Present: All the Justices 

WILLIAM H. LUCY, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 980770 

COUNTY OF ALBEMARLE 

 OPINION BY 

JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

June 11, 1999 

CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

v. Record No. 980771 

COUNTY OF ALBEMARLE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

John E. Clarkson, Rodham T. Delk, Jr., and Donald A. 

McGlothlin, Jr., Judges 

 In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether a 

citizen-initiated petition for reversion of an independent city 

to town status under Code § 15.2-4102 (formerly Code § 15.1-

965.10(B)) was properly filed in the circuit court prior to the 

notice specified in Code § 15.2-2907(A) (formerly Code § 15.1-

945.7(A)) being given to the Commission on Local Government and 

the affected local governments.1

 

1

Subsequent to the filing of the petition for reversion at 

issue in these appeals, Title 15.1 was superseded by Title 15.2, 

with the relevant statutory provisions now appearing in Code 

§§ 15.2-2900 et seq. and 15.2-4100 et seq. Because there is no 

material change between the former and current versions of the 

statutes we address, we will refer herein to the current 

statutes. 
 The parties do not dispute the legislative history of these 

and other relevant statutes or the procedural posture of the 

cases. However, the specific statutes in question are in 

apparent conflict and susceptible to differing constructions. 

Thus, the issue framed by these appeals is uniquely one of 

necessary judicial construction to reconcile these statutes 

consistent with legislative intent. Accordingly, in order to 

place the facts and the specific issue of these appeals in 

proper focus, we begin our analysis with a review of the 

legislative background of the general statutory scheme 

concerning changes in the boundaries, structure, and status of 

counties, cities, and towns in this Commonwealth. 

Although it has been almost three decades since the General 

Assembly first passed legislation to address the problems of 

relations among local governments within this Commonwealth, the 

underlying concerns with respect to this issue remain unchanged. 

In County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. 62, 294 

S.E.2d 825 (1982), we said: 

Relations among units of local government pose 

problems of continuing concern to the General 

Assembly. Different people in different communities 

have different needs for different reasons. 

Government seldom has sufficient resources to provide 

all it would like to give its citizens and never all 

they would like to receive. Necessarily, needs and 

means must be balanced and compromises must be 

reached. How well local governments succeed in 

promoting the common weal depends in large part upon 

2
how they are organized and how they interact with 

their neighbors. 

Id. at 71, 294 S.E.2d at 828-29. 

 To address these concerns, in 1971 the General Assembly 

authorized a study by the Commission on City-County 

Relationships. Acts 1971, c. 234. As a result of that study, 

the General Assembly enacted comprehensive legislation in 1979 

with the purpose and intent “to create a procedure whereby the 

Commonwealth will help ensure that all of its localities are 

maintained as viable communities in which their citizens can 

live.” Code § 15.2-2900. To carry out this purpose and intent, 

the General Assembly established the Commission on Local 

Government. Id.

 The General Assembly initially mandated and empowered the 

Commission on Local Government, inter alia, “[t]o investigate, 

analyze, and make findings of fact . . . as to the probable 

effect” of any proposed annexation, declaration of immunity from 

annexation, establishment of a town or independent city, or 

transition from a county to a city. Code § 15.2-2903(4). 

Relevant to the present appeals, the General Assembly in 1988 

amended the former version of this statute to include as an 

additional responsibility of the Commission on Local Government 

the administrative review “of any proposed action . . . [t]o 

3
make a transition from city status to town status.” Code 

§ 15.2-2903(4)(e). 

 The procedure for invoking an administrative review by the 

Commission on Local Government on matters within its purview is 

set out in Code § 15.2-2907, one of the two statutes principally 

at issue in the present appeals. In pertinent part, that 

statute provides: 

 A. No locality or person shall file any action in 

any court in Virginia . . . to make a transition from 

city status to town status, without first notifying 

the Commission and all local governments located 

within or contiguous to, or sharing functions, 

revenue, or tax sources with, the locality proposing 

such action. Upon receipt of the notice the 

Commission shall hold hearings, make investigations, 

analyze local needs and make findings of fact and 

recommendations . . . No court action may be filed 

until the Commission has made its findings of facts. 

. . . . 

B. The Commission shall report, in writing, its 

findings and recommendations to the affected 

localities, any other localities likely to be affected 

. . . and to any court which may subsequently consider 

the action. 

. . . . 

 Before making the report the Commission shall 

conduct hearings at which any interested person may 

testify. Prior to the hearing, the Commission shall 

publish a notice of the hearing once a week for two 

successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation 

in the affected counties and cities. 

(Emphasis added.) 

4
On its face, Code § 15.2-2907 is a clear directive 

expressing the intent of the General Assembly that all proposed 

actions to make a transition from city status to town status be 

subject to an administrative hearing and review by the 

Commission on Local Government prior to any court action being 

filed. Such hearing and review is initiated by notice to the 

Commission on Local Government. The statute mandates that all 

affected local governments also be notified of the proposed 

action and that the Commission on Local Government publish 

notice to the general public prior to its hearing on the matter. 

In 1988, in addition to including the responsibility of the 

Commission on Local Government to review actions concerning 

transition from city status to town status set out in Code 

§ 15.2-2907, the General Assembly also enacted the statutory 

scheme for instituting such actions. Under that statutory 

scheme, now found at Code § 15.2-4100 et seq., there are two 

methods by which an action for reversion from city status to 

town status may be instituted. Code § 15.2-4101 provides that: 

A. Any city in this Commonwealth with a 

population at the time of the latest United States 

decennial census of less than 50,000 people, after 

fulfilling the requirements of Chapter 29 (§ 15.2-2900 

et seq.), may by ordinance passed by a recorded 

majority vote of all the members thereof, petition the 

circuit court for the city, alleging that the city 

meets the criteria set out in § 15.2-4106 for an order 

granting town status to the city. The circuit court 

with which the petition is filed shall notify the 

Supreme Court, which shall appoint a special court to 

5
hear the case as prescribed by Chapter 30 (§ 15.2-3000 

et seq.) of this title. 

B. Before instituting a proceeding under this 

chapter for a grant of town status, a city shall serve 

notice on the county attorney, or if there is none, on 

the attorney for the Commonwealth, and on the chairman 

of the board of supervisors of the adjoining county 

that it will, on a given day, petition the circuit 

court for a grant of town status. The notice served 

on each official shall include a certified copy of the 

ordinance. A copy of the notice and ordinance, or a 

descriptive summary of the notice and ordinance and a 

reference to the place within the city or adjoining 

county where copies of the notice and ordinance may be 

examined, shall be published at least once a week for 

four successive weeks in some newspaper having general 

circulation in the city and adjoining county. The 

notice and ordinance shall be returned after service 

to the clerk of the circuit court. Certification by 

the owner, editor or manager of the newspaper 

publishing the notice and ordinance shall be proof of 

publication. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Code § 15.2-4102 provides that: 

Voters equal in number to fifteen percent or more 

of the registered voters of the city as of January 1 

of the year in which the petition is filed may 

petition the circuit court for the city, stating that 

it is desirable that such city make the transition to 

town status. All of the signatures on the petition 

shall have been made and filed within a twelve-month 

period. A copy of the petition shall be served on the 

city attorney and the county attorney, or if there is 

none, on the attorney for the Commonwealth for the 

county and on the mayor of the city and the chairman 

of the board of supervisors of the adjoining counties. 

A copy of the petition shall be published at least 

once a week for four successive weeks in a newspaper 

having general circulation in the city and the 

adjoining county. The case shall proceed in all 

respects as though instituted in the manner prescribed 

in § 15.2-4101, and the court shall forthwith refer 

6
the petition to the Commission on Local Government for 

review pursuant to Chapter 29 (§ 15.2-2900 et seq.). 

(Emphasis added.) 

 By express language, before a city may file its petition 

for reversion to town status in the circuit court, Code § 15.2-

4101 requires the city to comply with the notice provisions of 

Code § 15.2-2907(A). This requirement is harmonious with the 

prohibition contained in Code § 15.2-2907(A) against the 

“locality . . . fil[ing] any action in any court in Virginia 

. . . to make a transition from city status to town status, 

without first notifying the Commission and all [affected] local 

governments.” 

 The material distinction between the filing of a cityinitiated petition for reversion to town status under Code 

§ 15.2-4101 and the filing of a citizen-initiated petition for 

such reversion under Code § 15.2-4102 arises in the final 

sentence of the latter statute, which provides that “[t]he case 

shall proceed in all respects as though instituted in the manner 

prescribed in 15.2-4101, and the court shall forthwith refer the 

petition to the Commission on Local Government for review 

pursuant to Chapter 29 (§ 15.2-2900 et seq.).” (Emphasis 

added.) It is this manifest conflict between Code § 15.2-4102, 

requiring a citizen-initiated petition for reversion of a city 

to town status to be filed first in circuit court followed by a 

7
referral by the court to the Commission on Local Government, and 

Code § 15.2-2907(A), requiring notice of an intended reversion 

of a city to town status and a hearing and review by the 

Commission on Local Government prior to the filing of any court 

action, that is the focal point of these appeals. Within this 

statutory scheme, the following factual and procedural events 

occurred. 

 On November 26, 1996, William H. Lucy and four other 

representative petitioners (the petitioners) pursuant to Code 

§ 15.2-4102 filed a petition in the Circuit Court of the City of 

Charlottesville with signatures purported to represent at least 

fifteen percent of the registered voters of the City of 

Charlottesville. The petition stated that “for the reasons that 

will appear in the evidence which will be offered at subsequent 

hearings . . . it is desirable that the City of Charlottesville 

make the transition to town status.” Copies of the petition 

were served on the city attorney and mayor of the City of 

Charlottesville and the county attorney and chairman of the 

board of supervisors of Albemarle County, the adjoining county. 

The petitioners concede that no written notice of their 

intention to seek reversion to town status had been given to the 

Commission on Local Government or any affected local government 

prior to the filing of the petition in the circuit court. 

8
 On December 13, 1996, the City of Charlottesville (the 

City) filed an answer to the petition. The City requested that 

it be made a party to the suit and that “the Special Court, 

following its appointment, enter [an order] . . . referring this 

proceeding, following the Special Court’s disposition of all 

pleas, demurrers, or other preliminary motions as may be filed, 

to the Commission on Local Government for review pursuant to 

[Code § 15.2-2900 et seq.].” On December 16, 1996, we appointed 

a panel of three judges as authorized by Code § 15.2-3000 to 

consider the petition as a special court. 

 On December 18, 1996, Albemarle County (the County) filed 

an answer to the petition. The County challenged the adequacy 

of the petition asserting doubt whether the petitioners 

represented fifteen percent of the registered voters of the 

City. Accordingly, the County asserted that “referral to the 

Commission on Local Government prior to determining the 

jurisdictional status of the petitioners would be inappropriate 

because of the costly and time-consuming nature of the 

proceedings before the Commission on Local Government.” The 

County did not assert in its answer that the petition had been 

improperly filed due to lack of prior written notice to the 

Commission on Local Government and the affected local 

governments. On June 3, 1997, the court entered an order 

appointing a special commissioner charged with the 

9
responsibility to determine the validity and sufficiency of the 

signatures to the petition. 

 On June 6, 1997, the County filed a motion to dismiss the 

petition. It was in this motion that the County first asserted 

that the notice provision of Code § 15.2-2907(A) precluded the 

petitioners from filing the petition prior to giving notice to 

the Commission on Local Government and the affected local 

governments described in that statute. The County alleged that 

“the notice provisions are jurisdictional and/or mandatory 

condition precedent to filing this action.” 

 Following a hearing on the County’s motion to dismiss, the 

court indicated that it would sustain the motion. The 

petitioners and the City both filed motions to reconsider. The 

motions for reconsideration asserted that the notice requirement 

of Code § 15.2-2907(A) was not jurisdictional and was not 

implicated until the court referred the matter to the Commission 

on Local Government pursuant to Code § 15.2-4102. The 

petitioners also sought leave to amend their petition to include 

an allegation of actual notice to the Commission on Local 

Government and the affected local governments. 

 In an opinion letter subsequently adopted by reference in 

the final order, the court opined that “the specific and 

affirmative notice requirements in the comprehensive statute, 

[Code § 15.2-2907(A)], which also specifically apply to 

10
reversion suits, are not overruled by the silence as to notice 

in the limited statute for citizen-initiated reversions, [Code 

§ 15.2-4102]. In the present case, prior notice to the 

Commission [on Local Government] was required and not given by 

the citizen petitioners.” 

 In a final order dated January 20, 1998, the court 

sustained the County’s motion to dismiss and denied the motions 

to reconsider. In that order, the court found that Code § 15.2-

2907(A) required the petitioners to give prior notice to the 

Commission on Local Government and the affected local 

governments; that they had failed to give such notice; and, that 

this failure was a jurisdictional defect which required 

dismissal of the petition. The court expressly stated that it 

had not made any determination of “the eligibility of the City 

of Charlottesville for town status” in the future. We awarded 

appeals to the petitioners and the City. 

 Because we find that the dispositive issue of these appeals 

is whether Code § 15.2-2907(A) requires the petitioners to give 

notice to the Commission on Local Government and the affected 

local governments prior to filing their petition under Code 

§ 15.2-4102, we will confine our discussion of the respective 

positions of the parties to that issue. 

 The petitioners and the City assert that Code § 15.2-4102 

expressly permits a citizen-initiated petition for reversion 

11
from city status to town status to be filed in the circuit court 

prior to notice being given to the Commission on Local 

Government and affected localities. They further assert that 

the express distinction between city-initiated petitions and 

citizen-initiated petitions overrides the broad general language 

of Code § 15.2-2907(A). While recognizing the facial conflict 

between these two statutes, they contend that the General 

Assembly intended for procedural challenges to the validity of a 

citizen-initiated petition to be resolved by a court prior to a 

referral to the Commission on Local Government. Thus, they 

further contend that this conflict is reconciled by a statutory 

construction implicating the notice provisions of Code § 15.2-

2907(A) only when a court refers a valid citizen-initiated 

petition to the Commission on Local Government pursuant to Code 

§ 15.2-4102. 

 The County contends that this construction of Code § 15.2-

4102 improperly treats it as “an isolated fragment of a law 

setting out a specific procedure applicable only to citizeninitiated reversions.” Rather, the County contends that Code 

§ 15.2-2907(A) is a comprehensive general statute touching upon 

the same subject matter as Code § 15.2-4102 and that the two 

must be construed in pari materia. When the two code sections 

are so construed, the County asserts that, absent specific 

language in Code § 15.2-4102 regarding the pre-filing notice 

12
requirements of Code § 15.2-2907(A), there is a presumption “the 

legislature did not intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, 

alter or violate a general statute or system of statutory 

provisions.” Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405-06, 

100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957). While acknowledging that there is an 

apparent conflict between the two statutes concerning the time 

for filing a citizen-initiated petition in the circuit court, 

the County contends that the notice requirements of Code 15.2-

2907(A) are clear and mandatory. Thus, the County concludes 

that the requirement of notice under Code § 15.2-2907(A) 

prevails and resolves any conflict with Code § 15.2-4102. 

 We agree with the County that the statutes in question are 

to be considered in pari materia. As we said in Prillaman

“[t]he general rule is that statutes may be considered as in 

pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, the 

same class of persons or things or to the same subject or to 

closely connected subjects or objects. Statutes which have the 

same general or common purpose or are parts of the same general 

plan are also ordinarily considered as in pari materia.” 

Prillaman, 199 Va. at 405, 100 S.E.2d at 7. 

However, the mere fact that statutes relate to the same 

subject or are part of the same general plan does not mean that 

they cannot also be in conflict. Indeed, the reason for 

considering statutes in pari materia is that this permits “any 

13
apparent inconsistencies [to] be ironed out whenever that is 

possible.” Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 170 Va. 33, 38, 195 S.E. 

516, 518 (1938). Thus, we have recognized that the requirement 

that we consider statutes as in pari materia is only one rule of 

statutory construction among many: 

In the construction of statutes, the courts have but 

one object, to which all rules of construction are 

subservient, and that is to ascertain the will of the 

legislature, the true intent and meaning of the 

statute, which are to be gathered by giving to all the 

words used their plain meaning, and construing all 

statutes in pari materia in such manner as to 

reconcile, if possible, any discordant feature which 

may exist, and make the body of the laws harmonious 

and just in their operation. 

Tyson v. Scott, 116 Va. 243, 253, 81 S.E. 57, 61 (1914); see 

also Waller v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 83, 89, 63 S.E.2d 713, 716 

(1951); The Covington Virginian, Inc. v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 

548-49, 29 S.E.2d 406, 411 (1944). Guided by this rule of 

statutory construction, we turn now to the specific statutes in 

question. 

 As noted above, Code § 15.2-2900 et seq. clearly give the 

Commission on Local Government the authority and responsibility 

to review all matters touching upon the status of local 

governments to ensure that all localities are maintained as 

viable communities in which their citizens can live. It is 

equally clear that the purpose of Code § 15.2-2907(A) is to 

invoke in a timely manner the Commission on Local Government’s 

14
fact-finding process on any of the matters within its purview to 

ensure that all affected local governments have notice of and an 

opportunity to be heard in that process. 

In this manner, the overall procedural scheme embodied in 

Code § 15.2-2907 promotes settlement of disputes between 

localities without resort to court action by the provision of 

subsection A that permits the Commission on Local Government to 

“actively seek to negotiate a settlement of the proposed 

action,” and with the agreement of the parties to “appoint an 

independent mediator” to facilitate such settlement. Thus, it 

is manifest that the General Assembly’s primary intent was to 

permit, where possible, a settlement of disputes between 

localities prior to any mandated resolution by a court. To that 

end, Code § 15.2-2907(A) unequivocally prohibits the filing of 

any court action until the Commission on Local Government has 

been notified and completed its review.2

 

2

We note that when the General Assembly in 1988 amended the 

former version of Code § 15.2-2907(A) to include “person” within 

the statute’s mandate for pre-filing notice to the Commission on 

Local Government and affected localities, it created a patent 

ambiguity in the statute. Obviously, a “person” cannot be “the 

locality proposing such action” contained in the emphasized 

phrase of the statute previously noted in this opinion. This 

ambiguity, while not controlling in our analysis, further 

illustrates the conflict between Code § 15.2-2907(A) and Code 

§ 15.2-4102 created in 1988 that necessitates statutory 

construction to reconcile these statutes. 

15
We think, however, it is significant that there is no 

authority anywhere in the pertinent statutory scheme for the 

Commission on Local Government to decline to review an action 

that may appear to lack merit. Specific to the issue in these 

appeals, there is no provision for the Commission on Local 

Government to suspend its proceedings in order to permit a court 

to consider legal challenges to a citizen-initiated petition 

under Code § 15.2-4102, as the County suggests could be done. 

Rather, Code § 15.2-2907(A) provides that “[u]pon receipt of the 

notice the Commission shall hold hearings, make investigations, 

analyze local needs and make findings of facts and 

recommendations.” 

As the County itself acknowledged in its answer to the 

petition in this case, proceedings before the Commission on 

Local Government are “costly and time-consuming.” It is 

reasonable, therefore, that the General Assembly would not 

intend for private citizens to have the unfettered power to 

bring frivolous or procedurally deficient matters before the 

Commission on Local Government and thereby subject the 

Commission on Local Government and affected local governments to 

the unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer resources. 

In this context, Code § 15.2-4102 may be reasonably 

reconciled with Code § 15.2-2907(A) when the former is construed 

as a “gatekeeper” statute. Under this construction, the sole 

16
purpose for treating citizen-initiated petitions for reversion 

of a city to town status differently from such city-initiated 

petitions is to permit the city and the county directly involved 

to raise procedural challenges to the efficacy of citizeninitiated petitions in the court where they are filed, thus 

avoiding unnecessary involvement of the Commission on Local 

Government and other local governments in those cases where the 

petitions would fail without regard to their merits. Once those 

challenges are resolved, the statute expressly mandates that the 

court refer the petition to the Commission on Local Government 

without taking further action on the merits of the petition 

until the provisions of Code § 15.2-2900 et seq. have been 

satisfied. 

This construction of Code § 15.2-4102 as a gatekeeper 

statute is bolstered by our further conclusion that, contrary to 

the concern expressed by the court below, Code § 15.2-4102 does 

contain a comprehensive notice scheme. That scheme readily may 

be reconciled with the intent of Code § 15.2-2907(A) that 

affected local governments have a full and fair opportunity to 

participate in the Commission on Local Government’s proceedings 

prior to a trial on the merits of a citizen-initiated petition 

for reversion to town status. Code § 15.2-4102 mandates that a 

copy of the petition be served on the attorney and mayor of the 

city and the attorney and chairman of the board of supervisors 

17
of its adjoining county or counties. In addition, this statute 

mandates publication of a copy of the petition in a newspaper 

having general circulation in those localities. Thereafter, the 

statute mandates that the court forthwith refer the petition to 

the Commission on Local Government which in turn is subject to 

the mandate of Code § 15.2-2907(B) to publish a notice of its 

hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the affected 

counties and cities. These notice requirements ensure that the 

affected governments and other interested parties will have an 

adequate opportunity to be heard before the Commission on Local 

Government issues its final report and before any hearing on the 

merits is conducted by the court. In this context, Code § 15.2-

4102 and Code § 15.2-2907(A) are reconciled to the greatest 

extent possible and, moreover, are just in their operation. 

For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred. 

Thus, we will reverse the judgment of the court below and remand 

the case for further proceedings consistent with the views 

expressed in this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded. 

18