In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-18-00205-CV 

________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.K.J.J.F. AKA S.F., A CHILD 

 

 

On Appeal from the 69th District Court 

Dallam County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 12,046; Honorable Jack Graham, Presiding 

 

August 28, 2018 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, CJ., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant, J.F., appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to S.F.,

his daughter.1 On appeal, he asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient 

to support the trial court’s findings that (1) he violated section 161.001(b)(1)(O) and (Q) 

of the Texas Family Code; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O), (Q) (West Supp. 

 

1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 2014). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). S.F.’s mother voluntarily 

relinquished her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. 
2

2017), and (2) that termination was in S.F.’s best interest. The trial court’s order is 

affirmed.

BACKGROUND

S.F., a female child, was born in April 2016, and she is approximately two years 

old. The day before her delivery, T.L., her mother, tested positive for marijuana. The 

Department of Family and Protective Services opened a case and during its investigation 

for neglectful supervision, T.L. admitted using drugs during her pregnancy. She claimed, 

however, that was before finding out she was pregnant. When S.F. was removed, J.F. 

was under indictment for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. In January 2017, 

the Department closed its case after J.F. and T.L. received clean drug screens. 

In May, the Department received a second report of neglectful supervision

involving S.F. Shortly thereafter, T.L. and S.F. tested positive for methamphetamine. T.L. 

admitted to caseworkers that, at the end of April, she had been at a drug house with S.F. 

Throughout this period, J.F. had been living with T.L. and he tested positive for marijuana. 

The Department placed S.F. with her maternal cousin.

On May 16, 2017, the Department filed its first amended petition to terminate J.F.’s 

parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(O) and (Q) of the Texas Family Code. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O), (Q) (West Supp. 2017).2 On May 30, J.F. 

pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Being his third felony

 

2 Hereafter, we will refer to provisions of the Texas Family Code as “section” and “§.”

 
3

conviction, his punishment was enhanced to that of a habitual felon and he was sentenced 

to twenty-five years confinement.3 

In June 2017, while incarcerated, J.F. executed a family service plan that required 

among other things, that he participate in parenting classes, undergo a substance abuse 

assessment, comply with each requirement of the family service plan and complete all 

court-ordered services, participate in any services offered to him while incarcerated, 

provide proof of safe and stable housing, locate and maintain appropriate employment, 

complete a psychosocial assessment, attend individual counseling, submit to random 

drug tests, and test negative for drugs.4 Also in June, T.L. tested positive for 

methamphetamine.5

On May 11, 2018, the trial court held its final hearing. The Department’s evidence 

indicated that S.F. was doing well and had bonded with her foster family. When she was 

initially placed, she had a variety of developmental delays, i.e., she was not sitting up or 

crawling. By the time of the hearing, she was walking, running, using sign language, 

feeding herself, and communicating well with others. Furthermore, her foster family 

wanted to adopt her. 

J.F. appeared by telephone. His expected release date from prison is 2027 and 

he will be eligible for parole in 2019. During the final hearing, he candidly admitted that 

 

3

In April 2004, and again in December 2006, J.F. was convicted of the felony offenses of 

possession of a controlled substance. As enhanced, J.F.’s offense was punishable by confinement for any 

term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 

2017).

4

In its order of July 2, 2017, the trial court made the family service plan and all future modifications 

orders of the trial court. 

5 Although she also executed a plan of family service, she did not complete any services. 
4

parole was only a “possibility” and he did not know when he would be released. He 

testified that, while incarcerated, he had signed up for a parenting course that was 

cancelled, attended some AA and NA meetings, and had completed a Christian-based 

program related to life skills. Although the Department’s investigator testified J.F. knew 

T.L. was using methamphetamine prior to S.F.’s second removal, J.F. denied that he was 

aware she was using drugs. He admitted using marijuana but asserted that after S.F. 

was born, he stopped. He also acknowledged that the Department had informed him that 

he tested positive for drugs in May 2017. During his incarceration, he has communicated 

with the Department and S.F. by mail monthly. S.F.’s conservatorship worker and 

caseworker opined that termination was in S.F.’s best interest. 

In May 2018, the trial court issued its Order of Termination finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that J.F. had failed to comply with the provisions of its court order 

specifically establishing the actions necessary for S.F. to be returned to him, that S.F. 

had been in the temporary or permanent managing conservatorship of the Department 

for not less than nine months since her removal under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect; 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(O), and that he had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted 

in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for 

S.F. for not less than two years from the date of filing of the petition. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). 

This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional 

dimension. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 

2d 599 (1982). See also Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, 
5

termination proceedings are strictly construed in favor of the parent. In re E.R., 385 

S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012). Parental rights, however, are not absolute, and it is 

essential that the emotional and physical interests of a child not be sacrificed merely to 

preserve those rights. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). The Due Process Clause 

of the United States Constitution and section 161.001 require application of the 

heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence in cases involving involuntary 

termination of parental rights. See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); In re 

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002).

In a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if 

reasonable jurors could have done so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable 

jurors could not have done so. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112-13 (Tex. 2014). 

However, the reviewing court should not disregard undisputed facts that do not support 

the verdict to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 113. In 

cases requiring clear and convincing evidence, even evidence that does nothing more

than raise surmise and suspicion will not suffice unless that evidence is capable of 

producing a firm belief or conviction that the allegation is true. Id. If, after conducting a 

legal sufficiency review, a court determines that no reasonable fact finder could form a 

firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is 

legally insufficient. Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

In reviewing termination findings for factual sufficiency, a court of appeals must 

give due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be 

clear and convincing; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002) (citing In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d at 25), and give due deference to a jury’s fact findings. In the Interest of H.R.M., 
6

209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (an appellate court should not supplant 

the jury’s judgment with its own). We must determine whether the evidence is such that 

a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the 

Department’s allegations. Id. If, after considering the entire record, the disputed evidence 

that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant 

that a fact finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the 

evidence is factually insufficient. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

The clear and convincing standard does not mean that the evidence must negate 

all reasonable doubt or that the evidence must be uncontroverted. In the Interest of T.N., 

180 S.W.3d 376, 382 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.). The reviewing court must 

recall that the trier of fact has the authority to weigh the evidence, draw reasonable 

inferences therefrom, and choose between conflicting inferences. Id. Also, the trier of 

fact, as opposed to the reviewing body, enjoys the right to resolve credibility issues and 

conflicts within the evidence. Id. It may freely choose to believe all, part, or none of the 

testimony espoused by any particular witness. Id. at 382-83 (citing In re R.D.S., 902 

S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ)).

Only one statutory ground is required to support termination. In re K.C.B., 280 

S.W.3d 888, 894-95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). Although evidence 

presented may be relevant to both the statutory grounds for termination and best interest, 

each element must be established separately and proof of one element does not relieve 

the burden of proving the other. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
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ISSUE ONE—SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(Q) 6

Subsection (Q) permits termination when the clear and convincing evidence shows 

that the parent “knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent’s: 

(i) conviction of an offense and (ii) confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for 

the child not less than two years from the date of filing the petition.” § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). 

See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. 2003) (the purpose of subsection (Q) is to 

protect children from neglect). We apply subsection (Q) prospectively. Id. That is, 

subsection (Q) permits termination if the evidence shows that, during the two-year period 

following the initiation of the termination proceedings, the parent will be confined or 

imprisoned and unable to care for the child. Id. at 360-61. See In the Interest of J.M.G., 

No. 07-16-00202-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11729, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 27, 

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (subsection (Q) focuses on the parent’s future imprisonment 

and inability to care for the child). 

Establishing incarceration for the requisite period does not, by itself, justify 

termination pursuant to subsection (Q). In re B.M.R., 84 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). However, when the Department proves by clear and 

convincing evidence that the requirements of subsection (Q) have been met, “the trial 

court can reasonably infer that the parent will be unable to provide personal care for the 

child.” In the Interest of Caballero, 53 S.W.3d 392, 397-98 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, 

pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). See In the Interest of B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). At this point, the burden shifts to the parent to 

“produce some evidence as to how they [sic] would provide or arrange to provide care for 

 

6 Hereinafter, this subsection may also be referred to simply as “subsection (Q).” 
8

the child during that period.” In the Interest of Caballero, 53 S.W.3d at 396. “When that 

burden of production is met, the Department would have the burden of persuasion that 

the arrangement would not satisfy the parent’s duty to the child.” Id.

From the evidence at the final hearing, a reasonable fact finder could have 

determined that the Department filed its petition on May 16, 2017; J.F. was convicted of 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon on May 30, 2017; and he was sentenced to 

twenty-five years confinement due to the commission of two prior felonies that were drugrelated. See § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). The fact finder could also have formed a firm belief or 

conviction that his earliest release date was 2020; his earliest parole date was 2019; and 

his belief that he would be granted parole before the two-year statutory limit expired was 

unlikely and speculative at best.

While parole-related evidence is relevant to determine whether the parent will be 

released in two years, the mere introduction of such evidence does not prevent a fact 

finder from forming a firm conviction or belief that the parent will remain incarcerated for 

at least two years. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109 (parole decisions are inherently 

speculative and the decision rests entirely within the parole board’s discretion). In 

addition, while J.F. presented evidence that while incarcerated, he attended some classes 

and wrote letters to S.F., he produced no evidence as to how he would provide or arrange 

to provide care for S.F. during his incarceration. 

Consequently, we hold there was legally and factually sufficient clear and 

convincing evidence presented at the final hearing to allow a reasonable trier of fact to 

form a firm belief or conviction that J.F. knowingly engaged in criminal conduct resulting 
9

in his conviction of an offense that resulted in his imprisonment and inability to care for 

S.F. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of the Department’s petition. 

See In the Interest of Caballero, 53 S.W.3d at 396. Accordingly, termination of J.F.’s 

parental rights under subsection (Q) was proper and his first issue is overruled.7 

ISSUE TWO—BEST INTEREST

The Department was also required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of J.F.’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. § 161.001(b)(2); In re 

K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 116. Only if no reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm 

belief or conviction that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest 

can we conclude the evidence is insufficient. Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

There is a strong presumption that the best interest of the child will be served by 

preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). 

Prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to 

be in the child’s best interest. See § 263.307(a) (West Supp. 2017). Section 263.307(b)

provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in deciding best interest. Id. at (b). 

Additionally, the Supreme Court has set out other factors to consider when determining 

the best interest of a child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. Those factors include (1) 

the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the 

parental abilities of the individual seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist 

 

7 Because only one statutory ground is needed to support termination, we need not consider 

whether termination was also proper under section 161.001(b)(1)(O). In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894-

95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). 
10

the individual to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the 

individual or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed 

placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing 

parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions 

of the parent. Id.

Evidence that supports one or more statutory grounds for termination may also 

constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. See also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249-50 (Tex. 2013). The 

best interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the 

totality of the evidence as well as direct evidence. See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). Additionally, a child’s need for permanence through 

the establishment of a “stable, permanent home” has been recognized as the paramount 

consideration in determining best interest. See In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

S.F. is approximately two-years old and too young to express her desire. Although 

J.F. has no physical contact with S.F. while incarcerated, he presented evidence that he 

maintains contact with her by posting letters monthly and sending her drawings. While 

admirable, because of her age, this factor neither weighs for nor against termination. 

The second Holley factor weighs in favor of termination because S.F. presently 

has emotional and physical needs that can only be met by her foster parents due to J.F.’s 

incarceration. The third factor also weighs in favor of termination because in addition to 

his current felony conviction, J.F. has been convicted twice for felony possession of 
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controlled substances and has been labeled a “habitual” felon due to his latest conviction. 

In addition, S.F. was removed the first time due to drug-related activity, and shortly after 

the second removal due to parental substance abuse, J.F. tested positive for marijuana. 

The evidence also established that J.F. has a history of making bad parental 

choices including engaging in drug use, drug-related crimes, and a firearm-related felony

offense that has resulted in a sentence of twenty-five years confinement. This fourth

Holley factor weighs in favor of termination. Although the Department has many 

programs from which J.F. could benefit, he is unable to take advantage of them due to 

his incarceration. Although he has availed himself of some programs while incarcerated, 

there are many required activities in the family service plan that J.F. has failed to 

complete. In addition, he has yet to show he can remain drug-free outside of confinement 

or be a responsible parent to S.F. This fifth Holley factor also weighs in favor of 

termination. Thus, Holley factors (2), (3), (4), and (5) weigh in favor of termination. 

On the other hand, S.F. is doing well and has bonded with her foster family. She 

is living in a stable, drug-free environment. She also has shown marked improvement 

developmentally since her initial placement and her foster family loves her and wants to 

adopt her. In addition, J.F.’s testimony during the final hearing establishes that he 

approves of her placement and is happy that his daughter is with her foster family. Holley

factors (6) and (7) also support termination. 

Accordingly, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief 

or conviction that termination of J.F.’s parental rights was in S.F.’s best interest and the 
12

evidence supporting the trial court’s finding is legally and factually sufficient. J.F.’s 

second issue is overruled. 

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s order terminating J.F.’s parental rights to his child, S.F., is affirmed. 

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice