2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-4-2010

Bruce Murray v. David DiGuglielmo

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-3994

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AMENDED CLD-074 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3994

___________

BRUCE MURRAY,

Appellant

v.

SUPT. D. DIGUGLIELMO, Graterford Prison; 

CAPTAIN THOMAS DOHMAN; 

LIEUTENANT JOHN MOYER, Graterford Prison; 

JOHN DOE’S; MARY CANINO, Hearing Examiner

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-2310)

District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

December 17, 2009

Before: BARRY, FISHER AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed :February 4, 2010)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Bruce Murray appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his amended
2

complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6. 

I.

In May 2009, Murray, a pro se prisoner, filed a civil action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against David DiGuglielmo (“DiGuglielmo”), Superintendent at the

State Correctional Institution at Graterford (“SCI Graterford”); Mary Canino (“Canino”),

Hearing Examiner; Captain Thomas Dohman (“Dohman”); and Lieutenant John Moyer

(“Moyer”). Murray alleged that Dohman and Moyer violated his constitutional rights on

December 6, 2006, when they cited him for possession of drugs, possession of

contraband, unauthorized use of the mail, and lying to employees. Murray claimed that

Canino later violated his constitutional rights when she found him guilty of the

misconduct without any supporting evidence and sanctioned him to 360 days in the

Restricted Housing Unit. Lastly, he claimed that he was transferred from SCI Graterford

to another facility on April 2, 2007, in retaliation for filing grievances over his medical

care. 

On June 9, 2009, the Defendants moved to dismiss Murray’s complaint on the

basis that his claims were untimely, and thus, barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. Because Murray indicated in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss

that some of the underlying events may have occurred within the statute of limitations, the

District Court permitted Murray to amend his complaint to include “all allegations and the

facts supporting them.” Murray filed an amended complaint on July 27, 2009, and the
 Murray also appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion for relief 1

from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

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Defendants again moved to dismiss it. After thoroughly reviewing the amended

complaint, the District Court dismissed it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Even construing the amended complaint

liberally, the District Court concluded that the claims were untimely. Murray appeals 1

that determination.

 II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When

reviewing a complaint dismissed under § 1915, this Court applies the same standard

provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough,

184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). In determining whether a district court properly

dismissed a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must “accept all factual allegations

as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine

whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to

relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009).

We agree with the District Court’s analysis regarding the timeliness of Murray’s
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claims. A complaint may properly be dismissed for failure to state a claim on statute of

limitations grounds if the untimeliness of the complaint is apparent on its face. See

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).

While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not set forth a limitations period, “federal courts must look

to the statute of limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.” Urrutia v.

Harrisburg County Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 457 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, as the

District Court noted, the applicable statute of limitations is that governing personal injury

claims in Pennsylvania. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Therefore,

Murray had two years from the time his cause of action accrued in which to file his

complaint. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2). A § 1983 cause of action accrues on

the date when a plaintiff knew or should have known his rights had been violated. See

Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).

Here, Murray knew, or had reason to know, of his alleged mistreatment when it

occurred. Murray’s claims against the Defendants arose between December 5, 2006, and

April 2, 2007. However, he did not file a complaint until May 18, 2009. Accordingly,

Murray’s claims are untimely and the District Court properly dismissed his amended

complaint on that basis. The District Court also properly dismissed Murray’s motion for

relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

As Murray’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 

See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Murray’s motion for appointment of counsel is
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denied. Murray’s motion and amended motion for “Production of Documents, Etc. Under

Rule 34(a)” are also denied.