IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0894

Filed September 11, 2015

Amended September 11, 2015

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

JOSEPH MICHAEL HASKOVEC,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa, we find the attorney violated a rule of the Iowa 

Rules of Professional Conduct and publically reprimand the attorney. 

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Patrick W. O’Bryan, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Roger Sutton, Charles City, for respondent.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against an attorney alleging two violations of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct for the attorney having a witness sign a will outside 

the presence of the testator and the other witness and then giving the 

will to the executor to probate without disclosing this fact. A division of 

the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found the 

attorney’s conduct violated two rules and recommended we give him a 

public reprimand. On our de novo review, we find the attorney violated 

only one of our rules. But we nonetheless publicly reprimand the 

attorney for his conduct.

I. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Crum, 861 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 

2015). The Board has the burden to prove violations by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. “ ‘A convincing preponderance of the 

evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 2013)). Lastly, the 

commission’s findings and recommendations are not binding on our 

decision. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 

466, 470 (Iowa 2014). 

The attorney admitted most of the Board’s factual allegations in his 

answer to the complaint. We deem factual matters admitted by an 

attorney in an answer to a complaint established without further 

investigation into the record. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 532. 

In its brief, the Board set forth substantial facts. In his brief, the 

attorney stipulated to most of the facts set forth by the Board. 
3

Stipulations of facts are also binding on the parties. Id. “We interpret 

such stipulations ‘with reference to their subject matter and in light of 

the surrounding circumstances and the whole record, including the state 

of the pleadings and issues involved.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 2011)).

The attorney also stipulated in his brief that he violated two Iowa 

Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged by the Board in its complaint. A 

party’s stipulation as to a violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional 

Conduct does not bind us. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Gailey, 790 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 2010). As we have previously stated,

Nowhere in our rules have we given the parties the authority 

to determine what conduct constitutes a violation of our 

ethical rules or what sanction an attorney should receive for 

such violation. The parties to a disciplinary proceeding 

cannot substitute their judgment as to what conduct 

constitutes a violation of our ethical rules or what sanction 

we should impose for such a violation. The constitution and 

our court rules vest this function solely in our court. 

Accordingly, to allow the parties to make these 

determinations is against the public policy surrounding our 

attorney disciplinary system.

Id. Accordingly, we will not find an attorney violated the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct unless a factual basis exists in the record to 

support such a violation. See id.

II. Findings of Fact.

On our de novo review, we find the following facts. We admitted 

Joseph M. Haskovec to the Iowa bar in 1985. Haskovec currently serves 

as a magistrate for Howard County, a part-time position he has held 

since 2012. Haskovec also has a solo practice in Cresco; however, his 

solo practice makes up only a small portion of his work. Prior to his 

appointment as a magistrate, Haskovec worked part-time as the Howard 

County attorney for twenty-seven years. The events giving rise to the 
4

present complaint occurred while Haskovec was serving as a part-time 

county attorney, but acting as a private practitioner. 

Haskovec is part of a large family, which began feuding decades 

ago. Family members put Haskovec in the middle of this feud when they 

asked him to draft a new will for one of his aunts, Edith Benson. Benson 

had previously executed a will and power of attorney documents in 2005, 

naming her nephew, Kenneth M. Bronner, as the executor of her estate 

and his son, Kenneth R. Bronner, as her power of attorney. 

On July 6, 2010, Haskovec, Benson, and Benson’s sister, Elsie 

Pint, met for two hours at Benson’s home to discuss the provisions of a 

new will, a new power of attorney, and a new durable power of attorney 

for health care decisions. Haskovec and Benson discussed removing 

certain family members from Benson’s will and naming new individuals 

as her power of attorney and durable power of attorney for health care 

decisions. Haskovec, Benson, and Pint also discussed how to change the 

beneficiaries on Benson’s Ameriprise Financial account. Haskovec did 

not change the beneficiaries on this account. Rather, he advised Benson 

to speak with the financial agent on the account to determine the proper 

way to make that change.1

On July 8, Haskovec returned to Benson’s home to execute the 

new documents. She designated new beneficiaries and a new executor.2 

Haskovec and Pint were with Benson when she executed the will, and 

Haskovec signed the will as a witness. For some unknown reason, Pint 

1Ultimately, Pint and Benson did make the change to the beneficiaries on 

Benson’s Ameriprise account, which became the subject of later litigation. 

2The power of attorney and durable power of attorney for health care decisions 

are not at issue in this case. 

 
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did not sign the will as a witness. The will was not a self-proving will 

because Haskovec did not use self-proving wills in his practice.

In early August, Benson’s health began to fail and she entered the 

Cresco hospital. It was at that time other family members discovered the 

changes Haskovec had made to Benson’s will and power of attorney 

documents. The hospital where Benson was admitted notified Benson’s 

great-nephew, Kenneth R., and his wife, Terri Bronner, that other family 

members were trying to move Benson out of her local hospital. After 

learning from family member Susan Randall that Benson had named 

Randall as her new power of attorney and executor under the 2010 

documents, Kenneth R. went to Haskovec’s office to question him about 

the changes to the will. 

When questioned by Kenneth R., Haskovec confirmed he had 

written the new will and other documents executed by Benson. After this 

discussion Haskovec reviewed the will and discovered that Pint, who had 

been present at the execution of the will, did not sign the will as a 

witness. Soon after discovering Pint had not signed the will, Haskovec 

consulted the Iowa Code and noted that for a will to be valid, two 

witnesses must sign it in the presence of the testator and each other. 

See Iowa Code § 633.279(1) (2011). Though Haskovec recognized 

Benson’s will did not meet this requirement, he thought there might be 

some legal argument a probate attorney could make to save the will.3 

Prior to Benson’s death, he sent the will to Arizona for Pint to sign 

the will as a witness. Pint then signed the will pursuant to Haskovec’s 

instructions and returned it to his office.

3At the commission hearing, Haskovec failed to disclose what that argument 

would be.

 
6

On August 26, Benson passed away. In mid-September, Haskovec 

gave the 2010 will to Randall so she could probate it. Haskovec did not 

disclose to Randall the fact that Pint signed the will outside the presence

of himself and the testator. Randall took the will to another attorney, 

Michael Dunbar, so he could open an estate.

After receiving the will, Dunbar sent Haskovec an Affidavit of the 

Subscribing Witness. After receiving the affidavit, Haskovec contacted

Dunbar. Haskovec readily admitted he had sent the will to Pint for her 

signature, as she had not signed it on the same day as he and Benson 

had. He informed Dunbar he would not sign the affidavit because the 

statements in it were not accurate. Dunbar then informed Randall the 

will was invalid and he could not probate it. Another attorney, Brian 

McPhail, ultimately probated the 2005 will.

On October 13, 2014, the Board filed a complaint against 

Haskovec alleging violations of rule 32:4.1(b) (“In the course of 

representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose a 

material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid 

assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is 

prohibited by rule 32:1.6.”) and rule 32:8.4(c) (“It is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”). Iowa Rs. Prof’l Conduct 32:4.1(b), 

32:8.4(c).

The Board, in its hearing brief filed with the commission, argued

Haskovec was representing Randall when he gave her the will and then 

failed to disclose to her the issue with Pint’s signature. However, we find

the Board failed to prove by a convincing preponderance of the evidence 

Randall was Haskovec’s client. Haskovec only gave Randall the will. He 

provided no legal advice to her and did not probate the will for her. We 
7

find the only client Haskovec represented concerning this matter was 

Benson.

The commission found that Haskovec violated rules 32:4.1(b) and 

32:8.4(c). The commission recommends we give Haskovec a public 

reprimand for this conduct rather than a suspension because his 

disclosure to attorney Dunbar “prevented any fraud or dishonesty from 

being perpetrated on the Court or the public.”

III. Ethical Violations.

A. Rule 32:4.1(b). Rule 32:4.1(b) provides: 

In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall 

not knowingly:

. . . .

(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person 

when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 

fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 

rule 32:1.6.

Id. r. 32:4.1(b) (emphasis added).

The plain language requires that, in order for an attorney’s failure 

to disclose a material fact to violate this rule, disclosure must be

necessary for the attorney to avoid assisting his or her client in 

perpetrating a crime or fraud. See id.; see also 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 

et al., The Law of Lawyering § 40.07, at 40-16 (4th ed. 2015) (“[The 

attorney] must have known . . . that the client was indeed engaged in a 

criminal or fraudulent act.”); Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, Iowa 

Practice Series: Lawyer and Judicial Ethics § 8.1(d), at 771 (2015) 

(“Importantly, Rule [32:]4.1(b) is implicated only if the lawyer has become 

involved (presumably unwittingly) in the client’s criminal or fraudulent 

scheme, in such a way that the lawyer would be ‘assisting’ the client by 

remaining silent after discovery of the client’s wrongdoing.”). Here, the 
8

Board did not prove Randall was Haskovec’s client. The record only 

establishes that Haskovec’s client in this matter was Benson. There is 

no evidence in the record Benson was attempting to commit a criminal or 

fraudulent act when Haskovec drafted her will. Haskovec’s act of giving 

the will to Randall, the named executor, after his client had died did not 

assist his deceased client in perpetrating a criminal or fraudulent act.

We have previously found a violation of rule 32:4.1(b) in cases in 

which the attorney’s client engaged in a fraud or crime with the 

attorney’s assistance. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board 

v. Bieber, we found an attorney who assisted his client in 

misrepresenting the actual sales price of real estate in order to obtain a 

cash-back payment from the lender violated rule 32:4.1(b). 824 N.W.2d 

514, 517, 519–20 (Iowa 2012). The client’s conduct in listing the selling 

price as greater than the actual price paid for the property was 

fraudulent; therefore, the lawyer’s drafting and delivering the documents 

knowing they provided false information regarding the price assisted his 

client in fraudulent action. Id. Because he knew his client was providing 

false information, the lawyer had an obligation to disclose the 

misrepresentations to the lender. See id. at 520. 

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Engelmann,

we also found a violation of rule 32:4.1(b). 840 N.W.2d 156, 161–62 

(Iowa 2013). Again, the client falsified information on real estate sales 

paperwork, and the attorney assisted in the client’s fraudulent activity by 

preparing the documents and failing to disclose the fraudulent 

information to his client’s lenders. Id. at 158–59, 161–62. 

Here, there is no evidence Benson, Haskovec’s client, was 

committing a crime or fraud by executing her will. Even though 

Haskovec stipulated that he violated rule 32:4.1(b), we find no factual 
9

basis in this record to support a finding that Haskovec violated rule 

32:4.1(b). Therefore, upon our de novo review, we find Haskovec did not 

violate rule 32:4.1(b).

B. Rule 32:8.4(c). The commission found that by sending the will 

to Pint for her signature after the execution of the will and allowing 

Randall to take the will without informing her of this issue, Haskovec 

violated rule 32:8.4(c). Rule 32:8.4(c) provides “[i]t is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). 

“To violate [rule 32:8.4(c)], a lawyer must act with some level of 

scienter” and not simply negligence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Iowa 2014). An attorney–client 

relationship need not exist between the attorney and the person the 

attorney is dealing with at the time of the attorney’s dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation for an attorney to violate this rule. See

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa

1992) (interpreting DR 1–102(A)(4), the predecessor to rule 32:8.4(c)). An 

attorney may commit a violation of this rule when he or she fails to 

disclose a material fact. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Iowa 2011) (finding a violation of rule 

32:8.4(c) when an attorney failed to inform his client the bankruptcy 

court had terminated his bankruptcy practice). Honesty is necessary for 

the legal profession to function. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Iowa 2002). When dealing with a 

violation of rule 32:8.4(c), the key question we must answer is whether 

the effect of the lawyer’s conduct is to mislead rather than to inform. See

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 

1990) (interpreting DR 1–102(A)(4), the predecessor to rule 32:8.4(c)).
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In regards to the execution of a will, the Iowa Code provides:

All wills and codicils, except as provided in section 633.283, 

to be valid, must be in writing, signed by the testator, or by 

some person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s 

express direction writing the testator’s name thereto, and 

declared by the testator to be the testator’s will, and 

witnessed, at the testator’s request, by two competent 

persons who signed as witnesses in the presence of the 

testator and in the presence of each other; provided, 

however, that the validity of the execution of any will or 

instrument which was executed prior to January 1, 1964, 

shall be determined by the law in effect immediately prior to 

said date.

Iowa Code § 633.279(1).

The attestation clause of Benson’s will mimicked the formal 

requirements for the valid execution of a will contained in section 

633.279(1) and stated:

And now, on this 8th day of July, 2010, the forgoing 

instrument, consisting of two pages including this page, was 

in our presence signed and executed by Edith Benson and 

by her declared to us to be her Last Will and Testament, and 

at her request and in her presence and in the presence of 

each other, we have subscribed our signatures as witnesses 

hereto. 

(Emphasis added.)

Regarding Haskovec’s conduct in having Pint sign the will outside 

the presence of the testator and the witness, the record establishes by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence that Haskovec knew for a will 

to be valid it must be signed by the testator and the witnesses in the 

presence of each other. Haskovec knew when he sent the will for Pint’s 

signature that he was asking her to sign a legal document containing a 

false statement because she would not be signing the will in the presence 

of the testator and the other witness. He intended her to sign the will 

despite the false statement in the attestation clause. He also failed to 

disclose to Pint that her signature might not be valid because she did not 
11

sign it in the presence of the testator and the other witness or that she 

was falsifying a document intended to be filed with the court. 

In regards to Haskovec giving the will to Randall without disclosing 

it did not meet the formal requirements of the Code even though the 

attestation clause stated otherwise, the record establishes by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence Haskovec knew the will was 

not valid, but failed to disclose that fact to Randall. He also knew 

Randall did not ask him to probate the will. Thus, he had to know either 

that Randall was going to ask another attorney to probate an invalid will 

or that she was going to file an invalid will with the court pro se.

We find the evidence establishes by a convincing preponderance of 

the evidence Haskovec’s conduct had the effect to mislead rather than to 

inform. We also find the evidence establishes he had the intent to 

mislead Pint when he asked her to sign the will. Furthermore, he had 

the intent to mislead Randall when he gave her the will without 

disclosing its deficiencies. Accordingly, we agree with the commission 

that Haskovec violated rule 32:8.4(c).

IV. Sanction.

In deciding the proper sanction,

“we consider the nature of the violations, protection of the 

public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the 

lawyer’s fitness to practice, and [the court’s] duty to uphold 

the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public. We 

also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances 

present in the disciplinary action.”

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 726 N.W.2d 397, 408 

(Iowa 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Iversen, 723 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 2006)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we attempt “to achieve 

consistency with our prior cases when determining the proper sanction.” 
12

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 

769 (Iowa 2010). “The goal of our disciplinary system is ‘to maintain 

public confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a policing 

mechanism for poor lawyering.’ ” Id. at 770 (quoting Powell, 726 N.W.2d 

at 408).

We cannot find an Iowa disciplinary case with similar facts. 

However, in a disciplinary case involving an attorney attempting to 

probate a will when he knew the signature of the witness was forged, we 

imposed a sixty-day suspension for the attorney’s violation of rule 

32:8.4(c). Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Liles, 808 N.W.2d 

203, 207 (Iowa 2012). In another case in which an attorney forged a 

judge’s signature on an order that the judge had approved but failed to 

sign and then filed the order with the court, we imposed a public 

reprimand for the attorney’s violation of rule 32:8.4(c). Iowa Supreme Ct.

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Newman, 748 N.W.2d 786, 787, 788–89 (Iowa 

2008). 

We do note, however, that Haskovec did not forge a signature but 

rather sent a document to a witness to sign, which is not as egregious as 

the conduct in either Liles or Newman. Further, Haskovec immediately 

and without hesitation disclosed to Dunbar that Pint did not sign the will 

in the presence of the testator and the other witness without any probing 

by Dunbar or the court. Additionally, Haskovec does not have a prior

disciplinary record and has spent most of his career in public service. 

Lastly, Haskovec’s disclosure to Dunbar came before Dunbar attempted 

to probate the will and, therefore, caused no harm to the courts or the 

public. These all serve as mitigating circumstances.

After considering the nature of Haskovec’s conduct, the mitigating 

circumstances, and the need to protect the public and the reputation of 
13

the bar, we conclude a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for 

Haskovec’s violation of rule 32:8.4(c).

V. Future Stipulations Filed Concerning Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct Violations and Sanctions.

As we previously discussed in this opinion, we are not bound by 

the parties’ stipulations as to whether a violation of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct has occurred or what sanctions ought to be 

imposed. See Gailey, 790 N.W.2d at 804. However, we do find such 

stipulations to be helpful in narrowing the issues and highlighting the 

facts supporting a violation or sanction. Thus, when the parties 

stipulate to a rule violation, the stipulation for each violation must be 

contained in a separate paragraph that includes supporting facts 

sufficient to allow us to find a factual basis for concluding a violation of a 

rule occurred. When the parties stipulate to a sanction, the stipulation 

must be contained in a separate paragraph supported by citations to our 

prior decisions and a discussion as to why our prior decisions support 

such a sanction.

These requirements for stipulations shall apply to all stipulations 

entered into by the parties after the date we file this decision.

VI. Disposition.

For the above reasons, we agree with the recommendation of the 

committee and publicly reprimand Haskovec for his conduct. We tax the 

costs of this proceeding to Haskovec in accordance with Iowa Court Rule 

35.27(1).

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.

All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.