GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Honorable

Olympia J. Snowe, United States Senate

February 2001 AVIATION 

COMPETITION

Regional Jet Service 

Yet to Reach Many 

Small Communities

GAO-01-344

Page 1 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 36

Appendix II: Regional Jets: Manufacturers, Characteristics, 

and Demand 40

Appendix III: U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of 

October 2000 48

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Tables Table 1: Overview of Restrictions on RJ Operations in Pilot Labor 

Agreements 23

Table 2: Comparison of Delta’s and US Airways’ RJ Deployment, 

October 2000 25

Table 3: Categories of Service Change 38

Table 4: RJ Operating Characteristics 41

Table 5: U.S. RJ Orders, Options, Deliveries, and Backlog, by 

Aircraft Type 47

Figures Figure 1: Number of RJs Operated by Major U.S. Airlines and Their 

Regional Affiliates, October 2000 9

Figure 2: Locations of Cities Served by RJs, October 2000 10

Figure 3: Size of Cities Served by RJs, October 2000 11

Figure 4: Number and Population Category of Cities Receiving

RJ Service, by Year 13

Figure 5: RJ Deployment by Service Type Since January 1997 15

Figure 6: How RJs Expand the “Footprint” of Carriers’ Hubs 18

Figure 7: RJ Markets Served by Delta Connection Carriers as of

October 2000 26

Figure 8: RJ Markets Served by US Airways Express Carriers as of

October 2000 27

Figure 9: Bombardier CRJ200 42

Figure 10: Bombardier CRJ700 42

Figure 11: Embraer ERJ-135 43

Figure 12: Embraer ERJ-145 43

Figure 13: Embraer ERJ-170 44

Figure 14: Fairchild Dornier 328Jet 45

Figure 15: Fairchild Dornier 728Jet 46
Contents

Page 2 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Abbreviations

AIR-21 Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 

P.L. 106-181

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

MSA metropolitan statistical area

O&D origin and destination

RJ regional jet
Page 3 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

February 14, 2001

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe

United States Senate

Dear Senator Snowe:

Many aviation experts view U.S. airlines’ growing use of small “regional 

jets”1

 as a revolutionary development that is significantly changing the 

aviation marketplace. Because jets are generally faster, quieter, smoother, 

and perceived to be safer than turboprop aircraft, the public tends to prefer 

travel by jet. Additionally, because regional jets (typically seating between 

32 and 70 passengers) tend to have lower operating costs than larger 

“mainline” jets (e.g., the Boeing 737, which may seat 110 passengers or 

more), expectations rose that air carriers would provide regional jet 

service to smaller communities that could not profitably support mainline 

service. And because regional jets can fly farther than turboprop aircraft, 

their use holds the potential for small communities to obtain new service 

on longer routes to more distant airports—thereby perhaps offering new 

service options to those small communities. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation 

Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) further fueled 

small communities’ expectations of improved air service through specific 

provisions that eased certain restrictions at New York’s LaGuardia Airport 

to encourage air carriers to serve smaller communities with regional jets.2

To address your concerns about air service to smaller communities, we 

examined how U.S. air carriers are using regional jets and what issues 

surround the carriers’ abilities to use these aircraft. Our work focused on 

the following three questions:

1

 There is no uniformly accepted definition of a regional jet either in the industry or in 

federal laws and regulations. For example, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and 

Reform Act for the 21st Century, P.L. 106-181, variously defines a regional jet as having a 

maximum seating capacity of “not less than 30 nor more than 75” (sec. 210) or “less than 71” 

(sec. 231). Within the industry, “regional jet” is sometimes used to describe larger aircraft, 

such as the Fokker F-100 (107 seats) and Boeing 717 (106 seats), and older-technology 

aircraft, such as the Fokker F-28 (69 seats) and BAe 146-100 (70-82 seats).

2

 Among other things, AIR-21 allows the Department of Transportation to grant exemptions 

to existing rules at New York’s LaGuardia and John F. Kennedy airports and at Chicago’s 

O’Hare airport for carriers that provide service with a regional jet to certain small airports as 

a replacement for a turboprop aircraft. 
Page 4 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

• What is the status of regional jet deployment in the United States, and 

how has this service evolved? 

• What factors have affected the airlines’ decisions in deploying regional 

jets?

• What effects have regional jets had on air traffic and airport congestion, 

according to published studies and experts in the field?

To determine the status of the airlines’ regional jet service, we analyzed 

historical airline service data, as well as current airline schedule 

information. Our analysis excluded those carriers that do not have regional 

affiliates that operate regional jets. We defined regional jets as newer jet 

aircraft that have been placed into service since 1993 and are designed to 

seat 70 or fewer passengers. In addition, our analysis included only those 

markets that had a minimum of 20 monthly regional jet departures—the 

equivalent of 1 departure per business day. To determine the factors that 

have affected the airlines’ deployment of regional jets, we interviewed 

airline and industry officials and reviewed airline, government, and 

consultant documents. To ascertain industry experts’ views on the effects 

of regional jets on air traffic and airport congestion, we reviewed studies 

and consulted with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and industry 

officials. We conducted our work from March 2000 to February 2001 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix 

I.

Results in Brief As of October 2000, major airlines provided regional jet service to 157 U.S. 

cities, only 13 (8 percent) of which were small cities with populations 

under 100,000. Eight of these small cities received their service in or before 

1997; the remaining five received regional jet service between 1998 and 

October 2000. Larger cities (those with populations over 250,000) 

represented 74 percent (115) of the total U.S. cities receiving regional jet 

service. Most of this regional jet service has radiated from the carriers’ 

hubs to spoke cities that the carriers were already serving with either 

turboprops or mainline jets. Of the markets in which air carriers began 

regional jet service since May 1997, 41 percent were new markets in which 

the regional jet carrier had not previously flown. Air carriers used regional 

jets in these new markets to expand their networks, although another 

carrier may already have been providing service in some of these locations. 

For example, service between Denver and Fargo, North Dakota, 

represented a new market for United Airlines, although Northwest Airlines 

already served Fargo from Minneapolis. The airlines have tended to use 
Page 5 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

their regional jets to serve more distant cities (between 350 and 1,200 

miles) that previously were beyond their turboprops’ practical operating 

range or had too few passengers to be profitably served by mainline jets. 

Because those more distant cities may have been served only by other 

airlines, regional jets have provided passengers in those cities with 

additional choices among airline networks. Future regional jet deployment 

patterns may change, however, as carriers begin operating other types of 

regional jets—both smaller and larger than the 50-seat aircraft 

predominantly in service today. 

According to airline officials, regional jet deployment strategies are driven 

primarily by efforts to maximize profit, but other carrier-specific factors 

such as labor agreements and network structures have also influenced the 

airlines’ decisions. The airlines use complex models—which include data 

on numerous factors such as passenger traffic, operating costs, and various 

competitive considerations—to help determine the most profitable 

markets for regional jet service. In addition, industry officials told us that 

labor contracts—especially those with pilots—have affected the airlines’ 

regional jet deployments. The pilot contract for most major U.S. airlines 

includes a provision (the “scope clause”) that limits the number and/or size 

of the regional jets that the airlines’ affiliates can operate. These scope 

clauses differ greatly among the airlines. For example, Delta Air Lines’ 1996 

scope provision is relatively unconstrained, restricting the size but not the 

number of regional jets that can be operated. Thus, as of October 2000, 

Delta’s affiliates were flying more than 160 regional jets. In contrast, US 

Airways’ 1998 contract with its pilots limited to 35 the number of regional 

jets that its affiliates could operate. As of October 2000, US Airways’ 

regional affiliates were operating 30 such aircraft. Recent contract 

agreements at United and US Airways relaxed some scope clause limits on 

aircraft numbers while generally maintaining limits on aircraft seating 

capacity. 

Regional jets have added to the congestion and delays facing the nation’s 

air traffic system and airports, according to published studies and experts 

with whom we spoke. At the same time, however, there is little agreement 

or conclusive evidence as to the extent of their contribution to those 

problems. The key study we reviewed estimated a 31-percent 

(compounded yearly) increase in regional jet traffic between February 1998 

and December 2003, compared with FAA’s forecasted 3-percent 

(compounded yearly) increase in mainline jet traffic for the same time 

period. Experts agree that regional jets increase congestion partly because 

they represent a large infusion of aircraft into an already crowded system, 
Page 6 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

but opinions vary as to how regional jets’ specific flight operating 

characteristics (e.g., how fast they can climb to cruising altitude) may 

contribute to congestion and delays. Experts also agree that air traffic 

congestion often depends on circumstances or procedures in effect at a 

specific location, including the number of aircraft operating there. For 

example, according to officials, the influx of regional jets into the 

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport has had little impact on the 

airport’s operations to date, but regional jet operations have had a clear 

effect at New York’s LaGuardia Airport. Increased congestion at 

LaGuardia—an already congested airport within an extremely congested 

airspace corridor—led FAA to limit aircraft operations there. Given the 

projected growth in the number of regional jets that will be in service over 

the next few years and the likely impact of this growth on the already 

congested air traffic system, experts agree on the need for action to 

address the nation’s broader air traffic congestion concerns.

Background Regional jets (RJ) carry fewer passengers than mainline jets but generally 

travel at similar speeds, cruise at similar altitudes, and require runways of 

about the same length as mainline jets. The most common RJ models in 

service today are 50-passenger aircraft—the Bombardier CRJ100 and 

CRJ200 and the Embraer ERJ-145. Most RJs have a maximum flight range 

between 900 and 1,700 nautical miles.3

 (See app. II for more detailed 

information about these aircraft.)

Most RJs are operated by regional affiliates of major airlines rather than by 

the major airlines themselves.4

 The relationship between the major carrier 

and the regional carrier can take several forms. Some relationships are 

contractual; for example, United Airlines (United) contracts with Atlantic 

Coast Airlines to fly passengers to and from United’s hub at Washington 

Dulles International Airport. By contrast, other carriers own all or some of 

their regional affiliates. For example, American Airlines (American) and 

Continental Airlines (Continental) own many of the carriers that operate 

for their regional affiliates, American Eagle and Continental Express. 

Likewise, Delta Air Lines (Delta) purchased two of its regional affiliates, 

Comair and Atlantic Southeast Airlines, in 1999. Major carriers may also 

3

 According to the air carriers, the practical limit is much less—about 1,200 miles.

4

 In this report, we refer to all RJs and their operations as those of the major airline.
Page 7 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

purchase a partial interest in a regional carrier, as Northwest Airlines 

(Northwest) has done with Mesaba Airlines.

RJs are part of a U.S. air transportation structure dominated by “hub-andspoke” networks. Since the deregulation of U.S. commercial aviation in 

1978, nearly all major carriers have developed such networks. Airline 

officials state that by bringing passengers from a large number of cities to 

one central location and redistributing these passengers to their intended 

destinations, an airline’s fleet can serve more cities than it could through 

direct “point-to-point” service. Airline networks generally have several hub 

cities. For example, Northwest has hubs in Minneapolis, Detroit, and 

Memphis, and American has hubs in Chicago, Dallas, and Miami.

Rapid Growth of RJs 

Has Primarily 

Increased Service to 

Larger Cities 

With hundreds of aircraft in operation, the airlines were providing RJ 

service to 157 cities and 482 city-pair markets in October 2000.5 Seventyfour percent of the cities receiving this service were large and mediumsized; only 8 percent were small, with populations under 100,000.6

 Air 

carriers have placed almost 60 percent of their RJ service in markets they 

were already serving (“existing markets”) and have expanded their 

networks by instituting RJ service in markets that they previously were not 

serving (“new markets”). Much of the service to existing markets 

supplemented or replaced mainline jet service that the carriers provided in 

these markets. The airlines chose to establish new service at cities that 

either were beyond the practical operating range of turboprop aircraft or 

were perhaps too small to be profitably served by mainline jets, according 

to airline officials. However, the airlines have ordered hundreds more 

aircraft, many of which are smaller or larger than the predominantly 50-

seat RJs currently in service. In the future, with these aircraft of varying 

size, the airlines may adjust their RJ deployment strategies to provide 

service in markets of varying size. 

5

 In the airline industry, markets are generally defined in terms of service between a point of 

origin and a point of destination. This is often, but not always, defined as a city pair. When 

a metropolitan area is served by more than one airport, a market may be an airport pair. See 

app. I for additional information on our market definition.

6

 The U.S. Bureau of the Census categorizes metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) into four 

population categories. We have labeled these four standard MSA categories as follows: 

“Small cities” are MSAs with populations of less than 100,000, “medium cities” are MSAs 

with populations between 100,000 and 249,999, “medium-large cities” are MSAs with 

populations between 250,000 and 999,999, and “large cities” are MSAs with populations of 1 

million or more.
Page 8 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Number of RJs in Operation 

Has Increased Significantly

As of October 2000, major U.S. passenger airlines and their regional 

affiliates had deployed almost 500 RJs. This represents a significant 

increase in RJ aircraft since 1997, when only 89 RJs were in service. Of the 

486 RJs in U.S. domestic service in the fourth quarter of 2000, 86 percent 

were 50-seat Bombardier or Embraer aircraft. The remaining RJs were 32- 

or 37-seat Fairchild or Embraer RJs, both of which began commercial 

operations in the United States in 1999.

The number of RJs that each carrier operates varies widely. For example, 

Delta operates 168 RJs—more than any other major U.S. passenger carrier, 

largely because of its relationship with Comair (the first regional airline to 

purchase and begin operating RJs extensively).7

 Other major airlines whose 

regional affiliates have deployed relatively large numbers of RJs are 

Continental (92) and American (83). Figure 1 shows the number of RJs 

operated by major airlines as of October 2000 and the size of their RJ fleet 

compared with that of their total jet fleet. 

7

 While Comair was the first U.S. carrier to begin operating more modern RJs, airlines such 

as Air Wisconsin and Horizon Air had already been flying older-model RJs, such as the BAe146 (the predecessor of the Avro RJ) and the Fokker F-28. 
Page 9 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 1: Number of RJs Operated by Major U.S. Airlines and Their Regional Affiliates, October 2000

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from U.S. airlines.

Just as the number of RJs in service has increased since 1997, so has the 

number of RJ departures. For example, in May 1997, there were 12,364 

scheduled RJ departures, compared with 93,606 scheduled RJ departures in 

October 2000—an increase of 735 percent in 3-1⁄2 years. On average, each RJ 

in October 2000 made more than six departures per day. By comparison, 

overall mainline jet departures amounted to 492,331 in May 1997 and 

537,697 in September 2000—a 9-percent increase.

0 50 100 150 200

TWA

America West

US Airways

Northwest

United

American

Continental

Delta

Number of regional jets

0 5 10 15 20 25

TWA

America West

US Airways

Northwest

United

American

Continental

Delta

Percentage of carrier’s total fleet
Page 10 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

RJs Serve 157 Cities, Few of 

Which Are Small 

Although RJs are flying throughout the United States, about two-thirds of 

the cities with RJ service are located east of the Mississippi River. Figure 2 

shows the location of the cities served by RJs as of October 2000. Industry 

experts believed that this geographic distribution can be explained by 

differences in population densities and distances between cities that made 

RJ service well suited for these markets. See appendix III for more detailed 

information on the U.S. cities with RJ service as of October 2000.8

Figure 2: Locations of Cities Served by RJs, October 2000

Source: GAO’s presentation of data from the Kiehl Hendrickson Group.

8

 Some carriers use RJs to serve cities in Mexico and Canada as well. For example, 

Continental uses RJs to serve Ixtapa/Zihuatanejo, Mexico, from its Houston hub and 

Montreal, Canada, from its Cleveland and Newark hubs.
Page 11 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Of the 157 cities served by RJs as of October 2000, only 13 (or 8 percent) 

were small cities—those with populations under 100,000. Five carriers—

Delta, Continental, American, Northwest, and America West—provide RJ 

service to those cities.9

 However, only three of these small cities (White 

Plains, New York; Traverse City, Michigan; and Bozeman, Montana) have RJ 

service from more than one air carrier. Figure 3 shows the distribution of 

cities that had received RJ service as of October 2000.

Figure 3: Size of Cities Served by RJs, October 2000

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from the Kiehl Hendrickson Group and the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Large and medium-sized cities have received the vast majority of RJ 

service. The airlines generally introduced RJ service in larger cities before 

expanding it to smaller cities. For example, of the cities gaining RJ service 

in or before 1997, 69 (or 79 percent) were cities that had populations over 

9

 For our analysis, we included only those city-pair markets that had a minimum threshold of 

at least 20 RJ departures in Oct. 2000. 

13

29

67

48

0

20

40

60

80

100

Small

Medium

Medium-large

Large

City size

Number
Page 12 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

250,000 while only 8 (9 percent) were small cities. This deployment 

pattern—in which airlines have decided to serve larger cities rather than 

small cities with RJs—remained consistent between 1997 and 2000. Only 

five additional small cities received RJ service between 1998 and October 

2000. Larger cities also more often received RJ service from more than one 

carrier. Of the 157 cities that received RJ service, 94 received service from 

multiple carriers. Moreover, 77 of those 94 cities had populations of 250,000 

or more. 

The growth in the number of cities that have received RJ service has been 

slowing since 1997. Of the 157 cities that were served by RJs in October 

2000, 86 had begun to receive their service in or before 1997. Since then, 

however, air carriers initiated service to 34 cities in 1998, 22 cities in 1999, 

and 15 cities in 2000. Figure 4 shows the decreasing number of new cities 

served by RJs over time and further indicates that most of these cities are 

not small.
Page 13 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 4: Number and Population Category of Cities Receiving RJ Service, by Year

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from the Kiehl Hendrickson Group and the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

0

10

20

30

40

50

1997 1998 1999 2000

Year RJ service started

Number of cities

Medium

Small

Medium-large

Large
Page 14 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

RJ Service Has Been Split 

Between New and Existing 

Markets

As the total number of cities served by RJs has grown over time, so has the 

number of city pairs (or markets). As of October 2000, RJs were serving 482 

markets.10 Of these 482 markets, we examined the 432 that received RJ 

service between January 1997 and October 2000.11 Air carriers were already 

serving the majority of these markets with turboprops or mainline jets 

before they introduced RJs. However, air carriers also used RJs to expand 

their networks by flying to cities they had not previously served. 

Almost 60 percent of the 432 markets were existing markets—that is, they 

were already receiving either mainline jet or turboprop service from the RJ 

carrier before it added the RJ operations. Specifically, RJs supplemented 

existing mainline jet and/or turboprop service in about 36 percent of the 

markets and replaced mainline jet or turboprop service in 24 percent of the 

markets. The remaining 41 percent were new markets that had not received 

service from that RJ carrier for at least 1 year before the carrier introduced 

RJ operations. Figure 5 breaks down the changes in types of service for the 

432 RJ markets that have received RJ service since January 1997.

10 The total number of markets served is greater than the number of cities because many 

spoke cities receive service from more than one airline through different hubs. Competing 

airline networks and hubs create multiple markets.

11 Because of data limitations, we could not analyze the markets served by Delta before June 

1997. As a result, the data for Delta cover only those markets served from June 1997 

through Oct. 2000.
Page 15 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 5: RJ Deployment by Service Type Since January 1997

n = 432 markets

Note: Numbers do not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from BACK Aviation Solutions and the Kiehl Hendrickson Group.

Adding RJ Service to 

Existing Markets Improved 

Service Options 

Adding RJ operations to existing markets gave RJ carriers opportunities to 

change their levels of service in various ways. For instance, a carrier could 

upgrade its service by replacing or supplementing its existing turboprop 

service with RJs, because jet service is considered to be of higher quality 

than turboprop service. In other markets, airline officials told us, adding 

RJs allowed them to “right size” their existing mainline jet service. In other 

words, the air carrier replaced its existing mainline jet service (which 

might have been carrying relatively few passengers) with RJs, whose 

seating capacity better matched the existing passenger traffic. 

Mainline replacement

13% Mainline supplement

18%

Turboprop

replacement

11%

Turboprop

supplement 

13%

Turboprop/mainline

supplement 

5%

New market

41%
Page 16 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

When air carriers added RJ service to existing markets, they adjusted the 

total seating capacity. For example, in eight markets where RJs replaced 

mainline jets between January and October 2000, the carriers decreased 

the total seating capacity.12 In five markets, the carriers increased the total 

seating capacity, even though they “downgraded” these markets to smallersized jets. By contrast, in markets where carriers replaced turboprops with 

RJs, they decreased the total seating capacity in one while increasing it in 

another nine. As a result, with RJs, the airlines have been able to maintain 

jet service (albeit with smaller aircraft) but have more often decreased the 

total seating capacity; where they have upgraded service from turboprop to 

jet aircraft, they have more often increased total capacity. According to 

airline officials, both approaches were consistent with the carriers’ 

competitive service goals.

To date, carriers have seldom completely replaced turboprop service with 

RJ service. This has occurred in only 11 percent of the markets that have 

received RJ service since January 1997. The carriers continue to fly 

turboprops in some markets for two fundamental reasons.13 First, 

communities served by turboprops are often located within a few hundred 

miles of a hub airport, and carriers may continue to fly turboprops there 

because they are generally less expensive to operate on shorter routes than 

are RJs. Second, those communities also tend to be smaller, and they 

generate less passenger traffic—especially high-fare business traffic—than 

larger markets. Consequently, barring other considerations, if alternative 

markets that may generate more revenue are available, carriers will not 

deploy their RJs into smaller markets. Industry experts agreed that few 

turboprop aircraft had been replaced by RJs. So long as major U.S. carriers 

have turboprops in their fleets, they will use those aircraft as cost- and 

revenue-efficiently as possible.

12 We did not examine whether the airlines’ decisions to reduce the number of seats in some 

markets reflect the fact that these markets were competitive but had unnecessary capacity, 

or whether the airlines were able to increase airfares in some markets by reducing the 

number of seats available. 

13 One airline official said that if more RJs had been available for deployment, the airlines 

might have used them to replace more turboprops.
Page 17 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

RJs Have Allowed Airlines 

to Serve New Markets and 

Expand Their Networks

When carriers initiated RJ service in new markets14 (41 percent of the 

markets served by RJs), these new city pairs generally were more distant 

from each other than the city pairs that the carrier had previously served. 

According to information from airline officials, these new markets typically 

provided opportunities for the carrier to serve cities that previously were 

beyond the practical operating range of its turboprop aircraft. For example, 

in 1999, American initiated RJ service to Grand Rapids, Michigan, from its 

hub in Dallas (a distance of 931 miles), whereas previously it had served 

this city only with turboprops from its closer hub in Chicago (a distance of 

137 miles). With an RJ—capable of flying farther than a turboprop—

American could add this city pair as a new market and expand its network. 

The average distance (stage length) for all new markets receiving RJ 

service between 1997 and October 2000 was 563 miles—a distance well 

beyond the 350-mile range that many view as the practical limit for 

turboprop service. In other cases, industry officials indicated that airlines 

saw opportunities to provide RJ service in markets that were unlikely to 

have generated enough passenger traffic (and revenue) to support 

profitable mainline jet service.

Providing RJ service to these new, more distant markets thus expanded a 

carrier’s network size or “footprint.” One result of this expansion is more 

overlap among the different carriers’ networks. Figure 6 illustrates how 

using longer-range RJs instead of turboprops creates greater network 

overlap and effectively expands consumers’ choices in some cities. For 

example, in 1998, Continental initiated RJ service between its Houston hub 

and Greenville/Spartanburg, South Carolina—a distance of 838 miles. 

Similarly, United began service in 1999 between Denver and Fargo—a 

distance of 627 miles. Each of these new markets was too far from those 

particular hub airports to serve with turboprops and not big enough to 

serve with mainline jets. The new RJ service increased the flight 

opportunities for these communities because, for example, until 

Continental began flying into Greenville/Spartanburg, service to that 

location was generally provided only by Delta, Northwest, and US Airways. 

Likewise, Fargo was served only by Northwest until United began RJ 

service there. 

14 Of the 179 new markets (41 percent of the 432 markets), only 23 involved service to small 

and medium-sized communities. These markets represented 13 cities—11 medium and 2 

small. In addition, each of these cities already had mainline jet service from at least one 

other carrier.
Page 18 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 6: How RJs Expand the “Footprint” of Carriers’ Hubs

According to industry officials, expanding airline networks to include new 

cities also created opportunities for carriers to increase the number of 

passengers coming onto their networks—a key competitive goal for them. 

It is unclear whether RJs stimulate passenger traffic. Some industry 

observers believe that RJs increase passenger traffic because travelers who 

are unwilling to fly on turboprop aircraft will use RJs. Others believe that 

when RJ service is offered, passengers only switch to the carrier operating 

RJs and away from the carriers operating turboprops. 

500

miles

500

miles

Carrier

A’s hub

Carrier

B’s hub

Turboprop

range

Regional

jet range

Carrier

A’s hub

Carrier

B’s hub

With turboprop aircraft, which generally have a 

maximum range of 350 miles, different air 

carriers’ hubs that are 500 miles apart have 

little competitive overlap.

With the greater range that regional jets provide, the same two 

hubs have much greater overlap--and potentially much greater 

competition for the same passengers.
Page 19 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

The airlines have seldom used their RJs to provide direct service between 

spoke cities. As of October 2000, 82 percent of the major carriers’ 

scheduled RJ flights connected a hub and a spoke city. An additional 14 

percent of the RJ flights were between a spoke city and a major airport that 

is not considered a hub, such as LaGuardia. Only 4 percent of RJ flights 

were directly between spoke cities. For example, since 1998, Continental 

has begun RJ service from its Houston and Cleveland hubs to 75 U.S. spoke 

cities while offering spoke-to-spoke service only among 5 cities. Compared 

with Continental’s RJ deployment pattern, American’s is less “hub 

intensive”—flying RJs in 52 markets through its hubs in Chicago and Dallas 

while providing spoke-to-spoke service in 11 cities.15 Airline officials have 

said that because many smaller cities tend not to have enough passenger 

traffic to justify direct service between them, their airline can better and 

more profitably serve small communities by aggregating passengers from 

many small cities into one hub location and distributing them from there. 

RJ Deployment Is Expected 

to Grow, but Future 

Patterns Are Unknown

U.S. carriers expect to continue the rapid expansion of their RJ fleets. As of 

January 2001, 1,255 RJs of varying types and sizes had been ordered and 

1,010 were on option.16 These orders are scheduled to be delivered to the 

airlines between the fourth quarter of 2000 and 2006. (See app. II for 

additional information on orders and options.)

Whether the aircraft deployment trends seen so far will continue is 

unknown. One key reason is that the RJs that are to be placed into service 

over the next few years differ in size: some are smaller and some are larger 

than the current models. At one end of the market, carriers have recently 

begun to place smaller RJs into commercial service. Instead of carrying 50 

passengers, these models—such as the Embraer ERJ-135 and the Fairchild 

Dornier 328Jet—carry 37 and 32 passengers, respectively. Additionally, 

Embraer is developing a 44-seat RJ, the ERJ-140, which is slated to enter 

service in the first quarter of 2001. However, so few of these aircraft have 

15 Exceptions to this “hub-feeding” strategy include additional flights offered by Delta to 

Orlando, Boston, and New York’s LaGuardia Airport, and by US Airways to LaGuardia and 

Reagan National, all of which are nonhub airports for these airlines.

16 According to an industry expert, an order (or purchase agreement) for an RJ is a contract 

between the manufacturer and the purchaser that indicates, among other things, the number 

of aircraft to be delivered, equipment to be installed, delivery dates, purchase price, and 

financing arrangements. Options, when part of a purchase agreement, allow the purchaser 

to determine whether to purchase additional aircraft. 
Page 20 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

been put into service to date that it is difficult to characterize the markets 

where they are used. As of October 2000, carriers had ordered 304 of these 

smaller RJs and held options for 114 more.

At the other end of the RJ market, manufacturers are developing 70-seat 

RJs. By the end of 2000, U.S. carriers had placed orders for 112 and held 

options for 218 70-seat CRJ700s that are to begin commercial service in 

2001. Embraer’s ERJ-170 and Fairchild Dornier’s 728Jet are scheduled to 

enter service in 2002 and 2003, respectively. However, since none of these 

larger aircraft are now in service in the U.S., it is unclear how each will 

affect air service to small and medium-sized communities. 

The possible effect of these developments on air carriers’ continued use of 

turboprops is also unknown. The three carriers with the largest number of 

RJs—Delta, Continental, and American—are planning to eliminate all 

turboprop aircraft from some or all of their regional operations.17 Some 

industry officials told us that the airlines may reevaluate their service to 

some smaller communities because the higher cost of operating RJs over 

short distances—relative to turboprops—may make some markets that are 

relatively close to carriers’ hubs less profitable. One industry report 

concluded that with some airlines converting to all-RJ fleets, some markets 

currently served by turboprops could possibly lose all service from their 

current carriers if the airlines deem the markets to be unprofitable for RJs. 

However, other analyses indicated that turboprop service, while 

decreasing, would not be completely eliminated in the foreseeable future. 

RJ Deployment 

Decisions Are Profit 

Driven but Also 

Affected by Labor 

Agreements and Other 

Factors

The carriers’ decisions about where to deploy RJs are primarily profit 

driven, but according to airline officials, other factors, including pilot labor 

agreements, have influenced their acquisition and deployment decisions. 

The goal of profit maximization is common among the carriers we 

interviewed, but the other factors, such as their labor agreements, reflect 

each carrier’s circumstances. According to industry officials, these 

agreements greatly restrict the ability of some carriers to acquire and use 

RJs but give other carriers wide latitude to do so. Airline officials said that 

these agreements—together with other carrier-specific factors, such as the 

location of the carrier’s hubs in relation to major population centers—

affected their RJ deployment strategies. 

17 For example, American Eagle made its hub at O’Hare an all-RJ hub as of Nov. 2000 and 

Comair made its Cincinnati hub an all-RJ hub as of Dec. 2000.
Page 21 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Need to Maximize Profit 

Generally Drives RJ 

Deployment 

Without exception, officials with the airlines we contacted told us that the 

primary factor influencing the airlines’ decisions about where to deploy 

their RJs is the need to maximize profits. The airlines use sophisticated 

models to help them select potential markets. These models rely on 

detailed data to estimate whether certain markets can be served profitably. 

They take into account such considerations as estimated passenger traffic, 

the carrier’s operating costs, and competition in the market (including the 

type of aircraft competitors used, the number of daily flights they 

scheduled, and the fares charged). 

Industry officials told us that the number and type of passengers that an 

airline is likely to carry is the cornerstone of its model. A key element to the 

airline’s profit estimates is the availability of high-yield passenger traffic 

(e.g., business travelers who are more likely to pay higher airfares than 

leisure travelers) in a particular market. Because some smaller 

communities may not generate enough of this high-yield business traffic, 

carriers may not have begun RJ service there yet.

Aircraft operating costs—another key factor affecting profits—also 

determine whether an airline serves a market. While RJs are less costly to 

purchase than mainline jets, they are generally costlier than turboprops 

($22 million for a CRJ200 versus $14.3 million for a 50-seat Q300 Dash 8 

turboprop). Furthermore, crew and fuel costs combined, which tend to be 

the highest-cost elements for both RJs and mainline jets, are generally 

higher for RJs than for turboprops. Aircraft operating costs generally 

decrease (on a per-seat-mile basis) as the distance flown in a given market 

(the “stage length”) increases.18 According to data from Bombardier, 

operating costs are higher for its CRJ than for its Q300 for stage lengths up 

to about 380 miles but are lower for longer stage lengths. That is, RJs are 

less cost-efficient to operate on shorter-range flights than turboprops. As a 

result, the revenue requirements that a carrier must meet to operate a route 

profitably will vary with the stage length and the type of aircraft operated.

18 Cost per available seat mile is a common measure of an air carrier’s costs. This is 

generally calculated by dividing the total cost of operating an aircraft by the product of the 

total number of seats on the aircraft that the carrier can sell to paying passengers and the 

total statute (i.e., straight-line) miles that the aircraft is flown in revenue passenger service.
Page 22 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Pilot Labor Agreements 

Affect RJ Use

According to industry officials, pilot labor agreements have influenced past 

RJ deployments. However, as other agreements have been ratified more 

recently, the potential effect of some aspects of these labor issues appears 

to be waning for most carriers.19

In past labor negotiations, pilots and airline officials have agreed to 

restrictions on the number and/or size of the RJs the carriers’ affiliates can 

operate. Mainline pilots see these restrictions as job protection 

mechanisms because they ensure that a carrier cannot replace mainline 

flights operated by its own pilots with RJ flights operated by a regional 

affiliate’s pilots. These restrictions may be negotiated into the portion of 

the labor contract generally referred to as the “scope clause.” 

RJ-related scope clause provisions differ from carrier to carrier (see table 

1).20 For example, the 1998 labor agreement between Continental and its 

pilots generally did not limit the number of RJs that Continental’s affiliates 

could fly, but it did restrict the size of the aircraft to a maximum of 59 seats. 

The contract between American and its pilot union also limits the seating 

capacity of the RJs that American Eagle can operate. By contrast, 

Northwest’s RJ-related scope provisions basically limit the carrier’s RJ fleet 

to a certain portion of its overall fleet. 

19 The impact on the current scope clause agreements of the proposed merger agreement 

between United and US Airways and of American’s proposed purchase of TWA, if approved, 

is unknown. The impact of these two consolidations on small communities’ air service and 

the likelihood that those communities will be served by RJs are also unknown. For 

information on the potential impact of the United-US Airways merger on competition in the 

U.S. domestic airline market, see Aviation Competition: Issues Related to the Proposed 

United Airlines—US Airways Merger (GAO-01-212, Dec. 15, 2000). 

20 Scope clauses are typically one factor in broader labor negotiations on salary, job 

protection, benefits, and other elements, and the airlines and pilot unions negotiate tradeoffs among these elements to determine the best possible agreement for their respective 

interests.
Page 23 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Table 1: Overview of Restrictions on RJ Operations in Pilot Labor Agreements 

a America West’s pilot contract became amendable in April 2000 and Delta’s became 

amendable in May 2000. 

Sources: GAO’s presentation of information from the airlines, the Air Line Pilots 

Association, and the PA Consulting Group.

RJ-related scope provisions in mainline pilot contracts continue to be a 

part of recent and ongoing negotiations between carriers and pilots. Scope 

clause agreements adopted in recent negotiations have generally allowed 

for significant increases in the number, but not in the seating capacity, of 

the RJs that a carrier can operate with pilots not on that carrier’s seniority 

list. For example, the agreements between United and US Airways and 

their respective pilot unions have increased the number of aircraft the 

carriers can deploy. United’s limit increased from about 65 to about 300, 

and US Airways’ limit rose from 35 to 70. As of January 2001, America West 

and Delta were renegotiating contracts or contract extensions with their 

pilots, and in each case, the new agreement could alter the scope clause 

provisions. 

Airline Contract term and main provisions related to RJs

Number of RJs in

fleet as of

October 2000

America West 1995-2000: There are no RJ-related scope restrictions.a 20

American 1997-2001: There is a limit of 67 RJs—with a maximum of 70 seats, a minimum of 45 seats, and an 

average of 50 seats—that applies to the airline’s entire commuter fleet. There is no limit on the 

number of RJs with fewer than 45 seats. 

83

Continental 1998-2002: There is no limit on the number of RJs that can be operated, but their size is limited to 

59 seats; if this seat size is exceeded, Continental pilots will be given the opportunity to fly RJs.

92

Delta 1996-2000: There is no limit on the number of RJs, but their size is generally limited to 70 seats.a

 168

Northwest 1998-2002: There is a limit of 30 RJs until the number of narrow-body jets exceeds 347; then RJs 

can be added on a one-for-one basis. The carrier may also place its code on 36 additional RJs 

operated by Mesaba (with less than 70 seats), and utilize other RJs operated by regional affiliates.

41

TWA 1998-2002: There is a limit of 30 RJs. The carrier may also operate 2 additional RJs for each 

additional aircraft in its fleet above 180 until the fleet reaches 188, and 1 additional RJ for each 2 

additional aircraft above 188. RJ size is limited to 70 seats and cruise speed to 400 miles per hour.

6

United 1998-2000: This period’s agreement limited the maximum number of RJs to 65, with some 

provisions for adding more as the overall fleet size increased. 

2000-2004: The current agreement allows the carrier to deploy approximately 300 RJs by growing 

its mainline fleet and replacing 150 turboprops on a one-for-one basis.

46

US Airways 1998-2003: RJs are limited to either 35 total or 9 percent of the aircraft in US Airways’ fleet, 

whichever is larger. On April 7, 2000, the pilots and the airline signed an interim agreement allowing 

35 additional 50-seat RJs.

30
Page 24 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

American and Continental intend to begin renegotiating the contracts with 

their pilot unions in 2001. For example, American and its pilot union plan to 

begin contract negotiations in June 2001. This agreement followed the 

union’s September 2000 rejection of a proposed contract extension that, 

among other things, would have increased the number of 50-seat RJs that 

American Eagle pilots could fly, but would have given mainline pilots the 

right to fly 70-seat RJs. According to former union leaders, the union’s 

membership rejected the proposed contract extension not because of the 

scope provisions, but because the pay increase proposed by American was 

not high enough compared with the increase that pilots at United had 

secured in a contract negotiated in August 2000. 

Other Factors May Affect RJ 

Deployment Decisions

Another factor that may affect a carrier’s RJ deployment decisions is the 

carrier’s position in the manufacturing queue. The three primary RJ 

manufacturers—Bombardier, Embraer, and Fairchild Dornier—all have 

substantial backlogs of RJ aircraft orders and options. As of late 2000/early 

2001, the manufacturers had not delivered 61 percent of U.S. carriers’ total 

outstanding orders for RJs (including 50 percent of the orders for 50-seat 

RJs).21 According to Bombardier, a new order for a CRJ200 would take at 

least 24 months to be filled. A Delta official said that its early RJ order gave 

Delta a competitive advantage because it is ahead of many other airlines in 

the manufacturing queue. A US Airways official confirmed the importance 

of a carrier’s place in the RJ manufacturing queue by telling us that, other 

things being equal, US Airways would probably order RJs from the 

manufacturer that could deliver them most quickly. 

One carrier employed a different strategy to improve its place in the 

manufacturing queue and acquire RJs sooner than originally planned. In 

June 2000, Horizon Air (the sister company of Alaska Airlines) swapped 

CRJ700 delivery positions with American to get these planes sooner than 

originally contracted. This agreement will allow Horizon to take possession 

of its first 14 CRJ700s by October 2001, well ahead of the original 2002-2003 

schedule. 

Whether a carrier’s hubs can accommodate increased aircraft arrivals and 

departures and how close these hubs are to target markets are also 

21 RJ manufacturers are increasing their production capability to address the current 

backlog in RJ orders. App. II contains each manufacturer’s firm orders, options, deliveries, 

and backlog by type of aircraft.
Page 25 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

considerations that could influence a carrier’s RJ deployment strategy. For 

example, although Continental’s Newark hub is relatively close to a large 

number of potential markets for Continental’s RJ operations, the airport’s 

high rate of delays and physical constraints limit its capacity to expand. 

Continental officials told us that the airline might be forced to completely 

abandon its RJ operations at Newark to protect its mainline service there 

and to shift many of its RJ operations to its Cleveland hub, which has 

neither the physical constraints nor the problems with congestion and 

delay found at Newark. Similarly, the geographic location of some hubs 

may limit the number of potentially profitable spoke cities—even with the 

added range of RJs. For example, compared with hubs in some eastern or 

midwestern cities, America West’s Phoenix hub is located near fewer large 

cities that could be attractive RJ markets. On the other hand, Delta has 

developed an RJ hub in Cincinnati (in conjunction with its mainline 

operation there), and Northwest has begun to build a similar operation at 

Memphis. According to FAA officials, both of those airports are relatively 

uncongested and are within RJ operating distance of large numbers of 

potential RJ markets.

Responses of Two Carriers 

to Factors Affecting RJ 

Deployment Produced 

Different Results

The experiences of Delta and US Airways illustrate how the various factors 

influencing RJ deployment have affected their ability to deploy RJs and 

their strategies for doing so. The two carriers differ greatly in the size of 

their current RJ fleets and thus adopted markedly different strategies for 

using RJs to compete in various markets. Table 2 summarizes the 

differences in these carriers’ RJ deployment positions.

Table 2: Comparison of Delta’s and US Airways’ RJ Deployment, October 2000

Source: Airlines.

Delta Makes Extensive Use of 

RJs

Operating within the parameters of its labor contract, Delta has deployed 

more RJs than any other carrier, greatly expanding its network between 

1993 and 2000. Its relationship with Comair—once an independently owned 

Factor affecting deployment Delta US Airways

Year RJ service initiated 1993 1998

Number of RJs in fleet 168 30

Number of domestic markets served by RJs 178 41

Number of new markets served by RJs 62 20
Page 26 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

airline operating as a code-sharing partner with Delta out of Cincinnati—

facilitated this expansion. Comair was the first U.S. regional carrier to 

deploy RJs widely. By 1996, it and two other Delta affiliates were operating 

48 RJs—the only ones in service in the United States at the time. As of 

October 2000, Delta’s affiliates were operating 168 RJs. These aircraft 

served 178 U.S. markets, 76 percent of which included Delta’s hubs in 

Atlanta, Cincinnati, Dallas, and Salt Lake City (see fig. 7). Delta’s 1996 labor 

contract contained no scope clause restrictions on the number of RJs Delta 

could operate. Additionally, the location of its hubs in Cincinnati and 

Atlanta, which are within range of numerous profitable markets, has given 

it a tremendous opportunity to expand RJ service to additional spoke 

cities. 

Figure 7: RJ Markets Served by Delta Connection Carriers as of October 2000

Source: GAO’s presentation of data from the Kiehl Hendrickson Group.

US Airways Makes Limited Use 

of RJs

In part because of limitations in its pilot scope clause, US Airways has been 

slower to acquire and has deployed far fewer RJs than Delta. As of October 

2000, US Airways operated 30 RJs that are owned by its code-sharing 

partners Chautauqua and Mesa airlines. These jets were serving 41 markets 

out of locations such as Boston, Charlotte, New York (LaGuardia), 
Page 27 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Philadelphia, and Reagan National (see fig. 8). US Airways officials said 

that the airline’s management was aware that competitors were using RJs 

to make inroads into US Airways’ network when the airline renegotiated its 

pilot contract in 1997, but was unsuccessful in negotiating for more liberal 

RJ rights with its pilot union. Because of the relatively slow development of 

its RJ fleet, US Airways has tried to defend its markets by offering more 

turboprop flights in the hope that more frequent turboprop service could 

compete favorably against other carriers’ less frequent RJ service. At 

LaGuardia, in particular, US Airways is trying to counter a large influx of 

RJs from carriers such as Delta.

Figure 8: RJ Markets Served by US Airways Express Carriers as of October 2000

Source: GAO’s presentation of data from the Kiehl Hendrickson Group. 
Page 28 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Experts Believe That 

RJ Growth Has 

Increased Congestion, 

but Extent Is Unclear

There is consensus among the studies we reviewed and the industry 

experts we interviewed that RJs have contributed to congestion in our 

national airspace, but there is less agreement about the nature or extent of 

these effects. The experts we spoke with agreed that the growing number 

of RJs was increasing congestion at already crowded hub airports, but they 

varied in their views on whether specific characteristics of these jets, such 

as their cruising speed or climbing ability relative to that of mainline jets, 

were having a compounding effect. 

Few Studies Identify RJs’ 

Role in Airspace Congestion

To date, only one comprehensive study22 has focused on how RJs may 

affect congestion in the United States.23 Issued in 1999 by the MITRE 

Corporation, the study focused primarily on congestion in en route 

airspace and secondarily on airport congestion and infrastructure 

concerns.24 A January 2000 update to the MITRE study estimated that if the 

current scope clause limitations remained unchanged, up to 1,100 RJs 

would be in service in the continental United States by the end of 2003 (an 

increase from the 800 RJs estimated in the original 1999 study). The key 

study we reviewed estimated a 31-percent (compounded yearly) increase in 

RJ traffic between February 1998 and December 2003, compared with 

FAA’s forecasted 3-percent (compounded yearly) increase in mainline jet 

traffic for the same time period. This is equivalent to an increase of about 

22 William W. Trigeiro, The Impacts of Regional Jets on Congestion in the NAS, MITRE: 

Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, MP 98W0000256V3 (McLean, VA, Feb. 

1999).

23 Another study, conducted by FAA, focused on airport and infrastructure design concerns 

that could become increasingly relevant with the growing deployment of RJs. This study 

concluded that RJs will change the character of airports and passenger air transportation 

but that it is too early to predict their specific impact. It indicated that small airports (such 

as small nonhub airports that previously accommodated 727s and DC-9s) may be able to 

accommodate RJs if they were originally designed for commercial jet operations (i.e., if 

those airports have sufficiently long runways). Large, congested airports may be limited in 

their ability to add RJs, particularly if they have historically relied on shorter “commuter” 

runways that may not be long enough to accommodate RJs. For more information see 

Kenneth C. Jacobs, The Impact of Regional Jets on Airport Design, FAA (Apr. 20, 2000). One 

additional study reviews a variety of issues related to RJs, including the effects of scope 

clauses and the impact of RJs on mainline carriers’ employees. This report also includes 

information on RJs and congestion. For more information see: Robert W. Mann, Small Jet 

Issues (1996).

24 The MITRE Corporation describes itself in its mission statement as a not-for-profit 

corporation, working in the public interest in partnership with government clients on issues 

of national importance.
Page 29 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

4,000 RJ flights per day over a 70-month period compared with an increase 

of about 3,000 mainline jet flights per day over the same time period.

MITRE’s study generally concluded that the rapid growth of RJs operating 

in U.S. airspace is likely to contribute to increased congestion in different 

areas of the national airspace system. However, RJs represent an emerging 

technology (compared to turboprops) that is allowing airlines to change 

their service approaches and is increasing the competition between their 

respective hubs for spoke-city traffic. As a result, the effects that RJs will 

have on the structure and operations of the air transportation industry will 

become clear only over time. Key points in the study include the following:

• Currently, RJs fly mostly where airspace is already congested—at high 

altitudes traditionally used by mainline jets, not at the lower altitudes 

typically used by turboprops. Because the number of aircraft operating 

at higher altitudes is increasing, congestion at high altitudes is likely to 

worsen. 

• RJs perform similarly to older narrow-body jet aircraft (e.g., Boeing 

737s) except that they climb at a slower rate. Thus, transition airspace 

(used for climbing and descending) may become more congested and 

include more types of aircraft (although MITRE did not specifically 

include an analysis of transition airspace in its investigation). 

• Increased air traffic from RJs would create the highest levels of 

congestion in the northeastern United States. There is no reasonable 

way for air traffic to avoid this congested airspace, and congestion in 

this region is expected to be a major concern by 2003. 

• Competition for passenger traffic onto different airline networks may 

provide an opportunity to shift some traffic from badly congested hubs 

to other locations, but the overall change in traffic patterns is unclear as 

yet.

• New runway capacity is predicted to relieve potential airport congestion 

in some hub locations by 2003. These locations include Detroit/Wayne 

County, Houston (Bush Intercontinental), and Minneapolis/St. Paul. 

However, other hub airports with high RJ traffic are not likely to have 

new runways by 2003. Similarly, other hub airports that have runways 

unsuitable for RJs (i.e., those that are long enough for turboprops but 

too short for RJs) are not likely to have those runways lengthened by 

2003.
Page 30 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Industry Experts’ Opinions 

Supported Many of the 

Study’s Conclusions

Our discussions with a cross section of aviation industry experts 

consistently confirmed many of the key issues identified in the MITRE 

study. Among the experts’ key points were the following:

• Increased number of RJs inevitably affects congestion. The industry 

experts repeatedly expressed concern about the impact of adding so 

many aircraft so quickly to airspace whose capacity is already 

constrained. Because hundreds of new aircraft have been added to 

already congested airspace while comparatively few turboprops have 

been taken out of service, many of the experts believed it was inevitable 

that congestion and delays would increase. They also noted that with 

many more RJs on order, congestion and delays are not likely to 

diminish in the near future. The number of daily RJ flights further 

contributes to crowded skies. 

• RJs are flying into already congested airports. Industry experts also 

stated that the effect of such a large infusion of aircraft was exacerbated 

because these new aircraft were usually flying into already congested 

airports. For example, after the enactment of AIR-21, air carriers filed 

requests to add more than 600 new flights per day at New York’s 

LaGuardia Airport—an increase of more than 50 percent in the number 

of daily flights at what is considered to be one of the nation’s most 

congested airports. The vast majority of those flight requests were for 

RJ service. While action by FAA has since limited airport operations 

(take-offs and landings) to a maximum of 75 per hour (allowing a total 

increase of approximately 159 operations per day), the air carriers’ 

desire to serve this airport with RJs remains high. In October 2000, RJ 

carriers had 120 daily departures scheduled from LaGuardia.

• Effect of RJ flight characteristics is unclear. The experts we spoke with 

varied widely in their views on how or whether RJs’ operating or flight 

characteristics contributed significantly to congestion. Some believed 

that transition airspace was a problem area while others were more 

concerned about situations that might occur at cruise altitude when 

faster mainline jets—especially large, widebody aircraft—overtook 

slower RJs. Others believe that these different opinions reflect the lack 

of a common understanding about how most RJs operate. Many also 

thought that the congestion problems were not solely related to RJs’ 

operations or characteristics. Rather, congestion was associated more 

broadly with constraints at individual airports—such as unique design 

features (e.g., runway lengths) or particular air traffic control 

procedures. For example, Dallas air traffic officials had some concerns 

about fitting RJs into departure patterns and arrival sequences under 

certain conditions.
Page 31 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

According to data provided by industry experts, the characteristics of 

RJs and mainline jets may differ somewhat during certain flight phases, 

but RJ cruise speeds are highly compatible with those of older, narrowbody mainline jets. This information was generally confirmed by other 

experts’ experiences. For example, when operating in transition 

airspace, some RJs do not climb out at the same rate as some other 

aircraft. According to air traffic officials, this can cause congestion and 

delay by forcing other, faster jets to “stack up” behind the slower RJs. 

One facility has addressed this issue by restricting RJs to lower altitudes 

on departure and allowing other, larger jets to climb faster above the 

RJs. Other air traffic control officials believed that the RJs’ cruise 

speeds were compatible with those of other jets and did not find that 

managing RJs posed any special challenge during this flight phase.

Congestion at high altitudes is also a concern because RJs are designed 

to fly at the same altitudes as mainline jets. As their numbers grow, RJs 

are increasingly competing for airspace that is already frequented by 

many other aircraft, whereas turboprop aircraft typically fly in lower, 

less congested airspace. According to FAA, this problem seems to be 

particularly acute in the Northeast corridor, where air traffic is 

particularly heavy. 

• Runway space may become more of a problem with more RJs. RJs 

generally cannot use the shorter commuter runways that turboprops 

typically use, but instead require the same longer runways that mainline 

jets use. This is problematic in locations where runway space is already 

at a premium. For example, at Washington’s Reagan National Airport, 

only one of three runways is long enough to routinely accommodate 

most jet aircraft. FAA and airport officials observed that the use of this 

longest runway is increasing because regional airlines are replacing 

traditional turboprop aircraft, which can use the shorter runways, with 

RJs, which must use the longest runway.25 Some experts suggested that 

this infrastructure constraint could become an even greater concern as 

more and more RJs are deployed and increasingly compete with 

mainline jets for limited runway space. This is significant because few 

airports have additional runways under development, and according to 

an FAA official, the time needed to add a new runway can be between 5 

and 10 years.

25 See Reagan National Airport: Capacity to Handle Additional Flights and Impact on Other 

Area Airports (GAO/RCED-99-234, Sept. 17, 1999.) 
Page 32 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Some Interim Solutions 

Have Been Developed to 

Ease Congestion and 

Delays, but the Industry Is 

Concerned About 

Developing Long-term 

Solutions

Given the projected growth in the fleet of RJs and the capacity constraints 

of the current airspace system, industry experts agreed on the need for 

crafting solutions. Some interim solutions that have been implemented or 

are under consideration include the following:

• Low-Altitude Alternative Departure Routes. This procedure allows an 

aircraft to depart in certain situations—such as when higher altitudes 

are congested—provided that the aircraft initially flies at a lower 

altitude. As a result, aircraft are more often able to depart on time, but 

they incur higher fuel costs by flying at lower altitudes. This procedure 

involves RJs as well as other aircraft. Industry officials told us that the 

airlines are generally willing to make this trade-off to maintain their 

schedules.

• Tactical Altitude Assignment Program. Under this pilot program, set to 

begin officially in February 2001, certain short stage lengths between 

city pairs are identified as low-altitude routes, and aircraft are allowed 

to depart on these routes with potentially less delay provided that they 

fly the entire route at the predetermined, lower-than-optimum altitude. 

Because the program is voluntary, carriers can decide whether they 

want to incur extra fuel costs to maintain their schedules. Many of the 

selected city pairs included in this program are RJ routes, although this 

program is not specifically directed toward RJs, according to an FAA 

official. 

Trade association representatives generally supported these and other 

efforts to mitigate congestion, but expressed concern about initiatives that 

specifically targeted regional aircraft. They believed that solutions to 

congestion should be based on an aircraft’s operating and performance 

characteristics, not on its type. They believed that equal access to the air 

traffic control system and national airspace was important to the carriers 

flying RJs and, in particular, to their passengers.

The experts we interviewed agreed that interim solutions are important, 

given the projected growth in air traffic. In addition, these experts pointed 

to the need for action on larger, long-standing issues. They said that air 

traffic may not be able to grow as projected unless some of those needs 

(e.g., for enhancements to airport infrastructure and improvements to the 

air traffic control system) are addressed. 
Page 33 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Conclusions The increasing numbers of RJs in operation have provided U.S. air carriers 

with opportunities to serve new and existing markets. As we have noted, 

with predominantly 50-seat aircraft, the carriers have initiated service to 

many large and medium-large communities but have provided less service 

to smaller communities. Service to small communities—to which the 

airlines now mostly operate turboprop aircraft—continues to be an 

important concern, because of the uncertainty about whether those 

markets may generate enough passenger traffic and revenue to be 

financially viable to sustain RJ operations. Eventually, smaller RJs (i.e., 32- 

or 37-seat aircraft) may let carriers serve those smaller communities 

economically. 

Other questions also emerge about the impact of how the carriers will use 

their RJs. For example, the airlines could restrict capacity in a market by 

reducing service with larger mainline jets but increasing the number of RJ 

flights in a way that may inhibit entry by new competitors, allowing the 

airlines to charge fares higher than might exist in a more competitive 

market. Additionally, the growth in RJs has clearly contributed to an 

increasing problem with congestion, particularly in some locations like 

New York’s LaGuardia Airport. But how the expected growth in RJs may 

continue to contribute to congestion and delay remains to be seen. 

Depending on how events unfold in the near future, these and other 

potential impacts of the airlines’ RJ strategies may warrant continued 

oversight. 

Comments We provided representatives from the eight carriers whose regional 

affiliates or code-sharing partners operate RJs (America West, American, 

Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and US Airways) with draft 

copies of the sections of the report describing RJ deployment information 

and other factual descriptions of their historical and existing RJ service. We 

also provided draft copies of report sections to the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) and other interested parties, such as the Air Line 

Pilots Association, Allied Pilots Association, Regional Airline Association, 

Horizon Air, and the three RJ manufacturers—Bombardier, Embraer, and 

Fairchild Dornier. Representatives of the airlines and officials from DOT 

and the various industry groups offered technical comments, which we 

incorporated into the report as appropriate.
Page 34 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report 

until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will provide copies 

to the Honorable Norman Mineta, Secretary of Transportation; the 

Honorable Jane Garvey, FAA Administrator; major U.S. airlines; the Air 

Line Pilots Association; the Allied Pilots Association; the Regional Airline 

Association; the RJ manufacturers; and other interested parties. We will 

also send copies to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me or 

Steve Martin at (202) 512-2834. Other key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

JayEtta Z. Hecker

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 35 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets
Page 36 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

This report examined how U.S. air carriers are using regional jets and what 

issues surround the carriers’ abilities to use these aircraft. Our work 

focused on three questions: (1) What is the status of regional jet 

deployment in the United States and how has this service evolved since 

1997? (2) What factors have affected the airlines’ decisions in deploying 

regional jets? (3) What effect have regional jets had on air traffic and 

airport congestion, according to published studies and experts in the field?

To determine the current status of regional jet (RJ) deployment within the 

United States, we first needed to define this class of aircraft. There is no 

uniformly accepted definition of an RJ either in the industry or in federal 

laws and regulations. For example, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 

Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, P.L. 106-181 (AIR-21), 

variously defines an RJ as having a maximum seating capacity of “not less 

than 30 nor more than 75” (sec. 210) or “less than 71” (sec. 231). Within the 

industry, the term “regional jet” is sometimes used to describe larger 

aircraft, such as the Fokker F-100 (100 seats) and Boeing 717 (106 seats), 

and older-technology aircraft, such as the Fokker F-28 (69 seats) and BAe 

146-100 (70-82 seats). In this report, we defined RJs as newer aircraft that 

have been placed into service since 1993 and are designed to seat 70 or 

fewer passengers. 

We generally limited our analyses of RJ deployment to major network air 

carriers: America West Airlines, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, 

Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines, 

and US Airways. We excluded Alaska Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and 

American Trans Air because they or their regional affiliates do not operate 

RJs (as defined above). 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

To determine where those carriers operated their RJs, we analyzed 

historical data on airline traffic and current data on airline schedules. To 

obtain historical airline traffic data, we contracted with BACK Aviation 

Solutions (BACK), an aviation consulting firm, which obtains operational 

and financial information submitted by all U.S. airlines to the Department 

of Transportation (DOT). These data include the Origin and Destination 

Survey (O&D), based on a 10-percent sample of tickets containing itinerary 

and pricing information; T-100 on-flight data;1

 and 298C T-1 data, which 

supplement the T-100 data with data on commuter and small certified air 

carriers. BACK makes certain adjustments to these data, such as correcting 

recognized deficiencies in the air carriers’ O&D data submissions, when 

these submissions have not met DOT’s standard of 95-percent accuracy. To 

determine the carriers’ scheduled use of RJs, we analyzed airline flight 

schedule information that we purchased from the Kiehl Hendrickson 

Group, an aviation consulting firm. We did not independently assess the 

reliability of the data we purchased from either BACK or the Kiehl 

Hendrickson Group. Finally, to determine the size of communities that 

have received or are scheduled to receive RJ service, we obtained 

information on the populations of metropolitan statistical areas from the 

U.S. Bureau of the Census. We used the latest available Census data, which 

at the time we did our work were estimates for 1998. We used the Bureau’s 

definitions to assign each city to one of four population levels: “Small 

cities” are those with populations of less than 100,000. “Medium cities” are 

those with populations between 100,000 and 249,999. “Medium-large cities” 

are those with populations between 250,000 and 999,999. “Large cities” are 

those with populations of 1 million or more.

We determined the total number of cities to which airlines operated RJs, as 

well as the total number of markets. In the airline industry, markets are 

generally defined in terms of service between a point of origin and a point 

of destination. Thus, a market is often, but not always, defined as a city 

pair. Some cities, however, are served by more than one airport. In our 

counts of the number of markets served by RJs, we adopted the definition 

of a market as a city pair and included all airports that served a 

metropolitan area as serving that city. Thus, for example, in locations such 

as Chicago, we counted RJ service from some other city to both O’Hare 

1

 14 C.F.R. 241 prescribes the collection of scheduled service data from the domestic 

operations of large, certificated U.S. air carriers. The schedules submitted by the air 

carriers to DOT under this requirement collect nonstop segment data and on-flight market 

information by equipment type and by service class. This report is known as the “T-100” 

report.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

International and Midway airports as RJ service to the Chicago market. The 

total number of markets served is greater than the number of cities because 

many spoke cities receive service from more than one airline—through 

different hubs. Competing airline networks and hubs create multiple 

markets. To eliminate markets that might receive less service than one 

flight per day for business days, we included only those that had a 

minimum of 20 RJ departures in October 2000. The definitions we used in 

our analysis are generally consistent with those used by other industry 

experts.

As part of our effort to determine the status of RJ deployments, we also 

determined how the type of service provided by carriers changed over 

time. Prior research had established six main categories for how service in 

markets may change with the introduction of RJs: establishment of new 

markets, mainline jet replacement, mainline jet supplement, turboprop 

replacement, turboprop supplement, and both mainline jet and turboprop 

supplement. Table 3 shows how each of those categories is defined.

Table 3: Categories of Service Change

Category of 

service change 

by RJ Definition

New market Airline had no RJ service within the last year.

Mainline jet 

replacement

Airline replaced all mainline jet service with RJ service.

Mainline jet 

supplement

Airline added RJ service to existing mainline jet operations, 

regardless of whether the airline maintained the previous level of 

mainline operations.

Turboprop 

replacement

Airline replaced turboprop service with RJ service.

Turboprop 

supplement

Airline added RJ service to existing turboprop operations, regardless 

of whether the airline maintained the previous level of turboprop 

operations.

Mainline jet and 

turboprop 

supplement

Airline added RJ service to existing mainline jet and turboprop 

operations, regardless of whether the airline maintained the previous 

level of operations.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Using these same categories, we examined RJ deployment in city-pair 

markets where carriers introduced RJs between January 1997 and October 

2000,2

 and those RJs were still scheduled for service in October 2000. 

To determine what factors have affected airlines’ deployment of RJs, we 

interviewed officials from aircraft manufacturers, pilot unions, major 

airlines, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as industry 

experts and consultants. We interviewed airline officials to determine what 

criteria and processes they use in making deployment decisions. These 

officials also helped us understand the airlines’ perspectives in pilot 

contract negotiations. Union officials provided the labor perspective on 

scope issues, as well as data on the airlines’ uses of RJs. We interviewed 

FAA officials to determine whether infrastructure issues (e.g., airport 

runways and capacity) might have played a role in the airlines’ deployment 

of RJs. Industry experts and consultants provided a third perspective on RJ 

deployment and pilot labor issues. In addition, we reviewed studies and 

documents provided by these officials, as well as documents and studies 

obtained through literature and Internet searches. 

To determine the effect of RJs on congestion, we reviewed the limited 

number of available studies and consulted with a wide range of industry 

officials. To develop a list of relevant, comprehensive reports on RJs and 

congestion, we conducted a literature search and contacted industry 

officials. To identify industry experts, we relied on the recommendations of 

many knowledgeable industry officials. We interviewed officials from 

various sources, including the airlines, FAA (both headquarters staff and air 

traffic controllers in certain field locations), aviation industry consulting 

firms, and industry trade associations. 

We conducted our work from March 2000 through February 2001 in 

Washington, D.C.; Seattle, Washington; and Dallas and Houston, Texas, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

2

 Because of data limitations, we could include information on Delta’s RJ deployment only 

between June 1997 and Oct. 2000.
Page 40 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, Characteristics, 

and Demand ApendxiI

The regional jets (RJ) primarily in service in the United States are 

manufactured by three companies: Bombardier, Embraer, and Fairchild 

Dornier.1

 Bombardier, a Canadian company, was the first to enter the U.S. 

market in 1993 with its 50-seat Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ). Embraer, 

which is headquartered in Brazil, entered the U.S. market in 1997 with its 

50-seat ERJ-145 and in 1999 with its ERJ-135. Embraer is also developing 

the 44-seat ERJ-140. This plane is slated to enter service in the first quarter 

of 2001. Fairchild Dornier, which is based in Germany, first entered the 

market in 1999 with its 328Jet, the first 32-seat jet. Each of these companies 

also manufactures turboprops and is developing 70-seat RJs. These 70-seat 

aircraft are scheduled to go into service within the next 3 years. Table 4 

lists some operating characteristics of these RJs. Figures 9 through 15 are 

photographs of the Bombardier, Embraer, and Fairchild Dornier RJs that 

are either now in service or proposed for U.S. commercial service.

1

 Boeing is considering building large (i.e., 70 seats or more) RJs by altering its 106-seat B717 to accommodate 70 to 86 passengers. BAE Systems manufactures the Avro aircraft that 

the company describes as an RJ. These jets are designed to seat 70 to 112 passengers, and 

only one U.S. carrier—Northwest Airlines—is a customer. Northwest operates a 69-seat 

version of the Avro RJ85.
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 41 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Table 4: RJ Operating Characteristics

a

Embraer terms this operating characteristic the “service ceiling.”

Note: The information for the ERJ-140, CRJ700, ERJ-170, and 728Jet is italicized because these 

models are not yet in service in the U.S. and their specifications may therefore be preliminary.

Source: Manufacturers.

Manufacturer and RJ 

model

Seating

capacity

Range (fully loaded,

in nautical miles)

Maximum operating

altitude (in feet)a

Maximum

cruise speed

(in knots)

Take-off

distance at sea

level (in feet)

BAE Systems

 Avro RJ85 85-100 1,510 35,000 440 3,796

Bombardier

 CRJ200 ER 50 1,645 41,000 464 6,290

 CRJ700 70 1,685 41,000 473 5,130

Embraer

 ERJ-135 37 1,700 37,000 450 5,577

 ERJ-140 44 1,630 37,000 450 6,463

 ERJ-145 50 1,550 37,000 450 7,448

 ERJ-170 70 1,800 41,000 470 5,500

Fairchild Dornier

 328Jet 32-34 900 31,000 400 4,530

 728Jet 70-85 1,600 41,000 464 5,009
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 42 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 9: Bombardier CRJ200

Source: Bombardier.

Figure 10: Bombardier CRJ700

Source: Bombardier.
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 43 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 11: Embraer ERJ-135

Source: Embraer.

Figure 12: Embraer ERJ-145

Source: Embraer.
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 44 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 13: Embraer ERJ-170

Source: Embraer.
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 45 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 14: Fairchild Dornier 328Jet

Source: Fairchild Dornier.
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 46 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Figure 15: Fairchild Dornier 728Jet

Source: Fairchild Dornier.

These manufacturers have significant backlogs for U.S. orders. For 

example, Bombardier has not yet delivered 47 percent of the U.S. orders for 

its 50-seat CRJ. Embraer has not yet delivered 54 percent of the U.S. orders 

for its 50-seat ERJ and 51 percent of the U.S. orders for its ERJ-135. 

Fairchild Dornier has not delivered 69 percent of the U.S. orders for its 

328Jet. Table 5 presents the number of orders, options, and deliveries, 

together with the backlog for each aircraft type.
Appendix II

Regional Jets: Manufacturers, 

Characteristics, and Demand

Page 47 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Table 5: U.S. RJ Orders, Options, Deliveries, and Backlog, by Aircraft Type

Note: Orders, options, deliveries, and backlog are for orders placed by U.S. carriers only, including 

some airlines that are not flying RJs as code-sharing partners for major carriers. Orders by U.S.-based 

aircraft-leasing companies are not included. The ERJ-140 and the 70-seat RJs are not yet in service in 

the United States. 

a

 Data for Bombardier are as of January 2001.

b

 Data for Embraer are as of November 2000.

c

 Data for Fairchild Dornier are as of January 2001.

Sources: Manufacturers.

To address their backlogs, Bombardier and Embraer planned to increase 

production of their aircraft. Bombardier planned to increase its CRJ100/200 

production from 9.5 per month to 12.5 per month in the fall of 2001. This 

will allow the company to produce 135 aircraft in 2001-2002 and 150 aircraft 

in 2002-2003. Bombardier is building a new plant at Montreal’s Mirabel 

airport to handle the final assembly of the CRJ700 as well as of the CRJ900 

(a planned 86- to 90-seat jet). Embraer also planned to increase production 

of its RJs. The company expected to deliver 150 RJs in 2000 and nearly 200 

in 2001.

Manufacturer Aircraft type

Seating

capacity Orders Options Deliveries Backlog

Bombardiera

 CRJ100/200 50 516 497 272 244

CRJ700 70 112 218 0 112

Embraerb ERJ-135 37 100 0 49 51

ERJ-140 44 129 31 0 129

ERJ-145 50 323 181 147 176

ERJ-170 70 0 0 0 0

Fairchild Dornierc

 328Jet 32-34 75 83 23 52

728Jet 70-85 0 0 0 0

Total 1,255 1,010 491 764
Page 48 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Appendix III

U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of 

October 2000 ApendxiI

Cities State Airline and year RJ service started

Large cities

Atlanta GA DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1999)

Austin TX DL (1999)

Baltimore MD HP (1998), CO (2000)

Boston MA DL (1997), US (1998), CO (1999), AA (2000), HP (2000) 

Buffalo NY DL (1998), CO (2000), NW (2000)

Charlotte NC DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1998), NW (2000)

Chicago IL AA (1998), DL (1998), UA (1998), CO (1999), HP (1999)

Cincinnati OH DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1998), US (1998), TW (2000)

Cleveland OH DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1998), UA (2000)

Columbus OH DL (1997), AA (1998), HP (1998), UA (1999), US (2000)

Dallas TX AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1999), DL (2000)

Denver CO UA (1999)

Detroit MI DL (1997), NW (1998)

Ft. Lauderdale FL DL (2000)

Grand Rapids MI DL (1997), AA (1999), NW (1999), US (1999), CO (2000)

Greensboro NC DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (1999)a

, AA (2000), UA (2000), US (2000) 

Hartford CT CO (1998), HP (2000)

Houston TX CO (1998), DL (1998), AA (1999)

Indianapolis IN DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), UA (1998), US (1999)

Jacksonville FL UA (1998), CO (1999), DL (1999)

Kansas City MO DL (1997), CO (1999)

Las Vegas NV DL (1997), HP (1999)

Long Island NY DL (1998), CO (1999)

Memphis TN DL (1997), AA (1999), CO (1999), NW (2000)

Miami FL DL (1997)

Midland/Odessa TX CO (1999), AA (2000)

Milwaukee WI DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), US (1998), UA (2000)

Minneapolis MN DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (1998)

Nashville TN DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1998), US (1999), AA (2000), NW (2000)

New Orleans LA DL (1997)

New York Metro NY DL (1997), CO (1998), HP (1998), AA (1999), UA (1999), US (1999)

Norfolk VA AA (2000), CO (2000), DL (2000), UA (2000)

Oklahoma City OK AA (2000), CO (2000), DL (2000), UA (2000)

Santa Ana 

(Orange County)

CA DL (1997)
Appendix III

U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of 

October 2000

Page 49 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Cities State Airline and year RJ service started

Orlando FL DL (1997), CO (2000)a

Philadelphia PA DL (1997), HP (1998), US (1998), CO (1999), AA (2000)

Phoenix AZ HP (1997)

Pittsburgh PA DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (1998), AA (1999)

Portland OR DL (1997)

Providence RI CO (1999), DL (2000), UA (2000)

Raleigh/Durham NC DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1998), US (1998)

Rochester NY DL (1997), US (1999), CO (2000), NW (2000)

Salt Lake City UT DL (1997)

San Antonio TX DL (1999)

San Francisco CA DL (1997)

St. Louis MO DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1998), NW (1999), TW (2000)

Tampa FL CO (2000)a

Washington DC DL (1997), UA (1998), US (1998), CO (1999), HP (1999)

Medium-large cities 

Akron/Canton OH DL (1997), UA (2000)

Albany NY CO (1999), UA (1999)

Albuquerque NM DL (1997)

Allentown PA DL (1997)

Appleton WI DL (1997), UA (1999), NW (2000)

Bakersfield CA HP (1999)

Baton Rouge LA AA (1999), CO (1999), NW (2000)

Birmingham AL DL (1997), US (1998), CO (1999), NW (2000), UA (2000)

Boise ID DL (1997)

Brownsville TX CO (1999)

Charleston SC UA (1998), CO (1999), DL (1999), US (1999), NW (2000), TW (2000)

Charleston WV DL (1998), UA (1998), US (1998)

Chattanooga TN DL (1997), AA (2000), NW (2000)

Colorado Springs CO DL (1997), CO (1999), HP (1999)

Columbia SC DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1999), US (1999) 

Corpus Christi TX CO (1998), DL (1999), AA (2000)

Dayton OH DL (1997), AA (1998), CO (1998), NW (1998), US (1999), TW (2000)

Daytona Beach FL DL (1999)

Des Moines IA DL (1997), HP (1997), AA (1998), NW (1998) 

El Paso TX CO (1999), HP (1999)

Eugene OR HP (1999)

Evansville IN DL (1997), AA (2000)

(Continued From Previous Page)
Appendix III

U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of 

October 2000

Page 50 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Cities State Airline and year RJ service started

Fayetteville NC DL (1998)

Fayetteville AR AA (1998), DL (1999), NW (1999), TW (2000)

Flint MI NW (2000)

Fort Myers FL DL (1999)

Fort Wayne IN DL (1997), AA (2000), NW (2000), UA (2000)

Fresno CA HP (1997), DL (1998), UA (2000)

Greenville/Spartanburg SC DL (1997), CO (1998), UA (1998), AA (1999), NW (2000), TW (2000), US (2000)

Gulfport/Biloxi MS DL (1997), NW (2000)

Harrisburg PA DL (1997), NW (1999)

Huntsville/Decatur AL DL (1997), US (1998), AA (1999), CO (1999), NW (2000)

Jackson MS DL (1997), UA (1999), NW (2000), TW (2000)

Kalamazoo MI DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (1999), UA (2000)

Knoxville TN DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (1999), CO (1999), US (1999) 

Lafayette LA CO (1998)

Lansing MI DL (1998)

Lexington KY DL (1997), NW (1998)

Little Rock AR DL (1997), US (1998), CO (2000), UA (2000)

Louisville KY DL (1997), CO (1998), US (1999), UA (2000)

Macon GA DL (1997)

Madison WI DL (1998), AA (1999), UA (1999), CO (2000)

Melbourne FL DL (1999)

Mobile AL CO (1998), DL (1999), UA (1999), NW (2000)

Monterey CA HP (1999)

Montgomery AL AA (1998) 

Newburgh NY DL (1998)

Omaha NE DL (1997), AA (1999), CO (1999)

Pensacola FL CO (2000), NW (2000)

Peoria IL AA (1999), UA (1999), TW (2000)

Reno NV DL (2000)

Richmond VA DL (1997), AA (2000), CO (2000), US (2000)

Saginaw MI NW (2000)

Santa Barbara CA HP (1997)

Sarasota FL DL (1999)

Savannah GA CO (1998), UA (1998), DL (1999), US (1999), AA (2000)

Shreveport LA AA (1998), TW (2000)

South Bend IN DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (2000)

Springfield MO UA (1998), AA (2000), NW (2000)

(Continued From Previous Page)
Appendix III

U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of 

October 2000

Page 51 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Cities State Airline and year RJ service started

Syracuse NY DL (1997)

Tallahassee FL DL (1997)

Toledo OH DL (1997), AA (2000)

Tucson AZ HP (1999)

Tulsa OK DL (1997), NW (2000), UA (2000)

Wichita KS DL (1997), CO (1998), HP (1999), NW (2000)

Wilkes-Barre PA DL (1997), UA (1998)

Worcester MA DL (2000)

South Bend IN DL (1997), NW (1998), AA (2000)

Medium cities

Abilene TX AA (1998)

Amarillo TX CO (1998), DL (2000)

Asheville NC DL (1997)

Billings MT DL (1997), UA (1999)

Bloomington IL AA (2000), NW (2000)

Burlington VT CO (1998), UA (1999), US (1999), DL (2000)

Cedar Rapids IA DL (1997), AA (1998), NW (1998)

Champaign/Urbana IL AA (2000)

Charlottesville VA DL (1998)

Columbus/Starkville MS DL (2000)

Duluth MN AA (1998), NW (1998)

Fargo ND NW (1999), UA (1999)

Fort Smith AR AA (2000)

Ft. Walton Beach FL DL (1997)

Gainesville FL DL (1998)

Green Bay WI DL (1998), NW (1998), AA (2000), UA (2000)

La Crosse WI NW (1998), AA (2000)

Lincoln NE TW (2000)

Lubbock TX CO (1998), AA (2000), DL (2000)

Manchester NH DL (1997), CO (1999)

Myrtle Beach SC DL (1997), CO (1999)

Panama City FL DL (1997)

Pasco WA DL (1997)

Portland ME UA (1998), CO (2000), DL (2000)a

, US (2000)a

Roanoke VA DL (1997), UA (1998)

Rochester MN NW (2000)

Sioux Falls SD UA (1999)

(Continued From Previous Page)
Appendix III

U.S. Cities With Regional Jet Service as of 

October 2000

Page 52 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Airline Codes

AA — American Airlines

CO — Continental Airlines

DL — Delta Air Lines

HP — America West Airlines

NW — Northwest Airlines

TW — Trans World Airlines

UA — United Airlines

US — US Airways

Note: For 1997, the airline either started RJ service in that year or was already providing it before May 

1997. For some cities, carriers may have provided less than 20 departures in October 2000.

a

The carrier no longer provides RJ service to this city as of February 1, 2001.

Source: GAO’s analysis of data from BACK Aviation Solutions, Kiehl Hendrickson Group, and the U.S. 

Bureau of the Census.

Cities State Airline and year RJ service started

Tri City Airport TN DL (1997)

Wilmington NC DL (1999)

Small cities 

Bangor ME DL (1999)

Bozeman MT DL (1997), UA (2000)

Butte MT DL (1997)

Casper WY DL (1997)

Durango CO HP (1999)

Grand Forks ND NW (1997)

Harlingen TX CO (2000)

Helena MT DL (1997)

Idaho Falls ID DL (1998)

Missoula MT DL (1997)

Rapid City SD DL (1997)

Traverse City MI AA (1999), NW (1999)

White Plains 

(Westchester County)

NY DL (1997), CO (1998), NW (2000)

(Continued From Previous Page)
Page 53 GAO-01-344 Regional Jets

Appendix IV

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contacts JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512-2834

Steven C. Martin (202) 512-2834

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Dawn Hoff, David Hooper, Joseph Kile, 

Sara Ann Moessbauer, Tim Schindler, Stan Stenersen, and Pamela Vines 

made key contributions to this report.

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