Defense Science Board Study 

on 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and 

Uninhabited Combat Aerial 

Vehicles 

February 2004 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
 

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent 

advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and 

recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of 

the Department of Defense. 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(ACQillSmON, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJEcr: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and

Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles

I am pleased to forward the final report of the DSB Task Force on Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles (UA V) and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCA V). This Task Force was tasked

to evaluate the current status of the UA Vs and UCA Vs and provide recommendations on how to

better integrate UA Vs and UCA Vs into the force structure.

The Task Force concluded it is time for the Department of Defense and the Services

move forward and make UA Vs and UCA Vs an integral part of the force structure, not an

"additional asset". To do so requires appropriate planning, appropriate budgeting, and

continued management attention from the Department of Defense and Service leadership.

The Task Force's findings and recommendations fall into eight subject areas:

Introduction of UA Vs into the force structure

VA V unit production costs

UA V mishap rates

Communications constraints

UA V interoperability and mission management

Integration of UA Vs into national airspace

Focus technology investments

Reduction of UA V combat vulnerability

I endorse all of the recommendations of the Task Force and propose that you review the Task

Force Co-Chainnen' s letter and the report.

~ ~ ~ ':;fJ... ~

William Schneider, Jr.

Chairman
This page intentionally left blank 


___________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ______________________________________________________ i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................... III

Accelerate the introduction of UAVs into the force structure.................... v

Cap Unit Production Costs............................................................................ vii

Reduce UAV Mishap Rates ........................................................................... vii

Communications.............................................................................................. ix

Interoperability and mission management ....................................................x

Integrate UAVs into national airspace......................................................... xii

Focus technology investments ..................................................................... xiii

Reduce UAV Combat Vulnerability............................................................ xiv

CHAPTER 1. ACCELERATE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS INTO THE FORCE 

STRUCTURE. .................................................................................3

CHAPTER 2. CAP UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS ...............................................13

CHAPTER 3. REDUCE UAV MISHAP RATES..................................................17

CHAPTER 4. COMMUNICATIONS ...................................................................23

CHAPTER 5. INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT.................29

CHAPTER 6. INTEGRATE UAVS INTO NATIONAL AIRSPACE.......................37

CHAPTER 7. FOCUS TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS .......................................43

CHAPTER 8. REDUCE UAV COMBAT VULNERABILITY ................................47

APPENDIX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE ..............................................................51

APPENDIX II. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP .....................................................53

APPENDIX III. ACRONYMS.............................................................................55
TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________ 

ii ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have come of age. 

Lessons from recent combat experiences in Kosovo, Afghanistan 

and Iraq have shown that UAVs can provide vastly improved 

acquisition and more rapid dissemination of Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) data. They are one of the principal 

contributors to successful outcomes for the United States. in these 

campaigns. The benefits and promise offered by UAVs in surveillance, 

targeting and attack have captured the attention of senior military and 

civilian officials in the Defense Department (DoD), members of 

Congress, and the public alike. Indeed, these recent combat operations 

appear to indicate that unmanned air systems have at last come of age. 

There is no longer any question of the technical viability and 

operational utility of UAVs. The success of UAVs in recent conflicts 

represents a historic opportunity to exploit the transformational 

capabilities inherent in UAVs/Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles 

(UCAVs). Transformation is not a term, it is a philosophy. 

Transformation is a predisposition to exploring adaptations of existing 

and new systems, doctrine and organizations. True transformation is 

not the result of a one-time improvement, but of sustained and 

determined effort. For example, the American forces used multiple 

Predator UAVs during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to provide a far 

more comprehensive operational perspective across the theater to the 

Combined Air Operations Center by integrating the Predator common 

operating picture with the Falcon View mission planning system. 

There is now another mission imperative and that is distance. During 

this review the new concept of Global Persistence Surveillance has 

specifically focused on the contributions of UAVs and UCAVs. 

During OIF Predator UAVs also enabled time-critical targeting via 

streaming video to strike platforms. Likewise one Global Hawk in the 

Iraqi theater from 8 March 03 to 23 April 03 accounted for 55% of the 

Time Sensitive Targets generated to kill air defense equipment. In 16 

missions, Global Hawk located 13 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

iv ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

batteries, 50 SAM launchers, over 70 SAM transport vehicles and over 

300 tanks. Notwithstanding the success of UAVs in OIF, UAVs have 

not been fully “embedded” in current Concepts of Operations 

(CONOPS) or valued with effects driven methodology. Future UAV 

programs must be conceived with this mix in mind, i.e. predefined 

operational concepts and effects driven methodology. UAVs are ideal 

systems to support the emerging joint character and the asymmetric 

nature of warfare. 

The Task Force feels it is time for DoD and the Services to move 

forward and make UAVs and UCAVs an integral part of the force 

structure, not an “additional asset”. To do so requires appropriate 

planning, appropriate budgeting, and continued management 

attention of DoD and Service leadership. The DoD and the Services 

have already started to integrate UAVs into their force structure plans. 

Currently there are UAV plans and roadmaps within the DoD and 

Services and the FY 04 budget also shows substantial increases in 

funding of UAV programs. While progress has been made in planning 

and funding for UAVs, the Services need to move from deconfliction 

to integration to interdependence. UAV capabilities should be 

assessed in the larger context of the Global Persistent Surveillance. 

UAVs can ideally complement current architectures for Future 

Imagery Architecture, New Imagery System, and Space Based Radar. 

This study identifies steps the Department of Defense and Armed 

Services can take to field a robust UAV and UCAV capability. The 

recommendations in his executive summary indicate the Task Force’s 

top level recommendations. Additional recommendations can be 

found in the body of the report. The Task Force’s findings and 

recommendations fall into eight subject areas and are described in this 

executive summary in order of importance. 
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ v

The Task Force found that the single most important recommendation is 

to accelerate the introduction of UAVs into the force structure. 

ACCELERATE THE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS

INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE

UAVs are not yet widely distributed across the Military Services or 

firmly integrated into Service force structures. Funding support has at 

times been tenuous, and consequently, the overall pace of introduction 

has been slow. The Task Force found that operational experience with 

Predator, Global Hawk, Hunter, and special purpose UAVs during 

recent conflicts demonstrated that, once employed by warfighters, the 

value of UAVs becomes immediately evident, ideas for new 

operational concepts are spawned, and strong advocacy begins to 

build. 

 The Task Force recommends the Secretary of Defense direct 

that UAV procurement be accelerated and systems be 

moved into operational units at a faster pace, with focus on 

UAVs now in production or completing development. 

Where appropriate, a military Service should be 

encouraged to procure the system of another Service as 

necessary to realize this goal, or alternatively, implement 

joint operating arrangements with the parent Service. 

Specific actions are recommended, in addition to currently funded 

efforts, as follows: 

Army 

 Procure Predator and/or employ Air Force Predator assets 

in the near term while formulating requirements for and 

developing the proposed Army-unique Extended Range 

UAV System. 

 Field those Hunter UAVs remaining in storage, and selectively 

upgrade their systems as necessary. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

vi ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

 Consider Fire Scout UAVs as a vertical take-off and landing 

(VTOL) supplement to the fixed-wing Shadow 200 UAV fleet. 

 More widely equip company-level units with man-portable 

UAV systems like Raven, Dragon Eye, or Pointer. 

Air Force and Navy 

 Merge the current USAF Global Hawk and Navy Broad 

Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) programs into a 

common-use High Altitude Endurance (HAE) UAV system 

that will meet the needs of both Services. 

Navy and Marine Corps 

 Secretary of the Navy direct a near term procurement of a 

small force of Fire Scout Vertical Take-off UAV (VTUAV) 

systems in order to provide the Fleet and Fleet Marine 

Force with a modern automated, ship-based VTOL UAV 

for developing operational concepts and requirements for a 

future naval ship-based VTOL tactical UAV system, and to 

serve as a potential contingency response resource. 

 Navy-Marine Corps form a VTUAV tactical development 

squadron to serve as the Fire Scout operating entity in time 

to meet a proposed Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 

date of early 2006. The Coast Guard should be invited to 

participate. 

 Pending development of a common Navy and Marine 

Corps VTOL system, the Marine Corps should procure 

Shadow 200 systems to replace Pioneer as needed to 

alleviate operational inventory shortages. 

Joint 

 Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) should be tasked to 

develop doctrine and tactics to integrate UAVs into the 

force structure with emphasis on employing existing 

systems and exploring cross-service use of assets 
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ vii

The Task force found two areas where significant changes are 

needed – and without changes the potential of UAVs and UCAVs 

will not be realized. 

These recommendations address the need to cap UAV unit 

production costs and to reduce UAV mishap rates. 

CAP UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS

During the Task Force deliberations the cost of UAVs and UCAVs 

was identified as one of the major factors potentially limiting the 

development, acquisition, and use of UAVs and UCAVs. If UAVs and 

UCAVs become too expensive to be employed in a high risk 

environment they will lose their utility. If this occurs, UAV and UCAV 

technology and operations will not evolve to their full potential. 

Accordingly the Task Force Recommends: 

 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should require 

each major UAV and UCAV program in system design and 

development or production stage to establish a well 

defined and well defended recurring unit production cost 

target per system. Deviation from that cost target will only 

occur by direction of the Service Secretary. 

 The recurring unit production cost target of the 

UAV/UCAV system must be established and justified in 

terms of what it costs manned platforms or other means to 

accomplish the same mission. 

 OSD should undertake an initial program by program 

review of recurring unit production cost targets as soon as 

possible and set up mechanisms for revisiting these figures 

throughout the life of the programs. 

REDUCE UAV MISHAP RATES

High mishap rates are frequently cited as a deterrent to more 

widespread adoption of UAVs into the force structure. Over the last 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

viii ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

decades, investments in manned aircraft reliability have been made to 

drive equipment failures to near zero. This implies that a considerable 

reduction in UAV accident rates can be obtained with reasonable 

investments. UAV systems should be designed to a set of 

specifications that takes into account the total cost of the system, the 

environment it is going to be used in, and the expected / acceptable 

loss rate. 

A significant contributor to UAV mishaps is the experience level of 

UAV operators and maintainers. The services need to enhance the 

overall professional development of UAV/UCAV professionals. Most 

of our most experienced operators/maintainers separate from the 

service or rotate to other assignments at the height of their proficiency. 

A UAV/UCAC operator/maintenance personnel management plans 

need to address accession, retention, education and training, career 

path advancement and methods for developing a UAV career field that 

combines research, development, acquisition, operations and 

employment. 

With regards to improving UAV mishap rates the Task Force 

makes the following recommendations: 

 Develop and implement reliability specification standards 

as a function of the class / type of UAV. These 

specifications should become part of the acquisition 

strategy for the system. 

 Institute a standardized data set for tracking reliability and 

system mishaps for UAVs. The manned aircraft community 

has this in place and with minor adjustments these same 

formats could, and should be used for unmanned systems. 

 All UAV class A mishaps should be investigated using 

established Service procedures. The results should be 

documented and fed back into a system reliability 

improvement program. 

 UAV system acquisition budgets should include resources 

for reliability improvement programs. 
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ ix

During its deliberations The Task Force also identified five topics 

requiring increased attention and new developments. 

COMMUNICATIONS

UAV sensor data are highly sought after by a wide audience of 

users. The current architecture stresses the available bandwidth and 

results in less than desired distribution of data. A set of programs 

structured under the Global Information Grid (GIG) initiative will 

provide a marked improvement in the available bandwidth provided 

the Services make matching improvements to facilitate access. 

However, even with GIG deployment, distribution over the “last 

tactical mile” will remain a problem with Navy ships at sea and land 

forces at battalion and below most affected. 

In order to better address communication bandwidth constraints 

the Task Force recommends:

 Maintain strong support for Net Centric Transformation. 

This includes the following efforts: Network Centric 

Enterprise Services, Transformational Communications 

Architecture, Joint Tactical Radio System, Wide Band 

Satellite Communications, Global Information Grid 

Bandwidth Extension (GIG-BE), Information Assurance 

Horizontal Fusion and Power to the Edge. 

 Initiate development of a UAV communications relay 

program to provide the “last tactical mile” connection to 

and among mobile forces. Consider Global Hawk or 

Predator for near term and extreme endurance systems for 

long term. Build on the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) program base (AJCN and 

others). 

 Ensure “reachback” capabilities have the necessary 

bandwidth and protection to support time sensitive 

targeting. The network centric infrastructure of Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA) command and control and data 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

x ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

flow have generated a worldwide “Virtual Crew” that adds 

tremendous capabilities and challenges to effective ISR 

employment. As long as UAVs have the unique attribute 

of being operated by virtual crews out of theater, 

information assurance will be paramount. 

 Institute mechanisms to conserve communications 

bandwidth. These actions should include cost of 

communication as part of the Total Cost of Ownership 

(TCO) of a UAV system and continue to search for new 

paradigms of use, (e.g. sampling at the Nyquist rate and 

on-board target recognition1). 

 Develop a common video data link between UAVs and 

manned ISR systems and attack assets. Video from UAVs 

should be sent to Joint Stars, Airborne Warning and 

Control System (AWACS), and MC2A etc. all using the 

same format and type of data link. 

INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT

Currently, there are so many different UAV systems in various 

stages of development that they are outstripping the ability to evolve 

standards and approaches for common mission management. 

It is clear that no single mission management system will fit all 

UAVs but common systems could be used for controlling certain 

classes and types of UAVs. At least 100 UAVs of 10 different types 

were used in OIF yet none of them allowed integrated direct data 

receipt. To date, individual Services have been reluctant to adopt 

common mission management systems or other interoperability 

approaches within similar types or classes of UAVs. Each Service has 

tended to initiate its own separate development program specifically 

tailored to its requirements rather than adopting an existing capability 

from another Service. 

 

1 Nyquist rate is the minimum theoretical sampling rate that fully describes a given signal. 
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ xi

To address the challenges of enhancing UAV interoperability and 

to achieve the benefits of common mission management systems for 

classes of similar UAVs, DoD should take the following actions: 

 Designate the Deputy, UAV Planning Task Force as the 

DoD advocate for UAV interoperability. The Deputy, UAV 

Planning Task Force should advise the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(USD[AT&L]) about the potential for an existing UAV 

system from another Service to satisfy the new 

requirements as part of the Defense Acquisition Board 

(DAB) review for each new UAV system. 

 Task JFCOM in concert with Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) to more aggressively develop UAV doctrine 

and tactics. As part of its new ISR mission, JFCOM must be 

more aggressive in the development of doctrine and tactics 

to integrate UAVs more fully into the force structure. Both 

JFCOM and STRATCOM have equities for Global ISR 

missions and transition from a platform based garrison 

force to a capabilities-based expeditionary force. 

 Evaluate a separate procurement of a common mission 

management system for all UCAV variants. UCAV, as it 

goes forward as a joint program, is a prime example of how 

a common mission management/vehicle control system 

could be derived for a UAV type that features different air 

vehicle platforms. The new UCAV Joint Program Office 

(JPO) should structure its acquisition with separate mission 

management procurement for a system to be used with all 

air vehicle variants. 

 Fund the UAV Planning Task Force at $10M per year. The 

DoD UAV Planning Task Force should be given a budget 

to support requirements, architecture and standards trades 

and related analyses required to provide better advice to 

USD(AT&L) relative to UAV issues. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

xii ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

INTEGRATE UAVS INTO NATIONAL AIRSPACE

The DoD has an urgent need to allow UAVs unencumbered access 

to the National Airspace System (NAS) outside of restricted areas 

(airbases and military operating areas), here in the United States and 

around the world. The need stems from the requirement to transit 

to/from combat areas of operations and perform time-sensitive 

training. It can be expected that Predators, Global Hawks and 

someday UCAVs and high altitude airships will require rapid access to 

the airspace to fly from the U.S. to/from overseas locations. Access is 

critical to optimized force structure allocation during conflict. OSD 

recognizes this issue as a high priority and describes it in detail in the 

DoD UAV Planning Task Force UAV Roadmap, December 2002. The 

Task Force makes the following recommendations: 

 DoD should become an active participant in National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) and industry efforts to 

accelerate “file and fly” capability for all classes of UAVs 

for operation in U.S. and international civil airspace as well 

as provide better integration of UAVs in military airspace 

during peace time training and in combat zones. It is 

absolutely critical that the DoD develop Detect, See and 

Avoid (DSA) requirements for all classes of UAVs that they 

intend to deploy in the NAS and International Airspace. 

Once these requirements are validated, then technology 

solutions should be developed and tested to DoD and FAA 

satisfaction. 

 DoD should evaluate all types of Over The Horizon (OTH) 

communications to insure compliance with FAA 

requirements. This may include dual redundant satellite 

communication (SATCOM) links. 

 Accelerate advanced research on autonomous vehicle 

operation, specifically focused on airspace situation 

awareness. This research would include speech recognition 

for Air Traffic Control (ATC), DSA compatibility with 
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ xiii

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) and ADS-B 

and new approaches for lost-link recovery. 

 Direct accelerated development of DSA and other 

technologies so as to permit safe flight of UAVs in mixed 

manned and unmanned aircraft environments. 

 Direct Commander Joint Forces Command to develop 

tactics, techniques and procedures that will assure safe, yet 

combat-effective flight of mixed forces of manned and 

unmanned aircraft in combat theaters. 

FOCUS TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

The Task Force found that, generally, there is sufficient DoD 

investment in technology. In addition some technology advancement 

is being driven by the demands of commercial products, relative to 

which, any DoD investment would be small. For instance, the lightweight batteries being used in small UAVs were developed by the 

laptop computer and cellular phone industry. 

Despite our general opinion that there is sufficient investment in 

DoD UAV technology, we did identify a few areas that are not getting 

sufficient investment. The following recommendations address these 

under-funded, high-payoff technologies: 

 Expedite the development of specifications, Research, 

Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and fielding 

of heavy-fuel engines suitable for UAVs. This is a 

technology area that will not be addressed by commercial 

efforts and will benefit Predator, Army TUAV, Hunter, 

Navy VTUAV, Pioneer and other UAVs. 

 Push technology to drive down the cost and weight, while 

maintaining performance, of all categories of sensors to 

maximize their utility on UAVs, as well as on manned and 

unmanned ground systems. 

 Develop new technologies to allow integration of UAVs 

into the national and international airspace 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

xiv ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

 Implement auto-land and auto-takeoff technology for all 

UAVs with a gross weight of greater than 100 pounds. This 

will benefit Predator, Hunter, Pioneer and others. 

In addition to the above specific recommendations, technologies 

that address the bandwidth constraint that is a limiting factor for all 

UAVs need continued investment. 

REDUCE UAV COMBAT VULNERABILITY

Most of the UAVs in the inventory today are quite vulnerable to a 

variety of different air defense systems. Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), 

shoulder-fired man portable systems, and radar directed low medium 

and high altitude surface to air missile systems can all be quite lethal to 

UAVs within their range. Current operational UAV systems have not 

explicitly included stealth or active countermeasure technology. 

Vulnerability to air defenses has led to concept of operations 

employing UAVs in regions where the air defense threats have already 

been largely eliminated. However, UAVs would be quite useful in 

providing extended surveillance in denied areas prior to conflict, and 

operating early in a conflict in a tactical reconnaissance role. To do so 

will require improvements to UAVs and UCAVs in the area of crosssection reduction and/or active countermeasures. 

Recommending development of Very Low Observable (VLO), high 

altitude, long endurance UAV would be an easy to recommend if 

unconstrained by costs. This approach is consistent with the desires 

expressed by senior personnel in OSD and USAF so there is a receptive 

audience. Persistent clandestine surveillance of deep, politically 

denied enemy airspace would be a terrific capability to have. 

However, there are a number of issues which must be considered in 

formulating a recommendation in this area. These include mission 

requirements and trades, survivability trade space, technical and 

operational feasibility, unit and opportunity costs. 

The panel did not have access to current special access initiatives in 

these areas but many of the members have been fully accessed to 
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ xv

similar programs during the last 10-15 years. The following 

recommendations are made based on that experience. 

 Compile “lessons learned” from past programs in this 

overall area – with full security access to each. Make these 

lessons available to the ongoing/future efforts to guard 

against making the same mistakes. 

 Establish an independent Red Team to review all aspects of 

the pre-conflict persistent mission vehicle. Develop a clear 

understanding of the intended threat sophistication, 

mission requirements, and concepts for survivability. 

Presence, persistence, operability, sensing, reporting and 

survival must be achieved essentially simultaneously and 

the analyses cannot deal with them one at a time. 

__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 1

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the deliberations and conclusions of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force on UAVs and UCAVs. The Defense 

Science Board (DSB) was asked to conduct a comprehensive review of 

DoD plans for development and fielding of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAVs) and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). The study 

was commissioned by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics), the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)2, and the 

Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems. 

The study was conducted at this time due to the substantial 

increase in operational employment of UAVs and UCAVs over the last 

decade in conflicts as well as the complementary role that UAVs and 

UCAVs fill, supporting existing intelligence and attack assets. 

The Task Force Terms of Reference states in part that “transforming 

the U.S. military requires rebalancing existing forces and capabilities. 

Global situation awareness and the global war on terrorism mandate 

responsive worldwide airborne intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance.” The Sponsors identified several areas of concern with 

UAVs and UCAVs that the task force should explore. These included: 

 Affordability and increasing costs 

 Interoperability disconnects 

 Communications architectures to include bandwidth and 

redundancy 

 Accident rates 

 

2 Note: The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD (C3I)) was reorganized as an Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence (USD (I)) and as an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and 

Information Integration) (ASD (NII)) during the conduct of this study. For the purposes 

of this study we will use the new designation ASD (NII). 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

2 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

 Operational control in both FAA airspace and military 

restricted airspace 

 Survivability 

 Military utility analysis 

 Management approaches. 

The Task Force was asked, based on the areas of concern shown 

above, to identify the principal impediments to full and rapid 

exploitation of the joint warfighting potential of UAV and UCAV 

systems and to make recommendations on how these constraints 

might be mitigated or removed. 

Task Force Composition and Deliberations 

The DSB Task Force on UAVs and UCAVs conducted a thorough 

review of UAV, UCAV systems, capabilities, affordability, 

interoperability, accident rates, operations control (air space issues), 

utility, and management 

The Task Force reviewed the overall pace of fielding of UAVs, as 

well as approaches being taken by the Armed Services in integrating 

UAVs and UCAVs into their operations and inventories, and provided 

key recommendations relating to items specified in the terms of 

reference. 

Mr. Robert Nesbit and Major General Kenneth Israel, USAF, (Ret) 

chaired the Task Force and conducted the study along with 8 

additional members. The Task Force Executive Secretary was Mr. 

Dyke Weatherington, Director of the UAV Planning Task Force in the 

Office of Strategic and Tactical Systems. A full listing of Task Force 

members can be found in Appendix II. 

To perform this review the Task Force conducted seven meetings 

over an 8-month period. Meetings were held with Office of Secretary 

of Defense, the Military Services, the Joint Staff, Defense Agencies, 

Service Laboratories, the Coast Guard, and UAV industry 

representatives. 
ACCELERATE THE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS 

_____________________________________________________ INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 3

CHAPTER 1. ACCELERATE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS INTO 

THE FORCE STRUCTURE. 

As with most new military concepts, the path to acceptance of 

UAVs and recognition of their worth has been long and not without 

obstacles. Unmanned aircraft as target vehicles and air-to-surface 

weapons date back many years and were employed in World War II. 

For ISR purposes, camera-equipped Ryan Firebee drones enjoyed great 

success during the Vietnam War, flying some 3,400 sorties over 

heavily-defended North Vietnam, including a few missions launched 

from aircraft carriers. But despite the promise of early experiments 

and operational deployments, the U.S. military has been slow to invest 

in UAV development and reluctant to incorporate unmanned systems 

into the regular force structure. Looking back, it appears that earlier 

introduction of UAVs was impeded by several factors – culture, 

immature technologies, and a general lack of recognition by advocates 

that unmanned systems demand aerospace-quality treatment in the 

design, manufacture and operation of the systems. 

Over the past several years, a confluence of events and 

developments has brought about a distinct change in how the military 

worth of UAVs is perceived by operational commanders and senior 

officials in the Military Services and OSD. These include: 

 Dramatic increases in computer processing power. 

 Advances in sensor technologies that reduce sensor size 

and weight, provide high resolution, and permit detection 

of fixed and moving targets under a variety of 

environmental conditions. 

 Improved communications, image processing, and image 

exploitation capabilities. 

 Pressure on the military by political authorities and the 

general public to minimize casualties and capture of 

aircrews by the enemy. 
CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

4 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

 Emergence of the requirement for continuous or 

“persistent” surveillance of the battlespace, providing 

commanders with what is, in effect, a low hanging, nearstationary satellite. Hence, the quest for long endurance 

UAV systems which, if manned, would tax or exceed the 

limits of human endurance. 

 Availability of robust, long endurance UAV platforms 

resulting from visionary investments by DARPA and the 

DoD in the 1980s and 1990s – Amber, Predator and Global 

Hawk – sometimes in the face of resistance from the 

Services. 

 And perhaps most importantly, the generally high marks 

accorded Predator and Hunter during Operation Allied 

Force in the 1999 air war against Serbia, and as indicated 

above, to Predator and Global Hawk during Afghanistan 

operations, and to UAVs overall in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. 

Figure 1.1 UAVs in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

IRAQ

Global Hawk

1

Silver Fox

66

Dragon Eye

20

16

28

FPASS

Pointer

Shadow 

Predator

17

20

16

Pioneer

Hunter

?

IRAQ

Global Hawk

1

Silver Fox

66

Dragon Eye

20

16

28

FPASS

Pointer

Shadow 

Predator

17

20

16

Pioneer

Hunter

?
ACCELERATE THE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS 

_____________________________________________________ INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 5

Despite this increased recognition of military worth and the 

advances made, UAVs are not yet widely distributed across the 

Military Services or firmly integrated into Service force structures. 

Funding support has at times been tenuous, and consequently, the 

overall pace of introduction has been slow. Indeed, as of early summer 

2003, only 175 UAVs of Pioneer/Shadow-size or larger were 

operational throughout the DoD, with the Navy and Marine Corps 

significantly behind the other Services in numbers and in fielding 

modern systems. 

There are multiple reasons for this slow pace of introduction and 

utilization of UAVs, with some key ones being: 

 Culture and policy. The culture of any large institution of 

long standing almost always militates against ready 

acceptance of new concepts or, in the case of the military, 

new weapons systems. 

 Competition with legacy and other new systems for funds. 

As a relatively new type of military weapon system, UAVs 

are in competition for funds with older systems or even 

other new systems that are viewed as front line mainstays 

of a Service’s force structure. In such an environment, it is 

often the case that a new kind of system, like UAVs, falls to 

the bottom of the priority list. 

 The program start-stop-start syndrome. The unfortunate 

practice of starting a military program and then, when 

production is about to commence, canceling it in favor of a 

supposedly more promising system, has plagued the UAV 

world for years. Each such sequence adds years of delay in 

equipping the operating forces with UAVs. Past program 

examples include the Navy/Marine Corps Amber, the 

Hunter Short-Range UAV, the Mid-Range UAV, and the 

first joint Tactical UAV (TUAV) program. And recently, 

Navy production and Fleet introduction of the alreadydeveloped Fire Scout has suffered from uncertainty over 

requirements. 
CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

6 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

 Greater than expected costs, high accident rates, unreliable 

systems, and combat survivability concerns. A reason 

often given in the past for a military Service not making a 

strong commitment to UAVs is that these new systems cost 

more than anticipated, suffer from high accident rates 

because of subsystem unreliability and operator error, and 

lack the combat survivability features of manned aircraft. 

These concerns are valid, but all are solvable if the requisite 

attention is paid to them during the requirement 

formulation and development process. 

 Reluctance of one military Service to use the UAV system 

of another. Although this may smack of the “not invented 

here” syndrome, it is an understandable characteristic of 

some validity. A commander feels most secure if he owns 

and completely controls a system that is fundamental to 

accomplishing his mission. But there are obvious cost and 

operational advantages for the DoD if multi-Service use 

can be achieved – overall system development costs are 

reduced and UAV force levels can be increased more 

rapidly. Here, “use” is defined in two ways. The first is for 

one Service to acquire and operate a system developed by 

another Service. And in the case of ISR, the second is 

merely to make use of the information generated by the 

UAV system of the other Service. 

 Radio Frequency (RF) bandwidth constraints and lack of 

interoperability. The Task Force believes that RF 

bandwidth capacity limitations, interoperability problems, 

and imagery processing/exploitation issues are near the 

top of the list of impediments to a more rapid introduction 

and utilization of UAV systems. Each of the military 

Services suffers from these constraints to varying degrees, 

with the Navy's ships at sea and Army and Marine Corps 

units at battalion level and below being the most adversely 

affected. 

Status Today. Despite the slow pace of introduction, the Army and 

Air Force are now operating modern UAVs and the two Services have 

systems in production as well. The Air Force is committed to Global 
ACCELERATE THE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS 

_____________________________________________________ INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 7

Hawk production, continues with Predator procurement, and is 

developing a more capable Predator B system. The Army is fielding its 

Shadow 200 tactical system in increasing numbers, continues to 

employ the Hunter UAV, and has plans to increase use and introduce 

small man-portable systems like Pointer and Raven. 

The Navy has no UAVs in production and none in its operating 

forces. However, the Navy has committed to purchasing two Global 

Hawks for experimentation and has plans to put in service both high 

altitude long endurance and ship-based tactical ISR UAV systems at 

the end of this decade. 

The Marine Corps has some 32 aging Pioneers, a small land-based 

tactical system developed in the 1980s, which were used with mixed 

effectiveness during Operation Desert Storm as well as the Kosovo and 

Iraq campaigns. Additionally, the Marines have begun to introduce 

the small man-portable Dragon Eye system to serve units at battalion 

level and below. A listing of current DoD UAV systems is shown in 

Figure 1.2 below. 

Figure 1.2 Current DoD UAV Systems 

555 (Army)

126 (AF) 2002 2004 15 15/5 Army &Air Force Raven AeroVironment

1999 N/A 5 0 Test / CONOPS Navy & 

Army RQ-8/Fire Scout Northrop Grumman 

Army 1991 N/A 39 39/6 Extended life IAI /

Northrop Grumman RQ-5/Hunter

164 planned 

(41 systems) AAI Army 1998 2003 40 24/17 RQ-7/ Shadow 200

1985 1986 32 21/3 Extended life Navy & 

USMC RQ-2/Pioneer Pioneer UAVs, Inc 

60 to be delivered 

1QFY04 Lockheed Martin Air Force 2002 2002 120 60 Desert Hawk (FPASS)

Dragon Eye AeroVironment USMC 2000 2003 40 18 933 planned

51 planned 2

(ACTD)

4 (ACTD)

1 (Prod) Northrop Grumman Air Force 1998 2006 RQ-4/Global Hawk

General Atomics Air Force 2001 TBD 2 0 TBD MQ-9/

Predator B

MQ-1/Predator General Atomics Air Force 1994 2004 53 40/8 68 planned

Status

Aircraft 

/Grnd Stn 

Available

Total 

Aircraft IOC First

Flight

Lead 

Service System Manufacturer

555 (Army)

126 (AF) 2002 2004 15 15/5 Army &Air Force Raven AeroVironment

1999 N/A 5 0 Test / CONOPS Navy & 

Army RQ-8/Fire Scout Northrop Grumman 

Army 1991 N/A 39 39/6 Extended life IAI /

Northrop Grumman RQ-5/Hunter

164 planned 

(41 systems) AAI Army 1998 2003 40 24/17 RQ-7/ Shadow 200

1985 1986 32 21/3 Extended life Navy & 

USMC RQ-2/Pioneer Pioneer UAVs, Inc 

60 to be delivered 

1QFY04 Lockheed Martin Air Force 2002 2002 120 60 Desert Hawk (FPASS)

Dragon Eye AeroVironment USMC 2000 2003 40 18 933 planned

51 planned 2

(ACTD)

4 (ACTD)

1 (Prod) Northrop Grumman Air Force 1998 2006 RQ-4/Global Hawk

General Atomics Air Force 2001 TBD 2 0 TBD MQ-9/

Predator B

MQ-1/Predator General Atomics Air Force 1994 2004 53 40/8 68 planned

Status

Aircraft 

/Grnd Stn 

Available

Total 

Aircraft IOC First

Flight

Lead 

Service System Manufacturer

COTS/ Developmental/Operational System

small medium large

Current as of Dec 2, 2003
CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

8 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

In the aggregate, the Naval Services, which once led the Defense 

Department in developing and fielding UAVs, are now lagging the 

other Services in gaining operational experience, developing 

operational concepts, and exploiting the transformational warfighting 

potential offered by unmanned air systems. Absent a dramatically 

increased involvement with UAVs, the Navy and Marine Corps run 

the risk of falling further behind, not fully exploiting the benefits 

offered by Army and Air Force systems, and lagging in efforts to shape 

the direction new UAVs systems will take in the future. 

Looking to the future, DARPA is pursuing a number of UAV 

advanced technology demonstrations in concert with the military 

Services – fighter-like air vehicles for lethal missions (Joint Unmanned 

Combat Air System [J-UCAS]), rotorcraft for attack and long 

endurance ISR (A160, CRW, Unmanned Combat Aerial Rotorcraft 

[UCAR]), and small or micro-UAVs for urban combat. 

As stated in the Executive Summary, there are UAV plans and 

roadmaps within the DoD and Services and the FY 04 budget (See 

figure 1.3 below) shows substantial increases in funding of UAV 

programs. While progress has been made Service leadership still has 

not fully embraced the integration of UAVs into the force structure. 

Figure 1.3 UAV Yearly Funding Profile - FY04 data 1956

0

$M (TY$)

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 106144 165252430 225 267 272 553 359420 388 284363 763 1366 1694 2101 2010

2200

2400

2743

3221

2600

2800

3000

3200

1956

0

$M (TY$)

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 106144 165252430 225 267 272 553 359420 388 284363 763 1366 1694 2101 2010

2200

2400

2743

3221

2600

2800

3000

3200
ACCELERATE THE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS 

_____________________________________________________ INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 9

The Task Force also notes that strong support for UAVs exists in 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the regional Combatant 

Commanders, and in the Congress. Therefore, it makes sense for the 

Military Services to capitalize on the current positive climate and move 

out with dispatch to exploit the momentum that has been established. 

Operational Experience the Key. The Task Force found that 

operational experience with Predator, Global Hawk, Hunter, and 

special purpose UAV systems during recent conflicts demonstrated 

that, once employed by warfighters, the value of UAVs becomes 

immediately evident, ideas for new operational concepts are spawned, 

a constituency is formed, and strong advocacy begins to build. Hence, 

the lead element of a strategy to increase employment of UAVs should 

be to accelerate the introduction of those systems that are in 

production or have completed development. To this end, the Task 

Force believes that: 

 Requirements generation is best approached from the 

perspective of mission needs and effects rather than that of 

platform ownership or base location; 

 Acquisition or employment of UAVs developed by one 

Service should be considered by other Services in their 

plans to more rapidly introduce UAV capabilities into their 

force structures and new development programs should be 

initiated only if an existing system or modification cannot 

provide the desired effect; and 

 Essential enhancements to Command, Control and 

Communications (C3) and information exploitation 

systems must be made concurrent with accelerating the 

introduction of already-developed UAV systems into the 

Military Services. 

Assessment: Accelerated Fielding of UAV Systems 

 is Imperative 

In assessing the UAV situation today, the Task Force finds that the 

U.S. has made progress over the last three to four years in moving to 

exploit the potential offered by unmanned air systems. Little doubt 
CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

10 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

remains as to the operational utility and military worth of UAVs. They 

have proven themselves in combat and warfighters want them, 

particularly since UAVs are now seen as essential to realizing allimportant persistent surveillance of the battlespace. 

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the pace of UAV 

introduction is slow. Much remains to be done before the military can 

fully realize the potential benefits offered by these transformational 

systems. The Task Force believes the key to making more rapid 

progress is to get UAVs into operational units on an accelerated basis. 

And here the focus should be on those UAVs now in production or 

which have completed development and offer significant operational 

utility; these include Global Hawk, Predator, Shadow 200, Fire Scout, 

Raven, Dragon Eye and Pointer. 

Concurrently, the Military Services must move vigorously to 

eliminate or significantly mitigate interoperability deficiencies as well 

as those in C3 and imagery exploitation systems equipment and 

infrastructure that constrain the use of modern airborne ISR systems, 

such as Predator and Global Hawk, by ships at sea and Army and 

Marine Corps forces ashore. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

ACCELERATE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE 

The Task Force recommends the Secretary of Defense direct that 

UAV procurement be accelerated and systems moved into operational 

units at a faster pace, with focus on UAVs now in production or 

completing development. Where appropriate, a military Service 

should be encouraged to procure the system of another Service as 

necessary to realize this acceleration goal, or alternatively, implement 

joint operating arrangements with the parent service. Specific actions 

are recommended as follows: 

Army 

 Procure Predator and/or employ Air Force Predator assets 

in the near term while formulating requirements for and 
ACCELERATE THE INTRODUCTION OF UAVS 

_____________________________________________________ INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 11

developing the proposed Army-unique Extended Range 

UAV System. 

 Field those Hunter UAVs remaining in storage, selectively 

upgrading their systems as necessary. 

 Consider Fire Scout as a VTOL supplement to the fixedwing Shadow 200 UAV fleet. 

 More widely equip company-level units with man-portable 

UAV systems like Raven, Dragon Eye, or Pointer. 

Air Force and Navy 

 Merge the current USAF Global Hawk and Navy BAMS 

programs into a common-use HAE UAV system that will 

meet the needs of both Services. The two Services would 

join to develop, procure and operate a system suitable for 

both the overland and maritime ISR missions. In their joint 

approach, the two Services should increase the system 

production rate above that now planned in order to realize 

operational and cost benefits, and also explore the potential 

for a joint arrangement with the Department of Homeland 

Security and its agencies. The Memorandum of Agreement 

between the two Services should include delineation of 

responsibilities for requirements development, R&D, 

procurement, operations, and logistics support. The 

current EA-6B program should be considered as an initial 

MOA model. 

Navy and Marine Corps. 

 Secretary of the Navy direct a near term procurement of 

Fire Scout VTUAV systems in order to provide the Fleet 

and Fleet Marine Force with a modern automated, shipbased VTOL UAV for developing operational concepts and 

requirements for a future naval ship-based VTOL tactical 

UAV system, and to serve as a potential contingency 

response resource. 

 Navy-Marine Corps form a VTUAV tactical development 

squadron to serve as the Fire Scout operating entity in time to 
CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

12 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

meet a proposed IOC date of early 2006. The Coast Guard 

should be invited to participate. 

 Pending development of a common Navy and Marine 

Corps VTOL system that satisfies the tactical UAV 

requirements of both Services, the Marine Corps should 

procure Shadow 200 systems to replace Pioneer as needed 

to alleviate operational inventory shortages. 

Joint 

 JFCOM should be tasked to develop doctrine and tactics to 

integrate UAVs into the force structure with emphasis on 

employing existing systems and exploring cross-service use 

of assets 
PUT A CAP ON UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS

_________________________________________________________ FOR UAVS AND UCAVS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 13

CHAPTER 2. CAP UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS

During the Task Force deliberations the cost of UAVs and UCAVs was 

identified as one of the major factors potentially limiting the development, 

acquisition, and use of UAVs and UCAVs. If UAVs and UCAVs become too 

expensive to be employed in a high risk environment they will lose their 

utility and be treated similarly to manned aircraft. If this occurs, UAV and 

UCAV technology and operations will not evolve to their full potential. 

UAV systems should be designed to a set of specifications that takes into 

account the total cost of the system, the environment it is going to be used 

in, and the expected / acceptable loss rate. 

Findings 

 Requirements driven cost growth is a continuing problem 

for aircraft development programs. It is a particularly 

acute problem for unmanned aircraft programs because of 

their lack of maturity and lack of rigor in the requirements 

definition process. 

 There is a history of major requirements driven cost growth 

for joint unmanned aircraft programs because of frequent 

program starts and stops, low production rates, and lack of 

competition all of which exacerbate the cost issues. 

 Without extraordinary attention and decisive management 

controls, most UAV programs will face a low likelihood of 

transitioning from development to production because of 

significant increases in unit costs. 

Cost Cap Determination 

The UCAV cost cap should be based on a rational percentage of the 

current market cost of a similar manned aircraft such as the F-16 

aircraft equipped for all weather air to ground combat. The F-16 

Fighting Falcon is a compact, all weather, multi-role fighter aircraft. In 

an air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 

kilometers), deliver its weapons and return to its starting point, 
CHAPTER 2 __________________________________________________________________ 

14 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

however it is not as stealthy as a UCAV should be. The F-16 empty 

weight is 8,500kg (18,739 lbs) and the unit cost of the F-16 C/D was 

approximately $27M in FY98$. A suggested UCAV unit cost could be 

based on the ratio of the empty weight of the UCAV vs. the F-16. E.g. 

the planned X-45B, which is estimated to have an empty weight of 

approximately 14,500 lbs. would be 77% of the F-16 empty weight. 

The unit cost of an X-45B, for this example, would be capped at 

approximately $20.8M (FY98$). However, the empty weight of the X45C model is estimated as 18,000 lbs which is about 96% of the F-16 

C/D, therefore the cost would be capped at approximately $26.5M 

(FY98$). 

 The cost cap for the UCAV would cover the recurring unit 

production cost of an integrated aircraft consisting of: airframe, 

engine, flight control system, navigation system, low observable 

treatments, C2 communications, sensor systems needed for the basic 

mission including sensor processing and sensor communications. 

Excluded are any self-defense systems, weapons and ISR specific 

sensors since the cost of such sensors and weapons is very dependent 

on the specific mission. Cost of the sensor system alone can be a high 

percentage of the cost of the basic aircraft. The recurring unit 

production cost should be based on a reasonable quantity buy (e.g. > 

50 aircraft) using rate manufacturing tooling. 

The Role of Competition 

Lack of competition in developing new-concept UAV systems can 

be a significant factor in program cost growth. This is an important 

issue since, in recent times, UAV system Advanced Technology 

Development Programs (ATDs) are increasingly turning into 

acquisitions. A winner of a single ATD paper downselect is aware of 

this trend and can be counted on to push hard for a sole-source 

acquisition. And once such as contract is signed, the government 

becomes, in a sense, hostage to the contractor who won the paper 

contest, this at least two years earlier than would be the case had final 

selection been made after a competitive fly-off. It is not unusual in 

such cases for the contractor's top design and management team to be 

pulled off the project and reassigned elsewhere immediately after 

winning a no fly-off contract. As a consequence, problems begin to 
PUT A CAP ON UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS

_________________________________________________________ FOR UAVS AND UCAVS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 15

emerge, schedules slip, and development costs increase. It is critical 

that UAV programs be structured to result in reasonable production 

quantities or affordable cost will never be achieved. Many programs 

to date have suffered from this problem. 

Hence, the Task Force believes that taxpayers and the military 

would be better served by carrying competition for complex, state-ofthe-art UAV systems through a fly-off demonstration rather than 

selecting only a single contractor to build and fly his prototype design. 

Maintaining two teams through fly-off would foster innovation, give 

the customer additional time to decide what he really wants, and 

reduce development time and cost as well as overall time to Initial 

Operational Capability (IOC). Importantly also, it would keep on the 

pressure to control cost growth. 

DARPA and the Army are now headed down a no fly-off 

competition path for the UCAR, which promises to be a dramatically 

different, highly complex system, perhaps more so than J-UCAS. The 

stated reason for this approach for UCAR is the added cost of carrying 

both Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman through flight 

demonstration, an amount estimated at $160M. Since near-years 

dollars are hard to come by, the points above about innovation, 

reduced overall cost, a more certain match to requirements, and 

shorter time to IOC must be forcefully presented. Realization of a flyoff competition may well require intervention by the Secretary of 

Defense. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

CAP UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS 

 OSD should require each major UAV and UCAV program 

in System Design and Development or Production stage to 

establish a well defined and well defended recurring unit 

production cost target per vehicle. Deviation from that cost 

target will only occur by direction of the Service Secretary. 

 The recurring unit production cost target and the total cost 

of ownership of the UAV/UCAV system must be 
CHAPTER 2 __________________________________________________________________ 

16 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

established and justified in terms of what it costs manned 

platforms or other means to accomplish the same mission. 

 OSD should undertake initial program by program reviews 

of recurring unit production cost targets as soon as possible 

and set up mechanisms for revisiting these figures 

throughout the life of the programs. 

 OSD should always approach UAV/UCAV development 

with the intent to begin with competition and keep 

competition through early flight test. OSD should establish 

a competition advocacy team that can make the case to 

Congress on the benefit of competition. 

 The Secretary of Defense is requested to establish 

competition through fly-off as the norm for new-concept 

UAV system developments and acquisitions. In the near 

term, the current DARPA/Army UCAR program should 

be restructured to provide for two-contractor competition 

through fly-off. 
_____________________________________________________IMPROVE UAV MISHAP RATES

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 17

CHAPTER 3. REDUCE UAV MISHAP RATES

UAVs have been under development by the Department of Defense 

since the late 1950s. During the period from 1950-1970 most of these 

systems were relatively small, less than 2,000 pounds, and were used 

for local area reconnaissance. During the Vietnam War the systems 

were modified for many different applications including armed 

reconnaissance, Signals Intelligence and Psychological Operations. 

These systems were still relatively inexpensive compared with manned 

aircraft of their day. 

In the early 1970s DoD began developing and testing larger UAVs 

characterized by the Compass Cope series of systems. While still only a 

fraction of the cost of manned systems the cost of UAVs was beginning 

to increase as the size of the UAV increased and most importantly the 

size of the payload increased. The payload cost can often be of the 

same order as the cost of the airframe. 

 Many of these early systems were not developed or procured 

under classical 5000 series acquisition rules. As such, specifications on 

system reliability were often absent. In 1994 the HAE program office 

placed a specification of no more than one loss per 2000 flight hours on 

the demonstration systems. The goal of the Army TUAV program for 

the operational system is one mechanical beyond economic repair 

(BER) per 1200 flight hours. The Predator system was built with 

highly reliable subsystems, with the exception of the propulsion 

system. The propulsion subsystem has caused the vast majority of the 

system losses that were not combat losses. Predator was first procured 

in 1995; there was no system reliability specification levied at that time. 

Current Status. The DoD is currently procuring and/or operating 

the following UAV systems on a routine basis: Global Hawk, Predator, 

Army TUAV, Navy Vertical Take-Off UAV (VTUAV), Pioneer, and 

Hunter. These systems are operating in several different theaters and 

at training bases in the United States. These systems still have 

relatively few flight hours compared with manned aircraft. All of 

these systems exist in limited numbers ranging from 2 operational 
CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

18 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

Global Hawk air vehicles to approximately 9 operational Pioneer 

systems, consisting of 5 air vehicles each. Even after 17 years the 

Pioneer system has less than 20,000 flight hours. 

As the systems get larger and more costly an increased emphasis 

on system reliability is warranted. The desire for increased reliability 

is also being driven by the need to routinely operate in the National 

Airspace. Current statistics on the loss rate of the Predator, Pioneer 

and Hunter are compared with military and general aviation aircraft 

per 100,000 flight hours in Table 3.1. 

UAV Mishaps Aircraft Mishaps 

Predator – 32* F-16 – 3 

Pioneer – 334* General Aviation – 1 

Hunter – 55* Regional Commuter – 0.1 

* much less than 100,000 flight hours Large airliners – 0.01 

Table 3.1 Class A Mishap Rates Per 100,000 Flight Hours 

More of these UAV mishaps can be avoided. There are several 

factors at work contributing to UAV mishaps. These include the 

original design requirements, maturity of the UAV systems, resources 

applied to identify and correct problems, and consequence of failure. 

These UAV systems have very limited flight hours compared to 

manned systems. Of significance is that the manned system programs 

are deliberately structured to provide resources to find and fix 

reliability related problems. The cost of the manned airframe is high 

and the cost in human terms is high. The UAV programs have not had 

the resources necessary to fix root cause problems to a level necessary 

to drive the systems towards manned aircraft reliability. 

The dominant causes of UAV mishaps are presented in table 3.2. 
_____________________________________________________IMPROVE UAV MISHAP RATES

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 19

UAV Mishap Cause Percent 

Power and Propulsion 37% 

Flight Controls 25% 

Human Error 17% 

Communications 11% 

Miscellaneous 10% 

Table 3.2 Causes of UAV Mishaps 

Findings 

UAV power and propulsion related failures have been well 

documented. The need for highly reliable, heavy fuel engines capable 

of operating at the altitudes, temperatures and military operating 

environments expected for UAVs has been a documented requirement 

since the mid-1980s. 

UAV flight control failures are usually failures of the actuator 

subsystem. The primary reason has been cost. These are typically off 

the shelf subsystems, which were designed for a very different 

operating environment than the UAV uses them in. Some use manned 

aircraft quality components, (i.e. Predator), but some do not, (i.e. 

Pioneer). 

Many of the human error induced accidents occur on takeoff and 

landing. The Global Hawk and Army TUAV systems have moved to 

totally hands- off takeoff and landing technology. The Army 

specifically required this in their TUAV solicitation based on their 

historic loss rate with Hunter and the Navy loss rate with Pioneer. 

These auto-takeoff / auto-land systems have been proven reliable 

across a wide range of UAVs. There are several types, each with 

features specific to a class of UAV system. 
CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

20 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

Figure 3.3 below shows that UAV systems can achieve manned 

aircraft like reliability if the resources are applied to achieve that goal. 

Figure 3.3 – UAV vs. F-16 Mishap Rates 

Predator is currently coming down the same historic line that the F16 did. However, the known problems with the Predator propulsion 

system and the known issues with manned takeoff and landing errors 

are not being adequately addressed. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

REDUCE UAV MISHAP RATES 

While UAV systems could have been designed, fabricated and 

tested to manned aircraft specifications, that has not been the case. 

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06 1.E+07

Cumulative Flight Hours (FH)

F-16

Predator

Global Hawk

Mishap Rate/100K FH

1x103 1x104 1x105 1x106 1x107

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06 1.E+07

Cumulative Flight Hours (FH)

F-16

Predator

Global Hawk

Mishap Rate/100K FH

1x103 1x104 1x105 1x106 1x107 1x103 1x104 1x105 1x106 1x107
_____________________________________________________IMPROVE UAV MISHAP RATES

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 21

UAV systems should be designed to a set of specifications that takes 

into account the total cost of the system, the environments it is going to 

be used in, and the expected / acceptable loss rate. 

Several actions should be taken: 

 Develop and implement reliability specification standards 

as a function of the class / type of UAV. These 

specifications should become part of the acquisition 

strategy for the system. 

 Institute a standardized data set for tracking reliability and 

system mishaps for UAVs. The manned aircraft community 

has this in place and with minor adjustments these same 

formats could, and should be used for unmanned systems. 

 All UAV class A mishaps should be investigated using 

established Service procedures. The results should be 

documented and fed back into a system reliability 

improvement program. 

 UAV system acquisition budgets should include resources 

for reliability improvement programs. 

A careful examination of all subsystems contribution to the overall 

accident rate of UAV systems should be conducted to provide DoD 

with a baseline. Given that an overall reliability specification has been 

provided to the contractors, it is not necessary for the Government to 

specify the subsystem level requirements in a solicitation. The 

contractors should be held responsible for that allocation. If the 

contractor believes significant resources are required for a particular 

subsystem to meet the overall system requirement it will be reflected 

in their bid to the Government. 

Unmanned Air Vehicle systems were long viewed as overgrown 

model airplanes. Today’s systems are a long way from that early 

perception. These are sophisticated systems carrying expensive 

payloads performing critical military missions. The utility of these 

systems is no longer in question. The ability to task the systems and 

have confidence they are going to be ready to fly, fly the mission 

successfully, and return to begin the cycle over will require 
CHAPTER 3 __________________________________________________________________ 

22 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

improvements in the overall reliability of these systems. If the desire is 

to achieve manned-aircraft-like reliability, substantial additional 

investment will be required. For many classes of UAVs, that additional 

level of investment is not warranted. This trade-off should be 

recognized in the requirements process and both requirements and 

performance expectations should match the resulting decision. 
_____________________________________________________________COMMUNICATIONS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 23

CHAPTER 4. COMMUNICATIONS 

There is widespread concern that UAVs are consuming 

increasingly large amounts of communication bandwidth. While true, 

this is also an indication that UAV sensor products are highly sought 

after by a wide audience. On-board processing and algorithms to 

survey large areas and reliably select only targets of interest for 

transmission could decrease the communications load – but this 

technology is not yet available. A set of programs structured under the 

Global Information Grid (GIG) initiative will provide a marked 

improvement in the available bandwidth provided the Services make 

matching improvements to facilitate access. However, even with GIG 

deployment, distribution over the “last tactical mile” will remain a 

problem with Navy ships at sea and land forces at battalion and below 

most affected. 

Communications represent a major subsystem for UAVs. 

Bandwidth is needed to support systems that control the flight of 

UAVs, including launch and recovery, to transmit the output of onboard sensors to both line of sight and beyond line of sight processing 

centers, and to interface with air traffic control centers. Equally 

important is the recognition of a mission area for UAVs acting as 

communication relays linking tactical forces, including other UAVs, 

and providing connection to global support centers. Current data link 

requirements range from a few kbps for launch and recovery to in 

excess of 250 Mbps for the transmission of output of sophisticated 

sensors. Global Hawk has a documented data rate requirement of 548 

Mbps for “multi-INT” sensors in 2015 and beyond, Predator requires 

44.7 Mbps. 

UAVs will play an important role in future military operations. It 

is anticipated that DoD operations will be comprised of force 

capability packages with elements provided by the Services suited to 

the need. These will be capable of being rapidly deployed. Command 

and control will be accomplished using a highly networked 

communications system, in contrast to point-to-point circuits. In the 

early stages of such deployment prior to deployment of follow-on 
CHAPTER 4 __________________________________________________________________ 

24 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

forces, emphasis will be placed on reachback to CONUS based support 

centers for connection to intelligence processing centers, logistic 

support centers, medical centers, weather and other supporting 

elements. Airborne relays will be needed to link mobile forces in the 

field and other UAVs. This need was recognized in the ASD (C3I), 

(ASD (NII)), study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Communications 

Platforms, dated 4 November 1997. Major conclusions were: 

 Tactical communications needs: can be met much more 

responsively and effectively with Airborne 

Communications Nodes (ACNs) than with satellite 

 ACNs can effectively augment theater satellite capabilities 

by addressing deficiencies in capacity and connectivity. 

 Satellites are better suited than UAVs for meeting high 

capacity, worldwide communications needs. 

Bandwidth requirements will be increasing. Currently there are 

roughly 100 UAVs in service covering the various mission areas. This 

number will be increasing with production of Global Hawk, Shadow, 

Predator, and potentially large numbers of UCAVs. Additionally, new 

sensors for Electro/Optical (EO), Infrared, Synthetic Aperture Radar 

and Hyperspectral (EO/IR/SAR/HSI) sensing will add to the 

demand. 

Intelligence, operations, and support systems increasingly rely on 

assured communications bandwidth. In Desert Storm 99 mbps was 

available to support 542,000 deployed troops. In OIF, 3.2 Gigabits was 

available to support 350,000 deployed troops. 84% of this bandwidth 

was provided by commercial communications. However there were 

still communications problems in OIF with UAVs. There was a 30 day 

wait for Hunter in Kuwait for frequency allocation in congested (C 

band) spectrum. Frequencies were previously approved prior to 

deployment. Division commanders want communications relay 

capability with UAVs. SIPRNET and NIPRNET are required for 

intelligence analysis and UAV operations and soldiers use internet 

chat between nodes for coordination. Flat hierarchy of command (from 

commanders (LTC) to UAV Specialists (E-3/4)) made the Hunter UAV 

responsive to unit of action tasking. Ipso Facto our UAV 
_____________________________________________________________COMMUNICATIONS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 25

communication links must be properly engineered and designed for 

protection and responsiveness 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

COMMUNICATIONS 

 Maintain strong support for Net Centric Transformation. 

This includes the following efforts: Network Centric 

Enterprise Services, Transformational Communications 

Architecture, Joint Tactical Radio System, Wide Band 

Satellite Communications, GIG-BE, Information Assurance 

Horizontal Fusion and Power to the Edge. 

Power to the Edge implies equipping warfighters across 

the entire battlespace with the ability to access needed 

information at the right time to make the right decisions. 

Power to the edge means making information available on a 

network that people can depend on and trust, and 

populating the network with new, dynamic sources of 

information to defeat the enemy while denying the enemy 

advantages and exploiting its weaknesses. 

ASD (NII) has advanced the concept of an integrated 

system Global Information Grid (GIG) incorporating GIG 

Bandwidth Expansion, newly conceived Transformation 

Satellites, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) into a system 

of systems – in effect creating the backbone of a fully 

connected, global Internet-like communication service. A 

necessary component to connect the tactical forces on the 

move to this mega system is the existence of a relay to 

handle the “last mile problem” linking battlefield 

UHF/VHF systems and providing global connectivity. 

While the ASD (NII) leadership with Defense 

Information Systems Agency/National Security Agency 

acquisition is laudable, the difficulty in coordinating the 

many programs involved including the UAV relay will be a 

challenge over the long time period development will take 

place. A communication program office, or other 
CHAPTER 4 __________________________________________________________________ 

26 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

management mechanism, that exercises oversight over the 

myriad of programs and directs adjustments to program 

schedules and functionality is needed. JFCOM is 

empowered with a role to ensuring the viability of Joint 

operations and STRATCOM has been assigned leadership 

for global command and control. The Combatant 

Commands need to work together in concert with Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to put high priority on the development of 

the end-to-end GIG and to ensure that a central design 

authority is properly functioning. While substantial funds 

(approximately $5.5B) are currently committed, efforts need 

to be made to ensure the development path continues over 

a long time period. 

 The availability of the GIG is also important for another 

reason. Many of today’s UAVs are dependent on 

commercial satellite communications for narrow band 

beyond line-of-sight and wide-band beyond line of-of-sight 

connection because Military Satellite Communications 

(MILSAT) are already overscheduled. The use of MILSAT, 

via GIG, will provide information security and 

improvements in anti-jam performance and its development 

will provide the increased bandwidth which is in short 

supply currently and likely to remain so for 10 years. 

 Initiate development of a UAV communications relay 

program to provide the “last tactical mile” connection to 

and among lower echelon forces. Consider Global Hawk 

or Predator for near term and extreme endurance systems 

for long term. Build on the DARPA program base 

(Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN) and others). 

The Services have expressed individual relay 

requirements and they are in the early stages of acquisition 

under the Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), 

Army Future Combat System (FCS), and Air Force relay 

programs. The DARPA’s AJCN airborne relay program 

using Global Hawk/Shadow is underway and will provide 

a development vehicle for relay operations. While the 

individual Service needs are understandable, efforts need to 
_____________________________________________________________COMMUNICATIONS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 27

be made to ensure that any high altitude relay can support 

the general requirements of the Combatant Commander. 

Combat theatre relays need to present a single point of 

contact to satellites for relay purposes. This is necessary 

since the satellites will have limited RF and laser capability 

and can ill afford to support multiple theatre UAVs. It also 

implies that UAVs will be equipped with UAV to UAV 

communications capability to enable a single switching 

center concept and that control of the communication UAV 

network is under central control. A concept of operations 

(CONOPS) and a protocol for this control process needs to 

be developed. 

 Ensure “reachback” capabilities have the necessary 

bandwidth and protection to support time sensitive 

targeting. 

The network centric infrastructure of Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft (RPA) command and control and data flow have 

generated a worldwide “Virtual Crew” that adds 

tremendous capabilities and challenges to effective ISR 

employment. As long as UAVs have the unique attribute of 

being operated by virtual crews out of theater, information 

assurance will be paramount. 

 Institute mechanisms to conserve communications 

bandwidth. 

Include cost of communication as part of the Total Cost 

of Ownership (TCO) of an UAV system and continue to 

search for new paradigms of use – sampling at the Nyquist 

rate, on-board target recognition, etc. 

 Develop a common video data link between UAVs and 

manned ISR systems. 

For instance the Scathe View System sent Predator video 

images to an AC-130 gunship patrolling in Afghanistan, 

which then could rapidly engage the targets before they 

could hide again. Video from UAVs should also be sent to 

Joint Stars, AWACS, and MC2A etc... all using the same 

format and type of data link to insure we preserve this 
CHAPTER 4 __________________________________________________________________ 

28 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

“quick strike” capability. Likewise Hunter has successfully 

passed its imagery to Apache helicopters thus insuring the 

added survivability factor to helicopter nap of the earth 

operations. 

 Develop a protocol for controlling UAVs in Flight 

A protocol for controlling UAVs in flight is needed. It is 

envisioned that a method needs to accommodate group 

operations such as those implied with swarming to support 

operations such as hunter-killer, formation flying for 

SIGINT collection and beyond line-of-sight data relay from 

deep penetrating UAVs. The functions of own-ship 

position reporting via dependent surveillance system and 

collision avoidance replacing IFF and Traffic Alert and 

Collision Avoidance (TCAS) could be provided by this 

protocol with substantial cost savings. 

 Real progress is being made in Service collaboration 

with the initiation of the Distributed Common Ground 

System (DCGS) that provides a common system for ISR 

exploitation which incorporates Common Data Link 

standards. The relay control processes described above can 

be an extension of the DCGS development.
________________________________________ INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 29

CHAPTER 5. INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION

 MANAGEMENT

Most of the design focus for UAVs is on the air vehicle, including 

its payload, and it is this component that must be tailored for the 

specific mission requirements. However, as can be seen from the cost 

data in Table 5.1, significant costs (ranging from .5 to 3-4 times the cost 

of a single air vehicle/payload suite) are associated with the ground 

system (which includes the functions described below). 

1

UAV Systems (in SDD or greater)

Recurring Unit Production Cost [RUPC] ($M)

UAV System Air Comm Sensor Airveh Grnd Basis Basis Basis Comm Sensor Performance 

Vehicle Subsys Subsys w PLs System AirSys GrndSys Year Subsys Subsys Remarks

$M $M $M $M $M #/yr #/yr Remarks Remarks Alt,TAS,Tot Endur,PL

Predator MQ-1A $2.2 $0.5 $1.8 $4.5 $6.7 22 FY04 SATCOM&C LOS MTS Ball/Hellfire 25kft,70-100kt,24hr,450#

Global Hawk RQ-4A $16.2 $2.8 $16.7 $35.7 $22.0 8 2 FY03-04 CDL/SATCOM EO/IR/SAR/LR-100 65kft,350kt,34hr,2000#

Shadow 200 RQ-7A $0.3 $0.0 $0.2 $0.5 $3.8 36 9 FY03 C-Band PoP 200 (EO/IR) 14kft,80kt,5hr,60#

Fire Scout RQ-8B $2.2 $0.2 $0.9 $3.2 $1.9 24 8 CY-04 TCDL/UHF EO/IR/LDRF 20kft,115kt,7hr,400#

Predator B MQ-9A $4.7 $0.5 $4.4 $9.6 $6.7 6 FY03-04 SATCOM MTS/Lynx SAR 30kft,225kt,20hr,700#

Source: OSD/USD (AT&L)/S&TS-AW/UAV Office with some industry supplied missing data

Notes: 

1. Costs are Recurring Unit Production Cost (RUPC) based on the production quantity and year basis shown 

2. Recurring Unit Production Cost [RUPC] (also called Unit Flyaway Price [UFP]) includes Manufacturing Cost (Material,Labor, ODC, G&A, Fee), 

 Recurring Engineering, Sustaining Tooling, and Quality Control

 [RUPC does not include system/project management, engineering changes, software, system test, nonrecurring tooling,manufacturing and

 engineering, tech data/pubs, contractor services, support equipment, training, initial spares, ground station or RDT&E]

3. Air Vehicle cost is assumed to include a single air vehicle w/ FCS and C2 comm but not sensors or sensor data comm payload

4. [AirVeh w PLs] is total of Air Vehicle plus Sensor Data Communications and Sensor subsystems (one airborne system flyaway RUPC)

5. Ground System is assumed to include all ground communications subsystems

6. Quantity basis is the size of the current order and is the basis for the recurring unit production flyaway cost

7. Low quantity fabrication involves custom human-intensive operations and costs should decrease with automated tooling

8. Shadow 200 RQ-7A based on FY03 FRP costs for 9 systems (each with 4 Avs). Shadow Ground System includes:

 2 Ground Control Stations (GCS), 2 Ground Data Terminals (GDT), 1 Launcher, 1 Portable GCS, 1 Portable

 GDT, 1 AV transport, 1 TALS, 1Maintenancs Section Multifunctional, 4 Remote Video Terminals. Shadow is

 required to simultaneously operate two air vehicles and have displaced operations at two sites.

9. Global Hawk Ground System includes 1 Mission Control Element, 1 Launch & Recovery Element plus all communications subsystems including:

 SATCOM (DAMA UHF, 50Mb/s Ku, INMARSAT), and LOS (CDL 274 Mb/s and UHF) 

10. MQ-9 costs are GA estimates for 6 air vehicles

11. Fire Scout costs are NGC quotes based on 8 systems of 4 veh each based on order in FY03-04

12. The UAV systems shown differ considerably in performance and mission and only the basic characteristics are shown. 

Figure 5.1 UAV Systems Recurring Unit Production Cost 

This fact provides the rationale for the creation of common mission 

management systems that can control more than one type of UAV. 

There is also a significant benefit of reduced logistics support and 

enhanced operational flexibility that derives from achieving this 
CHAPTER 5 __________________________________________________________________ 

30 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

sought-after interoperability. Consequently, the Task Force 

investigated the status of DoD efforts in this area. 

The principal programs reviewed were the Navy-led Tactical 

Control System (TCS) and an Army initiative to require a common 

mission management system for small UAVs by building off the 

Shadow control system. TCS is a joint program, managed by the 

Naval Air Systems Command, to provide both command and control 

and direct data download for a joint family of UAVs. The Block II 

configuration currently is compatible with Pioneer, while the plans for 

Block III call for support of Predator and Fire Scout. The DoD UAV 

Planning Task Force has defined a Common Mission Planning 

Architecture (CMPA) 3 that provides a technical framework to guide 

all future UAV mission-planning developments. Also, NATO created 

a similar standard for mission planning documented in STANAG 

4586.4 

Because of the wide range of capabilities and missions, no single 

mission management system will fit all UAV categories, types and 

classes. The fact that mission management may include all or part of 

the functions of route planning, air vehicle management and control, 

communications, sensor tasking, and data dissemination and 

exploitation is a source of confusion that complicates interoperability 

discussions. For example, the Global Hawk Common Ground 

Segment focuses on mission planning and vehicle control with a clear 

separation from the sensor data download, exploitation and 

dissemination functions. In many smaller UAV platforms, 

management/control and exploitation are more integrated. Broad 

adoption of a standard functional breakdown, such as the DoD UAV 

Planning Task Force’s CMPA (see Figure 5.2), would clarify some of 

the confusion and provide a foundation for enhanced interoperability 

and lower operating costs. 

 

3 NOTE: Add Reference to the CMPA report 

4 NOTE: Add Reference to STANAG 
________________________________________ INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 31

Figure 5.2. Overview of the UAV Common Mission Planning 

Architecture. 

To date, individual Services have been reluctant to adopt common 

mission management systems or other interoperability approaches 

within similar types or classes of UAVs. At least 100 UAVs of 10 

different types were used in OIF yet none of them allowed integrated 

direct data receipt. Each Service has tended to initiate its own 

separate development program specifically tailored to its requirements 

rather than adopting an existing capability within another Service. For 

example, the Navy is proceeding with the Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance (BAMS) development rather than using Global Hawk. 

There have been no exercises or demonstrations that would stimulate 

cross-Service interchange of vehicle performance or mission 

management approaches. The Navy plans to use a few Global Hawks 

UAV Common Mission Planning Architecture

Functions Data Formats Standards Sources

Route Weather

Weapons

And

Targeting

Sensors Comms Observables Disposal

MCG&I

Takeoff WX\

Winds Aloft

Sig WX

Visibility

DPPDB

MIDB

JMEMS

SAR

EO

IR

LOS UHF

NB SATCOM

WB SATCOM

RCS

Threat

Parameters

MCG&I

Raster

Vector

NITF

AWDS

Sybase

Oracle

TBMCS

VPH

JPEG

MPEG

CDL

KU Band

X Band

ASCII Text

Raster

Vector

NITF

CADRG

CIB

NITFS 2.0

WGS84

AFWA

METOC

Building 

Product 

Standards

DPPDB

DIICOE

MIDB 2.0

NITFS Comms MIDB

No

Standards

Exist

NIMA AFWA

METOC DISA NIMAServices

DISA

Services DIA JFACCJFC

Alternate

Airfields

MCG&I

FLIP

GPS

Surveys

WGS84

CADRG

DAFIF

NIMA

Mission Planning Functional Decomposition

OV-3 Operational Information Elements

TV-1 Technical Architecture Profile

OV-3 Operational Information Elements Matrix

TV-1 Technical Architecture Profile

UAV Common Mission Planning Architecture

Functions Data Formats Standards Sources

Route Weather

Weapons

And

Targeting

Sensors Comms Observables Disposal

MCG&I

Takeoff WX\

Winds Aloft

Sig WX

Visibility

DPPDB

MIDB

JMEMS

SAR

EO

IR

LOS UHF

NB SATCOM

WB SATCOM

RCS

Threat

Parameters

MCG&I

Raster

Vector

NITF

AWDS

Sybase

Oracle

TBMCS

VPH

JPEG

MPEG

CDL

KU Band

X Band

ASCII Text

Raster

Vector

NITF

CADRG

CIB

NITFS 2.0

WGS84

AFWA

METOC

Building 

Product 

Standards

DPPDB

DIICOE

MIDB 2.0

NITFS Comms MIDB

No

Standards

Exist

NIMA AFWA

METOC DISA NIMAServices

DISA

Services DIA JFACCJFC

Alternate

Airfields

MCG&I

FLIP

GPS

Surveys

WGS84

CADRG

DAFIF

NIMA

Mission Planning Functional Decomposition

OV-3 Operational Information Elements

TV-1 Technical Architecture Profile

OV-3 Operational Information Elements Matrix

TV-1 Technical Architecture Profile
CHAPTER 5 __________________________________________________________________ 

32 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

in the BAMS mission, but only to valid concepts of operations, not to 

assess air vehicle or mission management suitability. 

Current acquisition practices allow for vehicle-specific mission 

management stovepipe solutions rather than vehicle management and 

control across UAV systems. Most of the programs are structured to 

include the full system capability – air vehicle and ground segment. 

However, the focus is on the air vehicle and the mission management 

system is an afterthought. Frequently, it is a variant of some prior 

capability within the development prime contractor rather than a 

specific design for the UAV mission requirements. 

Those few programs that have separately addressed common 

mission management, such as the Tactical Control System (TCS), were 

either not connected to air vehicles and/or were delayed such that the 

air vehicle projects had to develop their own capability. Once a 

standalone mission management system has been developed, there is 

significant resistance to the effort and expense to transition to a 

common system. Currently, there are so many different UAV systems 

in various stages of development that they are outstripping the ability 

of evolving standards and common mission management 

development efforts to keep up. A new approach to the structuring of 

UAV acquisition programs is required to address this challenge. 

Current mission management systems require multiple operators 

to control a single UAV platform. Even for the smaller classes of 

UAVs, the current capability is no better than one operator per air 

vehicle. This staffing level adds significant operational costs. For 

certain small unit operation, one-to-one may be acceptable. However, 

the one-to-many command and control concept, integral to UCAV and 

swarms of micro-UAVs, is still an objective not reality. To achieve this 

objective, significantly higher levels of autonomous operation are 

required. 

The task force found little evidence of demonstrations/exercises 

and tactics development that would stimulate Service adoption of 

UAVs let alone the use of common UAV elements or cross-Service 

cooperation/interoperability. In fact, the vast majority of the 

experience with UAVs has accumulated from taking developing 
________________________________________ INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 33

systems directly to war and discovering their value in the heat of 

battle. Significantly more effort is needed on the integration and 

evaluation of UAV operations and mission management systems. This 

effort will accelerate the development of doctrine and tactics to 

integrate UAVs more fully into the force structure. It will also provide 

the environment to generate and validate requirements for common, 

interoperable mission management systems. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT 

To address the challenges of enhancing UAV interoperability and 

to achieve the benefits of common mission management systems for 

classes of similar UAVs, DoD should take the following actions: 

 The SecDef should designate USD (AT&L) the Deputy, 

UAV Planning Task Force as the DoD advocate for UAV 

interoperability. 

As part of the DAB review for each new UAV system, 

the Deputy, UAV Planning Task Force should advise the 

USD(AT&L) about the potential for an existing UAV system 

from another Service to satisfy the new requirements. The 

acquisition strategy review at the DAB should explicitly 

assess the approach to mission management with the goal 

of reducing proliferation of unique, stove-pipe ground 

system components. An early focus for this function should 

be the Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) 

program where the existing Global Hawk system or at least 

its Common Ground Segment are attractive alternatives to 

an entirely new development. 

 Task JFCOM in concert with STRATCOM to more 

aggressively develop UAV doctrine and tactics. 

Both JFCOM and STRATCOM have equities for Global 

ISR missions and for transition from a platform based 

garrison force to a capabilities-based expeditionary force. 

As part of its new ISR mission, JFCOM must be more 
CHAPTER 5 __________________________________________________________________ 

34 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

aggressive in the development of doctrine and tactics to 

integrate UAVs more fully into the force structure. JFCOM 

should supervise the Service UAV Battle Laboratories in 

experimentation programs to define doctrine and tactics for 

the use of UAVs. A high priority task should be to develop 

a CONOPS to allow UAV flight control and payload tasking 

by one Service with acquisition, basing, maintenance and 

launch by another Service. DoD should provide $50M/yr 

additional funding for JFCOM experimentation, and tactics 

and doctrine development. This effort should be funded 

independently from platform/payload development. 

Special Operation Forces and general purpose forces use 

UAVs in a completely different manner. Training 

syllabuses for each community of interest needs to be 

developed. Likewise closer cooperation with interagency 

organizations needs to be better defined and coordinated. 

 Evaluate a separate procurement of a common mission 

management system for all UCAV variants. 

UCAV, as it goes forward as a joint program, is a prime 

example of how a common mission management/vehicle 

control system could be derived for a UAV type that 

features differing platforms. A Joint Program Office (JPO) 

was stood up on 1 October 2003 to address Air Force and 

Navy UCAV issues. Its goal is to create standards that will 

allow UCAVs to be built along common lines in hopes of 

decreasing costs while retaining interoperability. This new 

UCAV JPO should structure its acquisition with separate 

mission management procurement for a system to be used 

with all air vehicle variants. 

 Fund the UAV Planning Task Force at $10M per year. 

The DoD UAV Planning Task Force should be given a 

budget to support requirements, architecture and standards 

trades and related analyses required to provide better 

advice to USD(AT&L) relative to UAV issues. In addition 

to providing the resources to support the Deputy, UAV 

Planning Task Force in advocating UAV interoperability, 
________________________________________ INTEROPERABILITY AND MISSION MANAGEMENT

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 35

the organization should expand its standards development 

efforts to examine systematically the interactions/roles 

among mission management, infrastructure, level of 

autonomy and operator skill level. The DoD UAV 

Planning Task Force could also harmonize the UAV/UCAV 

efforts at the various service battle labs and technology 

centers if better staffed. 

 The Joint Staff should develop a Deployable UAV 

Operations Cell (DUOC). This initiative will develop new 

CONOPS and technologies for use in operation 

centers/cells to monitor multiple UAVs and limit the 

number of personnel required for supporting multiple 

UAV operations. 

 Develop a joint mission rehearsal and training system for 

UAVs. This system could help visualize the mission 

execution needs of both manned and unmanned systems. 

Train and familiarize commanders (Bn, Bde, Div) with 

UAV/UCAR/UCAV capabilities. This could be 

accomplished by strengthening UAV operations training in 

Officer Advanced, Command and General Staff College, 

Pre-Command Courses. Battle Command Training 

Programs (BCTPs) must include UAV play (currently an 

option) 

 Insure the Joint Operations Concepts or JOCs recently 

developed by the Joint Staff include UAV and UCAV 

capabilities in the four outlined JOCs areas: Major Combat 

Operations, Stability Operations, Homeland Security and 

Strategic Deterrence. 

 Given the potentially high reliance and cost impact of UAV 

systems on geospatial intelligence support, Service UAV 

and UCAV development organizations and program 

offices should ensure the National Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency (NGA) is an early participant in the definition of 

geospatial intelligence requirements for UAV and UCAV 

systems. 
CHAPTER 5 __________________________________________________________________ 

36 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

In addition to these specific recommendations, technology 

development should be sponsored to permit enhancement of the level 

of autonomy in UAV mission operations so that the goal of multiple 

vehicles controlled by a single operator can become a reality. This 

objective will require “intelligent” autonomy in both the vehicle and 

the mission control element, including more status sensing and control 

onboard the platform and intelligent decision aiding for operators. 

Ultimately, this will require a mindset of designing for unmanned 

operation rather than evolving manned platform system design 

practices. 
JOINT EFFORTS TO INTEGRATE UAVS INTO THE 

_____________________________________________________ NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 37

CHAPTER 6. INTEGRATE UAVS INTO NATIONAL AIRSPACE 

The DoD has an urgent need to allow UAVs unencumbered access 

to the National Airspace System (NAS) outside of restricted areas 

(airbases and military operating areas), here in the United States and 

around the world. The need stems from the requirement to transit 

to/from combat areas of operations and perform time-sensitive 

training. Access is most needed for medium/high altitude, long 

endurance UAVs, which must fly great distances for mission 

accomplishment. It is not unreasonable that Predators, Global Hawks 

and someday UCAVs and high altitude airships will require rapid 

access to the airspace to fly from the U.S. to/from overseas locations. 

This access is critical to optimized force structure allocation during 

conflict. OSD recognizes this issue as a high priority and describes it 

in detail in the DoD UAV Planning Task Force UAV Roadmap. 

Although not officially briefed to this DSB, we also concur with 

recent AF Scientific Advisory Board recommendations, which 

addressed extending UAV operations into international and mixaircraft environments. In addition to facilitating "file and fly" 

flexibility for UAVs in the NAS, the military must develop the 

capability to operate increasing numbers of unmanned air systems in 

combat theaters where hosts of manned aircraft must also fly. This 

will require reliable Detect, See and Avoid (DSA) conflict avoidance 

systems on board most UAVs and adapting mission planning and C3 

systems to accommodate high intensity mixed fleet operations of 

manned and unmanned aircraft. Current initiatives to integrate UAVs 

into the NAS should be expanded to include international airspace 

since large UAVs may have to transit long distances to reach combat 

theaters, and both large and small UAVs may have occasion to conduct 

training flights in airspace outside the United States. 

The DoD relies upon FAA Order 7610.4, Special Military 

Operations to obtain approval to fly UAVs in the NAS. The regulation 

provides a process to obtain permission via a Certificate of 

Authorization (COA) to fly UAVs according to stringent planning and 

safety factors. It can take up to two months to obtain a COA for a 
CHAPTER 6 __________________________________________________________________ 

38 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

particular UAV mission. The COA process has served the nation well, 

but should be modified/revised to enable more rapid access to the 

NAS, especially for wartime missions. 

According to the DoD UAV Roadmap, the DOD seeks to 

“coordinate revising FAA Order 7610.4 to replace the requirement for 

using the Certificate of Authorization process for all UAVs with one 

using the DD form 175 for qualifying UAVs.” The U.S. Air Force has 

the action to complete the task in FY 2004. This Task Force concurs 

with this approach, but the effort should be extended into international 

airspace through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 

using the traditional DD form 1801, international flight plans. This 

will require the DoD to become fully involved with not only FAA, but 

also international regulatory bodies working this issue. Results from 

international negotiations on this subject should be captured formally 

in the DoD plan and updated in the next DoD UAV Roadmap. 

As an interim step to streamline Global Hawk operations, the Air 

Force petitioned the FAA and got approval for a Global Hawk 

National COA (NCOA). This COA shortens the approval time to fly to 

no more than five days, but applies only to domestic operations 

involving take offs and landings in restricted areas, such as Beale AFB. 

The NCOA is a very appropriate movement in the right direction 

towards true “file and fly” capability similar to approvals for manned 

aircraft today. However, other DoD UAVs are not captured in this 

NCOA. This may require the DoD to seek case-by-case COAs, which 

will require substantial FAA coordination. 

Conflict avoidance, especially in a fully autonomous, lost-link 

situation will be the “Achilles Heel” challenge for the FAA to approve. 

Inherent in revising FAA Order 7610.4 is the need to fully satisfy the 

FAA that the DoD can build and operate UAVs in a manner that 

provides an “equivalent level of safety” (ELOS) to manned aircraft. 

We applaud the DoD for recognizing the magnitude of this problem 

and instituting integrated product teams to establish requirements and 

potential solutions. For true “file and fly” capability (using DD175 

and DD1801 flight plans) this may be a very difficult task involving 

issues concerning UAV reliability/airworthiness, operator 

qualifications, levels of autonomy, and most importantly, the ability 
JOINT EFFORTS TO INTEGRATE UAVS INTO THE 

_____________________________________________________ NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 39

for the UAV to avoid conflicts with other aircraft. Both cooperative 

(e.g., Traffic Collision Avoidance System and Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-B) and non-cooperative DSA situational 

awareness/collision avoidance systems may be required in each UAV 

to satisfy the FAA. It is highly unlikely the DoD will be able to selfcertify this capability. 

In parallel to these DoD initiatives, the high altitude, long 

endurance (HALE) aerospace industry has formed an alliance called 

UAV National Industry Team (UNITE) (www.unitealliance.com) to 

gain full access to the NAS for civil and commercial purposes. UNITE 

has joined with NASA in partnership called Access 5 

(www.access5.org). Access 5 seeks, within five years, to develop 

solutions for all barriers to flight in the NAS initially for HALE UAVs 

by systematically addressing all necessary technology, policy, 

regulatory and infrastructure issues satisfactory to the FAA. 

DoD has joined Access 5 partnership to insure joint cooperation 

and sharing of information/technology to achieve mutually 

advantageous results and minimize duplication of efforts, real or 

perceived. DoD has accepted a formal seat on the Access 5 Steering 

Committee, which is represented by UNITE, NASA and the FAA. The 

DoD has worked closely with Access 5 to jointly develop a detailed 

plan to access the NAS. Success in this planning effort will lead to 

program initiation in February 2004. The FAA fully supports Access 5 

in an advisory capacity and is carefully reviewing how to proceed with 

“file and fly” to insure uniform safety is maintained in the airspace for 

all participants. 

In addition to facilitating "file and fly" flexibility for UAVs in the 

U.S. NAS, the military must develop the capability to operate 

increasing numbers of unmanned air systems in combat theaters 

where hosts of manned aircraft must also fly. This will require reliable 

DSA systems on board most UAVs, and adapting mission planning 

and C3 systems to accommodate high intensity mixed fleet operations 

of manned and unmanned aircraft. 

Current initiatives to integrate UAVs into the U.S. NAS should be 

expanded to include international airspace since large UAVs may have 
CHAPTER 6 __________________________________________________________________ 

40 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

to transit long distances to reach combat theaters, and both large and 

small UAVs may have occasion to conduct training flights in airspace 

outside the United States. 

Other nations of the world are also investigating ways to integrate 

their UAV systems into their airspace. Both DoD and Access 5 

initiatives could lend support and leadership to global airspace 

integration and standardization, which in the long run, will be of 

benefit to all operators. 

A major distinction between DoD and Access 5 programs is that 

DoD can self-certify aircraft, whereas industry must certify civil 

aircraft independently. Currently, there are no rules or regulations 

that permit commercial or military UAV systems certification. While 

the DoD is developing internal UAV systems certification practices for 

FAA concurrence, Access 5 seeks to develop civil rules and regulations 

and obtain approval from the FAA; which will allow industry to 

proceed with the civil certification process. Without acceptable 

certification rules and regulations no commercial HALE UAV markets 

will evolve and insurance rates will remain be prohibitively expensive. 

DoD self-insures their aircraft. Access 5 could be a major enabler for 

companies to produce HALE UAVs in volume, thus enabling future 

cost reductions for DoD procurements. There is direct commercial and 

industrial linkage to economies of scale for the DoD. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTEGRATE UAVS INTO NATIONAL AIRSPACE 

 DoD should become an active participant in NASA, FAA 

and industry efforts to accelerate “file and fly” capability 

for all classes of UAVs for operation in U.S. and 

international civil airspace as well as provide better 

integration of UAVs in military airspace during peace time 

training and in combat zones. 

It is absolutely critical that the DoD develop DSA 

requirements for all classes of UAVs that they intend to 

deploy in the NAS and overseas. Once these requirements 
JOINT EFFORTS TO INTEGRATE UAVS INTO THE 

_____________________________________________________ NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 41

are validated, then technology solutions should be 

developed and tested to DoD and FAA satisfaction. The 

FAA has established an office that will interface with DSA 

development with Access 5. DoD is encouraged to 

integrate DSA development and testing activities with 

Access 5 planning to insure rapid decision-making and 

efficient use of federal resources. The FAA will require 

DoD to demonstrate military DSA systems operating in the 

NAS with civil traffic (cooperating and non-cooperating) to 

meet ELOS standards that civil UAV’s will be expected to 

meet. The great debate will be whether the FAA will accept 

simple passive (e.g., electro-optical/IR cameras) DSA 

systems or more complex all weather active (e.g., radar) 

solutions, which could drive cost and complexity. A 

balance between safety, cost and operational performance 

must be struck. DoD should collaborate with Access 5 on 

DSA to the maximum extent possible consistent with 

funding and schedules. 

 DoD should evaluate all types of OTH communications to 

insure compliance with FAA requirements. This may 

include dual redundant SATCOM links. 

 Accelerate advanced research on autonomous vehicle 

operation, specifically focused on airspace situation 

awareness. This research would include speech recognition 

for Air Traffic Control (ATC), DSA compatibility with 

TCAS/ADS-B and new approaches for lost-link recovery. 

 Direct accelerated development of DSA and other 

technologies so as to permit safe flight of UAVs in mixed 

manned/unmanned aircraft environments. 

 Direct Commander Joint Forces Command to develop 

tactics, techniques and procedures that will assure safe, yet 

combat-effective flight of mixed forces of manned and 

unmanned aircraft in combat theaters. 
CHAPTER 6 __________________________________________________________________ 

42 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
_________________________________________ FOCUS DOD UAV TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 43

CHAPTER 7. FOCUS TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

The Task Force received briefings from many government and 

commercial entities developing or improving technologies that will in 

turn increase the capability and usefulness of UAVs to the war fighter. 

UAVs in service with our military today span small vehicles like the 

Dragon Eye which carries just a few pounds of payload to the Global 

Hawk which carries several thousand pounds. Because of the large 

range of UAV sizes and the fact that many technologies are involved 

with any given vehicle, there are literally hundreds of technologies 

that enable UAVs to do their job. 

Despite the large number of technologies related to UAVs, the Task 

Force found that there is sufficient DoD investment in technology. In 

addition some DoD technology advancement is also being driven by 

the demands of commercial products, relative to which, any DoD 

investment would be small. For instance, the light-weight batteries 

being used in small UAVs were developed by the lap-top computer 

and cellular phone industry. 

The following general trends in UAV related technology were 

observed: 

 Computing and sensor technology is allowing flight 

control systems to fit in much smaller packages and 

enabling more automation. 

 EO and IR sensor systems and other sensing technologies 

are becoming smaller and more capable 

 Battery and other energy storage systems are getting better 

and smaller. 

Generally the above trends will allow the size of a UAV designed to 

do a given mission to be smaller and cheaper. Or alternatively a UAV 

of a given size and cost will be able collect more information and be 

more autonomous in the future. 
CHAPTER 7 __________________________________________________________________ 

44 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

The following are a few cautions related to technology that the 

Task Force felt needed acknowledgement: 

 Faster computers and sensor technology advancements can 

lead to requirements creep and/or quick technology 

obsolescence. 

 The attraction of advanced technologies can lead us to 

overlook the continued development of basic building 

blocks like propulsion systems and structures. 

 All UAVs rely on GPS and geospatial intelligence resources 

for basic navigation, georectification, and targeting. Efforts 

to install jam-resistant GPS on UAV’s and other DoD 

equipment must continue to be a high-priority. 

Several current development programs are underway to implement 

lightweight Laser Detection and Ranging (LADAR) systems for 

integration into UAVs. The Urban Reconnaissance Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration (ACTD), for example, is developing a 

LADAR package that will be under 100 lbs. and can be deployed in a 

variety of UAVs. 

The LADAR systems will collect sub-meter resolution, precise 3-

dimentional data for development of Geospatial Intelligence in the 

urban environment, and will detect activity under foliage and 

camouflage. LADAR sensors will provide a significantly increased 

resolution data set that can provide a superb foundation for the 

Common Operational Picture. These capabilities will support 

numerous data and intelligence requirements as stated by the Army, 

Air Force, and SOCOM. Once the technology is demonstrated, every 

effort should be made to implement the technology into operational 

UAV platforms (e.g., Predator and Global Hawk) and the mission 

applications they support. 

The utility of low frequency (UHF and VHF) radar systems for the 

detection of targets is critical in the counter camouflage, concealment, 

and deception targeting problem. The development of such a radar 

capability for Global Hawk was the recommendation of the Time 

Critical and Time Sensitive Targets DSB. The Global Hawk ORD has 
_________________________________________ FOCUS DOD UAV TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 45

this specific requirement. However, the requirement is not funded in 

the Air Force POM. The NGA Interferometric Synthetic Aperture 

Radar (IFSAR) Mapping ACTD has the development of this sensor as 

part of its funded baseline. However, the Air Force has not yet fully 

supported the use of a Global Hawk for this mission. 

Systems such as the UCAV are planned to carry an excellent radar 

system. The radar data from that system has the potential capability to 

be used to generate precise terrain elevation and target location data 

onboard the jet, without the need for interoperation with the NGAproduced, data intensive Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB). 

NGA and the UCAV System Program Office have initiated a 

technology effort – funded by the UCAV SPO – to develop this 

capability. The technology is relatively low risk, with high application 

to UCAVs and to other aircraft/systems applications (e.g., F/A-22, 

Joint Strike Fighter) with "next generation", highly precise radar 

systems and fairly robust onboard computing power). 

Current Service precise positioning tools may be unable to support 

the growing volume and expanded performance capabilities of the 

Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) entering the inventory. These 

tools and the processes to apply them will be an impediment toward 

satisfying the warfighter’s requirements for engaging time sensitive 

targets. The current generation of operational tactical sensor systems 

was not designed to meet stringent requirements for measuring sensor 

state information in order to support point positioning and precision 

targeting at the required levels of accuracy. Metadata generated by 

current tactical sensors is not adequate to generate a high success rate 

of auto-correlation of tactical images to reference imagery. 

UAV’s have historically run into trouble with requirements creep 

and/or the insertion of new technologies into operational systems 

before they have been matured in the lab. The Task Force does not 

advocate a new, large technology investment program. Quite to the 

contrary, with the exception of a few recommendations below to focus 

existing technology investments, we feel that additional funding is 

better spent in other areas addressed in this report. 
CHAPTER 7 __________________________________________________________________ 

46 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

RECOMMENDATIONS 

FOCUS TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 

Despite our general opinion that there is sufficient investment in 

DoD technology, we did identify a few areas that are not getting 

sufficient investment. The following recommendations address these 

few, under-funded, high-payoff technologies: 

 Expedite the development of specifications, RDT&E and 

fielding of heavy-fuel engines suitable for UAVs. This is a 

technology area that will not be addressed by commercial 

efforts and will benefit: Predator, Army TUAV, Hunter, 

Navy VTUAV, Pioneer and others. 

 Push technology to drive down the cost and weight, while 

maintaining performance, of all categories of sensors to 

maximize their utility on UAVs, as well as on manned and 

unmanned ground systems. 

 Develop the new technologies necessary to allow 

integration of UAVs into the national and international 

airspace 

 Implement auto-land and auto-takeoff technology for all 

UAVs with a gross weight of greater than 100 pounds. This 

will benefit Predator, Hunter, Pioneer and others. 

 Develop “next generation” tactical sensor metric 

performance and cost parameters critical for support to 

precise geopositioning and targeting. 

In addition to the above specific recommendations, technologies 

that address the bandwidth constraint that is a limiting factor for all 

UAVs need continued investment. 
__________________________________________________ PENETRATING SURVIVABLE UAVS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 47

CHAPTER 8. REDUCE UAV COMBAT VULNERABILITY

Most of the UAVs in the inventory today are quite vulnerable to a 

variety of different air defense systems. Anti aircraft artillery (AAA), 

shoulder-fired man portable systems, and radar directed low medium 

and high altitude surface to air missile systems can all be quite lethal to 

UAVs within their range. 

In an effort to keep costs in check, UAVs have not typically been 

equipped with either sophisticated radar warning systems or 

electronic countermeasure suites. UAV designs have also not 

incorporated much stealth technology, although for some of the short 

range varieties their small size and quiet engines do a reasonable job of 

reducing the probability of detection. 

Vulnerability to air defenses has led to concept of operations 

employing UAVs in regions where the air defense threats have already 

been largely eliminated. However, there are (at least) two scenarios of 

interest where UAVs would be quite useful where the defenses had 

not been suppressed. 

 Scenario 1. Providing extended surveillance in denied areas 

prior to conflict. Long endurance UAVs that could provide 

persistent coverage of an area, in all weather, while 

remaining covert would be a very useful capability to have. 

To do so would require the UAV to be immune from 

detection, tracking and/or targeting by modern air 

defenses. 

 Scenario 2. Operating early in a conflict in a tactical 

reconnaissance role. UAVs or UCAVs would be very 

useful for obtaining updates on the location or status of 

specific targets or threats early in a conflict prior to 

defenses being suppressed. This mission is similar to the 

RF-4 tactical reconnaissance mission, with quick ingress 

and egress. It does not require the persistence of the first 

mission, nor the covertness, but does require an enhanced 

degree of survivability over current UAVs. 
CHAPTER 8 __________________________________________________________________ 

48 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

The panel did not have access to current special access initiatives in 

these areas but many of the members have been fully accessed to 

various similar programs during the last 10-15 years. Many of those 

programs did not succeed for technical, cost and/or conops reasons. It 

is from that experience that we make the following observations and 

recommendations. 

OBSERVATIONS 

 The goal of stealthy ISR capability, able to survive while 

providing persistent observation of a battle space, is 

unquestionably attractive. This “holy grail” has been 

pursued in many different, classified programs over the 

past 25 years and, for one reason or another, each program 

has been terminated. High altitude, long endurance, deep 

penetration, stealthy ISR is the most difficult of all possible 

UAV missions. 

 Recommending development of a VLO, high altitude, 

endurance UAV would be easy for a DSB that is 

unconstrained by costs. This approach is consistent with 

the desires expressed by senior personnel in OSD and 

USAF so there is a receptive audience. However, there are 

a number of issues which must be considered in 

formulating a recommendation in this area. These include 

(1) mission requirements and trades, (2) survivability trade 

space, (3) technical and operational feasibility, (4) unit and 

opportunity costs. 

 Achieving high altitude, long endurance, persistent all 

weather coverage while maintaining a low observability 

signature is a demanding task of the highest order. The 

degree to which these goals can be met is quite unclear. In 

previous programs we have let these goals “float,” selected 

the most glitzy airframe proposal and as the program 

progressed thought little about hard things like sensors, 

communications, software, stealth details and real cost 

analysis. That is obviously not the right path to follow. 
__________________________________________________ PENETRATING SURVIVABLE UAVS

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 49

 Designing a UAV or UCAV for the RF-4 like tac recce 

mission is not as difficult. Operating at lower altitude, 

without persistence over a given area, with rapid ingress to 

predesignated points and rapid egress makes the stealth 

design significantly less stressing. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

REDUCE UAV COMBAT VULNERABILITY 

 Compile “lessons” from past programs in this overall area 

– with full security access to each. Make these lessons 

available to the ongoing/future efforts and implement 

actions to guard against making the same mistakes. 

 Establish an independent Red Team to review all aspects of 

the pre-conflict persistent mission vehicle. Develop a clear 

understanding of the intended threat sophistication, 

mission requirements, and concepts for survivability. 

Presence, persistence, operability, sensing, reporting and 

survival must be achieved essentially simultaneously and 

the analyses cannot deal with them one at a time. 
CHAPTER 8 __________________________________________________________________ 

50 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
__________________________________________________________________APPENDIX I 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 51

APPENDIX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE
TERMS OF REFERENCE___________________________________________________________ 

52 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX II 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 53

APPENDIX II. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

Mr. Robert Nesbit MITRE Corporation 

MajGen Kenneth Israel, USAF 

(Ret) 

Lockheed Martin 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Mr. Harry Berman SRS Technologies 

Mr. Bob Curtin Aerovironment 

Mr. Vic DeMarines MITRE Corporation 

Mr. John Entzminger Private Consultant 

RADM Bob Gormley, USN (ret) Oceanus Company 

Ms. Barbara Lindauer General Dynamics 

Mr. Larry Lynn Private Consultant 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Private Consultant 

Mr. Jim Shields Draper Labs 

Mr. Dale Tietz Aerovironment 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mr. Dyke Weatherington OUSD(AT&L) Defense Systems - Air 

Warfare 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

CDR David Waugh, USN Defense Science Board 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Mr. Kevin Meiners, 

Maj. Jim McCormick, 

Maj. Ken Myers 

CDR Mike Pease 

USD (I) 

USD (I) 

J-6 

USN/J-8 
TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ________________________________________________________ 

54 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

Mr. Eric Bradbury 

Mr. Mark Spivey 

Mr. Ron Smetek 

Mr. Steve Thompson

CIA 

NGA 

NGA 

DUSD/IP

 

SUPPORT STAFF

Mr. David Greinke Strategic Analysis Inc. 

 
________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX III 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 55

APPENDIX III. ACRONYMS

AAA Anti aircraft artillery 

ACN Airborne Communications Node 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

AJCN Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node 

ASD (NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration 

ATC Air Traffic Control 

ATD Advanced Technology Development 

AWACS Airborne Warning And Control System 

 

BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

BCTP Battle Command Training Program 

 

C3 Command, Control, and Communications 

CMPA Common Mission Planning Architecture 

COA Certificate of Authorization 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

CONUS Continental United States 

CRW 

 

DAB Defense Acquisition Board 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DCGS Distributed Common Ground System 

DoD Department of Defense 

DPPDB Digital Point Positioning Data Base 

DSA Detect, See and Avoid 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DUOC Deployable UAV Operations Cell 

 

ELOS Equivalent level of safety 

EO Electro/Optical 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FCS Future Combat System 

 

GIG Global Information Grid 
GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS _______________________________________________________ 

56 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

GIG-BE Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion 

 

HAE High Altitude Endurance 

HALE High altitude, long endurance 

HSI Hyperspectral 

 

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 

IFF Identification, Friend or Foe 

IFSAR Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar 

IOC Initial Operational Capability 

IR Infrared 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JOC Joint Operations Concepts 

JPO Joint Program Office 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

J-UCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air System 

 

LADAR Laser Detection and Ranging 

 

MC2A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft 

MILSAT Military Satellite Communications 

 

NAS National Airspace System 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NCOA National Certificate of Authorization 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (Formerly National 

Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) 

NIPRNET Government Restricted Unclassified Internet 

 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

ORD Operational Requirements Document 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

 

OASD/C3I Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications and Intelligence) 

OTH Over The Horizon 

 
________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX III 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND UNINHABITED

COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES ____________________________________________________ 57

PGM Precision Guided Munitions 

 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

RF Radio Frequency 

RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft 

 

SAM Surface to Air Missile 

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 

SATCOM Satellite Communication (Commercial) 

SIGINT Signals Intelligence 

SIPRNET Classified Government Internet 

SPO System Program Office 

STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver 

STRATCOM Strategic Command 

 

TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 

TCO Total Cost of Ownership 

TCS Transformational Communication System 

TUAV Tactical UAV Program 

 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UCAR Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft 

UCAV Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle 

UNITE UAV National Industry Team 

USAF United States Air Force 

USD(AT&L) Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

 

VLO Very Low Observable 

VTOL Vertical Take-off and Landing 

VTUAV Vertical Take-off UAV 
GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS _______________________________________________________ 

58 ______________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD