J-S24004-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY JACKSON

Appellant No. 404 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 16, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014203-2007;

CP-51-CR-0014205-2007; CP-51-CR-0014206-2007

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2015

Appellant, Anthony Jackson, appeals from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his first petition 

brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

On the night of September 10, 2007, [Wilson F.], an 

Operations Specialist in the United States Coast Guard, 

was standing on the steps outside his house at 1848 Sulis 

Street in Philadelphia. Also outside were his housemate, 

[David P.], and his friend, [Kwame F.]. During this time, 

two men walked down 19th Street and stood on the corner 

near [Wilson F.’s] house. Moments later, a burgundy 

Dodge Neon turned on Sulis Street from 19th Street and 

stopped by the two men. A passenger offered the two 

men a ride to a party, which they declined, saying they 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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would meet them there. A few minutes later, the Neon 

drove away leaving the two men on the corner. Right after 

that, [David P.] went inside, but [Wilson F.] and [Kwame 

F.] remained outside. 

Moments later, [Kwame F.] saw two men in black, one 

wearing a mask, ducking and coming up the sidewalk 

toward the two men. This prompted [Kwame F.] to say 

that it looked like there was about to be a shootout. Then, 

for no apparent reason, one of the two men on the corner 

pulled a gun from under his shirt, pointed it at [Kwame F.], 

and said “yeah you.” That prompted [Wilson F.] to grab 

[Kwame F.’s] shoulder and tell him to run. [Kwame F.] 

ran inside the house safely, but before [Wilson F.] could 

get inside, the man with the gun shot [Wilson F.] in his 

right thigh and right foot. [Wilson F.] yelled out that he 

was hit and ran into the house and up the stairs until he 

reached [David P.’s] bedroom, where he bled profusely 

while [Kwame F.] tried to apply first aid and [David P.] 

called 9-1-1. Medical personnel arrived about ten to 

fifteen minutes later and took [Wilson F.] to Einstein 

Hospital. 

About ten minutes after [Wilson F.] was taken to the 

hospital, police took [Kwame F.] and [David P.] about a 

block away to where moments earlier, Officer [Jason] Reid 

had stopped a burgundy Dodge Neon after receiving flash 

information that four males inside a vehicle matching that 

description might have knowledge of the shooting. 

Removed from the car were [Timothy J.], [Russell L.], 

[Jerrel M.], and [Appellant], who was very anxious and 

sweated heavily when Officer Reid spoke with him. 

[Kwame F.] was able to positively identify both the car and 

its driver and front seat passenger as being outside the 

house just before the shooting. [Appellant] and the three 

others were then taken to a police station, but were 

released later that day. 

On September 11, 2007, [Wilson F.] gave a description of 

the shooter to Detective [Stephen] Grace at Einstein 

Hospital after he woke up from surgery. Based on the 

description given by [Wilson F.], Detective Grace prepared 

two photo arrays, one of which included [Appellant’s] 

photograph. On September 12, 2007, Detective Grace 
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returned to Einstein to show the arrays to [Wilson F.]. 

When [Wilson F.] viewed the first array, which included 

[Appellant’s] image and seven others with similar facial 

features, he immediately recognized [Appellant], stating: 

“That’s the person that shot me.” On the second array, 

[Wilson F.] was less certain, but identified codefendant 

[Rasheed B.] as the second male on the corner who was 

with the shooter. [Wilson F.] circled the photos of 

[Appellant] and [Rasheed B.] and signed his name to both 

arrays. Arrest warrants were then obtained for [Appellant] 

and [Rasheed B.]. 

[Appellant] surrendered on October 9, 2007, and gave a 

statement to Detective Grace in which he said that he was 

at a birthday party with [Timothy J.] at the time the 

shooting occurred. At trial, [Timothy J.] testified that 

[Appellant] was at his birthday party at the time the 

shooting occurred, but that they left at about midnight in 

order to take [Russell L.] home because he was 

intoxicated. [Appellant] also called [Clifton G.] who 

testified that [Appellant] had a reputation for being 

nonviolent and [another witness] who testified that 

[Appellant] had a reputation for being mild-mannered and 

respectful. 

The bullet that struck [Wilson F.’s] leg hit an artery and his 

wounds required four surgeries and over five weeks of 

hospitalization. At the time of trial, [Wilson F.] was still 

taking medication for pain and neurological damage, was 

still in physical therapy, and had lingering muscle and 

nerve damage that caused his leg to buckle when he 

walked. 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 152 EDA 2010, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed January 19, 2011) (quoting Trial Court 

Opinion, filed May 10, 2010, at 2-4). 

Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of two (2) counts each of 

aggravated assault and criminal conspiracy, and one (1) count each of

attempted murder, carrying a firearm without a license, possessing an 
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instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. On 

October 31, 2008, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 

fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years’ imprisonment. This Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence on January 19, 2011, and our Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on August 30, 2011. 

On August 9, 2012, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. In it, 

Appellant raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial and direct 

appeal counsel. The court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed a motion to 

withdraw representation and “no-merit” letter, pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). On October 31, 2013, 

the court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.2 The court denied PCRA relief on December 

16, 2013. That same day, the court permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw. 

On January 10, 2014, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal and 

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2 The PCRA court notes Appellant “mailed the [c]ourt” a pro se response to 

the Rule 907 notice, which the court received on November 25, 2013. 

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed April 7, 2014, at 2). Significantly, Appellant’s pro 

se response to the Rule 907 notice does not appear in the certified record, 

and the criminal docket entries do not list the pro se filing. Thus, it appears 

Appellant did not properly file the pro se response to the Rule 907 notice. 

See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(stating “simply depositing a motion in a judge’s chambers is not filing,” and 

“the document must at least be addressed to a proper filing office within the 

Unified Judicial System in order to complete the filing”). 
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). 

Appellant raises three issues for our review: 

WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL [ERRED] BY FILING A “NOMERIT” LETTER, WHERE COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPERLY 

REVIEW THE RECORD AND [APPELLANT’S] CLAIMS WERE 

MERITORIOUS. 

WHETHER [THE] PCRA COURT [ERRED] BY ACCEPTING 

COUNSEL’S “NO-MERIT” LETTER, WHERE COUNSEL’S 

FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 

WHETHER [THE] PCRA COURT [ERRED] BY NOT HAVING 

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHEN THERE WAS A GENUINE 

ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT THAT NEEDED TO BE 

RESOLVED. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s 

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 

612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference to the 

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those 

findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such deference, 

however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 

A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA 

hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if 
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there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not 

entitled to PCRA relief, and no purpose would be served by any further 

proceedings. Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

On appeal, Appellant contends PCRA counsel did not conduct a proper 

review of the issues raised in the pro se PCRA petition. Appellant insists 

PCRA counsel incorrectly interpreted some of the issues raised in the pro se

PCRA petition, and the legal conclusions in the “no-merit” letter are 

unsupported by the record. Moreover, Appellant posits, “The record of this 

matter supports a finding that the court failed to conduct an independent 

review of the record before accepting counsel’s ‘no-merit’ letter.” 

(Appellant’s Brief at 45). Appellant concludes the PCRA court erroneously 

accepted the “no-merit” letter, and the court should not have permitted 

PCRA counsel to withdraw. Appellant further concludes that genuine issues 

of material fact still exist, and the PCRA court should have conducted an 

evidentiary hearing. We disagree. 

“Before an attorney can be permitted to withdraw from representing a 

petitioner under the PCRA, Pennsylvania law requires counsel to file and 

obtain approval of a ‘no-merit’ letter pursuant to the mandates of 

Turner/Finley.” Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (emphasis in original). 

[C]ounsel must...submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial 

court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature 

and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing 

the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed, 
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explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and 

requesting permission to withdraw. 

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007). Counsel 

must also send to the petitioner a copy of the “no-merit” letter or brief and 

petition to withdraw and advise the petitioner of his right to proceed pro se

or with private counsel. Id. “Substantial compliance with these 

requirements will satisfy the criteria.” Karanicolas, supra. Additionally, 

the PCRA court “must conduct its own independent evaluation of the record 

and agree with counsel that the petition is without merit....” 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa.Super. 2014). 

Instantly, counsel filed a Turner/Finley letter and motion to withdraw 

as counsel with the PCRA court. Counsel listed the issues Appellant wished 

to raise and explained why the issues merit no relief.3 Counsel indicated 

that he sent Appellant a copy of the “no-merit” letter and motion to 

withdraw, as well as an explanation of Appellant’s right to proceed pro se or 

with private counsel. Thus, counsel substantially complied with the 

Turner/Finley requirements. See Wrecks, supra. Moreover, the PCRA 

court conducted an independent review of the record and agreed with 

counsel that the issues raised in Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition were 

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3 Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the record reveals that PCRA counsel 

correctly interpreted all of the issues raised in the pro se PCRA petition and 

provided support for his conclusion that the issues lacked merit. 
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meritless. See Reed, supra. Thus, the PCRA court did not err in permitting 

counsel to withdraw. 

In addition to attacking the court’s decision to allow PCRA counsel to 

withdraw, Appellant asserts that PCRA counsel was ineffective on multiple 

bases. Appellant, however, failed to raise these claims in a properly filed 

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice.4 Consequently, Appellant’s 

claims regarding PCRA counsel’s purported ineffectiveness are waived. See 

Ford, supra (holding claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness cannot be 

raised for first time after notice of appeal has been filed from underlying 

PCRA matter). Although Appellant’s brief includes argument regarding trial 

and direct appeal counsels’ ineffectiveness, Appellant presents such 

argument in an attempt to demonstrate PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

conjunction with the preparation of the “no-merit” letter. Appellant’s pro se 

Rule 1925(b) statement also framed his issues in terms of PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, rather than raising independent claims of trial and direct 

appeal counsels’ ineffectiveness. See Pro Se Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 

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4 Appellant insists “[a] proper reading of Appellant’s objections to the court’s 

[Rule 907] notice reveals that Appellant sought to preserve claims of PCRA 

counsel’s ineffectiveness regarding all of the claims presented....” 

(Appellant’s Brief at 15). We emphasize, however, Appellant’s pro se 

response to the Rule 907 notice does not appear in the certified record, and 

this Court cannot consider any item that is not part of the certified record. 

See Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443 (Pa.Super. 2014) (reiterating 

appellate court may consider only those materials included in certified 

record, when resolving issues). 
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1/10/14, at 1-2. Thus, we do not undertake any further review of trial and 

direct appeal counsels’ purported ineffectiveness. Based upon the foregoing, 

we affirm the order denying PCRA relief. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2015