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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON EOREIGN RELATIO NS 

UNITED STATES SENA TE

NIN ET IE TH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

W IT H

GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP, FORMER COMMANDANT, 

UNIT ED STATES MARINE CORPS

s MARCH 20, 196S

Print ed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

91-805

U.S . GO VE RN MEN T PRIN TIN G OFF IC E 

W AS HI NG TO N : 1908
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CO M MIT TE E OX FO REIG N REL ATI ONS

J. W. F U L B R IG H T , Ark an sa s, C h air m a n

JO HN SPA R K M A N , Alab am a 

M IK E M A N SFIE LD , Mon tan a 

W A Y N E M OR SE , Orego n 

A L B E R T GO RE , Te nn essee 

F R A N K J. LA U SCH E, Ohio 

F R A N K CH URC H, Id ah o 

STU A R T SY M IN GTON , Miss ouri 

TH OM AS J. DO DD , Co nn ec tic ut 

JO SE PH S. CL A R K . Pe nnsy lv an ia 

CLA IB O R N E P E L L , Rh ode Island 

EU G EN E J. M CC ARTH Y, Minn esota

B O U R K E B. H IC K EN LO O PER , Io wa 

G EO RG E D. A IK E N , Ve rm on t 

F R A N K CA RLS O N , Kan sa s 

JO HN J. W IL LIA M S, Delaw ar e 

K A R L E . MUN DT , So ut h Da ko ta 

C L IF F O R D P . CA SE , New’ J er se y 

JO HN SH ERM AN CO OPE R, Ke nt uc ky

Car l Ma r c y, Ch ie f of St af f

A rth ur M. K u h l, Chi ef Cle rk

(II )
C O N T E N T S

Page

Sta te m ent by Ge n. D av id M . Sh ou p, fo rm er C om m an dan t, U.S. M ar in e C or ps _______________________________________________________________ 2

In se rtio ns fo r th e re co rd :

Biograp hic sk etch of G en er al Sho up ________________________________ 2

E xc er pt s fro m “T he K ore an W ar, ” by Ge n. M att hew B. R id g w a y .. . 29 

E xce rp ts fro m Gen er al R id gw ay ’s me moirs, re pri nte d in U.S. Ne ws <fe World Rep or t, Ja n. 3, 1966___________________________________ 30

Arti cle , “ We Can G et O ut of V ie tn am ,” by Ge n. Ja m es M. Gav in,

re pri nte d in th e Con gr es sion al Rec ord, Fe b. 27, 196 8_____________ 32

T ext of re m ar ks by G en er al Sh ou p in Los Angeles, Ca lif., M ay 14, 1966____________________________________________________________ 44

(i n ,

PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

W ED N ESD A Y , M A RCH 20 , 19 68

U n it e d S ta te s S e n a t e, 

C o m m it t e e o n F oreig n R e l a t io n s,

W ashington, D.C.

me committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, 

Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulb right (chairman) 

presiding.

Present: Senators Fulb righ t, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Aiken, 

Williams, Case and Cooper.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

We are meeting this morning to discuss the present situation in 

Vietnam with General David M. Shoup, of the U.S. Marine Corps, 

retired. While it has been said that war is too important to be left to the 

generals, it is nevertheless a fact that generals do conduct wars and that political solutions to conflicts must reflect military realities. To 

explore with the committee the military realities in Vietnam, the military prospects for the future, and other questions, we are fortunate 

indeed to have one of the Nation's most distinguished and experienced generals. General Shoup spent 27 years in the Marine Corps, advancing from the rank of lieutenant to the rank of general and ending his 

career as Commandant of the Corps. He holds this Nation's highest award for valor, the Congressional Medal of Honor, and a number 

of other decorations. Inasmuch as it is not a common occurrence for us 

to have a Congressional Medal of Honor winner as a witness, I would 

like to read the General's citation. I quote:

F or co ns pi cu ou s gall antr y and in tr epid it y a t th e ri sk of his lif e abov e 

an d beyo nd th e ca ll of duty as co m m an ding o ffic er of all M ar in e Corps troo ps in 

ac tio n again st enem y Ja panese fo rc es on Betio Is la nd . T ara w a At oll , Gilb er t Is la nd s, from 20 to 22 Nov em be r, 1043. Alth ou gh seve rely sh oc ke d by an ex ­

plod ing en em y shell soon a ft e r la nd in g a t th e pie r an d su ff er in g fro m a se rio us , 

pai nf ul leg wou nd which ha d become infected , Co lon el Sh ou p fe ar le ss ly expo sed 

him se lf to th e terriff ic an d re le ntles s art il le ry , mac hine gu n. an d rifle tire 

from h os tile s ho re empl ac em en ts. Ral ly in g hi s h esi ta n t tro op s by h is o wn in sp irin g 

he roism, he gal la ntl y led them ac ro ss th e fr in gin g re ef s to ch ar ge th e he av ily 

fo rtified is la nd an d re in fo rc e o u r ha rd -p re ss ed , th in ly he ld lin es. Up on arr iv al 

on shore, he as su med co mman d of all land ed fo rc es an d. w or ki ng w ith ou t 

re st unde r co ns ta nt , w ither in g en em y fire duri ng th e ne xt tw o da ys , co ndu cted sm as hi ng att acks again st un lie lie va hly st ro ng an d fa nati call y de fend ed 

Ja panese po sition s des pite in num er ab le ob stac les an d he av y ca su al ties . By his 

bri ll ia nt lead er sh ip , dari ng ta ct ic s, an d selfless de vo tio n to du ty . Colon el Shoup 

w as la rg el y resp on sibl e fo r th e fin al de cisive def ea t of th e enem y, an d his 

in do m itab le fig hting sp ir it re flec ts gre at cr ed it up on th e U nited S ta te s Nav al 

service .

(1)
I think th at citation is a grea t com plim ent to Gener al Shoup and 

it ce rta inly leaves him immune from any cha rge o f a lack of will.

I will inse rt at thi s point a more com plete bio gra phic statem ent for 

the record.

(The bi ograp hic sketch o f Genera l S houp follows:)

Biograp hy of Genera l David M. S ho up

Gen er al Slioup (USM C, Ret .) w as Com m an da nt of the M ar in e Co rps fro m 

I96 0 t o 1963.

He w as ho rn in B at tle Groun d, In dia na, in 1904, rec eive d an A.B. de gr ee a t De 

l ’auw U ni ve rs ity in 1926 an d ente re d th e M ar in e Co rps in th a t ye ar . He served 

on th e US S M ar yl an d 1929 -31; w as an in st ru cto r at the M ar in e Corps School 

th e re a ft e r; an d held var io us oth er as sign m en ts until 1941 whe n he became 

O pe ra tion s Officer fo r th e F ir st M ar in e B riga de in Icelan d. H e co mman de d th e 

Secon d B at ta li on of th e Six th M ar in e Reg im en t in 1942; beca me A ss is ta nt 

O pe ra tion s Officer of the Secon d M ar in e Div isio n; co mman de d th e fo rc es as ho re 

a t T ara w a in 1943; wa s a Division Chief of St af f with th e Secon d Divisi on in 

194 4; an d re tu rn ed to M ar in e Cor ps H eadquart ers in th a t ye ar . G en er al Sh ou p 

was Com m an ding Officer, Se rvice Co mm and, Fle et M ar in e For ce , Pacific, in 

1947; ap po in te d Di vis ion Chief of Staff, F ir st M ar in e Division in 194 9; com ­

man de d th e Bas ic School a t Q ua nt ic o 19 50 -52; an d was Fis ca l D irec to r in 

W as hi ng ton in 1953-56. He se rv ed as In sp ec to r Gen er al of th e U nited Sta te s 

M ar in e Co rps 1956- 58; Com m an ding Gen eral, T hird M ar in e Division, Okina wa 

1958-59 ; Co mman ding Gen eral, R ec ru it De po t, P a rr is Is la nd 195 9; Chief of 

Staff , U ni ted S ta te s M ar in e Cor ps 195 9; an d Com m an da nt, U nite d Sta te s 

M ar in e C orps 19 60-63. li e r eti re d in 1963.

Gen er al Sh ou p ho lds th e Con gr es sion al Me dal of Hon or, P urp le H eart w ith 

O ak le af C lu st er , Legio n of M er it w ith Com ba t V, D isting ui sh ed Se rv ice Me dal , 

an d th e B ri ti sh D isting ui sh ed Se rv ice Order.

The Chairman. I can not resist rec all ing at Ibis tim e th at du rin g 

a pub lic con troversy abou t 4 or 5 years ago on the question of the 

Pe ntag on ’s indo ctr inati ng ou r sold iers, Gen eral Shoup very wisely 

observed th at he did not have to teach his Ma rines to hate peop le because of th eir ideology. 1 am not qu oting him exactly, but he said something to the effect th at ail he ha d to do was to teach the m to be good 

ligh ters. Th is bit of common sense did not endear him to those who 

pose as sup erpa tri ots, but it did endear him , I believe, to all reasonable 

men.

Gener al, we are very honored to hav e you with us th is mornin g. 

As I un de rst an d it, you do not have a prep ared statem ent. Wo uld you 

care to mak e a ny observations before we star t q ues tionin g ?

STATEM ENT OF GEN. DAV ID M. SHOUP, FOR MER COMMANDANT, 

U.S. MAR IN E CORPS

Gen eral Shou p. Mr. Ch airm an , I feel qu ite ina deq uat e here, in this 

sit-in, but I do conside r it a privilege to be able to ap pe ar here and 

pa rti cipa te in this gre at dem ocratic process o f ou r country, partic ularly 

when you think that now an In di an a far m boy has been asked to come 

here and to talk abou t matters of great national intere st and to give 

his views witho ut any fear of rep ris al whatso ever except being called 

a dissenter, a tra itor , and being accused of giving a id and com fort to 

the enemy. T ha t is all.

The Chairman. General, it is a grea t com fort to have yo u here.

Se na tor Gore. You mean to have company ? [ La ughte r.]

The Chairma n. We will proc eed to specific questions. I appre cia te
very much your being willing to come and expose yourself to such 

charges, however unfounded I believe them to be.

STRATEGIC IMPORTAN CE OF VIE TN AM TO UN ITED STATES

General, as you know, the most troublesome question before the country—the origin, of most of our troubles—is Vietnam. In view of your long experience as a military man, what is your assessment of the real strategic importance of South Vietnam to the United States? In other words, what do you thin k is our national interest in being there ?

General Shoup. Mr. Chairman, 1 have never felt that we had absolutely no national interests in Southeast Asia. But rather that the reasons given for what we are doing there now are not supportable, particularly the first two reasons that we were given. I think my con­ tention that those were rather subject to erosion is proved by the fact that we have now been given a third reason; that is, more or less the 

containment of China.

The Chairman. For the record, General, which were the first two 

you had in mind ?

General Shoup. The first reason I believe that we were given was 

that we were there in order tha t the South Vietnamese might deter­ mine their own destiny without outside interference and at the very time this was given as a reason the people we were fighting were almost 

99 percent South Vietnamese. The second reason, as I remember it, was that if we don’t stop this there the Communists will be crawling up or soon attack Pearl H arbor or crawl up the beaches of Los Angeles or the Palisades or in words 

of that substance. I think tha t our strategic requirements-----

The Chairman. You don't think either of those reasons is valid?

General Shoup. I do not think they are supportable.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Shoup. Now, if we have those who have had the clairvoyance to tell us over the past several months and years now what was going to come to pass in the war in South Vietnam, if those are the people who have used the same kind of clairvoyance to look into the future and determine that this place, Southeast Asia, is very important to our existence and our continued existence—I believe that is a defini­ tion of vital—then I think if that is true we should have pictured for 

us what would be the predicament of America 5 years, 10 years, 15, 20, 

or 30 years if we didn't do what we are doing down there. I have never 

seen any such thing.

1 do believe that it would be almost impossible to make an intelligent 

decision to commit, ourselves, as we are without such a clairvoyance, but I haven't heard of any, I haven't seen any, and I don't think there 

is any that you can put down in black and white. It is ludicrous to think that just because we lose in South Vietnam that very soon somebody is going to be crawling and knocking at the doors of Pearl Harbor. We still have the Philippines and, as fa r as 1 know today, contrary to what the clairvoyants said a few years ago, Indonesia seems to be a little bit in our favor. Maybe we could help them considerably and we wouldn't have to worry about anybody from 

South Vietnam.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question?

The Chairman. I yield.
4

IS V IE T N A M VI TA L TO OU R IN TE REST S?

Senator Gore. General, in order that I may be certain that I understand the purport of what you have said, is it a fair conclusion that 

though you think the United States has an interest in what happens 

in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia, you do not hold that 

it is vital to the security of the United States for the X nited States 

to have intervened and to have remained a combatant in the Vietnam 

war?

General Shoup. That is correct.

Senator Gore. If it were vital to the security of the United States 

would there, in fact, be anything about which we ought to negotiate ? 

If our country was in mortal peril, depending on the outcome in Vietnam, should we have a goal of negotiation or should we proceed to 

tight to a military victory ?

General Shoup. Well, I think that is a pretty big “iffy” question. 

I don't think they would ask any such question. I am certain like Tom 

in the “Mill on the Floss,” there is no bear.

Senator Gore. In other words, you don't accept the “if," the 

hypothesis?

General Shoup. That is right. What would you do if there was 

a bear, but there is no bear.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. General, you do not accept self-determination as 

justification for the idea that if you don't stop them in Vietnam 

they will come to San Francisco or Los Angeles? I believe you have 

been quoted in rather more colorful language on what you thought 

about their coming across the water.

CO M M IT M EN T UNDER SEA TO TR EA TY

Would you care to comment about a further point on which the 

Secretary of State relied very heavily, but on which certainly I do 

not rely and about which a number of members of the committee, in 

times past, have voiced their reservations; that is, the nature of the 

commitment under the SEATO treaty. That treaty, as you know, 

was signed and submitted to the Senate in 1954 and approved in 1955. 

It has often been said that it was an effort on the part of our Government to offset the Geneva accords, to which we had not agreed.

Some agree with the Administration, but some of us do not agree 

that the treaty in itself constitutes a commitment to do what we are 

now doing in Vietnam.

It was at most a commitment to consult with our allies. We do not 

accept it as a commitment on the part of Congress or the country 

to do what we are doing.

Do you have any thoughts on that ?

General Shoup. Well, Senator, first, I make no claim to being a 

student of treaties. But I have read it, and my understanding of the 

treaty would be this : That there is no absolute requirement that 

we participa te in this kind of thing because of the words of the 

SEAT O treaty.

The Chairman. That is exactly my position.

Senator Gore. Will the Chairman yield ?

The Chairman. I yield.
o

Senator Gore. The Chairman will recall when former Secretary 

Dulles negotiated and signed the treaty, and appeared before this committee urging its ratification, he specifically said it did not contain 

such a commitment.

The Chairman. That is right.

Senator Gore. And, moreover, Great Britain, France, and Pakistan 

signed the treaty, and they do not consider it to involve such a 

commitment.

The Chairman. I raise this point, because the present Secretary of State says that it does. There is a direct conflict between what Sec­ retary Dulles said at the time the treaty was presented to the com­ mittee and what the present Secretary of State said last Monday 

and Tuesday. There is a difference of opinion on that point I suppose that rea­ sonable men may differ, but I think it very clear that the treaty does 

not require us to do what we are doing.

T O N K IN G ULF RE SO LU TI ON

The Administration goes further when pressed on this point and says that the Tonkin Gulf resolution is a further step which fortifies the commitment because the Congress has there made certain statements with regard to our vital interests, and so on. Do you have any comment to make about the Tonkin Gulf resolu­ tion ? You probably are aware of our recent hearings, are you not ?

General Shoup. I am; I think they have been covered very thor­ oughly. I think a few years in the future we will probably get the 

total truth.

The Chairman. It is true tha t the hearing does not cover every single point, but I think that it covers the principal points concerning provocation and the awareness of the Navy about what was going on. It covers those points completely to my satisfaction. There was a high degree of inaccuracy in the presentation of the Administration to this committee, and to the Senate through this committee. 1 believe that 

can be said, at a minimum.

U N IQ U E CHARA CT ER IS TI CS OF VIE TNAM WA R

General, do you think that, this war differs from other wars in which the United States has been involved? In other words, do you think that this war has characteristics that are different, from World War 

I or World War II or the Korean war ?

General Shoup. Well, Mr. Chairman, I definitely do.

The Chairman. Would you describe them for us?

General S houp. I think there is just one important one. I f my recol­ lections are correct, we had an entirely different objective in these wars you mentioned as contrasted to Vietnam. As far as I know the Armed Forces objective in South Vietnam is not to defeat the Armed Forces of North Vietnam, but. rather their objective is to rid this country, rid South Vietnam, of these interlopers, so-called, from the north and any others who have developed in the south. That makes a 

considerable difference. I would suppose you could say that this kind of thing limits our actions, our actions are limited to unlimited escalation in the South

91 -S 05 — 6S------ 2
b

Vietnam area, because we have no objective as far as I know to defeat 

the armed forces of the enemy. I think that is the great difference.

The Chairman. Does this difference grow out of the fact that this is 

a war which is really in the nature of a civil war—a war between two 

different factions of Vietnamese people—as distinguished from an 

overt invasion as, for example, when Germany invaded France?

General Shoup. Well, that has always been my contention that this 

was a civil war amongst South Vietnamese, and if we leave them alone 

to solve their own problems in the manner that they want to solve 

them they would be proud of their solution, support whatever conclusions they finally came to, and go ahead in the business of being 

a nation.

The Chairman. I can't think of any similar case in our history in 

which we have intervened in a civil war. Can you think of one?

General Shoup. Well, I suppose it would be facetious maybe but if 

you want to call the North a government, we had a little intervention 

in the South here. [Laughter.]

Senator (tore. May I say it is still resented in some parts of the 

country. [Laughter.]

concept of stopping aggression

The Chairman. General, your answer prompts me to ask you another question—it is not an easy question—which also relates to the 

justification of this war which the Administration continues to give, 

and that is that we are stopping aggression. The Secretary of State, 

as well as other members of the Administration, has often used the 

argument tha t we are showing that aggression doesn't pay; that we 

are stopping aggression. You use the analogy of our own civil war. 1 

suppose that the Yankees throughout the South were the aggressors, 

and we thought the Yankees were the aggressors; is that about right ?

General Shoup. I think that is probably correct.

The Chairman. Who would you say is the aggressor in the war in 

Vietnam, if this concept is applicable at all ?

General Shoup. Well, we are back in that place where I suppose 

it would be. correct to say we would have to define our terms, but in my 

feeling-----

The Chairman. All right, let ’s start with a definition of terms. That 

is a good idea.

General Siioup. What is the aggressor that you refer to? If it is 

someone who goes from where they are because they think they have 

the business to do so and involve themselves in warfare within the 

confines of another nation or another country, if that is what is meant 

then I think perhaps North Vietnam is the aggressor and the United 

States is the aggressor.

The Chairman. Both aggressors?

General S iioup. Right.

TRYING TO PROVE TH AT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY

The Chairman. There is a justification commonly offered that this 

war is supposed to prove that aggression doesn’t pay, not only in 

Vietnam, but everywhere else. We are supposed to be proving now a
z

princ iple to be appli ed fo r all time. If we win this wa r, and if we stay 

the course, and if ou r will does not weaken, from now on all Com ­

mu nis ts are going to be good boys a nd th ere will be no m ore agg ression. 

Is n't th at the th eory i

Gener al Shou p. I am gl ad yo u asked th at , b ecause in my min d if we 

were as successful as we hoped to be a few mo nth s ago and this came 

to a fav orable conclusion, what is the reason, whe re is the pro of, th at 

the same situatio n wo uldn 't bre ak cut withi n mo nths in Laos, Cambodia, Th ailand , Bu rm a, Ko rea , and you co uld keep on going.

Now, if the re was any permane ncy here, p erm ane ncy to this, or any 

finality to this sta tem ent th at we h ave stopped them and now they are 

going to stay sto pped, but I don't believe th at. Ar e we then going to 

com mit ourselves every tim e to this exten t, and I don't know wha t thi s 

exten t is go ing to esc alate to, and if we are committed , g iving the same 

kind of help to all the SEA TO and then about 40 o ther nations, some 

place u p the line it is too m uch for us, and at th at spot wh eth er we like 

it or not, we are go ing to have to say “we can’t help to th at exten t." 

An d then our promises are just as false as they mig ht be tod ay if we 

didn ’t keep on doing what we are doing .

I see no difference, if we f ace th e facts of life some day we are g oin g 

to have to say we c an't do it if this kind of thing keeps up. Th ere is 

no fin ality ; no finish to th is th in g if we w in in South Vietnam .

Ha ve we du rin g this conflict, except ind irectly, ha rm ed the two 

great Comm unist—so -called Comm unist—powers ?

Ha ve we caused them an y problem s? Ver y few, and are those the 

two great natio ns th at are causi ng us tro uble? If they are we are not 

ha rm ing them . In fac t, the y are ha rm ing us by using up our men, 

money, and ma terials. An d we don’t solve an ything perm anently, Air. 

Ch air ma n.

Th e Chairm an. I agree with you, Gen eral. Th is idea of aggression 

seems to me to be very mis leadin g. It is a word th at carries with it a 

certain con notation of evil, and it is used as tho ugh everyone admits 

th at this is an agg ression solely by the No rth . I th in k this is a very 

misle ading concept and causes confusion in the minds of our own 

people.

I think yo ur descr ipt ion of the na ture of the conflict is m uch more 

acc ura te— interv ention in a civil war. All it is going to prove is th at 

people shouldn 't intervene in civil wars. Th at is about the only thing 

it prov es, ra th er than th at aggression doesn’t pay.

EFF ECT OF AD DIT IO NAL AM ER IC A N TRO OPS

Gener al, do you th in k th at addit ion al Am erican tro op s in South 

Vietn am will insure success?

Gen eral Siioup. Was the question in Sou th Vietnam ?

The Chairm an. It has been rep orted in the p ress th at the Ad mi nis ­

trat io n is co nsider ing a very substan tia l increase in o ur troop s. I)o you 

think t ha t an increase will imp rove our situati on ?

Gen eral S hou p. We can increase the numb er of tro op s in South 

Vietn am but we are quite ce rta in that No rth Vietn am can match us 

ma n fo r man . I f we want to win m ilitaril y, th at is, defea t the No rth 

Vietnam ese arm ed forces, we can not do it in So uth Vietn am , because 

they don't have to send t he b ulk o f their arm ed forces down the re. W e
8

might come closer to meeting our objective, and that is pushing them 

out, hut up to date I believe the record will show that we haven t been 

too successful at that.

The Chairman. I think the record will show that the more people 

we have put in, the more North Vietnamese appear in the South.

General Shoup. Well, I think a little arithmetic will spell it out. 

They had about 4,000 troops there, I think in 1964 and now they must 

have at least 40,000. They must have been doing something, they didn't 

come down out of a parachute.

IS A MILITARY VICTORY FEASIBLE?

The Chairman. I)o you really think tha t a military victory, in the 

t raditional sense of the word, is feasible in South Vietnam?

General Siioup. If you will use the word possible instead of feasible, 

I will say that it is not possible to defeat the North Vietnamese Army, 

and without doing that, while we haven’t a declaration of war we 

surely must be considered to be at war with the North Vietnamese, and, 

as I said before, I don't believe that you can defeat the armed forces of 

North Vietnam by winning, so-called, in South Vietnam, because their 

big army is not there. So a military victory, staying below the demilitarized zone, with everything except bombers cannot come to pass, in 

my opinion.

FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE ENEM Y FORCES

The Chairman. You had a good deal of experience in the Fa r East. 

I think that you served on three different occasions in China or the Far 

East, and you have a familiarity with some of these people. How do 

you explain the determined fighting qualities of the Vietcong and the 

North Vietnamese in contrast to what we read about the army of 

South Vietnam ? There seems to be quite a difference as far as determination and efficiency are concerned.

General S houp. Well, Mr. Chairman, that seems to be an all-inclusive statement, and I would like to talk to that just a little bit.

First, let me talk to those who meet the criterion that you gave of 

not fighting. I think that category of South Vietnamese army forces 

are fearful that no matter how many legs and arms they give, things 

won't be any different than they have ever been. They have no loyalty 

to the Saigon government, in other words, in contrast to the North 

Vietnamese they don't have any George Washington.

Further , I think that the North Vietnamese, perhaps there is a bit of 

psychology that helps them and that is that IIo Chi Minli feels that 

lie got a p retty raw deal when he didn’t get to have the elections that 

were promised him in the treaty, and IIo Chi Minli holding the status 

he does amongst his people gives them an additional incentive, you get 

some retribution for the dirty tricks played on their boss, on their 

George Washington.

I am sure that those in the armed forces in South Vietnam who meet 

the criterion you gave of not seeming to fight as well as the north, can 

see no reason for losing a leg and an arm and an eye and a life for the 

only thing that they can see is continued, continued, and continued— 

same attitude by the South Vietnamese Saigon Government.
9

They have never ha d an ythi ng in the histo ry of th ei r generation s 

th at they have any kno wle dge o f an d what has happened in the last 2 

or 3 yea rs does not give them any gr ea ter hope. Fur th er , I think that 

th is business o f tel lin g the Am erican peop le how vital, how im po rta nt, 

how necessary to our prese nt existence an d ou r fu tu re e xistence South 

Vietn am is has convinced them that th at is tru e, and so if it is, why 

should they tigh t so m uch if this is so rea lly im po rtan t to Unc le Sam. 

Let him do th e fighting. Th ere is a l itt le bit of t ha t.

Let us go to the othe r side of the pic tur e. I do not think it is fa ir, 

and I shall not tak e th e pos itio n th at all of the So uth Vietnam ese 

forces are included in th is catego ry, because ra th er I seem to believe 

th at man y an outfit should be given cre dit for the great sta mina, the 

gr ea t valor th ey have shown in these battles and I do n't think we have 

to go back too fa r only to Hue where, as I un de rst an d it, there were 

som eth ing like two Vie tnamese Mari ne ba tta lio ns and two AK VN 

batta lio ns, all of which, to my know ledge, gave a grea t account of 

them selves and no thing could be asked abo ut th eir valor an d their 

determination.

I think we have exa mp les also recent ly in the n orth where we have 

a squad of arm ed forces in a village an d a platoo n of the local Vietnamese, I think the re were six or seven of those villages in the no rth 

att acke d du ring the Tet offensive, all of those people fou ght to the 

death , and not a Vietc ong ever got in one of those villa ges.

So, Mr. Ch air ma n, let us give cre dit to those who hav e fought like 

we th in k they ought to and not belittle all of them and put them in the 

cat egory of not fighting.

FE ASI BLE ALTE RNATIV E TO DE ST RU CT IO N OF IIU E

Se na tor Clark. Wou ld the Sen ato r yield f or a question ?

Th e C hairm an. Ce rta inly.

Se na tor Clark. Ge neral, I was in Hue in Ja nuar y before the Te t 

offensive. I think I was the last civilia n to go throug h th at magnificent 

city with all the wo nderf ul displa y of Vietnam ese imperial art. The 

Am erican officer, Sta te D ep artm en t officer, who took me throug h, was a 

splen did in div idu al do ing a g reat job. He is now de ad.

My question to you is t his : Wa s the re any feasible way of ha nd lin g 

the H ue sit ua tio n m ili ta ril y without destr oy ing those price less cultural 

memorials, d ev astatin g the city, rende rin g homeless pe rhap s 30 , 40 , 50 , 

GO perce nt of the po pu lat ion and leavin g behin d it pr et ty nearl y a 

scorched ea rth ? Is there any feasible military alternative to doing 

what we and the South Vietnam ese did ?

Gen eral Siioup. S en ato r, th at is su rely a $64 que stio n and I am------

Se na tor Clark. It puzzles me.

Gen eral Siiou p. I am 8, 00 0 miles away and I would have to defer 

to the jud gment of the military com mande rs in th at area. I suppose 

if you tal k in the realm of pos sibility, the ans wer is yes, because you 

could all run away. I mean all we had to do was retrea t and I do n't 

think the No rth Vie tnamese would have torn it up. Bu t I would hav e 

to d efer any ju dgme nt like th at to those in co mmand in South Vie tnam.

Se na tor Clark. Tha t raises just one fu rthe r question : If there is no 

feas ible alternative except wi thd raw al and re trea t, can the re be any 

reas ona ble hope th at the inde pendence of our mili tary efforts over
10

there will do oth er tha n to des troy most of the cities and cou ntryside 

of So uth Vietnam ?

Gen eral S ho up. Well, I t hink a p artia l ans wer to t ha t has been given 

to you by the des truction which has tak en place. Bu t I suppos e it is 

fa ir to say th at if you want to think o f history in terms of the millen ium 

we can po in t out man y, man y cities over the world th at have been 

des troyed by war, rebuilt. I guess P ar is is one of them.

Se na tor Clark. Th is is true. W ars aw is an oth er.

It does raise importa nt mo ral values in my mind as to wheth er 

the cost of what we are doing can lx> justifi ed on any feasible ethical 

gro und. W ould you comment on tha t ?

Gen eral S hou p. I d on't t hink it can.

Se na tor Clark. Th an k you, M r. C hairm an.

BOMBING DURING WORLD WAR II

The Chairman. If I mi gh t just ask you, I don't know the answ er 

but in W orl d W ar II we were fig hting a fa irly fan ati cal gr ou p of people un de r Mr. Hitl er and yet the y fou nd a way to avoid destroying 

Pa ris and Rome, why, 1 am not at the mom ent, I don't recall how 

th at was accomplished, but why could n't th e same thi ng have been done 

at Hue ?

Gen eral S houp. Well, Se na tor, if y ou wan t me to speak to th e realm 

of pos sibility, obviously it could have.

Th e Chairma n. I hones tly do n't recall why the Na zi’s did not 

destroy Pa ris . W hy d idn't the y ? I)o you rememb er why the y didn 't in 

Worl d W ar I I ? They were the re and th ey ga ve it up witho ut destroying 

it.

Gen eral S houp. Well, the re was a great deal of destruction, and 

my mem ory is not that good eit her, but there was a grea t deal of destr uc tio n within Pa ris . They ha d it pr etty well mined with sappers : 

you could blow it up.

The C hairman. Th eir g rea t monum ents, c omparable to the C itad el, 

in Par is were not des troyed , were t hey? I rea lly do n't recall precisely , 

bu t 1 d id n't think th at very su bstan tia l destruction of Pa ris occu rred, 

or Rome fo r th at matter , at leas t to the great historical mon ume nts, 

and the Nazis evacuated both of those cities wit hout destroying them.

Gen eral S houp. AV ell, I th in k pa rt of it may be mili tary because 

once you get the military directive to tak e a place and not bothe r this 

and th at and that and th at —I am rem inded of— I went to the neigh ­

bors for a C hristma s d inne r and we went out to shoot a pa rtic ul ar duck 

with a sho tgu n and killed three. AVell, I do n't think th at this rela tes 

to th at kin d of thi ng . Once you tu rn the arm ed forces loose and say 

“tak e it, ” even tho ugh you sav don't hit th is and do n't hit th at , you 

don't hav e any conception whatsoev er of wha t you are doing at a? 

hu nd reds of miles an ho ur w ith a big bomb com ing out of the belly of 

our airc ra ft. Ex am ple: I saw dive bom bers at Ta rawa, thr ee of them , 

<>oing- a ft er a big ship and there wa sn't any bod y sho oting back and 

Fhey’niissed it. Now, you can't say d on’t hit this and do n't hit th at and 

still give pr op er su pp ort fo r the men who are ris king th ei r lives to 

defea t the enemy people in th e area.

Th e C hairman. Gener al, I have some other questions I will hold 

and allow my colleagues to question.

Se na tor Gore ?
VIEWS OF OTHER FOR MER MI LITA RY LEADERS ABOUT WAR

Senator Gore. General, can yon identify for this committee other 

former military leaders of high rank, now retired, who share your 

reservations about the policy we are following in Vietnam ?

General Shoup. It may be a very strange answer, but I have very 

little reason to know them. I don't associate with them. I simply know 

there are a good many, and I am pretty sure that this committee must 

surely have the names and addresses that I don't even have. I could 

refer you to a place where some of them are mentioned, and that is the 

December issue of the Esquire magazine. Now, there are some of the 

names in there. But I do not know them all personally. In fact I never 

met them.

Senator Gore. I am speaking of some—well, you know General 

Norstad.

General Shoup. I know him, yes, sir.

Senator Gore. General Ridgway.

General Siioup. I know him.

Senator Gore. Have you discussed this with him?

General Shoup. No; but I have heard him state what his views are.

Senator Gore. Have you discussed it with General Gavin ?

General Shoup. No, sir.

Senator Gore. In other words, you are stating your own views?

General Siioup. That is right.

I have not asked anybody to help me come to my own conclusions.

BOTH SIDES ACCUSED OF AGGRESSION

Senator Gore. You and Senator Fulbright, had some discussion about 

aggression. A few days ago, in the hearing with Secretary Rusk, in 

order to illustrate that both sides are accusing the other of aggresssion, 

I said I did not know which country was first to introduce or send to 

South Vietnam organized military units. 1 have had letters of both 

approval and disapproval of that statement and I began to look at 

some records of this committee and the State Department and other 

sources and I find there are apparently interchangeable terms. ( )n some 

occasions the State Department uses the term organized military 

units; on other occasions the Department will refer to units of military units. Another time, when referring to the introduction of troops, 

it may speak of cadres; another time advisers; another time infiltrators. But you say that both North Vietnam and the U nited States have 

been, in your view, aggressors in South Vietnam.

General Shoup. Yes, sir; I think the confusion sometimes comes 

when we say an organized military unit. Well, we hope that is true, 

but most military units are a little bit disorganized, but nevertheless 

we should refer to combatant units.

Now, a combatant unit is one which is organized and so equipped 

and has a mission of the destruction of the enemy.

Now, for example, tha t is a completely different thing than an organized helicopter squadron that has no arms, which they did not 

have in the early days. So which side put the first organized combatant 

unit into South Vietnam is one thing. But who first put in the advisers 

and then the people to help the advisers and to help transport the ad-
12

risers, the truck companies, the jeep platoons or the helicopter squadrons, none of which were combatant type units? They were not designed to destroy the enemy or anybody else.

Now, when you get to puttin g in combatant type units that is something else.

Senator Gore. Well, this seems to further illustrate the advisability 

of the reservations you stated when Senator Fulbright first asked the 

question and you said there must be some definition of terms.

General Shoup. Right.

SPECIFIC TROOP RECOMM ENDATIO N

Senator Gore. 1 asked Secretary Rusk a few days ago if President 

Johnson was considering General Westmoreland's request for more 

troops, and he said no specific recommendation was before the President. How would you define that term? 1 didn't quite understand—

General Shoup. No specific recommendations?

Senator Gore. Yes.

General Shoup. Well, I would interpret it to mean that at this point 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not recommended to 

the Commander in Chief a definite overall number of troops nor the 

tactical organizations which he would recommend be sent to augment 

the forces in South Vietnam.

Senator Gore. Well, thank you. T hat is helpful.

From your experience, this would not indicate then that the overall 

policy was not under review, but indicates that a specific figure had 

not been recommended or had not been submitted by the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Siioup. Right.

Senator Gore. General, are not the number of troops to be used, the 

tactics to be followed, the strategy to be pursued, do not the answers 

to all these questions depend upon decisions as to policy ?

General Shoup. Well, if you are referring to the, what I believe to 

be the, greatest features of the organization of our Government, our 

country, and that is that the civilians control the military forces, then 

I suppose the proper answer to your question, is yes, if you said policy 

and not politics.

Senator (tore. I am speaking of policy.

General Siioup. Well, true, obviously. In other words, and it is 

always true, that for the Armed Forces, they will set a policy and, well, 

I could take from my own experience, “you, the Marine Corps, will 

maintain three combat divisions, three aircraft wings," so, so, so and 

so, that is the policy. But then we, as military people, tell the Congress 

and the Commander in Chief and the Secretaries what we require 

to maintain, to carry out that order.

POL ICY DECISION INVOLVED IN TROOP INCREA SE

Senator Gore. Well, I think you and I are in agreement, that if out 

of the reassessment from A to Z, as Secretary Rusk described it, there 

has been reached or is reached a policy decision to achieve a victory 

in Vietnam, as President Johnson said, I believe, on Saturday, theii 

the number of troops, the tactics to follow, the strategy to implement 

the policy will follow, as a m atter of course, is that not correct.
13

General Shoup. Absolutely, while they may be going on concurrently and there may be questions asked if this kind of decision were 

made and ask the Armed Forces what it would take to support tha t 

policy before the decision is made to do it while we gather the information, what is this going to cost in terms of men, money, and 

material and time, and to do this and this or this or this or this, and 

the Armed Forces are constantly working to produce information to 

support any number of possible policy decisions. If they didn’t do 

tha t we would really be out of luck. 1 think I am correct, that the 

decisionmaking process is a good one. All we have to do is to follow it.

Senator Gore. Well, again, with respect to policy, I must say, General, that insofar as any activity with respect to th is committee’s hearing is concerned, it has been related to policy determinations. This 

committee should not, in my opinion, concern itself about whether or 

not the military has followed a wise tactical course in fortifying Khesanh, or whether there be 15,000 additional troops for replacement or 

other purposes. The question with which this committee is concerned 

is tha t of policy.

DE FINIT IO N OF MODERATE NU MB ER OF TROOPS

Now, this committee has not been informed if an overall policy 

decision has been reached as a result of the review, except as it is 

informed by public speeches of officials of the Government. Perhaps if 

we knew what decision was reached as to numbers of troops, this might 

be an indication of the overall policy decision. But, actually, the only 

information we have was published—and I don't know why the press, 

television and radio falls for this kind of managed news—quoting an 

anonymous source, an unidentified source, as saying that the troop increase to Vietnam would be a “moderate number.”

Would you mind, from your long experience, giving us your interpretation of moderate number of troops in this or any other situation?

General Shoup. Senator, somehow I begin to feel that this seat 

hasn't cooled off since last Monday. But I will give you an answer. 

Moderate is a word of relative meaning. I would think anything could 

be moderate up to a certain point, if you didn’t intend to, if the policy 

was not to, defeat the armed forces of North Vietnam. Now, if the 

decision, if the policy—and you hit the nail on the head—is changed, 

all military buildup, all military action results from the efforts of 

those responsible for military action to do what the policymakers 

decided they wanted done, and the part the armed forces must play 

in it.

You are absolutely right, and the military forces don’t know what 

to prepare for or what to do for unless they are told “We want to get 

this war over in 90 days” well, somebody can say “IIow can you do it ?” 

I am sure somebody with a uniform on can tell. Well, tha t is their 

business to say “W hat can you do to support?” F irs t they determine 

likely policies. I mean strip out the stupid ones that even I would 

know were stupid, and then on the basis of those policies ask the 

military forces or direct them to tell “What can you do with the 

forces available to support this policy?” And then and only then is 

a determination made as to what we will try to do.

Senator Gore. Well, support what policy?

91 -805—6.8-----3
14

W IN N IN G A MILITAR Y VICTORY

You say that it is impossible to win a m ilitary victory if our activities are confined to South Vietnam ?

General Shoup. May I say, a m ilitary victory over the armed forces 

of North Vietnam.

Senator Gore. And yet it seems that most of the opposition we face 

in South Vietnam is indigenous to South Vietnam. I believe you said 

the North Vietnamese had some 40 or more thousand troops there. I 

believe Secretary Rusk last week gave us the estimate of 65,000 North 

Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

Why is it tha t the more than 500,000 United States troops in South 

Vietnam cannot defeat the 65,000 or something in tha t order, troops 

of North Vietnam?

General Siioup. Well, I think Mao Tse-Tung gave us all the answer 

to that in his writings long ago. The fish are still swimming in the 

river.

Senator Gore. What we really face in South Vietnam is largely the 

Vietcong, which are rebellious elements within South Vietnam, is th at 

correct ?

General Shoup. Well, I wouldn’t discount the 40,000 hard core 

troops from the North and another X thousand in the demilitarized 

zone that aren’t technically in South Vietnam and another X thousand 

tha t are just North of that. I don't think we can discount those 

people. But the point is to meet the objective that I understand we 

have set out as far as the m ilitary business in South Vietnam was and 

is, to get these jokers out of there so the people can sit back and determine their destiny and not be bothered every night and every day by 

some magistrate getting shot and all these things. Th at might be 

accomplished. If you poured sufficient troops in and if you also 

violated the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, you could probably 

drive them out in time. But even then you have not defeated the nation 

or the armed forces of the nation, with which we surely, surely must be 

at war in spite of there being no declaration.

Senator Gore. Then, from your experience, as I understand you, you 

are saying that with a war in which the ground operations are limited 

to South Vietnam, there is no possible way to win a victory over North 

Vietnam ?

General Siioup. Tha t is what I tried to say, yes, sir.

Senator Gore. Though I do not wish to identify any high military 

authorities not yet retired who take a similar view, there are large 

numbers of them, and some of them closely allied with the war in 

Vietnam. And yet if out of this current review has come the policy, 

“We will win in Vietnam,” will this not of necessity cause a readjustment of tactics and strategy to achieve that policy of victory over 

North Vietnam?

General Shoup. Undoubtedly so.

Senator Clark. Would the Senator yield for one question along 

the same line?

Senator Gore. Yes.
15

APPRAISAL OF NUM BER U.S . TROOPS NEEDED

Senator Clark. General Shoup, following up the question Senator 

Gore just asked you, if we assume—and I think it is fa ir to assume— that the mission of our armed forces is to clear the enemy—which 

means the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese—from the territory 

of South Vietnam so that the people there may live in peace, what is 

your best military ap praisal as to the American force needed to accomplish tha t mission ?

General Siioup. Well, again I don't like to appear facetious and 

I am not being ficticious but if you will first tell me how many more people North Vietnam is going to put down there I would give you 

a better idea. We can’t do it. You can’t answer a question like that, 

Senator, or I can’t. I give up. You can’t do it.

Senator Clark. Let me qualify iny question then by saying tha t 

one would assume that the enemy would react to escalation on our pa rt by sending in the 6, 8, 10, 12, whatever number of well-trained divisions they have in North Vietnam, not yet committed to the battle 

rather than permit us to accomplish our mission. Would tha t help 

you in your answer ?

General Siioup. Well, again I would have to say I don’t think IIo 

Chi Minh is that stupid. He hasn’t appeared to be so far.

Senator Clark. You mean tha t you don’t think he would commit 

the other divisions ?

General Shoup. No, and no more than we talk every day in the 

papers about we don’t want to pull out a few divisions tha t are still 

here in America because we want to be ready to protect ourselves. 

Well, he has the same predicament. He may think we are going to land up there. Do you think he is going to send all of his forces down 

there and have this gre at nation with unlimited forces and amphibious 

forces come in there when he has nothing left? Oh, no.

NEEDED TROOPS TO PACIFY VIETNAM

Senator Clark. All righ t, let’s assume he won’t substantially increase the present strength in South Vietnam of North Vietnamese 

regular troops. What is your appraisal of what would be necessary 

on our p art, from a military point of view, to clear the present North 

Vietnamese troops out; to pacify or overcome the Viet Cong; and to 

pacify the country ?

General Shoup. And to protect their cities ?

Senator Clark. Yes.

General Siioup. I would like to give you just a little bit of 

arithmetic.

When we first started out there, the enemy had a mortar range of 

about 800 yards. Now, they have a P FN missile or whatever you want 

to call it. We fiddle-faddled out there, giving them sufficient time to 

bring in these sophisticated missiles th at shoot 8,000 yards.

Senator Clark. I saw tha t Russian rocket which goes 9 miles.

General Siioup. Well, I am just giving them 8,000 yards, but I 

want to show you just what 8,000 means.

Two times 8,000 is 16,000 and then stir in a little r, and you have got 

something like 30 miles, circumference, meaning that you have to
16

prote ct a 30-mile circum ferenc e to keep from ge tti ng a missile in the 

middle of D ana ng.

Se na tor Clark. General Cuslnnan told me th at his troops ha d to 

pa tro l 200 s quare miles o f te rrito ry every nigh t in Da nang.

Gener al Siioup. Tha t is why I am ge tti ng aro und to this business. 

We hav e inf orma tio n anyw ay, and this is, 1 pres ume, the min imu m, 

you see they attack ed and m ortared o r mis siled, a m inimu m of 103 citie s 

du ring the Te t offensive. Now, ju st by a lit tle arith me tic and a lit tle 

bit of military knowledge you know wh at it would tak e to p rotec t those 

cities fro m mortar s or missiles, jus t 103 of them let alone anoth er 50 

or so which are vulne rab le, you are up in the minim um numb er of 

tro op s o f 700,000, 800,000 ju st to do tha t, wit hout any to sta nd a gains t 

the Nor th Vietnam ese Ar my . So I th in k you can jus t pu ll any figure 

you wante d ou t of the ha t an d th at would not be enough.

Se na tor Clark. As a practic al matter, it is not feasible is it?

General Siioup. I do n't th in k it is feasible to say we can pro tect 

every city out there, why , no, I am absolutely sure of th at. I t is not 

feasible.

Se na tor Clark. Th an k yo u.

W IN N IN G A MIL IT AR Y VICTORY OVER CHIN A

Se na tor Gore. Gener al, you are b eing very he lpful and I am try ing 

to draw u pon your e xperien ce as one of th e highes t rank in g and most 

dec ora ted m ili tary lead ers o f ou r c ountr y. Mem bers o f this comm ittee 

are no t mili tary experts. Some of us hav e about the same amoun t 

of mili tary experience th at ou r new Se cre tar y of Defense has, or 

th at o ur Com mande r in Ch ief had befo re becoming Presiden t. Never ­

theless, as civ ilia ns with ou t m ili tary trai ni ng , we mu st wre stle with 

these pro blems of policy, an d it is policy to which I keep tryi ng to 

direct yo ur atten tio n to an d g et y ou r advice.

Now, if the policy is to defea t Nor th Vie tna m, then you say it is 

necessary to widen the wa r bey ond So uth Vietnam.

Gen eral Siio up. Abs olutely .

Se na tor Gore. Now, th is ill us tra tes the pre dic am ent th at a Senator 

is in when he hea rs military leader s such as you say—and many others 

say less publicly —th at the re is no wav to win a military vic tor y with 

the pre sen t policy.

I wr ite th is in a le tte r to my constitue nts , I say this in a speech, and 

imme dia tely I am att acked as bei ng of, or at least as ha ving some 

colo r o f lim ited pa trioti sm , a nd yet you say, the same thi ng .

Le t us suppose we invade No rth Vietn am , we hav e been advised 

th at an invasion of North Vi etn am wou ld br ing China into the war. 

Th en how would we win a victory over Ch ina , in your opinion?

Gener al Shoup. Nu cle ar weapo ns is the only way to do it.

Se na tor Gore. Then, in or de r to achieve a vic tory in Asia, you say 

nucle ar war fare is the on ly w ay ?

Ge ner al Shou p. No, I di dn 't say th at. I accepted yo ur “if .”

Se na tor Gore. Yes.

Ge ner al Shou p. W ith respe ct to China.

Se na tor Gore. I me ant to inc lud e th at . Th ere is no effort here to 

en trap you into something. In othe r words, if it lead s to a wa r with 

Ch ina , the on ly hope of vic tor y t here is a nu cle ar one ?
17

General Shoup. If we then determined a policy to defeat the armed 

forces of China.

Senator Gore. The answer, then, is “Yes,” if the goal then is to-----

General Shoup. If we invade North Vietnam with an idea of defeating militarily the armed forces of North Vietnam, and by such 

action the Chinese Armed Forces come into the war on an all-out basis 

we cannot win a ground warfare against China without nuclear 

weapons.

Senator Gore. In a plainly spoken, but to me, a very dramatic way, 

you have described the dilemma which has driven me as a member 

of this committee and many other people to question in the most vigorous terms the wisdom of the policy we are pursuing. This is why we 

are so apprehensive of this talk of determination to win a victory in 

Vietnam, because as you have said, a victory is not possible against 

North Vietnam, whom we fight and who is our avowed enemy, without 

an invasion of North Vietnam. We are advised, this committee has 

been alerted for a long while, tha t China has warned us that an 

invasion of North Vietnam would be an occasion for their entrance 

into the war. If the goal then would be to defeat China, you say we 

could do so only in a nuclear war. So this is why so many of us have 

felt that we are on the brink of a third world war and a nuclear 

holocaust if we pursue blindly a policy of m ilitary victory in Southeast Asia.

General Shoup. Senator, many millions of people are suffering the 

same dilemma.

WAR OF ATTRITION'

However, there is, there are other methods. We can place more 

troops and more troops into South Vietnam and keep fighting, 

destroying and what have you, with the hope, if we are going to continue this murderous method, with the hope that finally North Vietnam will have enough of it. In other words, what you hear about 

attrition. We don’t have to go outside of North Vietnam. We can pour 

the people in there. We don't have to defeat the army that is up in the 

north. Maybe if we keep more troops, more troops, more troops, keep 

on doing what we are doing, the idea 1 think is in some people's minds 

that finally North Vietnam will have been bled so much th at they say 

“well, this is useless. Let’s sit down and talk this over.”

Senator Gore. Well now, let’s examine that. It seems to me t hat 

out of your very interesting testimony three possible choices have 

emerged. One, continuing what we are doing as you have just described it.

General Shoup. It is possible.

Senator Gore. However long and at whatever price.

Another is escalation in a way designed to win a victory over North 

Vietnam.

Another, perhaps, is a move toward deescalation.

Now, you have just re ferred to the possibility of ultimately winning 

a victory in a war of attrition.

General S houp. Without the greater risk of going into North Vietnam and inciting the Chinese.

Senator Gore. Now, can you give us some estimate of how long th at 

would take?
18

Ge neral Shou p. Se na tor, I wou ld be—i t wou ld be preposterou s 

of me to say th at I could g ive you a n estimate.

Se na tor Gore. Could you give us an estimate------

Ge neral Shou p. I t depends en tirely upo n th e will of the No rth 

Vietnam ese, H o Chi M inh a nd his followers and h ow much addit ion al 

help an d fo r how lon g will Ch ina and Rus sia help Nor th Vie tnam. I 

do n't know.

Se na tor Gore. Wou ld it, do you th in k it might pos sibly take 10 

years ?

Ge neral Shoup. I t m ight be possible in 6 m onths or 1 mo nth if we 

send sufficient tro op s in th e south. I f fina lly you make th e enemy 

com mande r in chief believe th at no matter how much he sends dow n 

there we are f inally go ing to chew them u p. So w ha t c an he g ain ?

A t the same tim e the real th in g th at has t o have so mu ch thou gh t 

wi th res pec t to Am erica is, yes, we can do i t in th is way, we can do this, 

bu t you have to con sider the cost and the n wh at do we e xpe ct to gain 

fro m it in the end ?

Se na tor Gore. W ill you ta lk about th at ?

Ge neral Shou p. Sir?

Se na tor Gore. We have 'been follow ing this policy which you say 

it might be possible to pu rsu e fu rther and ultim ately win wit h. Th is 

has been the policy we have been follow ing all along, is th at righ t?

Ge neral Shou p. I th in k th at is corr ect. In other words-----

Se na tor Gore. In ad ditio n to chewin g them up in So uth Vietn am 

the y have been chewing us up in So uth Vietn am.

Ge neral Shou p. Th ere is a lit tle rec iprocity b etween arm ed forces, 

you know.

COST OF CONTINU ING PRESENT POLICY

Se na tor Gore. An d we have been destr oying the co untry we pro fes s 

to be saving. An d we set ou t to bomb N orth Vietn am un til the y came 

to the conference table. T hat has n ot succeeded, either. So here we are 

now. W ha t now? Do we continue to do wh at we are doing ? Do we 

esc alate; do we c ontinue doing w hat we are doing; do we deescalate? 

Now, you hav e mentioned the cost. Let ’s ta lk about th e cost to the 

United State s in continuing the prese nt policy? You were abo ut to 

give us some estimates, I b eliev e, or express some views a bout it.

Ge neral Shou p. No, I sim ply said th at is one of the ma ny fac tors 

th at mu st enter in before th e pa infu l decision is made as to wh eth er 

or not we continu e o ur policy of escalation , es calatio n, esca lation, w ith 

the hop e th at Ho Chi Minh finally gets tir ed of th is and says “well, 

let’s sit dow n and ta lk th is over.’" Or wh eth er we take anoth er tac k 

and decide to defea t the arm ed forces of No rth Vietn am , close th eir 

harbo rs, declare war on the m, inv ade the no rth and all those thing s 

th at wou ld have to be con sidered if you mad e a decision to defea t the 

arm ed forces of No rth Vietn am . Th e cost, con sidering the cost to 

date, and if you had to multip ly 10 or 20, 30 or 40 times, it is very 

difficult fo r my men tality to believe th at we want to do som ething 

like t hat pa rti cu larly if y ou add to it the ris k involve d in g ettin g the 

Chinese arm ed forces in to it.
19

EX TEN T OF U .S . N ATIO N AL IN TER EST IN V IE TN A M

Senator Gore. Well, no one can really calculate the cost. I didn’t 

expect you to give an estimate of how many years, how many lives. 

No one can foresee the costs. Assuming it lasts a long time and that 

the furthe r destruction is vast, we then come to the question tha t Senator Symington asked; what do we win if we win ?

General Shoup. I just tried to express th at, but not quite so well. 

The cost against—what have we gained, and I do not thin k that the 

gain, no matter how greatly it may be embellished will ever equal 

one-one thousandth of the cost.

Senator Gore. I must conclude. You have said th at South Vietnam 

from a strategic military standpoint is not vital to our national 

security.

General S houp. Tha t is right.

Senator Gore. Now, from an economic standpoint-----

General Shoup. Not necessary to our existence today nor to our 

continued existence.

Senator Gore. Well, from an economic standpoint the only export 

they have ever had is rice. We don’t particularly need that. It is not 

a matter of vital necessity to our security, is it?

General Shoup. Well, a little tin and rubber down there, but science 

takes care of that. You can’t use that as an excuse any more for holding 

on to Malaya and those areas. T in and rubber, you used to use that, 

you know, to say why we had to be there, but you can’t-----

The Chairman. You can buy it a lot cheaper on the market than 

you can take it with troops, can’t you ?

PRESID EN T’S STA TEM ENT

Senator Gore. Since I referred to a statement by President Johnson 

last S aturday, before the National Alliance of Businessmen I think it 

is only fair that I read his exact words as reported by the press. I 

might say before I read it that it is a striking negotiating position :

As your Presiden t, I want to say this to you to da y: we must meet our commitments in the world and in Vietnam. We shall and we are going to win.

It is not South Vietnam, it is Vietnam. Continuing the quote:

To meet the needs of these fighting men, we shall do whateve r is required. 

We and our allies seek only a j us t and an honorable peace. * * * We seek nothing 

else. The communists have made it clear th at up to now, thus far, they are 

unwilling to negotiate or work out a settlement except on the battlefield. If 

that is what they choose, then we shall win a settleme nt on the battlefield. If 

their position changes—as we ferv ently hope it will—then we in the U.S. and 

our allies then are prep ared to immediately meet anywhere, any time, in the 

spirit of flexibility and und erstanding and generosity. Bu t make no m istak e about 

it—we are going to win.

I thought it fair to read the verbatim statements as reported by tlie 

press.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator from Missouri.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Shoup, it is a pleasure to see you. Of all military, there is 

none that I admire more than I do you.

General Shoup. Thank you.
20

GEN ERA L LEW WAL T

Senator S ymington. 1 still remember your testimony in this room 

before the Armed Services Committee not many years ago about the 

way you trained Marines.

I)o you think General Lew Walt is a good commander?

General Shoup. I say if you are not a good one you get relieved.

Senator Symington. Then your answer would be yes ?

General Siioup. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Do you know him personally?

General Shoup. For many years.

Senator Symington. I am sure you have the same very high opinion 

of him that I do ? I never met a finer leader of men.

SUCCESS OF PA CIFIC AT ION PROGRAM

Why do you think he has been unsuccessful in what he has been try ­

ing to do in the northern part of South Vietnam ?

General Siioup. Well, I don’t know what degree of or lack of success 

he has. But I think tha t I would have to have a lot more information 

than I do have before I could make an intelligent answer. I know 

that this business of pacification is an extremely difficult thing, and 

1 think one of the biggest assets to it is that when the Vietcong come 

into an area, whoever has the gun, whoever has the weapon, is the 

head man. That is why even though a lot of these people are converted 

to our side perhaps, they are reluctant to help because they endanger 

their family. 1 think that while we have tried hard, there is so much 

evidence tha t they can see, I suppose they have the same kind of 

grapevines that we do, that instead of winning the minds and hearts 

of their people, we have rather closed their minds and broken their 

hearts. There is a great deal of that.

And then secondly, thirdly, fourthly, and fifthly I don't think 

the South Vietnamese people—and we have pretty good evidence of 

this like us, and they don’t like us meddling in their business and they 

don’t like us trying to tell them what kind of a house they ought to 

live in, what kind of bandage they ought to put on their foot, and 

all the rest of it. They would like to live the way they want to live.

Senator Symington. Speaking of the pacification program, General 

Moislie Dayan, who has had experience in war himself, as have you, 

when out of the Government, a little over a year and a half ago, was 

here. Then he went to Vietnam, spent a lot of time with the troops. 

I saw him later in the Middle East on one of my trips back from 

Vietnam, and asked him if it was correct, as reported in the press, 

that he had said that if the Vietnamese reverted to guerrilla warfare, 

the United States could never defeat them. lie said yes, and added 

no American was ever going to sell his choice for village chief to 

the villagers. Is that, in effect, what you are implying in your answer?

General Siioup. I think so. I don’t think I said it as well. But tha t 

is a more specific indication.

Senator Symington. Do you know General Cushman?

General Siioup. Yes, sir.

Senator S ymington. Another outstanding officer, I visited with him 

at Danang recently.
21

LACK OF SU CCESS I N VIET NA M

Why do you think he isn’t having more success up there?

General Shoup. Well, Senator, you have me rather in a dilemma 

because when you say any more success, that would imply that he 

had some and I am sure he has.

Senator Symington. They both have had some and they are both 

fine leaders. They both lead the Marine Corps, in which there is no finer group of Americans. You have forgotten more about tha t than I will ever know. But what is the problem ? Is it lack of troops or lack of permission to counterattack, a factor which in previous wars was considered important to success? 1 don’t pretend to be any military expert. But what is the problem? Why are we, re­ gardless of the gigantic amount of money we are spending, runn ing around $2^ billion a month, plus steadily increasing the number of troops put in, why is it we are making so little progress?

General Siioup. Well, Senator, I think you probably asked a question, the wrong question at the wrong time of the wrong person.

Senator Symington. Well, I might take the first two but 1 won't 

take the third . I have been reading what you have been saying, and 

am interested.

General Siioup. Senator, I am not—I have not been filled in much 

on what we have been unsuccessful in doing. I think all of these commanders, Army, Marine, Navy, Air Force are assigned to a task to do and they have tried to their very level 

best to do it with the material at hand.

Senator Symington. No question.

General Siioup. And as you know they never have enough. If you 

gave them twice as much tha t wouldn’t be enough, but nevertheless with what they have had available, I think they have really in some instances made a miraculous success considering tha t the entire countryside, as I say, the man with the gun runs it, the entire country­ side is against them. They are with them in the daytime and they are against them at night. I don’t think our armed forces have ever 

experienced anything like that.

HO W TO BE MOKE SUC CES SFU L IN I AND I I CORPS

Senator Symington. I respect your modesty which is typical, but 

you come before the Senate to give your frank opinion. If the Sec­ retary of Defense called you in and asked what you thought should be done to be more successful in I Corps, what would be your answer?

General Siioup. In I Corps alone ?

Senator Symington. Let’s say I Corps and the II Corps. I don’t 

want to include the III Corps because there are problems which have been brought up, increasingly apparent, namely the solid dislike of the South Vietnamese people for the United States, corruption in the Government of South Vietnam. If you go further down in the delta, we have never really operated there until fairly re­ cently with our own troops in any quantity. So let’s take I Corps and 

the II Corps.

General Shoup. Senator, I have had considerable experience in 

knowing how unwelcome another question is as to th e answer to your

S

iestion, but I think if I were asked tha t question by the Secretary of efense I would say: “Mr. Secretary, what is the policy of the Com91- 80 5— 68-------4
22

mander-In-C hief with respect to the final objective of our commitment 

in Vietnam ?”

And then and only then could I give him my answer.

Senator Symington. You don’t feel we know t ha t yet?

General Shoup. No, sir, I don’t. I think this decisionmakingprocess that surely must be going on now and which is undoubtedly 

vital to these United States, I don’t believe it could be made that 

quickly. I think the assessment of what happened to us in the Viet— 

whatever tha t was, Tet offensive is going to play a g reat role in this. 

If they can do tha t so completely, while we undoubtedly knew something was going to happen, there was intelligence to indicate tha t 

something was going to happen, some strange thing was going to h appen on New Year’s, but the extent of it was never conceived to be what 

it was. I think there are so many factors involved tha t I do not believe, 

in spite of the greatness of our armed forces and our Administration 

to make decisions, I don’t think they could have possibly made a decision on the overall basis in this length of time, but they could have 

made a decision to keep on doing what we are doing with a few more 

troops. Whether they have or not I am sure you are in a more enviable 

position to know that than I am.

Senator Symington. More enviable ?

General Siioup. I think so, enviable. I would envy you if you could 

find out.

Senator Symington. You mean you would envy me if I could tell 

you? [Laughter.]

U .S . M IL IT A RY AN D ECONOM IC C O M M IT M EN T IN V IE TNAM

As a former respected member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, don’t 

you have some apprehension, about not only the nature, but the degree, 

of the m ilitary and economic commitments we have made in this little 

country in Southeast Asia?

General Shout. Senator, it is a serious thing to me considering all 

the trea ty commitments we have and all the promises we have made 

that this great Nation can be so shaken by such a little nation with 

such a few people, with such unsophisticated weapons, that they had, 

particula rly in the first 6 or 7 or 8 or 10 or 15 mont hs. But all we have 

to do is keep on what we are doing not winning anything, not negotiating and they will have even more sophisticated weapons certainly.

Senator Symington. They are adding to those sophisticated weapons all the time.

General Shoup. Yes.

Senator Symington. Anybody opposed to the United States, on a 

global scale, would relish the opportunity to p ut increasingly sophisticated weapons into Vietnam. It is just plain commonsense, isn’t it?

General Shoup. Yes, sir, it is good practice ground.

Senator Symington. A year ago last Jan uary I asked the Secretary 

of Defense how long he thought we could continue to p ut two and a 

half billion dollars a month in chasing people around the jungles over 

there. His answer was forever. Do you agree?

General Shoup. Well, considering how long forever is, I don’t agree 

with him.

Senator Symington. It is a pretty long time.
23

Then this year, last Jan uary 22, the Secretary testified tha t we could handle the Vietnam situation, and at the same time handle all the domestic programs we plan, and at the same time do what was necessary to reduce, if not eliminate, poverty and unemployment in all the other countries of the world. Would you agree with that?

General Shoup. Well, I think tha t tha t is very similar to during several years before Pearl Harbor all we heard was, well, we could whip those boys with, one arm tied behind our back. I th ink that is the 

answer. No, I don’t believe so.

Senator Symington. I know how you feel about some of the moral problems involved, and respect your thinking; and now you have expressed your feeling about the military situation.

IN CREA SIN G U N R EST AB OU T V IE TN A M WA R

Doesn’t the increasing unrest around the country because of failure to bring the Vietnam war to some form of conclusion disturb you 

from a political standpoint?

General Siioup. Well, I suppose I would have to say first that I am apolitical but I am interested in politics because that is the process which produces our Commander in Chief. People are concerned and I think tha t what really strikes them, Senator, is that for many, many months they had the wrong viewpoint. They thought this was just going to be another Santo Domingo and soon over with. They went ahead with their business trying to find out where the next cloverleaf was going to be built so they could buy the land ahead of time instead of thinking about the Vietnam war. B ut this is beginning-----

Senator Symington. My quest ion-----

General Shoup. Yes, it is definitely political.

Senator Symington. My question was not about domestic political problems; rath er international politics, the increasing interest on the part of our allies who watch us with over 200 million people and $800 billion gross national product not getting very far. This seems to be lowering the respect of our allies for us. That is what I mean by 

political.

General Shoup. Well, also sir, 1 am sure, I agree with that, it is eroding and I have some reasons to know this personally myself.

Senator Symington. Eroding in what way? That is an interesting 

word.

General Shoup. Well, thei r great respect for our image. Our great image is beginning to erode in the foreign countries, obviously in the foreign press, and 1 can hardly blame them when they now view a situation with the greatest country in the world, the greatest armed forces, the greatest this, the greatest th at, would now be convulsed by what a few months ago was referred to as a little affair in Southeast 

Asia.

IN TEG R IT Y OF T H E D OLL AR AT S TA KE

Senator Symington. My final series of questions has to do with what might be called the thi rd leg of our platform of security and well-being, the economic. We have talked about the military and the political legs and I would talk a minute about the economic. For 5 years 1 have been predicting to my colleagues that this heavy excess
24

of expo rt over import could only res ult in a mo net ary crisis. Now 

we have been looking at one. Th is m orn ing , one o f the ablest men in the 

field, the Ch air ma n of the Fe de ral Reserve, says this two-p rice decisio n is only tem po rary, bu t if we con tinue to po ur out our tre asure 

and more im po rta nt, lives—we have lost a lot of fine young men— to 

the po int where there it inc rea sin g distr us t of the in tegr ity of the 

do lla r, cou ldn’t we lose wh ate ver it is we are fi ghtin g fo r j us t as m uch 

as fro m a m ilitary sta nd po int ?

Gener al Sttoup. We c ertainly a re going to lose i t in the m inds o f all 

of th ose countries whose hi gh op inion of us is so im po rtan t to o ur co ntin ue d position in the w orl d, witho ut a do ubt, and, of course, to borrow 

yo ur w ord “forev er” since a sma ll boy I have heard th at spending more 

th an you tak e in can’t go on foreve r.

Se na tor Symin gton. Ca n you imagi ne an ything whi ch wou ld be a 

gr ea ter disservice to the Am eri can peop le than spendin g to the po int 

where, in major fas hio n, you reduce d the value of the do lla r and 

the reb y reduced hea vily th e value of life insurance, of pension pla ns, 

of ret ire me nt funds, an d of social sec urity itself. Should we no t face 

up as to how we are go ing to d ist rib ute our w ealth, or do you think the 

we alth o f the United St ates and i ts huma n resources are o f no lim it?

Ge neral Shou p. Se na tor, no thing could have a gr ea ter impac t on 

Am erica and its fu tu re excep t a n uclea r exchang e and, of course, th at 

solves insura nce prob lem s, re al estate mortgag es a nd you can s tart from 

the bottom again.

Se na tor Symington. Tha nk y ou Gen eral. It is alw ays construc tive 

to get y ou r t hin king .

The Chairman. Wou ld the Se na tor from New Je rsey mind if the 

Se na tor from Pe nn sylva nia pro ceeds; he has an oth er appoint me nt?

Se na tor Case. No.

Th e C hair man. Th e S en ator is recognized.

Se na tor Clark. I sh all be very brief.

EVALU ATI ON OF T H E TE T OF FE NSI VE

Gener al, as a m ili tary man do you th in k th at the Te t offensive can 

fa irly be described as an A me rican m ili tary vic tory? I t was, you know .

Genera] S houp. AA’ell, di d you get th at description fro m St. Eliza ­

be th’s some place ?

Se na tor Clark. I hate to say it bu t it came fro m the W hite House.

Gener al Shou p. We ll, there are all kin ds of people the re, too. I 

would th in k it would tak e a ra th er grea t stretc h of the imagina tion. 

Som ebody asked me the other day, somebody asked me how I was, and 

I said if I ha d to go th ro ug h an othe r one of these Tet holiday w inn ing 

streak s, I di dn ’t know w hethe r I could take it or not.

Se na tor Clark. Th an k you, Gen eral.

My colle ague from Pe nn sylva nia, Con gressm an W illiam M oorh ead, 

has subm itted Hou se Co ncurren t Resolution (575, which rea ds: “R esolved, th at it is the sense of Con gress th at the Un ite d State s should 

no t in crease its m ilitary involve me nt in V iet nam.”

Wou ld you s up po rt such a reso lution ?

Gen era 1 Si ioup. We ll. I th in k Congress has one resolu tion on the 

books already.

Se na tor Clark. You me an the Tonkin B ay Resolutio n ?
25

General Shoup. Yes, sir.

Senator Clark. This resolution would indicate a change in policy, 

of course.

General Shoup. All right, that is just my point. If the policy be 

changed, then OK.

ROLE OF CONGRESS IN DETERMIN ING POLICY

Senator Clark. Don’t you think Congress has a part to play in determining policy?

‘ General Shoup. Well, if they don’t, there are a lot of people in America being deceived.

Senator Clark. And, therefore—I don’t want to press you, General, and perhaps it is unfair to say if you were in Congress—as a citizen, would you support a resolution which resolved tha t we should not further increase our military intervention in Vietnam ?

General Shoup. Not unless the decision was made about what we are 

going to do in Vietnam.

Senator Clark. I understand.

General Shoup. I think it would be very stupid to make some cate­ gorical statement that we don’t give any more, and then stick with it without saying at the same time we are going to get out of there or something like that, because all you do would Ixi to have all of our 

people murdered out there.

Senator Clark. Yes; I understand your point of view. It seems to me, though, tha t there is a time at which the Congress has to move into the policymaking area. And the first thing to do is to make it clear—if it is the Congress’ view—tha t we have had enough 

in terms of furth er escalation.

M IL IT A RY TH EO R IE S OE GE NE RA L GA VI N AN D RIDG WAY

That, leads me to my second question: Do you put any credence in the military theories advocated by Generals Gavin and Ividgway—as 

General Gavin said when we only had 200,000 men there—that we 

should make do with what we had and not furth er escalate the war. I 

am sure, now that we have over 500,000 men there that he would feel 

the same way, but is it not feasible—from a military point of view— to pull back from Khe Sanh and the jungles and the highlands, and 

attempt to defend ourselves around the major cities?

General Shoup. If you change the mission of the armed forces; 

yes, sir. But their mission is to get these people out of there. You see, they are trying to do what their orders call for.

Senator Clark. I understand, General, and I am not trying to put 

you into the policymaking arena.

General Shoup. But the answer to your question is, you can retreat clear down to around Saigon or Danang or any other place all you want to, but you won’t be carrying out the objectives that the armed 

forces have been given.

Senator Clark. O f course, and I am assuming that we abandon that objective because it is not feasible, as you answered in reply to a question from me a little while ago.
26

M A IN T A IN IN G ONLY AIR AN D SEA PO WER IN AS IA

Now, my final question: As a matter of mixed diplomacy an d military policy, do you think tha t we could get off the land mass of Asia, 

maintain bases on the island chain running from Jap an to Okinawa 

to Taiwan to the Philippines to the Malaysian Peninsula—which is 

almost an island—and to Indonesia, utilize our airpower and our seapower to support our diplomacy: and have a policy on that basis which 

would be in the national interest ?

General Siiotjp. Yes, sir.

Senator Clark. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, Senator Case.

Senator Case. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator Pell ?

U .S . N A TIO N A L IN TEREST IN V IE TN A M

Senator Pell. General Shoup, I have always admired you and followed your statements with very great interest. At one time I think 

you said tha t you felt our national interest in Southeast Asia was 

really not worth the death of another American young man. I believe 

this is correct. I must say I agree with you.

If you were the commander in chief, what would you do? What 

would be your policy? I realize you are a military man and this may 

seem a little unfair, bu t i f you could lay out the broad strategy, what 

would it be ?

General Siioup. Well, Senator, I will just have to say in my time I 

have never been so presumptuous as to play like I was the commander 

in chief, so I haven’t had much experience thinkin g about what I ought 

to do as commander in chief.

Senator P ell. Here is your chance.

General Siioup. Without tha t experience, 1 don’t think it would be 

fair to try to answer it.

Senator Pell. I appreciate that. L think you are much more modest 

than most of us are on this side of the table, and I won’t press you fu rther on that. [Laughter.]

u.s. garrison at kite sanii

To be a little more specific and perhaps fairer to you as a military 

man, what is your view with regard to the positioning of our garrison 

at Khe Sanh ? Do you feel it is sound m ilitarily under the present set 

of circumstances ?

General Siioup. I am one of those who refuses to believe tha t our 

great commanders, tha t we have at all levels out there, would have that 

force out there, that they would just stumble into this situation t hat 

they would have it out there expecting to sacrifice it. I am one of those 

who believes that somewhere along the line there is some strategy with 

respect to this that we don't know, and this is one tiling 1 don’t* think 

we should know else the enemy might find it out, too. I have to feel 

tha t there is some strategy in which it is expected th at eventually we 

will gain a great deal by maintaining Khe Sanh. And I don’t think 

that they are going to take Khe Sanh.

Senator Pell. Do you believe that even with their full resources,
27

with t he ir m anpowe r five times, o r w hatev er figure yo u wish, m ore th an 

ours, that we hav e means to c ontrol it ?

Gen eral Shou p. Are you talk ing abo ut, specifica lly about Kh e 

San li?

Se nator P ell. Ye s; Kh e S anli.

Gen eral Sho up. U nt il—yes ; we do, I am sure, unt il there may come 

a situatio n un de r whi ch we w ould wa nt to ge t ou t of the place, an d I 

don’t think p rid e or a ny thin g else of th at na ture w ould be sufficient to 

keep us in t he re ju st to ge t that m any peop le annihilat ed . I thi nk th ere 

is some st rategy to th is th at has no t been ma de pub lic, an d I do n’t th in k 

i it should. But I con tinue to believe th at there is, there mu st be, some good 

sound reason fo r be ing there.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Se nator Pell. Are there any circ umstan ces, th at wou ld ju stify ou r 

using any sort o f nuc lear weap ons in S ou theast Asia ?

Gen eral Shoup. Y ou a re exclu din g the Chinese m ain lan d?

Se na tor P ell. I am e xclud ing t he wa r y ou mentioned ear lier.

General Sho up. I can’t imagine a ny such s ituations.

Se na tor P ell. I would very much agree with you, and I would 

hop e th at o ur C om ma nder in Ch ief w ould , too, an d tr ust th at he does. 

NOR TH VIETNAMESE WILL TO FIGHT

One o f the t hing s th at has b oth ere d me in t his war is th at it is so rt 

of an example of counterpurpo ses , as th e mili tary forc e gets larg er, 

as we hav e a larg er am ou nt of presence the re, we autom ati cally sap 

the Vie tnam ese vi talit y. I f we reduce our pre sence there, th en th ey a re 

sub ject to the bo rin g fro m wi thin in th ei r own country. How do you 

acco unt, fro m yo ur exp erie nce as a fig hting ma n, fo r the ap pa re nt 

more inten se will to figh t, be lief in th ei r cause, of th e N or th Vietnamese 

as opposed to th at of th e S ou th Vietnamese ?

Th e Chairm an. I ma y say to the Se na tor we went over t hat b efo re 

you came in.

Gener al Sho up. I wo uld say my re ply to t hat is in the record.

Se na tor P ell. I apo logize a nd w ith draw t he q uestion.

Th e Chairm an. W e talked about th at at len gth befo re you came in.

Se na tor P ell. Tha nk yo u very much .

■/ EFFECT OF BOMBING CIVILIAN AREAS

Fi na lly , also fro m a mili tary vie wp oin t, do you subscribe to the 

the ory th at bom bing of civ ilian areas does n ot sap th e will o f the people 

to r esi st bu t ra th er increases it?

Gener al Shoup. I thin k the only example we have is th at it increases 

the w ill of t he peo ple to resist.

Se na tor P ell. W as n’t th at the resu lt of th e str ateg ic bom bing 

survey af te r W orld W ar I I?

Ge neral Shou p. Yes, sir , I th in k so, and in ad ditio n, we di dn ’t 

decrease the will of th e Ja pa ne se t o resis t by bomb ing I wo Jim a fo r 

46 or 47 stra ig ht days with every airp lane a nd ev ery bomber we could 

get h old of. I t d id n’t sto p Londo n. Ge rm any—we knocked a c ity off o f
28

the top of the sub ma rine pens but the y kept on bu ild ing .submarines. 

I th in k th ere is no evidence on the othe r side o f the question.

EFFECT OF CESSATION OF BOMBING AND DEESCALATION

Se na tor P ell. Fi na lly , sub scribing as I do to the belief we sho uld 

cease the bom bing of the North and deescalate in the South , I ask, 

wou ld you believe that one could ha ng on th ere , w ith some d eve lopment 

of the Ga vin -Ridg wa y the ory, fo r some indefinite period with fa r 

few er casualties, fa r few er death s, and wi th fa r less ex pe nd itu re of 

money ?

Gener al Shou p. I am sure we cou ld ha ng on, bu t we wo uld n’t be 

accomplis hing the ob jective assigned to th e ar me d forces.

Se na tor P ell. T hat would be correct. Th e objectives wou ld be 

cha nged, bu t we wou ld be a su bs tan tia l nuisance value to the Com ­

mu nis ts and have some kind of a quid pro quo to negotia te with when 

it came to finally ge ttin g out.

Gener al Shou p. I f h olding three o r fo ur city enclaves, .so to spea k, 

is going t o be equ ated with co ntr ollin g the en tir e countryside outside 

of t ha t, th e hu nd red s of tho usands o f acres, I don’t believe the y could 

be equated.

Se na tor P ell. I wo uldn ’t equ ate them. I am say ing this would 

increase the chips we h ave of t ry in g to w ork o ut some k ind o f rea son ­

able s ettlem ent in the end.

Ge neral Siio up. Furt her , I feel quite confident by doing, taki ng 

such pos itio n we would gu aran tee ou r presence th ere fo r 20, 30, 40, 

50 years.

Se na tor P ell. But even th at might be preferab le to the present 

dir ectio n of our course, m ig ht it not?

Ge neral Shou p. I t hi nk i t would re quire an analy sis and a lot more 

cla irvoyance th an I have to determine an ans wer to th at , sir.

Se na tor Pell. Righ t.

Tha nk you v ery much.

Tha nk you, Mr. Ch air man.

REAL OBJECTIVE OF POLICY UNCLEAR

Th e Chairman. Gener al, I th in k th at you have give n us some very 

fine tes tim ony this mo rni ng. In yo ur discussion with Se na tor Gore, 

you rai sed a question th at is to me most im po rtan t an d th at is the 

question of policy and goals an d objectives, and the reconc iliation of 

wh at is ac tua lly being said an d d one today.

La st week, when we ha d the Se cre tar y of St ate here, the main purpose of my question ing was to urge the Se cre tar y, an d throug h him 

the A dm inist ratio n, to have genuin e c onsulta tio n—discu ssion wi th the 

Con gress over th is very question of ou r goals and ou r policy, ra th er 

th an the question of tactics. We have nev er been inter ested in day-toda y m ili ta ry tactics , inter ested in the sense of tryi ng to advise or to 

seek consu ltation. We m ay be int ere ste d, bu t we don’t presum e to h ave 

any ri ght to know secrets of th at kin d. But we are intere sted, and 

believe we do hav e a. ri ght to know, wh at goals we are seeking to 

achieve.
29

J gather from your testimony that you are very much in the same state that I am and that the committee is—we don’t know what the real 

objective of our policy is. I want to read you a short statement from General Ridgway s book, “The Korean War,” and ask you to comment on it, I will read from page 232 of “The Korean War,” published last year. I quote:

Yet, unde r to day ’s co nd iti on s, whe n me n ha ve co nt ro l of m ac hi ne s ca pa bl e of layi ng a w or ld to w as te , th er e m ust be a clo se in te rw ea vin g of po litica l and m il it ary go als , le st some m isstep se t up su dd en ly be yo nd th e ho pe of sa lv ag in g mor e th an a few sc ra ps of our civi liza tion . C iv ilia n au th ori ti es, th er ef ore , ne ed 

io work clo sely w ith m il it ary au th o ri ti es in se tt in g a tt ain ab le g oa ls an d in se le ct ­ ing mea ns to a tt a in th em . A w ar w ithout go als wou ld be mo st dan ge ro us of al l, and ne ar ly as dan ger ous wou ld be a w ar w ith on ly som e va gu ely sta te d aim , su ch as “v ic to ry ” or “f re ed om from ag gr es sion ” or “t he ri ght of th e peop le to choose th eir own go ve rn m en t.” G en er al itie s lik e th es e m ak e ad m ir ab le slog an s, bu t auth ori ti es to da y m ust h e h ar dheaded a nd spe cific in na min g ex ac tly w hat th e go al we are tr yin g to re ach an d exac tly w hat pr ic e we are w ill in g to pa y fo r re ac hi ng it. O th er w ise, we may find th at, in sp ite of ou rselve s, th e wh ole co nd uc t of th e w ar will l>e le ft in th e ha nds of me n who see on ly vi ct or y as th e pro per ob ject ive an d who ha ve ne ve r ha d to def ine th a t wor d in te rm s pl ai n en ou gh to 

be un de rs to od b y al l th e w orlds pe opl e.

What do you thin k of that statement?

General Shoup. I thin k lie is a great seer.

The Chairman. I thin k he is, too. He wrote this some time ago and he described almost word for word what is happening today. The poin t that I and other of my colleagues here are trying to make is that the Administration should tell us, and through us, the Senate and the American people, what our goals are. We don’t accept—I don’t accept'—victory or freedom from aggression, or the right to choose a government as legitimate goals and certainly not goals justifying what 

we are doing. I understand that you have the same feeling, is th at right?

General Siioup. I believe I said tha t several times.

The Chairman. I think you have said it. 1 just thought t hat Gen­ era] Ridgway described what is going on some time in advance remarkably well. Here is another statement. I won't read it all, but I will put it in 

the record. Here is one paragr ap h:

A w ar th a t is “o pe n- en de d”— th a t lia s no cl ea rly del in ea te d ge og ra ph ic al, po ­ liti ca l an d m il it ary go als be yo nd “v ic to ry ”—is a w ar th a t m ay es ca la te itse lf inde fin ite ly, as w ar s will , w ith one succ ess re quir in g st ill anoth er to in su re th e fir st one. An in sisten ce on go in g all out to win a w ar may ha ve a fine mas cu line rin g, an d a ca ll to “d ef en d fr ee dom ” may ha ve a m es sian ic so un d th a t st ir s our blood. B ut th e e nd in g of a n al l- ou t w ar in th es e tim es is beyo nd im ag ining. It may mea n th e tu rn in g ba ck of ci viliz at io n by se ve ra l th ousa nd ye ar s, w ith no one 

le ft ca pa bl e of si gn al in g t h e victo ry .

It seems to me tha t he has put it extremely well. I will put the whole statement in the record as well as a reprint of 

a chapter from his memoirs.

(The material referred to follows:)

E xcer pts F rom “T h e Korean War” by Mat th ew B. Ridgway', 

(D oubleday & Co., I nc., Garden Cit y,_N.Y ., 1967 )

“Y et, under to day ’s co nd iti on s, whe n me n ha ve co nt ro l of m ac hi ne s ca pa ble of la yi ng a wor ld to was te, th ere m ust be a clo se in te rw ea vin g of po litica l an d m il it ary go als , le st som e m is st ep se t us su dd en ly be yo nd th e ho pe of sa lv ag in g mo re th an a few sc ra ps of our ci vi liza tion . Civ ilia n auth ori ti es, th er ef ore , need
30

to w or k clo sely w ith m il it ary auth ori ti es in se ttin g att ain ab le go als an d in se ­

le ct in g m ea ns to a tt a in th em . A w ar w ithout go als wou ld be mos t da nger ous 

of all, an d ne ar ly as dan ger ous wou ld be a w ar w ith on ly som e va gu ely sta te d 

aim , such as ‘vic to ry ’ or ‘free do m from ag gr es sion ’ or ‘the ri g h t of th e peop le 

to choo se th eir own gov er nm en t.’ G en er al itie s lik e th es e m ak e ad m ir ab le slog an s, 

but auth ori ti es to da y m ust be har dhea ded and specific in na m in g ex ac tly w hat 

go al w e are tr yin g to r ea ch a nd e xac tly w hat pr ic e we a re w illing to p ay fo r re ac hin g it. Otherwise, we may fin d th at, in sp ite of ou rselv es, th e wh ole co nd uc t of the 

w ar w ill b e le ft in th e hands of m en wh o see on ly vi ct or y as th e pro pe r ob ject ive 

and wh o ha ve ne ve r ha d to defin e th a t wor d in te rm s pla in en ou gh to be understoo d by al l the w or ld ’s peop le.” (p. 232)

* * * * * * *

“O ne m ista ke we av oi de d in K or ea w as an in sisten ce on ‘to ta l vic to ry ’ or ‘unco nd itio na l su rr en d er’ or ev en a ‘h alt to ag gr es sion ’ be fo re ta lk in g peace. B ut in 

th e li ght of ma ny of th e slog an s th a t fill th e a ir an d the pu bl ic p ri n ts no w ad ay s, 

I am mo ved to won de r if all our ci tize ns ha ve com e to unders ta nd th e co nc ep t 

of lim ited war. A lim ite d w a r is not mer ely a sm al l w ar th a t has not yet grow n 

to fu ll size. It is a w ar in w hi ch th e ob ject ives a re specifically lim ited in th e li ght 

of o ur nat io nal in te re st a nd our curr ent ca pa bi lit ie s. A w ar th a t is ‘op en -end ed ’— 

th a t has no cl ea rly del in ea te d ge og ra ph ic al, po lit ic al, an d m il it ary go als beyond 

‘vic to ry ’—is w ar th a t may esc al at e it se lf inde fin ite ly , as w ars will, w ith one 

su cc es s re qu irin g st il l an o th er to in su re th e firs t one . An in sisten ce on go ing 

all-ou t to win a w ar may have a fine mas cu line rin g, an d a ca ll to ‘de fend fr eedo m’ m ay ha ve a m es sian ic so un d th a t sti rs our blood. B u t th e en ding of an all - 

out w ar in th es e tim es is be yo nd im ag inin g. I t ma y m ea n th e tu rn in g back of 

ci vi liza tion by se ve ra l th ousa nd ye ar s, w ith no one le ft ca pa bl e of sign al in g 

th e victory.

“In se tt in g ou r m il it ary go al s we ne ed firs t of al l to reco gn ize th a t mos t of th e 

w orld’s mos t ba sic wo es do es not lend them se lv es to pur el y m il it ary so lutio ns . In 

our cl as he s w ith ide olog ies th a t der id e th e dig ni ty of man an d deny him his in ­

div id ua l freedo m, so lu tion s m u st be so ug ht th ro ugh co mbine d po litica l, eco nom ic, 

an d m il it ary effor ts.” (p. 245)

* * * * * * *

“W hi le I am , as I sa id , not a t al l conv ince d th a t our politica l ob jectives in 

S outh ea st Asia—m an ifol d, tenu ou s, and im pr ec ise as ha ve been thos e se t fo rth 

by o u r go ve rn m en t officia ls—re al ly ha rm on iz e w ith our nati onal in te re st s, I do 

no t be lie ve th a t th es e m is st at em en ts sh ou ld l>e our pri m ar y co nc ern . B ath er we 

sh ou ld as k ou rselve s no w if we are no t, in th is op en-en ded confl ict, so im pa irin g 

our st re ngth th ro ug h over dra w in g on our reso ur ce s—po litica l, eco nom ic, an d 

m il it ary —as to find ou rs elve s und uly wea ke ne d when we ne ed to me et new ch al ­

leng es in ot her mor e vit al a re a s of th e wo rld . F or th ere su re ly will be th re ats 

th a t bear m ore clo sely on ou r tr u e n ati onal in te re st s. ” (p. 2 50)

[F ro m U .S. Ne ws & W or ld R ep or t, Ja n. 3, 1966 ]

F ro m c ha pt er 32 of Gen eral R id gw ay's m em oi rs :

In th e sp ri ng of 1954, w he n th e D ep art m ent of D efen se w as co nc en trat in g its 

g re ate st ef fo rts on de ve loping our ca pab ility to st ri ke m as sive atom ic blows, we 

ve ry nea rl y foun d ou rs elve s invo lved in a blo ody ju ngle w a r in which our nucl ea r 

capab ility wo uld ha ve l>een al m ost useles s.

I t w as duri ng th e tim e whe n a gall ant Fre nc h gar riso n, m ad e up mainly of 

m er ce nar ie s of th e Fo re ig n Le gion—fo r F ra nce ha d lac ke d th e will to d ra ft its 

ow n yo un g me n fo r se rv ice in In do -C hi na—w as m ak in g it s bra ve b u t fu tile st an d 

a t Dienb ienp hu .

To m il it ary men fa m il ia r w it h th e map s of Indo -C hina , th e ou tco me of th a t 

sie ge w as a forego ne c on clu sio n. The fig ht co uld end in bu t one way—in de at h or 

captu re fo r th e de fe nd er s. The de cis ion to fig ht a t D ie nb ienp hu ha d no t been 

m ad e on a ba si s of m il it ary co ns id er at io ns. It ha d been bas ic al ly po litica l in 

m ot ive— an ef fo rt to stiff en th e ba ck bo ne of sh ak en La os, wh ose bou nd ar ie s were 

ex po sed by th e mar ch of th e C hine se.

H ow ev er fu ti le i t mig ht ha ve been to st an d an d fig ht in th a t sp ot, still, th e gal ­

la n tr y of th e ha rd -fig ht in g F re nch garr is on di d cap tu re th e im ag in at io n of the 

wor ld. Soon I w as deep ly co nc er ne d to hear in di vid ual s of g re at inf lue nce, both 

in and out of Gov ernm en t, ra is in g th e cr y th a t now w as th e tim e, an d he re, in
31

Indo-China, was the place to “test the new look,” for us to intervene, to come to 

the aid of Franc e with arms. At the same time that same old delusive idea was advanced—tha t we could do thin gs the cheap and easy way, by going into Indo-China with air and naval 

forces alone. To me this had an ominous ring. For I felt sure th at if we committed air and naval power to tha t area, we would have to follow them immediately with ground 

forces in support. I also knew that none of those advocating such a step had any accurate idea wh at such an operation would cost us in blood and money and national effort. 1 felt th at i t was essential the refore that all who had any influence in making the decision on this grave matter should be fully aware of all the factors involved. To provide these facte, I sent out to Indo-China an Army team of experts in every field: engineers, signal and communications specialists, medical officers, and experienced combat leaders who knew how to eva luate terra in in terms of battle tactics. They went out to get the answers to a thousand questions that those who had so blithely recommended that we go to war there had never taken 

the trouble to ask. How deep was the wa ter over the bar at Saigon? What were the harbor and dock facilitie s? Where could we store the tons of supplies we would need to sup­ port us there? How good was the road n et—how could supplies be trans ported as the fighting forces moved inland, and in what tonnages? Wh at of the climate? The rainfall? Wh at tropical diseases would att ack the combat soldier in that jungle land? The ir rep ort was complete. The area , they found, was practically devoid of those facilitie s which modern forces such as ours find essential to the waging of war. Its telecommunications, highways, railway s—all the things that make possible the operation of a modern combat force on land—were almost 

nonexistent. Its port facilities and airfields were tota lly inadequa te, and to provide the facilities we would need would require a tremendous engineering and logistical 

effort. The land was a land of rice paddy and jungle—particu larly adapted to the guerrilla-type w arfare a t which the Chinese soldier is a master. This meant that every little detachment, every individual that tried to move about that country would have to be protecte d by riflemen. Every telephone lineman, road -repair party, every ambulance and every rear-area aid station would have to be under armed gua rd or they would be shot at around the clock. If we did go into IndoChina, we would have to win. We would have to go in with a militar y force adequate in all its branches, and th at meant a very strong ground force—an Army that could not only stan d the normal attri tio n of battle, but could absorb heavy casualties from the jungle heat, and the rots and fevers which afflict the white man in the tropics. We could not again afford to accept anythin g short of decisive military victory. We could have foug ht in Indo-China. We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money t ha t such intervention would have required—a cost th at in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or 

greater than we paid in Korea. In Korea, we had learned that ai r and naval power alone cannot win a w ar and th at inad equ ate ground forces can not win one either. It was incredible to me that we had forgotten th at b itter lesson so soon—that we were on the verge of making the same tragic error.

That e rror, thank God, was n ot repeated. As soon as the full report was in, I lost no time in having it passed on up the chain of command. It reached Pre sid ent Eisenhower. To a man of his military 

experience its implicatio ns were immediately clear. The idea of intervening was abandoned, and it is my belief th at the analysis which the Army made and pre­ sented to high er autho rity played a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part in persuading our Government not to embark on that tragic adventure. It is easy for people to drea m up intriguing tactical schemes. It is a pastime in which any high-school ROTC ca det can indulge, for it requires only a modicum of milita ry knowledge, and even professionals of long service engage in the same 

game from time to time. Wh at thro ws you in combat is rar ely the fac t th at your tactical scheme was wrong—though, of course, history is replete with examples of fau lty tactical planning—but th at you failed to think through the hard , cold fac ts of logistics.
32

You fa iled to as k yo ur se lf, “H ow am I go ing to get For ce A from X to Y—a nd 

liow a m I g oin g to s up pl y and s ust ai n it on ce it ge ts th ere ?”

Ther e is al w ay s a g re at te m pta tion to th in k on ly of th e ob jective to l>e a tta in ed , to igno re th e ba sic pla nn in g in th e ho pe th a t in som e way th e Lo rd will 

prov ide.

T h at so rt of w ishf ul th in kin g pre va iled in th e ear ly da ys of th e Indo -C hina 

disc us sion —p re va ile d, in fa ct, unti l th e Arm y took th e tim e an d trou bl e pai nsta kin gly to su rv ey th e gro und an d th en to si t down w ith paper an d pe nc il an d 

labo riou sly an d un gl am or ou sly sp ell th e who le th in g ou t in an an al ys is th a t re ­

ve al ed al l it s co sts an d im pl ic atio ns . As I ha ve po in te d ou t earl ie r in th is n a rra ti ve, whe n th e da y come s fo r me to fa ce my M ak er a nd ac co un t fo r my ac tio ns , 

th e th in g I wo uld be mos t hu m bl y pr ou d of w as th e fa c t th a t I fo ug ht ag ai nst , 

and per ha ps co nt ri bu te d to pr ev en ting , th e ca rr yin g out of som e har eb ra in ed 

ta cti cal schemes which wou ld hav e co st th e liv es of th ousa nds of men. To th a t 

li st of tr ag ic ac ci de nt s th a t fo rt unate ly ne ve r ha pp en ed I wo uld ad d th e Indo - 

Chi na in te rv en tion .

No t lon g aft e r th e ab ort iv e id ea of in te rv en tion in In do -C hi na had been la id 

to re st, th er e came th e flar e- up ov er Qu emoy an d Matsu. Aga in th ere w as st ro ng 

feel in g in high plac es th a t here w e sh ou ld ta ke a s ta nd . An d ag ai n I foun d mys elf 

in di sa gr ee m en t w ith th e in te rv en ti onis ts .

I do not fo r a mom en t w is h to im pu gn th e in te llec tu al ho ne sty of an y ot her s 

wh o did no t sh ar e th is vie w. Th ey sinc er ely fe lt. I th in k, th a t it was bett er to 

fa ce th e issu e th en an d th er e, to m ak e it c le ar to th e R ed s th a t an y e nc ro ac hm en t 

on Chine se N at io nal is t te rr it o ry , ho wev er slig ht , wou ld mea n war.

To me t h a t co ncept is co mpl etely re pu gn an t. I mak e no pre te nse to clairvoy an ce . 

God alon e kn ow s w hat wo uld ha pp en . B ut su ch an ac tio n wou ld be alm os t im po ssible to lim it. I t w ou ld bri ng u s in to dir ec t co nflic t w ith th e R ed Ch ine se. It could 

sp re ad to fu ll a nd a ll-o ut w ar, e mploy ing a ll t he terr ib le w ea po ns a t our c om ma nd.

An d we co uld , b y su ch a n all-ou t effo rt, c on qu er C hin a.

B ut I ch alleng e an y th es is th a t de st ro yi ng th e m il it ary m ig ht of Red Ch ina 

wou ld b e in o ur own lo ng ra ng e in te re st . We c ou ld cr ea te t her e, b y m ilitar y me ans, 

a g re at po wer vacuum .

The n we wo uld ha ve to go in th ere w ith hundre ds of th ousa nds of men to fill 

th a t va cu um —w hich wou ld bri ng us fa ce to fa ce w ith R us si a alon g a 7,000 -mile 

fr ontier. If we fa iled to go in. th en R us si a hers elf wo uld fill it, an d th e th re a t 

to o ur ow n se cu ri ty w ou ld n ot h av e ab at ed one iota.

Th e Chairman. I n this connection, I also want to pu t in the reco rd 

an artic le by General Ga vin who, as we all know, was a colle ague and 

a deputy . T believe, of Genera l R idg wa y.

(The ar tic le referre d to fo llo ws:)

[R epri nt of S at urd ay Eve nin g P o st art ic le in th e Con gr es sion al Re cord, Feb . 27, 196 8]

W e Can Get O ut of V ie tna m

(B y .Tames M. G av in, in c ol la bora tion w ith A rt h u r T. H ad le y)

Vietnam is th e le as t under st ood co nflic t in our nat io n's hi stor y. W e ha ve com ­

m it te d mor e th an 480.000 t ro op s and th e m ig ht o f our a ir a nd sea powe r. We ha ve 

fo ught sk illf ully an d br av ely. Yet “v ic to ry ” is no whe re in sigh t. W ill mo re troo ps 

bri ng a q uic ker v icto ry ? Mo re a ir s tr ik es?

U nfo rt unat el y, th er e will be no “v ic to ry ” in Vietnam . On ly mor e victi ms. Thi s 

is th e dif fic ult an d u n fo rt u n ate tr u th we ha ve ye t to unders ta nd. To see th e 

V ie tn am prob lem, we m ust fi rs t tr ace briefly th e his to ry of our invo lvem en t 

th er e, an d th en se t Vietnam in th e co nte xt of o ur pr es en t m il it ary an d dipl om at ic 

ca pa bi lit ie s. W he n we ha ve do ne th at, we may no t ha ve “v ic to ry ” but we ca n at 

le as t pl an to w ar d a su cc es sful c on clu sio n of ( he w ar .

B ef or e be ginn in g th is st udy of th e Vietn am es e si tu at io n, I w an t to m ak e one 

po in t ab so lu te ly clea r. On th e lev el of co m ba t it se lf Vietnam is th e be st fo ug ht 

w ar in ou r hi stor y. I ha ve w at ch ed officer s an d no ncom s le ad in g th e tro op s in 

th e field , and th ey are hig hl y pr of es si on al , th e tro op s s ta rt ou t w ell-trai ne d, 

bat tle-r eady American s, w hate ver th ey th in k of th e confl ict, can be pr ou d of 

th es e so ld ie rs an d th eir de di ca tio n. Let no de ba te on Vietnam div id e us fro m th e 

kn ow ledg e of ou r so ld iers co ur ag e. Th e err o rs of hi s tr agic w ar are mad e no t 

on th e ba ttle fiel d but i n W as hi ng to n.
33

My ow n invo lv em en t w ith Vietnam be ga n in 1954. I w as th en Chief of P la ns of th e Ar my, se rv in g under M at th ew B. Ridgw ay , th e Chi ef of Staff. 1 ha d se rv ed w ith him in th e p ast , a m an of inci sive inte llig en ce an d gre at mor al 

co urag e, a go od m an to w or k fo r. In 1954 th e Fre nc h in V ie tn am wer e invo lved a t D ie nb ienp hu . Th ey ha d du g in to th is isol at ed fo rtified a re a to pr ov ok e th e Viet-min h in to a m aj or batt le in which th e Com mun ist tr oops wo uld be de stro ye d. B ut th en it be came cl ea r th a t th e batt le w as no t go ing as th e Fre nc h had pl an ne d. Th ey step pe d up th eir al ­ re ad y tre m en do us d em an ds o n th e U ni ted S ta te s fo r w ar m at er ia l. The Jo in t Chiefs of Sta ff h ad been doubtf ul ab out th e D ie nb ienp hu st ra te gy from th e beginn ing. I fe lt th a t ge nu in e Fre nch co nc essio ns to mak e Viet na m inde pe nd en t w er e f a r m or e im p o rt an t th an mer e firepow er. As th e si tu ati on a t D ie nb ie np hu worsene d, th e Fre nc h in de sp er at io n as ke d us fo r carr ie r st ri kes ag ain st th e att ackin g Com mun ist s. Adm. A rt hur W. R ad ­ fo rd , th en C ha irm an of th e Jo in t Chiefs of Sta ff an d a st ro ng ad vo ca te of c arr ie r a ir po wer, fa vo re d th is . So di d Gen. N ath an F. Tw in ing. Chi ef of Sta ff of th e A ir Fo rce, an d Adm. R obert B. Carne y, Chief of N av al O pe ra tio ns . The re was ev en ta lk of us in g on e or tw o nucl ea r wea po ns. O ur allie s, so un de d ou t by Se cre­ ta ry of S ta te Jo hn F o st er Dulles, w er e opposed . G en er al Ridgw ay be lie ve d th a t th e a ir att ack s wou ld be inde cisive , and th a t th ey wou ld lead to invo lvem en t of A m er ic an gr ou nd tro op s. W e in th e Arm y fe lt th a t th is w as a w ar th a t America 

cert ain ly did no t w an t. Rid gw ay carr ie d his dis ag re em en t to P re si dent Eisen ho w er , who fin all y de ­ cid ed again st th e a ir st ri ke. I am conv ince d th a t Ridgw ay alon g w ith our allie s, pl ay ed a cr uc ia l role in abort in g th is 1954 ef fo rt to invo lve us in Viet na m. D ie nb ienp hu fe ll on M ay 7. The next da y th e Fre nch an d th e Viet minli met in Gen ev a an d—w ith sp ee d th a t su rp ri se d us in th e Pen ta gon—a gr ee d to en d the w ar . Th ey w ro te th e Gen ev a ac co rd s of Ju ly , 1954, p art it io nin g Vietnam a t th e 17 th para ll el in to N ort h an d So uth Vietnam , an d pr ov id in g fo r nat io nw id e ele c­ tion s to be he ld by Ju ly 20, 1950, to de cide th e natu re of re un ification. To unders ta nd w hat ha ppe ned ne xt , it is im port ant to unders ta nd th e att it u d e of th e Pen ta go n in 1954, bec au se th is a tt it u d e prod uc ed th e in it ia l de cis ions th at led to w her e we are in V ie tn am to da y an d be ca us e th is a tt it u d e is st il l al l too 

pre val en t in o ur m il it ary t hin kin g. In 1954 th e K or ea n W ar co ntro lle d Pen ta gon th in ki ng . F or th e Air Fo rce it had be en a di sillus io nin g and fr u str a ti n g ex pe rie nc e. Th ey ha d as su m ed th a t a ir po w er wo uld de mol ish th e N or th K or ea n m ilitar y. Th ey had tr ui uj ie te d th is po in t of vie w to th e pu bl ic and to th e P re si den t. W he n bo mb ing fa iled to h alt th e N orth K or ea n w ar effo rt, th e A ir For ce d ev elo pe d th e m yt h of the Yalu sa nct uar y. If on ly th ey could bom b M an ch uri a, beyond th e Ya lu, eve ry th in g wou ld tu rn ou t al l righ t. Th us , a t le ast in pu blic, th e A ir For ce w as ab le to av oid co nf ro nt in g th e ev iden ce th a t in K or ea a ir po w er had fa iled , st ra te gic all y an d ta ct ic al ly . Un­ fo rt unate ly , from th eir fr u str a ti o n sp ra ng a re ad in es s to re pl y to an y ch alleng e 

to A merican p ow er w ith th re a ts o f t ota l nuc le ar w ar. To th e Ar my , Kor ea had been em bi tter in g a nd costl y. Of th e mor e th an 147,000 ca su al ties , mos t had been in th e gr ou nd forces. D es pi te th e Arm y’s w ea lth of co m ba t ex pe rie nc e, ab u n d an t lo gi stic al su ppo rt an d mod er n eq uipm en t, m ajo r unit s ha d bee n su rp ri se d an d ro ut ed by Chine se forces. We fe lt th at more Korea - type w ars —w ar s fo ught o ut o n th e gro un d— were a po ss ib ility, an d th a t we shou ld , ha ve fu nds to tr a in and eq ui p ou rs elve s fo r the m. In st ead, we were be ginn in g to feel th e pr es su re of th e “n ew look ” cu tb ac ks th a t flowed out of th e doct rine of m as sive re ta liat io n. O ur fu nds an d troo p st re ngth s w er e slas he d, w hile th e 

fo rc es fo r st ra te gic n ucle ar bo mbing w er e b u il t up. In ad di tion al l of u s in th e Pen ta gon —an d I incl ud e m ys el f— tend ed to see th e w or ld in te rm s of g ood gu ys and ba d gu ys. I t w as a simple visio n, an d in th e era 

of S ta lini sm it he ld m uc h tr u th . St ill , we shou ld ha ve be en wise r. We as su m ed th a t Pek in g w as a pa w n of Moscow, th a t R us si a— th w art ed in Euroi>e by NATO an d th e M ar sh al l P la n —w as on th e m ar ch in As ia. T he Com m un ist w or ld w as as su m ed to be an in te gra te d, m on ol ith ic block. On ly a fe w of us w er e be gi nn in g to dis tinguis h be tw ee n th e nati onali st ic Co mmun ism of T ito an d th e Sta lini sm of R us si a. An d ev en fe w er ex te nd ed th a t co nc ep t to Ho Ch i M in h’s bra nd of Com mun ism in Vietnam . Th e who le idea w as ne ar -h er es y, but th e fa c t w as th a t Co mmun ism w as chan g in g ; the fu tu re wo uld show th a t th er e w er e bra nds of nati onali st ic Co mm un ism w ith 

which t he U ni ted S ta te s co uld qu ite sa fe ly c oe xist.
34

This was the Pentagon atmosphere as we followed the Geneva talks. We felt 

tha t the French, despite the lavish support they had had from us, were acting 

almost entirely out of self-interest—protecting French investments—rather than 

in the interest of democracy as a whole.

With the folding of the French the Pentagon staff assumed that the burden of 

fighting Communism in Asia had now fallen upon the United States. Secretary of 

State Dulles and the CIA agreed with the Pentagon. At th at time Secretary Dulles 

was building a paper wall of treaties to contain Communism. The Joint Chiefs 

began a high-priority study of a proposal to send combat troops into the Red 

River Delta of North Vietnam.

It was my responsibility as Chief of Plans of the Army Staff to recommend a 

position for the Army. I began by bringing in Asian experts. We had to face the 

fact that if we entered North Vietnam we were, in effect, going to war with Red 

China. Red China would be providing most of the arms, vehicles and ammunition, 

and would feel tha t our move was a threat to her national self-interest.

(Let me reiterate: the Army staff and I had wanted no war with Red China. 

We argued forcefully and frequently against such a war. We simply considered 

the alternatives.)

The Army staff anticipated a bloody and costly war tha t would engage a tremendous portion of our manpower and resources, at the expense of our obligations 

in other parts of the world and at home.

As they had during the Dienbienphu crisis, the Joint Chiefs divided. Admiral 

Radford strongly favored landing a force in the Haiphong-Hanoi area, even at the 

risk of war with Red China. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief 

of Naval Operations supported him.

In my opinion the risk of war would have been great. Just southeast of Haiphong harbor is the island of Hainan, which is actually part of Red China. The 

Navy was unwilling to risk ships in the Haiphong area without first taking the 

island.

Once more the embattled Ridgeway dissented. Using the staff study we had 

prepared in the Army, he wrote directly to President Eisenhower, pointing out 

the hazards of a war in Vietnam. Again, fortunately, the President decided not to 

commit U.S. forces to Southeast Asia.

However, there was a compromise. We decided to support what we hoped 

would be a stable, representative, independent government in South Vietnam. 

The fact tha t this was contrary to the Geneva accords seemed irrelevant.

We thought then that our most serious problem was the selection of a premier 

for South Vietnam, to serve under the technical head of state, Emperor Bao Dai. 

The job fell to Ngo Dinh Diem.

I visited Saigon early in 1955 to discuss political- and military-aid matters. 

I met Diem, who struck me as very nonpolitical, self-centered and quite unresponsive to the needs of his people. Nonetheless, the Defense Department, the State 

Department and the CIA supported him. Once more we were acting from honest 

conviction: The world was black and white, no gray in between. We had stopped 

Communism in Europe. We had stopped it in Korea. Now we were going to stop 

it at the 17th parallel in Vietnam.

On July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced—with American backing— 

that it would not comply with the provision of the Geneva accords calling for 

free elections. The reason given was tha t free choice was impossible in the North. 

In supporting Diem in this, the United States violated its own unilateral “Declaration of Support for the Geneva Conference.”

At the time of Diem’s announcement there still were significant numbers of 

French troops in South Vietnam. But thereafter the French began thinning out 

rapidly. On October 26, 1955, Premier Diem deposed the absentee Emperor Bao 

Dai and became the first president of the Republic of South Vietnam. President 

Eisenhower wrote to Diem offering U.S. assistance “in maintaining a strong, 

viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression.” Later 

President Eisenhower explained tha t this meant aid only. And during his Administration the U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group did not increase 

significantly ; it averaged 650 men.

President Kennedy began to occupy himself with Southeast Asia immediately 

after his inauguration. By then the resistance movement in South Vietnam by 

the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, had gained strength.

My growing concern with the doctrine of “massive retaliation ” and American 

over-reliance on nuclear weapons led me to resign in 1958. With the election of 

President Kennedy I returned to government service as Ambassador to France. 

Early in the Kennedy Administration the United States accepted the independence
35

of Laos, led by Prince Souvanna Phouma, whom many in our Government believed to be Communist-controlled if not outright Communist. During the negotiations I met several times with Souvanna Phouma in Paris, at the request of 

President Kennedy, to persuade him that he could trus t the United States.

While Laos then is not Vietnam now, there are distinct parallels. The Laotian 

experience convinced me of the need to work with national leaders of all political 

persuasions, as we had with Tito in Yugoslavia, Laos also convinced me of the 

fallacy of the falling-domino theory. Laos went neutral. Neither Cambodia nor 

Thailand fell. In the meantime things were not going well with Diem's government in Vietnam, though we were doing our verbal best to help him. Vice President Johnson, 

visiting there in 1901, referred to Diem as the “Churchill of today.” Yet the Diem 

government became more isolated and oppressive. And by 1963 the war in Vietnam 

also was going very badly. President Kennedy was having grave doubts about our 

course of action (we now had more than 15,000 men there ). Recent books have 

indicated the depth and bitterness of the division in the Kennedy Administration 

over Vietnam.

The President himself stated publicly :

“In the tinal analysis it is their war. They are the ones th at have to win it or 

lose it. We can help them, give them equipment. We can send our men out there 

as advisers. But they have to win it.”

However, the President’s military advisers continued to tell him the war was 

going well. On October 2, 1963, after another quick Vietnam trip McNamara 

insisted th at the President issue the following statement:

“The military program in South Vietnam has made progress and is sound in 

principle, though improvements are being energetically sought. . . . Secretary 

McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor reported their judgment that the major part 

of the United States military task can be completed by the end of 1965. . . . They 

reported tha t by the end of th is year [1963] the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point tha t one thousand U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn.”

There has been much speculation about what President Kennedy would or 

would not have done in Vietnam had he lived. Having discussed m ilitary affairs 

with him often and in detail for 15 years, I know he was totally opposed to the 

introduction of combat troops in Southeast Asia. His public statements just before 

his murder support this view. Let us not lay on the dead the blame for our own 

failures.

By 1964 Vietnam had become a major political issue in the presidential campaign. (There were, by then, 23,000 U.S. troops there, mostly advisers. President 

Johnson said : “We aren’t going to send American boys nine thousand or ten 

thousand miles away to do what the Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”

In August of 1964, in circumstances still not totally clear, two U.S. destroyers 

were attacked in Tonkin Bay by North Vietnamese I’T boats. In the excitement 

following the attack, Congress, a t the behest of the Administration, adopted the 

Southeast Asia (Tonkin Bay) Resolution upon which the Administration bases 

its actions today. On February 7, 1965, the first air strikes were ordered against 

North Vietnam. On March 6, U.S. Marines were ordered to land in the Danang 

area, north of Saigon. By October of 1965, American forces in South Vietnam 

totaled 132,300.

At this time it was already perfectly clear to me th at as a military operation 

Vietnam made no sense. It was obvious tha t bombing was not going to bring 

IIo Chi Minh to his knees. This was the lesson of World War II bombing—German 

war production actually rose despite the devastating attacks. And—more immediately to the point—it was the lesson learned by the British in the war they won 

against Communist guerrillas in Malaya. The British high command began 

bombing suspected guerrilla area s but stopped when they found that the bombing’s indiscriminate brutality alienated the people and strengthened the guerrillas.

It followed, then, tha t to get our “victory” we would have to commit an evergrowing number of ground troops. But this is no panacea either. There are definite 

contributions tha t ground troops, handled with sophistication, can make in a 

guerrilla war, but if the people of the country like the guerrillas better than they 

like the government th at the foreign troops are supporting, the mere pouring in 

of more and better-equipped ground troops won’t win the war.

As the government at Saigon did not appear to have this popular support, 

I believe the war would not go well, and tha t when this became clear the Pentagon and certain sections of Congress would call for more troops and heavier
36

bombing until we escalated into a direct confrontation with Red China. This 

could lead directly to a nuclear World War III.

With this grave concern I tried in my own mind to develop some strategy 

that could stop the escalation and end the war. I evolved in 1965 what has come 

to he known as the “enclave” strategy. And I promptly found myself at the 

center of violent controversy. I believe that the enclave strategy is even more 

valid today than it was in 1965. Combined with a halt in the bombing of North 

Vietnam, it would constitute a vital first step in our de-escalation of the war.

I reasoned that a primary tactical problem, once a war occurs, is to keep it 

limited. This is particularly true of a war in which we should not have become 

involved, and in which U.S. interests are, at best, marginal. Therefore I sought 

a way to halt the buildup, hold what we had, and open negotiations for peace.

By the fall of 1965 the United States had built up enclaves—vast logistical 

facilities at Camranh Bay, Danang, Saigon and other places. If we concentrated 

in these centers, we could immediately stop the ever-increasing inflow of U.S. 

troops and probably reduce the number of men involved. At the same time, we 

could encourage the development of democracy in the large areas dominated 

by these enclaves, and could help the South Vietnamese bring their own troops 

to a high standard of combat performance.

While doing this, we could search for a diplomatic solution of the war, using 

our hold on the big enclaves as a decisive counter in the bargaining.

I fully realize the problems of negotiating with the N.L.F. and the North 

Vietnamese. They are a tough, determined foe. They have fought the Japanese, 

European colonists, and Americans for more than 20 years. Our knowledge of 

them is distorted by distance and by propaganda—ours and theirs.

The Hanoi government has several times stated its position on ending the 

war, probably most significantly in the four points laid down by Premier Pham 

Van Dong on April 13, 1965 :

1. In accordance with the Geneva Agreement, the United States must withdraw from South Vietnam United States troops, military bases, etc.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the provisions of the 1954 

Geneva Agreement pertaining to no military alliances, foreign bases, etc., must 

be respected.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled in accordance with 

the N.L.F. program.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese 

people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

Hanoi had indicated on several occasions that these points were a basis for 

talks rath er than preconditions. Their more recent statement was they would 

talk if the bombing stopped.

Meanwhile, the war assumes a distinct Orwellian character. Images of violence 

and blood flash into our living rooms on TV screens. The goal and principles for 

which we began the conflict lie close to forgotten. Brave men die. Experts in 

Vietnam told me privately that the war could last 5 to 10 more years. Yet both 

sides seem to lack the will, or the ability, to extricate themselves from the 

nightmare.

We seem to have forgotten th at one of the vital aspects of a limited war is 

that it be limited in time also. A war may involve a minor portion of the total 

resources of a nation and may be limited to a small ar ea ; but if it goes on for 

four or five years at a reasonably intense level, it is not truly limited.

A Vietnamese solution, based on a “free, neutra l and independent” nation— 

on the pattern of Laos—should be acceptable in Vietnam. Such a government, 

without ties to China, the Soviet Union or the West, would be in the best interests of Vietnamese and Americans. I do not believe that IIo Chi Minh ever 

wanted to be a puppet or satellite of China, or of Russia. The information we 

have indicates he is a patriot, an intense nationalist, albeit a Communist—a 

Tito.

In Vietnam, war forces the N.L.F. into dependence upon Hanoi, and Hanoi 

into dependence on China and Russia. This compromises not only the prospects 

for peace but also the independence of any post-peace action by the N.L.F. Thus 

our military action tends to create the very Communist monolith we entered 

the war to avoid.

We should take extraordinary diplomatic steps to get fruitfu l negotiations. 

The President should appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a special cabinetlevel official of great stature to negotiate with the N.L.F. and Hanoi. The sole 

responsibility of this official should be termination of the war. He should be 

served by his own staff, free from bureaucratic interference and the burden
37

of pas t po sitio ns . W it h a re as on ed m il it ary st ra te gy and th e fu ll en er gi es of our Gov ernm en t de vo ted to diplom ac y, I am conv ince d th a t th e Viet Cong and th e 

N or th Vietnam ese w ill ne go tiate.

Th e follo wing step s sh ou ld be ta ke n pr om pt ly : 1. All th e bo mbing of N or th Vietnam shou ld he sto pp ed , no t ju st be ca us e the Com mun ists w an t it sto pp ed , hu t be ca us e st ra te gic bo mb ing of th e N or th is co un ter-pr od uc tiv e. In a bomb ing te rm in at io n, str ate g y and m ora lity co incid e. 

It shou ld h e under ta ken im med iately. 2. E x tr ao rd in ary and en er ge tic m ea su re s sh ou ld he ta ken by our Gov er nm en t to ente r in to nego tiat io ns w ith th e N.L.F. an d Han oi go ve rnmen ts. We ha ve co nt ac te d th es e go ve rn m en ts in th e pa st. The se conta cts sh ou ld be reo pe ne d. Neg otiatio ns sh ou ld he ha nd led by a sp ec ially ap poin te d ca bine t-l ev el official, 

op er at in g w ith th e fu ll con fid ence of th e Pre si de nt . 3. We sh ou ld de ve lop an d put in to op er at io n a pla n fo r th e de -e sc al at io n 

of ou r for ces, to he ba se d on th e en clav e s tr ate gy o ut line d ea rl ie r. Alth ou gh I th in k th a t by now th e American peop le re al iz e th at we are on an un wise co urse, I an ti cip ate h it te r cr itic ism of an y pla n th a t invo lves a U ni te d Sta te s ph as e- ou t fr om Viet na m. H ars h wor ds will come from co ng re ss io na l le ad er s wh o ha ve ad voc at ed in cr ea se d bombing . Some in vete ra ns’ org an iz at io ns an d th e m il it ary will find it dif fic ult to ac ce pt w hat appea rs to them to he no t "v ic to ry ” but “appea se m en t.” An d th e fa r le ft will de cr y as “im per ia lism ” an y 

sa fe guar ds ne ce ss ar y fo r ou rs el ve s an d our So uth Vietnam es e fr ie nd s. A se ttle m en t will be em ot io na lly dif ficult, ta xin g in tim e, w ea ring on our w is ­ dom an d pa tie nc e. B u t a se ttle m en t is im pe ra tive in our own se lf -i nte re st . It s alt ern ati ve is co nt in ue d es ca la tion unti l we oppo se th e fo rc es of Re d China in 

W orld W ar II I. W ith Vietnam we hav e gr ow n up in to trag ed y. W e ca nn ot en d our invo lv e­ m en t w ithout som e co st, som e pa in. A m atu re nat io n can fa ce su ch re ali ti es an d ta ke a ct io ns th at, w hile th ey a re les s th an som e w an t, ne ve rthe le ss lead a w ay 

from the ris k o f s el f-de st ru ct io n. I am s ure w e can.

NO LA ND WAR IN ASI A----DE PA RT UR E FR OM PO LI CY

The Chairm an. G ene ral, it is my un de rstand ing th at up until th is 

war, lea din g m ili ta ry experts—in clu din g Gen eral M ac Arth ur —were 

opposed to the United States beco ming involve d in a lan d wa r in 

Asia ? As you know, in 1954 Gen era l Ridgwa y and Gavin successfully 

oppo sed plan s fo r U.S . int erv entio n in Vie tnam on the side of the 

French.

W ha t, in yo ur opinion, has happened to make our present m ili tary 

leaders, includ ing th e Comm and er in C hie f, chan ge this assessment, an 

assessment th at had la sted f or so man y years ?

Gen eral S hou p. I think you have men tion ed an area there th at 

would be well wo rth find ing out some day in history. I do n’t believe 

from my lim ited knowledge, and 1 don't know, bu t somehow 1 am 

una ble to mak e my self believe th at the arm ed forces officers, flag 

officers, ever cha nged th eir minds. The reason I say this is th at in all 

of my studies and all of my associatio ns over the y ears with hu nd reds 

of Hag officers of the Army , Navy, A ir Force , and Ma rines, alw ays 

the conclusion af te r every stu dy, every discussion was th at un de r no 

circum stan ces sh ould we get eng aged in a l and wa rfa re in So uth Asia, 

in Asia, on the As ian m ainland.

If my m emory serves me as well a s I hope it does, in addit ion to those 

people I have perso nally heard three Presiden ts say the same th in g, 

and yet there we are , bogg ed down in the same ma nner th at had 

been predicted over the last 25 years at least by all those mili tary 

peop le who studied the situation.

The C hairma n. And who ad vise d a gains t it.

Gen eral S houp. Yes, sir.
38

The Chairman. I)o you have any theory at all as to why we have 

departed from this?

General Shoup. I do not; I cannot know.

'I’he Chairman. I can't, either. I have no idea what has caused 

this aberration.

General Siioup. The ability some place along the line to convince 

people that it is necessary to stop it there. When we were in Laos, 

this same thing would have happened except it was a provable situation 

that we could not logically support the number of armed forces organization that would be required to tight this out in Laos. We couldn’t 

do it.

But then the next time a confrontation possibility came to pass, 

and we had the seashore on our flank, increasing our capabilities of 

logistics support, we went right at it. I do not know why, Senator.

The Chairman. It is a mystery to me. This is one of the reasons 

reinforcing my belief that this committee and the Senate and the 

Congress have a duty to insist upon a public discussion of the reasons 

we have departed from this well-established policy, and a discussion 

too of what is present policy; what is meant by victory, as used by 

the Administration; is it a goal which is either feasible or justifiable; 

are we willing to pay the cost; and what is the cost. These are the 

questions, that just must be discussed in a democracy. They should be 

discussed in any case but certainly before any escalation or any 

change in the number of troops in Vietnam.

Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield there ?

The Chairman. Yes, I yield.

NE W COURSE OF PR ESIDEN TIAL POLICY

Senator Gore. In connection with a possible new course of Presidential policy about which this committee has not been consulted, 

and which this committee does not have a part in developing, President 

Johnson was quoted in today’s press. 1 am reading now from the 

New York Times. He is quoted as having said yesterday: “We have 

set our course and we will pursue it just as long as aggression threatens 

us. Make no mistake about i t : America will prevail.”

I am not sure whether the President was using “we” as an editorial 

“we” or whether he was using it in its normal sense. It is the 

President’s privilege to use the editorial “we,” but I would object to 

the use of “we” if it includes the elected representatives of the 

American people. The elected representatives of the American people 

have not set this course of a wider war in Vietnam. Yet it may be 

that a new policy, a policy leading to a wider war has been determined. 

The statements of the President in the last 3 days indicate that that 

is the case. All we know about the tactics to implement it is an increase 

in troops to supplement it will be “moderate.”

What does this mean? We are not even given an indication from 

the tactics to be followed as to what the policy may be. “Moderate,” 

as you say, is a relative term. It could mean 1,000, it could mean 

100,000, depending upon the policy. I f it is a policy to win a victory
39

in Vietnam, then would yon say 200,000 would be a moderate increase 

in the light of what would be requ ired ?

General Siioup. 1 wouldn't have the slightest idea.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

“pueblo’’ incident

The Chairman. General, this is a question on a different subject. 

It occurred to me that you might have a comment upon the recent 

Pueblo incident that occurred off North Korean waters. I)o you have 

any thoughts about it ?

General Shoup. The Pueblo?

The Chairman. Yes.

General Siioup. Mr. Chairman, no such aircraft ever flew over 

Russia.

The Chairman. That answers it very well. We had a long hearing on the U-2. I think we spent several weeks on that incident.

IS T H E R E A CO UR SE FOR A NE GO TIAT ED SETTLEM EN T

1 would like to end with this question: I)o you have any thoughts about how the United States might get into a position, through the use of its military power, to provide a basis for negotiation or do you foresee an alternative to the present course that could lead to a 

ncgot iated settlement ?

General Siioup. Well, my feeling is that in the past we have been in that position time after time after time, and we might even be in it today. We will have armed forces down there. A fine organization, not demoralized, ready to fight, and I think that Ho Chi Minh is well aware of their capabilities. So I would say that, in effect, we are in a military position to bring about negotiations any time they want to do 

it or can do it.

The Chairman. Do you believe tha t we could stop the bombing, without any undue harm to our military forces, as a gesture leading 

to a negotiation?

General Shoup. Well, when you say “stop the bombing’’-----

The Chairman. Of the north.

General Shoup. I presume you mean above the demilitarized zone.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Shoup. As a military man, as a foot soldier, an infant ry­ man, I would say that every bomb that would eliminate any item which, if not interdicted, would be used against the foot soldier in 

South Vietnam should be dropped. Now, where it should be dropped is something else. This pushing of the bombing up north was based on obviously not just a desire to tear up civilians’ homes and all that, but rather to interdict at a more vulnerable and more profitable location the supplies that were coming into the ports and coming down from the rail lines and what have 

von, where it was a more concentrated thing. I would feel if the bombing were to stop totally, tha t my conscience wouldn't let me say tha t you couldn't bomb an ammunition truck just 

north of the demilitarized zone.

Senator Gore. Well, General, isn’t bombing and the place of bomb- in”-. aren't those things also tactics and purely secondary to policy?
40

General Shoup. I suppose in the old military frame of mind everything t hat goes on in North Vietnam is strategic and everything that 

goes on down there around the troops is tactical bombing.

MORE LIVES SAVED BY STOPPING THE BOMBING

The Chairman. It seems to me, though, General, that if we stop 

the bombing ami negotiations begin—and we have as you know, been 

told time afte r time, by various people all the way from Kosygin to 

Wilson and others, that this will happen—we are doing more to save 

the lives of our soldiers, i f stopping the bombing is a prerequisite for 

negotiation, than if we continue the bombing sporadically with not 

too much effect, obviously, because the North Vietnamese have continued to bring in lots of troops and arms. The bombing hasn't been 

very successful. As between the two alternatives, it seems to me that 

we would be saving more lives and protecting our men better if we 

stopped the bombing and got a negotiation than continuing to do 

what we are doing.

General Shoup. If you could stop it—if by stopping the bombing 

you could start negotiations concurrently with a cease-fire, you have 

provided the ultimate for the armed forces.

The Chairman. That is what I mean. Of course, we can't guarantee 

that it will do th at; but we have been told that it would. You know 

the position of the Administration. I must say, in all fairness, that I 

think the so-called San Antonio formula is a reasonable proposal. But 

the North Vietnamese, Ilo Chi Minh, does not. They have a different 

view; it is their country that is l>eing bombed. However reasonable I 

might think it, th at is not very important or material. The fact that 

they don't think it is reasonable is sufficient to prevent its being 

effective, and, therefore, I think it would be wise to give it a try. I 

don't consider that this would lie appeasement or a nything of the sort. 

I think it would be simply trying to find a solution, an alternative to 

doing what we are doing.

COMMENTS ON TODAy ’s YOUTH

Lastly, you have had great experience with young people, and you 

have already shown in many different ways your understanding of 

human nature, particularly of your soldiers. A great deal of attention 

is given every day, including in this morning's paper, to Ihe younger 

people of this country—in and out of the armed services, all kinds of 

young people—and their disillusionment and dissent. I wonder, in 

view of your experience, whether you would wish to make any comment about these young people.

General Shoup. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been amongst them 

quite a bit in the last 3 or 4 years. I have some in my own family. I 

personally believe that, on a long-range basis for—as something vital 

to our Nation, the problems that are pointed out to us today through 

the actions of our youngsters is far more important than the Vietnam 

war. The Vietnam war will soon be over, and I am talking in relative 

terms, but these people we are talking about, and their children are 

going to be with this Nation—as Senator Symington said—forever.

I think they are just confused. It is interesting, I was asked to 

come to Los Angeles to make a speech which finally erupted over here
41

in the Congressional Record, and I was asked to go there to un­ confuse the students, that was the request that was made to me. I talked to many of them, and, well, they didn't go clear back to Santa Claus and a lot of other false things like Columbus discovered Amer­ ica. After they get more time in college, and there are hundreds of thousands more in college now than there used to be and they got 4 more years to study and think before they have to use the pickax or the IBM machine, they really wonder. It is a wonderment to them, and here is one of the things that 1 will just give you one example, I 

could give you many.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

General S houp. They say, “Well, here we are. We went through the political campaign, ami we listened to everybody," and many of these people weren't yet old enough to vote but they are really a whole lot smarter than my generation was; they study America, America's re­ quirements, and the great history of America, and they say, “Well, what good did it do to vote if that is our system? The ballot instead 

of the bullet. But what good did the ballot do us? We balloted for one thing and we defeated the other and now we got what we defeated." They just can't understand it. And I think those are some of the things that confront the youngsters today. They are thinking people, 

and it is pretty hard to answer that question. But you don’t want to try to make these people believe that there 

is no use to vote. Yet that is being expressed a lot of places, and I think our political parties have got to do a little bit of work in that area and prove that it is worthwhile to vote, tha t you sometimes do get what you vote for. That is one of the principal positions I found amongst the young people of America, as well as a feeling that they deserve the truth. They go clear back to Ike and IT-2 and our not going to bomb from Thailand and 8 days later they announced B-52's were taking off and the fighter bombers had been doing it for 2 or 3 months and on and on 

and on and they just can't understand it. They are adults, they don't get their total education from the boiler­ plate newspapers. They have good newspapers, as good as there are, and the books, they listen to fine television, and they think, but they are not given enough credit for the fact that they think and neither is the American public. They are willing to take this, they are willing to take bad news with the good and so finally they just shrug their shoulders and say, “Well, why don't they just once, just once, try telling us the truth first ?”

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, could I interject there?

The Chairman. I thought that was a very fine statement.

COLLEGE CA M PU S IN TH E BODY POL ITIC

Senator Gore. I have been very impressed during the past year I have been on a number of college campuses. I have found the situa- 'tion, attitudes, prevailing which the General has described very 

precisely. I would like to add this : During this past weekend I spoke to stu­ dent bodies at three universities, and the university campus has now come alive, whereas a year ago there was almost a total alienation 

and feeling of resistance and resentment against the body politic as 

you so well have described.
42

Now that they feel there is some opportunity to rectify a policy 

which they consider to lx1 immoral and unwise, the college campus is 

the most sensitive and dynamic and volatile element in our body 

politic today, and I hope that, as you say, th at we can give them once 

again confidence in our political process, confidence th at it is possible 

through the democratic process to work change and to achieve goals, 

and confidence that what they work for and win will be real.

General Shoup. That is a great deal.

The Chairman. General, 1 think that you have made a great contribution this morning to finding the trut h, and it will be very reassuring to the young people of this country. I am very glad to hear 

you say tha t you haven't lost confidence in the young people—that, 

on the contrary, they are the hope of the country. I agree.

These hearings, and many of our activities, are inspired by that same 

purpose which is to try to bring to light, as well as we can, what the 

truth is; where our national interest really lies; and what policy is in 

the best interest of this country. I appreciate very much your coming 

this morning.

I am so ny , Senator, do you wish to ask questions ?

Senator Cooper just came in.

Senator Cooper. Jus t one.

MEA NS OP ARRIVING AT A NEGOTIATION

General Shoup, I am very sorry I was not able to hear all of your 

testimony because I had to leave to attend another committee meeting 

and was only able to just now return. 1 do have one question to ask, 

but I thin k it is an importan t one.

Looking a t the present situation in Vietnam and the prospect of an 

expanded war—would you make a suggestion as to ways, means and 

procedures by which we might now be able to arrive at negotiation, 

either with a cease fire or entering into a fight and negotiate situation ?

General S houp. Senator, I am something in the position of Senator 

Symington, as I believe he expressed the other day. There was so 

much pressure when I first accepted this speaking engagement in 

which the purpose was to help unconfuse the students, tha t I got 

all of this playback about, yes, I should say this is wrong or that is 

wrong and then not have any solution. I mean you have seen that and 

heard tha t by so many.

1 had a solution, I proposed it, I actually visited one of the distinguished members of this committee and presented my proposal 

in a rough way. I went to the Secretary of Defense with it. Now, what 

has happened to it since then, I don't know.

But 1 still believe th at my proposal is the best one I have read or 

heard and I believe it would provide for us the answer to the one real, 

real big question that has to be answered before we know what the 

next step in this war is and if you want me to just briefly give it, I will. 

If you have this much time.

Senator Cooper. 1 would like to hear it, and I am sure the committee 

would.

The Chairman. Yes; go ahead.

PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATION

General S houp. The two governments, I mean the Presidents of the 

United States and South Vietnam, say in that kind of diplomatic
43

language they use—I am not good at th at—to H o Chi Min h, “Y ou, IIo 

('h i Minh, set the tim e and place fo r negoti ation, in collabora tion to th e 

degree th at you believe warranted with the NLF. We will have our 

rep res entative s the re at t hat tim e.” T hen we say, “w hen the gavel strik es 

for the be gin nin g o f negotia tio n we, Sou th Viet nam an d Am eric a, will 

cease all offensive o pe ratio ns," when they are at the table.

An d, parenthetic ally, th at elimina tes all this tro uble we see in all this 

rheto rical hokey-pokey th at goes on in which we have, we make a p ro ­

posal b ut we have a built-in fail ure in it.

So to hit the gave l, th is prov ide s, and thi s has someth ing to do with 

the ori ental min d th at you men tion ed, may be 1 had some feeling for, 

this pro vides Ho ('hi Minh , makes him a big man to his people. He 

can sto p t his t hing by s ettin g the time an d the place. I le can stop it, an d 

the n we say that as lon g as neg otiations are in pro gre ss we shall not 

ag ain begin offensive o peration s.

Th ere fore, Ho ('hi M inh can keep the bom bing sto pped th at he so 

badly w ants to do or says he does.

Then we say th at we rese rve the righ t to continue reco nnaissance 

both aerial and grou nd as is necessary for defe nse, and we go fu rther and say at a time du ring these negotiations when it shall ap pe ar 

th at we are ma kin g progres s which will eve ntu ally end in a peaceful 

settlement, we will begin to wi thdraw all of the com batan t forces of 

the Un ite d States fro m So uth Vietn am and we will as ou r allies to do 

the same.

Se na tor (tore. Bu t ad d, “Make no mista ke about it, make no mistake 

about it, we will win a vict ory.”

Ge neral S houp. 1 wo uld n't even mentio n to Ho Chi Minh th at he 

has to stop his offensive opera tion. We g ive him cre dit for what he is, 

the head of a sovereign sta te, easily ins ulted because we belittle his 

intelligence. We just say, “We are going to s top offensive opera tions."

()f course we say, we rese rve the righ t to defend ourselves.

We ll, give him some cre dit. He will stop offensive ope ration s. An d 

now let me tell you this, an d this is th e great pa rt of this pro position :

If Ho Chi Minh tu rn s down that kind of a pro position , then th is 

gr ea t surge of pro o pin ion that is being sought by ou r Ad minist ratio n 

will go u p a m illion pe rcen t overnight. The f eeling of the o the r nat ion s 

of this world will change overn igh t, and they will be fo r us and not 

Ho Chi Minh. Th is will tell us, if lie says no, th at he know s exa ctly 

what China is go ing to do and he has a g ua rantee of it, and t ha t China 

will come with all the help he wants when he as ksf or it, because only 

wi th th at knowledge could he say no to this proposi tion.

Se na tor Cooper. Mr. Ch air man , may I ask a fu rthe r questio n?

Th e Chairman. Yes.

U N IT E D ST AT ES SH OU LD TA K E T H E IN IT IA T IV E

Se na tor Cooper. W ould I be correct in say ing , the n, th at one of the 

basic point s of yo ur pro posal is, th at tlie Un ite d St ates should tak e 

the initiative ?

Gener al S hou p. Th e Uni ted State s in collaboration wi th the South 

Vie tnamese President.

Se na tor Cooper. 1 un de rst an d.

Ge neral Siioup. Ri gh t.
4i

Senator Cooper. Of course the Government of South Vietnam would 

have to he involved, but it is essentially the United States who should 

take the initiative in moving toward this goal of negotiations.

General Shoup. Yes, sir.

Senator Cooper. Secondly, you are proposing that the United States 

say that we are not imposing any condition upon the North Vietnamese, that we would not impose on ourselves.

General Shoup. Well, we are not even doing that in that proposition. We are just hoping he has got sense enough to do it.

Senator Cooper. I agree. 1 have stated many times that, while we 

say that North Vietnam is imposing conditions on us, we always 

manage to impose a condition on them which makes it impossible to 

come to the negotiating table.

General Siioup. A built-in failure, Senator. We have always had 

some built-in failures, you know, like we stop the bombing, you stop 

supplying your troops. That is like saying, “Mother, don't feed your 

baby.” Obviously, they are not going to agree to it.

Senator Cooper. That is all. Thank you for your constructive proposals, General.

The Chairman. General, thank you very much indeed. You have 

been extremely helpful, and we appreciate your taking the time to 

come here and help the committee. I think your testimony will be very 

helpful to the public and to the Senate as a whole.

Thank you, sir.

General Siioup. It is a privilege to be here, and be accorded such 

tine treatment.

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. For the record, I would like included a statement made almost 2 years ago by General Shoup.

(The statement referred follows:)

Rem arks by Gen. David M. S ho up , U.S. Mar ine Corps (R eti red), at th e IOti i

Ann ua l J unior College World Aff airs Day, P ierc e College, Los Ange les,

Cal if., May, 14, 1966.

To th is fine cros s-section of A m er ic a’s fu tu re , th e st ud en ts, th eir frie n d s; an d 

th eir t ea ch er s, g ood af te rn oo n !

Tha nk yo u G en er al Course.v fo r su ch a ge ne ro us in trod uc tion . Somehow 

it mak es me fee l as if I sh ou ld si t do wn now an d let th e fa cts ca tc h up w ith th e 

leg end. One th in g w as co rrec t th ou gh . I di d m ajo r in m ath. And I le ar ned a lot 

ab ou t fig ure s. It is ra th er dis tr ess in g to no te th a t yo un g men to da y see m to use 

fig ures only to h el p ge t on th e m oon . B ut I am g ladd en ed w he n I ca n see so p lain ly 

th a t th e yo un g la di es still are u sing figu res to get on th e honeym oon.

It w as an ho no r to he in vi te d to m ak e a few re m ark s he re toda y. B u t it is no t 

an en viab le po sitio n to he th e la st sp ea ke r, a nd ha ve to follow s uc h a fine p ro gr am 

in which you ha ve been privile ge d to part ic ip ate . I do ho pe list en in g to ju st one 

more ta lk will n ot d rive you into the Va lle y of the D olls.

Soon a ft e r ac ce pt in g th is as sign m en t, I re al iz ed th a t pe rh ap s I ’d mad e a gros s 

er ro r. Fa ce d w ith th is pr ed ic am en t, I ta lk ed w ith m an y of my fr ie nds , se ar ch in g 

fo r help. T heir re ac tion s were va ried . Some s ai d, “You were st up id t o ac ce pt. You 

do n't ha ve anyth in g in com mon w ith th es e yo un g pe op le. ”

I did n’t ag re e th a t we ha ve not hi ng in c ommon. I th in k we do. Ho w ab out th is ? 

We w er e all br ou gh t in to th is w or ld a t b ir th w ithout an y so lici ta tion on ou r 

part . An d a t th a t ve ry mo ment we w er e se nt en ce d to de at h by th e same gre at 

C re at or th a t ga ve us life. Betw ee n th es e tw o ev en ts there i s a re la tive ly tin y sjieck 

of tim e th at is ou rs. Al beit, of th is we are do om ed to sle ep aw ay a t le as t one 

th ir d. T hi s we h av e in common .

Soon we re al iz e th a t “c re at ed equal” m ea ns eq ua l at b ir th an d de at h. But 

w hat ab ou t th a t tiny speck of tim e in be tw ee n? Man wi ll use mo st of th is tim e 

do ing th in gs to show hi s diffe renc es, prov e his su per io ri ty to his fel lowmen . Th is, 

we ha ve in com mon.
45

A lrea dy yo u ha ve com e to kn ow , as ha ve I, th a t th e fo ot of m an has not al w ay s mad e th e sa m e tr ac k, nor his han ds fa sh io ne d th e sa m e to ols ; hut es se nt ia lly hi s prob lems re m ai n th e sam e. Bas ic al ly , th ey are th e sa tisf ac tion of his ph ys ic al an d m en ta l gn aw in gs , an d his fello wman . This, we hav e in com mon. By th is disc ou rse, it is no t in te nded to bri ng on dis tr ess or has te n de sp ai r. I ju st w ant to po in t out to yo u th a t al l gen er at io ns do ha ve som e im port an t th in gs in com mon. I w an t to m ak e an obse rv at io n; and I w an t to leav e yo u w ith 

a qu es tion to po nd er. You’ve hear d a few th in gs I th in k we ha ve in com mon. My ob se rv at io n is, th a t in yo ur life tim e yo ur g re ate st pr ob lems wi ll be people. A re n’t mo st of ou r ru le s an d la w s an d even a g re at p art of our C ons titu tion de sign ed to pr ot ec t peop le from peop le? Yes, your re al enem y in w ar or pe ac e will be people. So, st ud y them . Bea d, re ad , read . T ry to find ou t why th ey do do lik e th ey do do. Now th e ques ti on: W hat are yo u go ing to do w ith th is tiny speck of tim e th a t is yo ur s? I t ’s s hort er th an it w as whe n I first men tio ne d it, an d fo r mos t of you, 

one fo urt h of you r t ota l allotm en t is a lr ea dy gone. Are yo u ju st go ing to re pr od uc e ex ce ssively and m ul tiply th e a lr eady pai nfu lly pe rp le xi ng people prob lems? Or w ill you also sinc er el y an d ac tivel y part ic ip ate 

in w hat I be lie ve to be m an ’s m os t no ble ef fo rts on eart h—first, his st ru gg le to 

fr ee m an ki nd fro m th e afflu en t wh o go rge on de lic ac ies , while ch ildre n st ar ve fo r th e lack of milk an d b re ad ; an d, sec ond, hi s st ri vin g fo r pe ac e on eart h? I supp os e th er e are lo ad s of th in gs to ta lk ab ou t. An d th is re m in ds me of a st or y th a t may prov e tim ely. T his ri sk I ta k e fu ll we ll kn ow ing th a t th ere 's pr ob ab ly no st ory I co uld tell, we ll he re an yw ay , th a t w on 't be old-ha t-to-yo u. I do n’t prop os e to du mp th e who le load her e ei th er . I do pla n to th ro w off a 

few fo rk fu ll s as a kind of fe rt il iz er fo r yo ur th in ki ng .

I wi ll tr y to de liv er th is but— I me an Vig oro . in fo ur packag es ; (1 ) Co nfusion 

an d Com pa ss io n; (2 ) Co mmun ism an d C onfr onta ti on; (3 ) Co mba t an d Co nsc ri pti on; an d (3 ) Co nclus ion .

CO NFU SI O N AN D COM PA SS IO N

Now a li tt le ab out th is co nf us io n which a lo t of w ri te rs and mo st of you r el de rs sp ec ify as be ing th e univ ers al st ate of min d of th e st udent toda y. You are ju st a ge ne ra tion of co nfus ed , su pe rficia lly anim at ed as ci, so th ey say. I'm ce r­ ta in yo ur co nfus ion is do ub ly ju st if ie d an d I'm pre tt y su re th a t a t le as t, yo u're no t as ex ua l. L et me cu e you in on a li tt le se cr et. The se sa m e pe op le th a t plac e st uden ts in th e ca te go ry of th e co nf us ed are ju st as co nfus ed , alw ays ha ve been, an d al w ay s wi ll be. The y've simpl y su ffer ed more year s of it an d ha ve ac ce pt ed it as t he no rm al st ate o f man . An d th u s th ey are m is ta ken ly su rp ri se d th a t yo un g 

st uden ts are co nfused. The re shou ld he no w on de rm en t ab ou t it. F ir st , yo u' re ta ught th ere is a S an ta Claus. Lovely th in g a t th e ri ght tim e. B ut a lo t of people w an t yo u to ke ep be­ lie vi ng th is fo r yo ur wh ole life. In fa ct , th ey w an t you to be abo ut as vib ra nt an d th ou ght fu l as th e in h ab it an ts of a seco nd -h an d wax mu seum . You are ta ught th a t Colum bu s w as th e fi rs t to disc ov er America which is as 

fa ls e as my gra ndm oth er 's te et h. You are ta ught th at our pe op le ca n ge t w hat the m ajo ri ty w an ts , by th e ba llo t. We ll, we got Pre si de nt W ils on th a t way be ca us e hi s ca m pa ig n slo ga n was “H e ke pt us ou t of w ar ." A few d ays a ft e r his in augura ti on we w er e in th e F ir st 

W orld W ar. I do n't ha ve to te ll yo u w h at we ha ve now , ho w we go t i t ; n or w liat s ha pp en ed 

sinc e. Yo u'v e see n it ha pp en . You le arn th a t whe n m il it ary fo rc es are fig htin g an d killing an d m aimin g ea ch oth er w ith rifles , ca nn on , na pl am , and bomb s, th a t th a t’s w ar . T her e' s so m ethi ng of th at kind go ing on now bu t co nf us ingly enou gh th is is n't war . Eve ry on e ta lk s pe ace, peace. W or ld peace , w hile fo r ye ar s our go ve rnmen t has sfthl or ap pr ov ed th e sa le of hundre ds of m ill ions of doll ar s w orth of w ar 

m ate ri al to oth er co un trie s. Con fu sing ? You 're ta ught how in A ug us t 1619 th e Dut ch m an -o f-w ar ca me to th e Ja m es­ town pla nta ti on an d off ere d by au ct io n tw en ty A fric an s, so sta rt in g th e slav e tr ad e an d slav er y in America. B u t of co urse we st art ed slav e tr ad e ou rs elve s by captu ri ng In dia ns an d se lli ng th em in to slav er y in th e W es t In di es . You le arn how la te r we em an ci pat ed al l th e de sc en de nt s of th es e Afri ca ns . We ga ve th e slav es th e ir free do m, mad e them su bj ec t to th e pr ov isions of ou r C on stitut io n. F or a hund re d yea rs our g re at de moc racy has been a t work on this. All of you know th e fa cts of th e la st few ye ar s. Oh, of co urse we did. in
4 6

pl ac es, mod ernize th e tr eatm ent of N eg ro es ; in st ea d of th e club an d th e bla cksn ak e whip, th e w hi te m an su bst it ute d th e ul tra- m od er n de vice of th e elec tri c 

catt le prod .

We sp en d mill ions to bu ild ch ur ch es in which people pr of es s th eir love fo r 

th eir fe llo wman , wh ile ri gh t in th e sa m e co mm un ity th ey are so lici ting a few 

dollar s to he lp th e poo r.

We elec t officia ls to re pre se nt all th e i»eople an d th ey ta ke an oat h to do it. 

Th en we re ad th at som e ta ke mo ne y from th e few fo r th eir po litica l an d per ­

so na l uses. Sur el y co nfus ing.

You re ad th e glo wi ng ad s fo r au to s on ly to le arn of th eir de fects.

Yo u'r e sold d ru gs , an d th er e are a rm le ss babies .

You re ad , yo u' re tel ev ised to, you ’re ra di oe d to, yo u' re pr ea ch ed to, th a t it is 

ne ce ss ar y th a t we ha ve ou r ar m ed fo rc es tig ht, ge t kille d an d maimed , an d 

kill and maim oth er hu m an be ings in cl ud in g wo me n an d ch ildr en be ca us e now 

is th e tim e we m us t sto p som e kin d of unw an te d ide olo gy from cree pi ng up on 

th is na tion . Th e peo ple we ch ose to do th is is 8000 mile s aw ay w ith w at er in 

be tw een. I be lie ve th ere ’s a re co rd of but tw o men w al ki ng on w ate r an d one 

of them fa ile d. Yes, we mus t fig ht out th ere ’ca us e even th is gre at de mocracy, 

so fe arf u l of it s wo rld im age, ju st must, no t st an d by in co mplac en cy while villag e ch iefs, may or s, fa rm er s, an d oth ers are be ing m ur de re d by day an d ni gh t 

by th e be lie ve rs in th is te rr ib le ide olo gy. W e’re to ld it is cree pi ng da ng er ou sly 

clos er a nd cl os er to our sh ores. T his m ust be co nfus ing.

Su re ly a de cis ion to ge t th is n ati on in to th e pre di ca m en t we’re in, tr yin g to 

sto p th es e cre ep s, m us t ha ve be en bas ed on an al l inclus ive st ud y by thos e w ith 

th e gre ate st of clairv oy an ce . An d th ere m ust ha ve been a tim e- ta bl e de picting 

th e un te na bl e po sitio n, an d ir re p ara b le effects upon th is nat io n a t th e en d of 

5, 10, 15, 20 ye ar s, els e ou r go ve rn m en t co uld no t ha ve chose n th e pre se nt co urse 

of ac tio n. If su ch an est im at e of th e si tu ati on w as no t made, our le ad er s ha ve 

been de re lict in th eir duties an d re sp on sibi lities . If it w as done, th e pu blic 

shou ld be info rm ed . I as k you, ha ve yo u re ad or been in st ru cte d ab ou t an y 

tim e- tabl e of dis ast er fo r th is nati on an d her wor ld po sitio n if we hadn’t done 

an d w er en ’t do ing w ha t we are in Sou th E ast As ia to da y? I ha ve n't.

Th e re as on s fed to us are too sh al lo w an d nar ro w fo r st uden ts , as we ll as 

oth er citiz en s. Esp ec ially so, whe n yo u re al iz e th a t w hat is ha pp en ing, no m att er 

ho w car ef ully an d slo wly th e m il it ary es ca la tion has pr og re ssed , m ay be pro ­

je ct in g us t ow ar d w orld c at ast ro phe. Su rely, it is co nfus ing.

P art ic u la rl y is th is tr u e whe n we kn ow th a t a g re at de al cl os er th er e ar e 

es se ntial ly th e same si tu ati ons w hi ch our le ad ers sa y mad e it im po ssible fo r us 

no t to fight an d not to e sc al at e th e fig hting in Viet na m. See if th is do es n't soun d 

ab ou t th e sa m e:

(1 ) Sin ce la st Ju ly , P eru ’s nati onal ar m y has been batt li ng re d guerr illa s in 

more th an h a lf its st at es .

(2 ) Re d guerr illa s ru n a re as in se ve ra l st ate s of Colomb ia.

(2 ) M an y bu sin essm en are le av in g G ua te m al a follo wing ra ns om ki dn ap pi ng s 

by co m m un ist ba nd s.

(4 ) At le ast a dozen co mba t guerr il la br ig ad es are oper at in g in som e are as in 

ov er h alf of Ven ez ue la’s 20 st ate s, while te rr o ri sts blo ws ta ke plac e in Venezu elan c iti es , lik e t he Viet C ong in Saigo n.

We sh ou ld remem be r, too, th a t it’s o ve r w ate r an d 8000 mile s to Viet na m, bu t 

th ere is an is th m us be tw ee n th is co un tr y an d So uth America and it ’s mu ch, 

mu ch clo ser.

It m us t be a bit co nfus ing, too , to re ad and h ear ab ou t fig htin g fo r freedo m. 

Su pp osed ly. we ha ve it. an d I don't th in k an yo ne is go ing to ta ke it aw ay from 

us by pl ay in g cop s an d ro bb er s in So uth E ast Asia. Ev en so, we ur ge oth er s to 

tigh t fo r free do m. The re may be a li tt le co nf us ion he re. We in si st th ey shou ld 

sacrifi ce arm s an d leg s an d th e ir liv es fo r free do m. Th e peop le we urg e th is up on 

in So uth E ast Asia. So uth America an d m an y oth er plac es ha ve no ide a of ou r 

m ea ni ng of fre edom . In th e his to ry of th e ir an ce st ors th ey ’ve nev er ex pe rie nc ed 

w hat we ex ce pt them to unders ta nd an d fig ht fo r. Th e wor d or ev en th e ide a is 

no t in th e mores of th e ir peop le. Fr ee do m will re m ai n a fo re ig n wor d an d idea 

to th es e peop le unt il scor es of th em are br oug ht he re fo r six mon th s or a yea r 

an d th en re tu rn ed to th eir nati ve la nds to sing to th eir fello wmen th e son g of 

free do m w ith n otes of m us ic t he y ca n under st an d.

The se mas se s of i>eople an d th eir an ce st ors ha ve al w ay s liv ed w he re th e few 

ha ve ev er yt hi ng . E ve ry th in g th a t is prod uc ed by th e bu rd en so me la bo r of the 

ma ny . And th e man y ha ve not hin g ex ce pt fo r th e bar es t su bs iste nc e an d no t alway s th at. Ev en as li tt le as .8150 a yea r. In man y ca se s mu ch, muc h less . In fa ct
iii th e ir me mo ry th ey 'v e nev er had as muc h as a po t to— we ll, th ey ’ve no t even 

had a pot. 1 w an t to tell you, I don't th in k th e wh ole of So uth E ast As ia, as re la te d to th e pr es en t an d fu tu re sa fe ty an d fre ed om of th e people of th is co un try, is w orth th e life o r lim b of a sing le A mer ican . But may be th e peop le are an d may be th e i>eople 

of Sou th Am eri ca ar e, too. An d ma yb e th a t’s co nfus ing. I lielieve th a t if w e ha d and wo uld ke ep o ur dir ty , bloody, do lla r-cr oo ke d fin ge rs ou t of th e bu sine ss of th es e nat io ns so fu ll of de pr es se d, ex ploi ted peo ple, th ey will arr iv e a t a so lu tio n of th e ir o wn. T h at th ey de sig n an d want.. T hat th ey fight and work for. An d if unfo rt unate ly th eir revo lu tion m us t be of th e viol en t type be ca us e th e "h av es ” re fu se t o sh are w ith th e ‘•h av e-no ts” by an y pe ac eful metho d, a t le ast w ha t they ge t will be th eir own. an d no t th e Am er ic an styl e, which th ey do n't w an t an d ab ov e al l don't w an t cr am m ed down th eir th ro ats by American s. Tim e an d hi st ory has pr ov ed how wro ng our le ad ers hip was ab ou t Mexico in th e second de ca de of th is cen tu ry . More re ce nt ly, perh ap s th ere ’s a les son or tw o 

to be he ed ed in th e In do nes ia n si tu at io n, als o. U nt il yo u' re 21 you c a n 't vote. C an't part ic ip ate in th is gre at de m oc ra tic pr oc ­ ess. w he re some are st ill kep t fr om th e po lls by th re at, w he re a vo te c an st il l be bo ug ht fo r tw o do llar s or a hal f- pin t of whisk ey , whe re m an y do n' t vo te be ca us e 

th ey feel it’s usele ss. B u t yo u ca n m ak e your vot e he ar d. You do n' t ha ve to be a ve ge ta bl e 'til you' re 21. You ca n de m on st ra te . H is to rica lly, dem onst ra tions in te nd ed to br in g unre al­ is tic regimes to he el, hav e on ba la nc e pr od uc ed good fo r th e ex pl oi te d ma sses. Bro ug ht to m ind are mag na cart a. Jo an of Arc , In di a. So ut h American co un trie s. China , th e B ud dh is ts in Sou th Viet na m, an d w he re wou ld th e Ne gro be to da y w itho ut th e dem on st ra tions of th e re ce nt pas t wh ich aw ak en ed man y sle epy American w hi te s? It may be we ll th at th is te ch ni qu e ha s fin all y com e in an ex ­ plod ing fa sh io n to America an d American st uden ts . It sh ow s th a t yo u are th in k ­ ing. T h a t yo u' re in te re st ed and w an t to do so m ethi ng to be he ar d. T hat you' re go ing to g row up a s p art ic ip an ts in America an d he r fu tu re . T h a t y ou do n' t in te nd to sit ig no ra nt ly and idly by an d w at ch th is wor ld pan or am a of co nfus ion tr o t by unde r camo uflag e an d not ex pr es s yo ur se lv es ab ou t how yo u w an t th e fu tu re 

to be. The fu tu re th a t will soo n be you r re sp on sibi lity . F or th is c on fused st ate a sc ri bed to st udents by th os e se ni or c itiz en s I men tio ne d ea rl ie r, they give y ou co mpa ss ion. Th ey sa y yo ut h was al w ay s th a t wa y, a t le as t 

in th e ir el de rs ' day.

N ow :

C O M M U N IS M AN D CO NF RO NT AT IO N

(T his is only th e seco nd tim e I ha ve e ve r us ed th e wor d co mmun ism in ov er 100 

ta lk s, th e fir st w as a few m in ute s ag o.) Pec uli ar? Yes. B ut is c an be sa id th at we see m, fo re ver t o b e men ac ed by some ­ th in g red. 190 ye ar s ago it w as th e bo dies of men w ra pp ed in red- co ats . Tod ay , 

it is th e m in ds of me n th a t a re w ar pe d in to be lief in a th eo ry of vi si on ar y and im pra ct ic al nat ure , co mmun ism. Th os e th a t espo us e it. we c al l reds . Thi s ism th a t ho lds fo rt h th e pr om ise th a t fin all y man sh al l ha ve sh ar e and sh are al ik e of all th in gs is no t re ad ily cast asi de by th e mas ses who fo r gen er at io ns up on gener ation s ha ve sh ar ed n ot a t all. An d lik ely as no t whe n th ey tr ie d to sh ar e th ey go t th e pike. B ut it is th e go al 

of th is th eo ry an d it’s su pp os ed to ha pp en ri ght her e on eart h w he re man ca n ev- pe rien ce it w ith his phy si ca l senses. It is no t a go al lik e th e H ap py H unting Gro un ds , Hea ve n or V al hal la which m us t lie im ag ined . No t an y gre at sa le sm an ­ sh ip is needed to sel l th is ideo logy to th e lon ging , ea ge r, w an ting mas ses of de ­

pr iv ed , de pressed, di st re ss ed people. I say, th a t to da y th ere is no su ch th in g on th e fa ce of th e eart h as a com­ m un is tic st at e. I be lie ve th e neare st th in g to it w as ri ght her e in America. In Iowa an d New Eng la nd some years ago . I fee l cert ain th ere ne ve r will be su ch a th in g as a co m m un ist st ate . Sure th ere are som e w he re th e idea has bee n sol d to or fo rc ed up on th e peopl e, an d th ere are se ver al co un tr ie s w her e th e se llin g is 

pre tt y well alo ng. Yes. M ar x an d En ge ls co nt ri ved an ide a fo r a go al th a t w as ea sy to sell to th e ri ght peopl e. B ut th e a tt ain m en t of t he g oa l is st ri ctl y de pe nd en t up on a co mplete m et am or ph os is of hu m an n atu re , which I co nten d will ne ve r com e to pa ss. I)o yo u th in k th a t th e p re si de nts , th e m an ag ers of bu sine ss, will ev er perm it a si tu a­ tion to come to pa ss w he re th ey an d th eir fa m ily will be all ott ed tw o ho urs on T hurs day on th e st ate yac hts and th e floor sw ee pe rs in th eir pla nts ge t ex ac tly 

th e sa m e th in g? D on 't believ i It.
4S

The le ad ers of th es e nat io ns w ith th e go al of co mmun ism kn ow fu ll we ll it 

w on 't com e to pa ss, eith er .

The sa m e le ad er s wh o sol d th e id ea to th e mas ses also de sc ribe d to them the 

long ar du ou s, trea ch er ous path w ay of se lf- sa crifi ce an d dep ri va tion wh ich mus t 

be follo wed to get to th is gre at go al of th eir ev en tu al sa lv at io n. F urt her, they 

em ph as ized th a t th er e m us t be co m pe te nt le ad er s du ri ng th is tr ek to he lp na vi ­

gat e th es e pe rilo us wa ys. And wh o are th es e le ad er s to be? W hy th e same peo ple 

wh o sold th e ide a of t he g re at go al. Of c ou rse, th ey know th ere ’ll be no arr iv al at 

th e prom ised distilla tio n. The y ju s t mea n to ke ep on lead in g th os e they ha ve 

du ped. The y ne ve r inte nd to div id e up th eir lion 's sh ar e.

In fa ct , th e ILS. A. unw ittingly or a t le as t on an un plan ne d, un fo re se en , ba sis , 

ha s he lped to s te er Rus sia fu rth e r and f u rth e r aw ay f ro m th e go al of com mu nis m.

R us si a ha d no nu cl ea r wea po ns . We en circ led her w ith nucl ea r bomb s an d missile ba ses. W ith miss ile s. 1 m ig ht ad d. By so do ing , we ga ve her th e gre ate st ps ycholog ical bo os te r possible. One th ey co uld no t co nju re up them se lves . Th e bom bs 

an d m issiles were th er e. W ho se w er e th ey ? Uncle Su ga r's . And wh o do es Un cle 

in te nd to u se t he m on? W ho does he th re ate n ? T he g re at ho melan d of t he R us sian 

people. Fro m he re it was ea sy to get th es e people to forego b u tt er fo r gu ns. To 

sacrifi ce and to il ch ee rf ul ly so th ey co uld ha ve som e wea po ns to pro te ct th eir 

ho melan d from th e th re a t of dest ru cti on or at le as t be ab le to w re ak he av y da m ­

ag e on th e na tion who siglite d-in th es e m issiles on Rus sia. Th ey di d it. Th ey ha ve 

th e wea po ns . W ea po ns en ou gh to shov e ev er yt hin g above gr ou nd in W es tern 

Eu rope , in cl ud ing th e B ri ti sh Is le s, ri g h t ou t into th e A tlan tic Ocean. An d enough 

of th e tr an sc onti nenta l wea po ns to clob be r America from co as t to co as t an d pr odu ce un ac ce pt ab le de stru ct io n. T h a t' s w ha t th ey co nf ro nt us with . We co nf ro nt 

th em w ith a like pr ed ic am en t. P erh ap s we shou ld th ank God fo r th is ba lanc e of 

co nf ro nt at io n. Tha nk G od th a t hop ef ul ly A merica an d Rus sia ha ve finall y realized 

th at th er e are t hin gs an H-b omb c annot do.

An H- bomb can not p ro je ct n ati onal polic y as ho re.

An H -bo mb can no t r es to re la w a nd o rd er .

An H- bo mb ca n on ly de stroy.

Of co urse, w hi le Rus sia w as buildin g th is w ea po nr y we spok e of. sh e also pu t 

up th e Spu tn ik , se ve ra l sp ac e ve hicles, mo on sh ot s, etc . etc. Yet, be lie ve it or not 

th ere a re some people in America so unre ali st ic th ey st ill th in k th e Sp ut ni k wa s 

a fake .

B ut w hat now fo r R us si a? U nder th e um br el la of pr ot ec tion which they so 

de ar ly pai d fo r th er e is tim e and se cu ri ty fo r hav in g a li tt le mor e butter , a few 

more bic ycles , mor e au tomob ile s, ra di os , television s, an d more of oth er th in gs 

an d th in gs an d things . An d m or e an d more peop le are be ing pa id in ac co rd an ce 

w ith th eir pe rs on al ab ility to m an ag e or prod uc e. Th e go al of comm un ism becomes less and les s des irab le to m or e an d mo re peo ple. A ki nd of ca pi ta lism 

em erges. The id ea of com mun ism it fa di ng , ex ce pt to th e min ds o f th os e whe re a n 

ac ce pt ab le par ticip ati on in th e h avin g of m ate ri al th in gs h as n ot ye t c om e to p ass .

Who will ga in sa y th at mos t of th e R us si an peop le ar e no t b ett er off toda y th an 

th ey 'v e ev er been be fore? And to w hat m us t th e cr ed it be give n? The syste m 

th ey 've been w or ki ng fo r. of c ou rse.

We pr ov id ed China w ith th e sa m e bo oster. Sh e has re ac te d th e sam e. From 

my ex pe rien ce s ov er p art s of five years in Ch ina an d w hat I kn ow of co nd iti on s 

th ere to da y, I'm su re th a t mo re Chine se kn ow w he re to m or ro w ’s food is coming 

fro m, th an ev er in th e his to ry of livi ng man. And to w ha t m us t go th e cr ed it? 

Th e sy stem th ey're se rv in g un de r.

The a li enati on o f th e f ri endsh ip o f th e gre at an d w on de rful Chine se peopl e wi ll 

su re ly vie fo r de ca de s to com e as th e gre ate st blu nd er th is c ountr y ev er mad e in 

her re la ti ons w ith oth er na tion s, un less th e final re su lts from our Vi etn am 

co mm itm en t ov er sh ad ow s it.

You say. w hat about, th e Rep ub lic of Ch ina vis a vis Re d Chi na ? I rep ly, tim e 

is on th e side of th e one w ith th e bi gg er hu nk of ea rt h. An d th a t’s no t Taiw an .

CO MB AT W IT H CO NSC RIP TI ON

Ab out co ns cr ip tio n fir st. I th in k it is only fa ir to co nc lude th a t whe ne ve r a 

nat io n e m ba rk s on a lin e of ac tion in which a pre re quis ite fo r succ es s is sufficie nt 

man po wer, an d th er e are insu ffi cie nt vol un te er s fo r th e ta sk , th e only reco ur se is 

co ns cr ip tion or th e d ra ft . T hi s do es n’t, of co urse, an sw er al l th e pr os an d cons 

re gard in g th e ri ght or wro ng of d ra ft in g men to fig ht fo r th e ir co un try. B ut we 

di d ha ve a w ar , th e w in ning of which , I ha ve al w ay s th ought tu rn ed ou t to be
49

a pre tty good thin g. The R ev ol ut io na ry W ar . W ithout co ns cr ip tion we wou ld 

su re ly ha ve lo st th a t w ar . In th e adm in is tr ati on of th e d ra ft it is im po ssible to in su re ha pp in es s to al l. At best, it is an un de si ra ble , co mplicated m att er. B ut I ha ve al w ay s th ought it sh ou ld be on a st ri ctl y lo tt ery ba sis . To ex em pt th is on e an d th a t one fo r th is an d th a t mak es no se ns e to me. I f his nu m ber dr op s out of th e barr el he sh ou ld serve. A fter all. I do n’t th in k th is na tion wou ld co mpletely dis in te gra te if a few “A ” st ud en ts, pre-med ics, an d bu dd in g sc ie ntist s se rv ed in uni fo rm fo r a y ear 

or two . W ha t ab ou t th e d ra ft card burn er s? I'm su re th a t so on er or la te r th ey’ll re g re t th ey did it. It do es in tr ig ue me th ou gh th a t we’ve y et to h ear of an yo ne wh o has do ne th is bu rn in g w ithout an au dien ce . If they don't w ant to pa y ev en a tiny bit of th e pr em iu m on th e long ra nge in su ra nce policy fo r th eir co untr y th a t so m an y ha ve pa id so muc h fo r, wh y do n’t th ey ju st re fu se to rei>ort whe n ca lled , 

an d le t d ue pro ce ss of l aw t ak e its co ur se ? Ab out comb at. Tho se th a t ha ve ex pe rien ce d it soo n le ar n th a t th ere is no comm on la ng ua ge w ith w hi ch to com m un icat e w ith th os e la ck in g such ex pe rien ce . Rob er t E. Lee on ce sa id , “It is we ll th a t w ar is so te rr ib le , oth er w is e we m ig ht grow too fo nd of it .” Maybe it h asn 't bee n te rr ib le en ou gh . On e wou ld be led to believe th a t m an is too fond of w ar when we re al iz e th a t in th e p ast 20 years he has re so rt ed to fig htin g som e 40 or mor e tim es . Meaning , of co ur se , th a t na tions an d pe op les hav e fa iled to succeed w ith th eir es ta blish ed po lic ies 

by an y mea ns oth er th an m ur de r. Yes, m an ’s ol de st pla gue is w ar! An d I believe, it is a sa d, sa d co m m en ta ry on cen tu ri es of so -call ed en ligh te nm en t whe n th e m en ta li ty of m an has be en un ab le to pr ev en t ki llin g an d m ai min g of me n, wo me n an d ch ildr en in w ar!

B ut so i t has been , an d so it is toda y. Many ov er th e y ears have th ought an d w ri tt en about th is pl ig ht of m an ki nd . 

Ma y I qu ote in p a r t : “T he be lls w ill pe al, lo ng hair ed me n will dre ss in go lden sa ck s to pra y fo r su cc es sful sl au gh te r. An d th e old st ory will begin ag ai n, th e aw fu l cu st om ar y ac ts . The ed itor s of th e dail y pr es s will begin vir ule ntly to sti r men up to h atr ed an d m an sl au gh te r, m ansl aughte r in th e na me of patr io tism . M an ufa ct ure rs , m er ch an ts , co ntr acto rs fo r m il it ary st ore s— will h u rr y joyo us ly ab ou t th eir 

bu sine ss, in th e hope o f d ou ble rece ip ts. “ * * * Id le ladi es an d ge nt le m en w ill m ak e a g re at fu ss , en te ri ng th eir na m es in ad va nc e fo r th e Re d C ro ss So cie ty, an d they wi ll im ag in e th a t in so do ing th ey 

are pe rf or m in g a m os t Chr istian wo rk. “A nd sm ot he ring desp air w ithin th eir souls, me n will tr a il alo ng , to rn from pe ac ef ul lab or, from th e ir wi ves, m ot he rs an d ch ildr en ; hundre ds of th ousa nds an d sim ple-minde d, goo d- na tu re d men w ith m ur de ro us wea po ns in th eir han ds— 

an yw he re th ey may be dr iv en . Th ey wi ll m ar ch , fre eze’, hu ng er , su ffer sick ne ss an d die from it, or finally c om e to som e plac e w he re th ey w ill be s la in by th ousa nds 

or kill th ou sa nd s them se lv es . "A nd when th e num ber of sic k, wou nd ed an d ki lle d become s so gre at th a t th e a ir is so in fe cted w ith th e putr if yin g scen t of th e “fo od fo r po w de r” th a t ev en th e auth ori ti es find it di sa gr ee ab le , a tr uce w ill be mad e.” Who w ro te th es e w or ds ? I t w as a R us sian . The se w er e th e w or ds of a so ld ie r an d gre at w ri te r na m ed T olstoy , bo rn som e 140 y ears ago. A no th er in te re st in g obs er va tio n on th e sa m e su bj ec t go es so m ethi ng lik e th is :

“* * * I ca n see a mill io n years ah ea d an d th is ru le will nev er ch an ge in so man y as h alf a dozen in st an ce s. Th e lou d li tt le handfu l—as usu al— wi ll sh ou t fo r 

th e w ar . The pu lp it w ill—w ari ly an d ca utiou sl y—ob ject—a t fi rs t: th e gre at , 

big du ll bu lk of t he n ati on w ill ru b its sle epy ey es an d tr y to mak e ou t wh y th ere sh ou ld be a w ar an d will sa y. ea rn es tly an d in di gn an tly. “ It is unju st an d dis ­ ho no ra bl e an d th ere is no ne ce ss ity fo r it .” The n th e han dfu l will sh ou t loud er . A few fa ir men on th e oth er side will arg ue an d re as on again st th e w ar w ith speech an d pen, an d a t firs t will ha ve a heari ng an d be ap pl au de d, bu t it wi ll no t la st lo ng: th os e oth ers will ou tsliou t them , an d pre se ntly th e an ti w ar au di en ce s will th in ou t an d los e popula ri ty . Bef or e long you will see th es e cu riou s th in g s; sp ea ker s sto ne d from th e pl at fo rm , an d fr ee speech st ra ngle d by hord es of fu ri ous me n wh o in th e ir se cr et h e a rt s are st ill a t on e w ith th os e ston ed 

sp ea ke rs—as earl ie r— but do no t dar e to sa y so. And no w th e who le n a ti o n - 

pulp it an d all—will ta k e up th e w ar -c ry an d sh ou t it se lf ho ar se , an d mob an y ho ne st man wh o ventu re s to open his mou th , an d pre se ntly su ch mou th s wi ll ce as e to ope n. N ex t th e st at em en wi ll in ve nt ch ea p lies, putt in g th e blam e upon th e na tion th a t is att acked, an d ev ery m an wi ll be gl ad of th os e conscie nce-
50

so ot hi ng fa ls it ie s an d will dilig en tly st udy th em , an d re fu se to ex am in e an y 

re fu ta ti o n s of them , an d th u s he will by an d by co nv inc e him se lf th a t th e w ar 

is ju s t an d will th ank God fo r th e b ett er sle ep he en jo ys a ft e r th is proc ess of 

gr ot es qu e self- de ce ption.” Our ow n M ar k Tw ai n reco rd ed th es e th ou ghts . (M ar k 

Twai n, The M ys teriou s S tr an ger , 1898 .)

The se ha ve been th e w or ds of a R uss ia n an d an American , years ap a rt in 

tim e, bu t th in kin g th e same th ou gh ts . Tod ay mill ions of R uss ia ns an d American s 

do n’t w an t w ar . Rus sia an d Amer ica co uld pre ve nt w ar on th is eart h. Why do n't 

th ey team -u p an d do it ?

Now , may be we shou ld refle ct a b it on th e fa ct th a t even la st nig ht w hile we 

en joye d th e Los An geles way of lif e, American men wer e givi ng th eir liv es to 

he lp en su re th a t we ca n co nt in ue to ha ve su ch ha pp y tim es in th is co un try.

Who a re t he se A merican men ? The y are mem be rs of t he g re ate st m il it ary team 

on eart h. Mem bers of th e U.S. Arm y, Na vy , Air Fo rce, M ar in e Cor ps an d Co ast 

Gua rd . Th ey a re the r eal m in ut em en of 1966.

Now wlnit. ca n you do on a da y- to -d ay ba sis to su pp or t th is gre at American 

Ar med For ce s team wh ich is figh tin g be ca us e th ey are leg ally ord er ed to do so?

F ir st yo u co uld he lp in cr ea se th e sta tu re of th e so ld ie r in th e ey es of t ho se no t 

in th e ar m ed service s. The re le gat io n of th e so ld ie r to a po sition of in fe rior 

st atu s (e xc ep t wh en th e actu al sh oo ting is go ing on ) ha s, unfo rt unate ly , been a 

pa stim e of th os e no t in th e se rv ice fo r lo th es e man y ce nt ur ie s. An old , old sto ne 

se nt ry box in G ib ra lt ar carr ie s th is in sc ript io n :

“God an d the so ld ie r we ad or e, 

in tim e of dan ger , no t b e fo re ;

Th e dan ger p as se d, an d al l th in gs ri gh te d 

God is fo rg ot te n and th e so ld ier sl ig ht ed .”

So you see t his lac k of co nc ern fo r th e s ol di er is a n ag ed thing .

P erh ap s yo u co uld be a bit more unders ta ndin g of his p lig ht.

Our pre ss m ig ht be so mew ha t mor e co ns id er at e, too. All too o ften th e he ad lin es 

to da y re ad “e x-so ldier , ex -sailor, ex -M ar ine, ex -a irm an , rape s, m urd er s, robs, 

etc. ’- B ut I ne ve r see “e x-Gen eral M ot or s” or “ex -U.S. Ste el ” em ploy ees re fe rr ed 

to th is way .

The be st ex am ple— som e tim e ag o hea dl in es flar ed “E x- M ar in e ca rv es up 

sch ool te acher. ” A check re ve al ed he had been dis ch ar ge d 20 years b e fo re !

Also, you ca n he lp in th e de ve lopm en t of th e det er m in at io n of our people to 

re si st , a t al l co sts, an y en cr oa ch m en t on th e free do m we en joy her e in Am eri ca. 

Ju s t ho w mu ch des tr uc tion are we w illing to ac ce pt ? Ho w man y ca su al ties — 

men, wo men an d ch ildr en ? Who ca n sa y w hat it will ta ke to de st ro y th e wi ll 

of ou r pe op le?

And re m em ber!! U nd er our fo rm of go ve rn m en t, ci vi lian s alw ay s ha ve , an d 

al w ay s w ill —an d th ey sh ou ld—tel l th e m il it ary wh en to beg in an d whe n to sto p 

w ar .

But , also remem be r, th a t mos t of our pe op le haven ’t see n flying ar m s an d legs , 

an d gu ts an d blood, an d piles of de ad fr om a bomb bla st . Th ey vie w th is w ar 

bu sine ss in mu ch th e same pe rs pe ct iv e as th e man wh o was as ke d w het her he 

ha d ev er see n H al le y’s Comet. H e sa id . “Yes, I ha ve , but on ly from a d is ta n c e !”

F urt her, yo u can he lp in th e p re ve nt io n of fo rg et fu ln es s by th e liv ing, th a t men 

ha ve die d fo r th e ca us e of peace an d free do m. (I re pea t, m an 's st ri vin g to free 

m an ki nd an d ha ve a pe ac eful world, I belie ve, const itute s hi s mos t noble effo rt 

on th is e a rt h .)

It see ms cl ea r th a t if we are ev er to re ac h th e go al of pea ce, we m us t ori en t 

our th in kin g a nd our ac tio ns mo re to w ard th is end. It is es se nt ia l th a t we, in ou r 

tim e, mak e a m ea su ra bl e co nt ribu tion to w ar d th is ult im ate goa l—pe ace.

St ill we won de r, ho w man y mor e bl oo ds m ea re d bat tlef ie ld s an d co nt en tiou s 

cen tu ri es sh al l se para te us from a perm an en t i»eace? Thi s we ca nn ot know . We 

do kn ow th a t duri ng th e tim e we w ai t fo r th is co nst an t ho pe of m an ki nd to com e 

to pa ss, we m us t a t al l tim es be pre pare d—p re par ed fo r an y ev en tu ality !

I conce ive i t a fu ndam en ta l duty t h a t yo u an d o ur sch oo ls an d ch ur ch es e m phasiz e th a t th is na tion st ands as it is to da y— no t be ca us e of th e ea sy life of ou r 

pr ed ec es so rs, bu t in st ea d be ca us e th ousa nds sacrifi ce d th eir tim e, th eir ef fo rts 

an d th eir liv es w ith an un selfish de vo tio n to th e id ea th a t unde r th e Kingdom 

of God th ere w er e th in gs g re ate r th an th e ir own in div id ual ga in an d co mfo rt.

Let m e c on clu de w ith a b ri ef s um m at io n :

a. D on 't w or ry a bo ut b eing co nfused.

b. Ke ep on be ing c ur io us .

c. Be con st ru ct iv e in y ou r t ho ug hts and a ctio ns .
51

d. Be as su re d th a t our sy stem of go ve rn m en t an d pr od uc tion is th e bes t ev er 

devis ed to sa tisf y th e in st in ct iv e yea rn in gs of hu m an being s. P art ic ip ate in it 

an d lear n to pro te ct yo ur se lf from it. At le as t, kn ow th e m ea ni ng of ca vea t 

em ptor.

e. D on 't le t yours el f ge t too shoo k- up by th e ov er -a dv er tise d en cr oa ch m en t of 

comm unism . H elp peop le to ge t th in gs an d th e idea of commun ism wi ll str an g le 

by its own um bi lic al c ord .

f. Rem em be r th a t th e ar m ed fo rc es do n' t s ta rt w a rs : th a t th e so ld ie rs pl ig ht 

is unso li cit ed; th a t whe n he becom es a so ld ie r he give s up muc h of th e ve ry 

fre edom he ’s figh tin g for. An d th a t if he se rv es to re tire m en t, he ne ve r in his 

life tim e ge ts h ac k his fr ee do m.

Now o ne final wor d ab out thos e who h av e giv en th eir liv es f or America in w ar :

I believ e th a t gath ere d he re ab ov e us ri ght now, w at ch in g in te ntly an d li st en ­

ing ca re fu lly, are th e in vi sibl e sp ir it s of th os e sa m e gall ant men, wh o ov er th e 

yea rs —even un to today-—h av e giv en th eir fu ll m ea su re of de vo tio n. T heir pre senc e m ay be uns ee n, b u t th ey s ha ll n ot be unh ea rd .

Someone m us t sjjeak fo r the m. W hat do th ey w ant m an ki nd to hear ? Man y, 

man y things , of cou rs e, but I feel, th ey w ant th e fe ars an d ho pes of th eir ete rn al 

yea rs to be ex pr es se d in an ad m on iti on , a hop e, an d a pr ay er .

Th ey adm onis h: “You m us t st ri ve fo r pe ac e— bu t no t peace a t any price. You 

m us t view pe ac e in it s pr oper pe rspe ctiv e. Do no t give up one bi t of th e pr ic el es s 

her itag e of libe rty whi ch we ha ve he lped to pr es erve . Ac cept an d dis ch ar ge your 

re sp on sibi lities to civ iliz at io n as th e u nre lu cta nt wor ld le ad er s of thos e who are 

will ing to fig ht to p ro te ct th is libe rty. An d. if by th es e ac tion s you en joy i»eace in 

yo ur tim e, le t it be th e we lco me pro duct of fa ir de alin g, h ard work, so un d 

pla nn in g a nd a re adin es s to fig ht a gain st a gg re ss io n. ”

T he ir hope: So med ay , m ay th er e be a m ee ting a t th e su m mit, which sh al l be ­

com e as ev er la st in gly im p o rt an t to hum an it y as th e se rm on on th e m ou nt.”

Fin al ly , th e sp ir it s of th es e und yi ng de ad pra y : “P le as e God, may ou r sh ip of 

st ate sa il on a nd on in a wor ld , f ore ver a t pe ac e.”

Tha nk you.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call 

of the Chair.)