United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60890

Julio Cesar Esquibel-Segovia; Conzuelo Mejia-Guillen; 

Daniela Sarahi Esquibel-Mejia; Yolani Jazmin EsquibelMejia, 

Petitioners,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A208 982 686

BIA No. A208 449 553

BIA No. A208 449 554

BIA No. A208 982 685

Before Jones, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 14, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Julio Cesar Esquibel-Segovia, his common-law wife Conzuelo MejiaGuillen, and their two daughters, Daniela Sarahi Esquibel-Mejia and Yolani

Jazmin Esquibel-Mejia, natives and citizens of Honduras, entered the United 

States without inspection. They petition for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’s decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of 

their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture. We DENY the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Conzuelo Mejia-Guillen had a nephew, who was a part of a

local gang in Honduras and stole cattle from another man by the name of 

German Pacheco. Pacheco found out that Freddy was responsible for the 

theft and sought to exact revenge by killing Freddy’s father. Freddy, though, 

was able to convince Pacheco that his father was actually named Juteno 

Medina, who was Petitioner Julio Cesar Esquibel-Segovia’s father-in-law.

Mr. Medina was then killed by the police on the orders of Mr. Pacheco. 

Esquibel-Segovia and his family investigated Medina’s death and 

received information suggesting that police officers had been involved in the 

crime. As they continued to investigate, the family began receiving written 

threats. The letters threatened to kill the Petitioners if they did not disclose 

Freddy’s location. After receiving four letters, the Petitioners moved to a 

town several hours away, but continued to receive threatening letters at their 

new home.

In September 2015, Mejia-Guillen and Daniela entered the United 

States without inspection. In October 2015, they were served with notices to 

appear and charged as inadmissible for want of valid entry documents 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Esquibel-Segovia and Yolani 

entered the United States without being admitted or inspected in April 2016 

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and shortly thereafter were served with notices to appear for entering the 

United States without inspection under Section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 

The Petitioners filed applications with the immigration court for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture 

protection. In 2018, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued an oral decision

that found the Petitioners’ testimony credible but denied all relief. The IJ 

first rejected the Petitioners’ proposed grounds for asylum as noncognizable. The IJ separately found as a factual matter that even if the 

grounds were cognizable, the Petitioners had failed to show a nexus between 

the proposed grounds for asylum and the harm the family suffered. Going 

further, the IJ found that the Petitioners had suffered no past persecution 

because, other than the threats, “nothing happened to any of them,” and 

non-imminent threats alone generally do not constitute harassment rising to 

the level of persecution. The IJ also found no objectively valid fear of future 

persecution as other relatives continued to live in Honduras. Because the 

Petitioners failed to satisfy the standard for asylum, the IJ did not consider 

relief under the stricter standard for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ 

found that the Petitioners failed to demonstrate a probability of torture 

should they be returned to Honduras because the family had remained in 

Honduras for years after Medina’s death without being tortured. 

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusions that the family’s proposed 

grounds for asylum were either non-cognizable or invalid in the present case; 

that the Petitioners did not demonstrate a nexus between any harm and the 

proposed grounds for asylum; that because the Petitioners were ineligible for 

asylum, they necessarily could not meet the heightened burden required to 

demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal; and that denial of relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) was appropriate because 

the family was not more likely than not to be tortured upon removal to 

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Honduras. The Petitioners then filed a timely petition for review of the 

BIA’s decision. 

DISCUSSION

On petition for review of a BIA decision, this court reviews factual 

findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Lopez-Gomez v. 

Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001). The substantial-evidence 

standard requires that the BIA’s conclusion be based on the evidence 

presented and that its decision be substantially reasonable. See Zhang v. 

Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005). Under this standard, this court 

will not overturn a factual finding unless “the evidence compels a contrary 

result.” Martinez-Lopez v. Barr, 943 F.3d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 2019). This 

court reviews the BIA’s decision and considers the IJ’s decision only to the 

extent it influenced the BIA. See Singh v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th 

Cir. 2018).

I. Asylum

To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, an alien must 

demonstrate: (1) “either past persecution or a reasonable, well-founded fear 

of future persecution,” (2) “on account of” (3) “one of the five” grounds 

enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d 354, 360 

(5th Cir. 2014); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(i). One of the five enumerated 

grounds is membership within in a particular social group (“PSG”). 

Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 228–29 (5th Cir. 2019). We have 

previously held that “a particular social group must: (1) consist of persons 

who share a common immutable characteristic; (2) be defined with 

particularity; and (3) be socially visible or distinct within the society in 

question.” Id.

The family alleged membership in three proposed PSGs: “witnesses 

to the murder of Justino Medina,” “immediate family members of Justino 

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Medina” and “nuclear family members of Esquibel-Segovia.” We consider 

each proposed PSG in turn.

The BIA first adopted the IJ’s finding that none of the family members 

qualify as members of the PSG, “witnesses to the murder of Justino 

Medina,” as none of the family members witnessed his murder. Even if they 

had, though, the BIA stated that the witnessing of criminal activity did not 

constitute a cognizable PSG under its precedent. In a similar case, this court 

considered whether “former informants” on a criminal syndicate 

constituted a cognizable PSG. See Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 

784, 786–87 (5th Cir. 2016). We held that it did not because the proposed 

group neither had “social distinction” nor “would be perceived as a 

particular group, because . . . members of [the proposed PSG were] not 

substantially different from anyone else in the general population who 

resisted,” or threatened the interests of the syndicate. Id. We see nothing in 

the BIA’s decision or underlying record suggesting that the proposed PSG of 

“witnesses to the murder of Justino Medina” possesses the requisite social 

distinction to support a viable asylum claim.

The BIA also rejected the “family-based particular social groups” as 

“not cognizable” under a now-vacated decision from the attorney general. 

The BIA then determined that the Petitioners had not established the 

requisite nexus between the past harm and a protected ground. 

Even assuming that family-based PSG asylum claims could be

cognizable, the Petitioners here must demonstrate “that the evidence is so 

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion” 

on the BIA’s factual finding that there was no nexus between the past harm 

and a protected ground. See Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 

2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Petitioners simply cannot 

meet this heavy burden. The record establishesthat threats of harm followed 

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those individuals who investigated Justino Medina’s murder and that other 

members of the family have lived without incident in Honduras. 

II. Withholding of removal

The Petitioners also assert that the BIA erred in summarily rejecting 

their applications for withholding of removal. The BIA’s withholding of 

removal analysis rested on its asylum analysis: “As the [family] did not meet 

their burden in proving eligibility for asylum, they necessarily did not meet 

the higher burden required for withholding of removal.” The Petitioners 

now rely on out-of-circuit precedent to assert that the burden for showing a 

nexus between the persecution and their persecution is more relaxed in the 

withholding context than in the asylum context. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 

846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017). This is not true in our circuit. Compare 

Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent, 829 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2016) 

(asylum context), with Revencu, 895 F.3d at 402 (withholding of removal 

context). Accordingly, we affirm the BIA’s rejection of the Petitioners’ 

withholding of removal claims. 

III. Convention Against Torture

To establish entitlement to relief under the CAT, an alien must prove 

“that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured with the consent or 

acquiescence of public officials if he returns to the particular country in 

question. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). The BIA found no clear 

error in the IJ’s finding that the Petitioners did not meet their burden in 

proving that it was more likely than not that they would suffer torture if 

returned to Honduras. In support of its determination, the BIA pointed out 

the length of time spent by the family in Honduras after receipt of the 

threatening letters without suffering physical harm and the fact that MejiaGuillen’s mother continues to live safely in Honduras. 

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The Petitioners acknowledge that Esquibel-Segovia and MejiaGuillen’s mothers and siblings continue to live safely in Honduras, and that

the threats to the family ceased in 2014 — a year before Mejia-Guillen and 

one daughter left, and two years before Esquibel-Segovia and the other 

daughter departed the country. Esquibel-Segovia argues that he fled 

Honduras at the later date because he learned that certain policemen 

involved in the murder of his father-in-law were relocating to his town. He 

cites no evidence of new threats by them before or after he fled. He also offers

that one of Mejia-Guillen’s cousins was killed after the family left Honduras

as evidence of a continuing threat to the family. Esquibel-Segovia admitted

at the hearing, though, that he did not know the motivation for the killing.

Last, the Petitioners contend that the BIA ignored their testimony that 

the police were involved in the murder of Mejia-Guillen’s father and the 

threats. This evidence does act as counterweight to the evidence that other 

family members continued to live peacefully in Honduras and that no 

member of the family was threatened in the year or two prior to leaving 

Honduras, but it does not compel the conclusion that the Petitioners more 

likely than not would be tortured if returned to Honduras, much less that this 

would occur with the consent or acquiescence of Honduran authorities, as 

required under our precedent. See Martinez-Lopez, 943 F.3d at 769. 

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 

Esquibel-Segovia, Mejia-Guillen, and their two daughters are not entitled to 

protection under the CAT. 

The petition is DENIED. 

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