RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6022-17

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STANLEY R. DAVIS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued December 15, 2020 – Decided March 26, 2021

Before Judges Gilson, Moynihan and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Warren County, Indictment No. 14-04-0142.

John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel 

and on the briefs).

Dit Mosco, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (James L. Pfeiffer, Acting 

Prosecutor, attorney; Dit Mosco, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Following the denial of his motions to suppress child-pornography files 

found on computer equipment in his home and his statement to a Warren County 

Prosecutor's Office (WCPO) detective after the files were found, defendant 

Stanley R. Davis, Jr. was found guilty of fourth-degree endangering the welfare 

of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b), after a bench trial. He appeals from the 

judgment of conviction and challenges the sentence imposed, arguing:

POINT I

BY USING A COERCIVE KNOCK-AND-TALK 

TACTIC AND FAILING TO TELL [DEFENDANT] 

HE COULD REFUSE ENTRY INTO HIS HOME, THE 

DETECTIVES EXTRACTED UNKNOWING AND 

INVOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH FROM

[HIM].

POINT II

[DEFENDANT'S] STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE 

BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE DETECTIVES 

DID NOT APPROPRIATELY CLARIFY WHETHER 

[HE] UNDERSTOOD HIS MIRANDA[1] RIGHTS 

PRIOR TO WAIVING THEM.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A MANIFESTLY 

EXCESSIVE 364-DAY JAIL TERM AND FIVE 

YEARS' PROBATION ON THIS FIFTY-SEVENYEAR-OLD FIRST-TIME OFFENDER.

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

A-6022-17

Unpersuaded, we affirm.

Defendant came to the attention of Warren County law enforcement 

officers when then-Lieutenant Richard Gould of the Essex County Prosecutor's 

Office Cyber Crimes Unit informed WCPO Detective Sergeant Derek Michael 

Kries that a computer with an IP address subscribed to by an individual at 

defendant's residence contained child pornography files. Kries, Gould, 

Detective Sergeant John Amey of the Hackettstown Police Department, WCPO 

Detective Dawn Dalrymple and two other detectives traveled to defendant's 

residence at approximately 5:45 a.m. to conduct a planned knock and talk. The 

detectives did not have a search warrant.

While the other detectives remained out of sight, Gould, Amey and 

Dalrymple knocked on defendant's door and asked if they could enter. After 

defendant granted them entry, Dalrymple advised defendant that police had 

information about unlawful computer files and presented defendant with a 

consent-to-search form for the computers in his home. Dalrymple read the form 

aloud to defendant. Defendant signed the form at 6:20 a.m.

I

Defendant argues the trial judge erred because he did not consider that the 

officers had failed to advise defendant he had the "right to refuse consent to 
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enter his home for the purpose of a search," rendering the consent search 

"constitutionally invalid" thus requiring the suppression of all seized evidence. 

Though the record on appeal does not contain defendant's brief to the trial judge, 

as is proper under Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), we do not see any mention of that argument 

during the motion hearing or in the judge's oral decision. Our review is generally 

limited to the matters addressed by the trial judge. See State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 

409, 419 (2015) (noting parties must raise an issue before the trial court to allow 

an appellate court to review it); Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 

502, 539 (2002) (noting courts should be "reluctant to review matters . . . in any 

case where a record had not been fully developed by the parties in the trial 

courts"). This record, however, is sufficiently developed to allow our full 

review, see State v Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 480 (2017) (reviewing a bias argument 

raised for the first time on appeal because, unlike in Witt, the record was "fully 

developed"), in which we give deference to the trial judge's factual findings, 

State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016), and uphold them if they are 

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, State v. Minitee, 210 

N.J. 307, 317 (2012). We will disturb those findings only if they were "so 

clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and 

correction,'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
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42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). We review de novo the judge's application of factual 

findings to the law. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014). 

Defendant's argument rests on the false premise that police had the 

obligation to advise defendant he had the right to refuse when they requested 

entry to his residence. "A 'knock and talk' [is an investigative procedure that] 

occurs when the police knock on [a defendant’s] door, make contact with [him 

or her], ask if they may enter to talk about their concern, and once inside, ask 

permission to search the premises." State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 317 n.1 

(2006) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting). Our courts have upheld this 

tactic as a constitutionally permissible investigative procedure, see id. at 302-

03; see also State v. Williams, 461 N.J. Super. 80, 101-02 (App. Div. 2019), 

cert. denied, 241 N.J. 92 (2020) (upholding police use of a knock and talk), so 

long as the knock and talk is not being used simply as "a pretext to gain access 

to the [premises and] conduct an unconstitutional search," State v. Davila, 203 

N.J. 97, 130 (2010). 

Unlike the police in Davila, where our Supreme Court ordered a remand 

because it viewed the knock-and-talk procedure as a pretext to gain access to the 

defendant’s apartment to conduct a warrantless protective sweep—a search—of 

the premises, 203 N.J. at 130, nothing in the current record suggests the 
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detectives went to defendant’s apartment with the hope of carrying out an 

unconstitutional search of his home. Instead, they went with the purpose of 

obtaining defendant's consent to search: an exception to the warrant 

requirement. State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 337 (2014). 

The detectives did not conduct the search until defendant—advised that

he had the right to refuse consent to search—signed the consent-to-search form. 

Thus, defendant's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. 

Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, § 7, were not implicated or violated by the 

mere invited entry into his home—not to search, but to talk. See Domicz, 188 

N.J. at 302 ("[W]hen a law enforcement officer walks to a front or back door for 

the purpose of making contact with a resident and reasonably believes that the 

door is used by visitors, he is not [acting] unconstitutionally[.]"). 

Defendant’s decision to voluntarily admit the detectives into his residence 

"was the same as that of any other social guest or business visitor." The police 

entry into his home, therefore, did not constitute a search. See State v. Pineiro, 

369 N.J. Super. 65, 73 (App. Div. 2004) (reasoning, because the defendant 

"voluntarily admitted" police into his apartment, their entry "was the same as 

that of any other social guest or business visitor, and did not constitute a Fourth 

Amendment search"); see also State v. Padilla, 321 N.J. Super. 96, 108 (App. 
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Div. 1999) (holding police did not need to inform defendant of her right to refuse

entry into her motel room, given they "merely sought permission to enter to 

continue their investigation"). Even in Williams, where the pertinent issue 

raised by the defendant was whether her "consent to search was tainted by the 

prior unlawful entry, sweep, and seizure of the apartment," 461 N.J. Super. at 

93, we agreed with the trial judge that the officers "did have a legitimate purpose 

to be present at the scene," and "[b]ecause the officers obtained consent to enter 

the apartment and were 'lawfully within private premises for a legitimate 

purpose,' . . . their presence in the apartment was constitutionally permissible, 

and satisfied the first element of a protective sweep," id. at 102 (quoting Davila, 

203 N.J. at 102). We concluded under those circumstances, "there was no 

requirement that defendant be advised of her right to refuse entry to the police." 

Id. at 101.

Defendant's reliance on State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460 (2017), is 

misplaced. The Court in Legette, declining to "expand the scope of 

investigatory stops to encompass police entry into [a defendant's] home" prior 

to his or her arrest, determined the officer did not gain access to the premises by 

getting the defendant's consent. 227 N.J. at 473-75. Rather, he gained access 

by virtue of his exercise of authority over the defendant, id. at 474-75, by 
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approaching the defendant after receiving a noise complaint and then noticing 

the smell of burnt marijuana; stopping the defendant as he left the porch and 

began walking to his car; asking for identification which the defendant said "was 

in his apartment and volunteered to retrieve it"; and telling "defendant that he 

would have to accompany him to his apartment under the circumstances. 

Defendant did not respond and continued walking upstairs," id. at 464 (emphasis 

added). The officer did not seek defendant’s permission to enter the residence, 

nor did he inform defendant of his right to refuse entry. See ibid.

Here, defendant consented to the entry. The trial judge credited 

Dalrymple's and Amey's testimony and found "defendant invited them in and 

never asked them to leave," describing "his demeanor as welcoming, calm and 

cooperative." Under the circumstances, police were not required to advise 

defendant he could refuse their entry. Thus, we reject defendant's contention 

that his consent to search stemmed from the detectives' illegal entry into his 

home.

We also note the search was conducted only after defendant had signed 

the consent-to-search form, which was read aloud to him, and police had advised 

him of his right to refuse consent to the search. As we determined in Williams,

even if the initial entry . . . [was] unlawful, the 

[evidence] seized was not located as a result of [that 
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entry]. Instead, [it] was found as a result of defendant's 

consent to search, which was obtained independent of 

the initial entry[.] Therefore, . . . the seizure [of the 

evidence] did not arise either directly or indirectly, [as 

a result of] any unlawful police activity proscribed 

under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

[461 N.J. Super. at 105.]

Defendant also argues the totality of the circumstances established his 

consent was not knowing and voluntary. We disagree. Nothing in the record 

suggests the detectives threatened or coerced defendant to consent to the search 

of his computer. Defendant was not under arrest at the time of the entry or 

consent; he did not offer his consent after multiple denials of guilt; and he did 

not withdraw his consent or ask the detectives to leave at any point during his 

initial discussions with police, the search of his computer, or during his formal 

statement. See State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352 (1965) (measuring the 

voluntariness of a defendant's consent requires the court to consider, in part, 

whether: the defendant was under arrest at the time of consent; the consent was 

obtained after multiple denials of guilt; and the defendant attempted to revoke 

his or her consent at any point during the search).

The trial judge found the detectives' testimony credible, rejecting 

defendant's claim, reiterated on appeal, that the officers' presence coerced or 
10 A-6022-17

intimidated defendant to sign the consent-to-search form. The judge found the 

form

specifically identified the Dell laptop but also included 

all hard drives, computer memory and removable 

computer media. The consent form also specifically 

states that defendant could withdraw [h]is consent at 

any time. After consent was obtained the third 

detective began to preview his computers. Again, by 

testimony of both Amey and Dalrymple defendant 

never withdrew his consent.

And the judge found defendant had signed the form after it had been read to him 

and he had been advised he did not have to consent. The record is barren of any 

evidence that defendant did not understand the plain language of the form. The 

judge's denial of defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence was 

supported by the evidence; we see no reason to disturb that decision.

II

Defendant also challenges the trial judge's denial of his motion to suppress 

the audio-recorded statement given to Detective Kries, in the presence of 

Detective Dalrymple and Lieutenant Gould, after defendant had signed the 

consent-to-search form. Kries read each Miranda right aloud to defendant and, 

after each, asked defendant if he understood that right; defendant affirmatively

answered each of those questions. When Kries asked defendant if, "having [his] 
11 A-6022-17

rights in mind," defendant wanted to speak to Kries regarding the investigation. 

The following colloquy ensued:

[Defendant]: I have no problems speaking with you I 

will have a question of, is this something that I do need 

legal counsel for, is this something I don't need legal 

counsel for

[Detective Kries]: well as

[Defendant]: I, I, I know you're going to tell me that 

you can't tell me that

[Detective Kries]: that's correct

[Defendant]: but I mean I, I don't know what I've done 

wrong that, maybe I'm

[Detective Kries]: ok well

[Defendant]: I'm overseeing the picture, I'm seeing too 

much into the picture

[Detective Kries]: ok well I, again I told you that before 

you asked me, is this something prior, . . . when I asked 

you will you provide a recorded statement you asked 

me you know is this something that I'll need an attorney 

for and I explained to you that I can't give you any legal 

advi[c]e, I can basically tell you the reason that we're 

here, we're, we're here investigating you know child 

pornography, at this point you know you're a suspect in 

that investigation

[Defendant]: ok

[Detective Kries]: um you know, there's not any 

criminal charges filed at this time, however I'm not 
12 A-6022-17

telling you that there's not going to be criminal charges 

filed, there is a possibility of that, um you know I don't 

make that decision, that's you know left up to the 

assistant prosecutors—we're here investigating that and 

you know we're gonna take information back to them 

so as far as you know with regards to an attorney, that's 

a decision that you know you have to make, that's not 

something that I can make for you um

[Defendant]: yeah I know, ok

[Detective Kries]: ok

[Defendant]: I, I, I uh (inaudible) said, I am sort of in 

the loss on this that's why I'm asking questions

[Detective Kries]: no and I understand that and I 

encourage you if you do have questions to ask us um so 

just for clarification at this point and time, do you want 

an attorney or would you like to speak with us

[Defendant]: nah I, I will, I'll speak with you I have no 

problem with that[.]

Defendant argues his question to Kries "cast doubt on whether he 

understood his Miranda rights," and Kries's failure to clarify defendant's 

understanding rendered the waiver of those rights ineffective. Again, we see 

nothing in the record of oral argument or in the trial judge's decision that that 

issue was previously raised in the Law Division. Defendant's counsel argued to 

the trial judge suppression was warranted because defendant had invoked his 

right to counsel and the totality of the circumstances were coercive. The judge 
13 A-6022-17

considered: defendant's age; his "above-average intelligence"; the detailed 

nature of the Miranda warnings; that the three-hour length of defendant's 

interaction with police and the nearly one-hour-long statement was "certainly 

not excessive"; that police did not employ "threats, trickery or persuasion or 

pressure"; and that "defendant was a fire chief who was familiar with police." 

The judge concluded "under the totality of the circumstances . . . [defendant's]

statement was made freely, knowingly and voluntarily" because he had been 

"read his rights[,] . . . confirmed that he would speak with the officers and 

specifically didn't have a problem not having a . . . lawyer." 

As stated, our review is limited to the matters addressed by the trial judge, 

see Witt, 223 N.J. at 419, but, again, the record is sufficiently developed to allow 

our full review, see Scott, 229 N.J. at 480, under the same standard we utilized 

in considering defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress 

physical evidence.

First, as the trial judge found, defendant was read each of the Miranda

rights, including that he had "a right to talk with an attorney at any time and to 

have [the attorney] with [him] before any questioning and during questioning[.]" 

He said he understood each right. 
14 A-6022-17

Further, we do not agree with defendant's contention that Kries should 

have repeated the Miranda warnings after defendant asked if "this [is] something 

that [he needed] legal counsel for[?]" and that Kries "could have made clear . . . 

that the interrogation would cease if [defendant] wanted to consult with a 

lawyer." Repeating that defendant had the right to an attorney or that 

questioning would cease if defendant invoked that right would not have 

answered defendant's question if he needed a lawyer. Instead Kries correctly 

advised defendant, as he had done previously, he could not "give [defendant] 

any legal advi[c]e, [but could] basically tell [defendant] the reason" the 

detectives were there: "investigating . . . child pornography," and that defendant 

was then "a suspect in that investigation." Before questioning defendant, Kries 

encouraged defendant to ask any questions and asked defendant, "just for 

clarification at this point and time, do you want an attorney or would you like to 

speak with us[?]" Defendant did not let Kries finish the question and answered, 

"nah, . . . I'll speak with you[;] I have no problem with that[.]" 

Following defendant's request for advice, Kries's interrupted request for 

clarification made clear that the alternative to speaking with police was to 

invoke the right to counsel. As our Supreme Court reasoned in State v. Alston, 

204 N.J. 614, 628 (2011), "because the detective [in that case] was not obligated 
15 A-6022-17

to give [the] defendant advice about whether he should assert any of his rights, 

we cannot fault his choice of words as he sought to clarify [the] defendant's 

requests while avoiding giving him the advice he was seeking." As was the case 

in Alston, Kries's "response was a fair recitation of the right to counsel and the 

right to have the interrogation cease." See ibid. The record supports that 

defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his fully 

comprehended Miranda rights.

We determine defendant's remaining arguments on the Miranda issue, 

including that the detective was "subtly misleading [when he told defendant that 

there were no charges filed against him] because the officers were surely going 

to arrest [defendant] at some point based on the files they had just found" on his 

computer, to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

The detective told defendant he was a suspect in the investigation and there was 

a possibility that charges would be filed against him.

III

Defendant claims his five-year probationary sentence, conditioned on 

incarceration for 364 days, was manifestly excessive for the fourth-degree 

crime, considering he was a fifty-seven-year-old first-time offender, with a 

twenty-seven-year career of community service. 
16 A-6022-17

The trial judge found aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), 

there was a high risk that defendant would reoffend, because he: did not 

accidentally download the child pornography files; accumulated the files over a 

prolonged period of time on three separate occasions; and did not seek 

professional help toward rehabilitation. The court also found aggravating factor 

nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), the need to deter defendant and others from 

violating the law, based on the need for general and specific deterrence of child 

pornography, and to promote the protection of children.

The court also found mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), 

based on the fact that defendant had no prior history of delinquency or criminal 

activity and led a law-abiding life for fifty-seven years, and mitigating factor 

ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10), noting that "if [defendant] does get the 

psychosexual and mental health evaluation and help that he needs, then [the 

court] think[s] he will be amenable to probation." The court ultimately afforded 

substantial weight to the aggravating factors and found they preponderated over 

the mitigating factors, giving slight weight to mitigating factor ten.2

2 The court did not specify the weight it attributed to mitigating factor seven.
17 A-6022-17

Defendant contends the trial court "mistakenly exercised its discretion in 

giving too little weight to mitigating factors seven and ten and in concluding 

that the aggravating factors preponderated." 

Our review of the trial court's sentencing determination is limited. See

State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 516 (1989). "[A] sentence imposed by a trial 

court is not to be upset on appeal unless it represents an abuse of the [trial] 

court's discretion." Ibid. Accordingly, on appeal, our only function is to:

(a) review sentences to determine if the legislative 

policies, here the sentencing guidelines, were violated; 

(b) review the aggravating and mitigating factors found

. . . to determine whether those factors were based upon 

competent credible evidence in the record; and (c) 

determine whether, even though the court sentenced in 

accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the 

application of the guidelines to the facts of this case 

makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock 

the judicial conscience.

[State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013) (quoting

State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]

As a general matter, "[a]n appellate court is bound to affirm a sentence, even if 

it would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly 

identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by 

competent credible evidence in the record." State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 

215 (1989); see also State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 489 (2005).
18 A-6022-17

In view of the trial court's detailed analysis of defendant at the time of 

sentencing, we discern no reason to reverse the sentence imposed. The court 

recognized defendant's lack of criminal history in considering mitigating factor 

seven, and also "the fact that [defendant] incurred no new charges and 

maintained employment during the six-year pendency of th[e] case," noting, 

"[d]uring the years since the case has worked its way through the [c]ourt system 

and gone to trial, [defendant] has regained employment." The court, however, 

found more compelling that defendant had not participated in "any rehabilitation 

or counseling . . . since the commission of the offense. A true test of whether a 

defendant is likely not to . . . re-offend will take place in the coming months and 

years after the sentence has been imposed."

Defendant's contention that the court's imposition of counseling or 

treatment as a condition of probation would have supported a weightier 

mitigating factor ten ignores our Supreme Court's mandate that in weighing 

aggravating and mitigating factors, "a defendant should be assessed as he stands 

before the court on the day of sentencing," including his post-offense conduct. 

State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014); see also State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 

330, 354 (2012). Defendant had not undertaken any therapy or counseling for 

his psychosexual issues or any other underlying factor that contributed to his 
19 A-6022-17

offense. A court-imposed condition of probation requiring same would not have 

impacted on the weight given to mitigating factor ten; future programs do not 

manifest that he would have been "particularly likely to respond affirmatively 

to probationary treatment." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10). Likewise, they would not, 

contrary to defendant's argument, have "ameliorate[d] the concerns that 

animated the court's finding of aggravating factor three, that [defendant] was 

drinking on a daily basis and had not sought professional help."

We find no reason to disturb the trial court's findings of aggravating and 

mitigating factors as they are supported by competent evidence in the record, or 

the exercise of its broad discretion in fashioning the appropriate sentence that 

conforms to the sentencing guidelines and is not shocking to the judicial 

conscience. See Lawless, 214 N.J. at 606.

Affirmed.