J-A24005-21

2021 PA Super 251

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

WAYNE SINGLETARY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2069 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered September 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0006345-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2021

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, suppressing a firearm found 

as a result of a warrantless search of an automobile in which Wayne Singletary

was a passenger.

1

 After careful review, we affirm. 

The court made the following findings of fact

2 after the suppression 

hearing:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth avers that the order would 

terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution of its case. See Pa.R.A.P. 

311(d) (“In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the 

Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not 

end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal 

that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.”). 

2 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I) (“At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall 

enter on the record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On November 30, 2018, at approximately 12:30 p.m., in the 

vicinity of the 900 block of Lincoln [Street] in Chester City, Officer 

Terrence Taylor was on duty, in regular capacity, performing an 

area check [at] this location . . . based on instruction to patrol 

the vicinity as a result of frequent nuisance calls for loiteringgroups, loud noise, and open drug activity[.] Officer Taylor 

approached the area of the 800 block of Hughes Street and a large 

group of individuals began to disperse. 

Officer Taylor parked and exited his vehicle to advise the group 

that loitering is not permitted in the area. Officer Taylor observed 

a Mercedes SUV, that was not running, parked in a legal parking 

spot, on the opposite side of the street [from where he parked his 

vehicle], [which had] two individuals sitting in the [front seats. 

Troy L. Harris was seated in the driver’s seat and Singletary was

seated in the front passenger seat.] 

Officer Taylor approached the driver side of the vehicle and 

requested identification from both [Harris] and [Singletary]. 

[Harris] provided Officer Taylor with a passport and [Singletary] 

provided Officer Taylor with a [p]hoto ID. Officer Taylor, while 

still standing next to the driver side of the [Mercedes], radioed the 

information received from the identification provided, as well as 

the vehicle information [for confirmation and review of 

outstanding warrants]. Officer Taylor determined that [Harris’]

driver’s license was suspended, [] that the vehicle came back as 

[“no record found,”3listed no insurance, and that the documented

owner was neither Harris nor Singletary]. 

____________________________________________

to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights, 

or in violation of these rules or any statute, and shall make an order granting 

or denying the relief sought.”).

3 Officer Taylor testified that the Mercedes’ registration returned “no record 

found.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/31/20, at 14. When Officer Taylor 

submitted the Mercedes’ vehicle identification number (VIN) through the 

National Crime Information Center (NCIC), he testified that “the vehicle itself 

was suspension type[-]F, which is insurance cancelation and needed to have 

another registration displayed on it. . . . [T]he registration that was currently 

on it was not [] the one that was attached to it through PennDOT.” Id. at 18-

19.
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Officer Taylor observed an empty pill bottle in [Harris’] lap[, which 

he determined—based on the label—might have, at some point, 

contained oxycodone prescribed to someone other than Harris or 

Singletary.] During this time, Officer Singleton[4] arrived on the 

scene at the passenger door [of the Mercedes]. Officer Taylor and 

Officer Singleton asked [Harris] and [Singletary] to exit the 

vehicle. As [Singletary] exited the vehicle, the officers heard a 

hard metal object hit the ground, at which point [Singletary]

began to run from the officers. Officer Taylor gave chase, but did 

not apprehend [Singletary] at th[at] time.

Order, 9/24/20, at 1-2 (findings of fact paragraphs combined). The officers 

recovered a firearm with an obliterated serial number from the location where 

they heard the sound of a metal object striking the ground.

Later that day, Singletary was arrested and charged with one count each 

of: firearms not to be carried without a license;

5 altered or obliterated mark 

of identification;

6

flight to avoid apprehension or trial or punishment;

7

recklessly endangering another person;

8 and disorderly conduct.9

 On January 

31, 2020, Singletary filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking to suppress the 

firearm. On July 31, 2020, the court held a hearing on Singletary’s motion, 

where the court found the above facts, and the parties stipulated that, if called 

____________________________________________

4 The record did not disclose Officer Singleton’s first name. 

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6117(a).

7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a).

8 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

9 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1).
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to testify at the suppression hearing, Officer Singleton would have testified 

that she saw the silver handgun fall from Singletary’s lap as he got out of the 

car before he took off running. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/31/20, at 36-37. 

The court issued an order on September 25, 2020, granting suppression of 

the firearm. On October 23, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. 

The court did not order the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

10 but the court filed 

a Rule 1925(a) opinion nonetheless.

On appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issues for our 

review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Did the suppression court err by concluding that, at the time 

that [] Singletary was directed to exit the vehicle, the police 

lacked the legal authority to order [] Singletary to exit the 

vehicle?

2. Did the suppression court err by failing to conclude that the 

police interaction with the occupants of a parked vehicle, which 

began as a mere encounter, evolved into a lawful vehicle stop 

supported by reasonable suspicion and probable cause?

Appellant’s Brief, at 1.

Our standard of review of a Commonwealth’s appeal from a grant of a 

suppression order is well-settled:

[We] consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses

together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in 

the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The 

suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the 

____________________________________________

10 The Commonwealth has properly averred that the court did not order a Rule 

1925(b) statement, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11) and (d). See

Appellant’s Brief, at Exhibit B.
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record supports those findings. The suppression court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, 

whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Richard, 238 A.3d 522, 525 (Pa. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278-79 (Pa. Super. 2012)). 

Additionally, the appellate scope of review is limited to “only evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 188 A.3d 

478, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085-87 (Pa. 

2013)).

In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that it established 

reasonable suspicion sufficient to require Singletary to alight from the 

Mercedes because Officer Taylor articulated that: the pill bottle in Harris’ lap 

clearly did not belong to either Harris or to Singletary; the pill bottle was 

recognized by the officers as immediately incriminating pursuant to our 

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 

2007) (plurality) (probable cause to search interior of vehicle existed based 

on limited automobile exception where, under totality of circumstances, officer 

observed pill bottle in plain view in vehicle stopped in area well-known for 

illegal prescription drug sales, officer was aware of other officer’s pre-planned 

drug buy with passenger in defendant’s vehicle, passenger agreed to procure 

additional drugs for officer, and there was no advanced warning that 

defendant or his car would be target of police investigation); the area where 

the vehicle was parked had a documented, on-going, open-air drug dealing 

problem; the Mercedes was uninsured and not properly registered; neither 
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occupant had a valid driver’s license; and, consistent with illegal drug activity, 

a large number of people fled the area surrounding the Mercedes just as 

Officer Taylor approached. The Commonwealth contends that, although these 

facts could have innocent explanations, even a combination of innocent facts, 

when taken together, may warrant further investigation, and that reasonable 

suspicion may nevertheless be established where suspicion of criminal conduct 

is reasonably based upon the facts of the matter. See Appellant’s Brief, at 

18-19 (citing Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004)).

In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues that reasonable suspicion 

and probable cause supported a vehicle stop, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

6308(b), because, pursuant to Richard, supra, once police learn that a 

vehicle is unregistered, probable cause sufficient to conduct a vehicle stop is 

established. Appellant’s Brief, at 22. Moreover, the Commonwealth contends 

that, while investigating the scene further, police discovered that the 

occupants of the Mercedes seemed to have no lawful connection to it, the

Mercedes was uninsured, the Mercedes had an improper registration attached 

to it, and the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Harris was driving 

with a suspended driver’s license. Id. at 22-23. The Commonwealth 

concludes that “nothing in the Vehicle Code or in the appellate court decisions 

involving a vehicle stop says that a parked vehicle cannot be the subject of a 

lawful vehicle stop when the police have the requisite reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause to make a lawful vehicle stop.” Appellant’s brief, at 22-23

(citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1106-07 (Pa. Super. 
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2019)). Finally, the Commonwealth relies on case law that permits the police 

to request a driver and passengers to alight from a lawfully stopped car, as a 

matter of right, without additional reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 

is afoot. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. Super. 1995). We 

disagree with both of the Commonwealth’s claims.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals freedom from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. See Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 

A.2d 543, 550 (Pa. Super. 2008). A “warrantless search or seizure of evidence 

is . . . presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article 

I, § 8, subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions.”

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. Super. 2019). Courts in 

Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate varying levels 

of suspicion to justify citizen interactions, which interactions have been 

organized into three tiers: mere encounters, investigatory stops, and 

custodial detentions. See Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 

1154 (Pa. Super. 2017).

A mere encounter between police and a citizen need not be 

supported by any level of suspicion, and carries no official 

compulsion on the part of the citizen to stop or to respond. An 

investigatory stop, which subjects a suspect to a stop and a period 

of detention[,] requires a reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity is afoot. A custodial search is an arrest[,] and must be 

supported by probable cause.
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Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Kendall, 976 A.2d 503, 506 n.2 (Pa. Super. 

2009)) (brackets and ellipses omitted). 

“[I]n assessing the lawfulness of citizen/police encounters, a central, 

threshold issue is whether or not the citizen-subject has been seized.” Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 613 (Pa. Super. 2013)). 

“[T]he issue of whether an individual has been seized is distinct from the issue 

of whether that seizure was reasonable.” Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 

177 A.3d 609, 619-20 (Pa. 2017). “To determine whether a citizen’s 

movement has been restrained, courts must consider the totality of the 

circumstances, with no single factor dictating the ultimate conclusion as to 

whether a seizure has occurred.” Id. at 621 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained the objective test which 

the court must apply to the totality of the circumstances of each individual 

case to determine if police have seized the defendant:

No bright lines separate the[ three] types of encounter, but the 

United States Supreme Court has established an objective test by 

which courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to 

elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often 

referred to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to 

determine “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances 

surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have 

communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty 

to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’”

[Florida v.] Bostick, 501 U.S. [429,] 437 [(1991)]. “[W]henever 

a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 

walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” Terry [v. Ohio], 392 

U.S. [1,] 16 [(1968)].
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Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1200 (Pa. 2019) (some citations 

omitted). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1977).

In applying this objective test, we have previously explained that “the 

focus is directed toward whether, by means of physical force or show of 

authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has[,] in some way[,] been 

restrained.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 161 A.3d 357, 363 (Pa. Super. 

2017). In making this determination, we consider “all circumstances 

evidencing a show of authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of 

the police officer, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing 

the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements.” 

Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 715 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. 1998). 

Additionally, this Court has set forth non-exclusive factors for the court to 

consider: 

the number of officers present during the interaction; whether the 

officer informs the citizen they are suspected of criminal activity; 

the officer’s demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing 

of the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; 

and the questions asked. Otherwise[,] inoffensive contact 

between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter 

of law, amount to a seizure of that person.

Parker, supra (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1047 

n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)).

“No constitutional provision prohibits police officers from approaching a 

citizen in public to make inquiries of them.” Commonwealth v. Boswell, 

721 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. 1998). However, if the police action becomes too 
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intrusive, a mere encounter may escalate into an investigatory stop or a 

seizure. Id. 

“Officers may request identification or question an individual so long as 

the officers do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 

required. Although police may request a person’s identification, such 

individual still maintains the right to ignore the police and go about his 

business.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 303 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “[A]n encounter involving a request for 

identification could rise to a detention when coupled with circumstances of 

restraint of liberty, physical force, show of authority, or some level of coercion 

beyond the officer’s mere employment, conveying a demand for compliance 

or that there will be tangible consequences from a refusal.” Id. at 304. “[T]he 

retention by police of an identification card to conduct a warrant check will 

generally be a material and substantial escalating factor within the totality 

assessment.” Commonwealth v. Cost, 224 A.3d 641, 651 (Pa. 2020) (police

retention of Appellant’s identification card to conduct warrant check—as 

Appellant was asked if there was anything in his backpack that officers needed 

to know about—was sufficient to signify to reasonable person that Appellant

was not free to leave, resulting in seizure of Appellant).

This Court recently reiterated how police officers may require individuals 

to alight from their vehicles during a valid traffic stop:

[O]fficers conducting a valid traffic stop have an absolute right to 

ask the occupants of a vehicle to step out of the car for the 

duration of the traffic stop . . . to assure [officer] safety. 
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[Commonwealth v.] Reppert, 814 A.2d [1196,] 1202 [(Pa. 

Super. 2002) (en banc)]. This is true even absent a reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

This absolute right to order occupants out of a vehicle is limited in 

duration, however, and once the primary traffic stop has 

concluded . . . the officer’s authority to order either driver or

occupant from the car is extinguished. Reppert, supra at 

1202.[11] [T]he matter of when a traffic stop has concluded or 

otherwise given way to a new interaction does not lend itself to a 

bright[-]line definition.

The United States Supreme Court has held that authority for a 

seizure pursuant to a traffic stop ends “when tasks tied to the 

traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 349, 

(2015). Applying this principle, this Court’s analysis of similar 

cases has turned on whether the purpose of the traffic stop was 

accomplished prior to ordering occupants out of the vehicle, and 

whether the occupants had previously been issued citations or told 

that they were free to leave.

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal 

quotations, brackets, and some citations omitted).

We have previously described how the court determines whether a 

police officer has reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a warrantless 

search: 

____________________________________________

11 In Reppert, this Court noted that: 

Once the primary traffic stop has concluded, . . . the officer’s 

authority to order either driver or occupant from the car is 

extinguished. Thus, if[,] subsequently[,] the officer directs or 

requests the occupants to exit the vehicle, his show of authority 

may constitute an investigatory detention subject to a renewed 

showing of reasonable suspicion.”

Reppert, supra at 1202 (citations omitted).
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[T]he officer must articulate specific observations which, in 

conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these 

observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his 

experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person he 

stopped was involved in that activity.

In order to determine whether the police officer had 

reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must 

be considered. In making this determination, we must give 

due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the police 

officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 

experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does 

not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts 

that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a 

combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations, quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). The objective test 

“will not be satisfied by an officer’s ‘hunch’ or ‘unparticularized suspicion.’”

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 626 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Arch, 654 A.2d 1141, 1144 (Pa. Super. 1995)).

The suppression court offered analysis in support of its order

suppressing the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree12 as follows:

Officer Taylor’s presence in the vicinity was appropriate based on 

the instructions for area checks and the intent to disperse large 

groups in this location. Following Officer Taylor’s observation of 

the vehicle in which [Singletary] was a passenger, [Officer Taylor] 

approached the driver’s side of the [Mercedes] and communicated 

with [Harris and Singletary]. [T]he interaction[,] at this point[,

was] a mere encounter, which was reasonable, as it required no 

level of suspicion and carried no compulsion for [Harris] or 

[Singletary] to respond. Officer Taylor’s request for identification 

was also a reasonable inquiry during this mere encounter.

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12 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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Officer Taylor was in full uniform at the time and remained 

standing next to the driver side of the vehicle, at which point 

Officer Singleton arrived and approached toward the passenger 

side of the vehicle. Both officers requested [Harris] and 

[Singletary] to exit the vehicle. At this point, the encounter 

evolved into an investigative detention. Two officers in full 

uniform were on either side of the vehicle, which was legally 

parked and not running. The officers then directed [Harris and 

Singletary] to exit the vehicle. Under the totality of the 

circumstances, no reasonable person would feel free to leave. The 

interaction therefore amounted to a seizure, requiring reasonable 

suspicion.

This encounter did not derive from a traffic stop or any unlawful 

or suspicious activity. There were no warrants based on the 

running of the identification, there were no furtive movements by 

either [Harris or Singletary]. The mere fact that the entirety of 

Chester is unfortunately a high crime area, does not, in itself, 

provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative 

detention in this situation. There were no reasonable articulable 

grounds for [Singletary’s] seizure[.]

Order, 9/24/20, at 3.

Here, we agree with the trial court and conclude that, initially, when 

Officer Taylor first approached the Mercedes and requested identification from 

Harris and Singletary, the interaction was a mere encounter, as there was no 

show of force or authority on the part of Officer Taylor beyond the simple 

request. See Boswell, supra; Lyles, supra at 303. Nevertheless, the 

interaction evolved into an investigatory detention, see Lyles, supra at 304, 

at least at the point where officers stood on each side of the Mercedes, and 

requested the occupants to alight from the vehicle, all while the occupants’
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identifications remained in police possession.13 See Lyles, supra; see also 

Cost, supra. At the time of the officers’ request to alight from the Mercedes, 

the officers’ body positions on either side of the Mercedes restrained 

Singletary’s liberty of movement. See Livingstone, supra; see also Jones, 

supra at 840 (where officer immediately sought defendant’s identification and 

defendant complied, officer escalated exercise of force and seized Defendant 

by asking Defendant to remain seated in vehicle, seeking control of 

Defendant’s movement); Commonwealth v. Powell, 228 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (defendant subjected to investigative detention while eating 

inside legally parked car where officers, without observing criminal activity, 

parked right behind defendant’s vehicle, surrounded his vehicle, and ordered

defendant to lower car window). Additionally, here, while standing on either 

side of the Mercedes and retaining Harris’ and Singletary’s identification, the 

officers ordered Singletary and Harris out of the vehicle after a warrant check 

____________________________________________

13 Singletary would have this Court find that he was seized at the point that 

“Officer Taylor took his identification to run his information through NCIC[.]” 

Appellee’s Brief, at 12. Singletary’s suggestion—that any time an officer 

retains identification a seizure results—is contrary to the established 

precedent of this Commonwealth that such retention is, instead, but one factor 

to be considered within the totality of the circumstances. See Cost, supra

at 651 (“[T]he retention by police of an identification card to conduct a warrant 

check will generally be a material and substantial escalating factor 

within the totality assessment.”) (emphasis added); see also Lyles, 

supra at 303 (police may request identification, but individual still maintains

right to ignore police and go about his business). See also Commonwealth 

v. Powell, 228 A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 543 (Pa. Super. 2019)) (“Officers may request 

identification or question an individual so long as the officers do not convey a 

message that compliance with their requests is required.”). 
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revealed no outstanding warrants, which would signal to a reasonable person 

that they are not free to leave. See Cost, supra; see also Adams, supra. 

See also Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 637 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(interaction was investigative detention where two officers approached 

vehicle, positioned themselves one on each side of it, and, after requesting 

and confirming identification of driver and passenger, police requested 

individuals alight from vehicle).

Regarding the Commonwealth’s argument that the officers were 

permitted to require Singletary to alight from the Mercedes pursuant to a 

vehicle stop, we find the argument to be meritless. First, we note that the 

Commonwealth’s reliance on Richard, supra, for the proposition that a 

vehicle’s unregistered status is sufficient to grant police probable cause, is 

misplaced, because the Defendant in that case operated the vehicle on 

Commonwealth highways.14 Id. at 527; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a).15

____________________________________________

14 Here, our review of the record reveals that the officers only observed the 

Mercedes parked legally and the ignition turned off. The Mercedes, was, 

therefore, neither driven nor operated on Commonwealth highways at any 

time relevant to this case.

15 The vehicle registration statute requires the vehicle to drive or move on a 

highway for an infraction to result. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a) (“No person 

shall drive or move and no owner or motor carrier shall knowingly 

permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle which is 

not registered in this Commonwealth unless the vehicle is exempt from 

registration.”) (emphasis added). Here, the Mercedes never moved and, 

instead, remained parked legally throughout police observation.
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Second, we are satisfied that any vehicle stop16 of the Mercedes was fully 

concluded by the time the officers requested that Singletary alight from his 

seat since there was no further investigation to conduct as it related to any 

driving infraction,17 vehicle registration infraction,18 or vehicle insurance

infraction,19 and the officers declined to write a ticket or issue a warning to 

____________________________________________

16 The Commonwealth would have this Court find that a vehicle stop may be 

conducted on a parked vehicle. See Appellant’s brief, at 22-23 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1106-07 (Pa. Super. 2019)). 

We find Wright to be inapposite since the vehicle in that case was parked in 

a lane of travel, instead of parked in a legal parking spot. Nevertheless, we 

need not decide the question since any vehicle stop here would have been 

concluded at the time Singletary was seized, as we conclude below. See 

Palmer, supra; Reppert, supra. In DeHart, supra, we stated:

We are unaware of any search and seizure law that treats a police 

officer approaching a stopped vehicle as a “traffic stop.” Further, 

since a mere encounter between police officer and citizen requires 

no suspicion at all, the key to analyzing the within case is a 

determination of the point in time when Appellees were subjected 

to an investigative detention and whether, at that time, there 

existed sufficient justification for that classification of a detention.

Id. at 636. We proceed in the same manner as in DeHart by determining if 

at the point in time when Singletary was subjected to an investigative 

detention there existed sufficient justification for that detention.

17 See supra, at n.12.

18 See supra, at n.13.

19 The vehicle registration statute requires the vehicle to drive or move on a 

highway for an infraction to result. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(e)(1) (“An owner 

of a motor vehicle who ceases to maintain financial responsibility on a 

registered vehicle shall not operate or permit operation of the vehicle in 

this Commonwealth until proof of the required financial responsibility has been 

provided to the Department of Transportation.”) (emphasis added). As noted, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Harris and Singletary. See Palmer, supra. Indeed, Officer Taylor testified 

that “after I learned that [the vehicle was improperly registered, Harris’ 

driver’s license was suspended, and Singletary had no driver’s license], I 

asked [Harris] to exit the vehicle so I can check [] him for any weapons or 

any more contraband that he may have on them [sic].” N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 7/31/20, at 16; cf. Palmer, supra at 174 (officer ordered

passengers out of vehicle so that vehicle could be towed because of traffic 

infraction).20 Here, because the Mercedes was turned off and legally parked 

throughout the interaction, the officers effected a new seizure of Singletary’s 

person—which investigative detention must be supported by new reasonable 

suspicion—when the officers asked Singletary to alight from the Mercedes, 

especially after discovering no outstanding warrants, Vehicle Code violations,

____________________________________________

here, the Mercedes never moved and remained legally parked throughout 

police observation.

20 Here, there were no grounds to tow the Mercedes since it was parked 

legally, was not impeding the flow of traffic, and no one witnessed Harris, or 

anyone, drive it. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 101 (Pa. 

2013) (“[A]n officer who stops a vehicle operated by a person whose driving 

privilege is, inter alia, suspended, is faced with two options: immobilize the 

vehicle in place or, if it poses public safety concerns, have it towed and stored 

at an impound lot.”) (emphasis added); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6309.2(a)(1), (2) (requiring police to immobilize or tow vehicle that is (1) 

operated by unlicensed driver or (2) operated without valid registration); id.

§ 1786(e)(1) (“An owner of a motor vehicle who ceases to maintain financial 

responsibility on a registered vehicle shall not operate or permit operation

of the vehicle in this Commonwealth until proof of the required financial 

responsibility has been provided to the Department of Transportation.”) 

(emphasis added).
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or reports of the Mercedes’ theft, as the officers retained Singletary’s 

identification. See Reppert, supra.

Next, we address whether the officers had reasonable suspicion at the 

time Singletary was seized, and again conclude that the officers lacked 

reasonable suspicion since Officer Taylor failed to articulate specific 

observations that led him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity was 

afoot and that Singletary was involved in that activity.

21 See Fulton, 

supra. Here, there was no evidence that Singletary was connected to any of 

the Commonwealth’s evidence. Indeed, the empty amber pill bottle22 was 

seen in Harris’ lap and the individuals who were standing on the street near 

____________________________________________

21 Unlike in McCree, supra, the incriminating nature of the pill bottle in this 

case was not immediately apparent. Id. at 625. In McCree, police observed 

the defendant attempt to hide a Xanax pill bottle under his seat cushion, which 

factor was essential to the Court’s analysis. Additionally, the police officers in 

McCree specifically suspected that the defendant was connected to the sale 

of Xanax because officers purchased Xanax pills from another individual, and 

when officers asked for more Xanax, that individual agreed to procure more, 

walked to the defendant’s vehicle, sat in the passenger seat, and talked to the 

defendant, who was in the driver’s seat. Here, since there was no specific

evidence that the empty amber pill bottle ever contained contraband, and no 

other circumstances demonstrated, immediately, that the pill bottle was 

incriminating in nature, we find McCree distinguishable from the instant facts. 

22 Singletary’s connection to the empty pill bottle is seemingly that he was in 

the Mercedes at the same time that the bottle was discovered in Harris’ lap. 

Nevertheless, here, there was no evidence, aside from the label, that the 

empty amber pill bottle was immediately incriminating, see McCree, supra,

or that it ever contained anything, let alone any contraband. Indeed, the pill 

bottle’s label did not bear Singletary’s name and Singletary was not the 

claimed owner of the Mercedes or the pill bottle. Without more, Singletary’s

weak connection to the bottle, and any criminal activity—including open-air 

drug dealing—was a mere hunch. See Beasley, supra. 
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the Mercedes—who left23 when Officer Taylor arrived—had no other 

connection than standing nearby. Merely because the area had a 

documented, on-going, open-air drug dealing problem is not enough to create 

a reasonable suspicion, under these facts, that criminal activity was afoot, and 

that Singletary was involved.

24

 See In re T.W., 22 EAP 2020, at *31 n.5 (Pa. 

____________________________________________

23 Officer Taylor testified that:

[T]here w[ere] several individuals . . . on [the] 800 block of 

Hughes Street just hanging out. I don’t know what exactly they 

were doing, but they were just hanging out there when I arrived. 

I parked my vehicle to get out to advise them. Several members 

[] of that group had left before I could talk to them. They just left 

in different directions.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/31/20, at 9. We discern no connection between 

the group and Singletary or Harris where Officer Taylor did not mention one.

24 A police officer’s characterization of a high crime area must still bear some 

connection to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 507 EDA 

2019, at *16 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum decision) (“Being 

in a ‘high crime’ or ‘high gun’ neighborhood at 9:50 p.m. does not indelibly 

brand everyone in that neighborhood as a danger to police or others. And as 

the public defender correctly argued in her closing, “if we use high crime, high 

drug, we would be frisking every single person that’s in the City and County 

of Philadelphia.” Thus, while the police’s characterization of a neighborhood 

may enhance suspicion if tied to some specific conduct by the frisked 

individual, it does not carry much weight in and of itself. Also, 9:50 p.m. is 

not so late to be driving in a major metropolitan center, such as Philadelphia, 

that to do so leads to a reasonable belief that the car’s occupants are armed 

and dangerous.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Pa. IOP Super. Ct. 

65.37(B) (“Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited 

for their persuasive value, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).”).

Indeed, Officer Taylor testified that “it’s not illegal to sit in a parked car with 

a suspended license.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/31/20, at 30. Perhaps it 

goes without saying that it is also not a crime to sit it in an unregistered legally

parked vehicle without a license to drive it.
J-A24005-21

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filed Oct. 20, 2021) (“We acknowledge a suspect’s mere presence in a high 

crime area is not sufficient by itself to support reasonable suspicion. However, 

presence in a high crime area may be considered in examining the totality of 

the circumstances.”) (citations omitted). Officer Taylor’s hunch and 

unparticularized suspicion regarding Singletary is not enough to support the 

request to exit the vehicle under either of the Commonwealth’s theories. See 

Beasley, supra.

Consequently, the gun that police discovered and seized during this 

unconstitutional search is the fruit of the poisonous tree, which the court

correctly suppressed. See Wong Sun, supra.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/17/2021