford”) motion to dismiss1 Belrose’s action challenging the 

termination of his long-term disability benefits. We affirm.

Belrose became a full-time employee of the Camber 

Corporation (“Camber”) on August 1, 2002, and became eligible 

for disability benefits under the Camber Group Benefit Plan (the 

“Plan”) provided to employees through Hartford.

On September 10, 2002, Belrose underwent arthroscopic knee 

surgery. As a result, Belrose began receiving short-term 

disability benefits under the Plan in September 2002. After his 

surgery, Belrose received a diagnosis of aortic valve disease, 

coronary angina, and coronary artery disease. In December 2002, 

as a result of his heart condition, Belrose applied for and 

began receiving long-term disability benefits under the Plan. 

Belrose received the benefits until October 5, 2005, when 

 1 Belrose incorrectly states in his brief that the district 

court granted summary judgment. J.A. 8. In granting Hartford’s 

motion to dismiss, the district court considered the Camber 

Group Benefit Plan document which Hartford attached to its 

motion. Although Belrose did not attach the Camber Benefit Plan 

to his complaint, it was not improper for the district court to 

consider the document “in determining whether to dismiss the 

complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in 

the complaint and because [Belrose does] not challenge its 

authenticity.” Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 

(4th Cir. 1999).
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Hartford terminated the benefits. Belrose appealed the 

termination of the benefits. The decision to terminate 

Belrose’s benefits was affirmed on administrative appeal, and 

Hartford issued a final denial letter to Belrose on June 14, 

2006.

Belrose filed a complaint against Hartford in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria on July 9, 2010. Belrose brought a cause of action 

under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 

U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461, regarding termination of his long-term 

disability benefits. Hartford filed a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on the grounds that the limitations period within 

which Belrose could file suit had expired. The district court 

granted Hartford’s motion. Belrose now appeals. 

We review de novo a district court’s order granting a 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, 

Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2006). Like the district 

court, we “must accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint.” CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., 

Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 51 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Erikson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Further, “we draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting 
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Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 

250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)).

“‘[W]here facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative 

defense’—including ‘the defense that the plaintiff’s claim is 

time-barred’—‘are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be 

reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).’” 

Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 

336 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 

458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007)).

The policy at issue is an employee benefit plan, which is 

governed by ERISA. The cause of action available to those 

seeking benefits due under an ERISA plan does not specify a 

statute of limitations or a time of accrual. See 29 U.S.C. § 

1132 (2000). Generally, ERISA allows plans the flexibility to 

set their own limitations periods. White v. Sun Life Assur. 

Co. of Canada, 488 F.3d 240, 250 (4th Cir. 2007). However, 

where a plan does not contain a valid limitations period, courts 

may apply the applicable state statute of limitations. See id. 

at 250 n.4 (“In the absence of a valid contractual provision 

governing limitations, we borrow a limitations period from the 

law of [the state] . . . .”); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of 

Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 981–82 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying 

the applicable state statute of limitations). Regarding the 

date of accrual of a limitations period in an ERISA plan, we 
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have held that despite the terms of accrual which may be 

contained within the plan, “[a]n ERISA cause of action does not 

accrue until a claim of benefits has been made and formally 

denied.” White, 488 F.3d at 246 (citing Rodriguez v. MEBA 

Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir. 1989)). 

Belrose argues that the Plan’s limitations term should be

replaced with Virginia’s five-year statute of limitations for 

breach of contract actions, see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-246(2), 

because the limitations term created an impossibility of 

performance and was in violation of public policy.2 The Plan 

contained a three-year limitations period, which the Plan stated 

commenced on the date Hartford required the beneficiary to 

furnish proof of loss. Belrose asserts that in order to file 

suit in compliance with the limitations provision set forth in 

the Plan, he would have had to file suit before he ever received 

notice of the final denial of his benefits. Belrose argues that 

the limitations period began to run on September 10, 2002, when 

he underwent arthroscopic knee surgery. Applying an accrual 

date of September 10, 2002 to the Plan’s three-year limitations 

 2 In the alternative, Belrose asks the court to replace the 

three-year limitations period with a five-year limitations 

period which he alleges is contained in the short-term 

disability section of the Plan. Having determined that the 

district court did not err in applying the Plan’s three-year 

limitations period, it is not necessary to address Belrose’s 

alternative request. 
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period, the period in which Belrose could file an action against 

Hartford would expire on September 10, 2005, approximately nine 

months before Hartford’s final denial of Belrose’s claim. 

Belrose argues that to require filing of an action for benefits 

due before the benefits are finally denied is contrary to public 

policy.

However, in granting Hartford’s motion to dismiss, the 

district court reasoned that because the limitations period for 

an ERISA claim does not begin to run until the insurer issues a 

formal denial—despite the terms of accrual which may be 

contained within the Plan—Hartford’s three-year limitations 

period was not unreasonable or contrary to public policy. 

Finding the three-year limitations period to be reasonable and 

in accord with public policy when viewed as accruing on the date 

of formal denial of benefits, the district court reasoned, it 

was not necessary to substitute the Plan’s three-year 

limitations period with the Virginia statute of limitations for 

breach of contract. We find no error with the reasoning of the 

district court.

Belrose further argues that the district court’s 

substitution of the accrual date, without also replacing the 

three-year limitations period with the Virginia statute of 

limitations for breach of contract, constitutes “bluepenciling,” or rewriting the contract’s words to make them work 
7

together. Belrose asserts that such rewriting is inappropriate 

because Virginia courts have traditionally refused to rewrite 

contracts in order to make them enforceable. However, Belrose 

brings his claim under ERISA, and determining the time at which 

Belrose’s cause of action accrued is governed by federal law 

rather than Virginia law. See White, 488 F.3d at 245 (noting 

that, even where a state statute of limitations is applied, the 

accrual date is governed by a uniform federal rule); Blanck v. 

McKeen, 707 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that, in the 

case of a federal cause of action, the time at which the cause 

of action accrues is governed by federal law rather than state 

law). Accordingly, we find Belrose’s arguments unpersuasive.

Belrose argues that, even commencing the limitations period 

at the date of final denial of benefits, the Plan’s three-year 

limitations period remains contrary to public policy. 

Specifically, Belrose argues that a limitations period of less 

than five years is contrary to public policy in this case 

because the Virginia statute of limitations for actions derived 

from written contracts is five years. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-

246(2). 

The Supreme Court of Virginia has “upheld contractual 

statutes of limitations for periods shorter than that fixed by 

statute when they were not against public policy and the time 

period was not unreasonably short.” Bd. of Supervisors of 
8

Fairfax Cnty. v. Sentry Ins., 391 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Va. 1990) 

(citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Sampson, 369 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Va. 

1988)). A limitations period of three years fits well within 

the intent of Virginia’s legislature. Virginia’s legislature 

has expressed its intent with regard to the limitation of 

actions derived from insurance policies by its enactment of 

Section 38.2-314 of the Virginia Code. Section 38.2-314 

provides, “No provision in any insurance policy shall be valid 

if it limits the time within which an action may be brought to 

less than one year after the loss occurs or the cause of action 

accrues.” Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-314. Thus, a limitations period 

of three years does not appear to be contrary to public policy.

When viewed in light of this court’s prior holding that an 

ERISA cause of action does not accrue until the claim for 

benefits has been formally denied, the Plan’s limitations period 

is not unreasonable or contrary to public policy, and is 

therefore valid. Thus, when faced with a valid limitations 

period, the district court did not err in applying the Plan’s 

limitations period rather than substituting the Virginia statute 

of limitations for breach of contract actions. Belrose received 

a formal denial of his claim for benefits on June 14, 2006. 

Therefore, the period in which Belrose could bring a cause of 

action against Hartford for denial of benefits expired on June 

14, 2009. Belrose filed his complaint on July 9, 2010, over a
9

year after the limitations period expired. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in granting Hartford’s motion to 

dismiss. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED