2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-2-2005

Franks v. Lehigh

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 04-2971

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Recommended Citation

"Franks v. Lehigh" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 756.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No: 04-2971

TIMOTHY FRANKS,

 Appellant

 v.

COUNTY OF LEHIGH, THOMAS LAZORIK,

BRIAN KAHLER, TED KEHM, JANICE E. NESBIT

JANE BAKER, RICHARD O. KLOTZ

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(Civ. No. 02-cv-02652)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 14, 2005

Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and WEIS Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 2, 2005)

OPINION

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Timothy Franks asks us to review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of his employers in the action he filed against them under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. For the reasons that

follow, we will affirm.
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I. 

Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of

this case in detail. It is sufficient to note that Appellant Franks worked as an accountant

for the County of Lehigh from 1997 until 2001, when he was terminated. Franks suffers

from Type I Diabetes Mellitus (“diabetes”), and during his employment with the County,

he experienced numerous acute hyper- and hypoglycemic attacks that required medical

care. Franks alleges that he is entitled to recover under the ADA because 

his supervisors were overly preoccupied with his diabetic

condition and were paranoid about their own potential

personal liability should Franks become injured while at work

as a result of a diabetic attack. . . . the County manipulated his

final performance evaluation to reflect a bogus

‘unsatisfactory’ rating and create a basis for his termination.

Appellant’s Br. at 3. 

Summary judgement is only appropriate if, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [any] affidavits, . . . show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law," when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©). 

The District Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that

so often guides inquiries into employment discrimination. App. 14, citing Shaner v.

Synthes, 204, F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). The court found that Franks proved his prima

facie case, but failed to adequately refute the County’s articulation of a legitimate and 
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non-discriminatory ground for the adverse employment action taken against Franks. 

II.

In Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that:

[T]o avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff's evidence

rebutting the employer's proffered legitimate reasons must

allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the

employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons . . . was

either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually

motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason

is a pretext). 

To discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, the

plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was

wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is

whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not

whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.

. . . Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies,

or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate

reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could

rationally find them “unworthy of credence,” . . . and hence

infer “that the employer did not act for (the asserted) nondiscriminatory reasons.” 

Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (internal citations omitted). The County cited Franks’

incompetence as reflected in performance evaluations over the course of two years, as the

reason he was terminated. Franks sought to discredit this proffered reason by alleging

inconsistencies in the evaluation scheme as a whole. As the District Court summarized:

For example, the point is made that . . . what are apparently

similar grades assigned in a portion of the 1999 evaluation,

which resulted in an overall satisfactory rating, are

inconsistent with . . . what are given as comparable readings,
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but with a different bottom line in the 2000 evaluation.

App. 18. Judge Pollak recognized a lack of coherence in the testimony of Franks’s

supervisors in their explanation of the weighting of the various evaluation factors. App.

19. However, Judge Pollak concluded that the inconsistencies did not demonstrate that

the employer’s stated rationale was a pretext, nor that the employer was motivated by

discriminatory animus. App. 26. In a well-reasoned and thorough oral ruling, Judge

Pollak explained why the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law, and we can add little to his discussion. See App. 009-028. Accordingly, we will

affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its ruling from the

bench on December 1, 2004.