U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

47–589 PDF 2009

IRAN: REALITY, OPTIONS, AND CONSEQUENCES.

PART I—IRANIAN PEOPLE AND ATTITUDES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 30, 2007

Serial No. 110–127

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on October 30, 2007 .......................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Ballen, Ken, president, Terror Free Tomorrow .............................................. 10

Katzman, Dr. Kenneth, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign

Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service ... 74

Sadjadpour, Karim, associate, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace .............................................................................................................. 63

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Ballen, Ken, president, Terror Free Tomorrow, prepared statement of ...... 12

Katzman, Dr. Kenneth, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign

Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 77

Sadjadpour, Karim, associate, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 66

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 4

(1)

IRAN: REALITY, OPTIONS, AND CONSEQUENCES. PART I—IRANIAN PEOPLE AND

ATTITUDES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Higgins, Yarmuth,

Braley, McCollum, Van Hollen, Hodes, Welch, Shays, and Platts.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su and Andy

Wright, professional staff members; David Hake, clerk; Janice

Spector and Christopher Bright, minority professional staff members; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy adviser;

and Todd Greenwood, minority research assistant.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, the hearing entitled, ‘‘Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences. Part I—Iranian People and Attitudes’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Again, I ask unanimous consent the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. And without

objection, that is also ordered.

Good morning and welcome to everyone here today. I appreciate

our witnesses going through the long lines that I understand are

outside in order to be able to get here. This I think is an important

topic. And this first hearing will set the tone and give us good, substantial background information for the hearings to come.

Two weeks ago, the President of the United States made the following statement, ‘‘If you’re interested in avoiding World War III,

it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from

having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.’’

A few days later, the Vice President followed up this line with

his line in the sand, ‘‘We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear

weapon.’’ He then elaborated, ‘‘Our country and the entire interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
2

national community cannot stand by as a terror-supporting state

fulfills its most aggressive ambitions.’’

Compare this statement to one that Vice-President Cheney made

just 2 months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, ‘‘We will not permit

a brutal dictator with ties to terror and a record of feckless aggression to dominate the Middle East and to threaten the United

States.’’

The administration’s rhetoric on Iran is becoming more strident

and inflammatory. The temperature is rapidly rising. And at the

same time, as was the case with the buildup to the Iraq war, much

of the decisionmaking is being made in the utmost of secrecy.

My hope is this administration has learned lessons over nearly

7 years in office, lessons about truth, humility, and the importance

of fully leveling with the American people. It is my hope that any

administration, when faced with such an important foreign policy

challenge as Iran, will take a calculated, well-thought out approach

with a clear understanding of our long-term security and strategic

interests, the varying policy options and their consequences. We

must also be aware of what we don’t know and the law of unintended consequences.

Congress should also have learned some lessons over the past 7

years, most importantly about the need for vigorous congressional

oversight. Our Constitution requires and demands that Congress

ask the tough questions, questions about whether all other options

have been exhausted, about the consequences and true costs of

war, and whether the President is basing his decisions on an accurate picture of reality. ‘‘Trust us’’ should never be good enough

under our constitutional separation of powers, and it should certainly not be good enough now.

Beginning today, the Subcommittee on National Security and

Foreign Affairs initiates a series of robust, deliberative, and focused oversight hearings on a topic that has long been overdue for

congressional examination—U.S. policy toward Iran. Our constitutional responsibility demands nothing less.

As our series hearing entitled, ‘‘Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences,’’ suggests, we will fully explore the many options for

dealing with Iran and the consequences of those options. But let’s

not put the cart before the horse. First, let’s learn something about

Iranians, something we know far too little about.

Fareed Zakaria recently put it this way: ‘‘We are on a path to

irreversible confrontation with a country we know almost nothing

about. The U.S. Government has had no diplomats in Iran for almost 30 years. American officials have barely met with any senior

Iranian politicians or officials. We have no contact with the country’s vibrant civil society. Iran is a black hole to us—just as Iraq

had become in 2003.’’

The reality is that very few people in Washington understand

Iran and that many generalize and oversimplify a complex society

of 70 million people. We have little to no understanding of the attitudes and opinions of ordinary Iranians. We don’t know what the

word is on the so-called ‘‘Iranian street.’’ We don’t fully appreciate

Iran’s rich history and how it is ingrained in the Iranian psyche,

or about how the Islamic Revolution of 1979 intimately shaped the

3

behavior and livelihoods of a generation of Iranian youth, women,

and politicians.

The United States has continued to isolate Iran through unilateral and multilateral economic and trade sanctions. Outside of a

few people-to-people exchanges and limited opportunities for travel

by academics, journalists, and Iranian-Americans, there has been

little direct contact with Iran.

So before we start speculating about the prospects for diplomacy

or regime change, or the consequences of a U.S. military attack, all

of which will be discussed at later subsequent hearings of this subcommittee, let’s take a step back and try to understand who the

Iranians really are. This fundamental, common-sense approach, unfortunately, was largely missing in the public dialog leading up to

the Iraq war. It will not be missing this time.

We need to ask several basic questions. What makes Iranians

tick? What drives and motivates their behavior? Do Iranians want

democracy? Are they resoundingly anti-American, or are there opportunities for improvements in our relationship? How can we reintegrate Iran into the global economy and get them to adhere to

international human rights standards? And, given our lack of connection over the last 30 years, what don’t we know? And where are

our blind spots?

By understanding Iranians and building our knowledge of the intricacies in our fractured relationship, the subcommittee will be

able to conduct our constitutionally mandated oversight, to find out

if the current administration has thought through all of these

issues adequately and thoroughly, and to ask tough questions that

get to the heart of the myriad of issues involved.

With the support of the subcommittee members on both sides of

the aisle, I am pleased to embark on this series of Iran hearings.

And I now yield to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr.

Shays.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

4

5

6

7

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate you for embarking on this series of hearings about Iran. These hearings will

further our knowledge about a country that promotes and supports

terrorism. The American public must understand that if unchecked, Iran poses a national security threat not only to the

United States and our allies, but to the entire world. We must

never forget that Iran supports terrorists, wants to become a nuclear power, and has threatened other nations with annihilation.

Given its location, Iran is in a unique position to influence control over the energy-rich Middle East. As we listen to the comments

of the Bush administration and the Iranian leadership about what

lies ahead for our two nations, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman,

what is of fundamental importance is understanding the people,

the politics, and the culture of the Iranian people. We have learned

some hard lessons from our experience in Iraq about the absolute

importance of understanding countries and their people, particularly those we are confronting.

Our relationship with Iran is complex. Besides Cuba, Iran is the

only country in the world with which the United States has had

no sustained direct contact. In fact, we have had no significant connection with the Government of Iran since 1979, when Iranian students, with the approval of their government, strong-armed the embassy in Tehran, taking and holding 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days.

The United States has designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. Three pressing problems override our relation with this nation: One, Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon; two, Iran’s

ongoing involvement with and support for terrorist groups throughout the Middle East; and, three, Iran’s sustained and increasing

support for militia groups in Iraq.

The United States is deeply concerned about Iran’s connections

to numerous terrorist groups threatening the United States and

our allies around the globe. Iran is providing weapons, funding,

and guidance to Hezbollah, which threatens Lebanon and Israel.

Iran also provides significant support for Palestinian terrorist

groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which

threatens lasting peace and security in that region.

The United States is deeply concerned about Iran’s race to possess a nuclear weapon. A nuclear armed Iran would pose an incalculable risk to its Arab neighbors, to the countries of the greater

Middle East, and to Europe. This would be unthinkable for all who

value security and peace.

What we must ask ourselves is whether it is better to isolate

Iran or to engage its leaders in discussion. While we must not have

535 Secretaries of State, Congress should take a stronger role in

pressing the administration for diplomatic dialog and discourse

with Iran.

This administration must understand that even though Iran is a

rogue state, it is still a country with enormous influence in the

Middle East, which we have to deal with one way or the other. It

is time for us to start talking with Iran diplomat to diplomat, politician to politician, and person to person.

I look forward to today’s hearings as a positive step in this direction, and we welcome all our witnesses today, and especially welVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
8

come Dr. Kenneth Katzman, who agreed to testify only 4 days ago.

And I would like to again thank you, Mr. Chairman, and say to our

witnesses I have to be going before the Appropriations Committee

on a particular bill in my district, and I will hustle back as soon

as I make my testimony there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays. We are going to have a

brief statement from some of the Members who expressed an interest, despite our earlier comments on that. And Mr. Higgins, the

Chair recognizes you for 5 minutes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say I

don’t have a written statement, but I think this is particularly important for a lot of reasons. One is there is new war talk in the

air. When the President begins to reference World War III with

specific reference to Iran, which is flanked incidentally by Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is troubling. It is troubling because I think

it reeks of irresponsibility, it is warmongering, and it creates a potentially further destabilizing influence in a region that is very important to our strategic interests.

What is even more important is the results of your surveys about

the Iranian people. My understanding is the Iranian people are relatively young, average age approximately 26. Seventy percent of

the population is under the age of 30. The government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the governed. Corruption is endemic, and employment is chronic. Most of the Iranian population are very proWestern.

My concern is with a lot of war talk in the air, perhaps air

strikes on some 18 to 30 nuclear-related facilities that happen to

be interspersed with civilian populations, that we have to be very,

very careful, obviously, before we take any kind of military action.

Strongly engaging diplomatically I think is important, given the

precarious nature of this regime.

I think our interests are profound in that region, profound in

that country, and we have an obligation to explore not only the face

of Iran, which happens to be a President Ahmadinejad, which his

statements are very provocative, his goal I think is to become the

face of extremism in the Middle East, and I think he has succeeded

in that regard, but to understand there is a population of 70 million people, that is important to our strategic interests in that area

as well.

So I look forward to your testimony, and I thank you for being

here.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. Ms. McCollum is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Chairman Tierney. Thank you very

much for holding this hearing. I expect to be learning a lot from

our testifiers. With the talk of, as Congressman Higgins just pointed out, of President Bush talking about World War III, Vice-President Cheney issuing ultimatums without a robust discussion in the

Congress, I think it makes sense that this committee, with the

charge that we have with government oversight, show that we are

going to take the prudent, measured look at what is the situation

in Iran, but more importantly understand Iran so that we can engage with the families. Not necessarily engage always with the exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
9

treme talk that we hear from Iran, but to really understand what

is going on with the typical Iranian family and what they would

like to see their government do.

As I go back home and talk to the families in my district and listen carefully with what they want this Congress to do, they clearly

want engagement. They clearly want dialog, they clearly want the

heated rhetoric to cease and for engagement and diplomacy to take

effect.

So Mr. Chair, I think this hearing is extremely important. And

as it was just stated, when the number of youth far exceed the elders in a country, they have a different time reference as to their

engagement with the United States. Many of them do not remember or probably don’t even understand how some Americans continue to struggle with the kidnapping of our civil and State Department people in the embassy. They don’t understand why we have

even cutoff the way that we have dialog with Iran.

So Mr. Chairman, I look forward to learning, I look forward to

taking my responsibility to defend and protect the Constitution and

the people here of the United States seriously. But I want to do it

as an informed Member of Congress, not someone just going off

sound bites on the evening news. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. McCollum. If the witnesses would

please stand. It is our practice here before the subcommittee to

swear all witnesses before they testify. I would ask you to please

raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. The record will reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. And we are going to have all

of your written statements put in the record by unanimous consent.

So if you could keep your testimony to 5, 10 minutes, we would appreciate that. It is usually 5, but we think it is a pretty deep subject so we would have some forbearance on that.

I want to take a moment and introduce each of the witnesses before they testify rather than all three at the same time. Our first

witness this morning is Ken Ballen, who is the president of Terror

Free Tomorrow. He is here to share the results of the first nationwide survey of Iranians since 2002, and what lessons we can learn

from that effort.

Mr. Ballen has spent more than 20 years on the front lines of

law enforcement, international relations, intelligence oversight, and

congressional investigations. He has successfully prosecuted international terrorists. He has also prosecuted major figures in organized crime, international narcotics, and one of the first cases in

the United States involving illegal financing for Middle Eastern

terrorists. He has been counsel to the Iran-Contra Committee

under Chairman Lee Hamilton, where he was the lead investigator.

He was also chief counsel for the bipartisan Senate Special Investigative Committee, with Senator John McCain, and the chief counsel to the House Steering and Policy Committee for Speaker Foley,

where he directed policy initiatives on crime prevention and security, intelligence oversight, and select national security matters to

the U.S. House of Representatives.

Mr. Ballen, we would be pleased to hear your testimony.

10

STATEMENT OF KEN BALLEN, PRESIDENT, TERROR FREE

TOMORROW

Mr. BALLEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, members

of the subcommittee. I first would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for not only this series—I needed to turn that on—thank you,

Mr. Chairman. I first would like to commend you and the subcommittee not only for holding the oversight hearings on Iran, but

for starting them in a place and on a topic that most people would

not begin with, which is the people of Iran. That is absolutely the

right place to start.

Mr. Chairman, the Iranian people are speaking. The question before us now is are we listening? The United States has imposed

new economic sanctions against Iran, but these sanctions or any

other economic sanctions are likely to fail unless we also begin to

address the Iranian people directly.

President Reagan told us during the cold war that the average

Soviet citizen was the best ally of the United States. President

Reagan called that Soviet citizen Citizen Ivan, our friend. That is

no less true with Iran today.

Terror Free Tomorrow, an independent, nonprofit center on the

importance of public opinion, partnered this summer with D3 Systems, one of the most outstanding polling organizations for polling

in closed societies and in troubled situations like Iraq and Afghanistan. They are here with me today. D3 Systems conducted a nationwide phone survey of Iran this past summer. And in an act of

what could only be called everyday courage on the part of ordinary

Iranians, over the phone—they didn’t know who was on the other

end of the line; could have been the government, could have been

anyone—over the phone they told our pollsters that they reject the

autocratic rule of the Supreme Leader, that they want normal relations with the outside world, and nuclear weapons are simply not

their priority.

As the Chair mentioned, this is the first uncensored, complete

poll on these controversial issues since September 2002. What was

the result in 2002? Well, the result was the Iranian government

put the pollsters in jail. Our results was that 79 percent surveyed

across Iran said they want free elections and the opportunity to

elect their leaders rather than have their leaders chosen for them.

They want relations with the outside world, 68 percent with the

United States. Only 11 percent of Iranians said they favor their

current system of unelected rule by the Supreme Leader.

These results should not be treated as routine. They are not routine.

About the same time that we conducted a poll of Iran, we conducted a similar phone survey of Syria, another closed society. And

while three-quarters of Syrians said they favor better relations

with the West, almost no one in our poll of Syria was willing to

directly or indirectly come up to that line of criticizing the government or their Supreme Leader, Bashar Assad. But in Iran they did.

Criticizing the Supreme Leader, as my distinguished colleague to

my left here will tell you in Iran, is a line that one crosses at considerable personal risk. Yet in our poll the Iranian people are

bravely and collectively crossing that line.

11

The question before us is are we listening. I can tell you one

party that is listening. It is the Iranian Government itself. Within

a month of our poll they released a poll, refuting point by point the

findings that we came up with.

What accounts for the difference in results? Well, they didn’t release their methodology and questions, so I don’t really know. But

I can tell you this, that perhaps when the government calls you up

and says it is the government, you are going to get a very different

answer. Or perhaps they went to the minority of Iranians, the demographic that do support them, because we did find that in our

poll. We found that a very strong and committed minority, ranging

from 11 percent, as I mentioned, in terms of keeping the current

system of the unelected religious rule of the Supreme Leader, to almost a third in terms of certain policies of President Ahmadinejad

do support the government. So you have a majority of people who

don’t, but you have a determined and committed minority who do.

So where do we stand? What is the bottom line on all of this?

On the one hand, we have the Iranian people expressing to us their

true voice. On the other hand, we have the Iranian regime very

busy expressing the voice of the people that it wants the rest of the

world to hear. But the rest of the world is silent. Sanctions are imposed, military threats are made. The regime is talked to by some,

it is shunned by others. And in all this debate no one is reaching

out over the head of the regime to talk to the people themselves.

The United States is not, nor are the Europeans. No one is.

The irony of this situation that we find ourselves in is that the

regime itself is very busy trying to represent the people and their

will and to speak for them. But as much as they may try, the regime does not. The rest of the world, if it spoke to the priorities

of the Iranian people, to their economic desires, to their desires for

trade, to their desires for peaceful coexistence, to their desire for,

yes, respect from other nations, the irony is if the United States

did reach out, as we did during the cold war and delivered messages, a positive agenda directly to the people, we would find our

most receptive audience to be inside Iran itself.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to answer any questions as to the details of the polls and our findings, which I avoided

in my opening statements in the interests of time. And as I said,

I am accompanied by D3, which can speak to methodology as well.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ballen follows:]

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Ballen. I am sure we are all interested in statistics. And some people will want to question on that.

Sometimes statistics, besides being difficult to say, is difficult to

comprehend.

Mr. BALLEN. It is difficult to say, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. And I am sure we will probably have

plenty of questions on that. I appreciate your opening statement.

Our next witness is Karim Sadjadpour. He is an associate at the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and he is bringing a

wealth of experience from living and studying in Iran. Mr.

Sadjadpour joined the Carnegie Institute after 4 years as the chief

Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group, based in Tehran

and Washington, DC. He is a leading researcher on Iran. He has

conducted dozens of interviews with senior Iranian officials and

hundreds with Iranian intellectuals, clerics, dissidents,

paramilitaries, businessmen, students, activists, and youth, among

others.

Mr. Sadjadpour was named a Young Global Leader by the World

Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. And we are pleased to

have your testimony today, sir.

STATEMENT OF KARIM SADJADPOUR, ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE

ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is really a privilege to be here, and I do

commend you for expressing an interest in the views of the Iranian

people.

There is three, four points that I would like to make, and I would

preface my talks by saying that anecdotally, my experiences in Iran

very much coincide with a lot of the results of Mr. Ballen’s survey.

And I think it is one of the few surveys that I have seen that I

have seen results which coincide with anecdotal experiences of myself and many others who have spent time in contemporary Iran.

Discontent in Iran is very deep and very widespread. It is very

difficult, whether you are traveling in Tehran or throughout the

country, to find someone, regardless of age, gender, socioeconomic

class, religiosity, who will say to you things are going well here, I

am happy with the performance of the government and the clerics

are doing a good job. It is extremely rare to be able to find someone

who is able to say this.

But we have a population which is increasingly politically disengaged these days. They participated overwhelmingly the last 8

years, from 1997, the election of the reformist President Mohammad Khatami, through 2005 in their elections. They elected

Khatami with 80 percent turnout, they reelected him with 70 percent turn out. They elected a reform-minded parliament. But what

they saw was their votes weren’t able to affect change domestically.

And increasingly what we have seen is the Iranian population as

a result is disengaged. And I think this political disengagement is

quite natural. As a friend of mine in Tehran told me, it is like

going to the gym every day for 6 years and not losing 1 pound.

Pretty soon you are going to stop exercising if you don’t see results.

64

The failure of the U.S. policies in Iraq have also had a role in

the Iranian political participation. I think increasingly Iranians

look next door and they say if the choice is between what we see

in Iraq, democracy and carnage, and what we have now, which is

authoritarianism and security, we will choose the latter. And this

is a population which has experienced themselves an 8-year war

with Iraq and is very allergic to any prospect of tumult and chaos

and insecurity.

Second point I want to make is about Ahmadinejad’s election. We

all know that he was elected with a very clear mandate. It wasn’t

to wipe Israel off the map or to deny the Holocaust. It was to improve the economy. He has really failed miserably in doing so. And

I think if we are looking at Ahmadinejad’s election as the glass

being half full, we see for Iranians they see it actually does make

a difference to participate in elections and it does make a difference

who is the president of their country. During the Khatami era,

many people believed that, again, participating in elections in Iran

are an exercise in futility. But I think many people realize there

is a difference between a president like Mohammad Khatami and

President Ahmadinejad. And I think we will see in upcoming elections, March 2008 parliamentary elections and June 2009 Presidential elections, Iranians going to the polls and electing more

moderate, pragmatic leaders.

The third point I want to make, and this is a very important

point, that we should have no illusions that some type of abrupt,

sudden change or sudden upheaval in Iran will be a change for the

better. I would like to quote the great U.S. diplomat, retired U.S.

diplomat John Limbert, who is a great scholar on Iran who was

taken hostage in 1979 in the Iranian embassy for 444 days—in the

U.S. Embassy in Tehran. And when he was reflecting on his experience, on his 1979 experience, he wrote that what I learned from

1979 was that revolutions are not won by those who can write incisive op-ed pieces. They are won by those who are willing to go out

on the streets and fight the type of battles and street battles that

need to be waged to win these revolutions.

And likewise in Iran these days I would agree entirely that we

have a young population which is very much in favor of tolerance

and democracy and co-existence. But the only two groups in Iran

which are armed and organized are the Revolutionary Guards,

which number about 125,000, and the bassij militia, which number

about 2 million. So any type of sudden, abrupt upheaval in Iran

unfortunately, I would argue, is not going to bring to power these

liberal democrats, because by virtue of the fact they are liberal

democrats they are not going to be willing to fight these street battles with these armed groups, who will be very much willing to

fight these street battles.

So I think we should be looking at transition in Iran as a longer

term prospect or medium term prospect, not some type of sudden,

abrupt upheaval.

Last, I would argue that despite what we know about popular

opinion, that the Iranian street is the most pro-American street in

the Middle East, that there doesn’t exist an inherent enmity toward Israel, that the Iranian street doesn’t wake up in the morning

thinking about enriching uranium and producing a nuclear weapVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
65

ons capability. Despite this fact, Iranian popular opinion, what we

know is that Iranian popular opinion has little impact on Iranian

foreign policy. Again, opinion polls, anecdotal evidence suggests

that the Iranians overwhelmingly want to have a normalization of

relations with the United States. Despite this, Iranian Government

antagonism toward the United States is as great as it has ever

been. Iranian support for Hezbollah and for Hamas is as great as

it has ever been, and the Iranian defiance on the nuclear issue is

as great as it has ever been, despite the fact that these issues don’t

particularly resonate on the Iranian street.

I would close by saying when we think about challenges to U.S.

foreign policy at the moment and over the coming years, for me five

or six things come to mind. First, there is obviously Iraq. Second

is nuclear proliferation. The third issue is terrorism. The fourth

issue is energy security. And the fifth issue is Middle East peace,

Arab-Israeli peace. And the sixth issue, if we want to be altruistic,

is Afghanistan. And if you look at each of these six issues individually, the one common point which spans all of them is the fact

that Iran is integral to each of these issues. It is integral to Iraq,

to energy security, Arab-Israeli peace, terrorism, Afghanistan. And

looking at it from that context, ignoring Iran is obviously not an

option. Bombing Iran will exacerbate all of these issues which I

just listed. And we are left with what Churchill called the least bad

option, referring to democracy, and that is talking to Iran.

So despite the fact that we have this population which is overwhelmingly in favor of a different type of government, a different

type of relationship with the United States, we don’t have the luxury of waiting for the Iranian people to be our interlocutors in

Tehran. And I think we have to deal with the regime we have, not

the regime we wish we had. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony.

Dr. Kenneth Katzman is the Middle East Specialist with the

Congressional Research Service here in Washington, DC. He served

in government and the private sector as an analyst in Persian Gulf

affairs, with special emphasis on Iran and Iraq. In his current position, he analyzes U.S. policy and legislation on the Persian Gulf region for Members of Congress and their staffs. He has written numerous articles in various outside publications, including a book

entitled, ‘‘The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.’’

Doctor, we are pleased to hear your testimony today.

STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH KATZMAN, SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND

TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much. I would like to thank the

committee for asking me to appear today on the issue of Iranian

public opinion and translation into Iranian policy.

I would note that my official responsibilities at CRS include analyzing Iranian politics, U.S. policy toward Iran, Iran’s strategic capabilities, Iran’s economy, social and human rights situation. I do

not have specific expertise in polling data or methodology of specific

polls. My experience has been, in watching Iran over 20 years, that

Iran’s political and social attitudes are extremely opaque and difficult to gauge. It is important, I think, to try to correlate assessments of Iranian public opinion with known political events and

outcomes, such as election results, removal or appointment of cabinet ministers, negotiators, others, demonstrations, indicators of unrest, or similar events.

The poll that was cited would appear to be consistent, that the

Iranian public is relatively pro-American, would appear to be consistent with observed events such as the candlelight vigils held by

thousands of Iranians the night of the September 11, 2001 attacks

in the United States. The Iranian people, as Karim mentioned, do

not hold the United States responsible for maintaining the Iranian

regime in power because the United States and Iran have been estranged since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

The Iranian public attitude toward the United States is often

contrasted with attitudes in such U.S. allies as Egypt, with which

the United States is an ally. Egyptian opponents of the government

view the United States as cooperating in the official oppression by

the Egyptian government, for example. Other observable events

show that the Iranian people are discontented with their regime

and system of government. We have had repeated series of demonstrations. President Ahmadinejad in fact has faced student unrest. He has been shouted down, stickers and posters denouncing

him as a dictator, and various indicators. We have had labor unrest. We have had the imprisonment of labor leaders.

What is interesting, however, is we cannot really predict from

polls or others when unrest is going to boil over. For example,

there were few objective indicators of public opinion that showed

unrest was about to boil over in July 1999, when we had the student unrests. Mohammad Khatami, the reformist, was in power

then. And the thinking of most experts was that the Iranian stuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
75

dents and others were relatively contented, because they had now

a reformist leading Iran. Yet the student unrest boiled over because they saw that the conservatives, the hardliners in Iran, were

trying to undermine Khatami’s reforms, and they conducted a large

protest which Khatami was ultimately forced—at fear of dismissal

he was forced to actually condone the crackdown on the students.

And I believe about eight students were killed, or seven or eight

students were killed in that crackdown.

The same factors that limit public expression in Iran also cast

some doubt, I think, on objective polling results. The regime is very

aggressive in imprisoning, you know, civil activists. It severely restricts freedom of speech in the press. Journalists are routinely arrested for stories critical of the government. And reformist newspapers are regularly closed.

Polls have also in some sense missed some of the big election

turning points we have had in Iran. For example, the June 2005

election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, very few experts saw his emergence. The thinking was that Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the senior leader in the regime, would win those elections. He did not.

There was also a shock when Khatami was first elected in 1997.

The thinking was that the conservative candidate was going to win

because the regime was going to fix the election to ensure he won.

He did not. He was overwhelmingly defeated, and in fact went on

television to concede defeat.

From a policy analysis standpoint, I think it is significant to try

to assess the degree to which public opinion affects Iranian behavior. And what we can say is it really does not in many ways. Iran’s

system is very opaque. The Supreme Leader has under the Constitution vast powers, even to dismiss the President without even

much cause. The Supreme Leader is sometimes described as being

out of touch, yet he does maintain contacts with his constituencies,

the bazaar merchants and all.

In some ways, Ahmadinejad is out of touch. He has surrounded

himself with former Revolutionary Guard officers that served in

the Iran-Iraq war, as he did. They have sort of an insular opinion.

They viewed the Iran-Iraq war as a heroic struggle, whereas the

senior leaders, the Supreme Leader Rafsanjani and others viewed

it as a time of deprivation, where Iran’s economy nearly collapsed.

So even though Ahmadinejad is elected, many would argue in some

ways he is more out of touch than are some of the more seasoned

leaders of the regime.

I would also, as Karim mentioned, the Arab-Israeli dispute. The

Iranian public has never really expressed any major interest in

interfering or having their government insert itself into the ArabIsraeli dispute. Yet Iran, as has been noted, is described by the

State Department as the most active sponsor of terrorism, mainly

groups that are opposing the Arab-Israeli dispute. The conclusion

we might draw is there are few means for Iranian attitudes to effect policy. The public appears amenable to suspending the militarily useful aspects of Iran’s nuclear program if doing so would ensure economic prosperity and avoid further sanctions. But this has

not translated into Iranian Government policy to date. The implications are that U.S. policy efforts likely need to affect the thinking

of senior regime leaders. If the United States is to succeed in perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
76

suading the government to suspend its enrichment of uranium, it

would likely have to convince the senior leadership of the regime

that an Iranian nuclear weapon would not ensure Iran’s security

or that Iran’s economic future is jeopardized by the continuation of

that program. Or alternately, the sanctions imposed on Iran would

have to be so tight and so significant that it creates overt public

unrest that the regime has to respond to.

The Iranian public might not necessarily blame the international

community for imposing sanctions, but might instead blame

Ahmadinejad and the senior leadership for providing the United

States with justification for ratcheting up the sanctions, because

Ahmadinejad is widely perceived as provoking confrontation with

the international community on the nuclear issue.

The polls suggest nuclear power as electricity generating is popular, because Iranians want technological achievements, sophistication, etc. But the polls I believe, indicators of attitude, do show that

the public does not want to push the nuclear program so far that

it ends up with Iran being isolated and crippled by economic sanctions. If the serious unrest unfolds, that would likely attract the

definite attention of the Iranian senior leadership. However, as discussed, the leadership has thus far shown no hesitation to react

with repressive force to suppress rioting and demonstrations, and

would likely do so in the future.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Dr. Katzman. Thanks to all

our witnesses. I am going to prolong this for a second before we get

into questions and answers just because I think it would be instructive for everyone to hear a little bit about the actual structure

of the government in Iran. And maybe, Dr. Katzman, we will start

with you. If you could just give a brief primer on the Supreme

Leader and how the Supreme Leader gets authority, about the Assembly of Experts, how they are either elected or appointed. The

same with the Council of Guardians, the President, the parliament

and all that. And then people can ask questions, and other panelists can add comments if they care to.

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much. The Supreme Leader is not

elected, but he is selected. When Ayatollah Khomeini, who was the

founder of the Islamic Revolution died, the Assembly of Experts,

which is elected on a provincial basis, this 83-seat body, meets and

selects a new Supreme Leader. So the Assembly of Experts chooses

a Supreme Leader. It can amend the Constitution and it can oversee the work of the Supreme Leader. The President, Ahmadinejad

in this case, is directly elected by the public. The Majles, the parliament, is directly elected. The Majles can pass legislation; however, that legislation is reviewed by an unelected body, an appointed body called the Council of Guardians. The Council of

Guardians ensures that any legislation comports with Islamic law,

that it is not un-Islamic. And half the appointments are by the Supreme Leader, and the other half are by the judiciary, with the

concurrence of the elected Majles. It is really very much a hybrid

system. This Council of Guardians not only reviews legislation, but

it screens candidates in the elections. So if you want to run for a

seat in the parliament, you need to be vetted, you need to be approved by the Council of Guardians. If you want to run for President also, you must also be vetted by the Council of Guardians.

And routinely in Presidential elections 150, 200 people file to run

for President, and the Council of Guardians generally winnows that

down to about 8 to 10, sometimes it has been less candidates for

President. And in some cases women. Because the Constitution is

a little bit unclear, some women have sometimes filed to run for

President. But the Council of Guardians interprets the Constitution as not allowing women to run. So it routinely has omitted

them from the field.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I think that is quite helpful. Let me

just begin the questioning briefly. It appears from the opening

statements that sanctions might well have an impact, but it would

be important for the people of Iran to understand perhaps that the

sanctions are a result of the conduct of their government, something they would assess responsibility for to them as opposed

blame to the countries imposing the sanctions. And then the government of Iran would then perhaps feel the heat from their own

population and take some reaction to that. Several of you have

mentioned the idea of being able to communicate over the heads of

the Iranian Government to the people. How do you propose that

might be done? And then the second part of the question would be

how do you propose it might be done without increasing the paranoia of the Iranian Government, or what borders on paranoia, at

86

least their insecurity that somebody would be trying to change the

regime as opposed to changing attitudes?

Maybe start with Mr. Ballen and move left to right.

Mr. BALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that is a good

question. The problem is there is a battle for public opinion inside

Iran. The regime does care. It may not follow what people want,

but it desperately cares what people think.

As I mentioned, in our poll there was a very committed minority

base that it plays to as well. So that if we persist in saber rattling

and talk of war, we persist in sanctions, and there is nothing positive on the horizon, there is no future being articulated about a vision of what the United States thinks and the international community of a future Iran that is secure, that can trade, that is a

fully respected member of the community of nations, we leave the

playing field open to the Iranian Government to portray the sanctions and portray the hostility as just that, hostility, and there is

nothing to counterbalance it.

There are a lot of imaginative ways. President Nixon went to

China. Our greatest emissaries since 9/11 in reaching out to the

Muslim world have been former President Bush and former President Clinton after the tsunami. If I were the President of the

United States, I would send them to Iran and talk to the Iranian

people, talk to the Iranian Government, and put our case forward.

Because at the end of the day, I think the United States can have

a good, positive case to make. But if we don’t make the case, and

it is only about sanctions, only about military force, I think we will

lose the battle of public opinion, which is important inside Iran.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Sadjadpour.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would argue that this current leadership in

Tehran, especially the hardliners, really thrive in isolation. And

they thrive as a result of sanctions, which have been in place for

three decades now. I described them as kind of a weed which only

grows in the dark. And you know, think about it. If you were a 75-

year-old cleric in Tehran and you have a senior post in the Iranian

Government, do you really want the country to open up and become more meritocratic? Or if you are a Revolutionary Guardsman

which is privy to million dollar oil deals, do you really want Iran

to open up and join the WTO and become more meritocratic? So I

think actually sanctions and isolation further entrench the rule of

a lot of these hardliners in office currently.

Now, that being said, I don’t advocate removing the sanctions or

offering Iran major economic or political incentives at the moment.

What is problematic about that is that when Iran had a President,

Mohammad Khatami, who was talking about the dialog of civilizations, Iran got little in return. Now you have a President,

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is calling for Israel to be wiped off

the map, denying the Holocaust.

So I think it is problematic from a Western policy perspective if

we offer an Ahmadinejad administration incentives which we didn’t

offer a Khatami administration. Because the message Iran will

learn is that when we take a moderate approach it projects weakness, but when we take a belligerent approach it reaps rewards. So

I think that sanctions at the moment and the near term are a necessary means to make it clear to Iran, again, that a belligerent apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
87

proach is not going to reap rewards. And I think we need a way

of showing to, especially the hardliners in Tehran, that again this

policy that they are currently pursuing is going to bring about isolation. And I think the Iranian people will elect more likely more

pragmatic leadership when it comes to the next parliamentary and

Presidential elections.

But ultimately I would agree with Ken and others who say that

a prerequisite to domestic internal political change in Iran is a

U.S.-Iran diplomatic accommodation. I see very little hope of the

Iranian people, whom we have described today as being very much

in favor of a more progressive, democratic system, at peace with its

neighbors, at peace with the United States, I see very little hope

they will become empowered and they will be able to achieve these

dreams as long as the U.S.-Iran relationship remains as it is,

which is in isolation.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Dr. Katzman.

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, my assessment is that I do see some signs

that the ratcheting up of international sanctions is indeed starting

to produce differences of opinion within the leadership, and that if

this course of action were continued and perhaps accelerated these

divisions could be exacerbated to the point where Iran might even

consider altering its position on the nuclear issue. I think the

change in the nuclear negotiator last week was reflective of that.

I think the Supreme Leader and Mr. Rafsanjani, who reflect the

views of the bazaar merchants, the trading community who want

to deal with Europe and the outside world, they are becoming very

nervous that these sanctions are going to cutoff Iran from Europe,

from the United States, from the outside world, and they have seen

what the U.S. power can do. They were in the leadership during

the Iran-Iraq war, and they saw what the United States did in a

naval battle in April 1988, and other things. And they are very

much in awe of the U.S. power.

Ahmadinejad less so. Again, he views the Iran-Iraq war as a heroic struggle. His constituencies do not buy fancy European luxury

goods. They don’t care whether they are isolated from Europe or

whatever. And so he seems willing to push the nuclear issue to the

brink. The Supreme Leader and the others I think are much more

sober about the possible effects if these sanctions are ratcheted up

to the point where they really squeeze Iran’s civilian economy, as

we see some signs that they have started to do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Higgins, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just going back to, as

Mr. Ballen said, focus here on the Iranian people and their attitudes about their lives, their history, and their future. What seems

to be going on in Iran today is a more passive revolution, perhaps

influenced by disappointment, having the population having had

their expectations raised about economic reform and then not seeing that reform actually implemented and affecting their individual

lives.

Can you give us some examples of how this passive revolution is

manifesting itself in Iranian society?

Mr. BALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins, but before I address that

I just want to clearly state my view for the record, which is that

88

sanctions are important. Increasing sanctions are important. However, if it is done without anything positive on the agenda, if it is

done without any carrot, if it is just sticks coming from the United

States, to be blunt, those sticks will fail alone in isolation. And as

Karim said, I don’t think there is any doubt that it plays into the

hands of the most hardline and recalcitrant people inside Iran.

So I think you do need sanctions. I think everyone understands

it might be a military action. You don’t need to keep repeating

that. I don’t think that is helpful. But I think that accompanied by

that, as we did in the cold war, we must recognize the importance

of people because it could be a countervailing pressure inside Iran.

And it also lets people understand that the sanctions are a result

of the government’s policies, and not from American hostility.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. About economic reform, what I would do to

build on Ken’s points and the chairman’s question, in approaching

Iran I would simply present two very distinct paths to the Iranian

Government and present it publicly so it is also heard by the Iranian people. The first path is A, continue to take a noncompromising approach, a belligerent approach, and it is going to bring about

isolation, increased economic malaise, increased political isolation

for the government. And again, this is a population overwhelmingly

young, two-thirds under 32. The aspirations are not to wipe Israel

off the map and enrich uranium. They aspire to be reintegrated

into the economic community and have economic prospects.

But simultaneous to that you do have to present an alternative

approach, which is what President Bush Senior once said, good will

begets good will. That if Iran takes a compromising approach, it is

going to be met with certain incentives, reintegration into the

international community, security assurances from the United

States, and presenting these two approaches publicly will increase

the desire of the Iranian people, increase the demands of the Iranian people on their government to take an approach which is less

belligerent, less noncompromising.

But again, if it is just the threat of, quote-unquote, all options

being on the table and saber rattling and sanctions and no alternative policies, I don’t really see any change from what we have

seen the last three decades, which is essentially Iranian behavior

not improving one bit.

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you. Just to add a little bit, because we

talked about the military action issue. My own assessment is that

the talk of military action in some ways, although maybe it is not

always presented that well, in some ways it has helped convince

the Europeans how seriously the threat from Iran is taken in the

United States. The Europeans, and I just was in Europe talking,

they have a very different threat assessment of Iran than the

United States does. And very much when you talk to European diplomats, the view is, well, we are going to try to prevent Iran from

getting a nuclear weapon, but if they do, well, we will deal with

it.

The U.S. view is much, much different. Much different threat assessment. The Europeans do not want the use of force. And the

talk of military action has in some sense convinced the Europeans

how seriously this threat is taken in the United States and has

89

propelled them to offer new proposals for sanctions, for ways of

pressuring Iran without use of force.

So in some sense it has not all been a negative development in

my assessment.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Shays was saying he

was going to take his jacket off. I offer that to anybody in here. It

is warm. It has been warm in the room here. We don’t hold formality on that. Mr. Yarmuth, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was struck by the

comments that all of you made in that the foreign policy of the Iranian Government does not reflect the vast majority of the citizens.

And all I can say is we feel your pain or feel their pain. I am interested in the idea that our hope for a change in policy there may

rest more with convincing from the bottom up. This is my interpretation of what was said, the bottom up of the population affecting

the leaders as opposed to actually a formal change in the regime.

Is that a correct assessment or could you elaborate on that, that

elections or a change in the supreme leadership is not necessarily

going to effect change, but that this percolating attitude may

change? Is that our best hope or better hope?

Mr. BALLEN. I would simply say that is one element. I agree with

what Mr. Katzman said that the regime has its own drivers, not

just the—it is not a regime that respects the Iranian people. I

think we all understand that and because the Iranian people want

one thing doesn’t mean the regime is going to do it.

But on the other hand, it is not a regime that is completely insensitive to public opinion, either.

And there is an ideological state, part of many inside the Iranian

ruling class being connected to the people and having popular legitimacy. They wouldn’t spend the amounts of money they spend on

presenting public opinion in Iran, which they do, if they didn’t care

about it.

So I think that it is important but it is only one element, but it

is an element that we should not ignore.

Mr. YARMUTH. There is an article in Esquire Magazine, in the

November edition, called the Secret History of the Impending War

with Iran that the White House Doesn’t Want You to Know. It is

based on interviews with two officials, one State Department official, and one member who worked on the National Security Council

and dealt with Iran, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann. And there

are some pretty stunning reports in here. One of them from Hillary

Mann that in 2003, in April 2003, right after the war began, that

a diplomat of Iran, a high ranking Iranian diplomat, the nephew

of the Foreign Minister, son-in-law to the Supreme Leader, was in

discussions with the Swiss Ambassador who was then conducting

diplomacy, basically, I guess, as a proxy diplomat for us, and the

day that they had offered an agreement that was approved at the

highest levels in Tehran, including decisive action against all terrorists in Iran, an end to support for Hamas and the Islamic Jihad,

promise to cease its nuclear program and also its program to recognize Israel. The administration ignored the proposal and, in fact,

reprimanded the Swiss Ambassador for meddling.

I am curious as to whether this type of information is used by

the Iranian Government, assuming that it is valid, credible, that

90

this is the type of thing that is used on a PR effort inside Iran, and

what this type of information, if it were widely disseminated, would

mean for our relationships with the people and the government.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. There was a very interesting trial balloon

which the Iranians floated in 2003, and really 2003 was a different

world to 2007. I was based in Tehran at that time, and I can tell

you that the Iranian leadership was quite nervous about what the

U.S. Government was going to do.

If you recall at that time in 2003, oil prices were about $25 a

barrel, Iraq was a still a blank slate. There were student agitations

taking place in Tehran. And again, the Iranians were nervous that

the Hawks in Washington were thinking about transferring the regime change policy eastward to Tehran. So this trial balloon was

floated.

Now fast forward to 2007. Iran has tremendous leverage, not

only in Iraq but throughout the region, and they don’t feel compelled to make these same type of compromises.

So we do see that when the regime is under duress, it is prepared to make compromises on issues which they appear very ideologically rigid on. They can compromise for the sake of the government.

What I would say in response to your first question is that we

simply don’t have the luxury of waiting for more progressive interlocutors anymore. The urgency of the nuclear issue, the urgency of

the state of Iraq, is such that we have to talk to the current leadership in power in Tehran.

But elections in Iran, despite the fact that they are not free and

fair, elected institutions can have an effect on the Iranian policies.

We obviously see a difference between the views and the policies

of an Ahmadinejad-led government as opposed to Khatami-led government.

So whereas I don’t see any hope for some type of dramatic

change in which true representatives of the Iranian people will be

in office in the next few years, I do believe we will see a change

that—we will see the prospect of less belligerent, more pragmatic

leaders in Tehran who I think will be more amenable to certain

compromise with the United States on the nuclear issue and other

issues.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Yarmuth. You also gave a tease on

the next series of hearings that we will be having which will go

into depth on some of the negotiating opportunities since 2001

through today and possibly for the future.

Dr. Katzman, do you want to add something to that?

Mr. KATZMAN. My conversation with U.S. officials on that initiative and that idea suggested that it was much more murky, and we

still really haven’t gotten to the bottom of how well vetted that

whole issue was in Tehran.

The list of things on that list, I find very hard to believe that

Iran would ever agree to that many things. That would be like saying the Islamic Revolution never happened. That would just be a

repudiation of everything Khomeini stood for and the entire basis

of the revolution. I find it very difficult to believe they would ever

agree to that package of offers.

91

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. We are going to have some of those

folks in to talk to us at the next hearing. So that should be very

interesting in that respect.

Ms. McCollum, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We had a little bit of a discussion of how our governments could

engage, and I am hearing clearly that, you know, speaking to one

another, listening to one another changing the tone, it will be

tough on both sides, but changing the tone so it is more civil in nature.

I would like to talk a little bit about two other ways in which

engagement takes place. One is people to people.

I serve on the Appropriations Committee, and we recently had a

hearing, not specifically so much with Iran, but talking about Voice

of America, the Internet, TV, and radio exchanges.

I am a big supporter of Voice of America and the other ways in

which we can engage, whether it is Internet, TV, and radio, as a

way of sharing information, health care, what is going on with

avian flu, what is going on in the news, current events around the

world. Things like that. Educational cultural opportunities so that

the engagements reinforce family to-family, person-to-person.

But there are other engagements that go on, and I was a little

taken back by the statement, and I am going to reiterate the way

I heard it so I can be corrected if I heard it wrong, that Europe

is not engaged with Iran. We hear quite different from this administration at times criticizing the French and others for their engagement.

So I would like a little more information on that.

China is very engaged. I understand there is an airplane exchange being talked about because we do not supply even parts to

commercial aircraft in Iran, and they are in desperate need of having that because of life, health, and safety issue for the Iranians,

as well as other people traveling in and out of Iran.

And then India. India is engaged. India is a very robust democracy.

So if you could talk about those type of engagements and how we

can learn from them or not repeat some mistakes that they might

be making.

Mr. BALLEN. Let me just first comment on the issue of China and

France and what we found in our poll.

While there was a lot of feeling of opening up to the United

States, Iranians preferred dealing with France and China by a twoto-one margin over the United States. The only other country that

was less popular inside Iran in our poll than the United States was

Israel.

So while there is pro-American sentiment, we are not exactly No.

1 on the list. There is a strong undercurrent of distrust, and I absolutely agree with what you are saying that the people-to-people,

educational exchanges, all of that is vital. Absolutely vital, not only

with Iran but around the world. The broadcasting of Voice of America and other agencies, I mean, we live in one world now. People

look at the Internet.

92

For example, our poll was widely spread throughout the

blogosphere inside Iran. We no longer live in isolation. American

words, American policies matter throughout the world.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would like to focus just on one aspect of your

question which is about Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe

and some of these other Persian language television and radio

broadcasts to Iran because there has been a big debate in Washington, and there has been a lot of criticism, that Voice of America

and Radio Tomorrow have not been sufficiently sympathetic to the

views of the current administration in Washington and haven’t

been sufficiently critical of the views of the Iranian government.

What I would simply say is that if we want these programs to

be relevant, whether it is the VOA television broadcast or the

Radio Farda radio broadcast, they have to be perceived as objective

and professional in the eyes of Iranians.

Iranians right now are faced with two types of media. They have

the official state-run television media, which is essentially government propaganda, and they have satellite television channels from

Los Angeles, which are essentially Iranian exiles very much detached from the country and also not considered a credible source

of news.

So I think there is a real vacuum to be filled. And if we try to

fill that vacuum by projecting our own propaganda, I think we really insult the intelligence of the Iranian people. But I do think if we

tried to take an objective, professional approach, similar to what

the BBC World Service does, I think there is a real vacuum to be

filled, and we will have a real audience and we will have a real impact in Iran.

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you.

Under the Treasury Department regulations that govern the limited trade that the United States does with Iran, civilian aircraft

parts can be licensed for sale to Iran. And the Clinton administration did license a sale, and the Bush administration, about a year

or so, agreed to license a sale of some spare parts, landing gear,

for Iran aircraft.

But it has to be licensed on a case-by-case basis. It is not just

automatic. And the work has to be done sort of by contractor, and

it can’t be done by Americans. Lufthansa has done the work.

The countries in Europe, China, India, they have a very different

threat perception of Iran than the United States does. They are not

in the lead in any sense on the Arab-Israel dispute resolution as

the United States is, and the United States is very sensitive to

what Iran is doing to undermine Israel and the Arab-Israeli resolution of that dispute. China, India, Europe have far less, I think, a

sober assessment of Iranian policy. Iraq, obviously, they are not involved in Iraq. Europeans, not all of them.

So I think the threat assessment is different. China obviously is

motivated by oil. Needs a lot of oil. Iran is a source of oil. India,

India sees Iran as a regional player, doesn’t want to come into conflict with Iran. They have some naval and other exchanges at a

fairly low level, but there is a defense agreement of exchanges at

least so that they don’t come into conflict in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, etc.

93

Europe does a lot of trade with Iran, and as I said, just a very

different threat perception. They do not have the psychological history that the United States has with Iran.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panelists for

their excellent testimony.

Two areas of questions I would be interested in everyone’s opinions on.

First is your assessment on the current administration’s intention of using military force in Iran. I mean, that is constantly in

the news. It is constantly laid out there as a potential threat.

I would be interested in actual use of force. I would be interested

in how seriously you believe the administration is about pursuing

military options and what the consequences of that attack would

be.

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much.

My conversations with people in the—there has been a lot of, as

you know, press articles. I don’t get the sense that there is any decision or any planning or any move toward actual military force

against—what I am understanding where the administration is,

they want the sanctions to succeed. There is a belief that if the Europeans join us in tighter sanctions we might have a chance of success. But the administration doesn’t want the negotiations with our

partners to just drag on and on and on without result. There is a

view that there needs to show some progress soon, that Iran needs

to show that it might change its position due to these sanctions at

some point fairly soon.

The view is that, the administration view is that an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable and must be prevented. That is—I believe that is U.S. policy, and if the negotiations on sanctions just

go on and on and on without result, then I would say that these

options probably will get more focused at some point fairly soon.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would agree that the military option is something that the current administration is not going to take lightly.

President Bush has said that he would like to see this nuclear

issue resolved on his watch. And I don’t think the military option

would at all resolve it. It would in fact exacerbate it.

If I have to quantify the likelihood of a military option, I would

say 20 percent. But I think it is certainly within the realm of possibilities, and increasingly the pretext being used for potential military action is not the nuclear issue, it is Iran’s alleged support for

militias which are killing U.S. troops in Iraq.

As for the repercussions, I would repeat what I said earlier in

the hearing, that when I think about U.S. foreign policy challenges

over the next decade or so, there are five or six things that come

to mind: Iran nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security,

Arab-Israeli peace and Afghanistan.

Really thinking about bombing Iran, what would it do to these

issues? Iraq, the likelihood of stabilizing Iraq is much, much less.

I think the likelihood that Iran starts to pursue a nuclear weapons

program unequivocally increases if we bomb them. I think the likelihood that Iran will support terrorism more increases if we bomb

them.

94

In terms of energy security, oil prices go up at least 20, 30 percent, perhaps. The likelihood that Iran supports Palestinian rejections groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, increases, and again the likelihood that Iran will see fit to play a constructive role in issues of

common mutual overlap like Afghanistan also decreases.

So I really see no redeeming qualities to the military option, not

to mention the fact that this is the last oasis of good will which we

have in the Middle East in terms of the Iranian population, and

I think we likely soil that oasis by bombing Iran.

Mr. BALLEN. Based on my discussion with senior Pentagon officials, I would concur in the conclusions of my colleagues.

I would point out one finding in our policy. Two-thirds of the people in Iran support Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militia groups.

I think that if we had a military attack, that support would likely

increase.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

I do note there are three votes scheduled on the floor right now:

15-minute vote on the previous question, for H.R. 3867 followed by

a vote on the Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendment Act of 2007,

5 minutes, followed by a vote on designation of the month of October 2007 as Country Music Month, H.J. Res. 58, 5 minutes.

So we will go as far as we can, and we will break for a few minutes for good consideration and have our witnesses come back after

that.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. I want to address the situation on the possibility of

sanctions, and I think the closest example that we have is the previous limited sanction that we had against Iraq, the Oil for Food

Program. And these sanctions, while I think it is probably the way

to go, the efficacy of these sanctions is questionable given the fact

that the last sanctions that we had against Saddam Hussein were

meant to be just that, a limited sanction but in effect in retrospect

turned out to be a bonanza. It was a sweepstakes for him siphoning

off billions of dollars.

The efficacy of any sanction program will depend on the willingness of our international neighbors to support us. Right now we

have 1,700 German companies operating inside Iran.

Iran, if you look at Italy, Italy is Iran’s third highest trading

partner. We don’t have solidarity for governments in action.

So what I am afraid of is that even if we do adopt these sanctions, that they will be less than useful. And so I would like to hear

your thoughts on that, and second, in light of the votes here, there

have been some quiet entreaties from the Bundestag to try to identify members of our committee and our Congress and moderate

members of the Iranian parliament and members of the Bundestag

to try to sit down and talk about just the broader implications of

this situation. And I, for one, am loath to undermine the efforts of

our own State Department or to complicate this matter if it is possible, but I would like to hear what you have in mind—in your

minds as to the thoughts of some person-to-person or citizen-to-citizen or legislator-to-legislator type of dialog that might get us off of

the position that we currently find ourselves in.

95

Mr. SADJADPOUR. With regards to sanctions, when the Iraq war

was prosecuted, what we saw was the United States pursued very

strong resolutions and strong sanctions and thereby had a very

weak coalition.

I think what is key, if we want to try to attempt to change Iranian behavior, is initially weak sanctions and weak resolutions in

order to achieve a more robust international coalition. Because I

can tell you if Iranian leaders wake up in the morning and they

say well, there is an intensification of U.S. sanctions but they have

been in place for a few decades, we can endure it; but if they wake

up in the morning and they say wow, not even China or Russia or

India are returning our phone calls, then I think the world view

from Tehran changes a bit.

But in order to get Russia and China and India on board, we

have to make it clear to them we are not pursuing a military option, and that we are turning up the heat gradually and allowing

Iran a way out if they choose to take a more conciliatory approach.

The second issue about interaction. We are at times of potential

war and peace right now. So I think any type of dialog, especially

between our Congress and the Iranian parliament, would be welcome. I think what is lacking right now is some type of a dialog,

if anything, just to communicate one another’s red line.

One example I like to give is of a deputy foreign minister in Iran.

And when I used to be based in Tehran, he was always the hardest

line interview I would have. Of all of the people I talked to, he was

always very conspiratorial, always unwilling to divulge information, very suspicious of me personally; and he came on a fellowship

to Harvard University last year, and he spent 8 months in the

United States. And it was amazing based on his interaction with

U.S. academics and U.S. analysts how much his views had evolved

and how much their views had evolved that you appreciate the

other side’s concerns, security concerns and ambitions a bit more.

So my experience has always been that whenever these interactions happen, it helps to educate the other side, and it allays

these tensions. It doesn’t increase these tensions. So I think, broadly speaking, especially when we are talking about the level of Iranian and U.S. Congressmen and elected representatives, I would

welcome the initiative.

Mr. TIERNEY. We have about 5 minutes to vote.

Mr. Lynch, your time has expired. We will be coming back for the

panelists. The votes are probably about 20 minutes to a half hour,

but we will start immediately once the committee gets back. I

thank you for your patience and tell Members we will start as soon

as the last vote is made. And then we will return. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you for allowing me to jump in here between

other questioners.

Mr. Ballen, I would like to start just to get a little understanding, I don’t think I am going to repeat anything that was asked

earlier, and being in three places at once I am still working on, so

I apologize if I do.

96

But in the polling that the organization has done, one of the

issues was about the support of the Iranian people for groups such

as Hamas, Hezbollah, state, or identified by us as terrorist organizations.

They weren’t identified that way, is my understanding in the

way the questions were posed to the Iranian people; is that correct?

Mr. BALLEN. Yes, sir. That is correct. I mean, we simply named

the groups. We didn’t identify them as terrorist organizations. This

would introduce bias in the question, and what the Iranians said

was two-thirds have a favorable opinion of these groups, roughly

two-thirds but I want to put that in some context. You can ask people in a survey what they think and you will get one answer, but

it is important also to put it in context priorities.

That was not a priority for their—when we gave them a set of

priorities to pick for the Iranian Government, the top priority was

the economy, better relations with Western nations came in ahead.

These matters, financial assistance to Hamas, Hezbollah, were not

a priority, nor was nuclear weapons.

Mr. PLATTS. They were identified, as is my understanding, as

Palestinian opposition groups. So they were identified in some fashion.

Mr. BALLEN. You know, I believe that is correct. But I don’t have

the exact Farsi version in front of me. But we did not—we identified them by name and——

Mr. PLATTS. My reason for asking is whether there is an ability

to determine what the Iranian people, their views of President

Bush, but some of what your polling shows and our current actions,

if those views would be different if they understood how we see

those organizations for their support of terrorism or engagement of

terrorism, if that would impact the Iranians’ view of the economy

being one and foreign affairs being down the list. It would be different if they were identified in that fashion, but there is nothing

in your polling that would be able to indicate that?

Mr. BALLEN. That is correct.

Mr. PLATTS. Also recently in the Senate, the Kyl-Lieberman

amendment that was passed designating the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard as a terrorist organization based on their efforts regarding

weapons of mass destruction, was that organization—or was that

addressed at all in the polling?

Mr. BALLEN. No, it was not.

Mr. PLATTS. If you were going to ask about it, how would you address that to the Iranian people in the way we see them now based

on the Senate amendment as a terrorist organization or, again, just

asking them in a generic way about the Iranian Revolutionary

Guard?

Mr. BALLEN. If you are asking, from my advice in terms of how

to conduct a survey, and I would defer also to my colleagues from

D3 Systems who conduct these surveys regularly in that part of the

world and are experts in conducting surveys in Iraq and Afghanistan and closed societies like Iran, Syria. I think it is important

when you ask questions to try to eliminate as much as possible any

of your opinion or your perspective from the question. Otherwise,

it would tend to bias the answers.

97

Mr. PLATTS. And I am going to run out of time here. 5 minutes

is always tough.

The final issue, I guess I am going to have time for, is the discrepancy that appears in the policy. My understanding is it shows

the Iranian people supporting both a Palestinian state and the

State of Israel both co-existing.

Mr. BALLEN. I think that is a very good question, sir.

What we asked was not that question out of context. We asked

in terms of normal relations and better relations with the United

States, would you support a two-state solution. In that context, the

majority of people would.

But we did not ask the question do you support a two-state solution out of that context. I just want to clarify it for the record.

Mr. PLATTS. Was there any followup about their own President’s

statements then about the elimination of the State of Israel from

the face of the map?

Mr. BALLEN. We did not ask that in the survey as a question. So

I can’t give you an answer.

Mr. PLATTS. And I appreciate my time has expired.

Just how to understand the inconsistencies, their support for

Hamas, Hezbollah, which is certainly doing its best to go after

Israel, yet to some degree supporting a two-state solution.

Mr. BALLEN. I understand. And I am not sure they are necessarily inconsistent views, in the sense that I certainly consider

that and you do, knowing the platform of these groups. But Iranians may not perceive it that way. They may perceive Hamas and

Hezbollah standing up for Palestinian rights as opposed to destroying Israel, and that if Hamas or other groups reached an accommodation, they would be supportive of that.

I don’t know whether, Karim, you have other——

Mr. PLATTS. If others would like to comment.

Dr. Katzman.

Mr. KATZMAN. I would just say it also doesn’t necessarily mean

they support violence by Hamas or Hezbollah. It just means they

support the political goals of Hamas or Hezbollah.

And, you know, many in the Arab world, Iran is not Arab, but

many in the Arab world view those groups as having legitimate

goals without supporting use of violence in those groups.

Mr. BALLEN. I would concur in those remarks. I mean, it was a

more general question about favorability. So it is hard to draw a

lot of specifics that they support this policy or that policy from our

survey.

Mr. PLATTS. So your caution then is we shouldn’t read into that

the Iranian people support terrorist activities because we don’t

have the data to understand that.

Mr. BALLEN. Absolutely not. We don’t have the data.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would make one point, and this was the

slight inconsistency I saw in my own anecdotal experience as opposed to Ken’s poll was in my experiences in Iran there was somewhat of a backlash toward the government support for groups like

Hezbollah and Hamas for a couple of reasons.

One, they would say we are supposed to be a very rich country.

We have major, massive natural resources and yet a quarter of our

population is living at the poverty line, there is rampant inflation

98

and unemployment. Why are we sending all of this money to

Hezbollah and Hamas when we have all of these domestic problems? Especially among the younger generations of Iranians I noticed an increasing sense of discontent for the government support

for groups of Hezbollah and Hamas.

So I will just leave it at that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Shays, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. I apologize. When you were giving your testimony, I

had to go to another hearing. But I did read your statements, and

I would like your response to a few observations.

One, about 15 years ago, 10 to 15 years ago, I was in Iran—I was

actually in Jordan talking about Iran to the head of their security,

Jordanian security. And they basically said that when you shake

hands with an Iranian, you need to count your fingers. And it was

said to me in a way that wasn’t intended to be cute, it was intended to say, you know, these are very clever, very aggressive people, and you feel one way but then you learn that you just got

screwed.

So I would like to know their negotiating style, and I would like

your comment to that.

The other comment I would like you to respond to is that when

you go to Turkey, the Turks say we used to run this place for 402

years, why don’t you pay attention to us?

I go to Egypt, and they will say we have been a country for 4,000

years. We go to Jordan. They say, we are the Hashemite Kingdom,

why don’t you pay attention to us? I go to Iraq and they say, we

are the Fertile Crescent. We are where Western civilization began.

Why don’t you give us more respect?

And one thing that comes across very loud and clear in the Middle East is how you treat people and there is a tremendous amount

of pride that just—it is palpable. You could almost cut it with a

knife.

And my last comment, which I would like you to comment on, is

that when I talk to the administration about Syria or Iran, I get

the feeling that they feel like I apply my Western mind and so I

want to treat people a certain way. But the impression I get from

the administration is you don’t understand what you do says something different than what you think it does. I am talking about the

cultural difference. So I could wrap my arm around an Iranian and

say why can’t we work this out together, and they might view that

as weakness or whatever. I don’t know.

So comments.

Mr. BALLEN. I would agree with you, Mr. Shays, that on this

issue of respect and pride, and I think we see that very much—I

will speak to the data in the poll just in Iran and Syria that we

did and other policies around the world. There is a hunger. There

is not an inimical hatred of the United States. That is just false.

There is a hunger for a United States where people perceive, and

the perceptions are important here, that they are being treated

with pride and with respect. And I think that so much about what

has happened since 9/11 has been a feeling from other countries,

particularly in the Muslim world, that the United States does not

99

value them, that there is not a dignity and respect that is accorded

to them.

I think it is not a correct impression, but it is the impression

that people are getting. So I think that is a very important part

of our policy and that we need to figure out how we can better convey that we do respect people, that we do respect their culture, and

we respect their pride.

Mr. SHAYS. How about the other point, the other negative comments by the Jordanian security chief?

Mr. BALLEN. I am going to let my colleague answer that because

I don’t know the answer.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Well, it is useful, instructive to kind of look, do

an analogy of the Middle East and Europe. The Iranians are kind

of the French of the region. They kind of have a sense of chauvinism vis-a-vis the other countries, especially countries like Jordan,

which has a history which spans a half a century as opposed to

Iran’s.

There has always been this great sense of chauvinism in Arab

countries, whether it was the Shah’s regime or the Islamic Republic. And I think the smaller Arab countries certainly resent the

same way they say the United States needs to respect us, they

would direct that same message to the Iranians.

A couple points that I would make is that when it comes to the

issue of popular opinion throughout the region, I would make the

argument that Iran is the only country in the Middle East where

if there were to be free and fair elections next month and let the

chips fall where there may, Iran is the only country in the Middle

East where the results would be an improvement on the status quo

and would be favorable to U.S. policy interests. I don’t know if

there is any other country in the region where you could make that

argument. And my point is in Iran people have been under repressive Islamist regimes for the last three decades, and if they would

be able to vote free and fair, I think they would elect politicians

who would be more sympathetic to having relationships with the

United States.

Whereas in the other countries in the region, many of them U.S.

allies, such as Jordan and Egypt, etc., I think the status quo autocratic leaders are more progressive than the results of democratic

elections within those countries.

Last, the issue of how we should approach the Iranians, and I

assume you are talking about the Iranian regime, I think respect,

obviously, is a prerequisite. But I do think that it is problematic

to offer this particular administration in Tehran incentives which

we didn’t offer the previous administration in Tehran which took

a much more moderate approach. Because if you pay attention to

the domestic debate within Iran, the hardliners who are currently

in power were very critical. The former President, Mohammad

Khatami, they said this talk of, quote/unquote, dialog of civilizations was very cute, but all it did was get us into the Axis of Evil

and project a very weak image of the country, and what we need

to do is take a hardline approach, and this is what the U.S. responds to.

So I do think it is problematic in the short term that we roll out

the red carpet for Ahmadinejad and offer the major incentives. But

100

I do think that we will start to see a change of leadership in

Tehran, not a change of regime but a change of leadership. And

when there are more pragmatic kind of moderate officials in positions of influence in Tehran, I think it is then worthwhile to make

it clear to them that if they want to take a conciliatory approach,

it will—they will get a conciliatory response from the United

States.

Mr. KATZMAN. You mentioned Iran’s negotiating style, and I do

think we have not seen the type of investment in Iran’s energy sector that the Iranians expected, not necessarily because of the Iran

Sanctions Act, which provides penalties on foreign investment, but

really Iran’s negotiating style.

Any number of oil company personnel have told me that it is

Iran’s negotiating style that prevented them from making or

slowed major investments in Iran’s energy sector because Iran, the

negotiators, insisted on basically taking all of the profit out of the

deal.

They negotiate and negotiate even after the contract is signed.

The Iranians are still negotiating, renegotiating the terms, and

many of the European oil companies have found it very, very difficult to negotiate with the Iranians and make a profit.

I would also say we have had a lot of discussion about incentives.

The administration did offer Iran incentives. The June 2006 joint

offer, the P–5, the Permanent 5 plus Germany. The offer to Iran

was you suspend uranium enrichment and meet some of the other

nuclear demands and you can have X, Y, and Z: Nuclear medicine,

nuclear agriculture nuclear power, WTO, trade agreements, etc.

So there is a package that has been offered to Iran. It is not like

there have been no incentives offered to the regime.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Just to followup on that point, one of the issues I think that

might be interesting, I don’t know how constructive it is to say we

can talk about all of those things that Dr. Katzman said, provided

you first give us everything we want before we start talking, and

I think that has been some of the problem. I don’t know how productive it is going to be.

So say we start negotiating with you as soon as you start getting

us all of the end points that we want in our negotiations. We have

one administration that wants to win the battle before the clocks

start. We have another administration that is very, very security

conscious and all of this paranoia, paranoid to some extent on that,

and I think we have to break through that.

Can I just ask, there was talk during the conversation about

international coalition sanctions and the idea that they should be

built up slowly, which then goes directly in the face with what our

administration seems to be saying is too slow. By the time you end

up with that buildup of sanctions and any effect on them, they

might have a nuclear weapon in place.

Doctor, do you want to talk a little bit to that?

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much. The difference between the

United States and, I would say, the Europeans right now is how

quickly to ratchet up the sanctions. The European approach is that

each sanction resolution should adjust a marginal amount to the

previous of new sanctions and thereby place some psychological

101

pressure on Iran that there is more to follow. The U.S. view is that

the process is simply moving too slow, Iran’s nuclear achievement

is moving ahead, and we have not yet stopped them from enriching

uranium and that we need to ratchet up the sanctions more quickly

and add a lot to the previous resolutions and really get at civilian

trade with Iran. Civilian credits, investment in the energy sector,

start getting at civilian trade to really, in the administration’s

view, shake up the leadership, that these sanctions are going to be

quite biting.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me ask this. Because of the security consciousness of the Iranian Government, do you think it would be constructive if our administration were to make it clear to them that ultimately the end of negotiations is there would be some security for

Iran, that it would not be any attempt to change the government

other than through an electoral process in that country and then

came to Congress and asked them for a statement that if things

proceeded on that end, Congress would at least be amenable to

start talking about removing some of the sanctions?

Do you think—any of the witnesses think that would have a motivating factor in these negotiations?

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would argue that some type of a U.S. recognition of the Iranian Government, and that would entail security assurances, is a prerequisite to any type of a broader diplomatic accommodation. I think at the moment, what is lacking these days

between the United States and Iran—and it is not just these days,

it has been the history over the last three decades—is trust. There

is a very deep-seated mutual distrust, and this has definitely been

exacerbated since the Bush administration and since the

Ahmadinejad administration in Tehran.

What I would argue for a way forward is not to try to commence

discussions necessarily on the nuclear issue, because I think it is

an issue where there is just no common ground, it is a zero sum

game; but it is to continue the discussions on Iraq and Baghdad,

because that is one issue where there is a lot of overlapping interests between the United States and Iran. I would go so far as to

argue Iran has more common interests with the United States in

Iraq than any of Iraq’s other neighbors. Iraq is an issue where we

can eat away at this confidence deficit, try to build confidence, and

then gradually expand the discussion to encompass issues like the

nuclear issue and security assurances.

And I think what you suggest is a great idea, but I think we

need a few small interim steps before we can get to that type of

a gesture.

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. One idea I think some people are talking

about is to point to Libya, the U.S. agreement with Libya. When

we made that agreement with Libya, they denuclearized, they

agreed to give up all of their equipment, it was flown here to the

United States. And in exchange, the United States laid out a road

map of lifting of sanctions on Libya. And the United States can

point to the fact that those sanctions were indeed lifted, and Congress did not block it, and the sanctions were indeed removed.

That model I think could be applied to Iran to say if you do the

Libya thing, you give up, you will get X, Y, and Z. And it can work

out like that.

102

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. You know, it seems to me that some

people question the legitimacy of the Iranian Government. That is

their premise just moving out. But would you folks discuss with me

a comparison the legitimacy of the Iranian Government versus that

of Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia?

Mr. BALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I think a lot of those governments

have the same kind of issues with their people that the Iranian

Government has with their people. They are not elected, representative governments. They do not necessarily—although sometimes

they can reflect popular support.

I would just add that the issue of sanctions and other actions by

the United States shouldn’t be seen as an either/or proposition. Dr.

Katzman just said laying out a positive agenda of where the future

is going to be if Iran does change its course. I think we have done

it as a matter of policy, but not as a matter of public policy in

terms of articulating it clearly and forcefully.

Mr. TIERNEY. Anybody else want to comment on that?

Mr. KATZMAN. Just the legitimacy question. I mean some would

argue actually that the Iranian system is more legitimate because

it is based upon a Constitution that was adopted in a public referendum on the Islamic Republican Constitution after the revolution. So one could almost make a case that of those you mentioned,

Iran has significant legitimacy to its political system.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Sadjadpour.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would just argue that we should take Max

Weber’s definition of ‘‘legitimacy,’’ which is monopoly over coercion.

So even if we don’t like the Iranian Government, it does very cruel

things to its people, it has a monopoly over coercion. There is no

other game in town. There is no other alternative government waiting in diaspora. There is very little organized opposition at home.

And essentially this is the government we have to deal with.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Yarmuth and Mr. Shays, you have any further questions?

Mr. YARMUTH. I just have one.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Yarmuth.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you address

whether there is any difference in the relevance of religion among

the people to their political mindset, difference between that situation in Iran and what we have come to see in Iraq and some other

Muslim countries? And if there is a difference, what relevance that

has or what implications it has for U.S. foreign policy toward Iran?

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Well, there was an adage which people used to

use during communist times, and they would say the best antidote

for communism was to have people live in a Communist regime.

You know, disabuse themselves of any fantasies of living in a Communist government.

And I think this adage applies to Islamism as well, to an extent.

The best antidote is to have people endure and live under an Islamic system. And what we see in Iran is people have lived under

this system for three decades. And even those who are quite pious

and quite religious within Iran are very discontent with the status

quo, because they say they soiled the name of our religion by combining it with politics.

103

So we shouldn’t have the perception that discontent is only

among those who are secularly minded in Iran. In fact, among the

religious classes, there is an equal amount of discontent.

And I think what is taking place in the Arab world is that they

romanticize about this Islamist society because they haven’t really

experienced it. And this is why I argue that if we were to have free

and fair democratic elections in the region, the one country with

which we could be truly confident that the results would reflect

U.S. interests is probably Iran, just because the other countries in

the region haven’t experienced what Iran has.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Van Hollen, you rejoined us. I didn’t see you.

I am sorry. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let

me thank you very much for holding these—is that on now?

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. And thank you for holding these

hearings. I think, as you and others have pointed out, we haven’t

had any other diplomats or other personnel on the ground in Iran

for a very long time. And it is very important that we get a much

better understanding of what is going on inside Iran as we try and

decide how to approach Iran and what our policy should be.

And based on all accounts and the testimony you gentlemen have

provided today, it is pretty clear that President Ahmadinejad is

quite unpopular at home based on his domestic record. The economy, of course, is the No. 1 issue on the minds of the Iranian people, and he hasn’t delivered, clearly, on that. And I think that

comes through on the surveys that were taken.

So my question is this: Isn’t it counterproductive for us to focus

on the military option the way this administration has been doing

in recent weeks? President Bush and Vice President Cheney beating the war drums, doesn’t that have the effect of rallying people

in Iran in support of Ahmadinejad and strengthen Ahmadinejad

among the population at a time when otherwise he is very unpopular? And so in that sense, even though we all know the military

option is always something that America has in its arsenal, that

by elevating the rhetoric on that issue we have the effect of actually bolstering Ahmadinejad at home and having a counterproductive result?

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Congressman. I think in my talks

what I am seeing is the administration may be talking about the

military option, but it is really directed at our European partners

and Russia and China. It is a way of signaling to them the pot is

boiling here in the United States. We really find an Iranian nuclear

weapon absolutely unacceptable, and we need you to step up and

tighten the sanctions on Iran. I think that is really what the administration is trying to get at with that talk.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I might agree with Ken that is the case, but

I would argue, having just returned from Moscow recently, that increasingly Russia and China are actually far more worried about

the U.S. bombing Iran than Iran getting the bomb. So the approach

hasn’t been constructive in that respect.

When it comes to the military option domestically within Iran, I

would just say that the one thing and the only thing I could see

104

that could potentially rehabilitate Ahmadinejad’s Presidency is a

U.S. military attack. Because on his own, right now the economy

is floundering, he hasn’t delivered on any of his economic promises,

but I think U.S. bombs in Iran may change that dynamic. And interestingly enough, it could actually improve the Iranian economy,

because 80 percent of their export revenue is from oil, and if you

bomb Iran and oil prices go up $20 a barrel you could actually improve the Iranian economy and help them out even more.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. But does raising the rhetoric and focusing so

much more on the military option, does it have the effect—does it

give him a card to play at home that he wouldn’t otherwise have?

Does it elevate his status and provide more support for him than

he would otherwise have?

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Yes. First of all, I would say for him I think

he views the military option as more a carrot than a stick. And I

think in the eyes of the Supreme Leader—I mean really the focus

should be on the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. We

haven’t mentioned him today, but he is really the individual who

is signing off on these key decisions, not President Ahmadinejad.

And if we tried to get inside the head of Supreme Leader

Khamenei, he really believes what the United States wants is not

the change of behavior in Iran, but a change of regime.

And the nuclear issue; Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, are

just pretexts. And so with that belief, he believes if Iran compromises as a result of pressure, whether it is sanctions or military

threat, compromising as a result of pressure is not going to allay

the pressure, it is actually going to encourage even more pressure

because it is going to signal to the hawks in Washington that you

see, this pressure is working, so let’s turn up the heat even more.

So this is kind of a dangerous paradigm in which we are operating that people have described it as a game of chess, but it is really

a game of chicken. You have two cars moving at each other, and

neither side believes it behooves them to slow down, because if you

slow down it is going to signal weakness to the other side.

So to answer your question, I do think that the military option

doesn’t hurt Ahmadinejad domestically with the Supreme Leader

Ayatollah Khamenei.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If I could, Mr. Chairman, and I think you

raised an important point, we obviously focus a lot on Ahmadinejad

in this country, forgetting to recognize that the Supreme Leader

obviously makes the final decisions. And that has become sort of

the way the press and the discussion in this country has unfolded.

If I could just ask you a question with respect to the North Korean model, because for many years in this administration you had

people saying we wouldn’t talk to anybody in North Korea, we

weren’t going to negotiate, we weren’t going to do carrots along

with sticks, we were only going to do sticks. And during that period

of time, the North Korean regime in fact developed a number of nuclear weapons, which it has to this day.

Recently, the administration took a different tact, and obviously

was willing, even after the Six-Party Talks, to then engage in more

bilateral discussions with the North Koreans and was willing to

offer carrots as well as sticks. Do you think that represents a good

model for now moving forward with respect to Iran, or not?

105

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Theoretically, absolutely. Offering it as two distinct paths, offering the path of carrots and offering the path of

sticks. But I think one of the difficulties in devising an effective approach toward Iran is the fact that I don’t believe there exists a

consensus in Tehran. I think if we were to assemble this room with

the top 10 most powerful Iranian officials and ask them, OK, write

for us, please, on a sheet of paper what you are hoping to achieve

in your nuclear negotiations and in your negotiations with the

United States, I think we would get 10 different sheets of paper.

I think President Ahmadinejad’s vision for Iran is fundamentally

different than the former President Rafsanjani. As I said, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, I would describe him as being

paralyzed with mistrust. If the United States says to Iran, OK, we

want to dialog with you, he will receive it as a pretext for a regime

change approach. And if the United States tries to isolate and sanction you, he will also perceive it as a pretext for regime change. So

somehow we have to send the signal to Khamenei that the goal of

the U.S. Government is not regime change, it is behavior change.

And this is very difficult to do after three decades of not having relations and not having dialog.

And despite the fact that Secretary Rice may announce this publicly, that this is about behavior change, not regime change, when

we have two U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, and 75 million set aside for democracy promotion, and hundreds of thousands

of troops surrounding Iran, it is easy to see why they get conflicting

signals.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. If I can interject one, you just mentioned democracy promotion. And I think that leads to an interesting part of

your submitted testimony where you talked about Iran’s most respected dissidents and democratic agitators have asked the U.S.

Government to cease such democracy promotion efforts. Can you

tell us why it is they asked for that? I am sure when Congress

passed that they thought they were doing a good thing. Mr.

Sadjadpour, if you could.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I really defer to Iranian democratic activists

when it comes to this issue. And I was very curious to see in particular the views of this gentleman Akbar Ganji, who is really

Iran’s most respected dissident leader. He was in solitary confinement for 5 years, and he wasn’t able to comment, obviously, during

those 5 years, and when he came out I was very curious to see

what his recommendations for U.S. policy would be. And his assessment, and that has been the prevailing assessment in Tehran,

is that this public fanfare about promoting democracy in Iran and

setting aside of millions of dollars simply gives the Iranian regime

a further pretext to clamp down on these democratic agitators and

civil society activists on the pretext of protecting national security.

Now, I am not exonerating the Iranian regime’s cruelty and

blaming it on the Bush administration. This regime was abusing

their population far before the neocons came to power in Washington. So I am not saying this is necessarily primarily as a result of

Bush administration policy, but the United States—$75 million is

like $1.25 per Iranian. The notion that we are going to change this

106

government with $75 million, I think, has been seen to be ineffective and ultimately counterproductive.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I am just going to take a moment to

read the quote that you had in your report from Akbar Ganji, who

is the prominent dissident, you thought.

He said: Iranians are viewed as discredited when they receive

money from foreign governments. The Bush administration may be

striving to help Iranian democrats, but any Iranian who seeks

American dollars will not be recognized as a democrat by his or his

fellow citizens. Of course, Iran’s democratic movement and civil institutions need funding, but this must come from independent Iranian sources. Iranians themselves must support the transition to

democracy. It cannot be presented like a gift. So here is our request

to Congress, the request of dissidents I take it, to do away with any

misunderstanding. We hope lawmakers will provide a bill that

bans payment to individuals or groups opposing the Iranian Government. Iran’s democratic movement does not need foreign handouts. It needs the moral support of the international community

and the condemnation of the Iranian regime for its systemic violation of human rights.

Would the three of you recommend that Congress pass a bill banning payment to individuals or groups opposing the Iranian Government? Anybody?

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I don’t know if I would go so far as to pass a

bill banning payment. And as I said earlier, I think that actually

the bulk of this $75 million was not for civil society activists and

democratic agitators. The bulk of this money was intended for Persian language media and the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe,

Radio Farda.

But I would just emphasize my earlier point that this Persian

language media is far more objective and receives a much larger

audience in Iran if it is perceived as objective news media rather

than U.S. propaganda. And again, I think if you have Iran’s leading dissidents simply saying that we don’t want the money, it is

counterproductive, it is not helpful, I don’t see the logic in insisting

on saying, no, you actually do need the money. We know what is

better for you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I agree sometimes with my colleague from Maryland,

but I don’t like the analogy of Korea. Because the fact was, this administration continually is blamed for acting unilaterally. In North

Korea they acted multilaterally because they wanted China and

South Korea and Japan at the table, particularly China, to get

them to respond. And they stuck to their guns on it. But they were

always offering carrots. They were saying ‘‘but meet with us collectively.’’ And they did.

What confuses me about Iran is you are asking—first of all, I

think as a general rule you should have an Embassy in every country in the world: Cuba, North Korea, Iran. And it is not a reward.

It is just you have a vehicle to do business. And I wish we would

get out of the thought that somehow we reward someone by having

an Embassy. If we had had an Embassy in Iraq, we would have

known that their infrastructure was pathetic times 10 just being

107

there. And half of our Embassy, by the way, does not include State

employee officials.

But what I wrestle with is if the Supreme Leader Khamenei is

paranoid, he is going to be paranoid if we are aggressive, he is

going to be paranoid if we are not aggressive. You can’t deal with

someone who is paranoid very easily in the short run. So I don’t

quite know what we win either way with this so-called Supreme

Leader.

What I wrestle with is Europe sends its troops to Afghanistan,

but only allows four of their countries to be involved in battle. You

know, the tip of the spear. I have so little respect for Europe. Tell

me why I need to respect them. They are dependent in large measure on Iran, and so I am stuck with the fact they are going to be

under the thumb of Iran. And it seems to me the way you avoid

war is you have sanctions that work. And these guys don’t want

the sanctions to work. If they did, they would support it universally. And then Iran would have Russia and China as their only

two folks to do business with. That is kind of how I see it. So disagree or not, but comment.

Mr. KATZMAN. I believe there are more than four European countries fighting in southern Afghanistan.

Mr. SHAYS. That is not what I said. They are there, but they will

not allow their troops to be involved in battle.

Mr. KATZMAN. I think, again, they have a very different threat—

I don’t think they don’t want the sanctions to work. I think they

have a different threat assessment and a different philosophy that

if we move these sanctions up more slowly and conduct dialog, at

the same time we can get Iran to shift its position more effectively

than if we go right to the ultimate full trade ban, cutoff of all credits, official credit guarantees, etc. If we do that, in the European

view, we have sort of spent all our ammunition and we have nothing to followup with. They want to be able to say to Iran, we are

going to keep ratcheting up. And maybe Iran will change.

Mr. SHAYS. Just to quickly respond to that, then they have no

place to do business.

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, I agree with that, but I think they just also

have a different threat—I don’t think the business is necessarily

driving. I think it is more the philosophy of how you get Iran to

change its position rather than not wanting the sanctions.

Mr. SHAYS. I hear you.

Mr. BALLEN. Mr. Shays, I would just comment that a missing

actor or link in American policy has been putting forth, as I mentioned or testified earlier, the human rights agenda and talking

about human rights in the positive agenda. I think if we more

forcefully as a country talked about what was happening, as we did

with the former Soviet Union, we engaged them, but we put front

and center their human rights violations. This is a country in Iran

where there are significant human rights violations, yet it is not

part of the debate. It is not—it even hasn’t been mentioned until

right now, when I am bringing up the issue.

So I think it is very, very important. Not only Dr. Katzman mentioned, well, we are talking about military options so we can impress the Europeans; I think we could impress the Europeans if we

started talking about human rights inside Iran, too.

108

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to emphasize that point. I think the reason the President has talked about military is he is trying to get

China and Russia to wake up. In other words, if you don’t want

military operations, then make sanctions work. So I don’t really

think he is speaking to Iran. I think he is speaking to our allies.

Mr. BALLEN. Right. And what I would respectfully suggest is that

if we also talked about, A, the positive vision of the future where

Iran could be, and also the human rights violations inside Iran

today, we can also speak to our allies, too.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would just argue somewhat in defense of the

Europeans, that they have actually had a far more positive effect

at improving the human rights situation in Iran than the U.S. Government has. I can tell you numerous occasions of friends of mine,

or prominent intellectuals and dissidents who have been imprisoned in Tehran. Myself, I was not imprisoned, but my passport was

taken away from me. I would have loved to have been able to go

to the U.S. Embassy and consult with the U.S. Ambassador, but

there is no U.S. Embassy there.

And so Europeans have actually been quite effective on a lot of

these human rights issues within Iran. So when it comes to the

saber rattling intended for Russia and China, I agree it may be intended for Russia and China, but as I said, having just come back

from Moscow, my concern is that this has been counterproductive.

Because what the Russian officials and Chinese officials these days

are obsessing about is not that Iran is going to get a nuclear bomb,

it is that the United States is going to bomb Iran.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And that is my whole point.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. But this point is not impressed upon them.

Mr. SHAYS. No, I want to state the point, because you are the one

who triggered it. The whole point is they aren’t obsessed by it; they

don’t seem to care. But they do seem to care if we would be involved militarily. And so that is a stark choice for the Russians and

Chinese to deal with. I want to go on record, the last thing I want

to see is us to be involved in a military engagement in Iran. I think

it would be foolish, a huge mistake. But the way you avoid it is to

have sanctions that work. I just wanted to trigger this.

You triggered this. All of a sudden some are talking about how

nuclear got morphed into human rights. Isn’t there a danger that

the Iranians say to the Europeans, we gave in to you on human

rights, back off the nuclear. In other words, you got something from

us, now back off. So I mean I think human rights is important, but

I would put the nuclear threat above the human rights, frankly.

Wouldn’t you?

Mr. BALLEN. Well, in terms of U.S. national security, I think that

is correct. But I think it is also very important for dealing with not

only the regime, but the people in Iran and our allies around the

world. That is one of the ways we successfully dealt with the Soviet

Union during the cold war, and I think it was a successful model.

We live in a world now where people do matter and their opinions

do matter. And that has changed since the cold war. But that was

one of the ways we were successful. We shouldn’t neglect that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. I just want to respond briefly to

my friend from Connecticut with my use of the North Korean analVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Mar 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47589.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
109

ogy as a model. Because what I am suggesting is that the way we

ended up dealing with North Korea at the end, while the jury is

still out, clearly has been more productive than the way we were

dealing with them at the beginning. I think there can be no dispute

that in this administration there was a major difference of opinion

as to how to approach North Korea. And John Bolton, who continues to criticize the administration to this day, and others in the administration were strongly arguing that we should not provide any

sticks to North Korea because essentially——

Mr. SHAYS. Any carrots.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Excuse me, thank you; any carrots to North

Korea because essentially their intent was regime change in North

Korea, at the end of the day. And the administration’s position

evolved over many years. I am not being critical of the fact they

took the Six Party approach. What I am suggesting in fact is that

model of engaging may be useful in Iran, where they have now

taken the position that they refuse to talk to Iran about the big

issues. We have had some efforts with respect to Iraq and conversations, but looking at what at least has tentatively been successful in North Korea at the end of the day may provide a useful

model.

And I do think it is important, because while Secretary Rice

seems to have won the day in the end with respect to North Korea,

clearly the much more hardline position within the administration

with respect to any kind of conversation or dialog with Iran has

continued to dominate and win out.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I am going to take the prerogative of

the Chair and make a comment, ask a question, and close with

some comments. I appreciate everybody’s participation.

First comment is that, you know, I think we all respect our European allies, and hopefully are taking into consideration their

thoughts and concerns as we move forward, as well as their recommendations. For all of this saber rattling, I have not seen Russia

or China actually take any positive steps toward sanctions. I am

not sure that has worked very well. So while we intend to get their

attention, they may be moving in the opposite direction. They may

be becoming more obstinate and having an adverse reaction to it.

The question I have is how much of the difference between the

threat assessment that the Europeans and Russia and China may

have and that of the United States is dependent on somebody’s perception of what the threat of Iran is to Israel? Am I making myself

clear on that? Does anybody care to answer that or respond? Doctor.

Mr. KATZMAN. I think it is crucial. I think it is very important.

You know, none of those countries are front and center trying to

broker an Arab-Israeli peace. None of them are close allies of

Israel, as we are. And I think it is vitally important; that accounts

for a lot of the difference.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Sadjadpour, you mentioned something I

thought. What is the history with Iran originally? During the Shah

regime, didn’t they have normal relations? And how did we get to

the point where we listen to Ahmadinejad make these outrageous

statements? And what support is there for his outrageous statements?

110

Mr. SADJADPOUR. During the Shah’s time there was essentially

a lot of ties between Iran and Israel. There was a de facto—I call

it a de facto Israeli Embassy in Tehran. It was known as kind of

an Israeli consulate, but it was essentially operating like an Embassy. And part of the resentment that this current crop of leadership have in Tehran, apart from their ideological opposition to

Israel as a usurper of Muslim lands, but part of the enmity which

they have toward Israel, I would argue, is this—their experiences

during the time of the Shah. Many of them, the current leadership,

including the Supreme Leader and former President Hashemi

Rafsanjani, were in prison during the time of the Shah and claim

to have been tortured by the Shah’s secret police, Savak, which was

allegedly trained by Israeli intelligence, Mossad. So I think that is

one of the roots of their enmity.

But I think it is also quite ideological. Many of them cut their

teeth as revolutionaries on the Palestinian cause dating back to the

1960’s.

Now, getting back to Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and the Holocaust

and denying Israel, etc., this doesn’t make much sense in the domestic Iranian context, because Iranians are not Arabs. The Palestinian issue doesn’t resonate among Iran as it does among Arabs.

There is not land or border disputes with Israel. There is a long

history of tolerance vis-a-vis the Jewish people in Iran. There are

still 25,000 Jews living in Iran, the largest Jewish community in

the Middle East outside of Israel.

Why Ahmadinejad is taking this approach I think is much more

for the broader Arab and Muslim street; and what has been, since

the inception of the 1979 revolution, Iran has always aspired to be

the vanguard of the Arab and Muslim world. And this type of rhetoric sits very well in Arab and Muslim streets. And this is why we

see a lot of the Arab street right now supporting Iran’s positions,

because they are quite sympathetic to the fact that the Iranian

Government stands up to Israel and stands up to the United

States.

Mr. TIERNEY. If there was a preemptive bombing in Iran, or significant preemptive bombings in Iran by Israel or the United

States, or some perception they were working in unison for that to

happen, how would that change the attitudes of Iranians?

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Well, even the word ‘‘preemptive’’ I think is

somewhat misleading because it implies that Iran is set to bomb

the United States, and therefore we have to take preemptive action. But I think——

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess by this administration’s theory they are

preempting the nuclear outflow all the way back to knowledge.

Mr. SADJADPOUR. In my mind, there is a lot of time for diplomacy. When it comes to Iran, we are dealing in shades of gray, and

it is a very complex issue. But when it comes to the prospect of

bombing Iran, I think unequivocally it is a bad idea. I don’t think

of any potential redeeming qualities. And not only within Iran internally, but also on these broader range of issues which I mentioned: the future of Iraq, nuclear proliferation, energy security, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace and terrorism; it is going to exacerbate all these issues by bombing Iran.

111

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I want to thank all of the witnesses

here today, as well as my colleagues here for what I think was a

very informing conversation. It is important we understand the Iranian public’s opinion and attitudes for our own long-term national

interests in the region.

We have many economic and security issues. I think Mr.

Sadjadpour just summed them up: Israel, Afghanistan, energy

needs, nonproliferation, terrorism. All of those, it is important that

we, in my opinion at least, start engaging with the Iranians. And

hopefully, that engagement is going to be important, going forward

much longer than any lasting arguments between the Bush administration and Ahmadinejad. And I think we have to reach out and

do that.

You helped us understand the complicated situation. Hopefully,

our further hearings on this matter will give us more depth on

that. So thank you very, very much for your testimony and your

time here this morning.

Mr. Shays I think would also like to add his appreciation.

Mr. SHAYS. First, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this

hearing on Iran. I think it is very important. I am looking forward

to the others. And I frankly learn more from the outside experts

sometimes than I do from our own government officials, because

you all spend a heck of a long time thinking about this issue, but

you also have I think a sense of freedom that sometimes others

may not have. So a very, very interesting session, and thank you.

And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ