United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Committee on Armed

Services, U.S. Senate

November 1998 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Key Nuclear Weapons

Component Issues Are

Unresolved

GAO/RCED-99-1

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-280854 

November 9, 1998

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing the nation’s

stockpile of nuclear weapons. However, DOE lacks the capability to

produce a key nuclear weapons component for use in the stockpile. The

component is a trigger, or “pit,” which is made from plutonium and is

needed to start a chain reaction in a nuclear weapon. Different weapons

systems use different types of pits. DOE lost its capability to make pits

when production was stopped at DOE’s Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado in

1989. DOE must reestablish this capability to replace pits removed from the

stockpile for testing and other reasons, but the task will be challenging.

Pits that can be used in the stockpile, known as War Reserve pits, must

meet stringent specifications and be certified by DOE’s nuclear weapons

laboratories. DOE is reestablishing the capability to manufacture pits at its

Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

As requested, we are providing you with information on (1) DOE’s plans

and schedules for reestablishing the manufacturing of pits at Los Alamos,

(2) the costs associated with these efforts, and (3) unresolved issues

regarding the manufacturing of pits between the Department of Defense

(DOD) and DOE. As agreed with your office, we will provide you with

classified information on these issues in a separate product.

Results in Brief DOE’s plans for reestablishing the production of pits at Los Alamos

National Laboratory have changed and are still evolving. The Department

expects to have only a limited capacity on-line by fiscal year 2007.

Specifically, DOE plans to reestablish its capability to produce War Reserve

pits for one weapons system by fiscal year 2001 and plans to have an

interim capacity of 20 pits per year on-line by fiscal 2007. This planned

capacity differs from the goal that DOE established in fiscal year 1996 to

produce up to 50 pits per year by fiscal 2005. DOE has not decided what the

final production capacity at Los Alamos will be. Finally, DOE has done little

to develop a contingency plan for the large-scale manufacturing of pits

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(150-500 pits per year). Large-scale manufacturing would be necessary if a

systemwide problem were identified with pits in the stockpile.

The current estimated costs for establishing and operating DOE’s

pit-manufacturing mission total over $1.1 billion from fiscal year 1996

through fiscal 2007.1

 This estimate does not include over $490 million in

costs for other activities that are not directly attributable to the mission

but are needed to support a wide variety of defense-related activities,

including the production of pits. We also note that some key cost and

managerial controls related to DOE’s pit-manufacturing mission are either

in the formative stages of development or do not cover the mission in its

entirety.

DOD and DOE have discussed, but not resolved, important issues regarding

(1) changes in the manufacturing processes that will be used to produce

pits at Los Alamos and (2) the pit-manufacturing capacity planned by DOE.

Officials from various DOD organizations have expressed concerns about

the equivalence of Los Alamos’s pits to the pits previously manufactured at

Rocky Flats because some manufacturing processes will be new at Los

Alamos and are different from those previously used by Rocky Flats. Also,

officials from various DOD organizations are not satisfied that DOE’s current

or future capacity plans will be sufficient to meet the stockpile’s needs.

Various DOD organizations have performed preliminary analyses of the

capacity needed to support the stockpile. On the basis of these analyses,

some of these officials believe that the stockpile’s needs exceed the

20-pits-per-year interim capacity that DOE plans at Los Alamos or even the

50-pits-per-year capacity that DOE may establish in the future. However,

DOD officials said that they will be unable to give detailed

pit-manufacturing requirements until the lifetime of pits is more clearly

specified by DOE. DOE is currently studying this issue.

Background Since December 5, 1989, DOE has not produced War Reserve pits for the

nuclear stockpile. On that date, the production of pits at Rocky Flats,

which was DOE’s only large-scale pit-manufacturing facility, was suspended

because of environmental and regulatory concerns. At that time, it was

envisioned that production operations would eventually resume at the

plant, but this never occurred. In 1992, DOE closed its pit-manufacturing

operations at Rocky Flats without establishing a replacement location. In

1995, DOE began work on its Stockpile Stewardship and Management

1

DOE refers to its efforts as the pit-manufacturing mission. The estimated cost figures provided in this

report have not been adjusted to constant-year dollars. Rather, they reflect DOE’s budgeting and

planning process estimates, which were provided in current-year dollars.

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Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, which analyzed

alternatives for future DOE nuclear weapons work, including the

production of pits. In December 1996, Los Alamos was designated as the

site for reestablishing the manufacturing of pits.2 DOE is now reestablishing

its capability to produce War Reserve pits there so that pits removed from

the existing stockpile for testing or other reasons can be replaced with

new ones.

Reestablishing the manufacturing of pits will be very challenging because

DOE’s current efforts face new constraints that did not exist previously. For

example, engineering and physics tests were used in the past for pits

produced at Rocky Flats to ensure that those pits met the required

specifications. Nuclear tests were used to ensure that those pits and other

components would perform as required. While engineering and physics

tests will still be utilized for Los Alamos’s pits, the safety and reliability of

today’s nuclear stockpile, including newly manufactured pits, must be

maintained without the benefit of underground nuclear testing. The United

States declared a moratorium on such testing in 1992. President Clinton

extended this moratorium in 1996 by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty, through which the United States forwent underground testing

indefinitely. In addition, to meet regulatory and environmental standards

that did not exist when pits were produced at Rocky Flats, new

pit-production processes are being developed at Los Alamos.

DOD is responsible for implementing the U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy,

which includes establishing the military requirements associated with

planning for the stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons Council is responsible

for preparing the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, which

specifies how many warheads of each type will be in the stockpile.3

 Those

weapons types expected to be retained in the stockpile for the foreseeable

future are referred to as the enduring stockpile.

DOE is responsible for managing the nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, DOE certifies the safety and reliability of the stockpile and

determines the requirements for the number of weapons components,

including pits, needed to support the stockpile.

2

According to a Los Alamos official, in the past, Los Alamos produced a limited number of non-War

Reserve pits for research purposes, such as underground nuclear tests, but it has not built War Reserve

pits since the early years of nuclear weapons development.

3

The Nuclear Weapons Council coordinates activities jointly managed by DOD and DOE to support the

nuclear stockpile. The Council is responsible for all matters relating to nuclear weapons research,

development, and production.

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DOE’s Plans Have

Changed and Are Still

Evolving

DOE has made important changes in the plans for its pit-manufacturing

mission. Additionally, some specific goals associated with these plans are

still evolving. In December 1996, DOE’s goals for the mission were to

(1) reestablish the Department’s capability to produce War Reserve pits

for one weapons system by fiscal year 2001 and to demonstrate the

capability to produce all pit types for the enduring stockpile, (2) establish

a manufacturing capacity of 10 pits per year by fiscal year 2001 and

expand to a capacity of up to 50 pits per year by fiscal 2005,4

 and

(3) develop a contingency plan for the large-scale manufacturing of pits at

some other DOE site or sites.

In regard to the first goal, DOE and Los Alamos produced a pit prototype in

early 1998 and believe they are on target to produce a War Reserve pit for

one weapons system by fiscal year 2001.5

 In regard to the second goal, DOE

has made important changes. Most notably, DOE’s capacity plans have

changed from a goal of 50 pits per year in fiscal year 2005 to 20 pits per

year in fiscal 2007.6

 What the final production capacity at Los Alamos will

be is uncertain. Finally, DOE’s efforts to develop a contingency plan for

large-scale production have been limited and when such a plan will be in

place is not clear.

Establishing the Capability

to Produce War Reserve

Pits

To meet the first goal of reestablishing its capability to produce a War

Reserve pit for a particular weapons system by fiscal year 2001, DOE has an

ambitious schedule. This schedule is ambitious because several technical,

human resource, and regulatory challenges must be overcome.

Approximately 100 distinct steps or processes are utilized in fabricating a

pit suitable for use in the stockpile. Some of the steps in manufacturing

pits at Los Alamos will be new and were not used at Rocky Flats. Each of

these manufacturing processes must be tested and approved to ensure that

War Reserve quality requirements are achieved. The end result of

achieving this first goal is the ability to produce pits that meet precise War

Reserve specifications necessary for certification as acceptable for use in

the stockpile.

4

DOE believes that if a capacity of 50 pits per year is established by using one work shift, a capacity of

80 pits per year could be achieved by using multiple work shifts.

5

DOE has made some changes related to this goal that are classified. These changes will be discussed

further in our upcoming classified report.

6

An interim capacity of 20 pits per year will be sufficient to replace the War Reserve pits removed from

the stockpile annually for destructive testing.

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Skilled technicians must also be trained in the techniques associated with

the pit-manufacturing processes. Currently, according to DOE and Los

Alamos officials, several key areas remain understaffed. According to a

Los Alamos official, the laboratory is actively seeking individuals to fill

these positions; however, the number of qualified personnel who can

perform this type of work and have the appropriate security clearances is

limited. Finally, according to DOE and Los Alamos officials, the production

of pits at Los Alamos will be taking place in a regulatory environment that

is more stringent than that which existed previously at Rocky Flats. As a

result, new processes are being developed, and different materials are

being utilized so that the amount and types of waste can be reduced.

Los Alamos achieved a major milestone related to its first goal when it

produced a pit prototype on schedule in early 1998. DOE and Los Alamos

officials believe they are on schedule to produce a War Reserve pit for one

weapons system by fiscal year 2001. DOE plans to demonstrate the

capability to produce pits for other weapons systems but does not plan to

produce War Reserve pits for these systems until sometime after fiscal

year 2007. Furthermore, DOE’s Record of Decision stated that Los Alamos

would reestablish the capability to manufacture pits for all of the weapons

found in the enduring stockpile. Currently, however, according to DOE

officials, DOE does not plan to reestablish the capability to produce pits for

one of the weapons in the enduring stockpile until such time as the need

for this type of pit becomes apparent.

Establishing

Pit-Manufacturing Capacity

Once Los Alamos demonstrates the capability to produce War Reserve

pits, it plans on establishing a limited manufacturing capacity. Originally,

in late 1996, DOE wanted to have a manufacturing capacity of 10 pits per

year by fiscal year 2001 and planned to expand this capacity to 50 pits per

year by fiscal 2005. In order to achieve a 10-pits-per-year manufacturing

capacity by fiscal year 2001, DOE was going to supplement existing

equipment and staff in the PF-4 building at Los Alamos. To achieve a

capacity of 50 pits per year by fiscal year 2005, DOE planned a 3-year

suspension of production in PF-4 starting in fiscal year 2002. During this

time, PF-4 would be reconfigured to accommodate the larger capacity.

Also, some activities would be permanently moved to other buildings at

Los Alamos to make room for the 50-pits-per-year production capacity. For

example, a number of activities from the PF-4 facility would be transferred

to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building. Once PF-4 was

upgraded, it would be brought back on-line with a production capacity of

50 pits per year.

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In December 1997, DOE’s new plan changed the Department’s goal for

implementing the limited manufacturing capacity. DOE still plans to have a

10-pits-per-year capacity by fiscal year 2001. However, DOE now plans to

increase the capacity to 20 pits per year by fiscal year 2007. If DOE decides

to increase production to 50 pits per year, it would be achieved sometime

after fiscal year 2007. As with the original plan, in order to achieve a

50-pits-per-year capacity, space for manufacturing pits in PF-4, which is

now shared with other activities, would have to be completely dedicated

to the manufacturing of pits.

DOE officials gave us a number of reasons for these changes. First, because

the original plan required a 3-year shutdown of production in PF-4, DOE

was concerned that there would not be enough pits during the shutdown

to support the stockpile requirement, considering that pits would have

been destructively examined under the stockpile surveillance program.7

Under the new plan, annual production will continue except for 3-or

4-month work stoppages during some years to allow for facility

improvements and maintenance. Second, DOE was concerned that pits

produced after the originally planned 3-year shutdown might need to be

recertified. Third, DOE wanted to decouple the construction activities at

the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building from planned

construction at PF-4 because linking construction projects at these two

facilities might adversely affect the pit-manufacturing mission’s schedule.

Establishing a Contingency

Plan

DOE’s 1996 plan called for developing a contingency plan to establish a

large-scale (150-500 pits per year) pit-manufacturing capacity within 5

years, if a major problem were found in the stockpile. DOE has done little

to pursue this goal. It has performed only a preliminary evaluation of

possible sites. DOE has not developed a detailed contingency plan, selected

a site, or established a time frame by which a plan should be completed.

According to DOE officials, they will not pursue contingency planning for

large-scale manufacturing until fiscal year 2000 or later.

The purpose for the contingency plan was to lay out a framework by

which DOE could establish a production capacity of 150 to 500 pits per year

within a 5-year time frame. Such a capacity would be necessary if a

systemwide problem were identified with pits in the stockpile. This issue

may become more important in the future, as existing nuclear weapons

and their pits are retained in the stockpile beyond their originally planned

7

Stockpile surveillance includes the routine and periodic examination, evaluation, and testing of

stockpile weapons and weapons components to ensure that they conform to performance

specifications and to identify and evaluate the effect of unexpected or age-related requirements.

Page 6 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
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lifetime. Research is being conducted on the specific effects of aging on

plutonium in pits.

A DOE study found that Los Alamos is not an option for large-scale pit

manufacturing because of space limitations that exist at PF-4. As a result,

large-scale operations would most likely be established at some other DOE

nuclear site(s) where space is adequate and where some of the necessary

nuclear infrastructure exists. DOE has not specified a date by which the

plan will be completed, and, according to DOE officials, the contingency

plan has not been a high priority within DOE for fiscal years 1998-99.

According to DOE officials, they may fund approximately $100,000 for a

study of manufacturing and assembly processes for large-scale

manufacturing in fiscal year 1999. In addition, according to DOE officials,

DOE has not pursued contingency planning for large-scale manufacturing

more aggressively because the Department would like more work to be

done at PF-4 prior to initiating this effort. In this regard, the officials stated

that the development of a contingency plan requires more complete

knowledge of the processes, tooling, and technical skills still being put in

place at Los Alamos. This knowledge will serve as a template for

large-scale manufacturing. DOE believes that this knowledge should be well

defined by fiscal year 2000.

Estimated Costs Will

Total Over $1.1 Billion

According to information from DOE, the total cost for establishing and

operating the pit-manufacturing mission under its new plan will be over

$1.1 billion from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal 2007. This estimate

includes funds for numerous mission elements needed to achieve DOE’s

goals. This estimate does not include over $490 million in costs for other

activities that are not directly attributable to pit production but are needed

to support a wide variety of activities, including the pit-manufacturing

mission. Some key controls related to the mission are either in the

formative stages of development or do not cover the mission in its

entirety.

Current Estimated Costs DOE provided us with data reflecting the total estimated costs of its new

plans and schedules. These data were developed for the first time during

our audit. DOE emphasized that these costs should be treated as draft

estimates instead of approved numbers. On the basis of this information,

the costs for establishing and operating the pit-manufacturing mission

were estimated to total over $1.1 billion from fiscal year 1996 through

fiscal 2007. Table 1 shows the total estimated costs related to the various

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elements of the mission. At the time of our review, DOE estimated that by

the end of fiscal year 1998, it would have spent $69 million on the mission.

Table 1: Total Estimated

Pit-Manufacturing Mission Costs,

Fiscal Years 1996-2007, as of

August 10, 1998

Dollars in millions

Mission element and description Estimated cost

War Reserve pit-manufacturing capability

costs: These are the activities necessary to

reestablish the capability to fabricate most

of the pits in the enduring stockpile, develop

the processes needed for future production,

and produce nonnuclear pit components. $272.1

Pit-manufacturing operations costs: These

are the operating costs associated with

manufacturing War Reserve pits for one

weapons system. The number of pits to be

produced will support the stockpile through

fiscal year 2025. 466.6

Manufacturing construction costs: These are

the necessary construction upgrade costs

directly attributable to pit production at Los

Alamos. 161.3

Increased capacity costs: These are the

minimum initial costs for increasing capacity

from 20 to 50 pits per year by moving some

work from PF-4 to other facilities. DOE has

scheduled funding outlays for this element

beginning in fiscal year 2000. DOE noted

that increases in these estimated costs are

likely because of delays and potential

inefficiencies associated with implementing

this strategy. The total costs for a future

increase in production capacity are not

known by DOE. 162.8

Los Alamos certification costs: These costs

are specific to the weapons system for

which Los Alamos will produce War Reserve

pits. They include only those costs for

required engineering and physics

certification activities directly related to this

weapons system.a 49.2

Lawrence Livermore peer review costs:

These costs are specific to the Livermore

peer reviews of Los Alamos’s certification

efforts.a 2.0

(continued)

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Dollars in millions

Mission element and description Estimated cost

Large-scale manufacturing (contingency)

planning costs: These were the costs

incurred in fiscal years 1996-97 for the initial

study of site alternatives for large-scale

manufacturing and the costs anticipated in

fiscal year 1999 for a study of manufacturing

and assembly processes. 1.6

Total costs $1,115.6

Note: DOE does have a cost estimate for fiscal year 2008 but not for out-years beyond that time.

aUnlike other elements, these activities are funded by the Stockpile Stewardship Program rather

than by the Stockpile Management Program. The costs shown are estimated through fiscal year

2002.

Other activities are needed to support a wide variety of efforts, including

the pit-manufacturing mission but are not directly attributable to pit

production. These include construction-related activities at various Los

Alamos nuclear facilities. For example, one activity is the construction

upgrades at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building. DOE and Los

Alamos officials stated that the costs of these activities would have been

incurred whether or not Los Alamos was selected for the

pit-manufacturing mission. However, unless these activities are carried

out, DOE and Los Alamos officials believe that it will be difficult for them to

achieve the mission’s goals. Table 2 shows the total estimated costs of

these other supporting activities.

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Table 2: Total Estimated Costs of

Other Activities That Support the

Pit-Manufacturing Mission, Fiscal

Years 1996-2007, as of August 10, 1998

Dollars in millions

Activity and description Estimated cost

Infrastructure construction costs: These are

the costs associated with needed

maintenance and infrastructure construction

not directly attributable to pit production. $215.9

Other construction costs: These include

construction at various Los Alamos facilities

needed to support, among other things, the

pit-manufacturing mission. For example, two

of these projects are the Chemistry and

Metallurgy Research building’s upgrades

and the design-only phase of the Nuclear

Materials Storage Facility Renovation.a 274.7

Total costs $490.6

Note: DOE does have a cost estimate for fiscal year 2008 but not for out-years beyond that time.

aOther projects included are phase 1 of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades

Project, the TA-55 Fire Water Loop Replacement Project, and the Nonnuclear Reconfiguration

Project. Total costs are estimated for these projects from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal 2005, the

date by which all planned work will be completed.

DOE’s and Los Alamos’s

Cost and Managerial

Controls Under

Development

The success of DOE’s pit-manufacturing mission at Los Alamos requires the

use of effective cost and managerial controls for ensuring that the

mission’s goals are achieved within cost and on time. An effective cost and

managerial control system should have (1) an integrated cost and schedule

control system, (2) independent cost estimates, and (3) periodic

technical/management reviews. DOE and Los Alamos have taken actions to

institute these cost and managerial controls related to the pit mission.

However, some of these controls are either in the formative stages of

development or are limited to addressing only certain elements of the

mission instead of the entire mission.

Integrated Cost and Schedule

Control System

An integrated cost and schedule control system would allow managers to

measure costs against stages of completion for the pit-manufacturing

mission’s overall plan. For example, at any given time, the plan might

identify a certain percentage of the mission’s resources that were to be

spent within established limits. If variances from the plan were to exceed

those limits, corrective actions could be taken. DOE and Los Alamos have

in place, or are in the process of developing, (1) an integrated planning and

scheduling system for the pit-manufacturing mission and (2) a separate

financial management information system for monitoring costs.

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Los Alamos’s planning and scheduling system for the pit-manufacturing

mission will eventually track, in an integrated fashion, all key planning and

scheduling milestones. This system will enable managers to have timely

and integrated information regarding the mission’s progress. Currently,

individual managers are tracking their own progress toward important

milestones but do not have integrated mission information. If their

individual milestones slip, managers can take corrective actions. The

integrated planning and scheduling system will enable managers to have

information regarding the mission’s progress as a whole. According to a

Los Alamos official, the planning and scheduling system will be completed

in December 1998.

Los Alamos’s financial management information system, through which

mission-related costs can be monitored, provides managers with

information that enables them to track expenditures and available funds.

Eventually, this system will be interfaced with the pit-manufacturing

mission’s integrated planning and scheduling system. However, according

to a Los Alamos official, this may take several years.

Independent Cost Estimates Independent cost estimates are important, according to DOE, because they

serve as analytical tools to validate, cross-check, or analyze estimates

developed by proponents of a project. DOE’s guidance states that accurate

and timely cost estimates are integral to the effective and efficient

management of DOE’s projects and programs.8

 According to DOE and Los

Alamos officials, independent cost estimates are required by DOE’s

guidance for individual construction projects but are not required for

other elements of the pit-manufacturing mission. DOE has two construction

projects directly related to the pit mission and five others that indirectly

support it. The Capability Maintenance and Improvements Project and the

Transition Manufacturing and Safety Equipment project are directly

related to the pit-manufacturing mission. The Nuclear Materials Storage

Facility Renovation, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building

Upgrades Project, the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades

Project, the Nonnuclear Reconfiguration Project, and the Fire Water Loop

Replacement Project indirectly support the mission as well as other

activities at Los Alamos.

DOE plans to eventually make an independent cost estimate for most of

these construction projects. According to a DOE official, independent cost

estimates have been completed for the Nuclear Materials Storage Facility

Renovation, the Nonnuclear Reconfiguration Project, and the Fire Water

8

“Cost Estimating Guide” (DOE G 430.1-1, Mar. 28, 1997).

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Loop Project. Independent cost estimates have been performed for

portions of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Upgrades

Project. Additionally, a preliminary independent cost estimate was

performed for the Capability Maintenance and Improvements Project prior

to major changes in the project. DOE officials plan to complete independent

cost estimates for the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades

Project, the revised Capability Maintenance and Improvements Project,

and portions of the Transition Manufacturing and Safety Equipment

project, depending upon their complexity.9

Because the bulk of mission-related costs are not construction costs, these

other funds will not have the benefit of independent cost estimates. The

mission’s elements associated with these funds include activities

concerning War Reserve pit-manufacturing capability, pit-manufacturing

operations, and certification. Moreover, according to DOE and Los Alamos

officials, no independent cost estimate has been prepared for the mission

as a whole, and none is planned. According to these officials, this effort is

not planned because of the complexity of the mission and because it is

difficult to identify an external party with the requisite knowledge to

accomplish this task. It is important to note, however, that these types of

studies have been done by DOE. In fact, DOE has developed its own

independent cost-estimating capability, which is separate and distinct

from DOE’s program offices, to perform such estimates.

Technical/Management

Reviews

Technical/management reviews can be useful in identifying early problems

that could result in cost overruns or delay the pit-manufacturing mission.

DOE and Los Alamos have taken a number of actions to review particular

cost and management issues. These include (1) a “Change Control Board”

for the entire mission, (2) a technical advisory group on the management

and technical issues related to the production of pits, (3) peer reviews by

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on pit-certification issues, and

(4) annual mission reviews.

The Change Control Board consists of 14 DOE, Los Alamos, and Lawrence

Livermore staff who worked on the development of the mission’s

integrated plan. The Board was formed in March 1998 to act as a reviewing

body for costs and management issues related to the mission. This group

will meet quarterly or more regularly, as needed, to resolve cost or

schedule problems. The group’s initial efforts have focused on addressing

unresolved issues in the integrated plan. For example, the group has

9

DOE and Los Alamos officials told us that internal cost reviews have been performed for most of the

projects that have not had independent cost estimates.

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merged data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los

Alamos into the integrated plan and is updating a key document associated

with the mission’s master schedule.

Since July 1997, Los Alamos has been using a technical advisory group

composed of nuclear experts external to Los Alamos and DOE. This group,

paid by Los Alamos, provides independent advice and consultation on

management and technical issues related to pit manufacturing and other

related construction projects. The specific issues for assessment are

selected either by the group or upon the request of Los Alamos’s

management. According to the group’s chairman, Los Alamos has

historically had problems with project management, and the group’s work

has focused on efforts to strengthen this aspect of the pit-manufacturing

mission. For example, the group has identified the need for and provided

advice on the development of key planning documents. This group meets

at Los Alamos on a monthly basis.

Los Alamos plans specific peer reviews by Lawrence Livermore to

independently assess the processes and tests related to the certification of

pits. Los Alamos’s use of these peer reviews is an effort to provide an

independent reviewing authority because Los Alamos is responsible for

both manufacturing the pits and approving their certification. An initial

planning session for this effort is scheduled for the fall of 1998.

DOE and Los Alamos officials conducted a review of the pit-manufacturing

mission in September 1997. The purpose of this review was to brief DOE

management on the progress and status of various elements associated

with the mission. As a result of the 1997 review, DOE and Los Alamos began

developing an integrated plan that brings together the various elements of

the mission. According to Los Alamos officials, such reviews will be held

annually.

DOD and DOE Have

Not Resolved All

Pit-Manufacturing

Issues

DOD is responsible for implementing the U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy.

According to officials from various DOD organizations, DOE’s

pit-manufacturing mission is critical in supporting DOD’s needs. As a result,

representatives from both Departments have conferred on and continue to

discuss plans for the mission.10 Two important issues remain unresolved.

First, officials from various DOD organizations have concerns about

10One means by which DOD stays informed of the pit-manufacturing mission is through the use of

“Project Officer Groups” composed of representatives from DOD and DOE organizations. These

groups confer on weapons issues and conduct site visits to Los Alamos. Project Officer Groups are

associated with the Nuclear Weapons Council.

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changes in the manufacturing processes that will be used to produce pits

at Los Alamos. Second, on the basis of preliminary analyses by various DOD

organizations, some representatives of these organizations are not

satisfied that DOE’s planned capacity will meet the anticipated stockpile

needs.

DOE is responsible for ensuring that the stockpile is safe and reliable. The

safety and reliability of the pits produced at Rocky Flats were proven

through nuclear test detonations.11 Officials from various DOD

organizations are concerned that Los Alamos’s pits will be fabricated by

some processes that are different from those employed previously at

Rocky Flats. Furthermore, pits made with these new processes will not

have the benefit of being tested in a nuclear detonation to ensure that they

perform as desired. As a result, officials from various DOD organizations

want assurance that Los Alamos’s pits are equivalent to those produced at

Rocky Flats in all engineering and physics specifications. To accomplish

this, DOE and Los Alamos plan to have Lawrence Livermore conduct peer

reviews. These peer reviews will focus on the certification activities

related to the first type of pit to be produced. This will help verify that the

necessary standards have been met. According to representatives from

both Departments, they will continue to actively consult on these issues.

The other unresolved issue between DOD and DOE is DOE’s planned

pit-manufacturing capacity. Several efforts are currently under way within

various DOD organizations to determine the stockpile’s needs and the

associated requirements for pits.12 DOD has not established a date for

providing DOE with this information. Nevertheless, on the basis of the

preliminary analyses performed by various DOD organizations, many DOD

officials believe that DOE’s capacity plans will not meet their stockpile

needs. According to these officials, their requirements will be higher than

the production capacity planned at Los Alamos. As a result, these officials

do not support DOE’s stated goal of developing a contingency plan for a

large-scale manufacturing capacity sometime in the future. Rather, these

officials told us that they want DOE to establish a large-scale manufacturing

capacity as part of its current efforts. However, DOD officials said that they

will be unable to give detailed pit-manufacturing requirements until the

lifetime of pits is specified more clearly through DOE’s ongoing research on

how long a pit can be expected to function after its initial manufacture.

11DOE emphasized that a large share of the relevant underground tests were conducted on pits

manufactured by processes similar to those currently employed at Los Alamos.

12One of these organizations is DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation group, which will report its

findings to the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Page 14 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
B-280854 

According to DOE officials, they believe that the planned capacity is

sufficient to support the current needs of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Furthermore, no requirement has been established for a larger

manufacturing capacity beyond that which is planned for Los Alamos. DOE

officials told us that they are discussing capacity issues with DOD and are

seeking to have joint agreement on the required capacity. However, no

date has been established for reaching an agreement on this issue.

Conclusions DOE plans to spend over $1.1 billion through fiscal year 2007 to establish a

20-pits-per-year capacity. This capacity may be expanded to 50 pits per

year sometime after fiscal year 2007. Various DOD organizations have

performed preliminary analyses of the capacity needed to support the

stockpile. These analyses indicate that neither the 20-pits-per-year

capacity nor the 50-pits-per-year capacity will be sufficient to meet the

needs of the stockpile. As a result, officials from organizations within DOD

oppose DOE’s plan for not developing a large-scale manufacturing capacity

now but rather planning for it as a future contingency. Once the various

DOD organizations have completed their stockpile capacity analyses, DOD

can then let DOE know its position on the needs of the nuclear stockpile.

DOE will then be faced with the challenge of deciding how it should

respond. A decision to pursue a production capacity larger than that

planned by DOE at Los Alamos will be a major undertaking.

Because of the cost and critical nature of the pit-manufacturing mission,

DOE needs to ensure that effective cost and managerial controls are in

place and operating. DOE and Los Alamos have not fully developed some of

the cost and managerial control measures that could help keep them

within budget and on schedule. An integrated cost and schedule control

system is not in place even though millions of dollars have been spent on

the mission. Furthermore, only a small portion of the costs associated with

the mission has had the benefit of independent cost estimates. Without

fully developed effective cost and managerial controls, the mission could

be prone to cost overruns and delays.

Recommendations In order for DOE to have the necessary information for making

pit-production capacity decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense do the following:

• Provide DOE with DOD’s views on the pit-manufacturing capacity needed to

maintain the stockpile. This should be done so that DOE can use this

Page 15 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
B-280854 

information as part of its reevaluation of the stockpile’s long-term capacity

needs. While we understand that DOD cannot yet provide detailed

requirements, DOE can be provided with the findings of the preliminary

analyses of various DOD organizations.

In order to ensure that the pit-manufacturing mission at Los Alamos

supports the nuclear stockpile in a cost-effective and timely manner, we

recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following measures:

• Reevaluate existing plans for the pit-manufacturing mission in light of the

issues raised by DOD officials regarding the capacity planned by DOE.

• Expedite the development of the integrated cost and schedule control

system at Los Alamos. This needs to be done as soon as possible to help

ensure that the mission is achieved within cost and on time.

• Conduct independent cost estimates for the entire pit-manufacturing

mission. This can be done either for the mission as a whole or for those

individual mission elements that have not had independent estimates.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We provided DOE and DOD with a draft of this report for review and

comment. DOE concurred with all but one recommendation in the report.

That recommendation was that the Secretary of Energy “establish a

separate line item budget category for the pit-manufacturing mission at

Los Alamos.” In its comments, DOE emphasized that its current budgeting

and accounting practices related to pit production are consistent with

appropriation guidelines, are consistent with budgeting and accounting

standards, and are responsive to the Government Performance and Results

Act. DOE also stated that it plans to keep congressional staff informed of

the mission’s progress through quarterly updates. These updates will be

initiated following the approval of the budget for fiscal year 1999. In a

subsequent discussion, DOE’s Laboratory Team Leader in the Office of Site

Operation, said that these updates will include information on the

mission’s cost and milestones. He noted that the cost information provided

could be as detailed as congressional staff require. Our recommendation

was aimed at getting DOE to identify the total estimated costs associated

with the pit-manufacturing mission in a clear and comprehensive manner

to the Congress. The clear identification of total estimated costs is

important because the pit-manufacturing mission is critical to national

security interests and represents a significant financial investment for the

future. Since DOE prepared a cost estimate covering the total pit mission

during our audit, a baseline has been established. We believe that DOE’s

planned quarterly updates will be an appropriate means of updating this

Page 16 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
B-280854 

cost information for the Congress. As a result, we have deleted this

recommendation from our final report. DOE also provided several

clarifications to the report, and the report has been revised where

appropriate. DOE’s comments are provided in appendix II.

DOD agreed with the information presented in our draft report and

provided us with technical clarifications, which we incorporated as

appropriate. DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the

Secretary of Defense clearly articulate DOD’s views on the

pit-manufacturing capacity needed to maintain the stockpile. DOD was

concerned that the aging of pits was not clearly identified in our report as

a driving force of pit-production requirements. DOD said that it could not

give detailed pit-manufacturing requirements until the lifetime of pits is

specified more clearly by DOE. We have modified our report and the

recommendation to recognize that DOD believes that it cannot provide DOE

with detailed pit-manufacturing capacity requirements until more is

known about the aging of pits. However, we believe that there are merits

in DOD’s sharing of the information from the preliminary analyses of

various DOD organizations with DOE. This information would be useful for

DOE in its long-term planning efforts, especially those related to

contingency planning. DOD’s comments are included in appendix III.

To address our objectives, we interviewed officials and obtained

documents from DOD, DOE, Los Alamos, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

We did not independently verify the reliability of the estimated cost data

that DOE provided us with. According to DOE, these data represent its best

estimates of future mission costs but are likely to change as the mission

progresses and should not be viewed as final. Our scope and methodology

are discussed in detail in appendix I. We performed our review from

October 1997 through August 1998 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the

Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of

Management and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. We

will also make copies available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at

(202) 512-8021. Major contributors to this report include William F. Fenzel,

Page 17 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
B-280854 

Assistant Director, James C. Charlifue, Senior Evaluator, and Frank B.

Waterous, Senior Evaluator.

(Ms.) Gary L. Jones

Associate Director, Energy,

 Resources, and Science Issues

Page 18 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Page 19 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Scope and

Methodology

22

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of Energy

24

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

28

Tables Table 1: Total Estimated Pit-Manufacturing Mission Costs, Fiscal

Years 1996-2007, as of August 10, 1998

8

Table 2: Total Estimated Costs of Other Activities That Support

the Pit-Manufacturing Mission, Fiscal Years 1996-2007, as of

August 10, 1998

10

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

GAO General Accounting Office

Page 20 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Page 21 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

To obtain information about the Department of Energy’s (DOE) plans and

schedules for reestablishing the manufacturing of pits, we gathered and

analyzed various documents, including DOE’s (1) Record of Decision for

the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement, (2) guidance for stockpile management and the

pit-manufacturing mission, and (3) the draft Integrated Plan for pit

manufacturing and certification. We discussed with DOE and Los Alamos

National Laboratory officials the basis for the mission’s plans and

schedules. These officials also discussed why changes were made to these

plans and schedules in December 1997. DOE and Los Alamos officials

discussed with us their progress in meeting milestones, which we

compared with the established major milestones for the mission. In order

to have a better understanding of the efforts taking place at Los Alamos,

we also met with DOE and contractor employees at Rocky Flats who were

formerly involved with the production of pits at that site. These individuals

discussed the pit production issues and challenges that they faced at

Rocky Flats.

Cost information associated with the pit-manufacturing mission was

obtained primarily from DOE’s Albuquerque Operations Office. This

information was compiled by DOE with the assistance of Los Alamos

officials. These costs were only recently prepared by DOE and Los Alamos.

According to a DOE official, this effort took several months partly because

of changes in DOE’s mission plans. These costs were provided for us in

current-year dollars. As such, we did not adjust them to constant-year

dollars. Additionally, we did not independently verify the accuracy of the

cost data. These data were in draft form during our review and not

considered approved by DOE. We interviewed both DOE and Los Alamos

officials regarding the methodology that was used to develop the cost data.

In addition, we also discussed with DOE and Los Alamos officials cost and

managerial controls related to the mission and reviewed pertinent

documents on this subject.

To understand unresolved issues between the Department of Defense

(DOD) and DOE regarding the manufacturing of pits, we spoke with

representatives from DOD, DOE, and Los Alamos. DOD officials with whom

we spoke included representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nuclear

and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Army, Air Force, Navy,

and Strategic Command. We also met with a representative of the Nuclear

Weapons Council.

Page 22 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

Our work was conducted in Golden, Colorado; Germantown, Maryland;

Albuquerque, New Mexico; Los Alamos, New Mexico; Alexandria, Virginia;

and Washington, D.C., from October 1997 through August 1998 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 23 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 24 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 25 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 26 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 27 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

(141111) Page 29 GAO/RCED-99-1 Nuclear Weapons Component Issues
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