# United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 22

- 1677 UNITED STATES, Appellee,

v. GUILLERMO GONZÁLEZ

- SANTILLAN, Defendant, Appellant .

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge ]

Before Rikelman, Hamilton,  and Thompson,

Circuit Judges .
Raúl S. Mariani Franco , for appellant. Ricardo A. Imbert

- Fernández , Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Mariana E. Bauzá

- Almonte , Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and W. Stephen Muldrow , United States Attorney, w ere on brief, for appellee.
July 11, 2024

 Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.- 2

- THOMPSON , Circuit Judge . A person absconds when he "depart[s] secretly and hide[s] [himself]." Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam

- webster.com/dictionary/absconds (last visited June 10, 2024) [https://perma.cc/ 4C43

- 7TLW]. That's precisely what Appellant Guillermo Gonz ález

- Santillan (" Gonz ález

- Santillan ") did. In 2009, Gonz ález

- Santillan fled Puerto Rico to evade his sentencing hearing for conspiracy to commit money laundering after entering into

-- and pleading guilty pursuant to

-- a plea agreement with the government. After being on the run for thirteen years, Gonz ález

- Santil lan was eventually caught in the Dominican Republic and returned to the United States, where he awaited sentencing. However , now Gonz ález

- Santillan faced a recommended
two
- point obstruction

- of

- justice sentencing enhancement for his abscondment.

The upsho t. Currently, Gonz ález

- Santillan is serving a seventy
- month term of imprisonment. In this appeal, he asks us to vacate his sentence and judgment and to remand because, in his telling, the district court erred i n impos ing the enhancement. On review, we a ren't persuaded and therefore decline the invitation to let Gonz ález

- Santillan escape his sentence.- 3

- HOW GONZ ÁLEZ

- SANTILLAN GOT HERE 1 Beginning in 2007, Gonz ález

- Santillan conspired with his

co - defendants to launder drug money. As a part of their scheme, they moved drug money belonging to Col ombian traffickers into various United States bank accounts. Collectively their conspiracy delivered deposits of over $2,00 0,000, and González

- Santillan himself was involved in the delivery of over $1,500,000 for deposit ing . This all came to a head in 2008 when Gonz ález

- Santillan was indicted by a grand jury in the District of Puerto Rico on one count of conspiring to commit money laundering and five counts of aiding and abetting money laundering. In due
course, Gonz ález

- Santillan and the government struck a plea deal in which Gonz ález

- Santillan agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering (count one) in ex change for the government's dismissal of his other counts at sentencing (counts two through six). 2

1 We glean the relevant facts from the plea agreement, presentence investigation report, and transcript of the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Ubiles

- Rosario , 867 F.3d 277, 280 n.2 (1st Cir. 2017); see, e.g. , United States v. Lasalle González , 857 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2017).

2 González

- Santillan ple d guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which in relevant part provides that "[a]ny person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy."- 4
- Per the plea agreement, Gonz ález

- Santillan landed an adjusted offense level of twenty

- five giving him an advisory guideline range of fifty

- seven to seventy
- one months' imprisonment. As relevant to this appeal, the plea agreement provided that "[t]he parties agree [d] that no other adjustments or departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by the parties" and that the government res erved its right "to dispute sentencing factors or facts material to sentencing." The United States Pretrial and Probation Office ("USPO") prepared a presentence report that not ed the parties' agreement. Gonz ález

- Santillan entered his guilty plea on March 3, 2009 and the court scheduled a sentencing hearing. And here's where things beg a n to go off the rails.

Prior to his sentencing, Gonz ález

- Santillan failed to appear for a scheduled meeting with his probation officer on June 8th. And then, the next day , he failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. In response, the court revoked the terms of Gonz ález

- Santillan's bail (which included electronic monitoring and home detention) and issued an arrest warrant. Gonz ález

- Santillan's whereabouts were unknown until thirteen years later when he was arrested on March 9, 2022 in the Dominican Republic . In due course, he was extradited to the United States and held in custody. In anticipation of Gonz ález

- Santillan's (at long last) sentencing, and given the time that had elapsed, the- 5
-

court ordered the USPO to issue an updated presentence report (the "Amended Presentence Report"), which it did on June 17th.

In relevant part, the Amended Presentence Report mimicked the parties' origin al plea agreement. The government objected on the basis that the " report fail[ed] to include that by absconding the jurisdiction of the Court for thirteen years, defendant obstructed justice." Accordingly, the government sought a sentencing enhancement u nder U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which increases a defendant's adjusted offense level by two for obstructing justice (we'll explain this Guideline in more detail shortly).

The USPO a dop ted that recommendation and amended the report (the "Second Amended Presentence Report") to include a
two
- point obstruction

- of

- justice sentencing enhancement, placing Gonz ález

- Santillan at a total adjusted offense level of twenty
- seven with a corresponding guideline range of seventy to eighty

- seven months' imprisonment. In making tha t adjustment, the USPO explained that the enhancement was applicable for the reasons outlined in the government's objection . In response, Gonz ález

- Santillan submitted his sentencing memorandum, which opposed the USPO's findings on the bases that: (1) the parties' original plea agreement barred the government from seeking an obstruction

- of

- justice enhancement because "[t]he parties agree[d] that no other adjustments or departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by the parties"; and (2) the government- 6

-

had failed to prove that the enhancement was applicable because it had not presented any evidence that he willfully failed to appear at his sentencing hearing.

At Gonz ález

- Santillan's sentencing hearing, he argued his total offense level w asn't twenty

- seven; rather, he c alcula ted a total offense level of twenty

- one in the event the court add ed two points for obstructing justice , and requested a sentence of thirty

- seven months. 3 The government argued that Gonz ález

- Santillan's total offense level was indeed twenty

- seven and initially sought a sentence of eighty

- seven months, at the top of the guideline range, but later recanted and requested seventy months, at the lower end of Gonz ález

- Santillan's guideline range, in accordance with t he plea agreement's original pledge that "[t]he United States [ w ould] recommend a sentence at the lower end of the applicable guideline range." 4 Gonz ález

- Santillan voiced his objection to the government's recommendation for a sentence at the high er end o f the applicable guideline range, explaining that it s recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement . The court

3 Although González

- Santillan had previously agreed to a total offense level of twenty
- five , he argued at sentencing that his total offense level was then twenty
- one because of the efforts he took to rehabilitate himself during the thirteen years of his abscondment.

4 True to its word, the government dismissed the five counts of aiding and abe tting money laundering against González

- Santillan at sentencing.- 7
-

agreed, noting that the government was bound by its pledge to seek a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range. However, with respect to the obstruction

- of

- justice sentencing enhancement, it explained that the government could seek the enhancement because Gonz ál ez - Santillan had engaged in conduct, his thirteen

- year disappearance , that occurred after the plea agreement had been signed by the parties and therefore the government was not in breach of the agreement in making its request .

After hearing from the parti es and in accordance with the Second Amended Presentence Report, the court pegged Gonz ález

- Santillan's total offense level at twenty
- seven with a corresponding guideline range of seventy to eighty

- seven months' imprisonment. I n doing so, it appli ed the obstruction

- of

- justice sentencing enhancement , explain ing that "Mr. Gonzalez willfully obstructed or impeded or attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice with respect to his sentencing for this offense by absconding from pretrial s upervision and remaining a fugitive for 13 years." The court then meted out a seventy

- month term of imprisonment. Before the hearing's conclusion, Gonz ález

- Santillan's attorney lodged an objection to the sentence, again incorporating his objections outli ned in his sentencing memorandum 5 and labeling the sentence as both procedurally

5 In relevant part, González

- Santillan's arguments in his sentencing memor andum included his belief that : the government- 8

-

unreasonable due to the absence (he says) of evidence of willfulness and substantively unreasonable as excessively long.

This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION Gonz ález

- Santillan takes exception to the district court's imposition of the two

- level obstruction

- of

- justice sentencing enhancement . U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (the "enhancement" or "sentencing enhancement") provides:

If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct rela ted to (A) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. Application note 4( E ) is illustrative of the statute's covered conduct, explaining that " escaping or atte mpting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear , as ordered, for a judicial proceeding" are examples of obstructive or impeder conduct for which the enhancement applies. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n .4(E) (emphas es added ).

improperly sought and obtained the obstruction

- of
- justice sentencing enhancement; the government failed to provide any evidence to support the sentencing enhancement; he was being sentenced harsher than his co

- conspirators who received sentences of thirty, twenty

- four, and about eleven months, respectively ; he wa s largely rehabilitated; and a lighter sentence was warranted as a first

- time offender.- 9

- Against the application of the enhancement Gonz ález

- Santillan launches two arguments, and we'll take each in turn. A. The Court's Application of the Obstruction - of - Justice Enhancement First up is Gonz ález

- Santillan's primary argument that the district court erred when it applied the sentencing enhancement because the government failed to properly establish that he "willfully" failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. Rather than produce evidence of willfulness, Go nz ález

- Santillan says, the government did nothing more than summarily note that he left his electronic monitoring device at his residence when he fled the jurisdiction . That alone is insufficient proof, he concludes, and accordingly the enhancement should not have applied as a matter of law. Unsurprisingly, the government disagrees. 6 It argues that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is applicable here because

6 The government first maintains that Gonz ález

- Santillan has waived his challenge to the court's application of the sentencing enhancement because "he asked for [ it ] w hen recommending his desired sentence" and never argued against its application. We disagree. Th e sentencing hearing transcript (and his sentencing memorandum) indicates that in itially, González

- Santillan requested a sentence akin to that of his co

- defendant. However, alternatively he stated that "[i]f the Court understands that an additional punishment should be imposed by his failure to appear, disrespect to the courts, leaving the jurisdiction, I understand that. But that shouldn't double that 3 0

- month sentence [the sentence he sought] to 60 and even less to 70

-- or more than 70 months." Th e "if" conditional language indicates to us that- 10

-

Gonz ález

- Santillan's abscondment is clearly covered conduct . Furthermore, the government notes, the Second Amended Presentence Report succinct ly and pellucidly spelled out the factual findings of Gonz ález

- Santillan's flight to the Dominican Republic for thirteen years , and he did not object to those findings below. Continuing , the government e mphasizes that three things

-- the record, § 3C 1 .1.'s a pplication notes, and the case law

-- all make clear that Gonz ález

- Santillan's abscondment was willful and therefore the government met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Gonz ález

- Santillan willfully failed to appear for his sentencing hearing.

We review preserved claims of procedural sentencing errors for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Coplin

- Be njamin , 79 F.4th 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2023). "Within this framework, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error, and its interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo." United States v. Velez

- Soto , 804 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2015 ); see also United States v. Nygren , 933 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2019). When a defendant challenges the factual basis for the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement, as Gonz ález

- Santillan does here, "we ask only whether the court

González

- Santillan simply argued an alternative basis to his original plea to be sentenced as his co

- defenda nt who the record reflects was not given the two

- point obstruction

- of
- justice sentencing enhancement.- 11

-

clearly e rred in finding that the government proved the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Luciano , 414 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005) ( citation omitted). In our review of the evidence we've noted that "[e]ither direct or circumsta ntial evidence will do, with the sentencing court free to draw commonsense inferences from the evidence." United States v. Matthews , 749 F.3d 99, 105 (1st Cir. 2014).

Turning now to consider González

- Santillan's specific contentions on this issue, § 3C1.1 application note 4( E ) , as we previously noted, explains that "escaping or attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing [,] or willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial pro ceeding" is the type of conduct to which the sentencing enhancement applies. United States

v. Rivera

- Nazario , 68 F.4th 653 (1st Cir. 2023) , is instructive as we consider Gonz ález

- Santillan's contentions . There , we confronted an appellant's analogous claim that the government had failed to show that he had acted "willfully" in failing to appear. Id. at 661. Upon review, we held that everything about the appellant's conduct

-- namely his violation of " dozens of release conditions " ; " fail [ ure ] to appear at his sentencing hearing " ; departure from " his third

- party custodian's home without the permission of pretrial services " ; and outstanding fugitive status

" for over ten months "
-- suggested willfulnes s. Id. We concluded that "[a] criminal defendant who evades authorities and fails to- 12

-

appear for a sentencing hearing has obstructed justice; and '[t]o hold otherwise would condone direct disobedience of a court's conditional relea se order.'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Fuller v. United States , 398 F.3d 644, 652 ( 7th Cir. 2005) ) . As w ith Rivera

- Nazario , we similarly conclude that the circumstances of Gonz ález

- Santillan's abscondment suggest willfulness. As a remi nder, the record evinces Gonz ález

- Santillan's: failure to attend his scheduled appointment with his probation officer; failure to appear at his sentencing hearing; abscondment for thirteen years to a different country; and of particular import, his acknow ledgment of his abscondment at his sentencing hearing. 7 And to reiterate, "[a] criminal defendant who evades authorities and fails to appear for a sentencing hearing has obstructed justice." Id. Moreover, despite Gonz ález

- Santillan's insistence that "no factual conclusion or finding was included " in the Sec ond Amended Presentence Report, in its Addendum to the Report the USPO explained that the enhancement was appropriate because (and to repeat) he "absconded from his pretrial release just prior to his Sentence Hearing" and "was a fugitive from justice for 1 3 years."

7 Before the court announced its sentence, González

- Santillan remarked to the court that : "I'd like to apologize to you for my mistake . . . . I know th at I made a mistake by not having appeared in court on that date. . . . I went to the Dominican Republic."- 13

- Pl uck ing another arrow from his quiver, Gonz ález

- Santillan argues that our decision in United States v. Marshall , 753 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2014), "requires the government to prove that [he] acted with knowledge that his conduct would certainly obs truct the proceedings." However, i n Rivera

- Nazario , we declined an appellant's invitation to address a similar question: " whether district courts must make a particularized finding that a defendant had a specific intent to obstruct justice
to impose a § 3C1.1 enhancement . " 68 F.4th at 661

– 62. We declined to do so because , as the record elucidated, the appellant's conduct indisputably supported the enhancement. See id. ; see also United States v. Hall , 434 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (declinin g to address whether particularized findings of specific intent to obstruct justice are required under § 3C1.1 where "evidence clearly supports the district court's ultimate" obstruction

- of

- justice finding). And while Gonz ález

- Santillan is correct that the government bears the burden of proving sentencing enhancements,

see Matthews , 749 F.3d at 105, and by a preponderance of the evidence , see, e.g. , United States v. Paneto , 661 F.3d 709, 715 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Can non , 589 F.3d 514, 517 (1st Cir. 2009) , h ere, as in Rivera

- Nazario , we conclude that the government has easily met its burden because the facts of this

case -- as adequately set forth in the Second Amended Presentence Report and by Gonz ález

- Santillan 's own in

- court admission

--- 14

-

clearly support the conclusion that he willfully failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we espy no error from the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement. 8

8 Before turning the page on Gonz ález

- Santillan's primary argument, we quickly dispatch a secondary aspect of that claim. In his brief, Gonz ález

- Santillan summarily states that he "was not 'under custody' at any time prior to him absconding nor he 'escaped' [sic] from any prison." This is important, Gonz ález

- Santillan explains, because U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1's application notes di stinguish between "escaping or attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing" from failure to appear for a judicial proceeding. And for the latter, unlike the former, a showing of willfulness is required, which the government failed to prod uce. However, a thorough review of the record reveals that Gonz ález

- Santillan did not make this argument below in either his sentencing memoranda or at his sentencing hearing. Accordingly, "[t]here is a procedural obstacle to this claim of error: it is raised for the first time in this court." United States v. Mercado , 777 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2015). And therefore, we review, at best, for plain error. See i d. ; see also United States v. Padilla , 415 F.3d 211, 218, 220 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Bey , 188 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying plain error review when a defendant's objections were raised for the first time on appeal). Yet, Gonz ález

- Santillan has not even attempted to address the applicable standard of review, and therefore we deem his claim waived. See United States v. Vá z quez - Rosario , 45 F.4th 565, 571 (1st Cir. 2022) (deeming an appellant's claim waived when he did not address the applicable standard of review); see also United States v. Bulger , 816 F.3d 13 7, 157 (1st Cir. 2016) ("Whether you characterize Bulger's Brady claim as unpreserved because he did not seek a ruling below, or waived for failure to adequately develop it on appeal, his claim fails."). Separately, we deem Gonz ález

- Santillan 's "under custody" argument waived for lack of developed argumentation. His barebones assertation that he was not "under custody" without any further explanation for why he believes that to be so simply won't cut it. As we explained many times, "we see n o reason to abandon the settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." United States v. Zannino , 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990); see, e.g. , Brown v. Trs. o f Bos. Univ. , 891 F.2d 337, 352 (1st Cir. 1989).- 15

- B. Breach of the Parties' Plea Agr eement Alternatively, Gonz ález

- Santillan argues that the clear terms of the plea agreement barred the government from seeking the sentencing enhancement because they specified that "no other adjustment or departures [were] applicable in this case nor shall be sought by the parties , " and therefore the government breached the plea agreement by doing so. Furthermore, Gonz ález

- Santillan claims that because the plea agreement did not contain a breach clause , 9 the government " had no power to withdraw from its obligations [ under ] the plea agreement, " including its vow not to seek any upward adjustment or enhancement. Continuing o n, Gonz ález

- Santillan explains that this was not a situation where the government was under an "unflagging duty" to provide accurate information to the court, but instead was a situation where the government, without any prompting from the court, sought a clearly

9 Simply put, a breach clause, or breach provision as it is sometimes referred to, is a clause sometimes found in a defendant's plea agreement that allows the government to withdraw from the plea agreemen t if the defendant violates a term or condition of the agreement. For example, in United States v. Gardner , 5 F.4th 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2021), a case that both parties here cite to, we considered Gardner's claim that he was not bound by his guilty plea und er the plea agreement after he breached the agreement and the government withdrew from it. In relevant part, Gardner's breach clause stated that if "before sentencing," he "violat [ed] any term or condition of [his] Plea Agreement, engage[ed] in any criminal activity, or fail[ed] to appear for sentencing," the government "may consider such conduct to be a breach of the Plea Agreement and may withdraw therefrom."- 16

-

barred sentencing enhancement. (Quoting United States v. Almonte

- Nuñez , 771 F.3d 84, 89 (1st Cir. 2014)) .

The government argues that it did not breach the plea agreement because the agreement only barred it from seeking additional adjustments based on conduct that took place before the parties signed it, not conduct that occurred after its execution. 10 And utilizing " traditional principles of contract law , " it launches a n interpretive argument based on the clause's temporal languag e to establish that the "are applicable" language of the plea agreement could only include those adjustments and departures that were then available at the time the agreement was signed. Moving along, the government contends that Gonz ález

- Santillan himsel f breached the plea agreement by absconding because " [ a ] n implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that the defendant show up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction."

10 The government insists that González

- Santillan has waived his breach argument because he requested the sentencing enhancement at his sentencing hearing and he has failed in his opening brief to challenge the district court's rationale for finding that no breac h of the plea agreement had occurred. U pon review, we are not persuaded for two reasons. First, as explained above, González

- Santillan initially objected to a sentencing enhancement. And second, our review of his brief reveals that González

- Santillan do es indeed attack the district court's rationale for finding that no breach of the plea agreement occurred. For example, González

- Santillan argues that the district court incorrectly assumed that his failure to appear for his sentencing hearing constituted breach, cites to our decision in Gardner , 5 F . 4th at 110 , for the proposition that the absence of a breach clause supports his position, and launches additional arguments against the district court's reasoning.- 17

-

United States v. Hallahan , 756 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the government continues, Gonz ález

- Santillan materially breached the plea agreement when he fled the jurisdiction and that abscondment subsequently released it from the specific performance of its remaining obligations under the agreement. And, seeking to highlight Gonz ález

- Santillan's apparent hypocrisy, the government points out that Gonz ález

- Santillan , himself, disregarded the agreement at sentencing when he advocated for a sentence at the lower end of his requested offense level of twenty

- on e, which is not the twenty

- five offense level the plea agreement had originally contemplated.

At his sentencing hearing, Gonz ález

- Santillan objected on the basis that the government violated the plea agreement, so we review his claim de novo. See United States v. Brown , 31 F.4th 39, 50 (1st Cir. 2022). We've held that traditional principles of contract law guide our interpretation of and performance of a plea agreement. See United States v. Clark , 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1995). And because a def endant who enters into a plea agreement waives his fundamental constitutional rights, " we hold prosecutors to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.'" United States v. Marín

- Echeverri , 846 F.3d 473, 478 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Al monte
- Nuñez , 771 F.3d at 89 ) . Accordingly, the government's burden is not satisfied by mere "lip service." See id. (citation omitted). And "[i]n addition to- 18

-

entitlement to the government's technical compliance with the agreement, appellant is entitled to the 'benefit of the bargain' and the 'good faith' of the prosecutor." Brown , 31 F.4th at 50 (quoting Ubiles

- Rosario , 867 F.3d at 283). Therefore, we consider "the totality of the circumstances" in considering whether the government failed to uphold it s end of the bargain. I d.

In support of its argument that Gonz ález

- Santillan breached the plea agreement when he fled the jurisdiction , thereby relieving the government of any further obligations thereunder, the government points to our sister circuit's opinion in Hallahan , which considered a similar assertion .

In that case, the defendants entered into plea agreements in exchange for the government's promise, amongst others, to recommend sentences at the low end of the applicable guideline ranges. Hallahan , 756 F.3d at 967. However, before their sentencing hearings got underway, defendants fled the jurisdiction for twelve years. See i d. After their capture and return, their sentencing hearings eventually commenced and the government sought not the low

- end sentence s originally bargained for, but rather the "longest of sentences" at the highest end of the applicable guideline advisory ran ge s , arguing that it was relieved of its original obligation to seek sentence s at the low end of the guideline range s because the defendants had breached the plea agreement by absconding. See i d. at 96 7

- 6 8, 972. The- 19

-

district court agreed and imposed the government's requested sentences at the higher end of the guideline ranges. See i d. at 96 7

- 6 8. Upon review and as relevant here , the Seventh Circuit sided with the government, finding that the government's pledge "w as excused by the defendants' breach of their obligation to show up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction." Id. at 972. More specifically, the court explained that:

An implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that the defendant show up fo r sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction. The defendants breached this obligation when they fled the district and avoided the punishment for their crimes for twelve years. The defendants' flight constituted a material breach, depriving them of the abil ity to hold the government to its promise to recommend the low end of the applicable guideline range. Id. ( citation omitted). 11

W e find Hallahan persuasive and in full accord with our circuit's plea

- bargaining jurisprudence . See United States v.

11 S ee also United States v. Munoz , 718 F.3d 726, 729

– 30 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that "[n]o defenda nt could reasonably expect that he could abscond for five years and still hold the government to its promises under the plea agreement" and that "[w]hen [defendant] fled the country and spent nearly five years as a fugitive in Mexico, he breached what we b elieve was an implied but obvious term of the plea agreement that he remain in the country and show up for sentencing"); United States v. Delacru z , 144 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Since defendant failed to appear for sentencing and continued his crimin al conduct, the government was no longer obligated to recommend a sentence of 24 months at his sentencing hearing.").- 20

-

Bermudez , 407 F.3d 536, 540 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[I]f [a] defendant fails to fulfill his promises, the government is released from the agreement." (quoting United States v. Gonzalez

- Sanchez , 825 F.2d 572, 578 (1st Cir. 1987) )). Like the Hallahan court we conclu de that "[a]n implied but obvious term of any plea agreement is that the defendant show up for sentencing and not flee the jurisdiction . " 756 F.3d at 972. Accordingly, we conclude that Gonz ález

- Santillan materially breached the plea agreem ent when he hightailed it out of the jurisdiction for thirteen years to avoid punishment. See id. And therefore, it follows that Gonz ález

- Santillan is now deprived of the opportunity to hold the government to its original pledge "that no other adjustment s or departures [were] applicable in this case nor [would] be sought by the parties." That is so because we have held that " if the defendant fails to fulfill his promises, the government is released from its agreement ." Bermudez , 407 F.3d at 540 (quoting Gonzalez

- Sanchez , 825 F.2d at 578). Accordingly, we detect no breach of the parties' plea agreement stemming from the government's request for the obstruction

- of

- justice sentencing enhancement. Nor do we find error in the district court's application of it. FINAL WORDS

In sum, Gonz ález

- Santillan's sentence is affirmed .