United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1998 AIR TRAFFIC

CONTROL

Status of FAA’s

Modernization

Program

GAO/RCED-99-25

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-281077 

December 3, 1998

Congressional Requesters

In late 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began a

modernization program to replace and upgrade the National Airspace

System’s (NAS) equipment and facilities to meet the expected increase in

traffic volume, enhance the margin of air safety, and increase the

efficiency of the air traffic control system—the principal component of the

NAS. Historically, the modernization program has experienced many

problems in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. As a result,

many of the promised benefits from using new equipment have been

delayed, and the aviation community’s confidence in FAA’s ability to

manage the modernization program has been weakened. Because of the

complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past of FAA’s modernization

program, we designated it a high-risk information technology initiative in

1995 and again in 1997.1

In light of past problems and continuing concerns about key projects being

funded under this program, you asked us to provide current information

on the status of the modernization program. As agreed with your offices,

this report provides information on the (1) status of the overall

modernization program, including its cost; (2) status of 18 key

modernization projects; and (3) challenges facing the overall

modernization program. (See app. I for specific information on these 18

projects. A listing of projects completed from 1983 through August 1998 is

included in app. II.)

Results in Brief Over the past year, FAA, in collaboration with the aviation community, has

taken steps to restructure its multibillion-dollar modernization program in

order to achieve a more gradual and cost-effective approach by, among

other actions, limiting the scope of projects to more manageable segments.

This contrasts with the approach of the past, where the agency sought to

develop highly complex software-intensive systems all at once and often

established unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance goals. Under FAA’s

new incremental approach, the agency plans to implement a new way of

managing air traffic, known as “free flight,” in order to provide immediate

1

FAA’s modernization program is one of four high-risk system development and modernization efforts.

See High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb. 1995) and High-Risk Series: Information

Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, Feb. 1997).

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improvements for the system’s safety, efficiency, and capacity.2 Under its

most recent financial plan, FAA estimates that the total cost of

modernization will be nearly $42 billion from fiscal year 1982 through

fiscal 2004—a $3.8 billion increase since the agency’s last financial plan in

February 1998.3,4 This increase in planned spending (1) is attributed to new

funding levels that were provided by the Office of Management and Budget

and (2) allows for the acceleration of the NAS’ modernization. Through

fiscal year 1998, the Congress appropriated over $25 billion of the

$42 billion for modernization (funded through FAA’s Facilities and

Equipment account), and FAA’s latest financial plan indicates that

$17 billion will be needed from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal 2004.

We have identified 18 projects that are key to FAA’s efforts to replace NAS’

aging infrastructure and that provide a platform for improving the system’s

safety, efficiency, and/or capacity. Total estimated Facilities and

Equipment funding for each of these projects exceeds $100 million, and,

collectively, these projects account for about 41 percent of the Facilities

and Equipment funds requested for fiscal year 1999. FAA’s progress in

meeting cost and schedule goals for these 18 key projects has been mixed.

Under FAA’s new phased approach to modernization, two projects in our

review—Aeronautical Data Link and Air Traffic Management—have been

revised, resulting in new cost and schedule estimates for those

components that are planned for implementation under free flight.

Including these two projects, approximately two-thirds of the 18 projects

are operating within cost and schedule estimates. Of the remaining

projects, several have incurred cost increases and delays due, in part, to

changes in requirements, difficulties in developing software, and changes

designed to allow human operators to work better with new computer

systems. However, despite the delays with some projects, FAA has fielded

new air traffic control equipment. For example, since 1996, FAA has

commissioned 38 of 43 planned Air Route Surveillance Radar-4s.5,6

Additionally, since early 1997, FAA has commissioned 238 Automated

2

Under “free flight,” FAA will begin implementing new technologies and procedures that will allow the

agency to move to a more collaborative system of managing traffic under which pilots, within limits,

will be allowed to choose routes to save them time and money.

3

FAA’s financial plan, which is based on the national airspace architecture—FAA’s blueprint for

defining the long-range needs of the NAS—takes into account the funding required for the service life of

a project, including the amounts needed for upgrades (refreshments) to technology. Previously, these

amounts were not included in the financial plan.

4

Estimated costs may not add because of rounding.

5

The term “commissioned” is defined as the formal approval of the equipment for operational use.

6

The Air Route Surveillance Radar provides data on the movement of aircraft and weather and is used

for the separation of aircraft, drug interdiction, and defense of the U.S. borders.

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Surface Observing Systems at new sites, bringing the total commissioned

systems to 371 out of 597.7

While FAA has taken action to address some of its long-standing problems,

the agency still faces many challenges in effectively managing its

multibillion-dollar investment in modernization:

• FAA’s internal evaluations and our reviews have identified shortcomings in

FAA’s current process used to manage its investments in validating and

prioritizing mission needs analyses, in establishing and monitoring

baseline measurements for all projects, and in communicating and

coordinating among cross-functional teams. Improvements in these areas,

among others, will help ensure that FAA (1) selects those investments that

best meet its mission needs; (2) monitors all investments using accurate

and reliable cost, schedule, and other performance data; (3) evaluates

investment projects after they are implemented to measure outcomes and

incorporate lessons learned to improve its decision-making for new

investment projects; and (4) facilitates effective partnerships among teams

responsible for acquisitions.

• While FAA has begun to address some of the root causes of long-standing

modernization problems that hinder its achievement of desired mission

goals, these efforts are not yet complete. For example, we found that FAA

lacked reliable cost-estimating processes and cost-accounting practices

needed to effectively manage investments in information technology,

leaving it at risk of making ill-informed decisions on critical and costly air

traffic control systems.8 FAA has begun to improve its cost-estimating

practices and to acquire a cost-accounting system, but these efforts are not

complete. We have also identified problems with the agency’s systems

architecture, software acquisition processes, and organizational culture

among those responsible for acquisitions. FAA has actions under way to

implement our recommendations in all of these areas.

• FAA has more work to do to ensure that its mission-critical air traffic

control systems will work through the year 2000 date change and to

determine how it will ensure the continuity of critical operations in the

event of some systems’ failures when January 1, 2000, arrives. While FAA

has completed critical steps in identifying which systems need to be fixed

and repairing them, it must still test many of its mission-critical systems

and implement needed fixes. Also, the agency still needs to resolve a

7

The Automated Surface Observing System equipment automates the observation and dissemination of

selected weather data.

8

See Air Traffic Control: Improved Cost Information Needed to Make Billion Dollar Modernization

Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20, Jan. 22, 1997).

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number of cross-cutting risks that threaten aviation operations, such as

risks associated with exchanges of data with external partners—including

airports and airlines—that are integral to managing air traffic operations.

• FAA also has weaknesses in its computer security that will require action to

ensure that air traffic control systems on which it depends are sufficiently

resistant to intrusion. Disruptions to the nation’s air traffic control system

could result if these systems are not adequately protected. We identified

shortcomings in four areas: physical security of air traffic control facilities,

operational system security, the security of future air traffic control

systems, and management structure and security policy implementation.

We recommended that FAA build detailed security requirements into its

design of future air traffic control systems and that the agency enforce

computer security policy. The agency has acknowledged weaknesses but

has not yet formulated a plan to strengthen security.

Background FAA’s mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air

traffic in the national airspace. To accomplish its mission, FAA provides air

traffic control services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The air traffic

control system, which is the principal component of the NAS, comprises a

vast network of radars; automated data processing, navigation, and

communications equipment; and air traffic control facilities.

Through its modernization program, FAA is upgrading and replacing

equipment and facilities—such as controller workstations and airport

towers—and developing new technologies—such as digital

communications—to help improve the safety, efficiency, and capacity of

the NAS. FAA’s air traffic services are provided primarily through four

service areas—air traffic control towers, terminal-area facilities, en route

centers, and flight service stations. The functions of each type of service

area are described below.

• Airport towers control the flow of aircraft—before landing, on the ground,

and after takeoff—within 5 nautical miles of the airport and up to 3,000

feet above the airport.

• Terminal area facilities—known as Terminal Radar Approach Control

(TRACON) facilities—direct aircraft in the airspace that extends from the

point where the tower’s control ends to about 50 nautical miles from the

airport. A TRACON can be located at or outside an airport.

• En route centers—known as air route traffic control centers—control

aircraft in air routes outside of terminal airspace. Planes are controlled

through regions of airspace by en route centers responsible for the

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regions. Control is passed from one center to another as a plane moves

across a region until it reaches terminal airspace. Two en route

centers—Oakland and New York—also control aircraft over the ocean.

Because radar coverage over the ocean is limited, beyond the radars’ sight,

controllers must rely on periodic radio communications through a third

party—Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC), a private organization

funded by the airlines and FAA to operate radio stations—to determine

aircraft locations.

• Flight Service Stations provide weather and flight plan services primarily

for general aviation pilots.

(See fig. 1 for a visual summary of air traffic control over the continental

United States and oceans.)

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Figure 1: Summary of Air Traffic Control Over the Continental United States and Oceans

TRACON

ARINC

Oceanic

En Route

Center

En Route

Center

Flight Service

Station

En Route

Center

TRACON

Airport Tower

Airport Tower

Departure Control

Approach Control

Continental

United States

Local and Ground Control

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The 18 key modernization projects will help upgrade the air traffic services

provided through one or more of the four service areas that FAA uses.

Table 1 depicts the air traffic service areas that will be modernized by

these projects. (App. I describes the functions of each of these projects.)

Table 1: Air Traffic Services That Will Be Modernized by 18 Major Air Traffic Control Projects

Service areas

Project’s title Tower Terminal

En route

center

Flight service

station

Aeronautical Data Link X X X

Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 X

Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 X

Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator X

Air Traffic Management/Free Flight Phase 1 Program X X

Automated Surface Observing System X X X

Display System Replacement X

Global Positioning System Program: Wide Area Augmentation System X X X

Global Positioning System Program: Local Area Augmentation System X X

Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement Program X

Integrated Terminal Weather System X X

Oceanic Automation Program X X

Operational and Supportability Implementation System X

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System X

Terminal Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment Program/Airport

Surveillance Radar-11 Project X

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar X X

Voice Switching and Control System X

Weather and Radar Processor X

Note: “X” denotes service areas where projects are utilized.

Overall Status of

Modernization

Program

The NAS modernization program has undergone many changes since it was

established in 1981. Initially, the program comprised only about 80

projects, but in December 1990, it was redefined and expanded as the

Capital Investment Plan (hereafter, referred to as the financial plan). Over

the past year, FAA and industry have worked together to develop a new

approach to managing the program, which now includes 124 active

projects funded through FAA’s Facilities and Equipment appropriation

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account. Eighty-nine projects have been completed since the

modernization program began.

FAA and Industry Have

Agreed to a Phased

Approach to

Modernization

Over the past year, FAA and industry, working through the RTCA,

9

 have

agreed on a phased approach to modernizing the NAS—including a new

way of managing air traffic, known as “free flight.”10 A central tenet of this

approach is the “build a little, test a little” concept of technology

development and deployment—intended to limit development efforts to a

manageable scope, identify and mitigate risks, and deploy technologies

prior to their full maturity so they can provide immediate improvements to

the system’s safety, efficiency, and/or capacity. This approach contrasts

with the former approach, where FAA sought to build highly complex

systems, many of which required the extensive development of software.

In several cases, FAA underestimated the technical complexity of the

development efforts, and, as a result, the systems were more costly and

took longer to develop than anticipated.

Under the first phase of the modernization program, FAA plans to

accelerate the development and deployment of certain technology projects

that have the potential to provide immediate benefits to users.11

Additionally, the agency plans to continue to develop and deploy critical

infrastructure replacement projects like the Standard Terminal

Automation Replacement System and Display System Replacement, which

provide new workstations and functionality to controllers in terminal and

en route centers, respectively. Furthermore, other modernization projects,

particularly those related to communication, navigation, and surveillance,

will be tested under the agency’s planned demonstration program.12

9

RTCA serves in an advisory capacity to FAA. It was organized as the Radio Technical Commission for

Aeronautics in 1935 to provide a forum where industry and government representatives could discuss

aviation issues and develop consensus-based recommendations. In November 1991, it reorganized and

shortened its name to RTCA.

10In September, we issued a report on the status of FAA’s efforts to implement free flight and the

challenges that lie ahead. See National Airspace System: FAA Has Implemented Some Initiatives, but

Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept. 28, 1998).

11Under this phase, FAA would implement new technologies and procedures to allow the agency to

gradually move to a “free flight” operating system, where decisions for conducting flight operations

would be based increasingly on the collaborative efforts of FAA and users. Components of two

projects in our review—Aeronautical Data Link and Air Traffic Management—are a part of the

agency’s free flight effort.

12FAA has proposed to change the name of the demonstration from Flight 2000 to “Safe Flight 21.”

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Total Cost of

Modernization Through

Fiscal Year 2004 Is

Estimated to Be $42 Billion

FAA, in its current financial plan, dated July 1998, estimated that the cost of

the modernization program for fiscal years 1982 through 2004 will total

nearly $42 billion—a $3.8 billion increase over the estimate included in the

February 1998 plan.13 Of the estimated $42 billion required, the Congress

appropriated over $25 billion for fiscal years 1982 through 1998. Of this

amount, FAA has reported spending $5.7 billion on 89 completed projects

and $15.2 billion on 124 ongoing projects. Of the remaining amount, FAA

has reported spending about $2.8 billion on projects that have been

canceled or restructured and $1.6 billion for personnel-related expenses

associated with the acquisition of systems. The financial plan estimates

that approximately $17 billion will be required for fiscal years 1999

through 2004.

The $3.8 billion increase in the estimated cost of modernization since

February 1998 results from new spending levels provided by the Office of

Management and Budget for accelerating the NAS’ modernization. This

consists of $1.9 billion for existing projects to allow for acceleration, new

approaches (Free Flight Phase 1), and cost growth. The remaining

$1.9 billion increase results from the addition of new projects identified in

the architecture that could not be accommodated under the old funding

levels.

Cost, Schedule, and

Risks Associated With

18 Major Projects

The 18 projects represent the agency’s priority projects in the areas of

communication, navigation and landing, surveillance, automation, and

weather. Total estimated spending for each of these projects exceeds

$100 million, and, collectively, they represent about 41 percent of the

Facilities and Equipment funding requested for fiscal year 1999. FAA’s

progress in meeting cost and schedule goals for these 18 projects has been

mixed. Under FAA’s new phased approach to modernization, two projects

in our review—Aeronautical Data Link and Air Traffic Management—have

been revised, resulting in new cost and schedule estimates for those

components that are planned for implementation under free flight.

Including these two projects, approximately two-thirds are meeting cost

and schedule estimates, while several of the remaining projects have

incurred cost increases and delays due, in part, to changes in

13For the purposes of this report, the “cost of modernization” means all actual and projected Facilities

and Equipment appropriations from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal 2004 for projects in FAA’s financial

plan. This plan contains funding primarily for projects, including prime contract costs; costs for

personnel compensation, benefits, and travel; and contract costs for technical support service

activities. The plan also includes estimated future costs for some projects that have not yet been

funded but are part of the NAS architecture.

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requirements, difficulties in developing software, and changes designed to

allow human operators to work better with new computer systems.

The net estimated Facilities and Equipment cost of the 18 major

modernization projects has increased by $482 million since the original

estimate was made.14 This includes an increase of about $530 million for

six of these projects. Projects experiencing the largest increase—due

primarily to new requirements for additional equipment and technical and

siting problems—include the Airport Surveillance Radar-11, Automated

Surface Observing System, and Terminal Doppler Weather Radar. The

estimated cost for one project—Oceanic Automation Program—decreased

by about $48 million, 10 projects showed no change, and 1 project’s

original estimate was too recent for comparison purposes. (See app. I.)

Schedules for completing implementation were delayed for 5 of the 18

projects. The delays ranged from 5 months to over 6 years.15 For example,

the date for implementing the last of the Airport Surface Detection

Equipment-3 has slipped by over 3 years primarily because of delays in

completing towers or other structures at locations that will receive the

radars.16 Of the remaining 13 projects, 9 had no schedule delays, the

schedules for 2 were accelerated, and the original and current schedules

for 2 could not be compared. For one of these projects, the original

implementation date had not been established when the contract was

signed. For the second project, the agency established the schedule in

October 1998. As an example, the Display System Replacement project is

still scheduled to be completely implemented by May 2000.17 FAA

accelerated the schedule for implementing the Oceanic Automation

Program by 8 months when it canceled four of five planned phases and

14The original estimate, representing when the investment decision was made or the contract was

signed—whichever is relevant—was compared with the 1998 estimate to determine changes in costs.

The date of this estimate varies among projects.

15Implementation signifies that a system has been fielded and that the personnel who will use and

maintain it are satisfied that it is ready for operation. Usually, commissioning soon follows

implementation. “Last-site implementation” is the date when the last planned unit is scheduled to

become operational.

16The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 is a primary radar designed to provide tower controllers

with surveillance information—a video display—of all aircraft and other vehicles on an airport’s

surface.

17The Display System Replacement project will modernize en route center equipment by replacing 20-

to 30-year-old display channels, controller workstations, and network infrastructure.

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significantly reduced the requirements for the one remaining phase.18 (See

app. I.)

However, despite delays with some projects, FAA has fielded new air traffic

control equipment. For example, since 1996, FAA has commissioned 38 of

43 planned Air Route Surveillance Radar-4s. Additionally, since early 1997,

FAA has commissioned 238 Automated Surface Observing Systems at new

sites, bringing the total commissioned systems to 371 out of 597.

Several of the 18 projects face challenges and risks that could lead to

further cost increases and delays. For example, the Wide Area

Augmentation System was initially designed to serve as the only means of

navigation for civil aviation, thus allowing FAA to decommission its

existing, costly ground-based navigation system. However, the future of

the project is uncertain because of vulnerability concerns—related to both

intentional and unintentional interference with the satellite signal—and

congressional concerns about whether FAA’s program, as currently

planned, is cost-effective.19 FAA is revisiting the program’s cost, schedule,

and performance baselines and will incorporate the results of the

vulnerability assessment, expected in January 1999, into its analyses.20

FAA Faces Challenges

in Managing This

Multibillion-Dollar

Investment

Long-standing problems, including cost increases in the overall

modernization program and in many of the individual projects as well as

difficulty in meeting project schedules, demonstrate the difficulty of

managing an investment of this size. Although FAA is taking actions to

address many of these problems, the agency faces several challenges in

seeking to improve its management of the modernization program in order

to deliver promised benefits and thereby restore its credibility. Included

among these challenges is FAA’s need to (1) implement an effective process

for selecting, controlling, and evaluating its air traffic control investments;

(2) sustain its commitment to addressing the root causes of its

modernization problems; (3) address the Year 2000 problem; and

(4) correct its computer security weaknesses.

18The Oceanic Automation Program project is designed to provide a platform for improving air traffic

control over the oceans where radar coverage is limited. Among other capabilities, the one segment

that FAA is implementing will provide pilots and controllers with data link technology.

19Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1999 (P.L. 105-277,

Division A, sec. 101 (g)(1998)).

20FAA, the Air Transport Association, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association have initiated a

risk assessment of using satellite navigation as the only means of navigation in the NAS.

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Managing Modernization

Requires a Disciplined

Investment Management

Process

Recent federal management reforms have introduced requirements

emphasizing federal agencies’ need to significantly improve their

management processes for selecting, monitoring, and evaluating

investments.21 Our reviews and FAA’s internal evaluation of its acquisition

management system identified shortcomings in two of these areas: mission

analyses (selection) and baseline management (monitoring).22,23 FAA’s and

our work also identified problems with FAA’s cross-functional team

structure, which is key to successfully acquiring new modernization

systems and technology. It is critical that FAA has processes in place to

help ensure that its modernization projects are being implemented at

acceptable costs, within reasonable and expected time frames, and are

contributing to observable improvements in mission performance. FAA’s

acquisition management system, implemented on April 1, 1996, is intended

to provide high-level acquisition policy and guidance and to establish

rigorous investment management practices to guide modernization efforts.

We are currently reviewing FAA’s investment management approach as

carried out through its acquisition management system.

First, the mission analysis process is intended to enable FAA to determine

and prioritize its most critical capability shortfalls and its best

technological opportunities for improving the safety, security, capacity,

and efficiency of the NAS. FAA’s internal evaluation identified major

shortcomings relating to validating and prioritizing all critical needs,

evaluating mission needs statements to ensure that needs were still valid,

implementing the mission analysis process across the entire agency, and

coordinating the mission analysis process among internal organizations.

As a result of these shortcomings, FAA’s evaluation team found that the

agency cannot ensure that some of its most critical needs are being met,

that it is not duplicating efforts in identifying mission needs, and that

resources are being used in the most cost-effective manner.

Addressing shortcomings in mission analysis capabilities, among other

areas, would put FAA in a better position to effectively plan for its needs

and avoid crisis situations that result from inadequate planning. At least

two such situations arose during fiscal year 1998. FAA reprogrammed

$37.7 million to cover expenses associated with activities aimed at

21Included among these legislative reforms are revisions to the Paperwork Reduction Act, the

Government Performance and Results Act, and the Chief Financial Officers Act.

22See Air Traffic Control: Observations on FAA’s Modernization Program (GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-93,

Feb. 26, 1998).

23Evaluation of Acquisition Reform—The First Two Years: April 1996-March 1998, FAA Program

Evaluation Branch, Office of Systems Architecture and Investment Analysis, May 29, 1998.

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ensuring that the agency’s critical air traffic control-related computer

systems will function properly at the turn of the century (Year 2000

computer problem). Although FAA recognized the Year 2000 initiative as a

critical need and began addressing it, the agency did not document the

need in a mission needs statement. The discipline associated with mission

analysis—identifying the shortfall, the impact of not satisfying the

shortfall, and an estimate of the resources the agency should commit to

resolve the need—might have eliminated the need to reprogram funds to

meet this priority. Additionally, the agency reprogrammed $28.9 million for

additional requirements for its new automation system for terminal

controllers. Included in this amount were funds to implement solutions to

address design concerns identified by human operators of the system. As a

result of the reprogramming, the schedule for some projects may have to

be pushed out several years, increasing the likelihood that costs for these

projects will also increase.

Second, in the area of baseline management, the acquisition management

system requires that each program has a baseline, which establishes

performance, cost, schedule, and benefits parameters within which the

program is authorized to operate. These baselines assist managers in

monitoring the performance of projects. FAA’s internal evaluation

identified numerous shortcomings in baseline management, including the

fact that only 54 percent of the 94 programs funded by the Facilities and

Equipment account had some form of approved baseline documentation.24

Furthermore, the approved baselines did not always include enough

information to measure and monitor the program’s performance. For

example, while documentation related to Facilities and Equipment funding

for a project was usually complete, funding for research and development

and operations was not always included in the baseline document. Even

when operations data were included, questions existed about the

reliability of these cost estimates. We found, as did the FAA evaluation

team, that poor or inaccurate cost estimates could limit FAA’s ability to

make sound investment decisions about modernization projects on the

basis of economic merits.25 FAA has taken steps to improve its

cost-estimating capabilities; these steps are not yet complete. In a related

24FAA’s evaluation team also found that the agency had not established definitions for or designations

of “program,” “substantial acquisition program,” and “major systems acquisition.” Such definitions and

designations are important because P.L. 104-264 (Air Traffic Management System Performance

Improvement Act of 1996) requires the Administrator to consider terminating substantial acquisition

programs that fail to meet defined goals. Office of Management and Budget circulars require

designation and reporting on major systems acquisitions. FAA’s team defined “program” for purposes

of the evaluation and identified 94 programs that should have had an acquisition baseline.

25See GAO/AIMD-97-20.

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area, an FAA official indicated that the agency has begun to baseline a

number of projects. In this regard, future changes in cost and schedule

estimates will be measured against these new baselines. Although the

requirement for the Administrator to consider terminating a project that

fails to meet defined goals applies only to acquisitions initiated after

October 1996, this official indicated that the agency plans to subject its

ongoing projects to these requirements. Completing efforts under way to

improve cost-estimating capabilities and tracking and monitoring the

performance of projects against approved baselines would be a step in the

right direction as FAA seeks to improve its management of projects and

avoid past problems associated with cost increases and delays.

Finally, the agency faces a continuing challenge in effectively

implementing its cross-functional integrated product development team

structure.26 Our recent work relating to FAA’s implementation of free flight

initiatives found continuing problems with communication and

coordination across program lines.27 Some team members were motivated

primarily by the priorities and management of the offices that they

represented rather than the goals of a given team. FAA’s internal evaluation

findings were similar, in that conflicts between horizontal organizational

structures (teams) and vertical organizational structures (operating

divisions, such as air traffic) created a constraint to the team structure by,

among other things, delaying decisions that could affect a team’s ability to

support successful acquisitions. As we noted in our September 1998

report, FAA is attempting to improve cross-agency communication and

coordination through such initiatives as developing incentives for staff to

work toward the agency’s goals and priorities. Because FAA’s successful

implementation of the modernization program is tied to the effective

partnership among offices responsible for various acquisition-related

activities, it will be important for the agency to continue its efforts to forge

effective partnerships.

26The integrated product development team structure was designed as the implementing arm for the

acquisition management system. Integrated product teams are responsible for developing or procuring

equipment. The goals of these teams are to improve accountability and coordination and infuse a more

strategic, mission-oriented focus into the acquisition process. Team members include contractors,

FAA’s engineering division, and the FAA divisions that operate and maintain air traffic control

equipment.

27These findings were consistent with earlier findings in our work on FAA’s culture and how it affects

acquisition management. See GAO/RCED-98-246 and Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy

Is Needed for Cultural Change at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug. 22, 1996).

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Improving the

Management of the

Modernization Program

Will Require Sustained

Commitment to Address

Root Causes

Our reviews have identified some of the root causes of long-standing

problems that jeopardize the effective use of modernization resources.

These problems included unreliable cost information, incomplete

architecture, weak software acquisition capabilities, and an organizational

culture that did not reflect a strong commitment to the agency’s mission

focus, accountability, coordination, and adaptability. FAA has ongoing

actions under way to address these shortcomings.

In January 1997, we reported that FAA lacked reliable cost-estimating

processes and cost-accounting practices needed to effectively manage

investments in information technology, which leaves it at the risk of

making ill-informed decisions on critical and costly air traffic control

systems.28 Without reliable cost information, the likelihood of poor

investments is increased. We recommended that FAA improve its

cost-estimating processes and fully implement a cost-accounting system.

FAA has begun to institutionalize defined cost-estimating processes and to

acquire a cost-accounting system as required by legislation. According to

officials responsible for the new cost accounting system, the agency had

planned to have the first phase of the system—accumulating data for

domestic and oceanic air traffic services—operational by October 1998,

but this milestone has been delayed by complications associated with the

method used to allocate costs. These officials stated that it is too soon to

tell how this delay may affect other planned milestones.

With respect to the new system, the Department of Transportation’s

Inspector General has identified design issues that call into question

whether the planned cost-accounting system can accurately account for

FAA’s full cost of operations.29 For example, among its major findings, the

report noted that FAA had yet to establish a systematic method to identify

and reflect the (1) cost for all development projects, (2) correct labor

charged to appropriate projects, and (3) cost incurred by other agencies

for air traffic services.30 Additionally, decisions had not been made on how

to allocate Facilities and Equipment costs among operating facilities

28GAO/AIMD-97-20.

29See Implementation of Cost Accounting System: Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Office of Inspector General (Rpt. No. FE-1998-186, Aug. 10, 1998).

30The issue of allocating costs incurred by other agencies is relevant to a discussion of moving to a

cost-based fee system. The Department of Defense provides military and civilian users with air traffic

control services, and its costs may be relevant to determining user fees. However, for fiscal years 1998

and 1999, FAA is constrained by the Office of Management and Budget’s guidance from recognizing air

traffic service costs incurred by the Department of Defense. For a discussion of issues related to cost

allocation, see National Airspace System: Issues in Allocating Costs for Air Traffic Services to DOD

and Other Users (GAO/RCED-97-106, Apr. 25, 1997).

Page 15 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

throughout FAA. According to a senior FAA finance official, the agency has

made a change in program management and has assigned additional

resources to the cost-accounting effort to address problems cited by the

Inspector General’s report. For example, FAA has developed and tested the

capability to capture and report all of a project’s developmental costs. In

addition, with respect to decisions about how to allocate Facilities and

Equipment costs among operating divisions, this official noted that FAA

had new procedures for allocating property depreciation costs for fiscal

year 1998. Taking steps to ensure that its cost-accounting system is

complete—by correcting known design and allocation issues—will put FAA

in a better position to provide managers and other decisionmakers with

accurate information for use in determining and controlling the agency’s

costs.

In February 1997, we reported that FAA attempted to modernize the NAS

without a complete systems architecture, or blueprint, to guide

development and evolution.31 The result has been unnecessarily higher

spending to buy, integrate, and maintain hardware and software. We

recommended that FAA develop and enforce a complete systems

architecture and implement a management structure for doing so that is

similar to the Chief Information Officers provision of the Clinger-Cohen

Act of 1996. FAA has initiated activities to develop a complete systems

architecture, and project officials estimated in May 1998 that it would take

18 to 24 months to complete the development. Also, FAA is in the process

of hiring a Chief Information Officer that will report directly to the

Administrator.

Furthermore, in March 1997, we reported that FAA’s processes for

acquiring software for air traffic control systems are ad hoc, sometimes

chaotic, and not repeatable across projects.32 As a result, FAA is at great

risk of acquiring software that does not perform as intended and is not

delivered on time and within budget. We recommended that FAA improve

its software acquisition capabilities by establishing a mature acquisition

process throughout its entire organization. While FAA has initiated efforts

to improve its software acquisition process, these efforts have not been

implemented agencywide.

31Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed for FAA Systems Modernization

(GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb. 3, 1997).

32See Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes Increase FAA System Acquisition

Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21, 1997).

Page 16 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

Finally, we have reported that an underlying cause of FAA’s air traffic

control acquisition problems is its organizational culture—the values,

beliefs, attitudes, and expectations shared by an organization’s members

that affect their behavior and the behavior of the whole organization.33 We

found that FAA’s acquisitions were impaired because employees acted in

ways that did not reflect a strong commitment to mission focus,

accountability, coordination, and adaptability. We recommended a

comprehensive strategy for cultural change that (1) addresses specific

responsibilities and performance measures for all stakeholders throughout

FAA and (2) provides the incentives needed for promoting the desired

behaviors to achieve cultural change.

In response to our recommendations, FAA issued a report outlining its

overall strategy for changing its acquisition culture and describing its

ongoing actions to influence organizational culture.34 For example, the

Acquisition and Research organization has restructured its personnel

system to tie pay to performance based on achievement of organizational

goals. The Administrator has approved the Acquisition and Research

organization as the pilot for the new compensation program that FAA plans

to implement agencywide. Additionally, the Acquisition and Research

organization has developed an organizational assessment process that

identifies culture-related factors that inhibit full achievement of

organizational objectives. The centerpiece of this process is the

Acquisition and Research organization’s culture survey. The results of the

1998 survey showed that while employees are motivated in their current

job and are pleased with the variety within and complexity of their job, a

number of opportunities for improvement still exist. For example, the data

showed that employees (1) do not believe that accurate information is

disseminated downward to work groups or teams, (2) believe that

decisionmakers are not able to anticipate problems before they occur,

(3) feel that training is an area needing improvement, and (4) do not feel

that they have a clear understanding of organizational and job-specific

goals. While recognizing that cultural change is a complex and

time-consuming undertaking, the Acquisition and Research organization’s

management team has developed a set of actions to begin addressing the

shortcomings identified in the culture survey and is proceeding with other

initiatives.

33GAO/RCED-96-159.

34Strategy for Acquisition Culture Change, FAA (June 1997).

Page 17 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

Serious Challenges Remain

Unresolved for Year 2000

To perform its mission, FAA is dependent on an extensive array of

information-processing and communications technologies. Without these

specialized systems, the agency cannot effectively control traffic or

provide pilots and controllers with up-to-date weather information, among

other functions. FAA has identified 225 mission-critical NAS systems.35

Examples of such systems include the primary computer system used in

en route centers (known as Host computer), which processes radar and

other data, and the long-range radar systems, which allow controllers to

monitor and separate aircraft at higher altitudes. The implications of FAA’s

not meeting the Year 2000 deadline are enormous and could affect

hundreds of thousands of people—through customer inconvenience,

increased airline costs, grounded or delayed flights, or degraded levels of

safety. Although FAA has made progress in managing its Year 2000 problem

and has completed critical steps in defining which systems need to be

repaired and fixing them, the agency must still test many of its

mission-critical systems and implement needed changes.

In August 1998, we reported that, with less than 17 months left before

2000, it was doubtful that FAA could do all of this in the time remaining.36

Accordingly, FAA must determine how to ensure the continuity of critical

operations in the event of some systems’ failure. FAA is preparing a NAS

continuity plan to ensure that critical operations continue, should its

mission-critical systems fail. We are currently reviewing FAA’s business

continuity plan. Additionally, we noted that FAA must mitigate other

critical, cross-cutting risks, such as data exchanges with external entities;

international coordination to ensure safe, reliable aviation services for

U.S. travelers; and cooperation with contractors to ensure that the

telecommunications upon which FAA relies are dependable. FAA is taking

steps to address all of these issues.

Weak Security Practices

Degrade Safety

In May 1998, we reported that FAA cannot ensure that the air traffic control

systems upon which it depends are sufficiently resistant to intrusion.37 The

failure to adequately protect these systems threatens to disrupt the

nation’s air traffic. We found weaknesses in four areas: physical security of

air traffic control facilities, operational system security, the development

35These 225 systems are included among the 430 FAA-wide mission-critical systems.

36See FAA Systems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and Computer Security

Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, Aug. 6, 1998).

37See Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety [unclassified

version] (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998).

Page 18 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

of new systems, and FAA’s management structure and implementation of

security policy.

First, FAA’s management of physical security at its air traffic control

facilities that control aircraft has been ineffective. We found that FAA had

inspected some facilities and was aware of physical security weaknesses

at these facilities but was unaware of weaknesses that might exist at other

facilities because many had not been inspected. Since our review, FAA

officials indicated that they have inspected all applicable facilities and

have accredited over half (199 out of 368) of these facilities.

Second, FAA has not assessed, certified, or accredited most of its

operational air traffic control systems as required by its policy.38 As a

result, FAA does not know how vulnerable those operational systems are

and, consequently, has no basis for determining how to protect them. In

addition, FAA has assessed only one of nine FAA-owned or -leased air traffic

control telecommunications systems despite acknowledging that

vulnerabilities in this area could threaten property and public safety. FAA’s

1997 Telecommunications Strategic Plan continues to identify the security

of telecommunications systems as an area in need of improvement.

Third, FAA is not effectively incorporating security features into new air

traffic control systems. The agency does not consistently include

well-formulated security requirements in specifications for all new

modernization systems. Without security requirements that are based on

sound risk assessments, FAA lacks assurance that future air traffic control

systems will be protected from attack.

Finally, FAA’s management structure is not effectively implementing or

enforcing computer security policy. Security responsibilities are

distributed among three different organizations, all of which have been

remiss in their air traffic control security duties. Until existing computer

security policy is effectively implemented and enforced, operational and

developmental air traffic control systems will continue to be vulnerable to

the compromise of sensitive information and interruption of critical

services.

To improve security for the future in the most efficient and cost-effective

manner, we recommended that FAA build detailed security requirements

38System certification is the technical evaluation that is conducted to verify that FAA’s systems comply

with FAA’s security requirements, identify security deficiencies, specify remedies, and justify

exceptions. Accreditation is the formal declaration from management that the appropriate security

safeguards have been properly implemented and that residual risk is acceptable.

Page 19 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

into its design for new air traffic control systems. We also recommended

that FAA enforce its computer security policy for air traffic control. FAA has

acknowledged that major improvements are needed in all areas of its

computer security program but has not yet formulated a plan to strengthen

security.

Agency Comments We provided copies of a draft of this report to FAA for its review and

comment. We met with FAA officials, including the Deputy Director,

Program Office, Free Flight Phase 1, and the Program Director, NAS

Programming and Financial Management, who generally agreed with the

contents of the report and provided clarifying comments, which have been

incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

We reached agreement on the major projects to be included in our review

after discussions with officials from the office of the Program Director,

NAS Programming and Financial Management, within FAA’s Associate

Administrator for Research and Acquisition organization. We obtained the

information on the overall costs of air traffic system modernization as well

as on appropriations and obligations from documents provided by

representatives of FAA’s Research and Acquisition organization and the

Office of Financial Services. Cost, schedule, and performance information

on the 18 key projects came from project officials within the Research and

Acquisition organization. We also obtained information from the Office of

Independent Operational Test and Evaluation. We did not independently

verify the accuracy of the cost data but did compare it with past cost data

for consistency. We developed the list of challenges primarily from past

reviews by us and others and from our knowledge of FAA’s progress in

implementing past recommendations. We conducted our review from July

through October 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation;

the Administrator, FAA; and other interested parties. We will make copies

available to others on request.

Page 20 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

If you or your staff have any questions or need additional information,

please call me at (202) 512-3650. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix III.

Gerald L. Dillingham

Associate Director,

 Transportation Issues

Page 21 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
B-281077 

Congressional Requesters

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Chairman

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Transportation

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Chairman

The Honorable Martin O. Sabo

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Transportation and

 Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 22 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Page 23 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Information on the

Status of 18 Major

Modernization

Projects

28

Aeronautical Data Link 32

Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 36

Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 40

Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator 44

Air Traffic Management Program/Free Flight Phase 1 Program 45

Automated Surface Observing System 48

Display System Replacement 53

Global Positioning System Augmentation Program: Wide Area

Augmentation System/Local Area Augmentation System

55

Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement 65

Integrated Terminal Weather System 67

Oceanic Automation Program 69

Operational and Supportability Implementation System 72

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 73

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 79

Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment

Program: Airport Surveillance Radar-11 Project

82

Voice Switching and Control System 86

Weather and Radar Processor 90

Appendix II 

Modernization

Projects Completed

Through August 1998

92

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

96

Tables Table 1: Air Traffic Services That Will Be Modernized by 18 Major

Air Traffic Control Projects

7

Table I.1: Changes in Cost Estimates for 18 Major Modernization

Projects

29

Table I.2: Changes in Schedule for 18 Major Modernization

Projects

31

Page 24 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Contents

Table I.3: En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications’

Cost and Schedule

35

Table I.4: Changes to ARSR-4’s Cost and Schedule 37

Table I.5: Changes to ASDE-3’s Cost and Schedule 41

Table I.6: ATCBI’s Cost and Schedule 44

Table I.7: CTAS’ Cost and Schedule 47

Table I.8: Changes to ASOS’ Cost and Schedule 51

Table I.9: Changes to DSR’s Cost and Schedule 53

Table I.10: WAAS’ and LAAS’ Cost and Schedule 58

Table I.11: Changes to Host and Oceanic Computer System

Replacement Program’s Cost and Schedule

66

Table I.12: ITWS’ Cost and Schedule 69

Table I.13: Changes to Oceanic Automation Program’s Cost and

Schedule

71

Table I.14: Changes to OASIS’ Cost and Schedule 72

Table I.15: STARS’ Cost and Schedule 75

Table I.16: Changes to TDWR’s Cost and Schedule 79

Table I.17: Changes to ASR-11’s Cost and Schedule 83

Table I.18: Changes to VSCS’ Cost and Schedule 87

Table I.19: Changes to WARP’s Cost and Schedule 91

Figures Figure 1: Summary of Air Traffic Control Over the Continental

United States and Oceans

6

Figure I.1: ARSR-4 39

Figure I.2: Rotodome Containing ASDE-3 Radar on Top of Air

Traffic Control Tower

43

Figure I.3: ASOS 52

Figure I.4: DSR 54

Figure I.5: WAAS’ Architecture 64

Figure I.6: LAAS’ Architecture 65

Figure I.7: STARS 78

Figure I.8: TDWR 81

Figure I.9: ASR-11 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 85

Figure I.10: VSCS Display Module 89

Page 25 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Contents

Abbreviations

AMASS Airport Movement Area Safety System

ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporated

ARSR Air Route Surveillance Radar

ARTS Automated Radar Terminal System

ATCBI Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator

ATM Air Traffic Management

ASDE Airport Surface Detection Equipment

ASOS Automated Surface Observing System

ASR Airport Surveillance Radar

AWOS Automated Weather Observing System

CTAS Center Terminal Radar Approach Control Automation

System

DSR Display System Replacement

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

F&E Facilities and Equipment

GAO General Accounting Office

GPS Global Positioning System

ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System

LAAS Local Area Augmentation System

NAS National Airspace System

NATCA National Air Traffic Controllers Association

OASIS Operational Supportability and Implementation System

STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System

TDWR Terminal Doppler Weather Radar

TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control

TRDRE Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and

Establishment

VHF very high frequency

VSCS Voice Switching and Control System

VTABS VSCS Training and Backup Switch

WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System

WARP Weather and Radar Processor

Page 26 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Page 27 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix I 

Information on the Status of 18 Major

Modernization Projects

This appendix provides detailed information on changes in the costs and

schedules as well as challenges and risks for 18 of the Federal Aviation

Administration’s (FAA) major acquisitions. Collectively, these projects

account for about 41 percent of the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) funding

requested by FAA for fiscal year 1999.

In our past reports on the status of FAA’s modernization program, we used

cost and schedule estimates that were developed when the projects were

approved for inclusion in the modernization plan.1

 Instead in

February 1998, we began measuring FAA’s progress against revised

baselines that represent the date of the contract, the contract’s revision, or

the investment decision. This appendix uses this benchmark.2

 However,

where relevant, we provide historical cost and schedule information in the

project summaries to give a context for current developments.

On the basis of the revised baselines, the net estimated F&E cost of the 18

major modernization projects has increased by $482 million. Six of these

projects increased by a total of about $530 million. Three projects

experiencing the largest increase—due primarily to new requirements for

additional equipment and technical and siting problems—include the

Airport Surveillance Radar-11, Automated Surface Observing System, and

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar. One project—the Oceanic Automation

Program—decreased by about $48 million, 10 projects showed no change,

and 1 had no basis for comparison because FAA recently established

baselines for it. (See table I.1.)

1

Since estimates for many projects were developed in the 1980s, FAA officials asserted that the dates

in the early modernization plans did not represent a realistic baseline for measuring progress for a

variety of reasons, including changes to requirements for a number of projects as well as to the

number of systems being developed. As a result, these officials suggested that we measure progress

against the contract date or the date of the investment decision.

2

FAA officials informed us that they are currently baselining many of their older projects in

accordance with acquisition management policy. According to these officials, this effort will facilitate

the agency’s ability to report major variances in the achievement of cost, schedule, and performance

goals. (For the most part, FAA officials indicated that the new baseline will be the cost and schedule

estimate as of 1998. As a result, in future years, the baselines that we report, on the basis of the criteria

indicated above, may differ from those that FAA uses for external reporting).

Page 28 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix I 

Information on the Status of 18 Major

Modernization Projects

Table I.1: Changes in Cost Estimates for 18 Major Modernization Projects

Dollars in millions

Project

Date of

original F&E

cost

estimates

Original

F&E cost

estimatesa

Current F&E

cost

estimatesa

Change in

F&E cost

estimates

Original

planned

units

Current

planned units

Change in

units

Aeronautical Data Link

Program: En Route

Controller/Pilot Data Link

Communications 1998 $163.7 $163.7 N/Ab 22 units 22 units N/Ab

Air Route Surveillance

Radar-4 1988 349.4 415.8 +66.4 43 radars 44 radars +1

Airport Surface Detection

Equipment-3 1993 191.0 249.1 +58.1 40 radars 40 radars None

Air Traffic Control Beacon

Interrogator 1998 282.8 282.8 None 127 systems 127 systems None

Air Traffic Management

Program: Center Terminal

Radar Approach Control

Automation System 1997 251.1 251.1 None N/Ac N/Ad None

Automated Surface

Observing System 1991 151.3 287.5 +136.2 537 units 597 units +60

Display System

Replacement 1994 1,055.3 1,055.3 None 22 systems 22 systems None

Global Positioning System

Augmentation Program:

Wide Area Augmentation

System 1998 1,006.6 1,006.6 None e e e

Global Positioning System

Augmentation Program:

Local Area Augmentation

System 1998 535.8 535.8 None 143 systems 143 systems None

Host and Oceanic

Computer System

Replacement Program 1998 424.1 424.1 None 24 systems 24 systems None

Integrated Terminal

Weather System 1997 276.1 276.1 None 37 systems 37 systems None

Oceanic Automation

Program 1995 236.5 189.0 –47.5 3 systems 3 systems None

Operational and

Supportability

Implementation System 1997 174.7 190.5 +15.8 64 systems 64 systems None

Standard Terminal

Automation Replacement

System 1996 940.2 940.2 None 171 systems 173 systems +2

Terminal Doppler Weather

Radar 1988 322.2 393.5 +71.3 47 radars 47 radars None

(continued)

Page 29 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix I 

Information on the Status of 18 Major

Modernization Projects

Dollars in millions

Project

Date of

original F&E

cost

estimates

Original

F&E cost

estimatesa

Current F&E

cost

estimatesa

Change in

F&E cost

estimates

Original

planned

units

Current

planned units

Change in

units

Terminal Radar Digitization,

Replacement, and

Establishment Program:

Airport Surveillance

Radar-11 Project 1996 561.3 743.3 +182.0f 48 radars 112 radars +64

Voice Switching and Control

System 1994 1,452.9 1,452.9 None 23 units 23 units None

Weather and Radar

Processor 1996 125.6 125.6 None 23 systems 23 systems None

Total estimated costs $8,500.6 $8,982.9 +$482.3

Legend

N/A = not applicable.

aFor this report, all dollars are expressed in current-year dollars, unless otherwise noted, because

they are a better indication of the dollar amount that the Congress may have to appropriate.

bThere is no basis for comparing original and current cost estimates and planned units because

the investment decision for the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project (of the

Aeronautical Data Link Program) was made by FAA on October 30, 1998.

cThe number of original planned units for the Air Traffic Management Program is not applicable

because its primary purpose was to prototype technologies for future use under “free flight.”

Under free flight, FAA will gradually deploy a range of new technologies and procedures and

work collaboratively with users to manage air traffic operations.

dThe number of current planned units is not applicable because under the Free Flight Phase I

Program, FAA plans to deploy technologies developed under the Air Traffic Management

Program for early user benefits.

eThe initial Wide Area Augmentation System consists of 25 reference stations, 2 master stations,

and 4 ground stations joined by a telecommunications network.

f

The increase in costs is largely attributed to FAA’s decision to replace older radars rather than

upgrade them, thus, more than doubling the number of planned units.

On the basis of the revised baselines, the date for completing

implementation was delayed from 5 months to more than 6 years for 5 of

the 18 projects. Of the remaining 13 projects, the schedule for 2 was

accelerated, 9 had no schedule delays, and 2 project’s original and current

schedules had no basis for comparison. (See table I.2.)

Page 30 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix I 

Information on the Status of 18 Major

Modernization Projects

Table I.2: Changes in Schedule for 18

Major Modernization Projects Last-site implementation

Project Original estimate 1998 estimate

Changes in

months/years

Aeronautical Data Link

Program: En Route

Controller/Pilot Data Link

Communications Dec. 2005 Dec. 2005 N/Aa

Air Route Surveillance

Radar-4 Nov. 1996 May 1999

+2 years,

6 months

Airport Surface Detection

Equipment-3 July 1996 Nov. 1999

+3 years,

4 months

Air Traffic Control Beacon

Interrogator Sept. 2004 Sept. 2004 None

Air Traffic Management

Program: Center Terminal

Radar Approach Control

Automation System 2006b 2006b None

Automated Surface

Observing System Sept. 1996 Dec. 2002

+6 years,

3 months

Display System

Replacement May 2000 May 2000 None

Global Positioning System

Augmentation Program:

Wide Area Augmentation

System Aug. 1999c Aug. 1999c None

Global Positioning System

Augmentation Program:

Local Area Augmentation

System 2006 2006 None

Host and Oceanic

Computer System

Replacement Program Oct. 1999d Sept. 1999d –1 month

Integrated Terminal

Weather System July 2003 July 2003 None

Oceanic Automation

Program June 2000 Oct. 1999 –8 monthse

Operational and

Supportability

Implementation System Aug. 2001 Aug. 2001 None

Standard Terminal

Automation Replacement

System Feb. 2005 Feb. 2005 None

Terminal Doppler Weather

Radar Aug.1996 July 2001

+4 years,

11 months

(continued)

Page 31 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix I 

Information on the Status of 18 Major

Modernization Projects

Last-site implementation

Project Original estimate 1998 estimate

Changes in

months/years

Terminal Radar

Digitization, Replacement,

and Establishment

Program: Airport

Surveillance Radar-11

Project Not determined Sept. 2005 N/A

Voice Switching and

Control System May 2000 May 2000 None

Weather and Radar

Processor Feb. 2000 July 2000 +5 months

Legend

N/A = not applicable

aThere is no basis for comparing changes to last-site implementation because the investment

decision for the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project (of the Aeronautical

Data Link Program) was made by FAA on October 30, 1998.

bFAA expects to accelerate the schedule of this project under the Free Flight Phase 1 Program.

cImplementation date represents when the project is expected to achieve the system’s initial

capability.

dImplementation date for completing the project is for phase 1 of a planned four-phase system.

eImplementation date for completing the project has been accelerated by 8 months because FAA

canceled four of the five phases and significantly reduced requirements for the one remaining

phase.

Aeronautical Data

Link

Background Aeronautical Data Link is designed to provide digital data communications

between ground and airborne automation systems. It is expected to give

pilots direct access to weather and air traffic control information and

reduce voice communication errors. FAA has been developing Aeronautical

Data Link since the early 1980s. An original National Airspace System

(NAS) plan modernization program, Aeronautical Data Link was designed

to construct an En Route Data Link Processor and associated software

utilizing Mode-S.3

 In addition, Tower Data Link Services were planned to

3

Mode-S is a secondary surveillance radar. A secondary surveillance radar identifies, locates, and

tracks aircraft by using its signals to interrogate equipment (transponders) on board the aircraft.

Page 32 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix I 

Information on the Status of 18 Major

Modernization Projects

provide airlines with predeparture clearances. Other components, such as

Terminal Data Link and Oceanic Data Link were also planned.

The program has experienced a number of changes to cost and schedule

estimates since its inception. Several factors have led to the changes,

including the addition of new projects, restructuring of existing projects,

and international agreements. The most significant change to the program

was the decision to cancel the En Route Data Link Processor and transmit

controller-pilot messages via a service provider—very high frequency

(VHF) Digital Link Mode 2. This decision was reached for various reasons,

including spectrum and user equipage concerns. The En Route Data Link

Processor equipment will now be used for other FAA programs. FAA reports

that it spent $175.9 million of F&E funding on the Aeronautical Data Link

Program from its inception through fiscal year 1998. According to FAA

officials, funds were used primarily to establish Tower Data Link Services

and test and demonstrate the En Route Data Link Processor and

associated software.

The program currently comprises one major project—the En Route

Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project—which will provide a

two-way digital exchange of controller-pilot messages via VHF Digital Link

Mode 2—and six other projects. In October 1998, FAA approved the En

Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project’s baseline—the

only active project to have a formerly approved baseline. This project will

be developed in two phases—Build 1 and Build 1A. Build 1 will allow a

limited number of messages between pilots and controllers to be

automated for use at the Miami en route center. Build 1A will enhance this

capability by increasing the number of automated messages exchanged

and will be implemented at 20 en route centers, and one each at the FAA

Technical Center and the FAA Academy. Both builds will consist of

Aeronautical Telecommunication Network-compliant messages using VHF

Mode 2.4

The six other Aeronautical Data Link projects include (1) Tower Data Link

Services, (2) the Host Interface Device/National Airspace System Local

Area Network, (3) Traffic Information Service, (4) Terminal Weather

Information for Pilots, (5) Flight Information Services, and (6) Decision

Support System Services. Other programs, such as Free Flight Phase 1,

4

The Aeronautical Telecommunications Network is a data network being developed in accordance

with internationally accepted standards to provide a link between many U.S. and international airlines

and civil aviation authorities for the exchanging of flight plans, weather data, distress messages, and

other data.

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will use some of the services provided under this program. Terminal Data

Link and Oceanic Data Link are still in the planning stages.

Tower Data Link Services enables data link communications between air

traffic controllers and aircraft. For example, it provides aircraft with

predeparture clearances and pilots with weather and facility conditions at

major airports. FAA has completed the installation of Tower Data Link

Services at 57 airports and one each at the FAA Technical Center and the

FAA Academy. FAA is considering requests from additional airports for this

service.

The Host Interface Device will provide the interface for digital

communications between the Host computer system, En Route

Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project, and other automation

systems and tools. FAA plans to implement a Host Interface Device at 20 en

route centers, two at the FAA Technical Center, and one at the FAA

Academy.

Traffic Information Service will display information on traffic and

potential conflict situations to pilots via data link. The information will be

a graphic depiction of radar traffic similar to information received over

voice radio. This information is intended to improve the safety and

efficiency of flight under visual flight rules. FAA plans to implement the

Traffic Information Service at 119 locations throughout the NAS with

Mode-S radars.

Terminal Weather Information for Pilots will provide pilots with weather

information obtained through the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar on

conditions such as microbursts, gust fronts, wind shear, and heavy

precipitation within 15 miles of an airport. FAA plans to deploy this

function at all 47 Terminal Doppler Weather Radar sites.

Flight Information Services will provide pilots with general aeronautical

information, including weather and the status of special use airspace to

assist in flight planning. Currently, a pilot must obtain this information on

the ground before flight or in the cockpit via voice. Using data link, a pilot

will be able to read this information on a cockpit display unit. One

example of a flight information service is Graphical Weather Services,

which will provide pilots with a map that shows real-time precipitation

conditions throughout the nation. FAA plans to implement Graphical

Weather Services at three sites that will provide NAS coverage as well as

systems at the FAA Technical Center and at the FAA Academy.

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Decision Support System Services will allow pilots to plan more optimal

flight paths and to adhere more closely to controller-approved flight paths

by providing wind and air temperature information via data link. This

service will also provide controllers with more accurate information on

flight paths using data obtained via data link from aircraft about their

location, speed, direction, intended flight paths, and performance

characteristics. Ultimately, FAA plans for this service to provide automated

negotiations and clearances of conflict-free flight paths between pilots and

controllers.

Data Link’s Cost and

Schedule

Table I.3 summarizes the Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications’ cost

and schedule.

Table I.3: En Route Controller/Pilot

Data Link Communications’ Cost and

Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendors: Computer Sciences Corporation, Calverton, Md.; Aeronautical Radio

Incorporated, Annapolis, Md; Lockheed Martin Corporation, Bethesda, Md.; and

Universal Systems and Technology, Inc. Fairfax, Va.

Financial information Oct. 1998 Oct. 1998

Change in

dollars

Total estimated F&E cost $163.7 $163.7 N/Aa

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998 None

Schedule Oct. 1998 Oct. 1998 Change

Estimated first-site

implementation

(Controller/Pilot Data Link

Communications Build 1) Sept. 2002 Sept. 2002 N/Aa

Estimated last-site

implementation

(Controller/Pilot Data Link

Communications Build 1A) Dec. 2005 Dec. 2005 N/Aa

aThere is no basis for comparison of original and current cost estimates and first- and last-site

implementation because the investment decision for the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link

Communications project (of the Aeronautical Data Link Program) was made by FAA on

October 30, 1998.

Data Link’s Challenges and

Risks

The En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project has

aggressive development and implementation schedules for Build 1 and

Build 1A. The project also has a major schedule interdependency with

Aeronautical Telecommunications Network Systems, Inc.-developed

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software. Any software development delays by the company will likely

jeopardize FAA’s ability to meet the project’s baselined schedule.

Additionally, FAA has assumed that the service provider message costs of

VHF Data Link Mode 2 will be shared between FAA and industry. However,

FAA has yet to formalize this arrangement with industry.

Air Route Surveillance

Radar-4

Background Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 (ARSR-4) is a long-range primary

surveillance radar that tracks en route aircraft and weather by emitting

radio signals that are reflected back to the radar.5

 (See fig. I.1.) Data from

this radar on the movement of aircraft and on weather are used for

keeping aircraft separated, drug interdiction, and the defense of U.S.

borders. Radar data are merged with data from a collocated secondary

beacon system and then transmitted to FAA’s en route air traffic control

centers, Air Force Air Defense Sectors, and the Customs Service. ARSR-4 is

a part of FAA’s Long Range Radar Replacement Program—a multiyear

program funded jointly by FAA, the Air Force, and the Navy.

This project replaces some of the obsolete FAA and military air route

surveillance radars and aging long-range radars. FAA has acquired 44

ARSR-4s. Forty-two of these will be placed along the perimeter of the

continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and

will be owned and maintained by FAA for the agency’s and the Air Force’s

use. One radar will be used exclusively by the Air Force at Vandenberg Air

Force Base, California. The remaining radar is to be used for field support

and training in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and will not be commissioned.

Changes to ARSR-4’s Cost

and Schedule

The estimated cost of the ARSR-4 has increased by $66.4 million to

$415.8 million since the contract was awarded in 1988. About $50 million

of this increase occurred in the early-to-mid-1990s because of the

relocation of eight sites and the addition of one radar. The remaining

$16 million increase, which occurred in 1997, is due in part to (1) technical

corrections required for the system, (2) an increase in the costs of spare

parts, (3) an increase in the length of depot repair service from 3 to 5

5

A primary surveillance radar system tracks aircraft and weather by emitting radio signals that are

reflected by all of the aircraft and weather conditions present in the area covered by the system.

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years, (4) the installation of uninterruptible power systems at all sites, and

(5) software upgrades.

The project’s first-site implementation date was delayed by 2 years and 7

months, from September 1993 to April 1996 by several technical

issues—that were eventually resolved—and by new requirements.

However, within the last 2 years, FAA has made progress with

implementing the ARSR-4. As of October 1998, the agency had

commissioned 38 of 43 ARSR-4s and had 3 additional sites planned for

commissioning by December 1998. Commissioning at the last two

sites—Guam and Ajo, Arizona—is planned in 1999. Guam’s original

implementation date for ARSR-4 was delayed because new equipment had

to be replaced after being damaged by a typhoon. Ajo will be the last site

installed. This site alone has contributed 5 months to the total last-site

implementation delay because of environmental issues. However, FAA

recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service to mitigate the environmental issues at or near the site,

and construction at the site has started. Table I.4 summarizes the changes

to ARSR-4’s cost and schedule since 1988.

Table I.4: Changes to ARSR-4’s Cost

and Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Northrup-Grumman Corporation, Linthicum, Md.

Financial information 1988 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $349.4 $415.8 +$66.4

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$408.8

Schedule 1988 1998 Change in

years/months

First-site implementation Sept. 1993 Apr. 1996 +2 years,

7 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

Nov. 1996 May 1999 +2 years,

6 months

ARSR-4’s Challenges and

Risks

Total funding for this project could increase by about $2.5 million because

of the reprogramming of the project’s fiscal year 1998 funds. The program

office had planned for fiscal year 1999 to be the final year of F&E funding

for the ARSR-4 project. However, FAA reprogrammed $1.3 million of the

project’s fiscal year 1998 funds for other modernization activities,

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including the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System and

Year 2000 computer problems. The restoration of these funds—which the

program office planned to use to complete modifications to enhance the

system—is not expected until 2001. This action will most likely force the

program office to let a new contract for system modifications and, as a

result, spend an additional $2.5 million on the project’s costs.

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Figure I.1: ARSR-4

Source: FAA.

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Airport Surface

Detection

Equipment-3

Background The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 (ASDE-3) is a primary radar

designed to provide tower controllers with surveillance information—a

video display—of all aircraft and other vehicle operations on an airport’s

runways and taxiways. ASDE-3 will help prevent accidents by allowing

controllers to efficiently move traffic, especially during low visibility, such

as in fog or during night operations. (See fig. I.2.) FAA developed these

radars to replace the aging and less reliable ASDE-2 radars. While ASDE-3

provides a video display for controllers to assist them in preventing

potential runway collisions, controllers are not able to watch the display at

all times. As a result, FAA is developing an Airport Movement Area Safety

System (AMASS) to provide automated aural and visual warnings (conflict

alerts) to alert controllers of potential runway collisions.

FAA has procured a total of 40 ASDE-3 systems—33 under the original

contract and 7 under a contract with the same contractor (Northrup

Grumman-Norden Systems)—that was signed in September 1993.

Thirty-eight of the systems are for airport use, and two systems are for

support and training use in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

In the 1983 financial plan, ASDE-3’s F&E cost was $83.2 million, and the firstand last-site implementation dates were 1987 and 1990, respectively. Cost

increases from 1983 through 1993 were due to increases in the number of

systems being acquired and software and hardware changes. Slips in

implementation dates through 1993 were due in part to performance

problems with ASDE-3’s ability to accurately track targets and conflicts

with ongoing construction projects at airports that were scheduled to

receive these radars.

Changes to ASDE-3’s Cost

and Schedule

Since the project was expanded in 1993, the cost of ASDE-3 increased by

$58.1 million to procure and install additional equipment items needed for

remote site operation, additional radar displays, spare parts, test

equipment, and modifications to enhance the reliability and

maintainability of component parts for the system (such as bearings and

transmitters) that were deteriorating more quickly than anticipated.

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ASDE-3’s first-site implementation was delayed in part because of technical

problems at the first site. The last-site implementation has been delayed by

more than 40 months—from July 1996 to November 1999—primarily

because of delays in the completion of towers or structures at locations

receiving ASDE-3 systems. Other factors contributing to delays include

problems associated with the buildup of cadmium dust that was generated

by components needed to operate ASDE-3 antenna heaters. A project

official stated that although FAA has resolved this problem, the agency has

delayed the project’s installation schedule by 9 months.

As of September 1998, 37 of the 40 systems had been delivered to FAA, and

the last 3 were planned for delivery in 1999. Thirty of the 37 systems have

been commissioned, and 2 are being used as support systems. Of the

remaining five systems at operational sites, four are awaiting

commissioning, and one is undergoing implementation. Table I.5

summarizes the changes to ASDE-3’s cost and schedule since 1993.

Table I.5: Changes to ASDE-3’s Cost

and Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Northrup Grumman-Norden Systems, Inc., Norwalk, Conn.

Financial information 1993 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $191.0 $249.1 +$58.1

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$241.1

Schedule 1993 1998 Change in

years/months

First-site implementation Mar. 1993 Dec. 1993 + 9 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

July 1996 Nov. 1999 + 3 years,

4 months

ASDE-3’s/AMASS’

Challenges and Risks

Achieving the full safety benefits from ASDE-3 hinges on AMASS. FAA plans to

install an AMASS system at each of the 40 ASDE-3 sites; as of September 1998,

three AMASS systems had been delivered to FAA, and the first of these is

planned for implementation in October 1999. Additionally, FAA plans to

take delivery of the remaining 37 systems by March 2000 and have the last

site implemented by August 2000. There are several challenges to meeting

this schedule.

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Preliminary tests have shown that AMASS can provide accurate and timely

warnings of potential conflicts. Additionally, AMASS is designed to place

symbols on real targets so controllers can visually distinguish them from

false targets caused by multipath problems from the ASDE-3 radar.6

However, during early testing of AMASS, false alerts from multipath were

considered a challenging issue. For example, if excessive levels of false

alerts continued, controller confidence in AMASS could be eroded and could

affect the flow of air traffic. FAA has made system changes to address these

problems and continues to evaluate software algorithms and other

technical enhancements to mitigate false alerts. Operational testing is

expected to be completed in 1999.

Implementing AMASS could also prove to be operationally challenging. For

example, AMASS’ performance in accurately detecting conflicts is directly

affected by each airport’s physical layout, local procedures for traffic flow,

and ASDE-3’s performance during inclement weather. Consequently,

cooperation within FAA to optimize each system on the basis of

sight-specific parameters is key to the system’s implementation. Standards

and procedures will need to be developed to address such issues as the

acceptable AMASS performance rates for accurately detecting conflicts and

how controllers will use the tool in an operational setting. To use AMASS in

an operational setting, FAA will also have to resolve issues surrounding

controllers’ actions based on AMASS data, such as disruptions caused by

false alerts. According to an FAA official, the agency has begun to address

these issues.

6

Multipath problems occur when radio-frequency energy radiates off buildings or other aircraft, thus

creating a momentary false target on the ASDE-3 radar’s display. All radars experience multipath

problems, but radars like ASDE-3, which radiate energy downward, are especially prone to such

problems.

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Figure I.2: Rotodome Containing

ASDE-3 Radar on Top of Air Traffic

Control Tower

Source: FAA.

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Air Traffic Control

Beacon Interrogator

Background The Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator (ATCBI) project will replace

30-year-old model 4 and 5 secondary surveillance radars—located mainly

at en route sites—with a new model 6 radar. The existing model 4 and 5

radars are extremely vulnerable to outages as well as critical part

shortages, since they were planned to have only a 20-year life.

In August 1998, after a 10-month evaluation of potential vendors, FAA

awarded Raytheon a contract for up to 150 model 6 secondary surveillance

radars. As of November 1998, FAA is committed to purchasing 127 systems.

FAA expects to begin testing two preproduction systems in January 1999

and to begin fielding the new model 6 radar no later than March 2001.

ATCBI’s Cost and Schedule Table I.6 summarizes ATCBI’s costs and schedule since August 1998.

Table I.6: ATCBI’s Cost and Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company, Marlborough, Mass.

Financial information Aug. 1998 Oct.1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $282.8 $282.8 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$8.4

Schedule Aug. 1998 Oct. 1998 Change

Estimated first-site

implementation

Sept. 2001 Sept. 2001 None

Estimated last-site

implementation

Sept. 2004 Sept. 2004 None

ATCBI’s Challenges and

Risks

The project faces both technical and schedule risks related to interface

requirements. ATCBI-6 must interface with existing and future automation

systems as well as all primary radars collocated with the existing

equipment that ATCBI-6 will replace. According to project officials, the

contractor has limited experience with known interfaces and no

experience with those interfaces that are not yet defined. Project officials

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plan to develop interfaces in the order of “easiest” to “most difficult.” The

interfaces to existing en route automation systems will be the first to be

developed. Next, interfaces to existing primary radars will be developed,

and, finally, ATCBI-6 interfaces will be developed for future automation

systems.

Because some of ATCBI-6’s interface requirements are “moving targets,” the

ATCBI-6 project officials will need to maintain close coordination with other

project teams to help ensure that the ATCBI team meets its schedule. The

procurement, delivery, and installation of government equipment must

also be monitored closely to ensure that all ancillary equipment required

for complete installation and testing is available to the contractor.

Air Traffic

Management

Program/Free Flight

Phase 1 Program

Background The Air Traffic Management (ATM) program integrated the development

and prototyping of automated tools designed to improve the management

of air traffic control. Traffic flow management tools included the

Enhanced Traffic Management System and Collaborative Decision Making.

Air traffic control tools included the User Request Evaluation Tool, Center

Terminal Radar Approach Control Automation System (CTAS), and Surface

Movement Advisor. FAA has been developing these new capabilities to

support the agency’s efforts to implement a new, more flexible system of

air traffic management known as “free flight.” Under free flight, FAA will

gradually deploy a range of new technologies and procedures and work

collaboratively with users to manage air traffic operations.

As of September 30, 1998, the ATM program was completed—including all

of its prototyping efforts in support of Free Flight Phase 1—and the

program’s structure was eliminated. Under the ATM program, FAA estimates

that it spent $405 million on F&E through fiscal year 1998, including funding

for the Enhanced Traffic Management System. On October 1, 1998, the

recently established Free Flight Phase 1 program commenced operations

under a new charter to move these former ATM prototypes into full-scale

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development.7 Projects under this program include CTAS, Surface

Movement Advisor, User Request Evaluation Tool, and Collaborative

Decision Making. While not officially a part of Free Flight Phase 1,

Enhanced Traffic Management System will be managed by the program

office. FAA estimates the cost of Free Flight Phase 1 through its completion

in 2002 at $633 million.

CTAS has two components that are planned for use under Free Flight Phase

1—Traffic Management Advisor Build 2 and Passive Final Approach

Spacing Tool. Traffic Management Advisor will provide en route/terminal

controllers with automation tools to schedule aircraft to enter or depart

from airspace that is between 5 and 50 miles from an airport. Similarly, the

Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool is an automated device that provides

terminal controllers with sequence numbers and runway assignments

during final approach and landing. The Surface Movement Advisor is

intended to enhance the efficiency of aircraft movements on the airport

surface by facilitating the sharing of real-time information among airspace

users and airport operators. User Request Evaluation Tool is an automated

device that assists en route controllers in identifying and resolving

potential conflicts between aircraft up to 20 minutes before their

occurrence. Collaborative Decision Making provides a real-time exchange

of information on flight plans and system constraints to assist airline and

air traffic control personnel in making decisions about NAS resources.

Finally, Enhanced Traffic Management System provides the current traffic

management system with software and hardware upgrades to convert it to

an open system platform that is Year 2000 compliant.

ATM Program’s Cost and

Schedule

According to an FAA program official, CTAS is the only project to have a

formally approved baseline. The current baseline was approved under the

former ATM program, but FAA plans to request a revised baseline in

January 1999. At the same time, project officials plan to request the

approval of baselines for the remaining projects. FAA plans to deploy all of

these projects by 2002. Table I.7 summarizes CTAS’ cost and schedule since

1997.

7

FAA plans to move Free Flight Phase 1 technologies to full-scale development using an evolutionary

spiral development approach to the development and deployment of technology, as appropriate. Under

such an approach, the agency plans to limit the scope of project segments so that it can deploy, test,

evaluate, and refine a given technology in a cyclical manner until it can perform at the desired level.

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Table I.7: CTAS’ Cost and Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendors: Computer Science Corporation; Lockheed Martin; NASA Ames; Massachusetts

Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory; Wyndemer and EDS.

Financial Information 1997 1998

Changes in

dollars

Total F&E cost $251.1 $251.1 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$69.0

Schedule 1997 1998 Change

Estimated first-site

implementation

2002a,b 2002a,b None

Estimated last-site

implementation

2006b 2006b None

aFirst-site implementation date is for both components of CTAS—Traffic Management Advisor

Build 2 and Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool.

bFAA expects to accelerate this schedule under Free Flight Phase I.

Free Flight Phase 1’s

Challenges and Risks

In a recent report on FAA’s free flight implementation efforts, we reported

that FAA and the aviation community face numerous challenges in their

efforts to implement free flight—including Phase 1—in a cost-effective

manner.8

 Among the challenges, we identified the need for FAA to

(1) provide effective leadership and management of modernization efforts

both within and outside the agency, including effective collaboration with

stakeholders and improvements to cross-program communication and

coordination within FAA; (2) work collaboratively with the aviation

community to develop goals and sufficiently detailed plans for what it

intends to achieve and develop measures for tracking progress; and

(3) address outstanding issues related to the development of technology,

such as identifying and addressing the impacts of modernization on human

operators, including maintenance staff, controllers, and pilots.

FAA recently identified similar challenges, such as its need to provide

strong leadership and accountability for implementing Free Flight Phase 1.

A senior FAA official told us that the key challenge facing the agency in

implementing free flight—including Phase 1—will be maintaining a

consensus between FAA and the aviation community as implementation

efforts move forward. Other challenges highlighted by FAA include

8

See National Airspace System: FAA Has Implemented Some Free Flight Initiatives, but Challenges

Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept. 28, 1998).

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(1) managing the expectations of the aviation community on the expected

benefits of free flight capabilities, in part, by taking care not to overstate

expected benefits; (2) taking steps to ensure that vendors and research

organizations focus on Phase 1 from a system’s perspective rather than on

their individual products; (3) holding to the number of sites selected and

the agreed upon locations—to keep the program manageable and

affordable; (4) coordinating with projects on which Phase 1 is dependent;

and (5) managing an aggressive schedule for deploying Phase 1’s

capabilities by 2002 as planned.

According to FAA, the structure of the Free Flight Phase 1 program office is

designed to facilitate communication and coordination with other FAA

organizations and the aviation community. For example, the office

includes a stakeholder council to help assure adequate involvement of key

FAA and aviation community stakeholders in its implementation efforts.

This council will be responsible for maintaining consensus agreement and

addressing global issues related to the implementation of free flight. The

office also has a team that is working directly with the airlines to build

baseline performance data needed for measuring progress under free flight

and is addressing human factors issues, among other tasks.

Automated Surface

Observing System

Background The Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) automates the

observation and dissemination of data on temperature and dew point,

visibility, wind direction and speed, pressure, cloud height and amount,

and the types and amounts of precipitation. (See fig. I.3.) ASOS is intended

to improve the weather services at the nation’s large airports and provide

smaller airports used by general aviation pilots with new service. ASOS is

intended to replace some of the human observers who provide FAA with

similar services under contract. According to FAA’s Air Traffic officials, it is

estimated that $18 million a year can be avoided by replacing human

observers.

Under ASOS—a joint program administered by the National Weather

Service—597 ASOS units will be procured, installed, and maintained by FAA

at both towered and nontowered airports. Prior to fiscal year 1998, FAA

provided ASOS with funds under the umbrella of the Automated Weather

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Observing System (AWOS) program, which also included AWOS, AWOS Data

Acquisition System, and the Automated Lightning Detection and Reporting

System projects.9 AWOS filled an immediate need for automated weather

information during the development of the more sophisticated ASOS. The

last of 200 AWOS sites was implemented in April 1998. Each AWOS Data

Acquisition System acquires weather information from up to 137 AWOS and

ASOS units, disseminates this information via FAA’s National Weather

Network, and archives weather data products. According to project

officials, all 22 operational AWOS Data Acquisition Systems, located

primarily at en route centers, have been commissioned. Three additional

support systems are also operational.

Changes to ASOS’ Cost and

Schedule

As of October 1998, FAA had commissioned 371 of the 597 ASOSs—238 new

sites since early 1997. FAA plans to commission an additional 79 systems by

the end of December 1999 and the remaining 147 sites by the end of

December 2002. Currently, FAA cannot commission 70 nontowered sites

because it placed a moratorium on their commissioning as a result of

contract weather observers’ concerns. According to FAA project officials,

the agency may place a moratorium on an additional 40 nontowered sites.

Contract weather observers claim that ASOS provides a lower level of

service than they provide, and, as a result, they should not be replaced by

ASOSs at these sites. The estimated total cost of ASOS has increased by

$136.2 million since the contract was awarded in February 1991, and the

project’s last-site implementation schedule has slipped by more than 6

years. Five major factors caused changes to the project’s cost and

schedule baselines.

First, at the time of the contract’s award, the scope of ASOS’ commissioning

process was still under development. The schedule was extended once the

scope was fully defined to allow for such activities as the evaluation of

planned sites. The schedule also slipped because of limited manpower

resources in FAA’s regional offices responsible for commissioning ASOS

equipment. These events caused the first-site and last-site implementation

to slip by 27 and 8 months, respectively. Also contributing to the schedule

slippage was the shifting of telecommunications costs from the operations

and maintenance budget to the F&E budget. This change in policy regarding

telecommunications funding also resulted in an increase of $10.5 million to

the project’s F&E cost.

9

The Automated Lightning Detection and Reporting System will provide AWOS and ASOS with data on

lightning via AWOS’ Data Acquisition System.

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Second, FAA added new requirements to the ASOS project from 1994

through 1998 because it determined that the original requirements were

unacceptable. As a result, FAA added requirements for freezing rain

sensors, backup equipment, and a new tower display—ASOS Controller

Equipment.10 This additional equipment caused the project’s cost to

increase by $47.8 million and the project’s last-site implementation date to

slip by 13 months.

Third, FAA reduced the project’s 1994 funding by $10 million, causing the

National Weather Service to restructure the ASOS contract. As a result, the

project’s cost increased by $14.6 million, and its last-site implementation

date slipped by 18 months.

Fourth, in 1994 and 1995, the National Weather Service imposed a

moratorium on commissioning any ASOSs until the systems’ technical

deficiencies and logistic problems were resolved. FAA also agreed to halt

commissioning because the National Air Traffic Controllers Association

(NATCA) has similar concerns about the system. As a result, this caused the

project’s cost to increase by $10 million and the last-site implementation

date to slip by 1 year.

Fifth, the conferees for the fiscal year 1997 and 1998 Department of

Transportation Appropriations Acts directed the purchase of additional

systems in 1997 and 1998. This caused the project’s cost to increase by

$20 million, which FAA plans to use to purchase 60 additional systems—30

of which FAA has already purchased. The 1997 congressional direction

caused the last-site implementation date to slip by 1 year. In addition, the

1998 direction will cause the last-site implementation date to slip from

December 2001 to December 2002.

Additionally, an increase of $33.3 million in the cost baseline from 1991

through 1998 can be attributed to several other factors. These include

spare parts, congressionally directed ASOS augmentation for Alaska, special

site considerations in Alaska, equipment relocations, earthquake

anchoring, an ASOS assessment study, initial maintenance, preplanned

product improvements, and the procurement of modems. Table I.8

summarizes the changes to ASOS’ cost and schedule since 1991.

10This equipment consists of a local area network located in air traffic control towers and associated

terminal radar approach control facilities that are used for displaying ASOS-generated weather data at

controllers’ workstations in easily understood graphical displays. This equipment allows multiple

controllers to access similar ASOS data at the same time in both the terminal radar approach control

facility and tower.

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Table I.8: Changes to ASOS’ Cost and

Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: SMI Corporation, Hunt Valley, Md.

Financial information 1991 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $151.3 $287.5 +$136.2

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$215.8

Schedule 1991 1998 Change in

years/months

First-site implementation Aug. 1991 Nov. 1993 +2 years,

3 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

Sept. 1996 Dec. 2002 +6 years,

3 months

ASOS’ Challenges and

Risks

The ASOS project faces two primary challenges. First, FAA has experienced

reliability problems with ASOS’ temperature/dew point sensor. This faulty

sensor accounts for more than 50 percent of all ASOS data errors, thereby

limiting FAA’s ability to utilize ASOS to its full potential. FAA and the National

Weather Service are attempting to resolve this problem.

Second, as stated above, FAA has placed a moratorium on ASOS’

commissioning as a result of contract weather observers’ concerns. After a

reassessment of ASOS’ performance, which was conducted during 1997-98,

FAA determined that it should continue commissioning ASOS at selected

sites. However, in September 1998, in response to congressional concerns

about the contract weather observers’ opinions on ASOS’ performance, FAA

requested that the Air Force conduct an independent assessment to

validate the results of the first study. The Air Force plans to complete its

assessment by December 1998. FAA hopes to have closure on this matter by

year’s end to prevent further schedule slips.

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Figure I.3: ASOS

Source: FAA.

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Display System

Replacement

Background The Display System Replacement (DSR) project will modernize en route

center equipment by replacing 20- to 30-year-old display channels,

controllers’ workstations, and network infrastructure. (See fig. I.4.) DSR

will also provide a platform for FAA to implement planned capabilities,

such as the User Request Evaluation Tool, which will allow airlines to

request more direct routings, thereby providing them with benefits

including fuel and time savings. DSR is a scaled-back version of the Initial

Sector Suite System—a segment of the former Advanced Automation

System, which FAA restructured in 1994 to solve long-standing cost,

schedule, and technical problems. In 1994, the Initial Sector Suite System

was estimated to cost $3 billion, and, at the time of the restructuring, FAA

had sunk $1.8 billion into the project. The Initial Sector Suite System’s

first- and last-site implementation dates were 1996 and 1998, respectively.

Changes to DSR’s Cost and

Schedule

Table I.9 summarizes the changes to DSR’s cost and schedule since 1994. 

Table I.9: Changes to DSR’s Cost and

Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Lockheed Martin Corporation, Rockville, Md.

Financial information 1994 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $1,055.3 $1,055.3 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$771.0

Schedule 1994 1998 Change in

months

Estimated first-site

implementation

Oct. 1998 Dec. 1998 +1.5 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

May 2000 May 2000 None

DSR’s Challenges and

Risks

According to project officials, FAA achieved initial operational capability of

the system as scheduled at its first site, Seattle, Washington, on June 1,

1998. However, full implementation of DSR was suspended for a few

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months in response to 19 computer-human interface issues expressed by

NATCA. On June 16, 1998, FAA and NATCA agreed to solutions for these 19

issues, and, in October 1998, full implementation of DSR in Seattle resumed

in accordance with the terms of the June 16 agreement. The project office

estimates that activities associated with modifications to DSR could result

in a 1- to 3-month slip in Seattle’s original first-site implementation date of

October 31, 1998.11 However, the project office is only currently projecting

a 6-week slip to December 15, 1998. Moreover, according to project

officials, although FAA’s agreement with NATCA resulted in adjustments to

DSR’s schedule, the estimate last-site implementation date scheduled for

May 2000 at Indianapolis, Indiana, is not projected to change.

The Professional Airways Systems Specialists—the union for airway

facilities personnel—has also expressed some concerns regarding the

fielding of DSR. Chief among these is the ease of access for maintaining

Voice Switching and Control System electronics equipment located within

the DSR controller workstation. FAA reached an agreement in May 1998 to

cooperate with the union to identify acceptable solutions to these

concerns. However, until these solutions have been identified and

implemented, a risk to the DSR schedule remains.

Figure I.4: DSR

Source: FAA.

11In accordance with the agreement with NATCA, FAA incorporated a generic keyboard layout and the

use of color for display attributes along with software and hardware modifications.

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Global Positioning

System Augmentation

Program: Wide Area

Augmentation

System/Local Area

Augmentation System

Background FAA’s current policy is to transition from its present ground-based

navigation and landing system to a satellite-based system using signals

generated by the Department of Defense’s Global Positioning System

(GPS).12 However, GPS, by itself, does not satisfy all aviation requirements,

such as the one requiring the system to be available virtually all of the time

and another requiring the system be accurate enough to support landings

in the worst weather conditions. To satisfy these requirements, FAA has

taken a two-pronged approach to augmenting GPS through its Wide Area

Augmentation System (WAAS) and Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)

projects.

WAAS is expected to support the navigation for all phases of flight from

nonprecision through category I precision approaches.13 LAAS is needed to

support the more stringent category II and III precision approach

requirements.14 LAAS is also expected to complement WAAS and provide a

category I precision approach at airports where WAAS does not provide

sufficient coverage or where there is a higher requirement for availability.

FAA and the aviation industry expect that these systems will result in major

benefits, including a reduction in landing accidents, by providing more

precision-landing capabilities than currently exist and a reduction in flight

12There are currently 27 GPS satellites (24 in operation and 3 in reserve) located in six orbits at

approximately 11,000 miles above the earth. These satellites are positioned so that a user will have at

least four satellites in view at any given location.

13On a nonprecision approach, an aircraft receives electronic guidance for flying toward the runway’s

center line. On a precision approach, an aircraft not only receives this guidance but also guidance on

the slope of descent to the runway. As a result, on a precision approach, an aircraft can safely descend

closer to the ground while attempting to land in bad weather. FAA currently categorizes

precision-landing systems according to their ability to safely guide an aircraft to a runway in poor

weather conditions. A category I system provides aircraft with safe vertical guidance to a height of not

less than 200 feet with runway visibility of at least 1,800 feet.

14A category II system provides aircraft with a safe vertical guidance to a height of not less than 100

feet with runway visibility of not less than 1,200 feet. A category III system provides aircraft with safe

vertical guidance all the way to touchdown under conditions where a runway’s visibility is extremely

limited, for example, where a runway’s visibility is not less than 150 feet.

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times, fuel consumption, and delays due to bad weather. WAAS and LAAS are

eventually expected to serve as “sole means” navigation systems that

would enable FAA to phase out its costly network of ground-based

navigation aids.15

In August 1995, after several years of research, FAA contracted with Wilcox

Electric to develop WAAS. However, because of concerns about the

contractor’s work, FAA terminated the contract in April 1996. In May 1996,

FAA entered into an interim contract with Hughes Aircraft Company (now

Raytheon Systems), and the contract became final in October 1996. FAA

rebaselined the project in January 1998 to reflect safety changes that

occurred since Wilcox’s contract termination. Operations and

Maintenance costs were also included in the January 1998 baseline.16

At the time of the original baseline for WAAS in 1994, FAA estimated the

project’s cost at $509 million. Also at this time, FAA expected that the initial

and full system could be completed by June 1997 and December 2000,

respectively. From 1994 through 1998, baseline costs increased because of

higher development costs to build greater redundancy into the system’s

ground components and higher-than-originally-estimated satellite-leasing

costs. In addition to an already aggressive schedule, such factors as the

need to build greater reliability into the systems and certify system

software further contributed to the schedule’s slippage.

Currently, the initial WAAS network consists of 25 reference stations, 2

master stations, and 4 ground stations joined by a telecommunications

network. The initial system, still in testing, also uses two leased

geostationary communication satellites to provide signals for making

corrections and for transmitting information to aircraft.17 In

September 1998, FAA decided to add an interim step between the initial and

full system. During this interim step, FAA plans to add additional ground

stations and make performance upgrades to the initial system’s software in

order to evaluate operational experience before moving ahead to complete

the full system. For the full system, FAA envisions a design consisting of up

15A “sole means” navigation system must, for a given operation or phase of flight, allow the aircraft to

meet all performance requirements for the navigation system.

16During the January 1998 rebaselining, the agency conducted an economic analysis to reevaluate

whether WAAS was still a sound investment. The analysis assessed how such events as the range of

satellite costs and the inclusion of the costs of decommissioning ground-based navigation aids would

affect the investment. FAA found that WAAS’ benefits still outweighed costs.

17Unlike GPS satellites, the WAAS geostationary satellites are located at fixed positions in orbit 22,000

miles above the earth.

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to 54 reference stations, 8 master stations, and 14 ground earth stations.

(See fig. I.5.)18

LAAS is a joint research effort with industry. In January 1998, FAA approved

the first LAAS baseline and anticipates moving to full-scale development by

December 1998. During full-scale development, some systems will be built

to test and evaluate the capabilities of meeting category I, II, and III

precision-landing requirements. After full-scale development, FAA

anticipates acquiring 143 systems. About 42 systems will be installed at

airports and will provide a category I capability, where WAAS cannot.19 The

remaining 101 systems will provide category II and III capabilities. LAAS

will consist of precisely surveyed reference stations for receiving GPS

signals, detecting malfunctions, calculating corrections, and transmitting

corrections to aircraft. The system will also consist of a ground station,

known as a “pseudolite,” which will broadcast an additional signal to

aircraft for making corrections. (See fig. I.6.)

WAAS’ and LAAS’ Cost and

Schedule

Table I.10 summarizes WAAS’ and LAAS’ costs and schedules since

January 1998.

18Neighboring countries may field additional ground stations and reduce the need for FAA to invest in

as many ground stations as originally envisioned.

19WAAS may not provide sufficient coverage for precision landing guidance in remote areas, such as in

parts of Alaska. Also, some airports (e.g., Miami International) have higher availability requirements

than WAAS can provide. Availability is the probability that, at any given time, the system will meet the

accuracy and integrity requirements for each phase of flight.

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Table I.10: WAAS’ and LAAS’ Cost and

Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendors: WAAS-Raytheon Systems Company, Fullerton, Calif.;

COMSAT/Mobile Communications, Bethesda, Md.

Partners: LAAS-Honeywell, Minneapolis, Minn.; Raytheon Systems Company, Fullerton,

Calif.

Financial information Jan. 1998a Oct. 1998

Change in

dollars

Total WAAS F&E cost $1,006.6 $1,006.6 None

F&E appropriations through fiscal year 1998 $400.4

Total LAAS F&E cost $535.8 $535.8 None

F&E appropriations through fiscal year 1998 $11.2

Schedule Jan. 1998 Oct. 1998 Change

WAAS’ initial capability Aug. 1999 Aug. 1999 None

WAAS’ interim capability N/A Dec. 2001 N/A

WAAS’ full capability Dec. 2001 TBD N/A

LAAS’ first-site implementationb 2003 2003 None

Last-site implementationb 2006 2006 None

Legend

N/A = not applicable

TBD = to be determined

aThe revised WAAS baseline also includes $2.043 billion for operations and maintenance through

2016. In 1997, FAA estimated these costs at $1.5 billion. LAAS’ operations and maintenance

costs are estimated to reach $296 million.

bThese dates reflect the first- and last-site implementation dates for full production of LAAS.

WAAS’/LAAS’ Challenges

and Risks

Several uncertainties—related to cost, performance, and technical

issues—surround FAA’s satellite navigation program. While FAA’s revised

baseline recognizes that WAAS’ estimated costs have grown significantly,

questions persist about whether the WAAS program is cost-effective.

Closely related to the issue of whether the expected benefits justify the

cost are several performance and technical issues, including the

vulnerability of the GPS signal to interference, the selection of a second

broadcast frequency for civilian use, and the acquisition of additional

geostationary satellites for WAAS. FAA’s current efforts to identify

alternatives to satisfy its future satellite navigation needs and the

resolution of the outstanding issues could affect the cost, schedule, and

delivery of benefits to users and to FAA.

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Questions Persist About the

Cost and Benefits of WAAS

In the Department of Transportation Appropriations Acts for fiscal years

1998 and 1999 and their accompanying legislative histories, congressional

concerns were expressed about certain aspects of the WAAS program,

including its cost, schedule, performance, and risks.20 For example, in the

conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1999 appropriations, the

conferees noted that proponents of the WAAS program have not been able

to provide compelling assurance that the program will be cost-effective

beyond the initial phase, which is expected to become operational in 1999.

The conferees further asserted that serious and persistent technical

concerns await resolution by the FAA at an unknown cost and in unknown

time frames. The fiscal year 1999 appropriations act includes a provision

which prohibits the use of funds for any WAAS activity beyond phase 1.

FAA’s analyses of WAAS have shown the project to be cost beneficial. In fact,

during the January 1998 rebaselining of the project, FAA conducted an

economic analysis to reevaluate whether WAAS was still a sound

investment. The analysis assessed how such events as the range of satellite

costs and the inclusion of the costs of decommissioning ground-based

navigation aids would affect the investment. At that time, FAA found that

benefits still outweighed costs. However, since then questions have arisen

about the WAAS investment and in particular, the conferees for the fiscal

year 1999 Transportation Appropriations Act expressed concern that the

benefits of WAAS may be overstated.

It is expected that FAA will identify its future needs for satellite navigation

and analyze a range of alternatives for meeting those needs. In fact, the

conferees for the fiscal year 1999 Transportation Appropriations Act

directed FAA to complete an alternatives analysis which looks at various

combinations of existing and new, ground-based and satellite-based

technology. In response, FAA has completed a draft alternative analysis

plan, which calls for the identification of possible alternatives by early

1999. Once possible alternatives have been identified, the Center for

Advanced Aviation System Development of the Mitre Corporation is

expected to do a technical evaluation of the alternatives.21 Following

Mitre’s evaluation, FAA’s investment analysis team will analyze the costs,

20Senate Report 105-55, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal

Year 1998 (July 22, 1997), and House of Representatives Conference Report 105-313, Department of

Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1998 (Oct. 7, 1997) and House of

Representatives Conference Report 105-825, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1999 (Oct. 19, 1998).

21Mitre Corporation operates, under a memorandum of agreement with funding from FAA, the Center

for Advanced Aviation System Development. The Center carries out a continuing program of research,

development, system architecture, and high-level system engineering to support FAA’s NAS needs.

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benefits, schedule, performance, and risks of each alternative and expects

to recommend a proposed alternative to FAA’s senior acquisition managers

by the end of May 1999. The Congress is expected to use the results of

various analyses of WAAS in determining the level of appropriations needed

for FAA’s future navigation program including both WAAS and LAAS.

GPS Signals Are Vulnerable to

Interference

GPS provides low-power signals that are susceptible to both unintentional

and intentional radio frequency interference.22 For example, accidental or

inadvertent interference by extraneous radio transmissions on the GPS

frequency could cause the loss of service. Also, the potential exists that an

individual or organization could disrupt the GPS navigation signals by

jamming them.

FAA has recognized that the interference issue must be addressed and that

appropriate measures must be in place before satellite navigation can

become a “sole means” system. One mitigation strategy that FAA may

employ includes retaining a portion of its existing ground-based navigation

aids as a backup. Also, during the transition from ground-based navigation

aids to WAAS, which would last for about a decade, both would be available

to users and FAA. During this period, users would have time to equip their

aircraft, and FAA would have time to test several countermeasures,

including the use of the existing air traffic control and surveillance

networks to safely control traffic in areas where there is interference and

the use of flight inspection aircraft to detect interference events.

In recent months, vulnerability concerns about whether satellite

navigation should be used as the “sole means” of providing aircraft landing

guidance have been reemphasized. Consequently, FAA has begun assessing

whether, and to what extent, it may have to maintain some portion of

existing ground-based navigation aids as a backup navigation service.23 As

part of this effort, in July 1998, FAA, in a joint effort with industry,

contracted with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to

conduct a detailed risk assessment of using GPS along with WAAS’ and LAAS’

augmentations as a “sole means” system for aircraft navigation. FAA

expects to have the final report of this assessment by January 1999.

22These vulnerabilities are common to ground-based navigation aids. However, because GPS

broadcasts its signal at a very low power level, its signal may be somewhat more vulnerable to

interference.

23The issue of satellite navigation’s vulnerability to interference was raised by the President’s

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection of October 1997. The purpose of this commission

was to study the nation’s infrastructure, which constitutes the life support system of the United States;

determine the vulnerability of these support systems; and propose a strategy for protecting them in the

future. Also, in October 1997, a group of independent experts from outside FAA, and called together by

the agency, also raised concerns about the intentional jamming of GPS signals.

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FAA Asserts That the Selection

of a Second Frequency Would

Benefit the WAAS Program

The present GPS satellites broadcast position data for the Department of

Defense’s use on two frequencies referred to as L1 and L2. WAAS will use

data on the L1 frequency in conjunction with limited data available from

the L2 frequency to make corrections. LAAS will rely solely on the L1

frequency for making corrections. According to FAA, providing full access

to a second frequency can provide significant benefits in the long term for

both these systems. A second frequency could provide another risk

mitigation strategy to counteract these systems’ vulnerability to electronic

interference (mainly unintentional interference). If one frequency were

lost because of interference, a second frequency could be used to provide

service.

With a second frequency, FAA could build WAAS so that aircraft operators

would be able to use receivers that could function on a single frequency

now and on a dual frequency in the future. Building this type of “forward”

compatibility into WAAS could cut down on users’ investment in new

receivers and FAA’s future investments in WAAS to accommodate aircraft

with single- and dual-frequency receivers. Another potential advantage is

that FAA would need fewer WAAS ground stations and a smaller ground

communications network in the future if dual frequency receivers are used

to correct position data that may be distorted as GPS signals pass through

the ionosphere. Also, dual-frequency receivers could be used by LAAS to

detect and mitigate multipath problems caused when radio frequencies

radiate off objects and create data errors.

However, challenges need to be resolved before these benefits can be

realized. While the Interagency GPS Executive Board, together with its joint

chairs, the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation,

has agreed that a second frequency protected for civil air navigation’s

safety of life function will be provided, there is still ongoing discussion

within the executive board to identify the protected frequency.24 The

executive board has tentatively set December 1998 as the date for

selecting this frequency. Furthermore, once the executive board agrees

upon the second frequency, the United States will have to gain

concurrence from the International Telecommunications Union at the next

World Radio Conference. According to FAA officials, the next World Radio

Conference is scheduled for 2000, and there have been earlier proposals

24The Interagency GPS Executive Board manages the dual civil and military use of GPS. The board is

made up of representatives from the Departments of Transportation, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce,

the Interior, Justice, and State, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

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that the conference is studying to share the spectrum used by GPS with

nonaviation users.25

Beyond the challenge of identifying an additional frequency, funding

issues need resolution. The Department of Transportation has agreed to

fund the implementation of an additional frequency on the next generation

of GPS satellites. While it may not be until 2010 before a significant number

of these satellites will be placed in orbit, the Department of Transportation

believes it has to begin making the investment soon in order to allow the

manufacturer to build the second frequency into the design for

next-generation satellites. According to the Department of Transportation,

the amount that the agency has to invest can be established only once an

agreement is reached on the additional frequency to be provided for civil

air navigation use. Finally, current-generation GPS satellites still in

production could be retrofitted to provide a second frequency capability

and potentially bring about the expected benefits before 2010. However,

because of concerns about the potential high costs of this

solution—estimated to be about $130 million—the Department of

Transportation has not agreed to fund this solution.

Acquisition of Additional WAAS

Satellites Presents Significant

Challenges

We reported in April 1998 that the acquisition of geosatellites for WAAS

present some of the most significant cost, funding, and schedule

challenges to the project.26 Today, these challenges remain and have led to

FAA’s decision to delay the full implementation of the system to a date that

has not yet been determined.

The greatest degree of uncertainty about the cost of WAAS surrounds the

costs of satellites. This uncertainty exists because FAA does not know

exactly how many additional satellites will be needed and how much the

per-unit costs will be.27 Although FAA had initially planned to award a

contract in July 1998 for additional satellites, it did not meet this target

date. FAA is currently analyzing various options to identify additional

satellites, which include obtaining them from the existing provider.

However, according to FAA officials, since the need for additional satellites

and the timing for acquiring these satellites hinges on the outcome of the

25Every 2 years, the International Telecommunications Union of the United Nations holds a World

Radio Conference to develop policy and decide major international telecommunications and radio

spectrum issues affecting navigation and transportation systems.

26National Airspace System: Status of Wide Area Augmentation System Project (GAO/RCED-98-79,

Apr. 30, 1998).

27According to FAA officials, if more GPS satellites and a second civil frequency were available along

with deactivation of selective availability, the quantity of additional WAAS geostationary satellites and

life-cycle costs for the geostationary satellites could be reduced.

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previously mentioned risk assessment, they opted to wait for the results of

the assessment, which is expected in January 1999, before deciding on a

procurement strategy.

While the outcome of the risk assessment has postponed any decision to

lease additional satellites, FAA officials stated that entering into any leasing

negotiations with vendors has also been deferred for two other reasons.

First, they stated that during this period of uncertainty, negotiations with

satellite vendors would be precarious, at best. Since vendors are expected

to absorb most of the costs associated with building and leasing the

satellites, they may require huge premiums on leasing fees or large

cancellation fees to cover their investment in case FAA subsequently

decides against adding the satellites. Second, while FAA officials believe

that they could not afford to purchase the satellites from the agency’s F&E

appropriation without significantly reducing other capital projects, the

House mandated that the agency not sign a lease for WAAS satellites

services until it evaluates whether a lease versus purchase acquisition will

result in the lowest overall cost to the agency.28

In our April 1998 report, we questioned whether FAA would find a vendor

willing and able to complete the launching and testing of satellites in time

to meet FAA’s December 2001 date for implementing the full WAAS

capability. In this report, we stated that potential vendors pointed to 2002

or 2003 as a more realistic schedule for putting the satellites in orbit. Since

our report, FAA’s decision to postpone satellite acquisition activity, pending

the outcome of the current risk assessment, coupled with the agency’s

efforts to evaluate operational experience with WAAS before moving to full

capability and the need to resolve the lease versus purchase issue, will

likely result in delays to the schedule. FAA officials recognize that the

original date must change to allow enough time to address the above

issues, and they stated that they did not expect to make this decision on

the additional satellites until September 1999.29 Notwithstanding this

decision date, officials stated that a more realistic schedule for putting

satellites in orbit would be around 2003 or 2004.

28The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1999, P.L. 105-277,

Division A, sec. 101, (g)(1998).

29FAA’s ongoing alternatives analysis may impact the decision regarding the need for the additional

satellites. The results of this analysis is expected in May 1999.

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Figure I.5: WAAS’ Architecture

GPS

Satellites

Geostationary

Communications

Satellite

Geostationary

Communications

Satellite

Ground

Earth

Station

Ground

Earth

Station

Master stations

Reference stations

1

WAAS Signal WAAS Signal

Source: FAA.

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GPS

Satellites

Pseudolite

Pseudolite

LAAS

Reference Stations

Source: FAA.

Host and Oceanic

Computer System

Replacement

Background Many of the hardware components of the En Route and Oceanic

automation systems have reached or are near the end of their service life,

and are no longer supportable. Additionally, concerns existed that these

systems would suffer potential Year 2000 problems. Therefore, an

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immediate need exists for FAA to ensure that current and planned service

levels can be maintained until the replacement system is fully operational.

The Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement program replaces

existing En Route and Oceanic automation hardware and software over a

4-year period. The project is structured into four phases to help minimize

schedule and funding risks. Phase 1 of the project replaces existing En

Route and Oceanic hardware, but it does not replace the existing

software’s functionality. Phase 2 provides new software, which basically

duplicates the existing software functionality. Phases 3 and 4 replace

peripheral equipment and add new software functionality. According to

project officials, in June 1998, FAA awarded Lockheed Martin a contract for

up to 24 operational systems and 7 support systems. The project’s total F&E

cost is estimated at $424.1 million, over an 8-year period that includes

technology refreshment. To date, only Phase 1 of the project has a

schedule baseline.

Changes to the Host and

Oceanic Computer System

Replacement Program’s

Cost and Schedule

Table I.11 summarizes the changes to the Host and Oceanic Computer

System Replacement program’s cost and schedule since June 1998.

Table I.11: Changes to Host and

Oceanic Computer System

Replacement Program’s Cost and

Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendor: Lockheed Martin, Rockville, Md.

Financial information June 1998 Oct. 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $424.1 $424.1 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$86.4

Schedule June 1998 Oct. 1998 Change in

months

Estimated first-site

implementationa

Jan. 1999 Jan. 1999 None

Estimated last-site

implementationa

Oct. 1999 Sept. 1999 –1 month

aThe implementation dates are only for Phase 1 of the program.

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Host and Oceanic

Computer System

Replacement Program’s

Challenges and Risks

According to project officials, the project’s schedule is the primary risk.

Because the project’s schedule is aggressive and coincides with other en

route and oceanic modernization activities, the project office must

maintain close coordination with other project teams and operational

sites. The procurement, delivery, and installation of government-furnished

equipment must also be monitored closely to ensure that all ancillary

equipment required for complete installation and testing is available to the

contractor. Project officials report that all Phase 1 hardware deliveries and

site implementation plans are on or ahead of schedule.

According to project officials, the project’s technical risk is low because

the contractor is utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf equipment for this

procurement. Moreover, the lead contractor is experienced at installing

existing software on new equipment. In addition, the Host and Oceanic

Computer System Replacement team successfully completed a “proof of

concept” that showed that the existing software could run on the new

platform in a demonstration at the FAA Technical Center.

Integrated Terminal

Weather System

Background Air traffic personnel in tower and terminal facilities rely on a number of

sensors to obtain weather data. The interpretation of these data is

performed manually and is labor-intensive. The main shortcoming of the

present system is that it cannot anticipate short-term changes in ceilings,

visibility, winds, and precipitation.

The Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) is designed to

automatically integrate data from terminal weather sensors to provide

current weather conditions—as well as forecasts out to about 30 minutes

in the future—in easily understood graphical and textual form to air traffic

supervisors and controllers. ITWS will integrate information originating

from several sources, such as next-generation weather radar products,

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar, aircraft weather systems, surveillance

radars, or weather-observing systems, and present it on displays located in

the tower and Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities. ITWS’

products include wind shear and microburst predictions, storm cell and

lightning information, terminal area winds aloft, runway winds, and

short-term ceiling and visibility predictions. FAA intends to deploy 37 ITWSs,

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including 34 at terminal facilities and 3 at other locations, for training,

testing of interfaces, and software support and maintenance. The 34

systems that FAA plans to deploy at terminal facilities will enable air traffic

controllers to better identify terminal area weather hazards at 45 major

airports, thereby improving safety and capacity in bad weather.30

ITWS’ Cost and Schedule The total estimated F&E cost of ITWS has not changed since the contract

was awarded in January 1997. Cost estimates were rebaselined during the

contract’s award because of a decrease associated with a

higher-than-anticipated level of software productivity and reuse and a

reduction in newly developed software lines of code. As of

September 1998, FAA had obligated all of the $87.8 million appropriated

since 1992 for the ITWS project. Funding was used to develop and test

terminal weather algorithms, conduct demonstration/validation of the

system using three functional prototypes, continue the operation of these

prototypes, and test initial software.

ITWS has been on or ahead of schedule since the contract was awarded.

For example, the Preliminary Design Review was conducted 2 months

ahead of schedule in March 1998, and the Critical Design Review

scheduled for January 1999 was completed 4 months ahead of schedule in

September 1998. FAA plans to have the first of the 34 systems operational

by April 2002 and have all 34 systems operational by July 2003. FAA has

been successfully operating ITWS prototypes at the Memphis International

Airport and Orlando International Airport since 1994 and at Dallas/Ft.

Worth International Airport since 1995. As a result of their success, a

fourth prototype was installed and became operational at LaGuardia

Airport in August 1998. This prototype provides displays at LaGuardia,

Kennedy, Newark and the Teterboro, New Jersey, airports; New York

TRACON; New York, Boston, and Washington, D.C., en route centers, and at

the Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. The

prototype is being funded by the New York/New Jersey Port Authority in

conjunction with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln

Laboratory. These prototypes allow for testing the system at

different-sized airports and provide experience with different types of

weather. The four prototypes will be among the first eight sites

commissioned. Table I.12 summarizes ITWS’ cost and schedule since 1997.

30TRACONs can control airspace surrounding multiple airports; therefore, one ITWS can serve more

than one airport.

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Table I.12: ITWS’ Cost and Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendors: Raytheon Systems Company, Marlborough, Mass.; Massachusetts Institute of

Technology/Lincoln Laboratory, Boston, Mass.

Financial information 1997 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $276.1 $276.1 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$87.8

Schedule 1997 1998 Change

Estimated first-site

implementation

Apr. 2002 Apr. 2002 None

Estimated last-site

implementation

July 2003 July 2003 None

ITWS’ Challenges and

Risks

Although ITWS is currently on schedule, software development efforts

present a potential risk. To mitigate the risk of the project’s schedule

slipping, the ITWS project plans to continue Massachusetts Institute of

Technology’s/Lincoln Laboratory’s support during the software

development effort to provide for the transfer of technology from the

actual research scientists to the software developers. Also, the actual

implementation effort introduces potential risk to the project. For

example, ITWS will require at least one telecommunications line from each

of the sensors during the implementation. Although, FAA officials have

stated that this is not technically difficult, the sheer volume and

coordination effort required to install all of these communication lines

adds risk.

Oceanic Automation

Program

Background With radar coverage largely unavailable and aircraft navigation limited to

onboard systems, the current oceanic air traffic control system is

significantly different from the domestic air traffic control system. The

current oceanic air traffic control system is largely manual, dependent on

air/ground communications through a third party, subject to atmospheric

anomalies and human error, and troublesome when obtaining accurate

aircraft position reports. This lack of reliable and timely position

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information, in turn, requires greater separation standards for aircraft,

which severely limit the system’s capacity. As a result, oceanic users are

rarely able to obtain maximum fuel efficiency, minimum travel time, and

access to preferred takeoff times and flight paths.

The Oceanic Automation Program is designed to provide a platform for

improved air traffic control over the oceans. It evolved from the Oceanic

Display and Planning System into the Oceanic Automation System, and,

now, into the Advanced Oceanic Automation System. In the late 1980s, the

Oceanic Display and Planning System improved oceanic traffic control by

providing flight data processing and a situational display of estimated

aircraft positions. This system also provided a conflict probe capability

that alerted controllers when any flight plan or pilot-requested aircraft

route change violated appropriate separation standards. In the early 1990s,

FAA improved on the Oceanic Display and Planning System with the

Oceanic Automation System, which improved data display and

communications. This system is now being upgraded to the Advanced

Oceanic Automation System, which is designed to provide such features as

a new flight data processor, Automatic Dependent Surveillance position

reporting, an advanced conflict probe, and data link. FAA awarded a

contract to the Raytheon Systems Company in September 1995 for the

Advanced Oceanic Automation System. The contract is composed of

flexible segments, which will allow for incremental functional

development and delivery of benefits. Oceanic air traffic control systems

are installed at the en route centers at Oakland and New York and in

Anchorage, Alaska.

Changes to the Oceanic

Automation Program’s

Cost and Schedule

Over the past 3 years, FAA has reduced the cost and schedule baselines for

the Oceanic Automation Program. Since FAA awarded the Advanced

Oceanic Automation System’s contract in September 1995, the scope of

the project has been gradually revised from an original plan of five

segments (incremental deliveries of capabilities) to only a portion of the

first segment. In July 1996, 10 months after the contract’s award, FAA

canceled segments three, four, and five of the project because the agency

recognized that the cost of executing these segments was beyond the

funding that had been allocated for this project. As a result, FAA abandoned

many controller productivity tools needed to increase the system’s

capacity. Then, in December 1996, funding concerns forced FAA to revise

the second segment of the project, which replaces existing infrastructure

hardware and software that supports controller equipment. Eventually, in

September 1997, FAA canceled the entire second segment of the project

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because of the agency’s need to use the project’s funds to correct Year

2000 problems in existing oceanic automation software and because of the

need to transfer funds to the Host replacement program.31

Meanwhile, FAA’s contractor was reporting performance problems with the

first segment of the project, which adds data link and automatic

dependent surveillance in the oceanic environment. To avoid a potential

$45 million contractor cost overrun associated with this segment, FAA then

reduced the scope of segment one of the project in September 1998 by

eliminating the capability for automatic dependent surveillance. According

to project officials, the remaining elements of segment one (air-to-ground

data link, ground-to-ground data link, and controller tools) have

successfully completed the operational test and evaluation and are

expected to be delivered on schedule. Table I.13 summarizes the changes

to the Oceanic Automation Program’s cost and schedule since 1996.

Table I.13: Changes to Oceanic

Automation Program’s Cost and

Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company, Reston, Va.

Financial information 1996 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $236.5 $189.0 –$47.5

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$189.0

Schedule 1996 1998 Change in

months

Estimated first-site

implementation

Feb. 2000 Sept. 1999 –5 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

June 2000 Oct. 1999 –8 months

Oceanic Automation

Program’s Challenges and

Risks

Project officials state that the Advanced Oceanic Automation System’s

original requirements to improve oceanic air traffic control automation

remain valid today and that they will require FAA’s attention in the very

near future, particularly those that increase controller’s efficiency.

According to project officials, FAA is presently examining alternatives for

satisfying these needs.

31The Host replacement project replaces en route center and oceanic automation hardware that has

reached the end of its commercial support life and may have problems with Year 2000 date

requirements.

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Operational and

Supportability

Implementation

System

Background The Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS) project

(1) replaces all existing Flight Service Automation System hardware and

software with a leased commercial, off-the-shelf-based service;

(2) provides a graphic weather display capability that is currently being

obtained through the Interim Graphic Weather Display system; and

(3) incorporates direct user-access functionality that is currently being

obtained through two Direct User Access Terminal contracts. The

integration of these three capabilities and functions into a single system

will enable flight service specialists to more efficiently produce weather

and flight-planning information for pilots. In August 1997, FAA awarded

Harris Corporation a contract for OASIS services. The contract requires

Harris to provide up to 61 operational systems and 3 support systems.

Changes to OASIS’ Cost

and Schedule

FAA’s May 1998 decision to replace existing workstation consoles and

install new ones in response to human-factor concerns raised by the

unions that represent the controllers and the technicians caused the

project’s cost to increase by $15.8 million. Table I.14 summarizes the

changes to OASIS’ cost and schedule since 1997.

Table I.14: Changes to OASIS’ Cost

and Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne, Fla.

Financial information 1997 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $174.7 $190.5 +$15.8

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$25.9

Schedule 1997 1998 Change in

months

Estimated first-site

implementation

July 1998 Jan. 1999 +6 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

Aug. 2001 Aug. 2001 None

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OASIS’ Challenges and

Risks

Since FAA awarded the contract for OASIS services in August 1997, the

agency has seen the project’s schedule slip because of a

larger-than-planned developmental effort. FAA’s January 1998 review of the

Harris system’s architecture for OASIS revealed that the contractor’s

commercial-off-the-shelf solution was not as mature as FAA had envisioned

when the contract was awarded and revealed that many of the contractor’s

commercial products did not fully satisfy its requirements. FAA delayed

first-site implementation from July 1998 to January 1999—a 6-month slip.

Last-site implementation is not affected by the protracted development

effort and remains scheduled for August 2001.

Adding more risk to the project’s schedule are a number of human-factor

issues that have been raised by the National Association of Air Traffic

Specialist union and the Professional Airways Systems Specialists. While

the unions have yet to formally develop a comprehensive list of concerns,

project officials said that the unions are troubled about such issues as

lighting glare, shelf height, and immoveable keyboards. The unions want

these issues resolved before OASIS is deployed. FAA officials responsible for

requirements are working collaboratively with the program office to

address these concerns.

Finally, according to project officials, the project’s schedule has the

potential to slip further because the amount of fiscal year 1999 funding

was less than requested.

Standard Terminal

Automation

Replacement System

Background The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) is

designed to replace FAA’s automated radar terminal system, which

comprises 15- to 25-year-old controller workstations, and supporting

computer systems that allow controllers at TRACONs to separate and

sequence aircraft. According to FAA, this system is prone to failures and is

maintenance intensive. The system also has capacity constraints that

restrict the agency from making required safety and efficiency

enhancements. STARS equipment is also expected to provide the platform

needed to make enhancements to the system that would increase the level

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of air traffic control automation and improve surveillance,

communications, and weather display. (See fig. I.7.)

In September 1996, FAA signed a contract with Raytheon Systems Company

to acquire STARS. In producing the system, Raytheon originally intended to

rely exclusively on commercially available hardware and, to a large extent,

on commercially available software. The strategy for replacing and

enhancing the system is divided into two stages—the initial system

capability stage and the final system capability stage. Stage 1 is expected

to provide the same functions as the current automated radar terminal

systems. Under Stage 2, FAA expects to implement new functions to help

controllers move aircraft more safely and efficiently. In 1997, FAA created

another stage, known as early display configuration, because of concerns

about operational problems at Ronald Reagan National Airport. This new

stage will be implemented prior to Stages 1 and 2. The new stage replaces

the current controller displays and monitoring equipment but will require

the use of the existing computer system and software. It also provides an

emergency back-up system.

STARS replaced the Terminal Advanced Automation System segment of the

Advanced Automation System project, which was terminated because of

serious cost and schedule problems. The terminal segment was estimated

to cost about $810 million, and at the time of termination, FAA had sunk

about $317 million into it. The terminal segment’s first-site implementation

date was August 1997. FAA did not establish a last-site implementation

date.

STARS’ Cost and Schedule Table I.15 summarizes STARS’ cost and schedule since 1996.

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Table I.15: STARS’ Cost and Schedule

Dollars in millions

Vendors: Raytheon Systems Company, Marlborough, Mass.

Financial information 1996 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $940.2 $940.2 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$211.6

Schedule 1996 1998 Change

Estimated first-site

implementation—initial

stage

Dec. 1998 Dec. 1998 None

Estimated last-site

implementation—final

stage

Feb. 2005 Feb. 2005 None

STARS’ Challenges and

Risks

Although FAA has not officially changed the STARS’ baseline that was

approved in 1996, the baseline is in jeopardy of being breached because of

unions’ concerns surrounding human-factor and design issues, the

refinement of requirements, and the interjection of a new project phase.

FAA estimates that these issues have the potential to increase the project’s

costs from $294 million to $410 million over the approved baseline. FAA

also estimates that the project’s initial completion could be delayed by

almost 2-1/2 years. For future projects, cost overruns and schedule

slippages in excess of 10 percent of the cost and schedule baselines will

require the Administrator of FAA to consider terminating the project under

recently passed legislation.32

In addition to the issues cited above, the project has experienced other

challenges related mainly to software testing. While project officials stated

that they have been able to absorb the cost increases within the existing

baseline, additional risks could cause further cost increases and schedule

delays.

Unions’ Concerns NATCA and the Professional Airways Systems Specialists are working to

resolve 98 and 59 human-factor problems with STARS, respectively. In

September 1998, FAA estimated that the total cost for incorporating all

human-factors issues into the final design of STARS would be $192 million.

According to FAA, if the full scope of these issues is incorporated into the

system’s design, doing so would require the development of an additional

32Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264, Oct. 9, 1996).

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220,000 lines of software code and delay the deployment of the final design

of the system to June 2001—an almost 2-1/2-year delay from the initial

systems capability.

For example, one of NATCA’s human-factor concerns centered around a

lack of sufficient details about an aircraft’s position and movement, which

could hamper controllers’ ability to monitor traffic movement. The

Professional Airways Systems Specialists’ concerns centered mainly on a

lack of standardization between the primary and backup STARS systems.

For example, technicians must use two different screens to monitor the

integrity of both systems, and the visual warning alarms and color coding

to denote problems in the systems were not standard.

FAA could incur an additional cost of $116 million, if the agency addresses

NATCA’s concerns that the system’s design include synchronization

between the primary and backup systems. If the primary system fails,

synchronization would provide the backup with a smoother transition by

enabling controllers to forego having to recalibrate information needed for

controlling and separating aircraft. Without synchronization, such system

inefficiencies as slowing down traffic or increasing the separation between

aircraft could occur.

Requirements Refinement In order to promote competition among vendors who may have had

commercial and nondevelopmental applications that could address FAA’s

needs, the STARS system specification was written at a high-level.

Consequently, when FAA awarded the contract, it left the system’s

functional specifications open to interpretation. As a result, according to

FAA officials, considerable engineering was expended in an effort to clarify

the system’s requirements. For example, the additional engineering effort

caused software development to grow from an estimated 124,000 lines of

software code to about 162,000 lines of code because of more-detailed

specifications on how STARS was expected to function. The engineering

effort also identified, among other things, the need to strengthen security

and seismic requirements and add additional equipment. FAA officials

estimate the added cost for these requirements refinements to be about

$56 million.

New Early Display

Configuration Stage

Because of the concerns about human-factors problems and delays in

developing the initial system, FAA now anticipates that it may have to

deploy the system’s early display configuration to as many as 33 additional

TRACONs and to install automated radar terminal systems in new TRACONs

that were scheduled to begin operation prior to June 2001. FAA believes

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that this early deployment of the system’s displays solves one of its most

immediate problems—the failure of displays in the existing system. FAA

estimates that the additional costs associated with these changes account

for about $46 million of the cost growth.

Other Challenges Other challenges that could have an impact on the STARS project include

FAA’s software development problems related to the system’s early display

configuration and its initial system capability. For example, software

problems have pushed back the initial deployment of the early display

configuration at Ronald Reagan National Airport from September 1998 to

March 1999. An additional deployment of software to make the system

operationally ready is scheduled for July 1999. According to FAA, because

of concerns about completing the development of software and resolving

testing issues, a high probability exists that meeting both the March and

July 1999 dates will not be achieved. Technical problems with software are

also affecting the development of the system’s initial system capability

software. For example, Raytheon and FAA report software problems

through their program trouble reports. Two of the most worrisome

program trouble reports are types 1 and 2. Type 1 program trouble reports,

if not corrected, could prevent the accomplishment of mission-essential

capabilities. Type 2 program trouble reports must be corrected before key

site testing of software can proceed. As of September 1998, the total

number of open program trouble reports totaled nearly 570, and type 1 and

2 program trouble reports totaled 8 and 231, respectively.

FAA and Raytheon have mitigation efforts under way, including monthly

reviews that involve software demonstrations and the weekly monitoring

of the progress of software testing. Also, according to project officials,

they have been able to contain cost increases within the existing baseline

by using planned baseline reserves and by eliminating, combining, and

compressing certain tests. These actions may cause further cost and

schedule delays in the future. For example, we have reported that systems

development without careful and thorough testing has proven to be

imprudent and unproductive in many software development efforts. The

results from such shortcuts are systems that typically cost more, are of

low quality, and are generally late.33

Finally, FAA has assured the Congress that it will not place a new system

into service without first verifying that the system will not experience Year

33In Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes Increase FAA System Acquisition

Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21, 1997), we pointed out that the lack of a disciplined software

development process has contributed to FAA’s past problems to deliver systems capabilities on time

and within budget.

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2000 problems. FAA is now in the process of assessing whether STARS will

have a Year 2000 problem, and it plans to invest over $4 million to carry

out Year 2000 assessment and testing activities. While FAA’s initial

assessment results show the Year 2000 processing risks to be low to

medium, officials are awaiting the results of final assessments, and tests

needed to determine whether additional software changes may be needed.

Figure I.7: STARS

Source: FAA.

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Terminal Doppler

Weather Radar

Background The Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) system will alert aircraft in

the terminal area of hazardous weather conditions, such as microbursts,

gust fronts, and precipitation. The radar also will alert controllers of

changing wind conditions, thereby permitting them to make timely runway

changes. (See fig. I.8.) In November 1988, FAA contracted with Raytheon to

develop, produce, and install 47 TDWR systems.

Changes to TDWR’s Cost

and Schedule

According to FAA officials, three factors have caused the cost of the project

to increase by $71.3 million since November 1988. First, FAA’s failure to

properly estimate the cost for installing TDWR systems caused the project’s

cost to increase by $30 million. Second, environmental reviews conducted

by FAA at proposed sites identified environmental issues that caused the

project’s costs to increase by $26 million. Finally, land acquisition

problems necessitated that FAA and its contractor keep key project

personnel longer than planned to field the systems. This caused the

project’s cost to increase by $15.3 million. The project’s schedule delays

are primarily due to land acquisition and environmental problems. Table

I.16 summarizes the changes to TDWR’s cost and schedule since 1988.

Table I.16: Changes to TDWR’s Cost

and Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company, Marlborough, Mass.

Financial information 1988 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $322.2 $393.5 +$71.3

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$382.8

Schedule 1988 1998 Change in

years/months

First-site implementation Aug. 1993 July 1994 +11 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

Aug. 1996 July 2001 +4 years,

11 months

TDWR’s Challenges and

Risks

For the past 10 years, land acquisition and environmental problems have

plagued the project. These problems continue, causing increased delays to

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installation schedules and increased installation costs. As a result, FAA

does not have much confidence in its last-site implementation date for

completion of the project. The project office is working toward

implementing 45 of the 47 planned systems by December 1998. The final

two systems, scheduled for Chicago’s Midway Airport and New York,

remain in storage at FAA’s Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City.

According to project officials, FAA’s progress with Chicago-Midway had

been stymied for 2 years by problems associated with buying land. As a

last resort, FAA used condemnation procedures to reach closure on this

matter. In June 1998, FAA acquired the land for the Chicago-Midway TDWR

installation. Project officials anticipate that an operational system will be

available at Chicago-Midway in the summer of 2000.

Project officials stated that New York has experienced great difficulty in

finding a suitable location for the TDWR. Over a 4-year period, proposed

locations were rejected by both residents and local politicians on the

grounds that the radar’s electromagnetic radiation posed potential health

problems. Residents also rejected the radar itself as being inappropriate

and unsightly for a residential community. FAA’s current preferred site is

located on public land. According to project officials, an extensive

environmental impact study is being made of the site, which has prolonged

the system’s installation. Project officials expect to receive the necessary

environmental approvals by November 1998. Project officials also expect

residents who oppose FAA’s planned use of the site to initiate a court

action. Because of the expected court action, the last-site implementation

date remains tentative and could be pushed back even further.

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Figure I.8: TDWR

Source: FAA.

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Terminal Radar

Digitization,

Replacement, and

Establishment

Program: Airport

Surveillance Radar-11

Project

Background The Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment (TRDRE)

program includes projects to replace and upgrade current surveillance

radars. The Air Route Surveillance Radar-11 (ASR-11) project is a primary

and secondary surveillance radar system that will enable air traffic

controllers to monitor aircraft approaching, departing, and passing

through airport terminal areas. (See fig. I.9.) ASR-11 will provide a more

reliable replacement for aging analog ASR-7s and ASR-8s, and will also

provide digitized radar data necessary for interfacing with new automation

systems, such as STARS, planned to be used by terminal controllers. FAA

also plans to upgrade several ASR-8s with interim digitizers under a

separate contract to ensure that the radars are available to meet STARS’

implementation schedule.

Through a contract managed by the Department of Defense, FAA is

providing the Air Force with funding for the procurement of 112 ASR-11

radars that are designated for use at midsize airports. Ninety-five systems

will replace aging ASR-7/8s; 13 systems will be used for new establishments

or the Department of Defense takeover sites; 2 will be mobile units; and 2

will be support systems. Unlike the existing ASR-7/8s, ASR-11s are intended

to be more reliable and easier to maintain. They are also designed to

provide more accurate weather and target information, less clutter, and

fewer false targets on the controllers’ displays. The ASR-11 is a

nondevelopmental item with modifications to approximately 15 percent of

the system. The most significant modifications are to the interface

equipment.

Changes to ASR-11’s Cost

and Schedule

At the time the contract was awarded in August 1996, FAA had yet to

determine the total number of ASR-11 systems that it would require or the

total cost estimates of the project. The agency had preliminary project cost

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estimates of $561.3 million for the purchase of 48 ASR-11s and the upgrade

of the ASR-8s with digitizers. However, during 1997, FAA conducted an

analysis that demonstrated that it would be more cost beneficial to replace

all the ASR-8s with ASR-11s rather than upgrade them with digitizers. As a

result, in November 1997, FAA approved an estimated $743.3 million for 112

ASR-11s. Also, included in this amount was more than $9 million to upgrade

10 ASR-8s with interim digitizers. As of September 1998, FAA had provided

$70.4 million for the procurement of two preproduction units for the initial

development of the automation interface, in-plant testing, five production

units, and three ASR-8 interim digitizers.

Factory testing of the ASR-11 began in October 1997, and, in September

1998, the installation of the ASR-11 at the Department of Defense’s test site

at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, was completed. Site preparation at FAA’s

test site at Stockton, California (the first of two FAA preproduction sites)

has begun and is scheduled to be completed in December 1998. First-site

implementation at Stockton is scheduled for January 2000. As of October

1998, the current last-site implementation date is scheduled for

September 2005 at a presently undetermined location. Table I.17

summarizes the changes to ASR-11’s cost and schedule since 1996.

Table I.17: Changes to ASR-11’s Cost

and Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company, Marlborough, Mass.

Financial information 1996 1998 Change in dollars

Total F&E cost $561.3 $743.3 +$182.0

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$70.4

Schedule 1996 1998 Change

Estimated first-site

implementation

Jan. 2000 Jan. 2000 None

Estimated last-site

implementation

Not determined Sept. 2005 N/A

Legend

N/A = not applicable

ASR-11’s Challenges and

Risks

ASR-11 faces risk if (1) unexpected environmental problems and bad

weather occur, (2) the schedule for STARS continues to slip, and (3) the

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contractor’s test and system modification development strategy for the

project is not successful.

First, seasonal constraints for site surveys and preparations and additional

processing time related to environmental impact surveys could cause

ASR-11’s schedule to slip. A risk mitigation strategy was employed to

accomplish site surveys up to 2 years in advance of delivering systems and

site designs up to 1 year in advance of delivering systems.

Second, the ASR-11 deployment schedule is currently based on the need to

have a digital signal available for STARS. STARS requires a digital radar, but

ASR-11 can be delivered and commissioned without STARS. Although STARS’

schedule is slipping, an operational need for ASR-11 still remains because

the current ASR-7 and ASR-8 equipment is aging and needs to be replaced.

According to project officials, if STARS’ schedule slips more than 1 year, FAA

will likely reevaluate the ASR-11 deployment schedule on the basis of the

condition of the current ASR-7 and ASR-8 equipment rather than on the basis

of the STARS’ schedule.

Finally, the ASR-11 contractor’s current strategy for testing requirements

and developing system modifications could lead to delays in the project’s

baseline schedule. The original strategy called for a test program that

utilized previous test data and quick approval of test documentation from

the Contract Data Requirements List. Currently, however, little previous

test data have been used to verify specification requirements, and the test

Contract Data Requirements Lists originally submitted by the contractor

did not meet minimal requirements. As a result, testing has been delayed.

In April 1998, FAA implemented a streamlined test documentation

development and approval process to facilitate better management of the

testing process.

In addition, contractor’s delays have occurred in the completion of the

development and integration of system modifications. As a result,

resources for the radar system have been dedicated to development

activity rather than test activity. This has caused additional delays in the

test program. The contractor has proposed double shifts for testing and

parallel testing as a means of offsetting these delays.

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Figure I.9: ASR-11 at Eglin Air Force

Base, Florida

Source: FAA.

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Voice Switching and

Control System

Background The Voice Switching and Control System (VSCS) replaces existing

communication systems at en route centers with an expandable, highly

reliable system for both ground-to-ground and air-to-ground

communication. VSCS will also provide a communication capability for new

en route center controller workstations. (See fig. I-10.) FAA is also

installing the VSCS Training and Backup Switch (VTABS)—an emergency

back-up communications system, should VSCS experience an equipment

outage—at all en route centers.

VSCS was designed to provide the communication capabilities for the new

Initial Sector Suite System workstations under the Advanced Automation

System program. By the time that the VSCS contract was awarded in

December 1991 to the Harris Corporation, FAA had spent 5 years in

developing prototypes and had incurred cost growth of around $1 billion.34

The contract required Harris to deliver 23 VSCS systems—21 for en route

centers and 2 support systems. FAA’s plans called for VSCS to be installed

with the current equipment and with the new controller workstations.

During the initial development, the cost of the VSCS project increased by

$53.1 million to approximately $1.45 billion—costs associated primarily

with FAA’s decision in 1994 to cancel the Initial Sector Suite System

component of the Advanced Automation System and replace it with the

DSR project. The restructuring resulted in the need for additional

equipment and testing and the extension of contractor and project

personnel longer than planned to field VSCS equipment with DSR equipment.

FAA has also added new functionality requirements to the project. Harris

developed and installed the system in the existing en route controller work

stations in February 1997—5 months ahead of schedule established at the

time of contract award.

Harris is reinstalling the controller interface equipment into the en route

DSR controller workstations. First- and last-site implementation dates for

this phase are the same as those for DSR—October 1998 and May 2000,

respectively.

34According to project officials, the primary reason for this growth was the inability of commercially

available products to effectively and accurately manage air traffic control communications functions.

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Changes to VSCS’ Cost and

Schedule

Since the schedule for transferring VSCS to the DSR console is the same as

that for the DSR project, the agency is projecting a 1-1/2-month slip in

first-site implementation from October to December 1998. Table I.18

summarizes the changes to VSCS’ cost and schedule since 1994.

Table I.18: Changes to VSCS’ Cost and

Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne, Fla.

Financial information 1994 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $1,452.9 $1,452.9 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$1,388.9

Schedule 1994a 1998 Change in

months

Estimated first-site

Implementation

Oct. 1998 Dec. 1998 +1.5 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

May 2000 May 2000 None

aSchedule is for activities that coincide with the schedule for the DSR project.

VSCS’ Challenges and

Risks

Harris has completed software development for the primary system to be

fielded with the new DSR controller workstations. According to the project

manager, the project has not encountered any technical problems and is

not expected to incur any major schedule slips.

Meanwhile, FAA is in the process of installing VTABS at all en route centers.

By the end of 1998, FAA expects to have VTABS equipment installed at 10 en

route centers, the FAA Technical Center, and the FAA Academy. FAA plans to

have VTABS installed at the remaining en route centers and in Alaska by

November 1999.

In fiscal year 1998, FAA reprogrammed $22 million of the $45.4 million

appropriated for VSCS to support the Host replacement project. This

reprogramming action forced the project office to defer, until at least 2001,

the replacement of Tandem computers used by VSCS in its operating

system. The project office views this computer replacement as critical

because Tandem will not certify the existing computers as Year 2000

compliant. Currently, FAA and its contractor are conducting tests to

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determine if there is a Year 2000 problem. Tests to date have uncovered

only minor problems for which FAA has identified solutions.

According to the VSCS project manager, although no significant Year 2000

problems have been identified with the Tandem computer, the computer

and its operating system are several generations old. FAA’s current

software licensing and hardware maintenance agreements have expired

for FAA’s Technical Center and FAA’s Academy systems, greatly increasing

the monthly licensing and maintenance fees. Software licensing

agreements for the operational systems will begin to expire in 2003 and

will have similar program effects. On the basis of the fees that Tandem

charges FAA for the obsolete operating systems at FAA’s Technical Center, it

is conceivable that the fees that Tandem will charge for the obsolete

operating systems for the operational sites for one year could exceed the

cost to replace the Tandem computers. FAA currently has efforts under

way to restore funding for the Tandem computer replacement project in

fiscal year 1999 to ensure that the computers are replaced before the

license agreement expires for the operational system.

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Figure I.10: VSCS Display Module

Source: FAA.

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Weather and Radar

Processor

Background The Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) is an automated processing and

display system that will acquire, process, and disseminate Next Generation

Weather Radar data to air traffic personnel at 21 en route centers and one

each at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center and the FAA

Technical Center. Meteorologists will receive the data at their workstation;

area supervisors, via WARP briefing terminals; and en route controllers, via

the situation displays provided by DSR. WARP is being acquired in three

stages and will replace the current Meteorological Weather Processor

system. Stage 0 is an early deployment of a commercial off-the-shelf

system that will replace and improve the functionality of the current

system that experienced many problems in the past. Stage 1/2 is the core

of the project, where interfaces with DSR, several Next Generation Weather

Radar products—such as precipitation detection at multiple levels—and

other current systems will be developed. The latter part of this stage is

intended to improve the interface with Next Generation Weather Radar

products and allow for other improvements, such as providing the

controller with the ability to request and reply to data. FAA plans to

implement Stage 3 in the future to provide WARP with critical operational

changes. This stage will also allow WARP to interface with other systems

now being developed, such as ATM/Free Flight Phase 1, ITWS, OASIS, and

Oceanic Automation Program.

Changes to WARP’s Cost

and Schedule

Stage 0 has been completed. The project met all its milestones on or ahead

of schedule for this stage since the contract was signed in July 1996. For

example, the first operational readiness demonstration for Stage 0 was

met 2 months ahead of schedule in July 1997, and the last demonstration

was met 5 months ahead of schedule.

Also, in 1997, both preliminary and critical design reviews for Stage 1/2

were achieved months ahead of schedule. According to an FAA Office of

Aviation Research official, a working group was also initiated during

preliminary design review to address any human-factor questions that

might be raised in the project’s early stages. However, first- and last-site

implementation for Stage 1/2 have slipped 5 months each because of Year

2000 testing requirements; a slip in the Next Generation Weather Radar

certification testing schedule; an anticipated delay in operational test and

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Modernization Projects

evaluation because of the unavailability of the DSR interface; and an

additional requirement to develop initial weather telecommunications

capabilities. Currently, Stage 1/2 is in full-scale development, and three

limited production systems for Stage 1/2 have been procured. Cost

estimates for the project have remained constant since the contract’s

award. Stage 3 was originally scheduled to get started in 1999. Stage 3 is

not considered part of the project schedule’s official baseline. Table I.19

summarizes the changes to WARP’s cost and schedule since 1996.

Table I.19: Changes to WARP’s Cost

and Schedule Dollars in millions

Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne, Fla.

Financial information 1996 1998

Change in

dollars

Total F&E cost $125.6 $125.6 None

Cumulative F&E

appropriations through

fiscal year 1998

$57.7

Schedule 1996 1998 Change in

months

Estimated first-site

implementation

Sept. 1999a Feb. 2000a + 5 months

Estimated last-site

implementation

Feb. 2000a July 2000a + 5 months

aRepresents Stage 1/2.

WARP’s Challenges and

Risks

According to an FAA project official, three of the four issues that caused

the 5-month slip in the project’s first- and last-site implementation have

been mitigated. The required development of initial weather

telecommunications capabilities—the fourth issue—is an ongoing effort

but should not cause further slips in the project’s first- and last-site

implementation.

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Modernization Projects Completed Through

August 1998

Dollars in millions

Project (project number) Completion date

Total reported facilities

and equipment cost

Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS)

IIIA Assembler (22-02) 1983 0a

ARTS II Displays (22-07) 1984 $ 3.6

Radar Remote Weather Display System

(23-10) 1984 0a

Interim Voice Response System (23-06) 1985 0a

Geostationary Operational Environmental

Satellite Recorders (23-11) 1985 1.9

En Route Automation (21-01) 1986 2.3

ARTS IIIA Memory (22-04) 1986 8.6

Additional ARTS IIIA at FAA Technical Center

(22-05) 1986 4.7

ARTS II Interfacility Interface (22-08) 1986 0a

Consolidated Notice to Airmen System (23-03) 1986 0a

Radar Microwave Link Trunking (25-01) 1986 8.2

Teletypewriter Replacement (25-09) 1986 5.1

Nonradar Approach (21-14) 1987 1.6

Air Traffic Control Tower Closures (22-14) 1987 1.5

Air/Ground Communications Equipment

Modernization (24-01) 1987 60.6

Airport Telecommunications (25-05) 1987 4.2

Data System Specialist Support (51-20) 1987 32.0

Host Computer (21-07)b 1988 290.7

Altitude Reporting Mode of Secondary Radar

(Mode-C) (21-10) 1988 0a

Enhanced Target Generator Displays (ARTS

III) (22-03) 1988 0a

Nondirectional Beacon (24-04) 1988 23.8

National Airspace Data Interchange Network

IA (25-06) 1988 17.0

Aircraft Fleet Conversion (26-11) 1988 68.6

Enhanced Terminal Conflict Alert (22-01) 1989 0.4

Automatic Terminal Information Service

Recorders (22-10) 1989 11.2

High-Altitude En Route Flight Advisory

Service (23-07) 1989 6.3

Hazardous In Flight Weather Advisory Service

(23-08) 1989 7.3

Instrument Landing System (24-06) 1989 69.6

(continued)

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Modernization Projects Completed Through

August 1998

Dollars in millions

Project (project number) Completion date

Total reported facilities

and equipment cost

Power Conditioning Systems for ARTS III

(26-06) 1989 21.5

TPX-42 Replacement (22-17) 1990 40.0

Flight Data Entry and Print-Out Devices

(21-02) 1991 18.8

En Route Automated Radar Tracking System

Enhancements (21-04) 1991 2.8

Offshore Flight Data Processing System

(21-16) 1991 1.0

Sustain New York Terminal Radar Approach

Control (TRACON) (22-18) 1991 95.4

Computer-Based Instruction (26-02) 1991 10.4

National Radio Communication System (26-14) 1991 82.7

Direct Access Radar Channel System (21-03) 1992 45.0

Air Traffic Control Tower/TRACON

Modernization (22-13)c 1992 391.4

Communications Facilities

Consolidation/Network (24-02) 1992 16.8

National Airspace Data Interchange Network

II (25-07) 1992 42.4

Power System (26-07) 1992 71.5

Modernization of Unmanned FAA Buildings

and Equipment (26-08) 1992 85.7

Aircraft and Related Equipment (26-12) 1992 68.9

National Airspace System Spectrum

Engineering (26-15) 1992 9.4

System Support Lab (26-17) 1992 31.5

General Support Lab (26-18) 1992 25.6

ARTS IIA Enhancements (22-06) 1993 12.9

Area Control Facilities (21-15) 1993 9.6

Data Multiplexing Network (25-02) 1993 34.0

Radar Microwave Link Replacement and

Expansion (25-03)d 1993 268.4

Large Airport Cable Loop Systems (26-05) 1993 20.3

Interfacility Data Transfer System for Edwards

Air Force Base Radar Approach Control

(35-20) 1994 1.8

Visual Navaids (24-09) 1994 137.7

Acquisition of Flight Service Facilities (26-10) 1994 79.7

Interim Support Plane (46-30) 1994 362.9

Tower Integration Program (42-20) 1994 11.2

(continued)

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Modernization Projects Completed Through

August 1998

Dollars in millions

Project (project number) Completion date

Total reported facilities

and equipment cost

Radar Pedestal Vibration Analysis (44-43) 1994 5.0

Low-Level Wind Shear Alert System (23-12) 1994 47.2

Human Resource Management (56-22) 1994 7.3

Brite Radar Indicator Tower Equipment (22-16) 1994 64.5

Approach Lighting System Improvement

Program (24-10) 1994 121.9

Central Weather Processor (23-02) 1994 81.1

General Support (26-16)f 1994 824.0

National Implementation of the “Imaging” Aid

for Dependent Converging Runway

Approaches (62-24) 1994 4.6

Integrated Communications Switching System

(23-13) 1995 98.3

System Engineering and Integration Contract

(26-13) 1995 759.3

National Airspace Data Interchange Network

II Continuation (35-07) 1995 23.7

ARTS IIIA Peripheral Adapter Module

Modernization (52-21) 1995 5.9

Instrument Landing System and Visual

Navaids Engineering and Sparing (44-24) 1995 13.1

Air Traffic Control Tower/TRACON

Establishment (32-13) 1995 13.1

Flight Service Automation System (23-01) 1995 313.7

Multichannel Voice Recorders (22-11) 1996 40.2

Weather Message Switching Center

Replacement (23-04) 1996 32.5

Computer Aided Engineering Graphics

Enhancements (56-25) 1996 3.7

Oceanic Display and Planning System (21-05) 1996 36.8

Integrated Communications Switching System

Logistics Support (43-14) 1996 10.6

Maintenance Control Center (26-04) 1996 47.9

Long-Range Navigation-C (LORAN-C)

Systems (24-17) 1996 51.9

ARTS IIA Interface with Mode-S/Airport

Surveillance Radar-9 (22-09) 1996 0a

Replacement of Controllers Chairs (42-24) 1996 5.1

ARTS IIIA-Expand Capacity and Provide

Mode-C Intruder Capability (32-20) 1997 109.8

Display Channel Complex Rehost (A-01) 1997 61.3

(continued)

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Appendix II 

Modernization Projects Completed Through

August 1998

Dollars in millions

Project (project number) Completion date

Total reported facilities

and equipment cost

Digital Bright Radar Indicator Tower

Equipment (32-16) 1998 24.2

Civil Aviation Registry Modernization (56-24) 1998 34.4

FAA Telecommunications (45-21) 1998 16.1

Precision Automated Tracking System (56-16) 1998 3.3

National Airspace Integrated Logistic Support

(56-58) 1998 27.6

Long Range Radar Radome Replacement

(44-42) 1998 39.5

Computer Resources Nucleus (56-28) 1998 158.1

Total $5,714.2

aThe cost of this project was covered under another facilities and equipment project.

bInstalled at en route centers to allow processing of existing air traffic control software on new

equipment.

cProject comprised a variety of tower and terminal replacement and modernization projects.

Project was continued in the Capital Investment Plan under projects 42-13 and 42-14.

dAlso known as the Radio Communications Link project, it was designed to convert aging “special

purpose” Radar Microwave Link System into a “general purpose” system for data, voice, and

radar communications among en route centers and other major FAA facilities.

eProject was activated to sustain and upgrade air traffic control operations and acquire eight

terminal radars awaiting the full implementation of the Advanced Automation System.

f

Project comprised a variety of diverse support projects and has been continued in the Capital

Investment Plan under Continued General Support (46-16).

Source: FAA. We did not independently verify the schedule and cost information.

Page 95 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Resources,

Community, and

Economic

Development

Division, Washington,

D.C.

John H. Anderson, Jr.

Gregory P. Carroll

Beverly Norwood Dulaney

David B. Goldstein

Peter G. Maristch

Belva M. Martin

John T. Noto

Earl P. Williams, Jr.

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

Colleen M. Phillips

(348111) Page 96 GAO/RCED-99-25 FAA’s Modernization Program
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