Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

May 16, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

126509 & (50) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices v SC: 126509 

 COA: 244553 

Shiawassee CC: 02-007574-FC 

RICKY ALLEN PARKS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

By order of June 22, 2007, we remanded this case to the Shiawassee Circuit Court 

for an evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court to determine if there was any 

evidence that the complainant made a prior false accusation of sexual abuse against 

another person. On order of the Court, the evidentiary hearing having been held and the 

Shiawassee Circuit Court’s finding and accompanying transcript of the hearing having 

been received, we again consider the application for leave to appeal the May 18, 2004 

judgment of the Court of Appeals. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on 

whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). The 

parties shall file supplemental briefs within 56 days of the appointment or procurement of 

counsel by the defendant, and the parties shall include among the issues addressed: 

(1) whether the evidence of prior accusations of sexual abuse made by the complainant 

against another person that was revealed during the evidentiary hearing on remand is 

admissible under the Michigan Rules of Evidence; (2) whether the truth or falsity of those 

accusations makes a difference in assessing their admissibility, given the young age of 

the complainant at the time of trial; (3) whether the circuit court’s ruling at the 

defendant’s trial prohibiting the further discovery and introduction of this evidence 

constituted reversible error; (4) whether such evidence is subject to the rape shield 

statute, MCL 750.520j; (5) whether the sexual abuse of a young child constitutes “the 

victim’s past sexual conduct” within the meaning of MCL 750.520j(a); and (6) whether 

the defendant in this case must be allowed to introduce the evidence of the complainant’s 

prior accusations of sexual abuse in order to preserve his constitutional right of 

confrontation and to present a defense. 

We further ORDER the Shiawassee Circuit Court, in accordance with 

Administrative Order 2003-03, to determine whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, 
 

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to appoint the State Appellate Defender Office to represent the defendant in this Court. 

The Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the Prosecuting Attorneys 

Association of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups 

interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court 

for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. 

CORRIGAN, J., concurs and states as follows: 

I join the order scheduling this case for oral argument. I write separately because I 

question the manner in which this Court frames the issues for argument. The order 

(1) injects a new issue that defendant has never raised in the prior history of this case and 

(2) overlooks the key issue arising from this Court’s earlier remand of this case. 

A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), arising out of the sexual abuse of his nine-year-old 

stepdaughter. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by excluding 

evidence that the victim had made prior false accusations of sexual abuse against another 

person. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument because defendant had 

“failed to offer any concrete evidence” of a prior false accusation.1

 This Court remanded 

the case to the trial court for “an evidentiary hearing, affording the defendant the 

opportunity to offer proof that the complainant made a prior false accusation of sexual 

abuse against another person.”2 

On remand, the trial court held hearings and reviewed the evidence presented. At 

the conclusion of the hearings, the court found no evidence that the victim had made a 

prior false accusation of sexual abuse against another person. 

This Court’s order now directs the clerk to schedule oral argument on the 

application. The order identifies issues that the parties “shall” address. Notably absent 

from those mandatory issues is one related to the very question for which we required an 

evidentiary hearing on remand to the trial court: whether the victim made a prior false 

accusation of sexual abuse against another person. The order does not ask the parties to 

address whether the trial court clearly erred when it found no evidence of a prior false 

accusation. 

1 People v Parks, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 18, 2004 (Docket No. 

244553), p 3. 

2

 478 Mich 910 (2007). 
 _________________________________________ 

 

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Instead, the Court’s order mandates argument on issues that the parties themselves 

have never advanced. For example, the order asks whether the truth or falsity of the prior 

accusation affects its admissibility, whether the prior sexual abuse (implicitly assuming 

its truth) would constitute “the victim’s past sexual conduct” under the rape-shield 

statute, MCL 750.520j(1)(a), and whether defendant must be allowed to present such 

evidence to preserve his constitutional rights of confrontation and to present a defense. 

It appears that defendant has never argued on appeal that the prior accusation of 

sexual abuse was true and that he must be allowed to present such evidence. On the 

contrary, defendant’s contention on appeal has always been that the victim made a prior 

false accusation of sexual abuse. 

Accordingly, this Court’s framing of the issues for argument is quite unusual 

given that (1) this Court has already remanded for an evidentiary hearing regarding 

whether the prior accusation was false and (2) this Court now invents a new theory that 

the prior accusation may be admissible because it is true. If the evidence is admissible 

because it is true, then the purpose of our previous remand for an evidentiary hearing to 

determine whether the accusation was false is not readily apparent. 

In any event, I would invite the parties and the amici curiae to address (1) whether 

the issues now raised by this Court’s order are properly before this Court, (2) the 

appropriate standard for reviewing those issues, if any, and (3) whether it is appropriate 

to grant relief on those issues. Further, I would suggest that the parties and the amici 

curiae may also wish to address the issue resulting from our remanding this case to the 

trial court, which this Court’s order now overlooks: whether the trial court clearly erred 

when it found no evidence that the victim made a prior false accusation of sexual abuse 

against another person. 

WEAVER, J., joins the statement of CORRIGAN, J. 

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I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

May 16, 2008 

Clerk