S. HRG. 110–201, PT. 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 1547

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 2

SEAPOWER

MAY 3, 2007

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

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39-436 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–201 PT. 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 1547

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 2

SEAPOWER

MAY 3, 2007

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS

MAY 3, 2007

Page 

Winter, Hon. Donald C., Secretary of the Navy .................................................... 5

Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chief of Naval Operations ................................ 7

(III) 

(1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2008

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND 

PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I. 

Lieberman (acting chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Reed, Webb, 

Collins, and Thune. 

Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and 

Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Micah H. Harris. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Frederick M. Downey 

and Colleen J. Shogan, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Jonathan 

Cooper, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; 

Jeremy Shull, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Jane Alonso, Patrick M. 

Hughes, and Mark J. Winter, assistants to Senator Collins; and 

Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. I thank everybody for coming in. I thank our friends from the public and the 

media for their patience. We had reason to go into closed session 

for the first part. Of course, I thank Secretary Winter and Admiral 

Mullen for being here. We are grateful to you for your service to 

our country and to the extraordinarily skillful, professional, and 

courageous men and women under your command. I hope whenever 

you have the opportunity you will convey our gratitude and our 

pride to them. 

2

I should announce in public session what I did in closed session. 

Apparently nobody was confused, but I am not Senator Kennedy, 

who usually chairs this subcommittee. Senator Kennedy is on the 

floor managing the legislation there and could not break for the 

hearing. He asked me, since I am next in seniority, to chair, and 

I am honored to do that. 

Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, you are faced with a number of critical issues that confront the Department of the Navy as 

you attempt to balance modernization needs, based on threat assessments for the future, against the costs of supporting ongoing 

operations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are several 

areas of concern for the subcommittee today and for me personally 

that I would like to mention. I know Senator Kennedy shares these 

concerns. 

One is the prospects for meeting future force structure requirements. We are facing the prospect that the current Department of 

Navy program will lead to potentially large gaps between the forces 

that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has said he needs and 

the forces that will be available to him and his successors. This is 

a matter of budget restraints and it is important for the public to 

understand that, though the absolute dollar number we are spending on defense now and will next year is large by any estimate, it 

still remains lower as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product than 

we have ever to my knowledge spent during wartime, which is 

what we are in. 

It is forcing the various Services, in this case the Navy, to make 

decisions that I am concerned about. I mention first one case. The 

Navy now predicts that Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft 

forces are facing a shortfall of as many as 150 tactical fighters 

needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier air wings. With shortfalls 

that large, I worry, and I am sure you do, that we could be faced 

with reducing the number of aircraft available on short notice to 

the combatant commanders, either because we have deployed 

under-strength air wings or because we did not deploy the carrier 

at all because of the aircraft shortages. That is something none of 

us want. 

In another case, the CNO has said that the Navy needs to have 

48 attack submarines to meet the requirements of the combatant 

commanders. But we are faced with the risk now of falling well 

short of that goal, down to 40, for more than 10 years, starting 

some time during the next decade, that as other potential peer 

competitors continue to build submarines at a rapid rate. 

Other challenges facing the Navy center on acquisition programs. 

I know that the members of this subcommittee have special concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. This was intended to be a ship that the Navy could acquire relatively inexpensively and relatively quickly. As it turns out, unfortunately, it looks 

like the LCS program may in fact be neither. Once again we are 

presented with a program with significant cost growth, which at 

least in part is driven by the service changing requirements after 

the design and construction contract was signed. 

The LCS situation raises significant questions about acquisition 

management within the Navy. This is not dissimilar from exactly 

the same questions raised about the other Services. So we want to 

3

ask today in regard to the LCS program, why were not the Navy 

and contractor teams better able to see the problem sooner? How 

could we have gotten to the point that the program was just 

months away from running out of money, with no alarms being 

sounded up the acquisition chain of command? 

I want to ask Secretary Winter about what actions he believes 

the Department of the Navy should take to strengthen acquisition 

oversight and restore confidence in the Navy’s ability to manage 

these major acquisition programs. 

The subject of Navy force structure and acquisition, therefore, is 

of concern to us, but not a new one for the subcommittee. Over 

many years and with several different individuals holding the 

chairmanship of this subcommittee, we have devoted significant attention and concern to these subjects, as we do today. Today’s hearing, I think, continues the strong bipartisan interest in the broader 

naval force structure issues facing the Nation today. It is in that 

bipartisan spirit of shared interest and respect that I am glad to 

call on the ranking member of the Seapower Subcommittee, Senator Thune, new to this lofty position, I might say, and on Senator 

Kennedy’s behalf to welcome him as ranking member and ask him 

if he would like to make an opening statement now. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 

joining the Seapower Subcommittee. I look forward to working 

closely with you and our other colleagues on the committee on 

naval and other matters that come before us and to improving and 

building upon the naval assets that we have in the State of South 

Dakota. 

I am also pleased to welcome Secretary Winter for our second 

panel. Admiral Mullen, I appreciate very much your testimony 

from earlier this afternoon. You have done an excellent job of articulating some of your challenges and of providing critical insights 

for this next discussion. 

The committee, of course, has placed priority on meeting the demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 

Navy has contributed in important ways to those operations. However, we must also maintain sight of the broader role of the fleet, 

half of which may be underway on any given day to perform vigilance, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief around the world, 

and to provide a level of security made possible only through global 

presence and naval superiority. 

This is an important backdrop for today’s hearing, which is truly 

focused on the Navy’s readiness, and by that, in many respects, I 

mean the Nation’s readiness for future major conflict. A previous 

CNO, Admiral King, summed up the challenges of maintaining 

readiness in a memo to President Roosevelt, in which he stated: 

‘‘The fundamental United States policy is to maintain the Navy in 

strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests 

and to guard the United States and its overseas possessions.’’ 

In time of peace, when the threats to our national security 

change with the strength and attitude of other nations in the 

world, it is frequently difficult to translate our requirements into 

terms of ships and planes and trained men. It is one thing to say 

4

that we must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the 

naval strength adequate for that purpose.’’ 

Clearly, much has changed in the world since Admiral King 

made these remarks some 60 years ago, but I think his insights 

capture the challenges that confront us today. While it is appropriate that we spend great efforts focusing on the details of how 

we buy the ships and aircraft for our fleet—and, Mr. Secretary, we 

look forward to your testimony in that area—I believe we all would 

agree that perhaps the greatest challenge before us, as Admiral 

King suggested, is to decide what is and what is not the naval 

strength in terms of ships and planes adequate to uphold our national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies. 

While we enjoy the superiority of today’s fleet, I share the strong 

concerns raised by this committee these past several years regarding the steady decline in the size of our fleet. Admiral Mullen, you 

deserve great credit for committing to a plan to reverse that trend. 

Your shipbuilding program appears to balance the competing elements of capability and affordability. 

However, even this ambitious plan to build our Navy back to 313 

ships has to cope with shortfalls in key warfighting areas while 

also confronting significant cost risk. It would be extremely valuable today to gain your assessment of these challenges and to approach a common understanding of the prudent actions that would 

help mitigate the risks. 

It is also important to gain your assessment of progress on new 

ship programs. Clearly, Mr. Secretary, we look to learn from your 

recent experience with the Littoral Combat Ship and are interested 

in hearing of changes that you would propose to ensure other programs benefit by this experience. We need greater clarity on your 

plans to employ competition and balance industrial base factors for 

the Littoral Combat Ship and other major shipbuilding programs, 

including the guided missile (DDG)–1000 Destroyer. 

As well, we need to explore important opportunities to close capability gaps as we approach the next Virginia submarine multiyear procurement and as we consider alternatives for supporting 

Marine Corps amphibious lift requirements. 

Finally, the Navy’s estimate for this shipbuilding program represents a 50-percent increase above investments of the past decade. 

I appreciate that you have met your commitment for 2008 and 

would be interested in hearing your practical assessment of the 

Navy’s ability to continue to finance the plan in the face of everincreasing budget pressures. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. So, Mr. Chairman, again 

thank you for holding the hearing today. I look forward to the testimony from Mr. Secretary. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thune. 

Secretary Winter, thank you for being here. We welcome your 

testimony now. 

5

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY 

Secretary WINTER. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman, 

Senator Thune, distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here this afternoon. I respectfully submit my statement for the record and I applaud Congress and this committee in particular for its increasing interest in 

shipbuilding. This is an area that needs attention from all sides 

and it is an area in which I have focused most of my time in working to improve our efforts. I have taken action to hold both contractors and the Navy responsible and accountable for our shipbuilding 

program. 

At the same time, I am working hard to establish an attractive 

business environment for building naval ships. The Department of 

the Navy recognizes that we will fail to achieve our shipbuilding 

and thus force structure goals if we do not correct the number of 

serious deficiencies in our acquisition programs and processes. I am 

reviewing the Department’s major shipbuilding programs and I am 

working to improve our overall processes. 

I can assure you that I share your frustration and disquiet over 

the problems that we have encountered in many of our programs. 

I can also assure you that your Navy is leaning forward and beginning to build the ships and submarines that our country needs for 

the future. 

Over the past years, we have executed a major shipbuilding research and development program that has set the stage for a major 

force transformation in the Navy’s structure. We are in the early 

stages of development and production of more classes of new ships 

than we have produced in recent times. This will result in the 

transformation of the fleet and will position it to deal with a very 

uncertain future. 

But, as you have seen, such a grand transformation will not be 

without problems. You have my promise and commitment to oversee the management of these programs and I request your continued support in helping me to get our Navy shipbuilding program 

in position to deliver on our requirements. Putting our shipbuilding 

programs on a more solid footing is an urgent priority. With your 

help, we can succeed in building the fleet we need in our Nation’s 

defense. 

Thank you very much and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Winter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DONALD C. WINTER

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower. The support that this committee provides to the 

Navy and Marine Corps is greatly appreciated. 

A strong Navy is key to maritime dominance and is a critical aspect of our National Defense Strategy. We need a force structure of 313 ships. The process of acquiring new ships is challenging and the budget is tightly wound. Many of our past 

problems have resulted from constantly changing requirements and shipbuilding 

plans. If the Department of the Navy is to succeed in acquiring and maintaining 

the required numbers of ships, we need a plan, we need to stick to it, and we need 

to closely manage the execution of the plan. The 313-ship plan that was promulgated over the past 2 years is our goal. The force produced by this plan will satisfy 

our requirements for blue, green, and brown water capabilities. 

6

The biggest challenge we face is acquisition of new ships. We cannot build the 

quantities or qualities of ships that are required unless we correct several shortfalls. 

I have initiated a review of our major shipbuilding programs while simultaneously 

working to institutionalize key acquisition reform initiatives. The recent challenges 

associated with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and other shipbuilding programs 

point to a number of issues that we are addressing. In the long-term, I am initiating 

the following actions:

• Re-assert Navy control over the entire shipbuilding acquisition process. 

Control over acquisitions also means decoupling decision points. 

• Establish the Navy as the lead systems integrator to optimize the overall 

capability of the fleet. 

• Use the shipbuilding contract process to incentivize contractors to design 

for production and sustainment. 

• Use independent cost estimates for the trade-offs and decisions thus increasing reliability of the cost estimation process. 

• Assure that detail design and construction contracts are supported by 

mature specifications. 

• Develop an acquisition workforce capable of providing knowledgeable program oversight.

I am working to develop solutions that are in the best overall interest of the taxpayer, the Navy, and the industry that supports shipbuilding. 

In reviewing specific programs, my focus thus far has been on LCS, LPD–17, T–

AKE, and Virginia class submarines. In past discussions, I have noted our efforts 

to bring the production cost of Virginia class submarines down to $2 billion in fiscal 

year 2005 dollars. We are making considerable progress in this area and must 

achieve that goal by 2012, when we shift to two units per year. 

The early experience with the LCS has been disappointing and must be corrected 

to assure that we construct these vitally needed ships in a timely and cost effective 

manner. I am restructuring the program to address cost and programmatic issues. 

This restructuring will result in the cancellation of one of the fiscal year 2006 ships 

and will require the funding allocated for the fiscal year 2007 ships to be used to 

offset cost and schedule issues associated with the fiscal year 2005 and other two 

fiscal year 2006 ships. I am redoubling efforts to manage for the success of the lead 

ship efforts. My proposal is to reduce buys for fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 

from what was previously planned and position the program to down-select to a single design in fiscal year 2010. It is critical that the Department of the Navy take 

this action early to assure this vital program is technically sound and affordable. 

With respect to DDG–1000, CVN–78, MPF(F), and LHA(R), I plan to conduct detailed reviews of each of these programs to address potential issues early in these 

programs. Each of these programs must be properly initiated and closely monitored 

to assure success. 

To make our shipbuilding plan work, there are several areas where I need your 

help. I will need your support for the LCS restructuring plan I have noted previously. I will need your patience as we transform mine warfare shipboard capabilities to a LCS-centric structure. It is imperative that we move to this more capable 

force and retire less capable assets. A second area where we require your support 

is in modifying language regarding the number of aircraft carriers required. As we 

have noted, there will be a short period of time between the period when U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN–65) is retired and the Gerald Ford enters service when it will be necessary to reduce our carrier force from eleven to ten units. We will be able to meet 

operational requirements during this period with limited risk by carefully scheduling maintenance activities. A third challenge we are working through is getting 

amphibious lift right. 

I applaud Congress and this committee in particular for its increasing interest in 

shipbuilding. I acknowledge the desire of many Members to increase force structure 

at a faster rate than the Department of the Navy can afford to execute. My biggest 

concerns regarding changes to our annual shipbuilding plan relate to the budget 

and to the shipbuilding industrial base. Any additions to the shipbuilding budget 

that have unfunded out year liabilities will disrupt our delicate plan to achieve the 

desired long-term force structure. With respect to the shipbuilding industrial base, 

Hurricane Katrina has complicated the ability of the industrial base to surge, thus 

reducing flexibility to execute increased procurement rates. I am exploring opportunities to work with our industrial partners to restore our shipbuilding industrial 

base flexibility. 

In summary, your Navy is leaning forward and building the ships and submarines 

our country needs for the future. Over the past years we have executed a major 

shipbuilding research and development program that has set the stage for a major 

7

transformation in the Navy’s force structure. We are in the early stages of development and production of more classes of new ships than we have produced in recent 

times. This will result in a transformation of the fleet and position it to deal with 

a very uncertain future. But, as you have seen, such a grand transformation will 

not be without problems. You have my promise to actively manage these programs 

and I request your support in helping me to get our Navy’s shipbuilding program 

in position to deliver the fleet it needs.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Secretary Winter. 

Admiral Mullen, do you have an opening statement for this open 

session? 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN 

Chairman Kennedy, Senator Thune, and distinguished members of the Seapower 

Subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you representing the brave men and 

women, sailors and civilians of the United States Navy. We appreciate the long 

standing support we have received from your subcommittee. 

INTRODUCTION

We are a maritime nation involved in a long, irregular and global war that extends far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat we face breeds within failing 

states and the undergoverned spaces of the world and preys upon those weakened 

by poverty, disease, and hatred. It thrives where there is no rule of law and spreads 

through cyberspace and the vast maritime commons in this age of globalization. 

We are also confronted by nation-states determined to develop sophisticated weapons systems, including nuclear arms. We cannot allow ourselves to be fixated on one 

threat alone. Our national security is dependent upon a strong Navy that can keep 

the sea lanes free, deter aggression, safeguard our sources of energy, protect the interests of our citizens at home and reassure our friends abroad. We must never relinquish overmatching capability and capacity. 

While our ground forces are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, Navy’s ability to 

deliver two unique attributes—global reach and persistent presence—continues to 

support our worldwide responsibilities and provide a powerful deterrent force in 

day-to-day operations and as our Nation’s ‘‘Strategic Reserve.’’ As we face the rapidly changing security environment, there is no alternative to a well-balanced fleet. 

As I testified before Congress last year and earlier this year, I identified three 

priorities addressed by our fiscal year 2007 budget: Sustain Combat Readiness, 

Build a Fleet for the Future, and Develop 21st Century Leaders. We have made 

progress in all three and our fiscal year 2008 budget reaffirms our commitment to 

these priorities. In today’s testimony, I will focus on building a fleet for the future, 

placing particular emphasis on strengthening our core warfighting capabilities and 

increasing our military capacity. 

FORCE STRUCTURE

In 2005, the Navy conducted extensive analysis to determine the minimum required force structure needed to meet the security demands of the 21st century with 

an acceptable level of risk. In February 2006, Navy submitted a 30-year shipbuilding plan that would provide approximately 313 ships by 2020 with warfighting 

capacity and capability to meet the expected threat and security demands. Our recently submitted fiscal year 2008 Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of 

Naval Vessels (30-year shipbuilding plan), essentially unchanged from our 2007 submission, is intended to provide the shipbuilding industry with sufficient predictability to maintain critical skills and to make business decisions that increase efficiency and productivity in order to meet the Navy’s projected shipbuilding requirements. 

Navy’s force structure requirement was developed and validated through detailed 

joint campaign and mission level analysis, optimized through innovative sourcing 

initiatives (e.g. Fleet Response Plan (FRP)), adaptive force packaging) that increase 

platform operational availability. Importantly, the future battle force was measured 

against the anticipated threats for the 2020 timeframe. 

8

The future Navy will remain sea based, with global speed and persistent presence 

provided by forward deployed and surge-ready forces through the FRP. To maximize 

return on investment, the Navy must be balanced to fight an asymmetric war 

against the evil of terrorism, to help secure the maritime commons through strong 

partnerships and Maritime Security Operations, to deter would-be aggressors and, 

when necessary, to fight and win Major Combat Operations (MCO). This capabilities-based battle force can be disaggregated and distributed worldwide to support 

the operational demands of our combatant commanders. 

Our force structure strategy is balanced between new construction and modernization for ships, and recapitalization and sustainment for aircraft. It is critical to our 

strategy for us to have vigorous modernization and sustainment programs to 

achieve the expected service life of our ships and aircraft in the face of rapidly escalating global threats using advanced technologies. Modernization and sustainment 

optimizes our capital investments. 

With 38 ships currently under contract for construction, we can see the future 

fleet taking shape. In 2006, we christened the first Freedom Class littoral combat 

ship, amphibious assault ship Makin Island, amphibious transport dock ship Green 

Bay, guided-missile destroyers Gridley and Sampson, nuclear attack submarine 

(SSN) Hawaii, auxiliary dry cargo ships Alan Shepard and Sacagawea, and the aircraft carrier George H.W. Bush. We commissioned the SSN Texas and the guidedmissile destroyer Farragut. We also rolled out the first EA–18G Growler. By the end 

of fiscal year 2007, our fleet’s net size will have grown from a low of 274 ships in 

March 2007 to 279, including 5 newly commissioned ships. 

Navy is in the process of evaluating the impact global developments have had on 

our risk assumptions in our force plan and ultimately whether or not this should 

affect our future Battle Force. We are further evaluating lessons learned from the 

recently identified Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) cost overruns. Whatever the outcome 

of these evaluations, we will work closely with our partners in industry to control 

requirements and costs, and provide the industrial base the stability it needs to become more productive. 

Future platforms and combat systems must be designed and built with the knowledge that we plan to continually upgrade them over their lifetime. An Open Architecture approach to software acquisition and development of integrated weapons 

systems is a critical part of this business model. Free and open competition in which 

the best ideas win is the goal. 

To facilitate the stability required to achieve reduced costs in this constrained industrial sector, the fiscal year 2008 President’s budget submission made no changes 

in ship acquisitions in fiscal year 2008 from PB07 to PB08. Navy has a long-range 

vision to maximize reuse of ship designs and components, and to employ a business 

model that encourages the use of open architecture and mission systems modularity. 

The next major challenge in building a fleet for the future is to deliver a long 

range aviation procurement plan. Much work has been done analyzing joint 

warfighting capabilities and capacity based on threat and risk assessments driven 

by Defense Planning Guidance. Consideration has also been given to affordability, 

industrial capacity and production times associated with next generation aviation 

warfare. The Navy will work to deliver a stable aviation build plan that transforms 

and balances aviation capabilities with respect to conventional and irregular warfare, reduces excess capacity, and achieves technological superiority through costwise investments in recapitalization, sustainment and modernization programs. 

Resourcing critical maritime and joint effects, the President’s budget procures 188 

aircraft in fiscal year 2008, with a goal of eventually reducing average aircraft age 

from 74 percent to 50 percent of expected service life. The plan is structured to support required economic order quantity (EOQ) investments and facilitate Multi-Year 

Procurement (MYP) contracts. 

BUILD A FLEET FOR THE FUTURE

As we adapt to asymmetric threats and the challenges of irregular warfare, we 

cannot lose sight of Navy’s core warfighting competencies. We must continue to improve performance in anti-submarine and mine warfare, anti-surface warfare, antiair warfare, strike warfare, ballistic missile defense, and other core maritime superiority missions. We will continue to mature our FRP to ensure combat ready, surgecapable forces are available to meet any contingency. 

We have worked hard with Congress and industry to start to create stability between our shipbuilding plans and industrial base. We must continue to fund and 

build a balanced, effective Battle Force of about 313 ships . . . the minimum force 

required to guarantee the long-term strength and viability of U.S. naval sea and air 

power with acceptable risk. We recognize the need to control requirements, mainVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:37 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39436.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
9

tain program stability, curb costs, and encourage best business practices. We need 

support for sustained funding of our shipbuilding account—consistent with the 30-

year plan—that is critical to provide our partners in industry the stability they need 

to curb cost growth and sustain our vital shipbuilding industrial base. 

To build a fleet for the future and ensure the superiority of our future fleet, we 

seek congressional support in the following areas:

• 11 Carrier Force. The 30-year shipbuilding plan recognizes that as a result of the retirement of U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2013, the number 

of aircraft carriers will drop to 10 for a period of approximately 33 months, 

until the U.S.S. Gerald Ford enters active service. Legislative relief is required from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 

requiring a carrier force of 11. In developing the 30-year shipbuilding plan, 

Navy conducted extensive analysis that concluded the temporary drop to a 

carrier force of 10 for 33 months, from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 

2015, is an acceptable short-term risk. 

• Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS program remains of critical importance 

to our Navy providing mine warfare, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities. Extensive force structure analysis, as reflected in the 30-

year shipbuilding plan, establishes a requirement for 55 LCS. Navy is committed to satisfying this valid requirement. 

Current cost estimates exceed established thresholds for detail design 

and construction of LCS–1, the lead Lockheed Martin hull. This recent cost 

growth (to some extent the result of unrealistic schedule and cost constraints, unstable specifications at time of contract award, design-build concurrency, subcontractor performance delays impacting critical path, rework 

due to design changes, and Engineering Change Proposal scope increases) 

has provided an opportunity to reinforce the Navy’s commitment to providing warfighting capability through affordability. The Navy executed a 

pause in the construction of LCS–3, the second Lockheed Martin hull, to 

conduct a thorough review of the program, and to examine both internal 

and external factors relating to the acquisition and contracting processes, 

practices, and oversight and the related impact on cost. Negotiations failed 

to achieve a proper balancing of risk at an executable price for the Navy, 

which has led to the termination of construction of LCS Hull #3. 

On 12 April 2007, Navy terminated the contract with Lockheed Martin 

for construction of LCS Hull #3 since the cost-to-risk balance was considered unaffordable. The Navy remains committed to bringing LCS capability 

into the fleet to address emerging Long War and MCO capability requirements. Our LCS acquisition strategy is executable, affordable, and in the 

best interests of the Navy. 

• Virginia Class MYP. The Navy remains committed to reduce Virginia ac- quisition costs to $2 billion (fiscal year 2005 dollars) per hull concurrent 

with a build rate of two ships per year starting in fiscal year 2012. Two 

items requested this year are critical to achieving this goal. The first is authority in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to 

enter into a MYP contract with EOQ in fiscal year 2009. This would provide 

the Navy a significant negotiating advantage, send a clear signal to industry regarding the Navy’s commitment to future submarine procurement, 

and reduce risk. The Navy anticipates $2.9 billion (13 percent) of savings 

compared to annual (single ship) procurement contracts by using a 5-year/

7-ship MYP contract for Virginia class submarines starting in fiscal year 

2009. 

The second item critical to achieving cost reduction and an increased 

build rate of two submarines per year is the Virginia class cost reduction 

investment contained in the fiscal year 2008 budget request. As detailed in 

the recently delivered Report to Congress on Virginia Class Cost Reduction, 

the Navy plans to achieve its cost goal for the program through construction performance improvements, design changes that reduce cost, and by increasing the procurement rate under a MYP contract with EOQ authority. 

The cost reduction investment funds are vital to implementing the needed 

construction performance improvements and design changes. 

As identified in the 30-year shipbuilding plan, even with a build rate of 

two Virginia class submarines per year commencing in 2012, the number 

of nuclear attack submarines will fall below the desired 48 submarine fleet 

identified in the 30-year shipbuilding plan from about 2020 through 2034. 

This apparent shortfall, however, can be managed through several risk 

mitigation efforts. First, stationing 60 percent of our attack submarines in 

the Pacific, as recommended in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, will 

10

reduce critical response times in the Pacific. Second, by adjusting patrol 

times of our attack submarines, we can ensure greater operational availability without significantly impacting our sailors and their families. Finally, by pursuing an integrated approach to undersea warfare queuing 

through multiple sensors (e.g. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, the P–8A 

Multi-Mission Aircraft, SH–60R/S helicopters), we can improve critical target detection, tracking, and sensor-to-shooter response times to fully support the requirements of our combatant commanders for attack submarine 

presence worldwide. Other initiatives under review include reducing build 

time of the Virginia class SSN from 72 to 60 months and considering modest hull-life extensions on a small number of SSNs. 

• Split Funding for Zumwalt class DDG. The DDG–1000 Zumwalt class destroyer brings much needed stealth, counter air, and surface fire support 

to the fight. The Tumblehome hull provides a reduced radar cross section 

and acoustic signature while its Dual Band Radar represents a significant 

increase in air defense capability in the cluttered littoral environment. With 

the Advanced Gun System and associated Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) DDG–1000 will provide volume and precision fires in support 

of Joint forces ashore. A Global Positioning System-guided, 155 millimeter 

round, LRLAP will provide all-weather fires capability out to 83 nautical 

miles. Open architecture and reduced manning will provide the Navy life 

cycle cost savings and technology that can be retrofit to legacy ships. DDG–

1000 is the harbinger of our future fleet, taking major steps in advanced 

warfighting, reduced manning, a fully integrated power/propulsion system, 

and an open architecture design. 

The support of Congress for last year’s split funding request is greatly appreciated. This year Navy requests the second half of split year funding for 

dual lead ships of the Zumwalt class destroyer to maximize competitive efficiencies and focus design efforts. Split funding will also lend stability to the 

shipbuilding industrial base. This funding strategy supports the current 

budget structure, enhances future competitive opportunities, and limits liability for appropriations in future years. 

• Joint Strike Fighter. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) remains the 

cornerstone of Navy’s continuing superiority in air warfare. Although risk 

associated with the recent 2 year slip in the carrier variant of the F–35 will 

be mitigated by a modest increased buy of F/A–18E,F variants, there should 

be no doubt that JSF is a much more capable aircraft to which the Navy 

is fully committed. I encourage your continued strong support of this program to guard against further delays in production. 

• Legacy Aircraft Replacement. As our aging, legacy aircraft reach the end 

of the service lives, funding for follow-on programs becomes critical. Among 

these programs are the P–8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the 

F/A–18E/F and JSF, the EA–18G airborne electronic attack aircraft, the V–

22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and the MH–60R/S and CH–53K helicopters. Navy’s 

RDT&E program is also vital to this effort. 

• Anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Submarines with improving stealth and 

attack capability—particularly modern diesel attack submarines—are proliferating worldwide at an alarming rate. Locating these relatively inexpensive but extremely quiet boats presents our Navy with a formidable challenge. Navy is pursuing a distributed and netted approach to ASW. Some 

of the key ASW programs we must continue to develop and field as quickly 

as possible include: Surface Ship Torpedo Defense System; High Altitude 

ASW Weapon Concept; Deployable Distributed Autonomous system; Reliable Acoustic Path Vertical Line Array, and Aircraft Carrier Periscope Detection Radar. 

• SONAR Restrictions. ASW is a very complex and challenging warfighting 

competency in which to achieve and sustain the required level of expertise. 

Therefore every opportunity we have to gain and maintain proficiency at 

the ship/unit level, and every opportunity we have to integrate units in 

complex scenarios is crucial to our readiness. Unfortunately, our ability to 

train in the same manner in which we fight is under attack in public forums, including the courts. Thus far, we have seen little scientific basis for 

the claims lodged against the Navy. However, these allegations present the 

potential for severe restrictions on our continued ability to train effectively, 

as we saw in RIMPAC 2006 wherein we lost 3 days of valuable ASW training with active sonar because of a court restraining order. Navy is currently 

executing a comprehensive plan of action to cover all our at-sea training 

areas with environmental compliance documents by the end of 2009. We are 

11

committed to maintaining an open dialogue, continuing to advance our scientific understanding of the impacts of sonar on marine mammals, and 

complying with the relevant statutes. We have consistently made this clear 

as an organization in our debate on this issue. Maintaining proficiency in 

ASW is a daily challenge, and while our long-term compliance documents 

are being developed, we cannot afford to stop training. We owe it to our 

sailors to ensure they receive the training they need to fight and win. 

The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) requires permits for activities that may affect marine mammals. This includes military activities, including certain Navy activities at sea. The National Defense Authorization 

Act of 2004 included a provision that authorizes the Secretary of Defense 

to grant exemptions to the MMPA for certain military activities critical to 

our national defense. On 23 January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

granted Navy a National Defense Exemption (NDE) for 2 years covering 

mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar activities for major exercises and in 

major operating areas, as well as the use of Improved Explosive Echo Ranging sonobuoys. The NDE will help Navy continue to conduct the sonar 

training necessary for our national defense while protecting marine mammals through established mitigation measures. 

• Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). NECC is developing 

into a true force of choice in phase zero (pre-conflict) and phase V (reconstruction) operations, and is a vital part of our Nation’s Long War against 

terrorism. All new forces—Riverine, Expeditionary Training Group, Maritime Civil Affairs and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force—will meet 

full IOC objectives in fiscal year 2007. Riverine deployed its first squadron 

to Iraq in March to provide area security at Haditha dam and interdiction 

operations on the Euphrates River. Your continued support of our Riverine 

capability and capacity is vital. Our second Riverine Squadron was established on 2 February 2007 and our third Squadron will be stood up this 

June. 

• Sea Basing and Expeditionary Warfare. It would be difficult to consider 

any future expeditionary missions without recognizing the need for a sea 

base from which to employ Joint/Multinational Capabilities across the full 

Range of Military Operations. Seabasing provides operational maneuver 

and assured access to the Joint/Multinational forces while significantly reducing our footprint ashore, thereby minimizing the need to obtain host nation permission and/or support. These operational characteristics will prove 

increasingly vital in the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring 

Freedom political-military security environment. Navy is exploring innovative operational concepts combining seabasing with adaptive force packaging that will further support national security policy and the combatant 

commanders’ objectives worldwide. Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides 

for seabasing that covers the spectrum of warfare from Joint Forcible Entry 

to persistent and cooperative Theater Security Cooperation. 

Over the last several years, my staff and that of the Commandant’s Marine Corps Combat Development Center, and Marine Corps Headquarters, 

have worked diligently to develop a strategy for amphibious warfare that 

is relevant to the myriad challenges we face in the complex security environment of the 21st century. The investment strategy we have embarked 

upon represents the Navy-Marine Corps shared vision of the future and a 

significant investment of time and resources for both our Services. This vision was further validated by the Naval Operating Concept signed by the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Hagee, and me last summer. 

Based on a foundation built upon well-defined analytical underpinnings, 

our staffs agreed on an investment program that would provide a capable, 

agile, and affordable response force. Specifically, our investments in tomorrow’s Navy reflect a commitment to build the fleet of the future, with the 

capability and capacity to fight and win the Nation’s wars, including amphibious operations from the sea. This commitment supports the operational forces in the assault echelon and provides protection for the Maritime Prepositioning Force—Future (MPF(F)) to ensure its survivability in 

any hostile environment. 

The ability of our future fleet to meet the demand signal for amphibious 

forces must be viewed in the aggregate. Given the cost of ships today, we 

cannot discount the value of ships procured to support prepositioned equipment. Prepositioned assets must be included in the overall force availability 

equation—ignoring MPF(F) as the lift component of an additional Marine 

Expeditionary Battalion (MEB) would be incongruous with today’s fiscal enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:37 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39436.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
12

vironment. The capabilities provided by the MPF(F) mitigate concerns regarding the operational availability of the assault echelon force required to 

deliver 2.0 MEB lift, vehicle square footage, and passenger requirements. 

As reflected in our 30-year shipbuilding plan, we believe 30 amphibious 

ships will meet these requirements, when supported by, and supporting, the 

MPF(F). 

• Ballistic Missile Defense. Missile tests on the Korean Peninsula and by 

Iran, along with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, underscore 

the growing need for a robust, sea-borne ballistic missile defense system. 

Last year, the Navy made further progress on our Aegis Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD), the sea-based component of the Missile Defense Agency’s 

(MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It enables surface combatants to support ground-based sensors and provides a capability to intercept 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with ship-based interceptors 

(SM–3). The Sea-Based Terminal effort will provide the ability to engage 

Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM–2 Blk IV missiles from Aegis BMD capable ships. 

In May, 2006, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG 70) successfully engaged and intercepted a LANCE short-range test target with a modified SM–2 Block IV 

missile in a Navy-sponsored BMD demonstration. As a result, the Navy is 

modifying the remaining inventory of 100 SM–2 Block IV missiles, and 

MDA is modifying the Aegis BMD program to support sea-based terminal 

engagements. In June, 2006, Navy successfully achieved a second engagement of a separating SRBM target with the AEGIS BMD system. 

Last week, the Navy successfully engaged and destroyed a non-separating 

exo-atmospheric short-range ballistic missile, while simultaneously engaging a low altitude cruise missile. This successful engagement brings the 

tally to 8 successful intercepts in 10 flight tests and underscores the value 

of this sea-borne ballistic missile defense capability in an era of rapidly proliferating ballistic missile hardware and technology. 

• Research and Development. To achieve the speed of war Navy is pursuing 

Innovative Naval Prototypes—revolutionary ‘‘game changers’’ for future 

naval warfare. These initiatives have resulted in the development of an 

electromagnetic rail-gun prototype; new concepts for persistent, netted, littoral anti-submarine warfare; technologies to enable seabasing; and the 

naval tactical utilization of space. 

• Public Shipyard Loading. As we work with industry on shipbuilding cost 

reduction, we must ensure legislation and policy support best business 

practices and efficiencies. Apportioning work based upon funding quotas to 

drive workloading in public naval shipyards potentially diverts efficiency 

opportunities away from the private sector. Public yards provide vital services for nuclear propulsion and submarine work, and these critical competencies must be maintained. However, our first priorities in shipyard 

loading should be quality, efficiency, and cost savings. We seek your assistance in removing restrictions on our workloading flexibility.

Additional information on some of Navy’s priority warfighting programs is offered 

in the attached Annex I. 

CONCLUSION

Our Navy is truly a bargain, costing the taxpayers less than 1 percent of GDP. 

But as we strive to sustain combat readiness, build a fleet for the future and develop 21st century leaders, we cannot allow ourselves to take this for granted. We 

must be mindful of the need to maintain a strong Navy now, and after our ground 

forces return home. 

It has been just over 20 years since Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, subsequently signed into law by 

President Reagan. While this landmark legislation established a clean chain of command running from the President through the Secretary of Defense and Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs directly to the unified combatant commanders, and increased 

synergy among services by providing for shared procurement and development of 

technologies, it also precluded Service Chiefs from participating in the acquisition 

process beyond the identification of requirements. 

Without direct involvement in the entire acquisition cycle, Service Chiefs have little control over the mechanisms that drive efficiencies and best business practice 

in our major acquisition programs. Yet, the chiefs bear the responsibility of providing the right capabilities and capacity to meet the demands of our combatant 

commanders. I believe we should explore putting the Service Chiefs, and their miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:37 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39436.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
13

tary expertise, back into the acquisition chain of command and to hold them accountable for their procurement programs. 

Our Nation depends upon a strong Navy with the global reach and persistent 

presence needed to provide deterrence, access, and assurance, while delivering lethal warfighting capacity whenever and wherever it is needed. Our Navy is fighting 

the global war on terror while at the same time providing a Strategic Reserve worldwide for the President and our unified and combatant commanders. As we assess 

the risks associated with the dynamic security challenges that face us, we must ensure we have the Battle Force, the people, and the combat readiness we need to win 

our Nation’s wars. 

Simply reacting to change is no longer an acceptable course of action if our Navy 

is to successfully wage asymmetric warfare and simultaneously deter regional and 

transnational threats: Two Challenges, One Fleet. Our Nation’s security and prosperity depend upon keeping our shores safe and the world’s maritime highways 

open and free. 

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Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I will proceed. 

I want to get back to some of the questions I raised in my opening statement here about the stress on the capital programs of the 

Navy. I mentioned we are in danger of falling below the Navy’s 

own requirement of having 48 attack submarines for a 14-year period beginning in 2020. It sounds a long way away, but it is not 

that long away, and unless we start to act on it it is going to be 

a problem for us. 

In 2028, the number of attack submarines is expected to fall to 

40 under the current shipbuilding plan, not only below the Navy’s 

current requirement, but also far below the historically estimated 

need of submarines. In fact, in 1999, just 8 years ago, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concluded that the Navy needed to have 55 

attack submarines in the near-term and 68 to 72 subs by the middle of the next decade. So we are obviously far short of that estimate. 

I say parenthetically what you know because you live with it. 

Namely, that the current 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for mainVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:37 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39436.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB

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taining a 313-ship fleet as a minimum. In recent years, the estimates of the necessary fleet size from respected people have gone 

as high as 380. Meanwhile, the current Navy stands at about 279 

ships. 

So I say all this to just say again that we have a problem and 

in my opinion we are not spending enough. The recent incident, 

which has been publicly described, with China and a sub coming 

into the area where the Kitty Hawk Battle Group was and public 

reports that China is producing as many as two and a half subs 

per year and is rapidly closing the overall fleet strength gap, seems 

to indicate to me anyway that we need a much greater number of 

ships and subs than we are currently procuring. 

Admiral, I wanted to ask you to respond to this question. The 

Navy has repeatedly testified that it needs 2 years of advance procurement funding before construction in a given sub in order to 

have the parts that require a long lead time. However, the Congressional Research Service has said that the 2-year advance procurement is not necessary, that Congress can fund the entire sub 

construction program in a single year, which means that the finished product would take 2 years longer at the back end. In fact, 

that was done in 1988 when Congress funded the construction of 

two aircraft carriers in a single year, including advance procurement. 

So, acknowledging both the budget pressure you are under and 

the need in my opinion to accelerate to 2009 the date by which we 

start building two subs a year, provided we enter into a multi-year 

contract to save costs, why should Congress not begin to fund two 

subs a year in 2009? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, the basis for this, as you indicated, is 

the 313-ship future force structure plan. We are 275 ships today. 

By the end of the year, I actually hope in the commissioning, one 

of which is later this week, to head north in terms of stopping the 

free fall. We talked earlier about, or I have talked consistently 

about having a balanced fleet. The 48 submarines was the warfighting analysis that we went through extensively and I am very 

comfortable with that number and very comfortable with that number against the 1999 JCS study. 

That said, the plan you speak to, we do fall to 40 submarines. 

We have looked in the last year at ways to mitigate that and we 

are looking at possibilities of extending some hull life for a deployment, for an additional deployment. The hull lives of our nuclear 

attack submarines have gone from 30 years to 33 and now it looks 

as though there is a possibility some of them could be extended as 

one way. 

We want to reduce the time it takes to construct the Virginia

class submarine from 72 months to 60 months. That makes more 

submarines available. I also have the option of keeping them deployed longer for a period of time to mitigate that. 

With reasonable assumptions about those three specific possibilities, I can mitigate that eight submarine gap that you described in 

that timeframe down to about three submarines. We will continue 

to work that. So as I indicated, we would look to mitigate this. We 

are working very hard on that and we certainly intend to do that. 

32

But I share your concern in your opening statement about the 

pressure. I have been doing these budgets since the mid-1990s and 

we are, the Navy now, I am under extraordinary pressure across 

my people accounts, my operations accounts, as well as my procurement accounts, and the heart of those procurement accounts are 

ships, submarines, and airplanes, and balancing that in the environment in which I am finding myself right now is a real challenge. 

The cost growth we cannot tolerate or we are not going to be able 

to build the ships, the cost growth you speak to in LCS; we are not 

going to be able to meet this plan. We have to control that. So we 

are working hard in a very constrained environment to get there, 

and I am comfortable that we have worked hard in these mitigation areas, but it is early and it is still a concern. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that we share that concern. I 

do want to say that the very mitigating circumstances, the program 

to mitigate the impact of a gap where we fall substantially below 

the 48 submarines, is really a pressure that we ought not to be 

putting you under, and frankly the submarine force. I worry about 

whether we are pushing the subs structurally beyond what they 

can handle. I am certainly worried if one of the mitigating policies 

is to extend deployments, what that will do to the morale of the 

submarine force because, as you well know, they already deploy at 

a pretty good rate. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, Senator, they would not be major extensions. This is a month or 2. It is not an exceptional period of time. 

We certainly would never take the risk, if there was any concern 

with material failure, would not do that. 

I did not answer your question about can we buy it all in 1 year. 

The 3-year buy is basically a function of, obviously, affordability in 

a given year and also what I can execute to build the submarine. 

Clearly, that has been how a submarine has been built and the 

time line that we have had it. Could you appropriate all the money 

to do that or could we, could the Hill do that? Yes, absolutely. But 

the challenge will be executing that money in a meaningful way, 

and so it has been that, again it has been that balance. 

We have done that with other programs, but that has been it, the 

way we have built submarines. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up and I thank you. We will continue on this exchange. We have been going at it for a few years 

already. 

But I do want to say with some pride, and also to express my 

appreciation to the Navy, that the submarine building program has 

been going forward at a very good cost control, on a cost control 

basis, and the speed of delivery. Everything is relative, but when 

we start to talk about getting the cost of a submarine down to $2 

billion, which it looks like we can do, that is a lot of money. But 

compared to some of the other shipbuilding programs, it is not so 

bad. 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, the other thing, and I will try not to 

fill this up, but if I buy a $2 billion submarine in 2009, get to two 

a year, I have nothing in 2010 and 2011. I have no resources applied against that. So the program comes back to me to fill that up. 

Again, we are in a plan right now to get to two in 2012. That is 

33

several billion dollars, $4 to $5 billion that I currently do not have 

in the program. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, if you and I and a few others can get 

to two subs in 2009, we will take care of 2010 and 2011. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is an expression of faith. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. I have a feeling submarines are going to be really well-covered on this subcommittee. 

A question for you, Admiral, or for Secretary Winter, and that 

has to do with affordability of the LCS. It is critical in order to 

achieve the large numbers—55 ships, I think, is the goal that the 

Navy has determined it needs—that we start making some headway here. I harken back, I guess, to what the plan was for affordability was. One, keep it simple in its design; do not change the requirements; maximize competition; and leverage the smaller shipyards, which would be more efficient, building smaller, simple 

ships, and speed up the process to avoid the cost growth that often 

comes with time. 

I think the full committee and this subcommittee in particular 

has been in your corner on affordability. But we appear to be on 

a path that doubles the $220 million estimate for these ships. Mr. 

Secretary, I appreciate your efforts to stabilize this program, but 

I would like to have you explain, if you could, how the Navy and 

the industry’s original estimates ran so far askew. Second, since 

the Navy’s estimates indicate cost growth for both industry teams 

building their first ship, why has the Navy only taken corrective 

action on one contract and how do you intend to control cost for the 

remaining ships under both contracts? 

Secretary WINTER. Sir, let me address both questions there. First 

of all, relative to the reasons that we are in a cost overrun situation, I think it really is due to the over optimism that was created 

at the beginning of the program. I believe that as we look backwards we were not as realistic as perhaps we should have been relative to the cost estimates, in particular the cost estimates for the 

lead ships. We are now having to deal with that and one of the unfortunate aspects of initiating a contract which is underfunded is 

that often things are not done as well as they should be in the beginning, and it is at the early stages of the program where much 

can be done to reduce the overall cost of a ship. 

I do believe, though, that with a total buy on the magnitude of 

55 ships, which is the current program, there is huge opportunity 

out there to be able to motivate the type of business case, to provide the rewards that industry would be looking for, for a significant investment in a modern production capability, and in fact we 

may be able to afford two production capabilities. That would enable us to work through a leader-follower arrangement and be able 

to maintain competition in the long run. 

Working through the issues that we are going through right now, 

developing a competitive base, and being able to leverage the quantity buys that we are talking about in the future, all will hopefully 

lead us to a more affordable cost position on this particular vessel. 

34

Relative to the General Dynamics (GD) position and compared to 

the Lockheed position, we have established formal tripwires, if you 

will, associated with the performance parameters that GD is engaged in right now and Lockheed has already worked through. 

Should GD exceed any of those tripwires, it is our intention to pursue the same remedies that we sought with Lockheed Martin relative to containing their costs and seeking a renegotiation of the 

contract. 

At this point in time, GD has not exceeded any of those 

tripwires. I will note that we have kept those tripwires, the specifics there, confidential and have not shared them with the contractor, specifically to ensure that we have an honest and open assessment and there is no opportunity or motivation for gaming any 

of the particular parameters associated with that. 

Senator THUNE. The contracts for both industry teams place the 

Navy in the position of financing 100 percent of the cost overrun. 

How do you balance the risk on future major programs to avoid 

finding ourselves in a similar position? 

Secretary WINTER. I believe, sir, in future major programs, in the 

production phase at least, we very much need to go to cost structures, fixed-price incentive type structures, which enable us to 

share the cost risk appropriately between the contractor and the 

Navy. When we are talking about initial development phases, 

where there are very high uncertainties and it is difficult to obtain 

a fixed-price bid from a contractor, we will probably still have to 

go with cost reimbursable contracts. But even there, there are 

mechanisms that are available to us to provide cost and schedule 

incentives that share that risk with the contractor. 

Senator THUNE. Given the cost pressures on the shipbuilding 

program, what impact do the increased cost and delays in the LCS 

program have on the balance of the Navy’s plan? 

Secretary WINTER. Well, the significant impact that it has had is 

the need to reprogram or request reprogramming authority for the 

fiscal year 2007 funding to be able to be used for the completion 

of the vessels that still are under contract. In the out years, we are 

hopeful that the cost reductions associated with the strategy we are 

going to with the selected configuration and the quantity buy that 

will enable the cost efficiencies associated with a modern production facility, that those mechanisms will enable us to minimize the 

cost impact to the overall shipbuilding program. 

We need to go through that, though. We need to understand exactly how much we are going to be able to get by way of investment 

in those facilities and the leverage that that will provide us. But 

I am very hopeful that we will be able to recoup a significant 

amount of the increase in cost. 

Senator THUNE. I want to jump to one other subject here quickly 

and that is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) gap. The Government Accountability Office recently released a study titled ‘‘Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint Integrated Investment Strategy.’’ It made 

several conclusions: One, the Department of Defense (DOD) does 

not have a single integrated investment plan for recapitalizing and 

modernizing its tactical air forces; and that without a joint integrated investment strategy it is difficult to evaluate the severity of 

capability gaps or, alternatively, areas of redundancy. 

35

In light of the Navy’s concerns over a strike fighter gap, how do 

you respond to those findings? Given the Navy’s additional competing need to recapitalize its fleet of ships, how would you assess 

affordability of the Navy’s aviation procurement plans? 

Admiral MULLEN. One of the things that came out of the shipbuilding effort that we put forth was to try to stabilize it. One of 

the results of that was the desire on the part of many senior leaders in the Navy to stabilize the aviation plan as well, because it 

too had seen instability in recent years. So we are about there right 

now, this year and next year, to basically figure out how many aircraft we need and how we can stabilize it, with the same underpinning philosophy, so that industry can plan, not have significant 

changes every year, and then produce what we need at best cost 

and in a timely way. 

Specifically for me, for the Navy, the strike fighter shortfall—and 

I think your initial number was on the order of 110 planes. I have 

seen numbers as low as 40 or 50 and as high as over 200. The 

numbers I am very comfortable with is a shortfall starting in about 

8 to 10 years of 47 to 71 planes, depending on whether we buy 40 

or 50 a year at a certain price. The highest numbers are at a very 

low production rate, at a very high price. 

From the standpoint of the programs that I need, I need the JSF. 

I need it for its range, its payload, its stealth, its sustainability. So 

I am committed to that. Where I find myself is in the middle here, 

because I find myself buying more F–18 Es and Fs, and they are 

great airplanes, but they are not the planes I need to populate the 

entirety of my air wings in the future. I have to get to JSF and 

that is the plan right now. 

I will not talk about the DOD strategy, but I can tell you within 

the Navy the strategy is to get to JSF as quickly as we can, and 

yet there are some acquisition challenges we want to be mindful of 

with where this program is as well. 

I also have a challenge, a very clear challenge, with Jim Conway 

and I, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, because I basically 

fund Marine Corps aviation, and how we balance that inside the 

requirements that we both have is also a significant challenge. He 

and I are committed to working through that, and that is part of 

this shortfall as well. 

So I recognize the shortfall is there. I know we have to stabilize 

this plan in the very near future. But it is going to take a significant amount of additional procurement investment to get there and 

really mitigate that shortfall. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thune. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator 

Lieberman has asked these wonderful questions about submarines. 

He has grasped the mettle of naval policy, the submarine. It is the 

most key element, so thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We stand together. 

Senator REED. We stand together. 

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you not only for being 

here today, but for your great service to the Nation. Following on 

36

this issue of submarines, we have talked a lot in this open session 

about force structure, but there is also the industrial base issue, 

which is absolutely critical, not just to submarine construction, but 

to all naval shipbuilding programs. 

One of the areas of concern is that this is the first time in many, 

many years we have not had an active design program for a submarine. The recent RAND report suggested the that design for the 

new Trident, the new ballistic missile submarine, be accelerated. 

Mr. Secretary and Admiral, could you comment on that? 

Secretary WINTER. Yes, Senator, pleased to. We have recently 

been going through several iterations of a plan to create the next 

generation strategic deterrent for the Navy. One of the things that 

I have been fairly insistent on is ensuring that that is a complete 

integrated strategic plan, going through everything from the warhead to the missile to the boat itself. I think we now have a good 

laydown of a plan. We have worked through the aspects with 

United States Strategic Command in terms of ensuring that we 

have a current set of requirements and a good forecast of where 

those requirements may evolve in the future, both on the nuclear 

and the non-nuclear side. That will be factored into the overall design study activities for the future, the Ohio class replacement, if 

you will, activities. 

Initially, those will be mostly design studies as we go through 

the overall assessment of alternatives that can provide the basis for 

that strategic deterrent, and it will later on evolve into preliminary 

design efforts for the replacement activity. We do want to focus on 

getting to the right objective in the long-term and making sure that 

we have a good systems engineering process that we are factoring 

through. With that, we will phase in the individual design activities as the requirements support. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral, do you have any comments? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I would only echo that and say we recognize the criticality of this industry base or the design base. We are 

very committed, and Secretary Winter has led this effort, to really 

understand where we are and how we sustain it, which includes, 

could include various options. It is underpinned by the belief that 

if we lose it we cannot get it back, and the Nation cannot afford 

that. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator Lieberman pointed out that there has been some significant advances in lowering the cost of submarine construction. In 

fact, the selected acquisition report estimated a reduction of about 

3 percent of the total Virginia class submarine program. That I 

think is significant and I hope you share that feeling. 

But second, there are also opportunities within that cost reduction for additional research and design work to further accelerate 

reductions. Is that something that you are considering, Mr. Secretary or Admiral? 

Secretary WINTER. Yes, sir, we are considering both additional 

research and development activity. As you are probably aware, we 

have a number of efforts going on right now in terms of design 

modifications for the Virginia class, which are principally oriented 

towards reduction of costs, design for production, enhancements for 

37

that vessel. We are also engaged in a number of activities in terms 

of advanced submarine design and construction, including some 

promising activities in coordination with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral, let me ask another question. That is, as we both understand, our colleagues in the House adopted a measure that I believe would fund an additional set of Virginia class components, not 

specific to a hull. 

Secretary WINTER. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Mullen, is that an approach you think has merit? 

Admiral MULLEN. I do. I think it does have merit. As you said, 

it is not tied to a specific hull. In terms of—and it really gets to 

the issue that both you and Senator Lieberman are raising, which 

is to get the cost of the business down. It will allow us to continue 

to reduce risk over the long-term. 

I think it is an investment in long-term cost reduction here, both 

in this program and—one group I would really like to pat on the 

back is Electric Boat has done incredible work to help us reduce 

this cost. It is very clear when you go there that they are aboard 

to try to make this happen enthusiastically and as partners, and 

it is part of that strategic partnership I think we need to make to 

sustain, to have an outstanding industrial base for the future. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, any further comments? 

Secretary WINTER. I would just add that in shipbuilding in general, and in particular in submarine construction, maintaining the 

pace of work is very critical to efficient production. This is not a 

business where just-in-time inventory works. Having long lead 

items worked in advance so as to ensure that the pace of production is able to be maintained is a very good way of reducing the 

risk of program execution. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

One final question, Admiral Mullen, is that the Marine Corps 

stated a requirement for a minimum of 30 operational amphibious 

ships. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Senator REED. You are actually planning, as I understand it, to 

reduce the inventory of these ships. But your rationale I think for 

being able to meet the Marine Corps needs is that you can provide 

100 percent readiness of these ships. Can I understand your rationale and is it feasible? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. General Conway and I certainly have 

agreed that the requirement is for the availability of 30 ships. 

Based on historic availability, doing the math, you need 33 to do 

that. Now, that is how we have done it historically. What I have 

committed to him is to provide him the lift he needs. 

We have 31 ships, amphibious ships, in the 30-year shipbuilding 

plan and we have to look at how we are going to fight in the future 

and specifically how we are going to move this 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade into the fight. General Conway and I have agreed 

to figure out a way together to make that work. It could include 

higher availability of ships. Some of it depends on, obviously, the 

warning time you would have and that kind of thing. 

38

We are also building the Maritime Preposition Force Future 

ships, a significant investment there, which also has the potential 

to help us move marines to the fight. So there is an awful lot. It 

is a very complex set of variables and it is also a very important 

part of how we build the sea base for the future, which I think is 

going to become more and more important in terms of availability 

of footprint ashore and the requirement, not just from the Navy 

and Marine side but from a joint perspective, to be able to flow 

combat power through a sea base. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not 

welcome our new ranking member. Perhaps the Senator from 

South Dakota will be more dispassionate on the Navy’s budget 

than the rest of us around this table. But I hope that our new 

ranking member will take a great deal of guidance from the Senator from Connecticut, the Senator from Rhode Island, the Senator 

from Virginia, and the Senator from Maine on such issues as submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers. I just want to offer you all 

the guidance in the world on those important issues, as we welcome you to your new and very important position. 

It is amazing to me that our last ranking Republican was from 

Missouri and now we have one from South Dakota. There seems 

to be a pattern here. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here today. Last year 

we approved the funding for the dual lead ship design for the 

DDG–1000 and also funding for construction. This ship is obviously 

critical to the 313-ship plan that the CNO has put out. I am concerned that, although the design contracts were awarded to both 

yards in August of 2006, that the construction contracts have yet 

to be awarded. 

My concern is that this delay will begin to have an impact on the 

shipyard employees, on the vendor and subcontractor base. There 

is a lead time in getting the necessary subcontractor contracts in 

place and we cannot proceed with that until the contract is awarded. So this is a concern to me. 

I am also concerned that any further delays in the award of the 

construction contract will have an impact on overall cost and could 

well drive up costs. 

Could you update us on the status of the award of the construction contract? 

Secretary WINTER. Yes, Senator. I asked for a short hold be 

placed on the award and contracting there to ensure that the lessons learned from LCS were properly factored into the DDG–1000 

contract. I have now been satisfied that that has been done and I 

recently authorized the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition to proceed to the finalization 

and definitization of those contracts. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. That is good news indeed. Do you 

have a timetable for going forward on the contract? 

39

Secretary WINTER. I believe we are very close, in a matter of 

weeks hopefully. I would hesitate to give you a definitive schedule, 

but I would be happy to get you an update as soon as possible. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:]

On September 25, 2007, the Navy decided to resequence delivery of the first ship 

set of DDG–1000 mission systems government-furnished equipment (GFE) to General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) vice Northrop Grumman Ship Systems 

(NGSS). The Navy has received cost proposals from both BIW and NGSS reflecting 

the GFE resequencing and is entering negotiations with the two shipyards for lead 

ship production. The Navy anticipates completing negotiations no later than January 2008.

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Mullen, we have talked many times 

about the reduced life cycle costs of the new DDG–1000 because of 

the reduced crew size and other efficiencies. We also have a challenge as far as extending the life, the useful life of the DDG–51 

class and making sure that we get the full number of years originally envisioned in order to achieve your goal of the 313-ship fleet. 

Could you comment on the importance of modernizing that class 

of ships in order to achieve your goal? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am. Absolutely vital. We have in the 

2008 program both modernization money for the cruisers, the Aegis 

cruisers, as well as the Aegis destroyers. We do not have a good 

history here of modernizing our ships, and we cannot afford to do 

that. So it is vital that these programs be supported. 

I am not talking about just over here. Clearly that is important, 

but that is internal to the Navy. Historically, we do not have a 

good record of doing that. So we recognize that and I recognize that 

as part of this 313-ship plan, that we have to do that and get these 

ships to their hull life. Typically, it is when we decommission ships, 

it is not because—surface ships—it is not because their hulls are 

worn out; it is because their combat systems are not modernized. 

That is what we have to invest in and that is what this program 

is all about. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Secretary Winter, in February, the Commander of Naval Sea 

Systems Command, Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan, briefed the Maine 

and New Hampshire delegations on the Navy’s latest Naval Shipyard Business Plan for 2008 through 2013. I know this is an issue 

that you have put a great deal of time and effort into and that you 

have emphasized to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) the 

need to use all four of the Navy’s public shipyards as efficiently as 

possible. I am grateful for the personal effort that you have put 

into this plan. 

Now, obviously NAVSEA faces certain constraints in distributing 

workload among the four shipyards. But I am concerned upon reviewing the plan that the Navy’s plan may not fully acknowledge 

the specializations that each of the shipyards has. For example, 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME, its expertise is with 

attack submarines. It was also called the gold standard during the 

Base Realignment and Closures Commission. We are very proud of 

that. 

Puget Sound specializes in ballistic missile submarines. The Senator from Virginia’s shipyard focuses on aircraft carriers. So there 

are different expertises that are available. Does the Navy intend to 

40

try to optimize the specific and unusual skill sets that each shipyard has so as to ensure that we get the best value as we allocate 

the work among the four shipyards? 

Secretary WINTER. Thank you for the question, Senator. As you 

noted, I put a bit of personal time into this. I do feel a level of 

stewardship responsibility regarding all four of the yards. 

As you noted, we have requested that the Navy look at this from 

an optimization perspective and the overall objective here is to optimize the operational availability of the various ships in the most 

cost effective manner. Major consideration of that is the most effective utilization of the skills that are resident at each of the facilities. So that will be a very significant factor in terms of the allocation of availabilities to the individual yards, as well as the timing 

to be able to take maximum advantage of the work force that is 

resident at the individual yards. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I look forward to continuing to 

work with you on all of these issues. 

Secretary WINTER. I would be pleased to. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you both. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Webb, welcome. 

Senator WEBB. Nice to be here, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I note that, following the exchange between 

Senator Collins and Senator Thune, I never really stopped to notice 

this before, that all of us on this Subcommittee, both parties—this 

is a bipartisan inclination—except for Senator Ensign and Senator 

Thune are coastal Senators. 

Senator COLLINS. I do not think that is a coincidence. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We are not running your time, Jim. 

Senator WEBB. I would not be so optimistic about the Senator 

from South Dakota. I think there are rivers in South Dakota. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you very much. 

Senator WEBB. We are going to soon see the Riverine Warfare 

Center in Sioux City. I can remember when I was Secretary of the 

Navy 20 years ago we spent a lot of time talking to Senator Stevens about strategic homeporting in Alaska. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Chairman, I would show great deference to 

all my colleagues, coastal state colleagues here, on shipbuilding 

issues and only ask in exchange that you show deference to me 

when it comes to farm programs. [Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It is a deal. 

Senator Webb’s time should start now. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, first I would like to congratulate you and express 

my appreciation for the work you have done on trying to tighten 

up the business side of this. We cannot increase the force structure 

in the way that many of us would like without having the efficiencies built into it. I think that what you have done over the past 

couple of months is very commendable. 

Secretary WINTER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator WEBB. As a starting point on these force structure 

issues, I have to look back to the time when Admiral Mullen and 

I graduated from the Naval Academy 39 years ago. We had 932, 

I think, ships in the United States Navy. It went down to 479 in 

41

the post-Vietnam drawdown. We got it up to 568 when I was Secretary of the Navy. We are down to 270——

Admiral MULLEN. ’5. 

Senator WEBB.—275 Navy ships, which is roughly half that, now. 

There are different eras and different national requirements. But 

I think truly today when you look at what has happened, we have 

a number of budget restraints that are based on the inevitable 

strategic mousetrap, from the ground forces being burned up in 

Iraq, weapons system, force structure, replenishment, all those 

sorts of things. Inevitably when this happened, our strategic forces 

tend to pay. 

I would like to ask, Admiral Mullen, in an ideal strategic world, 

not in a budgetary sense but in an ideal strategic world, looking 

at the responsibilities of the United States around the world, where 

would you see the Navy force structure? 

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly north of 313 Navy ships. Senator 

Lieberman or—I am sorry, Senator Thune I think talked about 380 

as well, and that was one of the estimates that was out there 3 or 

4 years ago. I think you hit at one of the most vital parts of how 

we have these discussions in the world that we are living in right 

now, which is what is the strategic appetite and how are we going 

to resource it. 

I am extremely concerned about the long-term ability of naval 

forces, Navy and Marine Corps, to be out and about in the ways 

that we need to be in the unpredictable world that we have. That 

said, back to the point the Secretary made, our operational availability right now is a whole lot better than it used to be. We have 

invested an awful lot of money and resources. So today 40 percent 

of the ships that we have are deployed, which is a very high number and they are doing exceptionally well. 

313 Navy ships was really minimum risk. I have not done any 

current analysis, sort of unbounded, to say without those bounds 

what should it be. But I would describe it more as the maximum 

acceptable risk is where we are right now, and I am very comfortable saying that. 

Senator WEBB. What was the end result of the experiment I was 

reading about that was in the papers a year or 2 ago with rotating 

ships’ crews and keeping ships themselves on station? 

Admiral MULLEN. We call that Sea Swap, and we just finished 

the second phase of that, the second series of three ships. There are 

many lessons that came out of that. Probably the most significant 

is that it does pretty well on cruisers, destroyers, and smaller 

ships. Trying to scale it up to the big ships is going to be a difficult 

problem. 

But I think in the manning constructs, we are in the middle of 

changing sea-shore rotation. I think in manning constructs in the 

future that there will be pieces of that that we will roll into. I 

talked about availability of ships, even availability of submarines. 

Would we consider rotating a crew as opposed to bringing a submarine back off a deployment, for example, or a cruiser or a destroyer? I think those are things that come out of the lessons that 

we learned there to make these incredibly important platforms and 

large capital investments mean more to what we are doing in 

terms of our overall country’s security. 

42

Senator WEBB. Potentially be a force structure multiplier. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator WEBB. Secretary Winter, you used two phrases which I 

think were pretty important in terms of how we are making these 

decisions. One is that we are all fiduciaries here, because so much 

of this procurement cycle is beyond the next, say, 5 years, et cetera. 

The other is ‘‘pace of work.’’ I have a question relating to keeping 

this pace of work from falling into the bath tub and coming back 

out again when we lose so many good people. We have been told 

that the Newport News Shipyard, which is the largest employer in 

the entire Commonwealth of Virginia, that there is going to be one 

of these dips between 2009 and 2012 when a great percentage of 

work is done and before we pick up I believe on two submarine 

projects starting in fiscal year 2012. 

Is there a way for the Navy to take steps in conjunction with the 

business community to prevent that sort of hiatus? 

Secretary WINTER. Well, sir, we have been working that in several aspects. First of all, I think the plan and the profile there of 

work has been pretty well understood and has been very stable for 

the last at least year. So there has been a basis of planning. 

Second of all, we are trying to utilize the one yard construct, 

which enables a sharing of personnel between the public and private yards in particular down in the Tidewater region. 

Thirdly, we will be looking very carefully at emergent opportunities for additional work availabilities that may come up within this 

time period and will see what we can do in terms of being able to 

use those to help retain the critical skills that are available at 

Newport News. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Admiral Mullen, I would like to associate myself with the views 

of Senator Warner on this Oceana problem. He would have been 

here, but he is down with the Queen of England today. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is what senior Senators get to do. I 

speak as a junior Senator. 

Senator WEBB. He actually said he did this during the Bicentennial as well, so I guess he deserves a return visit. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But not during the Centennial. 

Senator WEBB. That is right. 

Senator Warner mentioned his belief that the facility at Fort 

Pickett might be an acceptable alternative and it has the advantage of already being a government-owned facility with respect to 

clearances and that sort of thing. I know you have stated your 

views that this is outside of the tactical radius or the training radius that has been heretofore defined. 

But I am just wondering if you could clarify for us what your 

thoughts are on the different options that are available since that 

one site in North Carolina apparently is not going to work. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the question. I was 

asked that—actually, I was down in Norfolk on Tuesday and I was 

asked that question. Clearly, we are—the requirement for the outlying field is a very significant one. I appreciate Senator Warner 

both making that offer and that we have—what I said was tied to 

the requirement at the time, which was we had drawn a line at 50 

43

miles and obviously Fort Pickett is further away than that specifically. 

But what I also said in my statement and it did not necessarily 

register in all the quotes was that my lens is wide open on this. 

The Secretary has indicated in discussions with Senator Warner, 

we are willing to look at other options and certainly include Fort 

Pickett, and that is really where I am. 

The criteria that Fort Pickett was excluded from was back when 

we first considered outlying fields. We are having challenges clearly in North Carolina. We want to get this right. We are trying to 

balance it between two bases, Cherry Point and Oceana, which is 

what constrained us to some degree. But we are willing to look at 

all options at this point in time, and be consistent with the process 

that we have used today. 

Senator WEBB. I appreciate your clarification. 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. 

Gentlemen, I think Senator Thune and I will go one or two more 

questions and then let you depart. I appreciate it very much. 

This is to Admiral Mullen. Just when I thought I got the pronunciation right as ‘‘Litt-OR-al,’’ you said ‘‘LITT-or-al’’ just a while 

back, and I want you to clarify for me which is the preferred pronunciation of the LCS. 

Secretary WINTER. We disagree, sir. [Laughter.] 

Admiral MULLEN. I actually use both terms. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We have noticed. 

Admiral MULLEN. How about a waffle answer? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But you do not waffle on anything else, so 

that is all right. 

Anyway, we talked about the concerns about the escalation in 

cost of the LCS program, heading up to close to two times, am I 

right, what we originally hoped it would be? We have some very 

big acquisition programs, carriers and destroyers, actually multibillion dollar programs, and of course the subs, which we talked 

about. 

Admiral, I appreciate very much what you said about Electric 

Boat (EB). That will mean a lot to the workers up there. That is 

appreciated. 

Secretary Winter, let me ask you more generally considering this, 

and particularly the problems on the LCS. I have great regard for 

your management abilities. What steps are you taking or are you 

planning to take to improve the Navy’s ability to acquire these 

major systems on time and on cost? In some sense, I am not looking for compliments for EB, but what—if you care to—you do not 

have to answer. But I am curious, what worked there and what lessons can you draw from that to the others? 

Secretary WINTER. Well, sir, I think there are a number of factors. First of all, we have to have a very firm understanding of 

what it is that we are buying. That to a great extent has to be defined by the Navy at the outset and eventually handed over to the 

industrial team for the final definitization of design compatible 

with the construction facilities. 

44

Second of all, we have to have an agreed to, realistic cost and 

schedule basis for the program. I think we have gone a long way 

to doing that on the Virginia class. 

Lastly, I think we need to have an acquisition force that is properly sized and skilled, with the right backgrounds to engage in the 

oversight of the activity. In particular, I believe that on the naval 

reactor side with the submarine efforts we have a very stable and 

mature acquisition organization and it has been able to provide 

that type of oversight. You couple that in with established and well 

understood relationships between the Navy and the contractor 

team and I think you have all the possibilities of a very efficient 

and effective acquisition program. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is interesting. So part of it is the experience of the acquisition force? 

Secretary WINTER. Most definitely, sir. I think that we have seen 

that, not only in the Navy, but I think we have seen that in other 

services as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We have for sure. So what do you do to try 

to make sure you improve the acquisition force across the board? 

Secretary WINTER. Well, sir, I think it is going to take a while 

to do this, but I believe that we have to emphasize and accelerate 

the process of training individuals in acquisition. I think we have 

to make sure that the individuals who are selected for that have 

the basic engineering and experience in the development of ships 

from an operator’s perspective before they get involved in the acquisition side. 

I think we have to recognize that it is a multi-year investment, 

that we have to take the individuals, give them the various opportunities in programs which are ongoing, and give them the opportunity to build up the experience base before they take responsibility for either an existing program or in particular a new program. 

In that regard, sir, if I could, I think we have to recognize that 

when we start new programs there are additional demands that 

are placed on the acquisition team, and in particular in those circumstances we have to make sure that we provide some of our best 

and most experienced individuals to be able to lead that from the 

Navy perspective. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Well, we are going to keep in touch 

with you on that and urge you to be as demanding as you have to 

be to have this be what you want it to be. 

I have one more sort of open-ended question, but I am going to 

save it until the end for Admiral Mullen and yield to Senator 

Thune at this time. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Warner, who could not be here today, had asked that 

there be two letters included in the record. The first is a letter from 

him to the Secretary dated April 19, 2007, which urges the Navy 

to consider existing military locations in Virginia, including Fort 

Pickett, for a new outlying landing field (OLF). The second is a letter from Senator Warner to the Secretary dated April 20, 2007, 

which thanks the Secretary for his time in a phone conversation 

where the Secretary confirmed that the Navy would consider locaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:37 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39436.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
45

tions in Virginia, including Fort Pickett, as a viable option for an 

OLF. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


503sea18.eps
46

Senator THUNE. I would like to ask a question. Admiral Mullen, 

the ongoing operations in Iraq and the demand for ground forces 

has resulted in the deployment of thousands of sailors and individual augmentees to United States Central Command 

(CENTCOM). You have pointed to the contributions of these individuals with pride, noting that there are more sailors supporting 

operations in the ground in the CENTCOM area of responsibility 

(AOR), over 12,000, than the Navy has at sea in that AOR. 

We have seen reports from General Mosely, however, expressing 

concern that ongoing demand for these augmentees is hurting morale and retention in the Air Force. Similar concerns could be expressed by Navy personnel who do not feel that they signed up for 

ground duty. Are the demands being placed on the Navy for individual augmentees excessive or becoming difficult to meet? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir, they are not. In fact, I was with many 

of them over the holidays in both Iraq and Afghanistan and they 

are making a huge difference. They know they are making a difference and they are very proud of what they are doing. I have 

tried to keep a very close eye on what I would call the red lines 

that would give me concern, and we are just not there yet. 

Senator THUNE. Do you see any negative impact on morale and 

retention as a result of ongoing operations? 


503sea19.eps
47

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. In fact, our recruiting numbers are 

good, our retention numbers are good. I think it was at actually the 

Senate hearing I did last time where I indicated for the first time 

I had seen first-term retention this year dip below 50 percent. That 

is our goal. That really got my attention. I am happy to report that 

the monthly that just came in a couple days ago, it is back above 

50 percent for this year. 

So we paid a lot of attention to that, and I just have not seen 

the kind of impact. In fact, the individual augmentees that I have 

spoken to, whether they are in Guantanamo Bay, the Horn of Africa, Bahrain, Iraq, Afghanistan, have been incredibly positive. It is 

almost 13,000; it is over 13,000 right now today. 

Senator THUNE. Given that number, do you consider a maximum 

number of sailors that can be assigned to Army and Marine Corps 

units in CENTCOM without harmful effects on the readiness of the 

Navy? Do you have a threshold or a maximum number? 

Admiral MULLEN. We work pretty hard to try to predict how 

many more there will be and there has been a gradual increase. 

But I do not see anything in the future over the next 2 or 3 years 

as I am able to predict that requirement that is going to raise this 

level dramatically higher so that it would have that kind of impact. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thune. Thanks very much. 

I have a question that is not the particular purview of this subcommittee, but rather of our Personnel Subcommittee. You are still 

reducing Navy personnel, are you not? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What numbers are you at now? 

Admiral MULLEN. At the end of 2007, I will be at about 340,000. 

We are actually asking for another 12,000 to come down in the 

2008 budget. That gets me to about 328,000. I am going to settle 

out at about, between 320 and 325, is the plan, and we have a plan 

to do that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You are confident that you can handle what 

we are asking you to do with those numbers? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. But I am at that point, I have gotten 

to a point where that is enough. You are hitting at what I believe 

is as big an issue as we have in the Department, is how we are 

going to compensate and how we resource that aspect. Our most 

vital part of our overall Navy—actually, it is all the services—are 

people, and the costs continue to go up. Adequately making sure 

we have the resources to do that in the future is really going to 

be critical. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. 

Let me just ask you this final open-ended question. It is about 

the future. Here we are very focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, the 

threat of the global war on terrorism and al Qaeda. We are investing in a lot of programs—and I am speaking about the Navy now, 

of course—that, they have some real significant relevance, of 

course, to the global war on terrorism. But some of these I know 

are also against a hedge of a future peer competitor. Even now, in 

the global war on terrorism, we have increasing worries about Iran. 

I wonder if you would talk a little about what you see as the 

kind of future geopolitical, geostrategic environment that you are 

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asking us to fund the Navy to meet, and specifically, to the extent 

that you are able in open session, talk a little bit about China and 

Iran? 

Admiral MULLEN. I believe without, obviously, getting into the 

very, very, getting into the middle of the political debate about 

Iraq—and I believed this for years—that there will be a time when 

we come out of Iraq and out of Afghanistan. I think it is—and I 

have talked to Jim Conway about this and my open-ended—I 

mean, my open arms to him is welcome aboard, let us get under 

way, because I think it is really vital for the country to be out and 

about, which is what the Navy and Marine Corps can do, and it 

does it obviously with a very strong Navy. 

Very difficult to predict, just based on what our predictions have 

been in recent years, what is going to happen and where the difficulties might be. It gets back to this, one of the concepts that I 

talk about is this 1,000-ship Navy, global partnerships in a very 

dangerous world, where you have weapons, weapons of mass destruction, drugs, immigration challenges, fishing violations, 

etcetera, and 90 percent of what moves in and out of most countries in the world goes by sea. So secure sea lanes to afford the opportunity for those economies to thrive are vital. 

Navies do that and we know how to do that. Then specifically, 

the western Pacific is a vital region. Obviously you have both 

China and India, thriving new economies, and there is going to 

continue to be a global adjustment associated with those economic 

engines and the transparency of China’s intent is not clear. 

You indicated earlier they are building 2 submarines a year or 

more than that, they are building 10 surface combatant ships a 

year or more than that. It has been very difficult to understand exactly why. They are building a Navy that is certainly more capable 

than the challenge they might have with Taiwan if we had a problem with the situation up near her, off the coast in Taiwan or near 

Taiwan. 

So it is the strategic intent specifically with her. I was recently 

in India and the focus there is very much on a more regional, 

broader—focus of the Indian Navy is a broader, regional focus, and 

they also share those kinds of concerns. So it is the transparency 

piece. China is buying technology, developing weapons, and creating challenges for us in other domains that I could not talk to 

in an open forum, that we are all very concerned about. 

That said, what Admiral Fallon did out there when he was 

United States Pacific Command, engaging military to military, I 

think is vital. 

With Iran, Iran sits at the heart of, obviously, the sea lane 

through which 60 percent of the world’s oil resources travel. It is 

a vital, critical sea lane. We have been there, the United States 

Navy has been there since the late 1940s. We are going to be there 

a long time. Preserving that sea lane and preserving it so that a 

global economy can thrive is key as well. 

I am concerned about what Iran is speaking about, what they are 

doing. Their taking these 13 British sailors and marines recently 

is just another example. Their rhetoric is strong. Clearly they 

could—they have the capability to shut down that strait for a period of time. 

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[Additional information follows:]

During my testimony, I indicated concern about Iran’s recent capture of the 13 

British sailors and marines. I would like to correct the record to show that there 

were 15 British sailors and marines recently captured by Iran, not 13.

I worry a lot about the Middle East, quite frankly, just the 

broader Middle East, outside of a discussion about Iraq and Afghanistan. Stability there is really critical. Naval forces as they are 

today, we have two carriers that are there today. Naval forces are 

a really important part of that stability. 

That does not even speak to what may happen in other parts of 

the world. We are engaged in Africa, east and west coast, as a 

Navy. We are engaged down in South America in a positive way, 

to prevent and deter. A strong Navy has always been a great deterrent and a great strength of this country, and that is why I am concerned about building the Navy that we need for the future. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks for that very thoughtful answer. We 

are concerned, too, and we want to keep the Navy as strong as we 

possibly can. 

I thank you, Secretary Winter, for your testimony, for your service. Admiral Mullen, obviously the same to you. 

We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 10 days 

in case you want to add anything or we want to ask you a few more 

questions. 

Senator Thune, do you want to make any conclusion? 

Senator THUNE. Just to also express my appreciation for your 

outstanding service, Admiral and Mr. Secretary. We thank you for 

all that you do and for those that serve under you. Please convey 

our deepest appreciation to them for their service. 

Secretary WINTER. Thank you very much. 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

SURFACE SHIP TORPEDO DEFENSE AND ANTI-TORPEDO TORPEDO DEFENSE SYSTEMS

1. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Mullen, the Navy has previously responded to a 

prior congressional inquiry that torpedo defense is an important ship survivability 

capability, and included Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) in the recent CNO 

unfunded priority submission. Recent Navy budget submissions and congressional 

staffer briefs indicate that the Navy has decremented the fiscal year 2008 SSTD 

Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) developmental funding by half ($15 million) and that 

the AN/WSQ–11 torpedo defense system intended for high value units is no longer 

funded for development. Please explain the Navy’s intent with respect to expeditiously fielding an improved torpedo defense capability for Navy ships, particularly 

high value ships most susceptible to a torpedo attack. 

Admiral MULLEN. The Navy recognizes that improved SSTD capability using ATT 

is a funded requirement and is working to expeditiously deliver this capability in 

accordance with technology maturity and available resources. The Navy’s intent is 

to initially integrate ATT capability on Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers 

and Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers that are equipped with the SQQ–

89A(V)15 Combat System. These cruisers and destroyers (CRUDES) have fire control and launcher systems that are modifiable for the ATT application, and the 

SQQ–89A(V)15 configuration provides threat torpedo detection, classification, and 

localization (DCL) capability. Improvements to CRUDES DCL capability were 

planned for testing in fiscal year 2007, but this testing has been deferred to fiscal 

year 2008 due to the unavailability of ships. Integration of the SSTD and its subsystems in CRUDES ships is a first step toward fielding an effective SSTD on high 

value, large deck ships. The Navy plans to leverage technologies developed and testVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:37 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39436.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
50

ed for CRUDES platforms to improve high value ship torpedo defense. The fiscal 

year 2008 budget submission reduced ATT development in favor of higher priority 

Navy programs and while evaluating DCL technology maturity. The impact of this 

reduction will be a 2-year delay to ATT initial operating capability. The Navy is 

willing to accept this risk in order to fund higher priority programs.

2. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Mullen, Congress has continued to support development of the ATT capability. In light of recent funding decrements, please explain 

the Navy’s intent and plan to field the ATT capability for SSTD protection. 

Admiral MULLEN. The Navy’s intent is to initially integrate ATT capability on Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers that are equipped with the SQQ–89A(V)15 Combat System. These 

CRUDES have fire control and launcher systems that are modifiable for the ATT 

application, and the SQQ–89A(V)15 configuration provides threat torpedo detection, 

classification, and localization capability. The Navy plans to leverage technologies 

developed and tested for CRUDES platforms to make future improvements to other 

ship classes, including aircraft carriers. 

The Navy’s plan is to utilize an evolutionary acquisition approach to deliver increments of ATT capability to the warfighters. Increment I plans to field the multimission hardware baseline and the first ATT software spiral to prosecute salvos of 

threat torpedoes. Increment II plans to field the software for enhanced salvo capability. Increment III plans to field the weapon and software for offensive Anti-Submarine Warfare capability. The Navy is drafting a capability development document 

and planning for an ATT Milestone B review in fiscal year 2008.

3. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Mullen, Congress has expressed concern regarding the increasing capability of threat torpedoes to engage surface ships, as well as 

the increased potential of the Chinese Navy’s ability to engage surface ships with 

anti-ship torpedoes. The Navy has indicated that new construction ships (CVN, 

DDG–1000, LCS, etc.) will be outfitted with standard and effective torpedo countermeasures. However, recent Navy actions to reduce the SSTD developmental funding 

line and not fund the proposed AN/WSQ–11 system for Navy high value units appear counterproductive to enhancing the capability of Navy ships to defend themselves against a torpedo attack. Please explain the Navy’s plan to provide each new 

construction class ship with a robust torpedo defense system. 

Admiral MULLEN. The Navy intends to utilize the appropriate torpedo defenses 

to meet the unique requirements for each new construction ship class within available resources. As with other mission areas, the Navy will maximize the undersea 

defense capabilities of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) by utilizing joint integrated 

operations. 

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) baseline design has space and weight reserved 

for a torpedo detection, classification, and localization (DCL) system that is compatible with the class’s sprint speed as well as its space and weight requirements. The 

LCS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) minimizes time in submarine danger areas. 

Unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles are planned for threat submarine detection. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopters will be used for threat submarine 

detection and prosecution prior to engagement with LCS in its mission areas. If LCS 

is alerted to a nearby threat submarine, it will exploit its high sprint speed and maneuverability to move to an area out of torpedo range. The Navy plans to leverage 

current and future development efforts to provide LCS with torpedo DCL and countermeasure capabilities. 

DDG–1000 will incorporate the Integrated Undersea Warfare (IUSW) suite with 

the AN/SLQ–25D (NIXIE), AN/SQQ–89A(V)15, and Launched Expendable Acoustic 

Decoy System (LEADS) for its baseline torpedo defense. Further, DDG–1000 is designed with space and weight reserve to accommodate the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo 

(ATT). These systems, incorporated into DDG–1000’s Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), will integrate Undersea Warfare combat management, fire control, 

command and control, and defensive countermeasures, enabling DDG–1000 to engage undersea threats in both littoral and open ocean environments. 

Aircraft carrier (CVN) protection uses an integrated CSG approach for torpedo defense that includes early detection and prosecution of undersea threats by maritime

51

patrol aircraft, submarines, and CRUDES ships. CVN defensive capability is provided by the AN/SLQ–25C NIXIE system. To further improve high value ship torpedo defense in the future, the Navy plans to leverage technologies developed and 

tested for CRUDES platforms, including ATT.

[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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