United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

NORTHERN BORDER 

SECURITY 

DHS’s Report Could 

Better Inform 

Congress by 

Identifying Actions, 

Resources, and Time 

Frames Needed to 

Address 

Vulnerabilities 

November 2008 

 

GAO-09-93 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2008

NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY

DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by 

Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames

Highlights of GAO-09-93, a report to Needed to Address Vulnerabilities

congressional committees 

Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land 

and water from Washington to

Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is

the longest undefended border in 

the world. Various Department of

Homeland Security (DHS)

component agencies share

responsibility for northern border 

security, primarily U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP), in

collaboration with other federal, 

state, local, tribal, and Canadian 

entities. The Implementing

Recommendations of the 9/11 Act 

of 2007 required the Secretary of

Homeland Security to submit a 

report to Congress that addresses 

the vulnerabilities along the 

northern border, and provides 

recommendations and required 

resources to address them. The act 

also required GAO to review and 

comment on this report. In 

response to this mandate, GAO

examined (1) the extent to which

the DHS report to Congress is 

responsive to the legislative

requirements and (2) actions that

may be necessary to address 

northern border vulnerabilities in 

addition to the actions addressed in

the report. To conduct this work,

GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports, 

and other documents, and

interviewed DHS officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security

provide more specific information 

in future reports on actions and 

resources needed to achieve 

northern border security, and in 

what time frame they are needed. 

DHS and CBP concurred with our 

recommendation. 

The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to 

legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern 

border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border 

vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include 

recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the 

northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of 

specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the 

component agencies’ priorities for action and resources are reflected in the 

existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or 

request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the 

resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The 

lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future 

actions and resources needed. 

DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management 

process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully 

implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also 

provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is 

currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall 

direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also

developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and 

resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials 

have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS’s testing of 

new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to 

protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to 

reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past 

evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to 

improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully 

addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the 

last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine

assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying 

nuclear detection equipment—which DHS and other agencies generally 

agreed to take action to implement—have remained open for at least 1 year 

and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding 

recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. 

Vehicle Inspections and Agent Patrols at and between Northern Border Ports of Entry 

Source: GAO. Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-93. 

For more information, contact Richard Stana 

at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing 

Information for Improving Northern Border Security 8 

DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and 

Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide 

Benefit 12

Conclusions 18

Recommendation for Executive Action 18 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19 

Appendix I Selected Open Recommendations from GAO 

on Various Border Security Issues 21 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 28 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30 

Related GAO Products 31 

Tables 

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a 

Primary Mission to Secure the Northern Border 6 

Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border 

Security That Have Not Been Fully Implemented 17 

Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General 

Border Security Issues with Potential Implications for 

Northern Border Security 21 

Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear 

Security with Potential Implications for Northern Border 

Security 24

Page i GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet

with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security 26 

Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding 

Partnerships and Joint Operations with Potential 

Implications for Northern Border Security 27 

Abbreviations 

9/11 Act Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act of 2007 

ASP advanced spectroscopic portal 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 

HSPD-11 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11 

IBET Integrated Border Enforcement Team

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

NFCCG National Fusion Center Coordination Group 

OBP Office of Border Patrol 

OES Office of the Executive Secretariat 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PM-ISE Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment 

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

POE port of entry 

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

SBI Secure Border Initiative 

USCG U.S. Coast Guard 

US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

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Page ii GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 25, 2008 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The U.S.-Canadian border stands as the longest undefended border in the 

world, covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water,1

 most of which is 

sparsely populated with limited law enforcement presence. Historically, 

U.S. attention and resources have been focused primarily on the U.S. 

border with Mexico, which continues to experience significantly higher 

levels of drug trafficking and illegal immigration than the U.S-Canadian 

border. However, the extensive volume of trade and travel between the 

two countries, and large expanse of areas with limited law enforcement 

presence, provide potential for terrorists and other criminal elements to 

enter the United States undetected at or between the northern ports of 

entry. 

Securing the northern border is the primary responsibility of various 

components within DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, local, 

tribal, and Canadian entities. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) is the frontline agency responsible for interdiction of 

persons and contraband crossing the border illegally; U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for investigating the 

source of cross-border crimes and dismantling their operations; and the 

 1

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines the U.S.-Canadian border as

stretching from the state of Washington to Maine, and does not include the Alaskan border 

with Canada. 

Page 1 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) executes its maritime security mission on all 

navigable waterways on the northern border, including the Great Lakes. 

DHS submitted a report to Congress in February 2008, discussing ongoing

initiatives of these agencies to improve security along the northern border, 

as required by law. Specifically, the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to submit a report within 180 days of enactment that 

was to (1) address the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and 

(2) provide recommendations to address such vulnerabilities, including 

required resources needed to protect the border.2

The 9/11 Act also directed us to submit to Congress, within 270 days of 

DHS’s report, a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and 

to provide recommendations regarding any additional actions necessary to 

protect the northern border.3

 In response to this mandate, we prepared 

this report to answer the following key questions: 

• To what extent is the DHS report to Congress responsive to the 

legislative requirements to report on ongoing initiatives to improve U.S. 

northern border security, address the vulnerabilities along the northern 

border, and provide recommendations to address these vulnerabilities 

and required resources to protect the northern border? 

• In addition to the actions addressed in the report, what actions may be 

necessary to address northern border security vulnerabilities? 

In conducting our work, we reviewed the DHS report structure and 

content against requirements in the 9/11 Act. We also reviewed whether 

the DHS report content was complete and consistent with information 

provided in its key management documents including strategic plans, 

performance and accountability reports, budget requests, and other 

documentation produced by relevant DHS agencies. We interviewed DHS 

officials from CBP, ICE, and USCG located at headquarters and Detroit, 

Michigan, who had roles and responsibilities for northern border security 

to obtain their perspectives on documented information. For this reason, 

we also interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) officials with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has national responsibility for 

 2

Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 731(a)-(b), 121 Stat. 266, 351. 

3

Id. § 731(c), 121 Stat. at 351. 

Page 2 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
drug enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which 

has national responsibility for terrorism. We selected Detroit, Michigan, 

among CBP’s Office of Border Patrol’s (OBP) eight northern border 

sectors based on factors including relative threat and vulnerabilities, 

priority for resources, and demonstration site for new technology. Our 

observations from the Detroit sector cannot be generalized across the 

other seven sectors; however, we believe that they were sufficient for the

purposes of this report in comparing the headquarters and field 

perspective. While in Detroit, we also spoke with state and Canadian 

officials involved in northern border security to obtain their perspectives 

on northern border security threats and vulnerabilities, DHS actions to 

address them, and the effectiveness of binational and national 

partnerships. To determine actions that could help address northern 

border security vulnerabilities, we reviewed whether the information 

reported by DHS reflected a strategic risk–informed approach as required 

in the Homeland Security Act of 20024

 and Homeland Security Presidential

Directive 7 (HSPD-7). We also identified report recommendations for 

strengthening national border security from past GAO evaluations from 

fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that when fully implemented have potential 

to help address northern border vulnerabilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through November 

2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

based on our audit objectives. 

The DHS report to Congress is not fully responsive in providing 

information for improving northern border security as required in the 9/11 

Act. DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and 

initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and 

additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS 

officials responsible for preparing the report provided several reasons for 

the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact 

that DHS reflects its priorities for action and resources in the existing 

budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or 

Results in Brief 

 4

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

Page 3 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
request. However, the budget process provides Congress with a 5-year 

plan to meet prioritized needs within projected resource constraints, not 

the time frame and resources needed to achieve control of the northern 

border. The lack of information regarding the extent that vulnerabilities 

remain unaddressed on the northern border and the time and resources it 

will take to address them makes it challenging for Congress to consider 

future actions and resources necessary for the northern border in the 

broader context of national security. DHS has an opportunity to increase 

the value of information it provides to Congress in fulfilling other 

reporting requirements established in law. 

DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management 

process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully 

implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also 

provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS 

officials are currently developing strategic plans that are intended to 

provide its component agencies with overall direction in addressing 

vulnerabilities in northern border security, as well as more-targeted 

direction specific to vulnerabilities in the air and water environments. DHS 

is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing 

efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. 

DHS officials said the success of various pilot projects will likely change 

the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. For 

example, DHS is testing new technology that, if successful, may change

the mix of technology and personnel deployed along the border, and 

partnerships among federal, state, and local agencies to coordinate 

information and operations may also create efficiencies that change 

resource requirements. DHS can also act to timely implement 

recommendations made in recent and past GAO evaluations. At the time of 

our review, DHS had implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to

improve border security, but 39 recommendations had not been fully 

implemented. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within 

the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving screening 

processes at the ports of entry, expediting deployment of nuclear 

detection equipment, and improving the use of air and marine assets have 

not been fully implemented in the course of at least 1 and, in some cases, 

over 3 years. Internal control standards for the federal government state 

that agencies are to ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are 

promptly resolved. We believe that these outstanding recommendations 

continue to have merit and should be implemented. 

We are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security 

to provide more specific information in addressing future reporting 

Page 4 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
requirements to Congress, including planned actions, resource 

requirements, and time frames for increasing and achieving northern 

border security, and the basis used for prioritizing such action and 

resources in the context of other national security risks. In commenting on 

a draft of this report, DHS and CBP concurred with this recommendation 

and stated that CBP will work with the department to implement the 

recommendation through the approved budget process. Written comments 

from DHS are in appendix II. 

The United States shares nearly 4,000 miles of border with Canada 

stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, and the U.S.-Canadian 

border is considered to be the world’s longest open border between two 

nations. There is a great deal of trade and travel across this border, and 

approximately 90 percent of Canada’s population lives within 100 miles of 

the U.S. border. While legal trade is predominant, DHS reports networks of 

illicit criminal activity and smuggling of drugs, currency, people, and 

weapons between the two countries. Annually, CBP reports making 

approximately 4,000 arrests and interdicts approximately 40,000 pounds of

illegal drugs at and between the northern border ports of entry. 

Historically, these numbers have been significantly lower than those of the 

southwest border;5

 however, DHS reports that the terrorist threat on the 

northern border is higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law 

enforcement coverage. 

Background 

DHS agencies are charged with protecting the nation and its citizens from 

threats of terrorism, as shown in table 1. CBP is the lead federal agency in

charge of securing our nation’s borders, and has three components with a 

mission to interdict illegal contraband and persons seeking to enter 

illegally at and between the land ports of entry. Two other DHS agencies, 

ICE and USCG, also have key roles. The ICE mission includes investigating 

and dismantling criminal organizations that transport persons and goods 

across the border illegally, while USCG executes its maritime security 

mission by providing patrol presence and operational response for all 

navigable waterways on the northern border, including the Great Lakes. 

 5

For example, OBP data shows that in fiscal year 2008, apprehensions of inadmissible 

aliens along the northern border were approximately 1.1 percent of apprehensions along

the southwest border, and pounds of illegal narcotics seized along the northern border 

were about 0.6 percent of pounds seized along the southwest border.

Page 5 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a Primary Mission to 

Secure the Northern Border

Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) 

components Role and responsibility on northern border

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) 

Lead federal component agency in charge of securing 

U.S. borders 

 Office of Border Patrol 

(OBP) 

Prevents terrorists, terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens, 

smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from entering 

the U.S. between ports of entry

 Office of Field Operations Prevents terrorists, terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens, 

smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from entering 

the U.S, while facilitating legitimate trade and travel, at the 

nation’s air, land, and sea ports of entry 

 Office of Air and Marine Operates integrated air and marine forces to detect, 

interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful 

movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband 

toward or across U.S. borders 

U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Enforces federal immigration and customs laws—along 

with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—in relation to 

activities occurring at, or with a nexus to, the border 

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Executes maritime security mission on and over the major 

waterways using marine and air assets 

 Source: GAO analysis of DHS data. 

DHS agencies leverage their border security efforts through partnerships 

with state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies to share 

intelligence, information, and conduct joint operations for interdiction and 

investigation of cross-border crime. DHS considers these collaborative 

efforts particularly important for the northern border in remote, sparsely 

populated areas. 

There has been growing concern within Congress over the number of 

personnel assigned to the northern border, the increasing amount of illegal 

activity, and the potential for terrorists to gain unlawful entry into the 

United States. There has also been concern with respect to the adequacy

of facilities and physical infrastructure to accommodate the increasing 

volume of traffic.6

 Congress has shown increasing interest in issues 

 6

For example, see Congressional Research Service, Border Security: U.S.-Canada 

Immigration Border Issues, RS21258 (updated Dec. 28, 2004). 

Page 6 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
surrounding security of the northern border—first authorizing, and later 

directing—resource allocations to the northern border for personnel and 

improved technology.7

 Congress has also established various reporting 

requirements in laws that are to provide updates on the status of northern 

border security. In addition to the 9/11 Act, for example, the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2008,8

 directs DHS to prepare and submit a biennial 

National Land Border Security Plan. This plan is to include a vulnerability, 

risk, and threat assessment of each port of entry located on the northern 

border or the southern border, beginning in January 2009. 

The DHS report—issued to Congress on February 29, 2008—was overseen 

and facilitated by CBP’s Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES). OES 

was formed in August 2007 to assign responsibilities for and coordinate 

the development of all CBP congressional reports, correspondence, and 

external requests for information. OES tasked the CBP Office for Secure 

Border Initiative with taking the lead in coordinating information 

gathering from the relevant CBP components.9

 OES also received input 

from ICE and USCG in formulating the report. The information from these 

sources was compiled and reviewed within CBP, DHS, and the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) before submission to Congress. 

 7

For example, the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) authorized 

funding to triple the number of border patrol and inspection personnel along the northern

border and to improve technology for monitoring the northern border. See Pub. L. No. 107-

56, § 402, 115 Stat. 272, 342-43. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of

2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to assign to the northern border no less 

than 20 percent of the net increase in border patrol agents each year for fiscal years 2006 

through 2010. See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5202, 118 Stat. 3638, 3734. Also, in March 2007, the 

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations both wrote to the Secretary of DHS 

expressing the committees’ expectation that DHS redirect $20,000,000 of its Border 

Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology expenditure plan to begin addressing 

security needs along the northern border.

8

Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, § 604, 121 Stat. 1844, 2095-96 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 

1403). 

9

OES tasked the following CBP components to provide input to the Report to Congress:

Office of Field Operations, OBP, Office of Air & Marine, the Office of Intelligence and 

Operations Coordination, and the Office of Information Technology. 

Page 7 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
While the DHS report to Congress discusses northern border 

vulnerabilities and ongoing initiatives in place as required in law, 

information is missing that identifies the extent that various vulnerabilities 

remain unaddressed, and recommendations and resources to address 

these security gaps. Without this information, it is difficult for Congress to 

consider future actions and resources needed on the northern border in 

the broader context of national security. 

The DHS report to Congress discusses northern border vulnerabilities and 

ongoing initiatives to improve northern border security consistent with the 

content of its planning, performance, and budget documents, but DHS 

does not link this information to show the extent that security gaps remain 

on the northern border. The DHS report states that the northern border is 

vulnerable to the primary threats of terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal

immigration. These facts were consistently supported by threat 

information obtained from Canadian officials, and officials from DHS and 

CBP.10 According to these sources, northern border vulnerabilities are 

most actively exploited to smuggle illegal drugs and contraband; illegal 

immigration is a lesser problem. While DHS reports significant concern 

that terrorists can enter the United States undetected at or between the 

northern ports of entry, U.S. and Canadian officials agree that there is 

currently no credible intelligence or evidence indicating that there are 

terrorists in Canada planning an attack on U.S. soil. 

DHS Report Is Not 

Fully Responsive to 

Congress in Providing 

Information for 

Improving Northern 

Border Security 

The DHS Report Discusses 

Vulnerabilities and 

Initiatives Reflected in Key 

Management Documents, 

but Does Not Link This 

Information to Identify 

Security Gaps 

The DHS report lists initiatives its component agencies have underway to 

address vulnerabilities and achieve operational control of the border but 

does not mention progress made in this regard, or how many border miles 

are under operational control.11 CBP reports on these indicators—border 

miles under effective (or operational) control, and border miles with 

increased situational awareness—as two of its key performance measures 

and reports that it plans to increase and achieve control of the northern 

 10Our discussions with FBI officials on the terrorist threat, and DEA officials on the drug 

trafficking threat, were generally consistent with DHS-reported information. 

11OBP defines operational control as the ability to detect entries when they occur, identify 

the entry and classify its level of threat, effectively and efficiently respond to the entry and 

bring the situation to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. OBP data from fiscal 

year 2008 showed that few northern border miles were under operational control, but that

a greater number of miles have shown progress toward this goal. 

Page 8 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
border by deploying a proper mix of personnel, technology, facilities, and 

partnerships at and between the ports of entry. While the DHS report lists 

initiatives in each of these areas, they are not linked to the reported 

vulnerabilities, and the extent that these initiatives mitigate or eliminate 

vulnerabilities at and between the ports of entry is not mentioned. Also not 

mentioned in the report is the timeline DHS is using to request and deploy

resources necessary to increase the levels of control of the northern 

border. The absence of such information makes it difficult for Congress to 

consider future action and resources needed on the northern border in the 

context of other areas of national security. 

In terms of personnel, DHS lists ongoing initiatives for adequately staffing

the northern ports of entry, and hiring initiatives to increase staffing 

between the ports of entry by 2010. For the ports of entry, DHS describes 

its implementation of a workload staffing model that considers workload

and processing times to help identify the number of personnel that should 

be deployed at each location, which has resulted in the deployment of 190 

CBP officers. Between the ports of entry, DHS does not provide its 

methodology for identifying adequate staffing, but does describe initiatives 

to more than double the number of border patrol agents from fiscal years 

2007 to 2010, in response to direction from Congress. It is unclear, 

however, to what extent these staffing initiatives will result in obtaining 

effective control of the border. For example, the report states that 190 

CBP officers have been deployed to ports of entry as indicated in part by 

the workload staffing model; however, DHS reports in its strategic plan for 

fiscal years 2008-2013 that additional CBP officers are needed at many 

ports of entry. Similarly, while DHS reports a commitment to meet 

statutory staffing goals between the ports of entry by the year 2010, OBP 

officials indicated that a greater number of agents would be needed to gain 

operational control of the northern border. 

Personnel 

In discussing technology initiatives, CBP reports that technology has been 

employed at the northern ports of entry to address a number of 

vulnerabilities, but between the ports of entry, discussion is focused on 

pilot projects intended to test capabilities for potential use on the northern 

border. At the ports of entry, CBP reports that much technology is in place 

to address vulnerabilities related to the transport of illegal radiological and 

nuclear materials, illegal contraband, and misrepresentation of identity 

through the use of fraudulent documents. Between the ports of entry, pilot 

projects address vulnerabilities related to the inability to detect low-flying 

aircraft; the inability to detect unauthorized border crossings in areas 

without law enforcement patrol; and to share communications. The report 

does not discuss when the results of the projects will be available or the 

Technology

Page 9 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
extent that DHS would use these technologies, if successful, to address 

existing vulnerabilities. DHS also does not discuss initiatives to address 

the vulnerabilities cited in the report related to maritime security, such as 

the lack of video capabilities in marinas, unregulated access that small 

private vessels have on the Great Lakes and other border waterways, and 

insufficient resources to access boats on the open water. Subsequent to 

the report issued to Congress, DHS provided a thorough discussion of the 

vulnerabilities and challenges in addressing these aspects of maritime 

security in the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, issued April 2008.

USCG stated that an implementation plan would be finalized at the end of

December 2008, to guide agency actions in implementing the strategy, but

this plan would not be released to the public due to its security 

classification.12

In discussing facilities, the DHS report describes ongoing initiatives to 

systematically review the port of entry inspection facilities to identify the 

need for upgrade or replacement, and to develop a new standard station 

concept13 to accommodate the growth in number of border agents between 

the ports of entry. The report describes the age and condition of some 

facilities and volume of traffic and use. However, while the DHS strategic 

plan states that the department’s secure border program depends 

significantly on modernizing the ports of entry, there is no discussion in 

the report to Congress on the status of these efforts, when they will be 

completed, and how they currently affect northern border security. 14

Facilities 

The DHS report lists various initiatives underway that establish binational 

partnerships or partnerships among U.S. federal, state, and local agencies 

to share information and improve communication and cooperation among 

Partnerships

 12USCG also stated that a public strategic communication plan regarding the

implementation plan would be released sometime in the spring of 2009. 

13The standard station concept is a base design that may be utilized at multiple locations to 

reduce design costs and time frame. The standard station being implemented on the 

northern border is capable of supporting 50 agents and their support personnel, and allows

for addition or expansion as needed. 

14CBP officials commented that CBP conducts strategic resource assessments for ports of 

entry to gather facility and planning data, assess the facilities to determine critical needs in 

support of the mission, and make facility recommendations for budgeting and 

programming. CBP completed an initial round of these assessments at all land ports of 

entry from 2004 through 2006, and plans to soon begin a second round of expanded 

assessments that will include air and sea ports. CBP anticipates completing this second 

round of assessments within 3 years and repeating the process on a 2 to 3 year cycle. 

Page 10 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
agencies working along the border. Five binational partnerships were 

discussed, four with a broad focus on cross-border law enforcement 

efforts,15 and one with a specific focus on preventing illegal air incursions.16

Six U.S. partnerships were also mentioned, one specific to smuggling on

Indian reservations,17 two related to drug trafficking,18 two related to 

intelligence gathering,19 and one related to augmenting enforcement 

capacity by cross-designating federal authority to other agencies.20 DHS 

and CBP management documents support the report’s discussion of these 

partnerships as a key strategy for northern border security; however, there 

is no discussion of the extent that these partnerships were responsible for 

increasing the level of control across the border or how they will do so in 

the future. 

 15The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) are a multi-DHS-agency law 

enforcement initiative with Canada with a goal to ensure comprehensive and permanent 

coordination of cross-border law enforcement, antiterrorism efforts, and information

sharing between the two countries. The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is an 

interagency task force designed to enhance border security and combat violence related to

smuggling through coordinated effort involving federal, state, local, and Canadian law

enforcement agencies. Upon completion of a bilateral agreement currently under 

negotiation, Shiprider operations will support IBETs and include joint cross-border 

maritime patrols of USCG and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In this effort, 

designated USCG and RCMP maritime law enforcement officers will embark on the other 

party’s vessels for patrolling and enforcing U.S. and Canadian law on either side of the

maritime border. Project North Star provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement 

managers a mechanism to enhance communications, cooperation, and partnership. 

16The Airfields Initiative is a binational partnership between federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies of the United States and Canada involving the aviation community 

and the public as sources of information and intelligence on aircraft incursions. 

17ICE patrol officers, known as Shadow Wolves, were established by congressional 

mandate to remedy smuggling of narcotics across Indian reservations. 

18The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program is an antidrug support program

providing a mechanism for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to share 

information and intelligence. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force is a 

mechanism to promote cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies engaged in narcotics and money laundering investigations. 

19Border Security Evaluation Teams gather intelligence from state and local law 

enforcement agencies, local civic leaders, and the public to determine if suspected crossborder activities indicate a need for deployment of border patrol resources in those areas. 

Operation Last Call was created by the ICE Office of Deportation and Removal Operations

to maximize intelligence collection through systematic debriefing of ICE detainees. 

20ICE reports cross-designating other federal, state, and local officers to supplement the

ICE investigative mission and participate on task forces. 

Page 11 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
The DHS report contains a section for recommendations to address 

northern border vulnerabilities, but the information provided is a 

restatement of initiatives in place without mention of recommendations 

for further action or additional resources as required by law. Officials from 

DHS component agencies provided several reasons this information was 

missing from the report. One reason was that the Secure Border Initiative

(SBI) office—which was tasked with coordinating component agency 

contributions to the report—directed them to discuss their resource needs 

in terms of the existing budget; therefore, they did not discuss actions or 

resource requirements for future years. A second reason was that some 

components were satisfied with their current budget allocation. CBP 

officials stated that they supported the President’s budget and had nothing

further to recommend or request in the report to Congress.21 A third reason 

is that some components did not have the information necessary to 

identify recommendations or additional resources. USCG officials 

indicated that the lack of departmentwide strategic direction for the 

northern border has made it difficult to identify specific resource needs. 

Similarly, ICE officials said that information was lacking to compare and 

assess overall resources devoted across various northern border agencies, 

initiatives, and border locations. 

DHS is developing strategic plans, a risk-management process, and new 

initiatives that could change the level and mix of resources needed to 

protect the northern border; however, most efforts were incomplete and

unavailable for our review. Over the years, we have conducted evaluations 

of various border security activities and our reports included a number of 

recommendations for improvement. DHS action to fully implement these 

recommendations would provide benefit in addressing northern border 

vulnerabilities. 

DHS Report Does Not 

Provide Recommendations 

or Resource Requirements 

to Improve Northern 

Border Security 

DHS Is Taking Action 

to Improve Northern 

Border Security, and 

Implementing Past 

GAO 

Recommendations 

Would Also Provide 

Benefit 

 21The budget process provides Congress with a 1-year President’s budget, and a 5-year plan 

to meet prioritized needs within projected resource constraints. However, these documents

do not reflect the resources and time frame needed to achieve control of the northern 

border. 

Page 12 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
DHS and CBP have reported the need to provide a coherent framework to 

coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal northern border security efforts, 

and are developing northern border strategic plans, as well as a riskmanagement process to further these goals. Completion of these efforts 

should provide DHS with useful information in developing future reports 

to Congress on northern border security. 

DHS Is Developing 

Strategic Plans and a RiskManagement Process 

DHS has completed, or begun efforts to develop, three strategic plans that

will help address vulnerabilities on the northern border. Strategic plans 

help ensure that missions requiring a multiagency response are firmly 

aligned with articulated goals and objectives, and help keep agencies 

focused on the desired “end state.” While DHS has developed a broad 

strategic plan to outline the department’s overall mission and objectives, it 

has begun to focus on the need to develop coordinated and unified 

strategies to address more specific concerns, such as northern border 

security. A key effort under development is an overall northern border 

strategic plan that will, for the first time, take all DHS component agencies 

into account in efforts to address vulnerabilities necessary for control of 

the northern border. CBP did not indicate when this plan may be 

completed. A second strategic plan under development will address 

security vulnerabilities in the air environment, such as the inability to 

detect low-flying aircraft. CBP officials stated that they were working on 

performance measures for this plan, and estimate that it will be released in

April 2009. DHS issued its third strategic plan, the Small Vessel Security

Strategy, in April 2008 to help close existing maritime security gaps on 

waterways such as the Great Lakes, related to the small vessel 

environment. 

To help component agencies achieve the major goals outlined in each of 

these strategic plans, DHS plans to develop implementation plans that are 

to describe specific actions component agencies will take in support of 

each objective, identify lead component agencies for these actions, and 

provide target completion dates. USCG has stated that the implementation

plan for the small vessel strategic plan is scheduled to be issued for use by

component agencies at the end of December 2009, but will be considered 

security sensitive.22 Dates are not yet available for implementation plans to 

follow the remaining two strategic plans. 

 22An unclassified notice to the public is to be published sometime in spring 2009. 

Page 13 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Some DHS component agencies have acted to incorporate riskmanagement principles that provide information to prioritize and allocate 

resources for their individual programs and activities as required by law 

and presidential directive,23 but DHS has not yet completed efforts to 

implement this approach departmentwide. Risk management is important 

for strengthening homeland security resource allocations, as the nation 

cannot afford to fully protect against every type of threat. Therefore, an 

approach is needed that considers how best to allocate resources based on 

factors such as probability and adverse consequence. The DHS goal is to 

develop a risk-management process that will assess risk and inform 

strategic planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes 

across all of its component agencies and that will evaluate the riskreduction effects among relevant DHS programs. However, achieving this 

goal has been difficult. While risk management has been used in the 

private and public sectors for decades, its application for homeland 

security and combating terrorism is relatively new and without a 

precedent framework.24 As such, the effort to assess risk across DHS 

component agencies and programs is still in its very early stages of 

development. 

Future DHS Action to 

Improve Northern Border 

Security Is Influenced by 

Success of Pilot Projects, 

Partnerships, and External 

Factors 

DHS component agencies have identified resources to increase and 

achieve northern border security, but the need for these resources 

constantly evolves in response to various factors. For example, the DHS 

report described many pilot projects for new technology. If successful, 

OBP officials report that these projects could reduce security

vulnerabilities and current needs for other resources, such as existing 

technology, personnel, or infrastructure. However, these officials also 

indicate that new technology must be fully tested for operational 

effectiveness, and delays coupled with uncertainties of success have made 

it difficult to balance future resource investments in new technology with 

 23This requirement is found in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security

Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). 

24Our previous work pointed out the challenges DHS faces in developing its riskmanagement process. See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess 

Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, 

GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005), and GAO, Highlights of a Forum Convened

by the Comptroller General of the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk 

Management Principles in Homeland Security, GAO-08-627SP (Washington, D.C.: April 

2008). 

Page 14 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
current investments in existing technology. Such balance is necessary to

ensure security as well as effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 

Similarly, DHS officials discussed partnerships among federal, state, and

local agencies to coordinate information and operations—either newly 

created or still in development—that could result in greater efficiencies in 

border security. However, time will tell if these partnerships are 

sustainable and warrant a decrease or change in current estimated needs

for personnel. 

External factors—such as the interplay among private parties, 

governments, and agencies—also influence actions in addressing security

vulnerabilities. In Detroit, for example, CBP officials said that action to 

improve facilities at northern ports of entry was stymied by private 

ownership of property and landlocked facilities. In addition, the Small 

Vessel Security Strategy indicates that efforts to address maritime 

vulnerabilities were challenged by different practices or views among 

federal, state, and Canadian governments in balancing security needs with 

the freedom of the waterways expected by the small-vessel community. 

Further, ICE officials said that the scope of their authority in pursuing 

narcotics investigations influenced their actions in addressing some crossborder crimes. 

DHS Action to Implement 

Past GAO 

Recommendations Would 

Strengthen Northern 

Border Security 

DHS has an opportunity to address some northern border vulnerabilities 

by fully implementing recommendations made in past evaluations of its 

security efforts. Over the past few years, we have conducted evaluations 

and issued a number of reports related to the security of the U.S. border 

both at and between ports of entry (see Related GAO Products section at 

end of this report). In some instances, our reports included 

recommendations addressing vulnerabilities in border security—including 

the northern border—while in other cases, our reports and 

recommendations were more general, but when implemented, would 

provide benefit to the northern border. 

We reviewed recommendations resulting from GAO evaluations conducted 

from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and identified 11 reports containing 50

recommendations that had potential to address vulnerabilities in border 

security, or to address weaknesses in key initiatives. At the time of our 

review, DHS had implemented 11 of these 50 recommendations. For 

example, DHS implemented a recommendation to formalize a 

performance measure for the traveler inspection program that would help 

Page 15 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
agency management and Congress monitor effectiveness in apprehending

inadmissible aliens and other violators. 

However, 39 recommendations from the 11 GAO reports are still open. In 

some cases, recommendations were open because DHS and other federal 

agencies25 had not yet had time to implement them. For example, 18 of the 

39 open recommendations were from GAO reports issued within the last 

fiscal year. In regard to the remaining 21 recommendations, DHS and other 

agencies agreed to take action, but at least 1 and, in some cases, over 3 

years have passed without full implementation.26 Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government state that agencies are to ensure that 

findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.27 The time 

necessary to resolve recommendations varies depending on the type of 

action required. However, DHS does not have a transparent process to 

show how long it will take to implement each recommendation 

considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of effort required. 

Timely implementation of recommendations would help address 

vulnerabilities related to a variety of border security initiatives. Some of 

the older recommendations that have not been fully implemented include 

those to improve screening of travelers at ports of entry to ensure legal

entry, preclude cross-border transport of illicit nuclear materials, reduce 

risks in delivering key technology for border surveillance and for 

information sharing, and increase information sharing and coordination 

among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as shown in 

table 2 and appendix I. We believe that these outstanding 

recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. 

 25Other federal agencies included the FBI, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

and Counter Terrorism, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Fusion Center

Coordination Group (NFCCG), Department of State, and Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL). 

26DHS officials provided us with reasons why two of the 21 GAO recommendations had not

been implemented. DHS did not implement these fiscal year 2005 recommendations

regarding coordination of its air and marine assets due to inadvertent exclusion of these 

recommendations from the agency tracking system. DHS and the Department of State 

report making progress towards implementing seven of the remaining pre–fiscal year 2008 

recommendations. 

27GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 16 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border Security That Have 

Not Been Fully Implemented 

Number and year of

recommendation Purpose of recommendations

Traveler Screening

 4 (fiscal year 2007) Achieve benefits from investment in the US-VISIT program at 

land ports of entry by developing performance measures for 

assessing US-VISIT operations, and ensuring reports to 

Congress include information regarding deployment of 

biometric exit capabilities, and how these capabilities align with 

existing land border security initiatives. (GAO-07-248, 

December 2006) 

 3 (fiscal year 2007) Prevent fraudulent use of passports and visas by periodically

reassessing and fully utilizing their security features, and 

establishing a comprehensive oversight program of passport 

acceptance facilities. (GAO-07-1006, July 2007) 

 5 (fiscal year 2008) Mitigate vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening 

processes, enhance the use of the terrorist watch list as a 

counterterrorism tool and ensure its effectiveness, and ensure 

governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have 

oversight, accountability, and guidance. (GAO-08-110, October 

2007) 

 2 (fiscal year 2008) Mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry 

by developing data on training programs and incorporating

specific tasks and requirements into CBP’s procedures for its 

on-the-job training program. (GAO-08-219, November 2007) 

Nuclear Security 

 6 (fiscal year 2006) Reduce delays in acquisition and deployment of radiation 

detection equipment to ports of entry, take steps to increase

the chances that inspection officers find illicit radiological 

material, and ensure the reliability and effective use of costbenefit information for risk assessment and acquisition 

decisions. (GAO-06-389, March 2006) 

 4 (fiscal year 2007) Test the capabilities and limitations of radiation detection

equipment before making production and acquisition decisions. 

(GAO-07-1247T, September 2007) 

 3 (fiscal year 2008) Better track and detect radioactive materials and ensure that

for materials transported across the U.S. border, personnel at 

ports of entry comply with guidance for verifying that materials 

licenses are legitimate. (GAO-08-598, June 2008) 

Secure Border Initiative Technology (SBInet) 

 7 (fiscal year 2008) Improve acquisition, testing, and implementation of SBInet

technology for improving surveillance and communications 

technologies along U.S. borders, and to permit meaningful 

measurement, oversight, and accountability of the SBInet

program to CBP, DHS senior leadership, and Congress. 

(GAO-08-1086, September 2008) 

Page 17 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Number and year of

recommendation Purpose of recommendations

Federal, State, and Local Coordination 

 2 (fiscal year 2005) Ensure that air and marine assets among DHS agencies are 

effectively coordinated to meet border security needs. (GAO05-543, August 2005) 

 2 (fiscal year 2007) Provide guidance and support to enhance collaboration at 

operations centers staffed by multiple DHS agencies. (GAO07-89, October 2006) 

 1 (fiscal year 2008) Improve efforts to create and support a national network of 

state and local information fusion centers. (GAO-08-35, 

October 2007) 

Source: GAO.

Federal agency reporting requirements, such as those contained in the 9/11 

Act, can provide Congress with important information for debating policy 

and allocating scarce resources, and the level of agency responsiveness 

can either support or hinder these efforts. While the DHS report to 

Congress provided information on the status of its efforts, there is little 

sense of the relative effect these efforts have had in protecting the 

northern border, and what additional action or resources may be needed 

in the future. Requirements in law to periodically assess the status of 

northern border security provide DHS with additional opportunity to 

highlight information that can best meet congressional needs. 

Completion of DHS efforts to develop a northern border strategic plan and 

risk management process to prioritize action and funding could lead to 

better understanding among DHS, its component agencies, and Congress 

in determining whether resources are most effectively allocated across 

initiatives, border locations, and responsible agencies. However, balancing 

current and future funding for border security will remain challenging as 

the resource needs for the northern border will continue to evolve in 

response to the relative success of new initiatives. In the meantime, 

implementing recommendations for improving border security in a more 

timely fashion would help reduce the nation’s risk due to unaddressed 

vulnerabilities. 

To provide Congress with information that will facilitate policy 

discussions and resource decisions for northern border security, we 

recommend that for future reporting requirements the Secretary of 

Homeland Security include more specific information on the actions, 

resources, and time frame needed to improve security of the northern 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Page 18 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
border along with any attendant uncertainties, and the basis used to 

prioritize action and resources for northern border security relative to 

other areas of national security. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and Attorney General. In its response, DHS and CBP 

agreed with our recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the 

department to implement it through the approved budget process. DOJ 

did not provide formal comments. 

In its comments, DHS stated that our report said DHS and other agencies

should proceed to adopt and address all of the recommendations from 

previous reports without any assessment of priority based on risk. Our 

intent in discussing these recommendations was to point out potential 

security vulnerabilities that exist, not to imply that all of these 

recommendations were of equal importance, or that risk-based 

prioritization should not be applied when addressing them. GAO has 

advocated the use of risk management principles, and using them to 

sequence actions on open recommendations would seem to be 

appropriate. We have added language to clarify that while the definition of 

timely implementation will vary across recommendations, DHS lacks a 

transparent process to show how long it will take to implement each 

recommendation considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of 

effort required. 

DHS’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS and DOJ also offered 

technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where 

appropriate.

We are providing copies of this report to the Senate and House committees 

that have authorization and oversight responsibilities for homeland 

security. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, 

this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-8777, or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Page 19 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Richard M. Stana 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 20 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recomme

from GAO on Various Border Securit

ndations 

y Issues 

Page 21 GAO-09-93

In the past, GAO has offered numerous recommendations to the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) related to border security. 

Although previous recommendations are not specific to the northern 

border, many touch on different aspects that do affect various elements of 

northern border security. Many recommendations made by GAO 

concerning general border security, nuclear security, technology, and 

interagency cooperation and information sharing, have yet to be 

implemented by DHS. Fully implementing these recommendations could

provide great benefits to DHS and the nation in terms of strengthening 

general border security, and by extension, security of the northern border. 

Tables 3 through 6 detail 39 selected open recommendations related to 

border security vulnerabilities. 

Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General Border Security Issues with Potential Implications for 

Northern Border Security 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO-07-248: Border Security: 

US-VISIT Program Faces 

Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land 

Ports of Entry (Dec. 6, 2006) 

To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in U.S. Visitor and Immigrant 

Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) at land ports of entry (POE), and security goals and 

objectives, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the US-VISIT Program Director, in 

collaboration with the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to: 

(1) Develop performance measures for assessing the effect of US-VISIT operations specifically at 

land POEs. 

As DHS finalized the statutorily mandated report describing a comprehensive biometric entry and 

exit system for US-VISIT, the Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to ensure that 

the report include, among other things: 

(2) Information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit 

capabilities at land POEs. 

(3) A discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit capability, such as the 

technology currently being tested, to a reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory 

requirements. 

(4) A description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border security initiatives with USVISIT and what facility or facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that 

technology and process work in harmony. 

Appendix I: Selected Open 

Recommendations from GAO on Various 

Border Security Issues 

 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations 

from GAO on Various Border Security Issues 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO-07-1006 : Border Security: 

Security of New Passports and 

Visas Enhanced, but More Needs 

to Be Done to Prevent Their 

Fraudulent Use (July 31, 2007) 

To improve the integrity of its travel documents, the Secretary of State should: 

(5) Develop a process and schedule for periodically reassessing the security features and 

planning the redesign of its travel documents.

(6) Establish a comprehensive oversight program of passport acceptance facilities. In doing so, 

the Department of State should consider conducting performance audits of acceptance facilities, 

agents, and accepted applications and establishing an appropriate system of internal controls 

over the acceptance facilities.

To more fully utilize the security features of passports and visas, the Secretary of Homeland

Security should: 

(7) Develop a deployment schedule for providing sufficient e-passport readers to U.S. POEs, 

which would enable inspection officials to better utilize the security features in the new U.S. epassport. 

GAO-08-110 : Terrorist Watch List 

Screening: Opportunities Exist to 

Enhance Management Oversight, 

Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency 

Screening Processes, and Expand 

Use of the List (Oct. 11, 2007) 

In order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening processes, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) should: 

(8) Assess to what extent there are vulnerabilities in the current screening processes that arise 

when screening agencies do not accept relevant records due to the designs of their computer 

systems, the extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a security risk, and what actions, if any, 

should be taken in response. 

To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help 

ensure its effectiveness, the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the 

heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private sector entities: 

(9) Develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support private sector screening 

processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in Homeland

Security Presidential Directive 6. 

To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to help 

ensure its effectiveness, the Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the 

heads of other appropriate federal departments: 

(10) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland 

Security and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive 

approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

11 (HSPD-11), which, among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate screening opportunities to 

use watch list records to detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to

homeland security and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties. 

(11) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland 

Security and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan that describes the 

scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and 

schedule of activities necessary for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy, as called 

for in HSPD-11.

To help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have the oversight, 

accountability, and guidance necessary to achieve the administration’s vision of a comprehensive 

and coordinated approach, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism should: 

(12) Ensure that the governance structure proposed by the plan affords clear and adequate 

responsibility and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts 

governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward 

intended outcomes. 

Page 22 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations 

from GAO on Various Border Security Issues 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO 08-219 : Border Security: 

Despite Progress, Weaknesses in 

Traveler Inspections Exist at Our 

Nation’s Ports of Entry (Nov. 5, 

2007) 

To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to 

take the following actions: 

(13) Develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the individuals who require 

training are receiving it so that agency management is in a better position to measure progress 

toward achieving training goals. 

(14) Incorporate into CBP’s procedures for its on-the-job training program (1) specific tasks that 

CBP officers must experience during on-the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring 

officer proficiency in performing those tasks. 

Source: GAO.

Page 23 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations 

from GAO on Various Border Security Issues 

Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear Security with Potential Implications for Northern Border 

Security 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO-06-389: Combating Nuclear 

Smuggling: DHS Has Made 

Progress Deploying Radiation 

Detection Equipment at U.S. 

Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns 

Remain (Mar. 22, 2006) 

Since DHS provides Congress with information concerning the acquisition and deployment of 

portal monitors, and since DHS’s procedures to obtain internal agreement on this information are 

lengthy and cumbersome—often resulting in delays—the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

working with the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the 

Commissioner of CBP, should: 

(15) Review these approval procedures and take actions necessary to ensure that DHS submits 

information to the Congress early in the fiscal year. 

In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program as planned, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and the Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), should: 

(16) Devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and the rate needed to 

complete deployments by September 2009. 

To ensure that DHS’s substantial investment in radiation detection technology yields the greatest 

possible level of detection capability at the lowest possible cost, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, once the costs and capabilities of advanced technology portal monitors are well

understood, and before any of the new equipment is purchased, should: 

(17) Work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs of deploying advanced 

portal monitors. This analysis should focus on determining whether any additional detection 

capability provided by the advanced equipment is worth its additional cost. After completing this 

cost-benefit analysis, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO, 

should revise its total program cost estimates to reflect current decisions. 

To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail deployments proceed on 

time, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, should: 

(18) Develop procedures for effectively screening rail containers and develop new technologies to 

facilitate inspections. 

To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological material, the Secretary of

Homeland Security, working with the Commissioner of CBP, should: 

(19) Consider modifying the agency’s standard operating procedures for secondary inspections to 

include physically opening cargo containers during secondary inspections at all ports of entry 

when the external inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological material inside.

To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, the Secretary of Homeland

Security should: 

(20) Direct PNNL to have its earned value management system validated so that it complies with 

guidance developed by the American National Standards Institute / Electronic Industries Alliance. 

In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an 

Integrated Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data is reliable for assessing 

risk and developing alternatives. 

Page 24 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations 

from GAO on Various Border Security Issues 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO-07-1247T: Combating 

Nuclear Smuggling: Additional 

Actions Needed to Ensure 

Adequate Testing of Next 

Generation Radiation Detection 

Equipment (Sept. 18, 2007) 

The Secretary of Homeland Security should:

(21) Delay Secretarial Certification and full-scale production decisions of the advanced 

spectroscopic portal (ASP) until all relevant tests and studies have been completed and limitations 

to these tests and studies have been identified and addressed. Furthermore, results of these tests 

and studies should be validated and made fully transparent to the Department of Energy (DOE), 

CBP, and other relevant parties. 

(22) Once the tests and studies have been completed, evaluated, and validated, determine in 

cooperation with CBP, DOE, and other stakeholders including independent reviewers, if additional 

testing is needed. 

(23) If additional testing is needed, appoint an independent group within DHS, not aligned with the 

ASP acquisition process, to conduct objective, comprehensive, and transparent testing that 

realistically demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of the ASP system. This independent 

group would be separate from the recently appointed independent review panel. 

(24) Report the results of the tests and analyses to the appropriate congressional committees 

before large scale purchases of ASPs are made. 

GAO-08-598 : Nuclear Security: 

NRC and DHS Need to Take 

Additional Steps to Better Track 

and Detect Radioactive Materials 

(June 19, 2008)

Given the repeated delays in implementing improvements to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s ability to monitor and track radioactive sealed sources, the Chairman of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission should take steps, consistent with sound systems development practices, 

to: 

(25) Ensure that priority attention is given to meeting the current January 2009 and summer 2010 

target dates for launching the National Source Tracking System, Web-based licensing system, 

and the new license verification system, respectively. 

Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially dangerous to human health if not 

properly handled, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should: 

(26) Complete the steps needed to include all potentially dangerous radioactive sources (category 

3 and the larger category 4 sources, as well as categories 1 and 2) in the National Source

Tracking System as quickly as is reasonably possible. 

To improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and materials from being smuggled 

into the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security should: 

(27) Direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take measures to ensure that 

this guidance is being followed. 

Source: GAO.

Page 25 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations 

from GAO on Various Border Security Issues 

Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO-08-1086:Secure Border 

Initiative: DHS Needs to 

Address Significant Risks in 

Delivering Key Technology 

Investment (Sept. 22, 2008) 

To improve DHS’s efforts to acquire and implement SBIneta, we made the following

recommendations: 

To permit meaningful measurement and oversight of and accountability for the program, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

Commissioner to: 

(28) Ensure that the risks associated with planned SBInet acquisition, development, testing, and 

deployment activities are immediately assessed. 

(29) Ensure that the results, including proposed alternative courses of action for mitigating the risks, 

are provided to the Commissioner and DHS’s senior leadership, as well as to the department’s 

congressional authorization and appropriation committees. 

We further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP Commissioner to 

have the Acting SBInet Program Manager take the following additional actions: 

(30) Finalize and approve an integrated master schedule that reflects the timing and sequencing of 

the work needed to achieve these commitments. 

(31) Revise and approve versions of the SBInet life cycle management approach, including the draft 

Systems Engineering Plan and draft Test and Evaluation Management Plan, and in doing so, ensure 

that these revised and approved versions are consistent with one another, reflect program officials’ 

recently described changes to the engineering and testing approaches, and reflect relevant federal

guidance and associated leading practices.

(32) Ensure that the revised and approved life cycle management approach is fully implemented. 

(33) Implement key requirements development and management practices to include (1) baselining 

requirements before system design and development efforts begin; (2) analyzing requirements prior 

to being baselined to ensure that they are complete, achievable, and verifiable; and (3) tracing 

requirements to higher-level requirements, lower-level requirements, and test cases. 

(34) Implement key test management practices to include (1) developing and documenting test plans 

prior to the start of testing; (2) conducting appropriate component level testing prior to integrating

system components; and (3) approving a test management strategy that, at a minimum, includes a 

relevant testing schedule, establishes accountability for testing activities by clearly defining testing 

roles and responsibilities, and includes sufficient detail to allow for testing and oversight activities to 

be clearly understood and communicated to test stakeholders. 

Source: GAO.

a

In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar

program to secure the nation’s borders through enhanced surveillance technologies, increased 

staffing levels, improved infrastructure, and increased domestic enforcement of immigration laws. 

One component of SBI, known as SBInet, is focused on the acquisition and deployment of 

surveillance and communications technologies. 

Page 26 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations 

from GAO on Various Border Security Issues 

Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Partnerships and Joint Operations with Potential Implications for 

Northern Border Security 

GAO report Recommendation 

GAO-05-543: Border Security: 

Opportunities to Increase 

Coordination of Air and Marine

Assets (Aug. 12, 2005) 

In order to help ensure that the use of available air and marine assets is effectively coordinated to 

meet border security needs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should: 

(35) Provide guidance that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) and CBP, the primary DHS agencies that employ air and marine assets, in their 

homeland security missions, as well as how asset use should be coordinated. 

(36) Determine whether the Homeland Security Act’s prohibition on diversion of USCG assets, or 

any similar restriction in appropriations laws, limits the ability of USCG to coordinate assets with 

other agencies, and if so, evaluate the merits, including the costs and benefits of proposing a 

change in relevant laws to Congress. 

GAO-07-89: Homeland Security: 

Opportunities Exist to Enhance 

Collaboration at 24/7 Operations 

Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS 

Agencies (Oct. 20, 2006) 

To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff at each multiagency 24/7/365 

operations center, the Secretary of Homeland Security should charge the Director of the 

Operations Directorate with developing and providing guidance and helping to ensure the

agencies that sponsor the center: 

(37) Conduct staffing needs assessments. 

(38) Address collaborative efforts at the four multiagency operations centers in plans and reports 

on the level of each operation center’s managing agency. 

GAO-08-35: Homeland Security: 

Federal Efforts Are Helping to

Alleviate Some Challenges 

Encountered by State and Local 

Information Fusion Centers (Oct. 

30, 2007) 

To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, the National Fusion Center 

Coordination Group (NFCCG), through the Information Sharing Council and the Program 

Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), should: 

(39) Determine and articulate the federal government’s role in, and whether it expects to provide 

resources to, fusion centers over the long term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular 

emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions that support a 

national information sharing capability as critical nodes of the ISE. 

Source: GAO.

Page 27 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

of Homeland Security 

Page 28 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 29 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 30 GAO-09-93

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director, 

and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David 

Holt made significant contributions to the work. Amanda Miller and 

Michele Fejfar assisted with design, methodology, and data analysis. Linda 

Miller provided assistance in report preparation; and Frances Cook 

provided legal support. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

 Northern Border Security
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 

Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.: 

September 22, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. GAO08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008. 

Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management 

Principles in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June 

25, 2008. 

Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better

Track and Detect Radioactive Materials. GAO-08-598. Washington, D.C.: 

June 19, 2008. 

Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for 

the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007. GAO-08-757. Washington, 

D.C.: May 16, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border 

Security Program and Operations, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-542T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008. 

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.: 

January 3, 2008. 

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-219. Washington, D.C.: 

November 5, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some 

Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 

GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet 

Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24,

2007. 

Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance 

Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening 

Processes, and Expand Use of the List. GAO-08-110. Washington, D.C.: 

October 11, 2007. 

Page 31 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Related GAO Products 

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-123SU. Washington, D.C.: 

October 5, 2007, SBU. 

Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and 

Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations. GAO-07-884T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 27, 2007. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 

Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. 

GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007. 

Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but 

More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use. GAO-07-1006. 

Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Border Security: Long-term Strategy Needed to Keep Pace with 

Increasing Demand for Visas. GAO-07-847. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 

2007. 

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-378T. 

Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007. 

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248. 

Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-56SU. 

Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2006 SBU. 

Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 

24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89. 

Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006. 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 

of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: September 

7, 2006. 

Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the 

United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006. 

Page 32 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
Related GAO Products 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns 

Remain. GAO-06-389. March 22, 2006. 

Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and 

Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical 

Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. December 15, 2005. 

Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and 

Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. August 12, 2005. 

(440721) Page 33 GAO-09-93 Northern Border Security
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