### The Hon. Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for 1 

### the Southern District of Iowa. _____________ No. 96-1614SI

_____________ Diana Dodson, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * v. * On Appeal from the United * States District Court for * the Southern District Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of Iowa. of the Social Security * Administration, * * Defendant-Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: September 11, 1996 Filed: November 25, 1996

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Diana Dodson appeals a District Court order affirming th e 1 Commis sioner's denial of Dodson's application for Social Securit y disability benefits. We affirm.

### The Commissioner denied Dodson's application on October 27 , 2 

### 1993, and again, on reconsider ation, on December 3, 1993. After a hea ring in July 1994, Administrative Law Judge Thomas M. Donahu e issued the final decision of t he Commissioner, dated September 13, 1994. Dodson's counsel filed a motion requesting this limitation
.

3 

### We grant the motion but note that it was not required. Since the Commissioner awarded Dodson benefits, an appeal of the prior denial of those benefits is necessarily limited to the time before th e award. A protection control technician performs duties such a s

4 

### running computers and high-speed check sorters. Admin. Rec. 48. -2- I.

At th e time of the District Court's decision, the Commissioner o f Soci al Security had consistently denied disability benefits to Dodson. 2 Since the filing of t his appeal, however, the Commissioner has found that Dodson is disabled and eligible to receive benefits. We therefore limit
our review to the time period between September 12, 1992, when Dodso n alleges her disability began, and March 26, 1996, the date the Commissione r found that her disability began. 3

II.

Diana Dod son is 48 years old and a high school graduate. He r em ployment experience includes work as a convenience store assistan t manager, a cashier/checker, a pizza baker, and, most recently, as a protection control technician in a bank. 4
In a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") at the Social Securi tyAdministration, she listed several health problems whic h contribute to her disability. Chief among them were chronic asthma, sinus infections, recurrent urinary tract infections, chronic irritation of the bowe l, a severely injured ankle, and pain associated with prior bac k surgery. Admin. Rec. 40-43. She

### -3-

testif ied that the ankle injury, urinary tract infections, bowe l irritation, and asthma interfered most significantly with her ability to work. Her leg had to be elevated much of the day, she required rest break s when using her inhale r for her asthma, and she had to go to the rest room
once or t wice every half hour due to her frequent urination and chroni c diarrhea. Id. at 40, 46-48.

The ALJ, evaluating Dodson's testimony and medical records and th e testimony of a vocational expert, found that Dod son's health problems were not so disabling as to prevent her from working. Id. at 11. The District Cour t affirmed. Appellant's App. 5. We review the District Court' s decisi on to determine whether the ALJ's decision was supported b y sub stantial evidence on the record as a whole. Baker v. Secretary o f Health and Human Servs. , 955 F.2d 552, 554 (8th Cir. 1992).

III.

Dodson ch allenges the ALJ's finding that her testimony that she was unemployable was not fully credible. Appellant's Br. 18. Dodson argues that the ALJ failed to give proper consideration to her subjectiv e allegations of pain as required by Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1321

- 22 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent history omitted). Under Polaski , a n adjudicator may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints solel y because the objective medical evidence does not support them. Id. at 1322
. But after full consideration of all of the evide nce relating to subjective compla ints, the adjudicator may discount those complaints if there ar e inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. Ibid.
Dodson's hearing testimony regarding her ability to work was at times cont radictory. Dodson testified that she did not think she could b e employed again in the position she had held at the bank, "because [she ] couldn 't do all the running that [she] did before." Admin. Rec. 47
. During the same proceeding, she also

### We recognize that, simply because one employer was tolerant 5 

### in accommodating Dodson's needs, all employers might not be s o inclined. From her testimony, it appears that the management o f the bank which bought out her original employer was far les s understanding; she said they complained about her frequent t rips to the rest room. The vocational expert testified, however, that a pers on in Dodson's condition should qualify for sedentary work
. The ALJ is entitled to evaluate her employability based on a ll this evidence, and his finding can be disturbed only if unsupported by substantial evidence. -4- testified that, were the bank still operated by its previous owners, she was "sure [she'd] sti ll have the job." Ibid. Though she later dismissed the latter statement as "probably wishful thinking," id. at 49, she also said nothing new had happened to her physically or mentally since she left her job that would ma ke work harder for her than it had been when she was employed. The ALJ concluded that, since Dodson had been able to work whil e having the exact same impairments she claimed made her unemployable, she was "less than fully credible" regarding her inability to work. 5
Dodson also challenges the ALJ's dec ision for "fail[ing] to mention" impor tant medical evidence corroborating her testimony about he r employability. Appellant's Br. 22-23. The evidence to which Dodson refer s is a one-pa ge form filled out by Dr. R. Hart. Contrary to Dodson' s ass ertion, the ALJ specifically mentioned this piece of evidence by it s exhibi t number in his opinion, noting that it received particula r attention. Admin. Rec. 16.
Presumably, Dodson means to dispute the ALJ's evaluation of tha t evide nce. The ALJ wrote that "no medical source ha[d] suggested [the ] notion" that Dodson's ankle condition precluded her from all work. Dodson insists that Dr. Hart indeed suggested such a notion. The form Dr. Hart filled out contains the question, "If unable to work, is inability : temporary [or] permanent[?]" Dr. Hart marked "permanent." Id. at 205.

### -5- The formlater contradicts itself. Although Dr. Hart's check mar k in the question quote d above indicates that Dodson was unable to work and that her disability w as permanent, another of his check marks points to a differ ent conclusion. On the immediately preceding line, beside "wor k capacity," Dr. Hart marked "limited work." Ibid. It is impossible to kno w what Dr. Hart intende d to convey. Considering this ambiguous evidence in light of all the other evidence, it was permissible for the ALJ to conclud e that Dodson remained able to work. While the ALJ did not accept Dodson's subj ective evaluation of her ability to work, he also did not rejec t Dodson's subjective assessment solely because the objective medica l evidence failed to support her claim. See Admin. Rec. 14-17. Hi s treatment of that evidence was both sensible and proper under Polaski . 73 9 F.2d at 1322; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

The ALJ also relied upon the testimony of a vocational expert wh o appeared at Dodson's hearing. The expert heard all of Dodson's testimony and had reviewed her file. Relying on Dodson's testimony and referring to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), the expert testified that
a person with Dodson's employment background and physical limitations coul d work, but would be limited to sedentary work. Admin. Rec. 55.

In the e xpert's opinion, Dodson could still perform work like tha t she had performed at the bank, only "in a way that the DOT normally says that it is performed" -- presumably, without lifting heavy bags of checks
or traveling very far without rest. See id. at 44, 52, 56. The exper t further testified that Dodson was qualified for several clerical positions which were classified in the DOT as "sedentary." According to the expert, Dodso n's need to keep her ankle elevated could usually be readil y accommodated in most of these jobs, and most employers normally allowed fo r sufficient rest periods.

### -6- Tha t different interpretations of Dodson's ability to work wer e possible does not inv alidate the ALJ's conclusions. Oberst v. Shalala , 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Ci r. 1993) (citing Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992)). Since we find those conclusions were supported by medical evidence, the testimony of the vocational expert, and in part by Dodson's own testimony, we will not disturb the ALJ's ruling.

IV.

The ALJ's consideration of Dodson's subjective assessment of he r employability was proper under Polaski , 739 F.2d at 1321-22. His conclusio n that Dodson was employable, and therefore ineligible for disabilit y benefits, was supported by substantial evidence. The District Court was correct in affirming that decision. We therefore affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.