IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 10, 2017

TAMIR CLARK v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. F-66462 Royce Taylor, Judge

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No. M2016-01079-CCA-R3-ECN

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In 2012, the Petitioner, Tamir Clark, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, 

arson, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner 

later filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 

guilty plea was involuntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and this Court 

affirmed the denial on appeal. See State v. Tamir Clark, No. M2014-00618-CCA-R3-PC, 

2014 WL 7191536, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 18, 2014), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. April 13, 2015). On February 24, 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for a 

writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered evidence. In March 2016, the trial 

court issued an order dismissing the petition as time-barred. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., joined.

Tamir Clark, Clifton, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and J. Paul Newman, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

The Petitioner pleaded guilty, on November 21, 2012, to especially aggravated 

kidnapping, arson, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder of 

his stepmother. These convictions arose out of the Petitioner’s breaking into his 

02/13/2017
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stepmother’s residence, attacking her, stabbing her, and then dragging her from the 

residence and placing her in her vehicle parked in the driveway. The Petitioner attempted 

to steal the vehicle but instead started a fire in the front compartment of the vehicle. The 

Petitioner’s stepmother was pulled out of the vehicle before it ultimately exploded. 

The Petitioner, pro se, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on February 

24, 2016, alleging newly discovered evidence. He asserted that the newly discovered 

evidence was the victim’s hospital records that he claimed showed that the victim was not 

treated for stab wounds and that she did not suffer from life-threatening injuries. The 

Petitioner asserted that he did not receive this evidence from his attorney until October 9, 

2015, and that this evidence would have provided him a defense for trial. 

After reviewing the petition, the trial court filed an order denying relief. In its 

order dated, March 11, 2016, the trial court made the following findings:

The Court finds the claim concerning the hospital records is time 

barred and filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations designated 

for this type of relief. Although the statute of limitations would have 

expired in December 2013, the claimed grounds for relief did not arise until 

October 2015. This Court finds, however, that a strict application of the 

limitations period does not deny the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to 

present his claim. Because the hospital records upon which [petitioner] 

relies as his grounds for relief were in the possession of [petitioner]’s 

attorney at the time of the plea, the records were not hidden or unknown. 

The records could have been addressed at trial or during plea negotiations. 

It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his

petition for a writ of error coram nobis because newly discovered evidence entitles him to 

relief. He argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to inform him of the hospital 

records and that he filed his writ of error coram nobis four months after learning of the 

hospital records; thus, the trial court should not have found his claim time-barred. The 

State responds that the Petitioner is not entitled to coram nobis relief because the 

convictions are the result of a guilty plea. We agree with the State.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105 (2012) provides:
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There is hereby made available to convicted defendants in criminal 

cases a proceeding in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, to be 

governed by the same rules and procedure applicable to the writ of error 

coram nobis in civil cases, except insofar as inconsistent herewith. . . . 

Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in 

failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram 

nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to 

matters which are litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such 

evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at 

trial.

(emphasis added). It is well-established that the writ of error coram nobis “is an 

extraordinary procedural remedy . . . [that] fills only a slight gap into which few cases 

fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999). Generally, a decision whether 

to grant a writ rests within the sound discretion of the coram nobis court. See State v. 

Hart, 991 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). We, therefore, review for abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Workman, 111 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

As the State correctly notes, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently held in Frazier 

v. State, that coram nobis relief “is not available as a procedural mechanism for 

collaterally attacking a guilty plea.” 495 S.W.3d 246, 253 (Tenn. 2016). As the 

Petitioner’s convictions are the result of a guilty plea, he is not entitled to coram nobis 

relief. 

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial court’s 

dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE