[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-13496

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:06-cr-00062-MCR-CJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TABITHA DIXON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(September 19, 2014)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 1 of 7 
2

Tabitha Dixon, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

judge’s denial of her 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce sentence. We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2006, Dixon pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with 

intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine and 5 or more grams of crack 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846 (Count 1); and 

using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in 

furtherance of, a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 

(Count 2). Dixon’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which applied the 

2005 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, assigned her a base offense level of 38 for 

Count 1, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), because she was accountable for 2.8 

kilograms of cocaine base. The PSI awarded a 3-level acceptance-of-responsibility 

reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which yielded a total offense level of 35. The 

PSI assigned a criminal history category of I, which yielded a Sentencing 

Guidelines range of 168-210 months of imprisonment as to Count 1. Dixon was 

subject to a consecutive term of 5 years to life on Count 2, under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

The district judge adopted the PSI Guidelines calculations and departed 

downward from the Guidelins range, based on Dixon’s substantial assistance to the 

government, under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. On each count, the judge imposed 

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 2 of 7 
3

consecutive 60-month sentences, the mandatory minimums, for a total sentence of 

120 months.

In 2008, Dixon moved to reduce her sentence under § 3582(c)(2), based on 

Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district judge denied Dixon’s 

motion, because, based on the facts underlying Dixon’s original sentence, 

including her substantial assistance, the judge would not have reduced her sentence 

below 120 months even after applying Amendment 706.

In November 2011, Dixon filed the § 3582(c)(2) motion on appeal, based on 

Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Dixon asserted her § 5K1.1 

reduction had resulted in an initial sentence 67% below her original Guidelines

range. She requested a comparable reduction below her amended Guidelines

range, and argued that denying a further reduction would effectively lessen the 

benefit of her prior substantial-assistance reduction. In her § 3582(c)(2) motion, 

Dixon also discussed her various efforts toward rehabilitation. The district judge

denied Dixon’s motion, because Amendment 750 did not result in a change to 

Dixon’s Guidelines range.

On appeal, we vacated and remanded for the district judge to reconsider 

whether Dixon was entitled to a sentence reduction comparable to the reduction 

she received under § 5K1.1. United States v. Dixon, 507 F. App’x 880, 881, 883 

(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We concluded the district judge clearly had erred,

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 3 of 7 
4

when she determined Amendment 750 did not have the effect of reducing Dixon’s 

guideline range. Id. at 883. Had Amendment 750 been in effect at the time of 

Dixon’s sentencing, her total offense level would have been 33, which would have 

yielded a 135-to-168-month Guidelines range. Id. We noted that, on remand, the 

district judge could determine a further reduction below the sentence Dixon 

received for her substantial assistance was not warranted based on the facts of her 

case. Id.

On remand, the district judge again denied Dixon’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. 

The judge noted she was “impressed by and applaud[ed]” Dixon’s “substantial and 

meaningful” post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, and the judge encouraged Dixon

“to remain on a positive path toward reentry.” ROA at 328. The judge

acknowledged Amendment 750 reduced Dixon’s guideline range to 135-168 

months. The judge concluded, however, the facts and circumstances of Dixon’s 

case, including those pertaining to Count 2, warranted a 120-month sentence, 

particularly after considering Dixon’s co-conspirators’ sentences. The judge

further determined a 60-month sentence on Count 1 remained sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a).

On appeal, Dixon argues the district judge erred by failing to consider 

Dixon’s eligibility for both a § 5K1.1 reduction and a reduction based on 

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 4 of 7 
5

Amendment 750. According to Dixon, the denial of her § 3582(c)(2) motion 

dilutes her prior § 5K1.1 reduction and results in inequality between this circuit 

and circuits in which defendants received § 5K1.1 reductions resulting in sentences 

below the mandatory minimums. Dixon also contends she was eligible for a 

sentence reduction based in part on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. 

L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district judge’s decision not to reduce a sentence under 

§ 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mills, 613 F.3d 1070, 1074-

75 (11th Cir. 2010). Under § 3582(c)(2), a judge may modify a term of 

imprisonment that was based on a sentencing range that subsequently has been 

lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The purpose of 

§ 3582(c)(2) is to give a defendant an opportunity to receive the same sentence she 

would have received if the Guidelines that applied at the time of her sentencing 

had been the same as after the amendment. United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 

1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 340 

(11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that eligibility for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction based on 

Amendment 750 turns on whether a defendant “would have had a lower guidelines 

range had Amendment 750 been in effect at the time he was sentenced”).

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 5 of 7 
6

Where a Guidelines amendment reduces a defendant’s Guidelines 

sentencing range, the district judge must decide whether, in light of the § 3553(a) 

factors, the judge should exercise her discretion to impose a newly calculated 

sentence under the amended Guidelines. Hamilton, 715 F.3d at 337. A district 

judge need not articulate specifically the applicability of each § 3553(a) factor, as 

long as the record shows the pertinent factors were taken into account by the judge. 

Id. at 338.

Amendment 750, which re-promulgated Amendment 748, effectively 

reduced the offense levels previously applicable to offenses involving various 

amounts of cocaine base. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 748, 750; compare

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2) (2011) (assigning a base offense level of 36 to offenses 

involving at least 2.8 kilograms but less than 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base), with

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2006) (assigning a base offense level of 38 to offenses 

involving at least 1.5 kilograms but less than 5 kilograms of cocaine base). The 

FSA, which lowered the statutory minimum sentences for various cocaine-base 

offenses, does not apply to defendants who originally were sentenced before its 

August 3, 2010, enactment. United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 

2012) (per curiam).

Dixon has not shown the district judge abused her discretion in denying

Dixon’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See Mills, 613 F.3d at 1074-75. The judge correctly 

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 6 of 7 
7

concluded Amendment 750 lowered Dixon’s guideline range to 135-168 months of 

imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2011). The judge stated she had 

considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the facts and circumstances of Dixon’s 

case, her substantial rehabilitative efforts, and the sentences of her co-conspirators. 

Although the judge did not refer explicitly to Dixon’s substantial assistance, the 

record does not suggest the judge did not consider this factor, given that the 

§ 3582(c)(2) motion was decided by the same district judge, who (1) imposed 

Dixon’s initial sentence and (2) discussed Dixon’s substantial assistance in the 

order denying her 2008 § 3582(c)(2) motion. Dixon has alleged no facts 

supporting her suggestion the denial of the § 3582(c)(2) motion resulted in 

unwarranted disparities between her and other defendants with similar records who 

were convicted of similar conduct, in this or other circuits. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(6) (instructing sentencing judges about “the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 

guilty of similar conduct”).

Finally, Dixon’s argument as to the FSA has no bearing on her case, because

the FSA does not apply to defendants, like Dixon, who initially were sentenced 

before its August 2010 enactment. See Berry, 701 F.3d at 377. Accordingly, we 

affirm the denial of Dixon’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 13-13496 Date Filed: 09/19/2014 Page: 7 of 7