1 DCS also filed for term ination o f the par ental rig hts of t he two putative f athers. The fathers ’ right s were ter minat ed, an d nei ther

has appeale d. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE Assigned on

Briefs M ay 31, 2002 TENNESSEE DEP

ARTMENT OF C HILDREN’S SERV ICES v. C. M. S., ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Maury County No. 42-097 George L. Lovell, Judge

No. M2001-02893-COA-R3-JV - Filed Septem ber 26, 2002

This case involves the termination of parental rights of the mother of two children, both of whomwere born while the mother was a minor. At the time of the hearing the son was almost five and the daughter was almost three, and they have been in state custody since they we

re one year old and three months old, respectively . The trial court terminat ed the mot

her’s pa rental r ights because of the persistence o f conditions which prevent the safe return of the childre n to the mother and because there wa s little like

lihood the condition s would be

remedie d at an ea

rly date toallow a safe return in the near future. We affirm that dec ision.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Affirmed and Remanded
P AT RICIA J. C OTT RELL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C ANT RELL , P.J., M.S., and W IL LI AM C. K OCH , J R ., J., joined.
Lar ry Samuel Pat

terson, Jr. , Columbia, Tenness ee, for the appe llant, C.M. S. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Repor

ter; Eliza beth C. Driver, Assistant

Attorney Genera l, for the a ppellee , State of

Tenness ee, Dep artment o f Childre n’s Servi ces. OPINION This case comes before us on an appea l from an order

of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the mother involved in this litigation. The mother (“Mother”), appeals the terminat ion of her parenta l rights with respect to her two childr

en, N.A. S. and L .M.S. 12 The puta ti ve f athe r was not P. P.’s son, who was the puta ti ve f athe r of N.A.S. 3 In a temporary custody petit ion, t he gran dmo ther all eged the disruption occurred because she found drug para phe rnalia in M other ’s laund ry. She as ked t hat DCS fin d anot her pl acement forMother, but w ante d to r etai n cus tody of N.A .S. At the h earing herei n, the grandmothe r tes tif ied th at t he placement

did not work

out becaus e Mother was unruly at t imes and wi ld. Mother admi tted t he p lace ment did not work becau se she wa s being disobedient and was resent ful of th e grandmother ’s at tempts to get

her to be more responsi ble. -2- Mother was only fifteen (15) y ears old when her son, N.A.S., was born on January 29, 1997. She and her son lived with her mother. N.A.S. was removed from this home on January 28, 1998, the day befor

e his first birthday, bec ause the home was raided and marijuana

and cocaine were found on the premises. Mother’s mother was present the night the house w as raided, and Mother testified that she and her mother had used marijuana toge ther until their house was raided.
N.A.S.’s removal was initiated by a petition by

a law enforcement officer w ho participated in the raid on Mother’s mother’s apartment. The petition alleg es that the child wa s found in the residence“where

office rs noted a strong s mell of ma

rijuana and mari juana sm oke.” The officer believedthat, due

to the child’s age, this situation was hazardous to his health. He also alleged that Mother neglected to prov ide a sa fe environment for the child. Based upon this petition, the court found N.A.S. to be dependent and neglected, a nd placed temporary

legal custody

with DCS. Mother was also p laced in

state custody bec ause she was underage. N.A.S. and mother we re not placedin the same home at first. Instead, mother was sent to a facility in Memphis where she lived for approximately two months. Later, N.A.S.’s paternal grandmother , P.P., gainedphysical custody of both Mot

h er and N.A.S. Mot

her bec ame pre gnant w

hile living

with P.P. 2 In June of 1998, P.P. called the case worker at DCS assigned to the case and requested that Mother be moved to a foster home bec ause

of som e disa greemen ts th at she and Mo ther w ere hav ing. 3 Mother requested that N.A.S. be moved with her. The case worker plac ed both Mother and N.A.S. with a fos ter couple. The staffing summary completed during this placement stated “All in attendance agre e that [N.A.S.]’s best inter

est will be

served f or him to remain i n foster care where he

can [have ] close contact with his mother wh

ile she works on her issues.” DCS continued to attempt placements that would further this goal, but Mother’s conduct sometimes interfered. Mother, p regna nt with her second child, continue d to use ma rijuana . She and N .A.S. only lived with this first foster family for approxima

tely two months b ecause

mother failed a drug test by testing positive for marijuana. As a result, in August of 199 8 DCS mov ed Mother and N.A. S. to different foster homes. While living in the secondfoster home and pregnant, Mother fa iled another drug screen. DCS placed Mother in a mental health fac ility for the last fo ur months of her pr eg na nc y. Her second child, L.M.S., a daug hter, was born onJanuary 7, 1999. Mother signed the document s required to surrender L .M.S. for adoption, but revoked the surrender before it was final. L.M.S. was placed in temporary custody of the State on Mar ch 1, 1999, as a result of the Department having custody

of Mother and because Mother had no visible means of support.4 Although DC S alleg ed in its p etition tha t M other had fa iled to follow the Permanency Plan, such f ailu re was not a groun d for t ermination in thi s case.

5 The record is not clear as to the date of the arrest or conviction. -3- Mother and her two childr en were placed in a foster home tog ether. In Marc h of 1999, approximately three months after Mother began living in this her third foster home, Mother failed another drug screen, and DCS infor med Mot her that she was going to have to attend a drug rehabilitation program. Because she did not want to be sent to the rehabilitation program, Mother ran away, le aving both of her children in foster car e. In April of 1999 both children were placed with a new foster

fa mi ly, where they

still reside. At this time N.A.S. was two years old and L .M.S. was three months old. Shortly after her

eighte enth

birthday , which wa s May 30, 1999, M other co ntacted her cas e manager to attempt

to establish

visitation with her children. Visitation was arranged; at first it was supervisedand for

one hou r pe r we ek. In addition, DCS and Mother worked out a permanency plan requiring that she obtain employment and maintain a suitable home for the children. Although no copy of this pla

n appea rs in the r ecord be fore us, 4 we gather from the testimony that the purpose of the plan was to reunite

Mother a nd her ch ildren if she wer e able to demonstr ate the a bility to provide a stable and suita ble home e

nvironme nt. Mother

testified that she had signed the plan of care and that the requirements in the plan were reasona ble and re lated t o remedying the conditions that brought her children into state custody . She testified that she knew that in order to get custody of her childre n she nee ded to keep a

stable job, maintain a place where she could live with her c hildren, and maintain regular visitation.
In an attempt to meet these goals, Mother rented a trailer, where she lived

for appr oximately seven months. She was then able to move into a subsidized apartment. During this time Mo ther also attempted to maintain employment. Mother testified that five months was the longest that she had held any one job, but that she wa s never unemployed for more

than one month. Mother testified that she would sometimes get fired from a job because she was “doing something out the night before and would be sleepy a

nd not want to get up” to go to work. She admitted, “That was one of my ma in problems

. I didn’t keepa stable job.” Mother was fairly consiste nt with her

visitation , especi ally withN.A.S. and, ev entually, g ot overnight visits with N.A.S. However, she frequently missed visitation with L.M.S. and never obtained overnig htvisits with L.M.S. For several months Mother paid $245 in child support per month.
Mother lived on he

r own fro m around M ay

of 1999 un

til M arch of 200 1. At some point during this time, Mother was arrested and convicted for theft unde r $500 because she stole clothes from a mall. 5 Mother was given probation for her thef t crime. However, she violated the probation by driving under the

influ ence of a lcohol. As a result of her DUI conviction, her probation was revoked, and she w as requi red to se rve six month s in jail. She was incarcerated March 26, 2001 and was releas ed on Sept

ember 23 , 2001. While

in jail, Mother could not comply with the plan of care6 The rec ord i s un cle ar on th e det ail s of Mother ’s tw o wee k i ncar cer ati on. DCS chos e to present it s case through M other’s testimony, and it is imprecise in som e areas. -4- because she did nothave visitation, was not living on her ow n, was not

employ ed and did

not pay child supp ort. When she missed

visitation

because of her incarce

ration, M other wa s force d to tell DCS about that inca rcera tion, altho ugh the record does not te

ll us when D CS was notif

ied. Appr oximately two months after Mother began her six month jail sentence, DCS filed the underlyin g petitio n to terminat e her parental rights. After her September

2001 release from jail, Mother was incarce rated for anot her t wo weeks in October on conviction of or related to cha rges of

6 driving on a revoked license. Mother

owes approximately $1,000 in fines that she must pay before she can

obtain another driver’s license, which she estimates will take her a couple of months. At the time of the hearing here in, sh e had criminal impersonation charges pending against her which had not been resolve d. The hearing on the termination petition was held November 15, 2001. Since being released from jail, Mother had been living with her mother and not on her own. Mother, who was twenty at the time, admits to drinking on at least one o ccasion since her release. At the time of the hearing Mother had been employed for one week by Quick Sak.
At the time of

the hear ing, Moth

er was st ill on probation and, therefore, was being dr ug tested. Mother had not failed a drug scree n in the three months prior to the hearing and stated that she had not used drugs for about eight months. Although Mother testified she had never undergone any drug treatment, it is unclear whether her stays at various fa

cilities had included counseling related to drug abuse. Mother left school in the ninth grade and has not gotten a GED. She testified that she was preparing to attend classes for a GED at t

he time of the hear ing. Moth

er is not in

counseling bec ause she feels that she does not need any counseling. Neither o f the chi l dren’s fathers have ever es ta bl is he d p at er ni ty. L.M.S. has been in state custody her entire life. She was, a t the time o f the hea

ring, a lmost three y ears old . L.M. S. has bre athing p roblems, but Mother does not know what they a re, or what the condition

is called . N.A.S. ha s been in state custody and

foster care since his first birthday . He was almost five year s old at the time of the hearing. H e suffers fr om emotiona l problems . Both children have been in the care of the same foster parents since spring of 1999.
DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother asto both children, alleging that the parental rights should be terminat e d because, among other things, the c onditions that had led to the chi ldren’sremoval from the p arents, or sim ilar co nditions, persisted pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(a). The trial court agreed and terminate d Mother’s pa rental r ights stati ng:-5-

[Mother has] not had custody of the childre

n for mor e than six mon

ths and the

re is a persistence in conditions which led to the children being brought into State custody which prevent

the child ren’s sa fe retu rn to the p arents. These

conditions still pers ist. [N.A.S.] and [L .M.S. ] w ere taken into State custody when [Mother’s] house was raidedfor drugs. Shewas in Stat e custody for seve ral years, was in some counseling butwhen the State attempted to provide services for drug r ehabilitation, [Mother] ran from State custody, esca

ped, left and was gone

until she turned eighteen (18). At that time she said, “I want to see my c hildren, ” and the

State at th at time, di d make som e effort to get th is plan of care done, to get [Mother] visiting with the children, which she did for a

time. But

the same condition s still persist. She does not have a stable job or any kind of s table ho me life. She is still violating the law and has been incarcerated, was on probation, violated that probation and since that time has gotten new charg es. The s tatute talks about the likelihood that these conditions would be remedied at an ea rly date so th at the ch

ild could b e reinte grate d in to its family and that w ould be a permanent situation. . . . [Mother] has been legally an adult for almost two and a half y ears, since May 23, 1999. How long does a parent need to get themselv es establish

ed and to s how that th

ey can be a parent t o a child? And

th e other side of the question is how long should a child remain in limbo and be subject to being bounced

back an d forth f

rom foste r home to parents’ home and perhaps back to f ost er ca re ? With regard to the best interests of the children the trial court stated: [T]he Defend ants have

failed to make such anadjustmen

t of circumstance s, conduct, or condition s as to mak

e it in the child ren’s be st intere st to retur

n to their home in the foreseea b le future . . . . The Court must also consider the effect of a c hange of careta kers and phy sical en

vironmen ts is likely

to have on

the child ren’s e motional, psychologic al and medical condition; . . . t hat the physical envir onment of the parent’s or guardi an’s hom e is not healthy and saf e, there is suspected criminal activity in the home

and such use of alcohol or controlled substances as may render the parent o

r guar dian cons istently

unable to care for the children in a saf e andstable manner; the parent’s or guardian’s mental a nd/or emotional status would b e detrimental to the chi ldren or prevent the pare nt or gua rdian fr om effe ctively providing safe and stable care a nd supervision for the children . . . . Having found that ground s for terminat io n were proved by

clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best inte

rests of the children to terminate Mother’s parental rig hts, the trial court entered judgmen t termina ting Mother’s rig

hts. Mother appeals that

ruling to this court arguing that the State did not prove by clea r and convincing evidence statutory grounds for termination.-6- I. Sta ndard fo r Termin ation of Pa

rental Ri ghts
A parent has a fundamental right to the ca re, custody a

nd control of his or her child. Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212-13 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud , 921 S.W.2d 170, 174- 75 (Tenn . 1996); In Re Adoption o f a Female

Child , 896 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tenn. 1995); Nale v. Robertson , 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1994). This right is a fundamental but not absolute right, and

the state may

interfe re with pa rental r ights if t here is a compelling state

interest

. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 7 45, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (198 2); Nash-Putnam , 921 S.W.2d at 174-75. Terminating parental rights has the legal e ffect of reducing the par e nt to the role of a complete stranger, “severing

forever all legal rig

hts and obligations of

the parent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( l )(1). This most drastic interference with a parent’s rig hts requires “theopportunity for an individua

lized dete rmination that a pa rent is either unfit or

will cause substantial harm to his or her child before thefundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken away.” In re Swanson , 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999).
Becau se the de cision to te rminate p arenta

l rights a ffects f undament al constit utional ri ghts, courts app ly a

hig her standard of proof when adjudicating termination cases. In re M.W.A. ,980 S.W.2d 620, 622 ( Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1998) ; O'Daniel v. Messier , 905 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). To justify the termination of pare ntal rights, the grounds for termination must be established by clear and convincing evi dence . Tenn. Co de. Ann. § 36-1-113 (c)(1) ; In re M.W.A. , 980 S.W.2d at 622; State Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Defriece , 937 S.W.2d 954, 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). “ This heightened

standard . . . serves to prevent the un warrantedtermination or interference with the biological parents’ rights to their children.” In re M.W.A. , 980 S.W.2d at 622. This court has explained that standard: [A] ltho ugh it does not

require as much c ertainty

as the “b ey ond a rea sonable d oubt” st andard the “clear and convincing evide nce” standard is more exacting than the “preponderance

of the evidence” standar

d. O ‘Daniel v. Messier , 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 95); Brandon v. Wright , 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 199 2). In order to be clear and convincing, evidence must eliminate any serious or subst antial doubt about the cor rectne ss of the c onclusion s to be dra wn from t

h e evidence. Ho dges v. S

.C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992); O’Daniel v. Messier , 905 S.W.2d at 188. Such evidence should pro duce in the factfinder’s mind afirm belief or conviction as to thetruth of th e alleg ations sou ght to be establi shed. O’ Daniel v. Messier , 905 S.W.2d a t 188; Wiltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). In contrast to the pre ponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing e vidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is “highly probable” as opposed to merely “more probable” than not. Lettner v. Plummer , 559 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977); Goldsmith v. Rober ts , 622 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Brandon v. Wright , 838 S.W.2d at 536.7 Mother requ ested that the final o rder be am end ed to reflect tha t the only g roun d for te rmin ation was Tenn.

Code A nn. §36-1-113(g)(3)(A), stating in her motion that the tri al court had r equ ired D CS to spe cify which grou nd it was proceedin g on and tha t DCS had c hose n this gro und. T he co urt am end ed the ord er to re flect that M other ’s rights were terminated on the basis of that st atutory provisi on. -7- In r e C. W.W. , 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Parental rights ma

y be terminat ed in only

a limited n

umber of statutori l y defined circumst ances. In re M.W.A. , 980 S.W.2d at 622. Before termination, one or more of the asserted statutory grounds must be proved by cle ar and convincing evidence. Af ter the court, applying

the appropr iateevidentiary standa

rd, determi

nes that th e statutor y c riteria for term ination ha ve been met, the court additionally must find, also using the clear and co nvincing evidence standard, that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2).
II . Grounds
In the present case, the trial court ter minated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Co de Ann. §36-1-113(g)(3)(A). 7 This statute lists as one of the grounds for termination: (3)(A) The child has been removed from the home of the parent or g uardian by order of a cour t for a pe riod of six ( 6) months a

nd: (i) The conditions which led to the child’s removal or other conditions which in all re asonable

probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abus e o r neglect and which, therefore, prevent the child’s safe re

turn to the care of the pare nt, still pers ist; (ii) T here is little lik

elihood th at these

condition s will be r

emedied at an ea rly date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent(s) or gua rdian(s ) in the near future; and (iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian a nd chi ld r elationsh

ip grea tly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permane nt home. These ground s must be in

terpreted a nd applied in accordance with the express legislative intentof our statutory sy stemof child removal, foster care, and adoption. One of the stated purposes of these sta tutes is “t o protect [children] from needless prolonged placement in foster care and the uncerta inty it provide s, and to provide them a reasonable assurance that, if an early

return to the care of their pa rents is not possible, they will be pla

ced in a p ermane

nt home at

a n early da

te.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-401(a). Our courts have recognized the significance of permanency

as the goal of decisions invo lving future placement of children and termination of par ental rights. See, e.g.,-8-

St ate Dep’t of H

uman Serv

s.v. Smith , 785 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 1990) (holdi ng that t h e c onsequence of denying

termination of parental rights of parents who we re unfit due to mental illne s s would be “to condemn a child . . . to a life in serial foster homes without an y po ssibility

of a stable, permanent home”). There is no dispute that the children have be en remov ed from th e mother for sixmonths. The issue before us, therefore, is whether the other statutorily required fa

ctors were proved by

clear and convincing evidence. DCS argues that the court can consider any conditions which would cause a child to be subjected to f

urther a buseor neglect and is not limited to the conditions which were the basis of the initial removal. Based on the clear lang uage of the statute, we ag ree. The children were placed in State custody and have remained there beca us e Mother w as unable to provide

a safe a nd stable environment for them. Mother herself was a minor for much of the tim e her chi ldren were in State custody , and apparently DCS was willing to give her the opportuni ty to demonstrate that she could re sponsibly care for her children af

ter she turned eighteen. DCS initiated visitation and established a plan for Mother to follow in order to gain custody of her children. During the two years be tween that event

and the filing of the petition herein, Mother failed to establish a secure environment for the children or to de monstrate s he could prov ide the care needed by t hem. At the

hearing , Mother a

dmitted she had not compl ied with the plan of care designed to eliminate existing conditions that made return of the children to her custody impossible. Safe return of the children to Mother’s custody was not possible. When the petition was filed, and even when the hearing was held, there wa s little likelihood a safe returncould be a ccomplish

ed in the near future. When asked, Mother could not provide any estimation of how long it would be before she would be able to care f or her children. During these same two ye ars (two and a half y ears by the

time of the hearing) t

h e two children were living together in the same foster home. They

developed strong bonds with each other and with their foster parents who have indicated a de sire to adopt the children. The children have had the benefit of a safe and stable en vironment, b ut not with Mother or due to her efforts. The children were a

lmost five and almos tthree a t the t ime of the he aring. Continuing Mother’s parental rights would greatly

diminish the children’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent home.
On ap pe al , M ot he r a rg ue s t ha t p ro of of gr ou nd s w as no t s ho wn by c lear and convincing evidence. Her

argument is that she was making e fforts to improve her situat

ion and to c omply

with the requirements for gaining custody of her children prior to her incarce ration. She argues that the underlying

offenses which re sulted in th at incar ceratio n were n ot so serio

us as to justify termination or to show a p attern o f crimina l activity similar to t

hat which led to the initial removal of NAS from the home. That is not the issue. I t is not the seri ousness of the offenses that determine whether grounds were pr

oved; it is M other’sinability to do those things necessary to provide a

safe and stable environment for her children.8 She also s tate d that if her p arenta l rights wer e term inated , she pr eferre d that P .P. be allowe d to a dop t N.A .S., ther eby separat ing t

he chil dren. Al though s he acknowl edged this s eparation would be difficul t for the children, she thought it more important t hat at leas t one of them be ra ised w ith his bio logica l family. T he gua rdian ad litem felt that since the children had been together s ince the daughter’s b irt h and we re ve ry c lose , “ It would not be fai r to eit her of these chil dren to s eparate t hem so that

one coul d be pla ced wi th arel ati ve.” The is sue of adoption or other placement of these children is not be fore this court. Our so le issue is the termination of M other’s parental rights. -9- Mother was given probation for the theft offense , but was u nable to comply with the require ments of that

probation and was convicted of driving under the influenc e while sh

e was still under the legal age for a

l cohol consum ption. She later had additional criminal charges placed agains ther. Her inability to c o nform he r conduct to the law , and her inability to comply

with pr obation condition s, are simply further examples o f her ina

bility to do those

things necessar

y to demonstrate she can provide her children with the c are and stability they need.
We affir m the tr ial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that conditions persisted whichprevented the return of the children to Mother’s c ustody, that

there was littlelikelihood that those conditions would be remedied in the near future, and that continuation of the relationship between Mother and her two children would diminish the chances of the children’s integration into a safe, stable and permane nt home.
II I. Best I nterest of the Children Mother’s position at the hearing was that she should have another c hance. Giving Mother “another chance” would, of course, mean tha t the child ren woul d remain

in foster care indefinite

ly and remain unavaila

ble for a doption unt

il Mother w as able

to demonstrate she could care for them or until Mother’s parental rights were eventua lly terminat

ed. Mothercould not say how long the children should remain in this status while she attempted to do better. 8
We understand Mother’s desire to be give n ye t another opportuni

ty and also understand the degree of respo nsibility

she was a sked to de

monstr ate at a re latively

you ng ag e. However, thos e responsibilities arose from the needs of her children, and our concern must be the best interests of the two children involved. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2). Our legislature has listed some, but notall, of the factors a court i s requir ed to cons ider in

determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In determining whe

ther termination of

parenta l or gua rdianshi p rightsis in the be st interest of the ch ild pursua nt to this part, the

court sha ll conside r, but is not limited to, t he fol lowi ng: (1) Whether th

e p arent or guardian has made suc h an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or condit

ions as to ma

ke it safe and in the

child’s b est inter

est to be in

the home of the parent or guardian;-10-

(2) Whether th

e paren t or gua rdian ha s failed t

o effect a lastin g adjustment after reasona ble efforts by a

vailable social services agenc ies for suchduration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible; (3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child; (4) Whether a meaningful relationship ha s o therwise been established between the parent o r guar dian and t he child; (5) The effec t a chang e of car etaker s and phy sical en

vironmen t is likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition; (6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing wi th the paren t or guardian, has shown brutality, phy sical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward other children in the fa mily or household; (7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is hea lthy and safe, whether t

here is c riminal a ctivity in the home, or whether ther e is such use of alcohol or controlled substances as may render theparent or guardian consiste ntly unable to care for the child in a safe a nd stable manner; ( 8) Whether th

e paren t’s or guardian ’s mental

and/or e motional st

atu s would b e detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from effectively providing safe and stable care and super vision for the child; or (9) Whether the parent o

r guar dian has p aid

child supp ort consi stent with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). The children were appointed a gua rdian ad litem f

or these procee dings, and the guardian filed a report detailing her investigation into the situation. She concluded that, in her opinion, termination was in the ch ildre n’s be st in teres t, st ating: These children have been

in foster care f or appro ximately

two y ears. B ecause

their mother has not tried to comply with the plan of ca re, it appea

rs t hat they

will be in foster care for several more y

ears. The children have bonded with their foster p arents and the foster parents are anxious to adopt them.
Our review of the evidence presente d at the hearing in light o f th e factors set out above compels our agreement with the lower court that the best interests of these children would be served by the termination of Mother’s parental rights. As explained earlier, Mother has not made a n-11-

adjustmentof circumstance so as to make it safe for her children to be in her home. She ha s not demonstrated an ability to provide the children with the care they need. While Mother maintained fairly regular visitation with N.A.S., her visitation with L.M.S. was less regular. While incarcerated Mother did not see her children. After her rele ase from jail, Mother saw her children only

twice. Mother also admits that she maintained her visitation with N.A.S. more than with L .M.S., but b lames thison car trouble, the foste

r paren ts and L .M.S.’s he alth prob lems. Both children have lived

with foster parents longer than they lived with Mother. N.A.S. was remove d fr om Mother’s custody on his first birthday ; although he and Mother shared some foster care placements, they w ere separated sometimes due to Mother’s actions. L.M.S. was plac ed in state custody shortly after he

r birth. Mother liv ed with L.M.S. and N.A.S. for only two to three months after L.M.S.’s birth. Then, she ran away and left her

children. For approximately two and half ye ars thereafter, unt il the date o f the hearing, L .M.S. and N.A.S. have lived with their current foster parents

. While Mother enjoyed visitation during most of this time, it is clear that the children have spent most of their young liveswith their foster parents. The foster parents ar e the only pare

nts that L.M.S. knows. Mother admits that she has a stronger bond with N.A.S., but the c hildren have a strong bond with each other. Thus, while we cannot say that no meaningful relationship has been established between Mother and the children, it is clear that these children have formed a stronger bond with their

foster p arents and have found their only stable environment with them. This is not a situation where children were raised and c ared for by their biological parents for a number of years before they

were removed from the parents’ c ustody. These children need sta

bility in their lives and Mother cannot provide that to her children. Mother has been an adult f

or two y ears and in that tim

e has bee n unable t o demonstr

ate an a bility to provide the care he

r child ren need. The General Assembly has made the policy decision that children in such situations need not remain in limbo indefinitely. There fore, we find that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the childre n. IV. Conclusion
We affirm the order terminating the mother’s parental rights and remand the c ase to the trial court for such further procee dings asmay

be requi red. Costsof this appeal are taxed to Mother, the appellant, for which execution may issue if necessary

.

___________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTREL L, JUDGE