NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

MICHELLE L. PRINCIPE, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

DAVID M. BLEVINS, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0413 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2015-008129

The Honorable Kerstin G. LeMaire, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL

Michelle L. Principe, Denver, CO

Petitioner/Appellant

FILED 6-3-2021
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Michelle L. Principe (Mother) appeals the superior 

court’s order modifying legal decision-making authority and parenting 

time orders set forth in the decree of dissolution. Mother has not shown that 

the court erred in modifying the decree. The court, however, erred by 

ordering Mother to complete and pay for a psychological evaluation 

(without considering her ability to pay) before it would consider another

petition to modify. Accordingly, that requirement is vacated. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and David Michael Blevins (Father) have one child, 

born in 2009. When the parties divorced in 2011, all three lived in Arizona.

The decree awarded joint legal decision-making authority, gave primary 

physical custody to Mother and parenting time to Father. Father later

moved to Utah. In September 2017, the parties agreed that the child would 

live in Utah with Father, stepmother and their children for the 2017–2018 

school year. The child visited Mother in Arizona a few times, including for 

spring break in March 2018. 

¶3 In March 2018, Mother received a report that Father and

stepmother punished the child by slapping her, confining her to a bedroom 

except for school and taking away her mattress. Mother relayed the report 

to the Arizona Department of Child Safety (ADCS). Mother also refused to 

return the child to Utah and filed a modification petition requesting sole 

legal decision-making authority and supervised parenting time for Father.

An ADCS investigation addressed the report Mother provided as well as 

alleged sexual abuse. After a forensic interview, ADCS concluded the 

allegations were unsubstantiated and took no action.
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In June 2018, the court appointed an advisor (CAA) to make 

recommendations regarding the child’s best interests. Later that month, 

Mother indicated she was willing to send the child back to Utah and give 

up her parental rights. On June 27, 2018, without prior notice to Father, 

Mother put the child on a late-night flight to Utah and sent Father a text 

message telling him she was sending the child back. Mother claimed she 

did so because she was financially destitute and had no option. However, 

Mother objected when Father attempted to formalize this arrangement and 

proposed joint legal decision-making, with Father having primary custody 

in Utah and Mother having long-distance parenting time, with the cost of 

travel split equally.

¶5 At an August 2018 hearing, Mother explained that she had 

been “on the edge of a nervous breakdown when she elected to relinquish 

the child back to Utah voluntarily” in late June 2018. Mother had lost her 

job and unemployment benefits, and her utilities had been shut off. The 

CAA expressed concern about Mother’s mental health and about awarding 

unsupervised parenting time based on what had happened. The CAA 

stated that she had not interviewed Mother because Mother was unable to 

pay the CAA’s fees. The court then granted Mother a waiver for the CAA’s 

fees.

¶6 Father asked to have Mother submit to a psychological 

evaluation at Mother’s expense, subject to reallocation of the expense after 

the evaluation. Mother objected, arguing that the evaluation was 

unnecessary, and she could not afford it. The court, however, granted 

Father’s request. Mother then moved to Colorado. At a January 2019 status 

conference, Mother again objected that the psychological evaluation was 

unnecessary, and she could not afford it. The court, however, reaffirmed its

prior order.

¶7 In April 2019, Mother filed a motion for temporary orders 

because the court had not yet scheduled a hearing on her April 2018 petition 

to modify. The court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2019 and issued 

temporary orders granting Father sole legal decision-making authority. The 

court found supervised parenting time was necessary based on Mother’s 

behavior. The court found Mother’s behavior still warranted “a full[-]scale 

psychological evaluation to determine the extent to which she can parent.”

Mother unsuccessfully moved to amend this order, again claiming that she 

could not afford the evaluation.
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 Ultimately, in March 2020, the court held an evidentiary 

hearing on Mother’s April 2018 petition. After receiving the evidence, the 

court found a significant and continuing change of circumstances

warranted modification, granted Father sole legal decision-making 

authority and ordered that Mother have supervised parenting time in Utah 

for up to four hours per month. The court stated that it would consider a 

petition to modify after Mother completed six consecutive months of 

supervised parenting time and “a full[-]scale psychological evaluation 

conducted by a court approved psychologist demonstrating her fitness to 

parent.” The court also ordered Mother to pay $569 per month in child 

support. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from that order. Mother later 

filed several post-order motions that she included in an amended notice of 

appeal. This court has appellate jurisdiction over these post-decree orders 

resolving all of the relief sought in Mother’s April 2018 post-decree petition 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(2) (2021).

1

¶9 In January 2021, while this appeal was pending, Mother filed 

several more motions and petitions, including to modify legal decisionmaking, parenting time and child support, alleging another incident of 

abuse by stepmother. After a conference later in January 2021 with the Utah 

court (where related proceedings were and apparently are pending), the 

Arizona superior court relinquished jurisdiction to the Utah court and 

dismissed “all pending pleadings” in Arizona. Mother’s challenge to that 

order is pending in a separate appeal in 1 CA-CV 21-0187 FC.

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Had Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction to Rule 

on the April 2018 Petition to Modify.

¶10 Mother argues that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to 

rule on her April 2018 petition to modify. Mother contends that Arizona 

was not the child’s home state when she filed the April 2018 petition and

that, by October 2018, Mother, Father and the child had moved out of 

Arizona. Whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction under Arizona’s 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. Although Father’s 

failure to file an answering brief could be considered a confession of error, 

the court is not required to view it as such, particularly when the best 

interests of a minor child are at issue. See In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 

524, 525 ¶ 2 (App. 2002).
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

5

version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

(UCCJEA) is an issue this court reviews de novo. Mangan v. Mangan, 227 

Ariz. 346, 350 ¶ 16 (App. 2011).

¶11 Because Arizona issued the original custody order, it has 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order until either of the 

following is true: 

1. A court of this state determines that neither 

the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the 

child and a person acting as a parent have a 

significant connection with this state and that 

substantial evidence is no longer available in 

this state concerning the child’s care, protection, 

training and personal relationships. [or]

2. A court of this state or a court of another state 

determines that the child, the child’s parents 

and any person acting as a parent do not 

presently reside in this state.

A.R.S. § 25-1032(A). This statute “reflects the UCCJEA’s goal of allowing 

the court that makes the original custody determination to retain exclusive, 

continuing jurisdiction over that order.” Mangan, 227 Ariz. at 351 ¶ 19.

¶12 In April 2018, when Mother filed the petition that initiated 

these proceedings, she still lived in Arizona. Thus, the fact that Arizona 

might not have been the child’s home state in April 2018 did not deprive 

Arizona of jurisdiction under § 25-1032(A) because Mother still lived here.

Nor did Mother’s subsequent move from Arizona to Colorado deprive the 

court of jurisdiction, given that Mother lived in Arizona when she filed the 

petition. “Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding.”

Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enf’t Act § 202 cmt. 2, U.L.A. 26 (1997).

Thus, the superior court had jurisdiction to rule on Mother’s April 2018 

petition.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Ignore Allegations of Child Abuse 

and Neglect.

¶13 This court reviews legal decision-making and parenting time 

orders for an abuse of discretion, accepting the superior court’s findings of 

fact absent clear error. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 

2018). “A finding of fact cannot be ‘clearly erroneous’ if there is substantial 

evidence to support it, even though there might be substantial conflicting 
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

6

evidence.” Moore v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 148 Ariz. 408, 413 (App. 1985). The 

superior court at trial, not this court on appeal, weighs and assesses

credibility and conflicting evidence. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347

¶ 13 (App. 1998). Although conflicting evidence may exist, the superior 

court’s ruling will be affirmed if substantial evidence supports it. Hurd v.

Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶14 Where legal decision-making or parenting time is contested, 

the court “shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant 

factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best-interests of the 

child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B). One of the factors relevant to determining the 

child’s best interests is whether there has been domestic violence. A.R.S. § 

25-403(A)(8) (citing § 25-403.03). Therefore, the court must consider 

whether there has been domestic violence as defined by § 25-403.03(C).

DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423 ¶ 11 (App. 2019).

¶15 The court made detailed findings about each statutory factor 

and found that allegations of child abuse asserted in the April 2018 petition 

were not supported. Mother contends the court ignored evidence of 

punishments that constitute child abuse. She argues that the court failed to 

address (1) Father and stepmother taking the child’s bed away as a 

punishment, (2) a police report stating stepmother cut the child’s cheek and 

(3) Father’s failure to place the child in therapy when recommended by a 

doctor.

2 Although the findings did not address these specific allegations,

the failure to reference this evidence does not establish, as Mother argues, 

that the court did not consider it. Rather, the court found Mother’s 

allegations of abuse were not credible and weighed them accordingly. See 

Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55–56 ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (appellate courts 

presume the superior court fully considered evidence admitted at trial).

¶16 Mother challenges the weight the court attributed to the 

evidence that Father took away the child’s bed as a punishment. Father 

admitted he did this for one night and that Utah child safety workers told

him it was inappropriate. Father’s testimony and the records show that 

Utah authorities investigated this incident, instructed Father it was 

inappropriate and closed the case without further action. Viewing the 

2 Mother’s statement of facts in her brief on appeal contains many other 

allegations and disputes the evidence and post-hearing rulings. Because 

those assertions were not properly raised or developed, they are not 

considered here. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (arguments in opening brief must 

contain supporting contentions, legal authorities, and record citations).
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

7

evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s order,

Mother has not shown that the court abused its discretion in addressing this 

assertion. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16; Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 13.

¶17 Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the police report regarding 

stepmother cutting the child’s cheek was admitted into evidence. The court 

also reviewed the child’s therapy records and heard testimony regarding 

the child’s progress in therapy. As of January 2019, the child was stable and 

her behavior improving, so Father stopped her therapy sessions. At the time 

of the evidentiary hearing, the child was again seeing a counselor upon the 

recommendation of the CAA (and as Mother had requested) and was doing 

well. Although the court did not discuss this evidence, it is presumed to 

have considered all admitted evidence, Fuentes, 209 Ariz. at 55–56 ¶ 18, and 

this court defers to the weight it afforded the evidence, Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 

52 ¶ 16. Accordingly, Mother has not shown the court ignored evidence of 

child abuse. 

III. The Court Erred in Failing to Consider Mother’s Ability to Pay for 

a Psychological Evaluation and Improperly Restricted Her Ability 

to File a Petition to Modify Parenting Time. 

¶18 In September 2018, the superior court ordered Mother to 

undergo a psychological evaluation at her expense. The order did not 

specify that Mother was obligated to pay for the entire cost of the 

psychological evaluation, but this is implied because Father asked to have 

Mother pay for the evaluation “subject to reallocation.” The court also 

ordered supervised parenting time for Mother.

¶19 The final order required Mother to pay all costs associated 

with her long-distance, supervised parenting time and ordered Mother to 

complete “a full[-]scale psychological evaluation . . . demonstrating her 

fitness to parent.” The order stated that Mother must complete the 

evaluation before the court “will entertain a motion to modify parenting 

time.” Mother contends these orders are not necessary and place an unfair 

financial burden on her ability to exercise parenting time.

¶20 By requesting a custody modification, Mother placed her 

mental health at issue given that consideration of the parties’ mental health 

is required by statute. A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(5); In re Marriage of Gove, 117 Ariz. 

324, 328 (App. 1977). Moreover, the record supports the order for both 

supervised parenting time and a psychological evaluation based on 

Mother’s behavior, correspondence with Father and the CAA report.
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

8

¶21 As to the financial burden of supervised parenting time, the 

order allowed a mutually agreed upon person to supervise. Presumably,

this will reduce the cost. Mother suggests that Father has unreasonably 

increased the cost of supervised parenting time by refusing to allow family 

members to supervise, but she failed to cite to any evidence of this in the 

record. At trial, Mother referred to one incident when the child visited 

Arizona without her knowledge but did not establish that she lived in 

Arizona at that time.

¶22 Mother also argues that, under Arizona Rule of Family Law 

Procedure (Rule) 51, Father must pay for the psychological evaluation 

because he requested it under Rule 63. Rule 51(b)(4)(C)requires that, absent 

“manifest injustice,” the party requesting discovery under Rule 63 from an 

expert witness shall pay for the expert’s time. Although Father’s motion 

cited Rule 63, the superior court ordered the evaluation to determine what 

custody arrangement and parenting time was in the child’s best interests.

Therefore, this order anticipated an evaluation from a neutral psychologist 

to determine the child’s best interests, not an “expert” hired by a party for 

discovery purposes. Therefore, Rule 51 is inapplicable here.

¶23 The order for a psychological evaluation is authorized by 

Rule 95(b), which allows the court to order parties to engage in behavioral 

health services. However, under Rule 95(a), the court “must determine on 

the record whether the parties have the ability to pay for services as well as 

allocate the costs of those services.” The court did not do so here. 

¶24 Mother repeatedly asserted that she is unable to pay for a 

psychological evaluation. In other ways, the court credited Mother’s 

inability to pay for various costs, including granting a fee waiver due to 

Mother’s financial circumstances when she could not pay the CAA’s fees.

At the time of trial, Mother was on disability, earning $3,000 per month. 

Father’s financial affidavit showed that he earned between $8,000 and 

$9,000 a month. The court’s findings, however, did not address the parties’

financial circumstances as required by Rule 95(a), nor did the court consider 

reallocating the cost of the evaluation as Father suggested in his original 

motion. In short, the court was aware that Mother had been unable to pay 

for the evaluation from the outset but did not address that issue when it 

again ordered Mother to pay for a comprehensive psychological evaluation.
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

9

¶25 The order also stated that the court would not entertain a 

petition to modify parenting time until Mother completed the evaluation.

To the extent this order restricts Mother’s ability to file a petition to modify,

it violates § 25-411(A), which allows a petition to modify legal decisionmaking or parenting time any time “there is reason to believe the child’s 

present environment may seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, 

moral or emotional health.” A party may also file a petition to modify at 

any time if there is evidence of domestic violence or abuse. Id. However, a 

parent must wait six months to file a petition based on the other parent’s 

failure to comply with court orders. Id.

¶26 The statutory requirements balance the competing interests of 

“the need for stability in the child’s life versus the need to change a previous 

order if that is necessary to place the child in a more suitable environment.”

Canty v. Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 447 (App. 1994). The order improperly 

imposed additional requirements by requiring Mother to complete the 

evaluation before filing a petition to modify. To the extent that the order 

was an effort to compel Mother to undergo an evaluation, compliance can 

be compelled in other ways that do not also limit Mother’s statutory right 

to file a petition to modify. Alternatives include a petition to enforce or a 

motion for contempt under Rules 91(b) or 92. Accordingly, this pre-filing 

requirement was improper and is vacated.

¶27 The superior court properly ordered supervised parenting 

time and a psychological evaluation of Mother. But the court erred by 

ordering Mother to pay the entire cost of the psychological evaluation 

without considering the parties’ financial resources, including under Rule 

95. The court also erred by requiring Mother to complete “a full [-] scale 

psychological evaluation” before the court would “entertain a motion to 

modify parenting time.” Accordingly, those portions of the order are 

vacated. 
PRINCIPE v. BLEVINS

Decision of the Court

10

CONCLUSION

¶28 The order modifying legal decision-making and parenting 

time is affirmed. Those portions of the order requiring Mother to pay for 

and complete a psychological evaluation, and that she complete the 

evaluation before she can file a petition to modify, are vacated.

¶29 Given the pendency of Mother’s appeal (1 CA-CV 21-0187 FC) 

challenging the superior court’s January 2021 relinquishment of jurisdiction 

to the Utah court and dismissal of “all pending pleadings” in Arizona, a 

copy of this memorandum decision (and, when issued, the mandate) 

should be provided to:

Second Judicial District Court

In and for Weber County, State of Utah, Ogden 

Department

2525 Grant Avenue

Ogden, UT 84401

Case No. 204901284

Attention: The Honorable Jennifer Valencia, 

Judge, and The Honorable Catherine Conklin, 

Commissioner