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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Air Force Smart Operations

for the Twenty-first Century

Identifying Potential Failure Points

in Sustaining Continuous Process

Improvement across the Air Force

Harold W. Linnean III

Major, USAFR

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 33

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research projects from the prior academic year. The 

ACSC research program encourages our students to move 

beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own professional development and in “advancing air and space power.” 

The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects 

selected for publication combine solid research, innovative 

thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer 

Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, 

organizational, and operational questions. Some of these 

studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others 

encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new 

possibilities. By making these research studies available in 

the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical 

examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

 JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

 Brigadier General, USAF

 Commandant

Abstract

Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century 

(AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to recapitalize funds 

by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. 

This is a fundamental shift by the Air Force toward a desired end state of continuous process improvement. Will 

AFSO 21 change the culture of the Air Force? A successful 

change requires a balance between the system components 

of culture, vision, structure, leadership, and systems. 

Air Force leadership may avoid failure in its AFSO 21 implementation if it addresses potential failure points before 

they fester and take root. The first potential failure point is 

focusing only on culture and thus creating an unbalanced 

system or organization. The next potential failure point is 

the inflexibility of the Air Force structure. A third potential 

failure point is its human resource management systems. 

When it comes to “quality” programs, Air Force midlevel 

officers are experiencing déjà vu. How will midlevel officers 

accept it? The failure to win over Generation TQM, the midlevel officers, is a fourth potential failure point for the sustainment of AFSO 21. Does the Air Force have a vision for 

AFSO 21? The Air Force must rectify this disparity between 

vision and message and remove a final potential failure 

point in sustaining AFSO 21. 

This paper identifies potential failure points associated 

with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force’s 

change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. 

However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately 

planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There 

is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the 

system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term 

sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement 

will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to 

AFSO 21. 



Preface

I have always been a proponent of working smarter and not 

harder. I could never stand to hear the words “we’ve always 

done it this way.” Those words were enough to send shivers 

up my spine. I believe, as leaders, we should always try to 

find better, faster, smarter ways of doing business. In addition, we should naturally solicit honest feedback and opinions 

from our people. Sometimes we tend to complicate our lives 

by introducing programs that involve new languages, rules, 

processes, training, and so forth. I think leadership is much 

simpler than that—it is serving your people. 

I selected this topic with the hope of learning more about 

Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century 

(AFSO 21). I do believe its philosophy and principles are 

sound. However, as a member of “Generation TQM (Total 

Quality Management)” (see section on “Midlevel Officers—

Generation TQM”), I am skeptical about creating and implementing another “quality” program. I do believe it is a fad 

which will soon fade away. 

I would like to acknowledge several people who made 

significant contributions that enabled me to complete this 

research odyssey—it has been a strange ride. I owe thanks 

to Lt Col Bill Polakowski, my research advisor, and his 

deputy, Maj John Sawyer, for tackling this new and 

challenging class—a job well done. I owe special thanks to 

Maj Kelly Jost for being my cohort in crime. She was 

invaluable in helping me keep my sanity throughout the 

research process. In addition, I would like to give a “shout 

out” to the Third Herd—you guys rock.

I owe a very special thanks (and a place in my heart) to 

my wife, Joy. She endured my many late nights and cranky 

days as I pounded the keyboard. Thank you all. I’ll see you 

on the other side.

vii



Introduction

Money makes the world go around, of that we both 

are sure.

—Lyrics from “Money, Money”

This line from the musical Cabaret highlights a certain 

truth in the world. Whether it is people, businesses, or 

militaries, money is the engine that powers them all. For 

example, people must have money to provide adequately 

for themselves and their families. Businesses must have 

money to operate and earn a profit. In short, money makes 

the world go around. Militaries are not exempt from this 

economic reality. 

It takes a tremendous amount of money to operate a 

world-class military. To illustrate this point, the requested 

fiscal year 2008 budget for the United States Air Force is 

over $110 billion. Moreover, the Air Force has requested 

another $17 billion for operations supporting the global war 

on terror.1 However, even this amount is not enough. The Air 

Force needs more funds to modernize and recapitalize its 

aging fleet. Many aircraft have long passed their intended 

life span. For example, the average age of the KC-135E 

Stratotanker is 48 years old, and the B-52H Stratofortress 

is 45 years old.2 Operational and budgetary pressures further hinder the modernization and recapitalization effort. 

Fiscal pressures include rising operating costs (e.g., personnel and energy resources) and cutthroat interservice 

competition for defense funds. Operational pressures include funding new weapon systems, assuming new missions, and sustaining current mission requirements. These 

pressures stress an already constrained budget. 

These budget problems are basic Economics 101. The Air 

Force has “x” amount of dollars to pay for “y” amount of 

goods and services. If the need for “y” is greater than for 

“x,” then the reduction of expenses and fiscal obligations is 

the only way to generate the necessary savings. Air Force 

Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is 

the Air Force’s initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing 

value and minimizing waste in operations. Per the secretary 

of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, and the Air Force chief of 
staff, Gen T. Michael Moseley, “our strategy will be a comprehensive effort to improve our work processes across our Air 

Force.”3 This is a fundamental shift by the Air Force toward a 

desired end state of continuous process improvement. 

AFSO 21 incorporates many different types of processimprovement models such as Lean, Six Sigma, and the Theory 

of Constraints. According to the director of the AFSO 21

office, Brig Gen S. “Taco” Gilbert, the intent is to build a 

toolkit with a variety of tools that are flexible enough to apply across many areas.4 The Air Force is emphasizing Lean 

because of its “infectious quality [with] quick, visible results that cause natural replication.”5 Undeniably, the Air 

Force is trying to ensure AFSO 21 develops and infectiously 

spreads across the Air Force. As expected, positive results 

(i.e., quick wins) are pouring in from units. The program 

appears to be working, efficiencies are being gained, and 

money is being saved—but for how long?

The introduction of a new Air Force–wide program generates many questions regarding the “real” reasons behind 

it. For instance, is AFSO 21 just a short-term initiative to 

navigate the Air Force through a few years of treacherous 

financial waters? What happens if the current operations 

(and thus the cost) of the global war on terror decrease? 

What if energy costs suddenly fall and maintain a steadily 

low price? What happens after Presidential Budget 720 

force reductions are off the financial ledgers? Will leadership’s interest with continuous process improvement wane 

once fiscal and operational pressures are alleviated? 

On the other hand, is AFSO 21 a long-term program for 

developing the world’s best combat force? Will it actually 

improve combat readiness? Will it increase the delivery of 

war-fighting capabilities? Will it ultimately shorten the “kill 

chain” in combat? According to Secretary Wynne, AFSO 21

will be around for a long time. In a letter to Airmen, he 

stated that “the continuous process improvements of AFSO 

21 will be the new culture of our Air Force.”6 Therefore, one 

can submit that the sustainment of AFSO 21 is dependent 

upon reaching the desired end state. One must also derive 

that the desired end state is a culture of continuous process 

improvement. Thus, the Air Force must change to achieve 

the end state and become a continuous-process-improvement 

organization. This task is not as easy as it sounds. 
The Air Force has tried an organizational culture change—

in the name of quality—before. A little over a decade ago, 

the Air Force tried to sow the seeds of quality on its force. 

That foray was Quality Air Force or Total Quality Management (TQM); the program ultimately failed to take hold and 

sustain itself. So what is different this time around that will 

enable a new continuous-process-improvement culture? 

The philosophy and principles of Lean and Six Sigma are 

sound; the problems with these programs will be with their 

implementation. Therefore, this paper does not debate or 

challenge the merit of the AFSO 21 program. Instead, it explores how the Air Force is implementing AFSO 21 and discusses potential failure points. It is too late to suggest how 

to initiate the program, but it is not too late to bring awareness to possible stumbling points in sustaining a long-term 

culture of continuous process improvement. Furthermore, 

it is about changing the culture, which requires a balance 

between the parts of the organization. The thesis of this 

study is that AFSO 21 will fail to sustain itself unless there 

is a successful change in Air Force culture—a change requiring a balance between the system parts of vision, structure, leadership, and systems. 

Organizational Change

I cannot say whether things will get better if we 

change; what I can say is they must change if they 

are to get better.

—Georg C. Lichtenberg

Change is in the air. The Air Force is trying to become 

smarter, faster, cheaper, and more efficient. The current 

status quo of doing business is unacceptable to the secretary and the chief of staff of the Air Force. As already 

acknowledged, there is a new desired end state; it is an 

Air Force culture of continuous process improvement. 

The challenge for the Air Force is making the change from 

the current state to the desired end state. Organizational 

change is hard but is predictable and manageable. To establish a common understanding of what is involved with 
implementing and sustaining a transformation initiative, 

the concept of change is first briefly explored. 

A Journey across the “Unknown” State

Organizational change “is a dynamic process, rather than 

a series of events.”7 Human nature tends to gravitate toward 

the path of least resistance. The tendency is to believe that 

very simple answers will handle the complex problems we 

face. However, change requires more than simply redrawing an organizational chart. It is active and is in constant 

motion. Change is relentlessly creating a new crisis or challenge. This dynamic process requires an organization to 

continuously monitor and adjust its activities accordingly. 

As the rate of change fluctuates, leadership and followers 

must adapt to it. Failing to adapt can lead to a slowdown or 

discontinuation of the change effort.

Another way to frame change is by looking at it from a 

different perspective. Organizational change occurs when 

an organization realizes there is a significant gap between 

its current and desired environment. This unknown state 

is a foreign and mysterious place. Change occurs when an 

organization closes this gap (see fig. 1). 

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Figure 1. Change gap. (Developed by author using concepts of Earl 

Walker, Changing Organizational Culture: Strategy, Structure, and Professionalism in the U.S. General Accounting Office, 1st ed. [Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986].)

“Failure to close this gap . . . that is, the failure to change—will 

spell doom for the organization.”8 Closing this gap is difficult.

The trek across the unknown state is an unfamiliar journey (or at least for the people in the organization). After 

all, the people must endure the process. Involving the human aspect injects a host of other complications such as 
emotions. According to Jeanie Duck, “Changing an organization is inherently and inescapably an emotional human 

process.”9 This emotional process may include uncertainty, 

fear, and excitement. As we will discover, the introduction 

of the human aspect further complicates the change effort. 

Thus, an organization’s change effort is dependent upon 

discovering the best way(s) to close this gap. Random, unplanned forays for closing the gap are discouraged because 

it is easy to become lost, overwhelmed, and discouraged. 

This “close the gap” endeavor requires a broad plan of action focused on the long term. The journey will be long, but 

successfully changing an organization is dependent upon 

reaching the end state. 

How to Change (and How Not to Change)

Once an organization realizes it must change, the next 

step is determining how to change. There are a number of 

drivers for, and barriers to, change. Duck frames change 

efforts into three essential elements: 

1. Strategy: a passionate belief in where you’re going. 

Clear strategy [that is] more easily understood . . . 

translates into action.

2. Execution: good, basic management. Indispensable 

during radical change.

3. Manag[ement of] all the human issues that swirl 

around change.10

In her view, the most important driver of change is managing all of the human issues that swirl around it. This 

perspective on how human issues affect change resurfaces 

later in this paper.

Another example of how to implement change is John Kotter’s eight steps to transforming your organization (fig. 2). He 

argues that change requires much more effort than simply 

redrawing organizational charts. A true transformation of 

an organization requires leadership and all of its trappings. 

However, these steps are not as simple. An organization will 

transition through the steps at different speeds—sometimes 

fast, but most often slowly.11
Moving through these steps is complicated and timeconsuming—it can take years. According to Kotter, this is 

where trouble begins with the change initiative. These long 

periods are “incomprehensible to short-term, reactive managers.” As a result, they are more likely to make a critical 

mistake in one of the steps, which “can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum and negating hard-won 

gains.”12 Kotter has categorized these critical mistakes into 

eight barriers to change (fig. 3):

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John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do [Boston: Harvard Business School 

Press, 1999], 92.) 

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Figure 3. Kotter’s eight change-process barriers. (Developed by author 

based on John P. Kotter, John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do [Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999], 60­–67.) 
Change efforts are nothing new to the Air Force. It has 

undergone many organizational and cultural changes such 

as realignment of major commands and the bomber-to-fighter 

coup d’état. However, not all changes took root. The Air Force’s 

attempt in the 1990s at a “quality” culture experienced many 

of Kotter’s change barriers. Admittedly, the Air Force “made 

mistakes in implementing TQM and there were some significant flaws in the approach itself.”13 With this in mind, it is one 

thing to acknowledge past mistakes, but it is another thing to 

learn from them. 

Did the Air Force learn from its past failures and develop 

a comprehensive strategy and change plan for AFSO 21? 

Furthermore, what is the best way to analyze these products and the survivability of AFSO 21? Utilizing the systems 

thinking approach allows us to conceptualize the Air Force 

and identify potential failure points for AFSO 21. 

Systems Thinking Approach

The significant problems we have cannot be solved 

at the same level of thinking with which we created 

them.

—Albert Einstein

The Air Force is a large, complex organization, thereby 

making it a challenge to grasp and understand its many 

interdependent components. The systems thinking approach 

provides a structure for visualizing the organization as interrelationships and not just separate parts. This approach also 

provides a means to identify potential failure points in changing the Air Force culture to one of continuous process improvement. The intent of this discussion is not to fully utilize the 

systems thinking processes of loops and links, diagnostics, 

systems archetypes, or computer modeling. Instead, it simply 

uses systems thinking to conceptualize the Air Force and its 

components so that potential failure points in the change 

initiative can be identified. However, before examining the various components, it is important to examine systems thinking. 

What Is Systems Thinking?

Systems thinking is a process for looking at the whole and 

not its parts, a concept popularized by Peter Senge. In his 
book The Fifth Discipline, Senge suggests that “systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes, recognizing patterns and 

interrelationships, and learning how to structure those interrelationships in more effective, efficient ways.”14 To spin an old 

country saying, it is seeing the forest and not just the trees. 

As an illustration, consider the composition of an automobile. 

It consists of thousands of individual parts that connect to 

form a large, complex system. In addition, there are smaller 

subsystems such as electrical, brake, and fuel systems. Each 

part directly or indirectly affects the operation of the automobile. The key concept is that each part, no matter the size 

or importance, has a central role in the system. However, if 

there is a problem, the complexity of the automobile makes it 

difficult to determine which part is failing (or has failed). The 

systems thinking approach allows the mechanic to see the 

interrelationships rather than parts. This approach is useful 

in troubleshooting because it eliminates the mayhem under 

the hood. In his book Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos 

and Complexity, Jamshid Gharajedaghi submits that systems 

thinking provides “a holistic picture that will allow us to see 

through chaos and understand complexity.”15

In essence, systems thinking is an excellent way to view 

change because it focuses not on the individual component but rather the big picture. This is very useful when 

examining large, complex organizations like the Air Force. 

Systems thinking “organizes complexity into a coherent 

story that illuminates the causes of problems and how 

they can be remedied in enduring ways.”16 Understanding 

the system as a whole enables us to predict, influence, or 

control its behavior.

Interrelationships Take Time

Changes to a system do not occur overnight. It takes time 

to make holistic changes due to processes, linkages, and 

interactions between the components; these are complex 

and dynamic interrelationships. “Very often, people expect 

improvements too soon after changes are implemented.”17

This may explain why long-term change efforts sometimes 

fail in organizations. In some cases of failure, a frequent 

mistake is overlooking these interrelationships. It is important to remember that changing or ignoring one part of 
a system can have consequences elsewhere. This is even 

more apparent when one considers that organizations do 

not operate in a vacuum; they interact with both internal 

and external environments. The level of these interactions 

varies between simple and complex relationships. Therefore, leaders need a tool to distinguish processes, patterns, 

and relationships from events.

Just Like Tires—Alignment and Balance Matter

“Systems thinking is a useful tool to initiate organizational change and continuous improvement.”18 Michael 

Beer provides an organizational change model for leaders.19

He believes “one of the keys to successful organizational 

change is ensuring that all components in Figure [4] are 

in alignment.”20 In other words, no one component is an 

island; all components must work in unison to achieve the 

desired change. However, there is a difference in the amount 

of time and energy invested in each component. Organizations must find the appropriate balance. “Any imbalance 

diminishes the system’s ability to effectively accomplish its 

purpose and causes conflict within the system.”21

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Figure 4. Beer’s system model for change. (Reprinted from Richard L. 

Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordon J. Curphy, Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, 5th ed. [Boston: McGraw-Hill Custom 

Publishing, 2006], 397.)
10

The following discussion utilizes Beer’s system model to 

identify potential points of failure to sustaining AFSO 21

and its culture of continuous process improvement. This 

is important because change failures often occur when 

only addressing one part of a larger, complex system. As 

a result, an organization focuses on the symptom and not 

the problem. This focus on a short-term symptom fails to 

address the long-term problem; thus, the energy and resources directed at it will not create a culture of continuous 

process improvement. “[Culture] does not stand alone; it 

must operate effectively (in balance) with other parts for the 

system to accomplish its purpose.”22 The sustainment of a 

long-term program demands that “no area of the organization can be off-limits or protected.”23 Because of this, the 

Air Force must be willing to address the long-term problems of change resistance and not just the symptoms. 

Potential Failure Point No. 1

It’s the Culture, Stupid—Or Is It?

The continuous process improvements of AFSO 21 

will be the new culture of our Air Force.

 —Michael W. Wynne, secretary of the Air Force

Secretary Wynne has zeroed in on culture as the key to 

making continuous process improvement a reality. In his 

view, “we must fundamentally change the culture of our Air 

Force so that all Airmen understand their individual role in 

improving their daily processes and eliminating things that 

don’t add value to the mission.”24

Organizational culture is a mystifying thing. How else 

does one explain how a deftly constructed strategy can fail 

when employees do not buy into it? After all, is strategy 

not the driver for action? Or, on the contrary, does culture 

drive how effectively people work together? For instance, 

an organization’s strategy is to increase efficiencies across 

the organization. However, if its culture is one where people 

get the job done at any cost, then the disparity between the 

strategy and the culture could be impossible to achieve. The 

challenge for organizations is overcoming these differences 

in order to sustain a long-term change. Hence, an impor-
11

tant aspect to organizational change is the understanding 

of how to change culture while keeping it in alignment with 

the plan.

First of all, it is very difficult to change what one does 

not comprehend. Therefore, it is important to establish an 

understanding of culture. “If we understand the dynamics 

of culture . . . we will have a deeper understanding not only 

of why various groups of people or organizations can be 

so different, but also why it is so hard to change them.”25

Secondly, it is important to understand why attempts to 

change it fail. So what is culture?

What Is Culture?

It appears that a definitive meaning of culture does not 

exist. The definition is open for interpretation depending 

upon the subject, the career disciplines, or context. For example, Samuel Huntington defines culture as “the values, 

attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions 

prevalent among people in a society.”26 Edgar Schein defines 

culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was 

learned by a group as it solved its problems . . . taught to 

new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 

feel in relation to those problems.”27 For our discussion, 

probably the most appropriate definition incorporates the 

works of Huntington, Schein, and others. James Detert 

sums it up best, saying that “there is some consensus that 

organizational culture is holistic, historically determined, 

and socially constructed, and it involves beliefs and behavior, exists at a variety of levels, and manifests itself in 

a wide range of features of organizational life.”28 To put it 

in an overly simple way, culture influences how effectively 

employees work together. Moreover, according to Schein, 

“leadership creates and changes cultures.”29

More Than the Culture

According to Hughes, “a common mistake for many leaders is to change the organization’s vision, structure, and 

systems and overlook the organization’s culture and leader 

and follower capabilities.”30 As previously demonstrated, 

equally important to changing culture is changing the other 

parts of the system. Leadership may avoid a culture change 
12

failure if it addresses potential failure points before they 

fester and take root. Therefore, a potential failure point for 

sustaining AFSO 21 is focusing only on the culture and 

thus creating an unbalanced system.

Potential Failure Point No. 2

Inflexible Structure

You do need to put people into a new organizational 

context that creates new roles, responsibilities, and 

relationships if you are to affect their behavior.

 —Gen Bill Creech, USAF, Retired 

 Five Pillars of TQM

Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric (GE), is 

famous for restructuring GE and instilling a processimprovement culture. He is a firm believer in a decentralized 

approach to organization. In his book Jack: Straight from 

the Gut, Welch predicts that “hierarchy is dead. The organization of the future will be virtually layerless and increasingly boundaryless, a series of information networks in which 

more electrons and fewer people will manage processes.”31

Does the Air Force’s current organizational structure 

support the idea of continuous process improvement? If 

not, can it change? Alternatively, will the autocratic hierarchy, which defines the Air Force, become a potential failure point? The answer for both of these questions is, it depends. As a result, the structure, or its inflexibility, is an 

AFSO 21 potential failure point. 

Combat versus Business

The Air Force desires a culture of continuous process 

improvement. The only way to reach and sustain the desired end state is to address the structure. However, upon 

reviewing AFSO 21 key documents (e.g., concept of operations [CONOPS], White Paper, and Implementation Plan), 

the restructuring of the organization does not gather much 

attention. A successful continuous-process-improvement 

program requires a flat organization. It is team-based and 

void of layers of unnecessary management. In keeping with 

the philosophy of eliminating waste, the pathway of every 
13

product must be simple and direct. In order to make it work, 

the Air Force must move from a centralized approach to a 

decentralized approach to improve efficiencies. “A centralized approach provides improved control while decentralization leads to employee autonomy and empowerment.”32

Due to the conglomerate makeup of the Air Force, delayering the organization will be difficult. This conglomerate 

consists of many different types of industries such as service, financial, and manufacturing. Although these industries seem to mirror private businesses, the distinguishing 

factor is the “go to war” side of the business. Therefore, I 

developed the depicted organizational model, which categorizes the Air Force structure (i.e., industries) into combat 

and business groupings (fig. 5). Of course, the Air Force 

does not categorize its structure this way. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38-101, Manpower and Organization, categorizes 

the Air Force in a variety of structures, such as a wing, 

center, direct reporting unit, or nonunit. 

Headquarters USAF

Major

Command

(MAJCOM)

Numbered

Air Force

Wing

Squadron

Group

Flight

MAJCOM

Center

Branch

Directorate

Section

Direct

Reporting Unit

(DRU)

Field

Operating

Agency

(FOA)

MAJCOM DRU

MAJCOM FOA

Detachments

Operating

Location

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Figure 5. Air Force standard levels of organization

The depicted organizational model categorizes the standard 

Air Force wing structure as “combat.” Per AFI 38-101, “the 

standard wing generates and employs combat capability.”33 Alternately, the “business” category designates those organiza-
14

tions aligned closer with industry (i.e., noncombat). Within the 

combat category of the model, organizations such as aircraft 

maintenance and communications also fit the business category requirements, depending on their combat/peacetime status. To a private corporation, a conglomerate like the Air Force 

is not efficient because there are too many financially draining 

suborganizations. The key is to understand your business; do 

it well. Divest of what does not fit. For example, GE conducted 

“a stem-to-stem review of [its] conglomerate makeup and produced over $9 billion in divestitures. In addition, it reduced a 

diverse mix of 350 businesses to 13 core businesses.”34 Can the 

Air Force accomplish such a divestiture? 

Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde

This conflict between business models is a classic “Dr. 

Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” phenomenon. The Air Force does not 

really understand what it is—a manager of violence or a Fortune 500 company. The Jekyll-and-Hyde metaphor is ideal 

for describing the bipolar actions of the Air Force as it constantly changes between its combat and business faces. 

Dr. Jekyll desires to operate his business as efficiently as 

possible. His focus is production, eliminating waste, and reducing cycle times. He wants to make a profit (or recapitalize 

dollars to spend elsewhere). His ideal structure is a decentralized approach. In his mind, a flatter organization means 

increased efficiency and cost savings. “The plain fact of life is 

that authentic quality improvements demand the flattening of 

structures, the liberation of line management from corporate 

control . . . and the breakdown of functional foxholes.”35 Jekyll 

wants to “adopt the business-management language of those 

cutting the budgetary pieces of the pie and gradually whittle 

away at the warrior culture.”36 This “efficiency” approach appears good for business, but what about combat? In contrast, 

Hyde’s perspective is much different from Jekyll’s.

Mr. Hyde desires to blow things up; he wants effects, not efficiency. His focus is defeating the enemy before he defeats you. 

Hyde delivers “sovereign options for the defense of the United 

States and its global interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space, 

and Cyberspace.”37 Sure, he would like to be as efficient as possible on the battlefield, but that is not a requirement—survival 

is. In the heat of battle, efficiencies go out the window. If a unit 
15

is in serious trouble, everything available is sent to save it. Does 

it matter if the Lean process determined two aircraft would be 

enough? Does it really matter whether nine aircraft respond 

instead of two? The unit in trouble demands effects, not efficiency. As Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner’s Every Man a Tiger 

observes, “The military is used to operating in the fog of war, a 

world of uncertainty, and at levels of efficiency that might reach 

5 or 10 percent—such levels of uncertainty [will not] cripple a 

military operation, only lower its efficiency.”38

Equally important as effects is decision making. In combat, 

there is no time for team decisions; leaders must step up and 

tell troops what to do—sometimes there is validity to the term 

“gut feeling.” Hence, Mr. Hyde views layers of organizations 

as unavoidable. There must be a chain of command—people 

must be in charge. The Air Force even touts this in the AFSO 

21 CONOPS: “The Air Force must leverage the advantages we 

have over . . . large commercial and public organizations [such 

as] well-defined lines of authority.” 39 Due to the demands of 

combat, Mr. Hyde prefers the centralized approach. 

Is the Zenith Good Enough?

The Air Force understands its mission; it does it well. 

Nevertheless, due to its unique mission of defending the 

United States, the Air Force cannot divest of the business 

side. It needs to keep the business side because there is 

no other viable option for supplying and maintaining combat systems and infrastructure. However, every few years, 

some of the business side divests via outsourcing. In addition, the Air Force is slowly changing to reflect its new “flattening” position. As indicated in AFI 38-101, “organizations 

must encourage rapid decision making, so they should be 

flat structures without immediate levels, unless mission 

requirements cannot otherwise be met. . . . Both the number of supervisors and the number of internal subdivisions 

within organizations should be designed to minimize layers 

and maximize worker-to-supervisor ratios.”40 

However, this effort is not one of active encouragement; 

it will not make a significant difference. The root problem is 

that the Air Force does not know who it is today (Dr. Jekyll) 

or who it will be tomorrow (Mr. Hyde). As a result, the Air 

Force’s bipolar disorder will prevent a substantial change 
16

in structure. Although the Air Force will make minor structural changes, this tweaking and massaging will only support short-term results. This struggle between Jekyll and 

Hyde will allow only minimal movement up and down the 

efficiency spectrum (fig. 6). 

'VODUJPOBM 1SPEVDUJPO

$FOUSBMJ[FE "JS'PSDF

	;FOJUI


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Figure 6. Efficiency spectrum

The centralized spectrum is a traditional hierarchy structure while the decentralized end of the spectrum is flat. The 

ability and capability for continuous process improvement 

resides in the decentralized spectrum. The minimal movement on the spectrum is because of both personalities [Jekyll 

and Hyde] countering each other’s efforts. Two steps forward 

today could be two steps backward in six months. An imbalance in other system components (e.g., change of leadership 

or poor incentives) is usually the reason for this countering 

effect. This Jekyll-and-Hyde tug-of-war drags out the effort 

and increases the chances for potential failure points. 

Therefore, the Air Force’s desire for establishing and sustaining a continuous-process-improvement organization will 

stop short of “true” efficiency. Its zenith will reside somewhere 

in between the two ends of the spectrum. Will the efficiency 

zenith be good enough? Consequently, the inflexibility of the 

Air Force structure is a potential failure point for AFSO 21.

Potential Failure Point No. 3 

Human Resource Management Systems

Don’t fight the system. Change the rules and the 

system will change itself.

 —Gene Bellinger

 “Beaucracy and Organizational Politics”
17

Organizations consist of many different types of systems. 

There are production systems, financial systems, and supply systems, to name a few. These systems are all vital to 

an organization’s ability to operate. Consider a maintenance 

process’s interrelationship with the supply system. A 

process-improvement team can “Lean” out an aircraft 

repair process so well that it makes one’s eyes water. However, without a corresponding change in the legacy supply 

system, those technicians must nevertheless wait on the 

inefficient supply system despite their perfect process. For 

this reason, systems must keep up with changes occurring 

elsewhere in the organization. Therefore, a potential failure 

point for sustaining AFSO 21 is the human resource 

management (HRM) system.

What about the People?

“The key to an effective organization is to align the structure with strategy and at the same time to design high commitment human resource policies and practices.”41 Since 

people manage and operate an organization, human resources are the core of an organization. Hence, when trying 

to change the organization’s culture, systems should be a 

primary consideration in the strategic planning phase. Systems serve to develop and reinforce organizational culture. 

With this in mind, will the Air Force pay attention to the 

HRM system?

A thorough review of AFSO 21 key documents does not 

reveal such consideration. Why were HRM systems left out of 

the strategic planning for AFSO 21? After all, decisions about 

how people are managed make a difference. The Air Force is 

well aware of the significance of its people. The AFSO 21

CONOPS emphasizes the “use of our greatest resource . . . 

our innovative, dedicated Airmen.”42 Consequently, where is 

the emphasis on HRM systems? These systems help guide 

and shape Airmen’s behavior. Addressed next are two key 

areas of HRM that enable the sustainment of a continuousprocess-improvement culture: incentives and staffing. 

Wrong People off the Bus

The Air Force is trying to rationally appeal to its employees by informing and educating them on the importance 
18

of a continuous-process-improvement culture. Articles and 

messages crying that the “fiscal sky” is falling have bombarded Airmen. The problem with this approach is that, in 

most cases, these budgetary constraints have not affected 

Airmen at their local operating level. Therefore, saving the 

Air Force programmed money is not an attractive selling 

point. It does not answer the questions, What is in it for 

me, and why should I care? However, HRM practices and 

polices directly affect Airmen. Michael Beer articulates that 

“decisions about human resource policies affect levels of 

employee commitment.”43 

The two most attractive incentive areas for policy adjustment are promotions and evaluations. The day continuous 

process improvement becomes officially part of the promotion and evaluation process is the day people start taking 

AFSO 21 seriously. Airmen will need to know that their 

evaluations, promotions, and appraisal bonuses are dependent on having significant amounts of continuous process 

improvement in their respective areas of responsibility. 

Consider the promotion process and the mixed signals 

that it currently sends Airmen. The promotion process 

should favor Airmen who are most concerned with group 

improvement. However, the current system does not favor 

this approach. According to Bellinger, current promotion 

processes focus on individual performance rather than on 

the team. “One of the most prevalent of these mixed messages comes from management continuing to talk about the 

benefits of a team based operation, while still performing 

individual performance appraisals.”44 The Air Force needs 

promotions and evaluations based on how Airmen’s attitudes and capabilities fit the desired continuous-processimprovement culture. As Jim Collins observes in his book 

Good to Great, the “transformation [began] by first getting 

the right people on the bus (and the wrong people off the 

bus).”45 

Right People on the Bus

Retention and recruitment both encompass staffing. As 

mentioned earlier, people are at the center of an organization. Retention is significant because the Air Force invests 

a lot of time and money in training Airmen. Likewise, re-
19

cruiting is just as important as retention. Because of this, 

selecting and hiring qualified people save on the amount 

of time and money required before the Airman becomes a 

productive contributor. 

High labor turnover makes sustaining a culture of continuous process improvement difficult. The Air Force’s permanent change of station (PCS) is an excellent example 

of high turnover and a potential change barrier. The Air 

Force frequently PCSs its force. (Although a recent budgetary constraint has slowed down PCSing, the effort to 

instill a continuous-process-improvement culture did not 

factor this into the decision to extend time on station.) The 

cumulative effect of PCSs is staggering. It is probably safe 

to say that within a five-year window a majority of Air Force 

personnel has changed duty assignments. This fluid workforce erodes culture-change momentum in organizations. 

“Management reshuffling regularly strips away program 

champions and replaces them with managers who may not 

share the interests or the skills of those who initiated existing programs.”46 Should the Air Force go ahead and make 

extended time on station a policy? 

When recruiting an individual, how selective is the Air 

Force? Does the Air Force base recruiting efforts on a recruit’s predisposition for continuous process improvement? 

Is recruiting another example of the Air Force’s Jekyll-andHyde condition? Current recruiting criteria focus more on 

the physical capabilities and moral histories of potential 

recruits. There is no emphasis on an individual penchant 

for value creation and waste reduction. “In a good-to-great 

transformation, people are not your most important asset. The right people are” (emphasis added).47 The Air Force 

should selectively recruit the right people.

Resources are limited; creativity is not. The Air Force 

needs to find a way to change HRM practices and policies 

and ensure an appropriate level of balance between the 

other system components. The institutionalization of new 

HRM practices through incentives and staffing will mold 

the new organizational culture. Until such an emphasis, 

HRM systems remain a potential failure point for sustaining AFSO 21.
20

Potential Failure Point No. 4 

Midlevel Officers—Generation TQM

Thank you sir, may I have another.

—Chip Diller, Animal House

A midlevel officer is either a major or a young lieutenant 

colonel. At this point in the career, he or she has already 

experienced two or three levels of professional military 

schools. Here, these officers study history and explore battles, leaders, and theorists to learn from their experiences 

and mistakes. Upon studying history, a central theme resonates throughout time—history is bound to repeat itself. 

When it comes to quality programs, Air Force midlevel officers are experiencing déjà vu. AFSO 21 is knocking on the 

door, and it looks eerily similar to TQM. How will midlevel 

officers accept it? The following briefly explores cynicism as 

it relates to midlevel officers and their opinion of AFSO 21. 

Therefore, midlevel officers may be a potential failure point 

for sustaining AFSO 21.

Generation TQM

Cynicism is “an attitude of scornful or jaded negativity, especially a general distrust of the integrity or professed motives 

of others.”48 Mention quality to midlevel officers, and watch 

them roll their eyes. After all, today’s midlevel officers cut their 

Air Force teeth on TQM. Thus, this paper coined the term 

“Generation TQM” to describe them. Generation TQM characterizes Air Force officers who entered service in the early 

to mid-1990s and experienced TQM indoctrination. As lieutenants, today’s midlevel officers were conditioned with the 

many promises of TQM, with phrases such as “it is not a fad, 

continuous improvement, responsibility of every Airman and 

customers are first” bandied about.49 (It is painfully funny 

how AFSO 21 uses those same words.) By the late 1990s, the 

TQM movement fizzled away sort of like the Soviets guarding 

the Berlin Wall—here today, gone tomorrow.

Why are they so cynical? Many midlevel officers have 

seen numerous fads during their careers. As one retiring 

Airman described his career experiences, “I’ve been zero defected, total quality managed, micromanaged, one-minute 
21

managed, synergized, had my paradigms shifted, had my 

paradigms broken, and been told to decrease my habits to 

seven.”50 Officer attitudes were not much better during the 

implementation of TQM. In 1993 a survey assessed the 

attitudes and perceptions of Pope Air Force Base (North 

Carolina) personnel toward TQM. The results were less 

than positive. “Officer perceptions and attitudes [were less] 

favorable as a whole than those of either the [senior NCO 

or civilian] groups.”51 These officers learned early in their 

careers about “lip service” toward TQM. Beer notes that 

“the result . . . was cynicism by employees who saw inconsistencies between management’s espoused TQM direction 

and the reality of superficial change. ‘This too will pass’ was 

one of the most frequent responses to new programs, an 

indication of low commitment, an essential ingredient for 

fundamental change.”52 Why should they think anything 

different of AFSO 21? 

Once a Cynic, Always a Cynic

The Air Force is in a tough position with midlevel officers. 

These officers are the gas that makes the Air Force operate. 

“They are the backbone . . . our aces-in-the-hole for the 

long war. [They] have a passion to fight to win.”53 These majors and lieutenant colonels want to do their jobs—leading 

troops in combat. If they wanted to value-stream a process, 

they would have joined GE. The Air Force cannot afford 

to lose these officers because the sustainment of AFSO 21

depends upon winning them over. These officers influence 

and shape the cultures of their organizations. Michael Beer 

points out that “organizational changes often stall, however, due to the inability of the leader to confront resistance 

to change and develop required commitment and skills [for 

the change effort].”54 AFSO 21 cynics are looking for their 

next champion in the mold of Gen John Jumper, USAF, 

retired. In 2001 General Jumper delivered these lines at a 

Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy graduation:

[The Air Force] went through a period in the decade of the 90s where 

[it] lost some of its character as an institution. We once had a quality 

Air Force that was ruined by a concept known as Quality Air Force. 

. . . We were told to believe that big business had all the answers. 

“Quality” . . . let words and slogans guide our behavior. Words like 

“empowerment” [and] “break down barriers.” We stopped mentoring 

our people. We lost touch with the fine art of chewing ass.55
22

The balancing of the other systems’ parts may hold the key 

to “winning” over the midlevel officer cynics. General Creech 

believed that “you must change the organization conceptually and structurally to bring leadership alive at all levels.”56 

Changing the HRM system and the structure may demonstrate that senior leadership really means action instead of 

rhetoric. According to Beer, if senior leaders “want to ensure that [AFSO 21] practices are sustained over time, they 

will have to consider requiring all [midlevel officers] to lead 

a regular process of organizational learning from which they 

also can learn. This will, of course, place demands on them 

to engage in a similar process at the top. It will be the loudest and most believable signal that senior management is 

serious about creating a [continuous-process-improvement] 

culture.”57 

The above quote originally discussed TQM; however, 

Beer’s insights are just as applicable to today’s improvement program of AFSO 21. The successful change of Air 

Force culture and the sustainment of AFSO 21 are dependent upon leadership. The failure to win over Generation 

TQM—the midlevel officers—is a potential failure point for 

the sustainment of AFSO 21.

Potential Failure Point No. 5 

Lack of Vision

When you prepare well, you convey confidence 

and trust to the people. Lack of preparation has 

the opposite effect.

 —John Maxwell

 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership

The Moon Speech

A vision is fundamental to a strategy; it is the strategy’s 

guide. The vision provides a depiction of where an organization 

wants to be. A shared vision takes it a step further by obtaining 

commitment from the people for a common goal. It inspires and 

guides the organization to its destination. An excellent example 

of a shared vision was Pres. John F. Kennedy’s moon speech. 

Duck remarks that “Kennedy’s call to ‘put a man on the moon 

by the end of the decade’ is a classic vision statement—clear, 
23

short, compelling, broad enough for all to contribute, and with 

an emotional hook that motivates.”58 

On the other hand, a blurry or absent vision spells certain doom to a change effort. Without a vision, will the organization reach its desired end state? How will the employees 

sustain their drive for excellence? Proverbs 29:18 conveys 

the importance of vision—“Where there is no vision, the 

people perish.” Hence, an unclear vision is almost as 

ineffective as not having one at all because it can demotivate and confuse the organization. These ill effects make it 

difficult for employees to maintain their drive, passion, and 

resolve toward the change effort. As a result, change initiatives will often fail due to these shortcomings. John Kotter has asserted that in “failed transformations, you often 

find plenty of plans and directives and programs, but no 

vision.”59 True to military form, the Air Force has a plethora 

of plans and directives for AFSO 21. Conversely, has the Air 

Force met the vision component requirement? 

A Vision or Not

There are a couple of ways to answer this question. The 

Air Force does have an official organizational vision statement; it reads, “Lasting heritage . . . limitless horizons.”60 

However, this overarching vision does not clearly convey 

the direction in which the Air Force is heading—toward a 

culture of continuous process improvement. It is very difficult for Airmen to link this vision to the AFSO 21 initiative. 

For instance, where is the emotional hook that motivates 

Airmen? In similar fashion, the Air Force included a vision 

for AFSO 21 in the draft AFSO 21 CONOPS.61 However, it 

is a very long, wordy, and vague message that is difficult 

for Airmen to understand; in essence, it might as well be 

absent. As with the Air Force vision, the AFSO 21 vision 

does not compel leaders or followers to embrace the idea of 

continuous process improvement. Both of these visions run 

counter to Kotter’s belief that the vision must be “relatively 

easy to communicate and appeal[ing] to . . . employees.”62

It would seem obvious, then, that AFSO 21 needs a “moon 

speech” to inspire and rally the force.

On a related note, locating and obtaining the vision is 

part of the “relatively easy to communicate” aspect. Yet, 
24

both visions are difficult to track down. For example, the 

Air Force vision is not in any of the more recent highly publicized Air Force strategic communications publications 

such as the Air Force Handbook or the Air Force Roadmap. 

It is even harder to find the AFSO 21 vision. It is in one, 

repeat, only one document [draft AFSO 21 CONOPS]. It 

would therefore seem clear that the Air Force has failed in 

meeting the vision component requirement. Its poor and 

blurry vision does not inspire or provide an emotional hook 

for either AFSO 21 or continuous process improvement. 

Specifically, what should the vision be? 

Daydreams or Nightmares

The Air Force vision for AFSO 21 should encapsulate the 

message that the Air Force is already communicating. These 

messages contain meaningful words and phrases such as 

increasing combat capability, value to customers, improving readiness, maximizing value, and eliminating waste. 

This disparity between vision and message is puzzling 

because it appears, in a roundabout way, that Air Force 

senior leaders convey an appropriate vision for AFSO 21. For 

example, one Air Force publication states that “the AFSO 

21 vision is to increase combat capability by integrating 

process improvement into the culture.”63 Secretary Wynne 

and General Moseley have communicated the previously 

mentioned key words and phrases in numerous speeches, 

articles, and memorandums. Their message seems to be 

sound and constant—in essence, an undeclared vision. 

However, AFSO 21 needs a marketable vision that captures 

the essence of continuous process improvement and motivates Airmen to “reach for the stars.”

The Air Force must rectify this disparity between vision 

and message and remove a potential failure point in sustaining AFSO 21. It cannot overlook the importance of a 

vision because “building shared visions fosters a commitment to the long term.”64 The vision is the beacon of light 

that will guide the program through both calm and stormy 

waters. If not, according to a Japanese proverb, the Air 

Force may soon experience nightmares: “Vision without action is a daydream. Action without vision is a nightmare.”
25

Conclusion

AFSO 21 signifies a shift in our thinking.

 —Michael W. Wynne, secretary of the Air Force

 Letter to Airmen, 8 March 2006

This paper identified potential failure points associated 

with successfully changing Air Force culture to one of continuous process improvement. The AFSO 21 program is the 

catalyst for this change initiative. AFSO 21 is the Air Force’s 

program for maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. The Air Force is counting on the program’s return on investment to fund its recapitalization and modernization effort. 

Will AFSO 21 sustain itself over the long term and succeed in 

establishing a culture of continuous process improvement?

Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. AFSO 21 quick wins are in 

the news. In addition, AFSO 21 is beginning to spread to the 

Air Force’s professional military education schools such as 

Air Command and Staff College. However, there are many 

potential weak spots, which may shift the balance between 

system components. As a result, misaligned components 

may eventually erode the AFSO 21 foundation.

Consequently, an effective change plan needs to address 

components other than just culture. It is the interrelationships between the various parts of the system that give it 

strength and longevity. Upon reviewing key AFSO 21 program documents, it does not appear that the Air Force is 

adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 

21. There is no mention or discussion about structure or 

systems. This omission may indicate that the focus is on 

the short-term and not a long view. In addition, there is no 

substantial discussion on vision or winning over midlevel 

officers. Once again, it appears that the Air Force is proceeding with a mandate; thus, the goal is quick wins without sufficiently planning for the long term.

This paper identified several potential failure points for 

senior leadership to address. These failure points are observations and not criticisms of the AFSO 21 implementation. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to 

correct the system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track 

for a long-term sustainment. However, the journey toward 
26

establishing this new culture is difficult. According to Jack 

Welch, a culture change requires dedication and perseverance: “Even with my constant cheerleading and a lot of 

pounding, it took us three years to get all the best people 

into Six Sigma.65 Making initiatives successful is all about 

focus and passionate commitment. The drumbeat must be 

relentless. Every leadership action must demonstrate total 

commitment to the initiative.”66

The philosophy and principles behind AFSO 21 are 

sound. A culture of continuous process improvement will 

take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to 

AFSO 21. Maj Kenneth R. Theriot’s view on quality is just 

as appropriate now for AFSO 21 as it was for TQM. When 

leadership commits its resources to all aspects of process 

improvement, and where a continuous-improvement-friendly 

culture is established and nurtured, AFSO 21 will succeed.67

“If [AFSO 21] is truly the centerpiece of doing business, it 

becomes everyone’s responsibility and the cornerstone of 

strategy and operations.”68 Therefore, this paper asks, is 

AFSO 21 shifting how you think?

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Faykes, “FY08 President’s Budget,” 50.

2. Ibid., 15.

3. Wynne and Moseley, memorandum.

4. Gilbert, “AFSO 21,” 49.

5. Ibid.

6. Wynne, Letter to Airmen.

7. Duck, Change Monster, xiii.

8. Walker, Changing Organizational Culture, 7.

9. Duck, Change Monster, 9.

10. Ibid., 11.

11. Kotter, John P. Kotter, 92.

12. Kotter, “Leading Change,” 60. 

13. Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century, White Paper, 7. 

14. Senge, Fifth Discipline, 375.

15. Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking, 26.

16. Senge, Fifth Discipline, 128.

17. Thornton, Peltier, and Perreault, “Systems Thinking,” 225.

18. Ibid., 223.

19. Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, Leadership, 398.

20. Ibid., 397.
27

21. Pierce, “Applying Systems Thinking,” 49.

22. Ibid., 50.

23. Senge, Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, 92.

24. Wynne and Moseley, memorandum.

25. Schein, Organizational Culture, 10.

26. Harrison and Huntington, Culture Matters, xv.

27. Schein, Organizational Culture, 17.

28. Detert, Schroeder, and Mauriel, “Framework for Linking Culture,” 851. 

29. Schein, Organizational Culture, 11.

30. Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, Leadership, 397.

31. Welch with Byrne, Jack: Straight from the Gut, 433.

32. Dubrin and Ireland, Management and Organization, 231.

33. AFI 38-101, Manpower and Organization, 16.

34. Creech, Five Pillars of TQM, 108.

35. Harari, “Ten Reasons,” 41.

36. Vest, “Tomorrow’s ‘Cyber Warriors,’ ” 5.

37. USAF, Air Force Roadmap, 11.

38. Clancy and Horner, Every Man a Tiger, 512.

39. USAF, “Air Force Smart Operations,” 7.

40. AFI 38-101, Manpower and Organization, 6.

41. Beer, “Organizational Behavior,” 7.

42. USAF, “Air Force Smart Operations,” 3.

43. Beer, “Organizational Behavior,” 6.

44. Bellinger, “Bureaucracy.”

45. Collins, Good to Great, 63.

46. Keating, “Overcoming the Improvement Paradox,” 11.

47. Collins, Good to Great, 51.

48. American Heritage® Dictionary.

49. Palladini, “Total Quality Management,” 29.

50. Rinehart, “How the Air Force Embraced ‘Partial Quality.’ ” 

51. Palladini, “Total Quality Management,” 140.

52. Beer, “Why TQM Programs Do Not Persist,” 3.

53. Small Wars Journal editors, “Wake up Call for DIA,” blog.

54. Beer, “Organizational Behavior,” 11.

55. Jumper, graduation address.

56. Creech, Five Pillars of TQM, 297.

57. Beer, “Why TQM Programs Do Not Persist,” 12.

58. Duck, Change Monster, 49.

59. Kotter, John P. Kotter, 81.

60. USAF, “Air Force Story,” 4.

61. USAF, “Air Force Smart Operations,” 4.

62. Kotter, John P. Kotter, 81.

63. USAF, 2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement, 38.

64. Senge, Fifth Discipline, 12.

65. Welch with Byrne, Jack: Straight from the Gut, 333.

66. Ibid., 299.

67. Rinehart, “How the Air Force Embraced ‘Partial Quality,’ ” 7.

68. Harari, “Ten Reasons,” 40.

29

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